capability: use new capable_or functionality
Subsystems (23)
RFC PATCH 2/2 capability: use new capable_or functionality
Use the new added capable_or macro in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
TODO: split into subsystem patches.
--- block/ioprio.c | 9 +-------- drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/platform/fsl-viu.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 2 +- fs/pipe.c | 2 +- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++-- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- net/unix/scm.c | 2 +- 15 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
block/ioprio.c +1 -8
@@ -37,14 +37,7 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)switch (class) {case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT : -/* -* Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, -* which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security -* modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check -* CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for -* possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission. -*/ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_NICE )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_NICE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; fallthrough;/* rt has prio field too */
drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1 -1
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1 -2
@@ -2569,8 +2569,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1 -2
@@ -1803,8 +1803,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/platform/fsl-viu.c +1 -1
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1 -1
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1 -1
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */
drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1 -1
@@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
fs/pipe.c +1 -1
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user (void ) { -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info (void )
include/linux/capability.h +2 -2
@@ -262,12 +262,12 @@ extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns);static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_or (CAP_PERFMON ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool bpf_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_BPF ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_or (CAP_BPF ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -1
@@ -2243,7 +2243,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) !bpf_capable())return -EPERM ; -if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (is_perfmon_prog_type (type) && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( retval = -EAGAIN ;if (is_ucounts_overlimit (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ))) {if (p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) goto bad_fork_free; } current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;
kernel/sys.c +1 -1
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new)*/ if (is_ucounts_overlimit (new->ucounts,UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC )) && new_user !=INIT_USER && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) current->flags |=PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;else current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;
net/caif/caif_socket.c +1 -1
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
net/unix/scm.c +1 -1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)struct user_struct *user =current_user ();if (unlikely (user->unix_inflight >task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NOFILE ))) -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
RFC PATCH 1/2 capability: add capable_or to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Add the interface capable_or() as an alternative to or multiple capable() calls, like capable_or(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) instead of capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). capable_or() will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.
This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an avc denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g. CAP_SYS_NICE before CAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any avc denial message.
--- include/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
include/linux/capability.h +6 -0
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,extern bool has_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +#define capable_or (...) _capable_or_impl((sizeof((int[]){__VA_ARGS__}) / sizeof(int)), __VA_ARGS__) +extern bool _capable_or_impl (int count, ...);extern bool capable (int cap);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);
@@ -230,6 +232,10 @@ static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, {return true; } +static inline bool capable_or (int first_cap, ...) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool capable (int cap) {return true;
kernel/capability.c +48 -0
54 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
PATCH v2 2/8 capability: use new capable_or functionality
Use the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
--- include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +2 -2
@@ -261,12 +261,12 @@ extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns);static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_or (CAP_PERFMON ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool bpf_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_BPF ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_or (CAP_BPF ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns)
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v2 1/8 capability: add capable_or to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Add the interface capable_or() as an alternative to or multiple capable() calls, like capable_or(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) instead of capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). capable_or() will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.
This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an avc denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g. CAP_SYS_NICE before CAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any avc denial message.
---
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities; capable_or3() can be added later if needed
--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
include/linux/capability.h +5 -0
@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,extern bool has_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +extern bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2);extern bool capable (int cap);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);
@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@ static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, {return true; } +static inline bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool capable (int cap) {return true;
kernel/capability.c +29 -0
@@ -435,6 +435,35 @@ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_setid); +/** +* capable_or - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at one of the two given superior +* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +if (ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap1)) +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap1); + +if (ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap2)) +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap2); + +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap1); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable_or); +/** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @cap: The capability to be tested for
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/8] capability: add capable_or to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Quoted 1 line · Christian Göttsche
Add the interface
capable_or()as an alternative to or multiple
How about 'capable_contains_oneof(x, y)' or 'capable_of_one(a, b)'?
Quoted 52 lines
capable()calls, likecapable_or(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).capable_or()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.
This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an avc denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any avc denial message.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities;capable_or3()can be added later if needed--- include/linux/capability.h | 5 +++++ kernel/capability.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)include/linux/capability.h +5
-0@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,extern bool has_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +extern bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2);extern bool capable (int cap);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@ static inline bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, {return true; } +static inline bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool capable (int cap) {return true;kernel/capability.c +0
-0
kernel/capability.c bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) · line 443
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/capability.c +6
-0@@ -435,6 +435,35 @@ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_setid); +/** +* capable_or - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at one of the two given superior
s/has at one/has at least one/ ?
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/capability.c +10
-0+* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used.
kernel/capability.c bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) · line 463
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/capability.c +10
-0+*/ +bool capable_or (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +if (ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap1)) +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap1); + +if (ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns, cap2)) +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap2); + +return ns_capable (&init_user_ns, cap1);
Hm, too bad about the repetition of work, but I guess it has to be this way right now.
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/capability.c +3
-0+} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable_or); +/** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @cap: The capability to be tested for Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v3 2/8 capability: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
---
v3:
- rename to capable_any()
- simplify checkpoint_restore_ns_capable()
--- include/linux/capability.h | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +3 -4
@@ -266,18 +266,17 @@ extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,extern bool ptracer_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,struct user_namespace *ns);static inline bool perfmon_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_PERFMON ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_any (CAP_PERFMON ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool bpf_capable (void ) { -return capable (CAP_BPF ) ||capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return capable_any (CAP_BPF ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }static inline bool checkpoint_restore_ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns) { -return ns_capable (ns,CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ) || -ns_capable (ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return ns_capable_any (ns,CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
PATCH v3 1/8 capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Add the interfaces capable_any() and ns_capable_any() as an alternative to multiple capable()/ns_capable() calls, like capable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) instead of capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any() will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.
This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g. CAP_SYS_NICE before CAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.
---
v3:
- rename to capable_any()
- fix typo in function documentation
- add ns_capable_any()
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities; capable_or3() can be added later if needed
--- include/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++ kernel/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
include/linux/capability.h +10 -0
@@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool capable (int cap); +extern bool capable_any (int cap1,int cap2);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +extern bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_setid (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);#else
@@ -234,10 +236,18 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool capable_any (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true;
kernel/capability.c +53 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/8] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Quoted 17 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add the interfaces
capable_any()andns_capable_any()as an alternative to multiplecapable()/ns_capable()calls, likecapable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.
CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
Quoted 113 lines
---
v3:
- rename tocapable_any()
- fix typo in function documentation
- addns_capable_any()
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities;capable_or3()can be added later if needed--- include/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++ kernel/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+)include/linux/capability.h +10
-0@@ -208,7 +208,9 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit (struct task_struct *t,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool capable (int cap); +extern bool capable_any (int cap1,int cap2);extern bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap); +extern bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2);extern bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);extern bool ns_capable_setid (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap);#else @@ -234,10 +236,18 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool capable_any (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true; } +static inline bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return true; +}static inline bool ns_capable_noaudit (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap) {return true;kernel/capability.c +53
-0@@ -435,6 +435,59 @@ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_setid); +/** +* ns_capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior +* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2) +{ +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap1)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap1); + +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap2)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap2); + +return ns_capable (ns, cap1); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_any); + +/** +* capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior +* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. +*/ +bool capable_any (int cap1,int cap2) +{ +return ns_capable_any (&init_user_ns, cap1, cap2); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable_any); +/** * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect * @cap: The capability to be tested for Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/8] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Quoted 19 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 17 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add the interfaces
capable_any()andns_capable_any()as an alternative to multiplecapable()/ns_capable()calls, likecapable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.
CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Kindly ping.
So far patch 3 was reviewed [1] and patch 4 was reviewed [2,3] and partially acked [4].
Currently this series trivially rebases on top of 6.0-rc1. Should I send a rebased v4 or what is the best way to move forward?
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/8] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Quoted 25 lines · Christian Göttsche
Quoted 19 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 17 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add the interfaces
capable_any()andns_capable_any()as an alternative to multiplecapable()/ns_capable()calls, likecapable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.
CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Kindly ping.
So far patch 3 was reviewed [1] and patch 4 was reviewed [2,3] and partially acked [4].
Currently this series trivially rebases on top of 6.0-rc1. Should I send a rebased v4 or what is the best way to move forward?
Hi Christian,
Sorry for the delay, this is one of those things that was stalled a bit during the maintainer hand-off. It's on my list of things to look at, it is just unfortunate that we have had a lot of things going on at the LSM layer lately; don't respin it just yet, let me take a quick look first ...
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/8] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
In reply to Christian GöttscheQuoted 32 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add the interfaces
capable_any()andns_capable_any()as an alternative to multiplecapable()/ns_capable()calls, likecapable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.
CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
v3:
- rename tocapable_any()
- fix typo in function documentation
- addns_capable_any()
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities;capable_or3()can be added later if needed--- include/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++ kernel/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
...
Quoted 25 lines
kernel/capability.c +17
-0@@ -435,6 +435,59 @@ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_setid); +/** +* ns_capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior +* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used.
kernel/capability.c bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) · line 464
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/capability.c +10
-0+*/ +bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2) +{ +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap1)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap1); + +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap2)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap2); + +return ns_capable (ns, cap1);
I'm slightly concerned that some people are going to be upset about making an additional call into the capabilities code with this function. I think we need to be a bit more clever here to take out some of the extra work.
I wonder if we create a new capability function, call it ns_capable_audittrue(...) or something like that, that only generates an audit record if the current task has the requested capability; if the current task does not have the requested capability no audit record is generated. With this new function I think we could rewrite ns_capable_any(...) like this:
bool ns_capable_any(ns, cap1, cap2)
{
if (ns_capable_audittrue(ns, cap1))
return true;
if (ns_capable_audittrue(ns, cap2))
return true;
return ns_capable(ns, cap1);
}... we would still have an extra capability check in the failure case, but that's an error case anyway and not likely to draw much concern.
Of course this would require some additional work, meaning a new CAP_OPT_XXX flag (CAP_OPT_AUDITTRUE?), and updates to the individual LSMs. However, the good news here is that it appears only SELinux and AppArmor would need modification (the others don't care about capabilities or audit) and in each case the modification to support the new CAP_OPT_AUDITTRUE flag look pretty simple.
Thoughts?
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/capability.c +2
-0+} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_any);
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/8] capability: add any wrapper to test for multiple caps with exactly one audit message
Quoted 79 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 32 lines · Christian Göttsche
Add the interfaces
capable_any()andns_capable_any()as an alternative to multiplecapable()/ns_capable()calls, likecapable_any(CAP_SYS_NICE, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)instead ofcapable(CAP_SYS_NICE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
capable_any()/ns_capable_any()will in particular generate exactly one audit message, either for the left most capability in effect or, if the task has none, the first one.This is especially helpful with regard to SELinux, where each audit message about a not allowed capability will create an AVC denial. Using this function with the least invasive capability as left most argument (e.g.
CAP_SYS_NICEbeforeCAP_SYS_ADMIN) enables policy writers to only allow the least invasive one and SELinux domains pass this check with only capability:sys_nice or capability:sys_admin allowed without any AVC denial message.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
v3:
- rename tocapable_any()
- fix typo in function documentation
- addns_capable_any()
v2:
avoid varargs and fix to two capabilities;capable_or3()can be added later if needed--- include/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++ kernel/capability.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+)...
Quoted 25 lines
kernel/capability.c +17
-0@@ -435,6 +435,59 @@ bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_setid); +/** +* ns_capable_any - Determine if the current task has one of two superior capabilities in effect +* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in +* @cap1: The capabilities to be tested for first +* @cap2: The capabilities to be tested for secondly +* +* Return true if the current task has at least one of the two given superior +* capabilities currently available for use, false if not. +* +* In contrast to or'ing capable() this call will create exactly one audit +* message, either for @cap1, if it is granted or both are not permitted, +* or @cap2, if it is granted while the other one is not. +* +* The capabilities should be ordered from least to most invasive, i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN last. +* +* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the +* assumption that it's about to be used. kernel/capability.c bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) · line 464
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/capability.c +10
-0+*/ +bool ns_capable_any (struct user_namespace *ns,int cap1,int cap2) +{ +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap1)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap1); + +if (ns_capable_noaudit (ns, cap2)) +return ns_capable (ns, cap2); + +return ns_capable (ns, cap1);I'm slightly concerned that some people are going to be upset about making an additional call into the capabilities code with this function. I think we need to be a bit more clever here to take out some of the extra work.
Quoted 3 lines
I wonder if we create a new capability function, call it
ns_capable_audittrue(...)or something like that, that only generates an audit record if the current task has the requested capability ...
To be clear, when I mean by generating an audit record when true is that the LSMs implementing the security_capable() hook would only call their audit related code when the capability requirement was met, in many cases that will *not* likely generate an audit record, but you get the basic idea I hope. For SELinux this would likely mean modifying cred_has_capability() something like this ...
security/selinux/hooks.c +5 -1
@@ -1581,6 +1581,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,u16 sclass;u32 sid =cred_sid (cred);u32 av =CAP_TO_MASK (cap); +bool audit;int rc; ad.type =LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP ;
@@ -1601,7 +1602,10 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, rc =avc_has_perm_noaudit (&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av,0 , &avd); -if (!(opts &CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT )) { + audit = !(opts &CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT ); +if (opts &CAP_OPT_AUDITTRUE ) + audit = !rc; +if (audit) {int rc2 =avc_audit (&selinux_state, sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);if (rc2)
[There is likely a cleaner patch than the above, this was just mean as a demonstration]
Quoted 28 lines
... if
the current task does not have the requested capability no audit record is generated. With this new function I think we could rewritens_capable_any(...)like this:bool ns_capable_any(ns, cap1, cap2) { if (ns_capable_audittrue(ns, cap1)) return true; if (ns_capable_audittrue(ns, cap2)) return true; return ns_capable(ns, cap1); }... we would still have an extra capability check in the failure case, but that's an error case anyway and not likely to draw much concern.
Of course this would require some additional work, meaning a new
CAP_OPT_XXXflag (CAP_OPT_AUDITTRUE?), and updates to the individual LSMs. However, the good news here is that it appears only SELinux and AppArmor would need modification (the others don't care about capabilities or audit) and in each case the modification to support the newCAP_OPT_AUDITTRUEflag look pretty simple.Thoughts?
Quoted 2 lines
kernel/capability.c +2
-0+} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (ns_capable_any);
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
PATCH v3 3/8 block: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
---
v3:
rename to capable_any()
--- block/ioprio.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
block/ioprio.c +1 -8
@@ -37,14 +37,7 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)switch (class) {case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT : -/* -* Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, -* which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security -* modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check -* CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for -* possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission. -*/ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_NICE )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_NICE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; fallthrough;/* rt has prio field too */
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Re: [PATCH v3 3/8] block: use new capable_any functionality
Quoted 25 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_anyfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.Fixes 94c4b4fd25e6 ("block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT")Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
v3:
rename tocapable_any()--- block/ioprio.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)block/ioprio.c +0
-2@@ -37,14 +37,7 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)switch (class) {case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT : -/* -* Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
block/ioprio.c int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio) · line 43
Quoted 10 lines
block/ioprio.c +1
-6-* which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security -* modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check -* CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for -* possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission. -*/ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_NICE )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_NICE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; fallthrough;/* rt has prio field too */
PATCH v3 4/8 drivers: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
---
v3:
rename to capable_any()
--- drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1 -1
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1 -2
@@ -2567,8 +2567,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1 -2
@@ -1797,8 +1797,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c +1 -1
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1 -1
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1 -1
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */
drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1 -1
@@ -5330,7 +5330,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Re: [PATCH v3 4/8] drivers: use new capable_any functionality
Hi Christian,
Thank you for the patch.
Quoted 6 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_anyfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
Quoted 106 lines
---
v3:
rename tocapable_any()--- drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1
-1@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1
-2@@ -2567,8 +2567,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1
-2@@ -1797,8 +1797,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c +1
-1@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1
-1@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1
-1@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */ drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1
-1@@ -5330,7 +5330,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
Signature · 3 lines
Regards, Laurent Pinchart
PATCH v3 5/8 fs: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
---
v3:
rename to capable_any()
--- fs/pipe.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pipe.c +1 -1
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user (void ) { -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_any (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Christian Brauner
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 5/8] fs: use new capable_any functionality
Quoted 5 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_anyfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
Not seeing the whole patch series so it's a bit difficult to judge but in general we've needed something like this for quite some time.
Quoted 22 lines
v3:
rename tocapable_any()--- fs/pipe.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/pipe.c +1
-1@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user (void ) { -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_any (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info (void )Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
Re: [PATCH v3 5/8] fs: use new capable_any functionality
Quoted 10 lines · Christian Brauner
Quoted 5 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_anyfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
Not seeing the whole patch series so it's a bit difficult to judge but in general we've needed something like this for quite some time.
Full patch series:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/selinux/list/?series=650662
or
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
v3:
rename tocapable_any()--- fs/pipe.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/pipe.c +1
-2@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user (void ) { -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_any (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info (void ) --2.36.1
PATCH v3 6/8 kernel: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
---
v3:
rename to capable_any()
--- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -2104,7 +2104,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( retval = -EAGAIN ;if (is_ucounts_overlimit (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ))) {if (p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + !capable_any (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) goto bad_fork_cleanup_count; } current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
PATCH v3 7/8 bpf: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
---
v3:
rename to capable_any()
--- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -1
@@ -2473,7 +2473,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) !bpf_capable())return -EPERM ; -if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable_any (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (is_perfmon_prog_type (type) && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
PATCH v3 8/8 net: use new capable_any functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_any function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
---
v3:
- rename to capable_any()
- make use of ns_capable_any
--- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- net/core/sock.c | 12 ++++-------- net/ieee802154/socket.c | 6 ++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 3 +-- net/unix/scm.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/caif/caif_socket.c +1 -1
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!capable_any (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
net/core/sock.c +4 -8
@@ -1163,8 +1163,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,case SO_PRIORITY :if ((val >=0 && val <=6 ) || -ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) || -ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +ns_capable_any (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) sk->sk_priority = val;else ret = -EPERM ;
@@ -1309,8 +1308,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,clear_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags);break ;case SO_MARK : -if (!ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) && - !ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { +if (!ns_capable_any (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { ret = -EPERM ;break ; }
@@ -1318,8 +1316,7 @@ int sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,__sock_set_mark (sk, val);break ;case SO_RCVMARK : -if (!ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) && - !ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { +if (!ns_capable_any (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { ret = -EPERM ;break ; }
@@ -2680,8 +2677,7 @@ int __sock_cmsg_send(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct cmsghdr *cmsg,switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {case SO_MARK : -if (!ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) && - !ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!ns_capable_any (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (cmsg->cmsg_len !=CMSG_LEN (sizeof (u32)))return -EINVAL ;
net/ieee802154/socket.c +2 -4
@@ -894,8 +894,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, ro->want_lqi = !!val;break ;case WPAN_SECURITY : -if (!ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN ) && - !ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW )) { +if (!ns_capable_any (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { err = -EPERM ;break ; }
@@ -918,8 +917,7 @@ static int dgram_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, }break ;case WPAN_SECURITY_LEVEL : -if (!ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN ) && - !ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW )) { +if (!ns_capable_any (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { err = -EPERM ;break ; }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -2
@@ -1339,8 +1339,7 @@ static int do_ip_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,break ;case IP_TRANSPARENT : -if (!!val && !ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) && - !ns_capable (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { +if (!!val && !ns_capable_any (sock_net (sk)->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { err = -EPERM ;break ; }
net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +1 -2
@@ -634,8 +634,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,break ;case IPV6_TRANSPARENT : -if (valbool && !ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ) && - !ns_capable (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { +if (valbool && !ns_capable_any (net->user_ns,CAP_NET_RAW ,CAP_NET_ADMIN )) { retv = -EPERM ;break ; }
net/unix/scm.c +1 -1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)struct user_struct *user =current_user ();if (unlikely (user->unix_inflight >task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NOFILE ))) -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_any (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.36.1
PATCH v2 3/8 block: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
--- block/ioprio.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
block/ioprio.c +1 -8
@@ -37,14 +37,7 @@ int ioprio_check_cap(int ioprio)switch (class) {case IOPRIO_CLASS_RT : -/* -* Originally this only checked for CAP_SYS_ADMIN, -* which was implicitly allowed for pid 0 by security -* modules such as SELinux. Make sure we check -* CAP_SYS_ADMIN first to avoid a denial/avc for -* possibly missing CAP_SYS_NICE permission. -*/ -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_NICE )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_NICE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; fallthrough;/* rt has prio field too */
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v2 4/8 drivers: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
--- drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1 -1
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1 -2
@@ -2569,8 +2569,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1 -2
@@ -1798,8 +1798,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c +1 -1
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */
drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1 -1
@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1 -1
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */
drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1 -1
@@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] drivers: use new capable_or functionality
Quoted 9 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_orfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>---
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +-
For the above:
Quoted 95 lines
7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1
-1@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1
-2@@ -2569,8 +2569,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1
-2@@ -1798,8 +1798,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c +1
-1@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1
-1@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1
-1@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */ drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1
-1@@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
Signature · 2 lines
js suse labs
Re: [PATCH v2 4/8] drivers: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheQuoted 5 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_orfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c | 2 +- drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c | 3 +-- drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c | 2 +- drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c | 2 +-
For the media drivers:
Regards,
Hans
Quoted 97 lines
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 2 +- drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)drivers/media/common/saa7146/saa7146_video.c +1
-1@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh, const struct v4l2_framebufDEB_EE ("VIDIOC_S_FBUF\n" ); -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +1
-2@@ -2569,8 +2569,7 @@ static int bttv_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,const struct bttv_format *fmt;int retval; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-video.c +1
-2@@ -1798,8 +1798,7 @@ static int saa7134_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *f,struct saa7134_dev *dev =video_drvdata (file);struct saa7134_format *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/platform/nxp/fsl-viu.c +1
-1@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ static int vidioc_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *priv, const struct v4l2_framebconst struct v4l2_framebuffer *fb = arg;struct viu_fmt *fmt; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* check args */ drivers/media/test-drivers/vivid/vivid-vid-cap.c +1
-1@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ int vivid_vid_cap_s_fbuf(struct file *file, void *fh,if (dev->multiplanar)return -ENOTTY ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (dev->overlay_cap_owner)drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +1
-1@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)/* No write no play */ if (tty->ops->write ==NULL )return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* release devices to avoid name collision */ drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c +1
-1@@ -5319,7 +5319,7 @@ static int dasd_symm_io(struct dasd_device *device, void __user *argp)char psf0, psf1;int rc; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EACCES ; psf0 = psf1 =0 ;
PATCH v2 5/8 fs: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
--- fs/pipe.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pipe.c +1 -1
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(unsigned long user_bufs)bool pipe_is_unprivileged_user (void ) { -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); }struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v2 6/8 kernel: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
--- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -2098,7 +2098,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( retval = -EAGAIN ;if (is_ucounts_overlimit (task_ucounts (p),UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC ,rlimit (RLIMIT_NPROC ))) {if (p->real_cred->user !=INIT_USER && - !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) + !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) goto bad_fork_cleanup_count; } current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v2 7/8 kernel/bpf: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
--- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +1 -1
@@ -2249,7 +2249,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) !bpf_capable())return -EPERM ; -if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +if (is_net_admin_prog_type (type) && !capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;if (is_perfmon_prog_type (type) && !perfmon_capable ())return -EPERM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
PATCH v2 8/8 net: use new capable_or functionality
In reply to Christian GöttscheUse the new added capable_or function in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.
Reorder CAP_SYS_ADMIN last.
--- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- net/unix/scm.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/caif/caif_socket.c +1 -1
@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use.
net/unix/scm.c +1 -1
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)struct user_struct *user =current_user ();if (unlikely (user->unix_inflight >task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NOFILE ))) -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Re: [PATCH v2 8/8] net: use new capable_or functionality
Quoted 6 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_orfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>
Thanks, for 2-8:
though I'd still like to talk about the name :)
Quoted 33 lines
--- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- net/unix/scm.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/caif/caif_socket.c +1
-1@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use. net/unix/scm.c +1
-1@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)struct user_struct *user =current_user ();if (unlikely (user->unix_inflight >task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NOFILE ))) -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );return false; }Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 8/8] net: use new capable_or functionality
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 5 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_orfunction in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>Thanks, for 2-8:
Reviewed-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>though I'd still like to talk about the name :)
Just checking in - is this being discussed elsewhere?
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines
--- net/caif/caif_socket.c | 2 +- net/unix/scm.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/caif/caif_socket.c +1
-1@@ -1036,7 +1036,7 @@ static int caif_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, .usersize = sizeof_field(struct caifsock, conn_req.param) }; -if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +if (!capable_or (CAP_NET_ADMIN ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;/* * The sock->type specifies the socket type to use. net/unix/scm.c +1
-1@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)struct user_struct *user =current_user ();if (unlikely (user->unix_inflight >task_rlimit (p,RLIMIT_NOFILE ))) -return !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ); +return !capable_or (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );return false; }Signature · 1 line
2.36.0
Quoted 7 lines · Christian Göttsche
Use the new added
capable_ormacro in appropriate cases, where a task is required to have any of two capabilities.Reorder
CAP_SYS_ADMINlast.TODO: split into subsystem patches.
Yes. Please.
The bpf side picked the existing order because we were aware of that selinux issue.
Looks like there is no good order that works for all. So the new helper makes a lot of sense.
Quoted 1 line
Fixes 94c4b4fd25e6 ("block: Check ADMIN before NICE for IOPRIO_CLASS_RT")