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/proc/modules: honor kptr_restrict even without CONFIG_KALLSYMS

PATCH In review Aleksander Mazur 2 participants 4 messages Jun 5, 2022 – Aug 21, 2023

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 /proc/modules: honor kptr_restrict even without CONFIG_KALLSYMS

Commit e4a8ca3baa55 fixed building without CONFIG_KALLSYMS by providing dummy kallsyms_show_value(). Unfortunately -- due to hard-coded "false" being returned -- access to addresses in /proc/modules became permanently disabled.

My proposal is to change this unconditional "false" to !kptr_restrict. This re-enables addresses in /proc/modules even without CONFIG_KALLSYSMS unless restricted by means of sysctl (kernel.kptr_restrict).

Fixes e4a8ca3baa55 ("/proc/module: fix building without kallsyms")
---
 include/linux/kallsyms.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kallsyms.h +1 -1
index ad39636e0c3f..cf64f9709f46 100644
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static inline int lookup_symbol_attrs(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *size, u
 
 static inline bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	return false;
+	return !kptr_restrict;
 }
 
 static inline int kallsyms_on_each_symbol(int (*fn)(void *, const char *, struct module *,
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
#1 lore raw

Hi,

Have you had a chance to review my patch?

Signature · 2 lines
Dnia 2022-06-05, o godz. 22:43:47
Aleksander Mazur <[email protected]> napisał(a):
Quoted 29 lines

Commit e4a8ca3baa55 fixed building without CONFIG_KALLSYMS by providing dummy kallsyms_show_value(). Unfortunately -- due to hard-coded "false" being returned -- access to addresses in /proc/modules became permanently disabled.

My proposal is to change this unconditional "false" to !kptr_restrict. This re-enables addresses in /proc/modules even without CONFIG_KALLSYSMS unless restricted by means of sysctl (kernel.kptr_restrict).

Fixes e4a8ca3baa55 ("/proc/module: fix building without kallsyms")
---
 include/linux/kallsyms.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kallsyms.h +0 -0
index ad39636e0c3f..cf64f9709f46 100644
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static inline int lookup_symbol_attrs(unsigned long addr,

unsigned long *size, u
static inline bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred) {

include/linux/kallsyms.h +1 -1
-	return false;
+	return !kptr_restrict;
 }
 
 static inline int kallsyms_on_each_symbol(int (*fn)(void *, const char *,

struct module *,

#2 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Aleksander Mazur

Have you had a chance to review my patch?

I don't seem to have the original submission from you.

Quoted 11 lines

Dnia 2022-06-05, o godz. 22:43:47
Aleksander Mazur <[email protected]> napisał(a):

Quoted 8 lines

Commit e4a8ca3baa55 fixed building without CONFIG_KALLSYMS by providing dummy kallsyms_show_value(). Unfortunately -- due to hard-coded "false" being returned -- access to addresses in /proc/modules became permanently disabled.

My proposal is to change this unconditional "false" to !kptr_restrict. This re-enables addresses in /proc/modules even without CONFIG_KALLSYSMS unless restricted by means of sysctl (kernel.kptr_restrict).

I just looked at the original 516fb7f2e73dc ("/proc/module: use the same logic as /proc/kallsyms for address exposure") commit again, the intention here was to use the same logic for /proc/modules and /proc/kallsyms.

I agree that this means my patch went too far, but I'm not sure about yours either. Maybe we can just move kallsyms_show_value() into a different location that is always built and rename it accordingly. Then it can be used by both kallsyms and /proc/modules regardless of which combination of these two is enabled in the kernel.

Arnd

#3 lore raw

Dnia 2023-05-27, o godz. 11:44:35
"Arnd Bergmann" <[email protected]> napisał(a):

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Dnia 2022-06-05, o godz. 22:43:47
Aleksander Mazur <[email protected]> napisał(a):

Quoted 8 lines

Commit e4a8ca3baa55 fixed building without CONFIG_KALLSYMS by providing dummy kallsyms_show_value(). Unfortunately -- due to hard-coded "false" being returned -- access to addresses in /proc/modules became permanently disabled.

My proposal is to change this unconditional "false" to !kptr_restrict. This re-enables addresses in /proc/modules even without CONFIG_KALLSYSMS unless restricted by means of sysctl (kernel.kptr_restrict).

I just looked at the original 516fb7f2e73dc ("/proc/module: use the same logic as /proc/kallsyms for address exposure") commit again, the intention here was to use the same logic for /proc/modules and /proc/kallsyms.

Quoted 7 lines

I agree that this means my patch went too far, but I'm not sure about yours either. Maybe we can just move kallsyms_show_value() into a different location that is always built and rename it accordingly. Then it can be used by both kallsyms and /proc/modules regardless of which combination of these two is enabled in the kernel.

I don't see any reason why should I enable both KALLSYMS and PERF_EVENTS just to see addressess inside /proc/modules.
But this is currently required by the kernel, what in my opinion violates the description of kptr_restrict in Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst.

My patch restores exposing kernel addresses via /proc/modules in the case of kptr_restrict==0 and it doesn't change current behaviour in other cases, especially for kptr_restrict==1; this means that even with my patch applied, the code is still more restrictive than the description of kptr_restrict (because it doesn't make an exception for processes with CAP_SYSLOG). Therefore I cannot agree that my patch goes "too far"; it rather goes just one step in the direction towards compliance with kernel documentation.

Moving kallsyms_show_value() somewhere else and re-using it won't help in my case because that function honors kptr_restrict==0 only if profiling is compiled in and perf_event_paranoid<=1.
BTW. I think this is wrong since according to the docs, perf_event_paranoid "controls use of the performance events system by unprivileged users", while placing restrictions on exposing kernel addresses via /proc should be controlled by kptr_restrict. Or maybe I'm wrong and /proc/modules silently became a part of "the performance events system"?...

Signature · 1 line
Aleksander Mazur