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4.14.285-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 4 participants 241 messages Jun 23, 2022 – Jun 25, 2022 Page 3 of 3

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author maintainer
#217 lore raw

PATCH 217/237 comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ian Abbott <[email protected]>

commit 242439f7e279d86b3f73b5de724bc67b2f8aeb07 upstream.

The expression for setting the size of the allocated bulk TX buffer (devpriv->usb_tx_buf) is calling usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), which is using the wrong endpoint (should be devpriv->ep_tx). Fix it.

Fixes a23461c47482 ("comedi: vmk80xx: fix transfer-buffer overflow")
Cc Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c +1 -1
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static int vmk80xx_alloc_usb_buffers(str
 	if (!devpriv->usb_rx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
+	size = max(usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx), MIN_BUF_SIZE);
 	devpriv->usb_tx_buf = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!devpriv->usb_tx_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#218 lore raw

PATCH 218/237 USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Slark Xiao <[email protected]>

commit 158f7585bfcea4aae0ad4128d032a80fec550df1 upstream.

Adding support for Cinterion device MV31 with Qualcomm new baseline. Use different PIDs to separate it from previous base line products.
All interfaces settings keep same as previous.

Below is test evidence:

T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#=  6 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b8 Rev=04.14
S:  Manufacturer=Cinterion
S:  Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B8 USB Mobile Broadband
S:  SerialNumber=90418e79
C:  #Ifs= 6 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=02(commc) Sub=0e Prot=00 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 1 #EPs= 2 Cls=0a(data ) Sub=00 Prot=02 Driver=cdc_mbim
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 1 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=ff Driver=(none)
I:  If#=0x4 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x5 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option
T:  Bus=03 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=00 Cnt=01 Dev#=  7 Spd=480 MxCh= 0
D:  Ver= 2.10 Cls=ef(misc ) Sub=02 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs=  1
P:  Vendor=1e2d ProdID=00b9 Rev=04.14
S:  Manufacturer=Cinterion
S:  Product=Cinterion PID 0x00B9 USB Mobile Broadband
S:  SerialNumber=90418e79
C:  #Ifs= 4 Cfg#= 1 Atr=a0 MxPwr=500mA
I:  If#=0x0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=50 Driver=qmi_wwan
I:  If#=0x1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=40 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x2 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=60 Driver=option
I:  If#=0x3 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=ff Prot=30 Driver=option

For PID 00b8, interface 3 is GNSS port which don't use serial driver.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +6 -0
@@ -435,6 +435,8 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_CLS8			0x00b0
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_MBIM		0x00b3
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET		0x00b7
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM		0x00b8
+#define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET		0x00b9
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA		0x00f1
 #define CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB		0x00f2
 
@@ -1982,6 +1984,10 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_RMNET, 0xff),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_MBIM, 0xff),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV31_2_RMNET, 0xff),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(0)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WA, 0xff),
 	  .driver_info = RSVD(3)},
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(CINTERION_VENDOR_ID, CINTERION_PRODUCT_MV32_WB, 0xff),
author maintainer
#219 lore raw

PATCH 219/237 USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Robert Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 908e698f2149c3d6a67d9ae15c75545a3f392559 upstream.

Add support for Agilent E5805A (rebranded ION Edgeport/4) to io_ti.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c      |    2 ++
 drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c +2 -0
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id edgepo
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_8S) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_TI_EDGEPORT_416B) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ION, ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A) },
 	{ }
 };
 
drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h +1 -0
@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@
 //
 // Definitions for other product IDs
 #define ION_DEVICE_ID_MT4X56USB			0x1403	// OEM device
+#define ION_DEVICE_ID_E5805A			0x1A01  // OEM device (rebranded Edgeport/4)
 
 
 #define	GENERATION_ID_FROM_USB_PRODUCT_ID(ProductId)				\
author maintainer
#220 lore raw

PATCH 220/237 usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>

commit 3755278f078460b021cd0384562977bf2039a57a upstream.

usb_create_hcd will alloc memory for hcd, and we should call usb_put_hcd to free it when platform_get_resource() fails to prevent memory leak.
goto error2 label instead error1 to fix this.

Fixes 856e6e8e0f93 ("usb: dwc2: check return value after calling platform_get_resource()")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc2/hcd.c +1 -1
@@ -5231,7 +5231,7 @@ int dwc2_hcd_init(struct dwc2_hsotg *hso
 	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	if (!res) {
 		retval = -EINVAL;
-		goto error1;
+		goto error2;
 	}
 	hcd->rsrc_start = res->start;
 	hcd->rsrc_len = resource_size(res);
author maintainer
#221 lore raw

PATCH 221/237 usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>

commit 4757c9ade34178b351580133771f510b5ffcf9c8 upstream.

of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak. of_node_put() will check NULL pointer.

Fixes 24a28e428351 ("USB: gadget driver for LPC32xx")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c +1 -0
@@ -3034,6 +3034,7 @@ static int lpc32xx_udc_probe(struct plat
 	}
 
 	udc->isp1301_i2c_client = isp1301_get_client(isp1301_node);
+	of_node_put(isp1301_node);
 	if (!udc->isp1301_i2c_client) {
 		retval = -EPROBE_DEFER;
 		goto phy_fail;
author maintainer
#222 lore raw

PATCH 222/237 serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>

commit be03b0651ffd8bab69dfd574c6818b446c0753ce upstream.

Not all LSR register flags are preserved across reads. Therefore, LSR readers must store the non-preserved bits into lsr_save_flags.

This fix was initially mixed into feature commit f6f586102add ("serial:
8250: Handle UART without interrupt on TEMT using em485"). However, that feature change had a flaw and it was reverted to make room for simpler approach providing the same feature. The embedded fix got reverted with the feature change.

Re-add the lsr_save_flags fix and properly mark it's a fix.

---
 drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c +2 -0
@@ -1524,6 +1524,8 @@ static inline void __stop_tx(struct uart
 
 	if (em485) {
 		unsigned char lsr = serial_in(p, UART_LSR);
+		p->lsr_saved_flags |= lsr & LSR_SAVE_FLAGS;
+
 		/*
 		 * To provide required timeing and allow FIFO transfer,
 		 * __stop_tx_rs485() must be called only when both FIFO and
author maintainer
#223 lore raw

PATCH 223/237 ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit a08f789d2ab5242c07e716baf9a835725046be89 upstream.

Hulk Robot reported a BUG_ON:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:3211!
[...]

RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used.cold+0x85/0x136f
[...]
Call Trace:
 ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x9df/0x5d30
 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1803/0x4d80
 ext4_map_blocks+0x3a4/0x1a10
 ext4_writepages+0x126d/0x2c30
 do_writepages+0x7f/0x1b0
 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x285/0x3b0
 file_write_and_wait_range+0xb1/0x140
 ext4_sync_file+0x1aa/0xca0
 vfs_fsync_range+0xfb/0x260
 do_fsync+0x48/0xa0

[...]
==================================================================

Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
do_fsync
vfs_fsync_range
ext4_sync_file
file_write_and_wait_range

    __filemap_fdatawrite_range
     do_writepages
      ext4_writepages
       mpage_map_and_submit_extent
        mpage_map_one_extent
         ext4_map_blocks
          ext4_mb_new_blocks
           ext4_mb_normalize_request
            >>> start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical
           ext4_mb_regular_allocator
            ext4_mb_simple_scan_group
             ext4_mb_use_best_found
              ext4_mb_new_preallocation
               ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
                ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
                 >>> set ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0
           ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used
            >>> BUG_ON(ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len <= 0);

we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:

	`fallocate -l100M disk`
	`mkfs.ext4 -b 1024 -g 256 disk`
	`mount disk /mnt`
	`fsstress -d /mnt -l 0 -n 1000 -p 1`

The size must be smaller than or equal to EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP. Therefore, "start + size <= ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical" may occur when the size is truncated. So start should be the start position of the group where ac_o_ex.fe_logical is located after alignment. In addition, when the value of fe_logical or EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP is very large, the value calculated by start_off is more accurate.

---
 fs/ext4/mballoc.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/mballoc.c +9 -0
@@ -3197,6 +3197,15 @@ ext4_mb_normalize_request(struct ext4_al
 	size = size >> bsbits;
 	start = start_off >> bsbits;
 
+	/*
+	 * For tiny groups (smaller than 8MB) the chosen allocation
+	 * alignment may be larger than group size. Make sure the
+	 * alignment does not move allocation to a different group which
+	 * makes mballoc fail assertions later.
+	 */
+	start = max(start, rounddown(ac->ac_o_ex.fe_logical,
+			(ext4_lblk_t)EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(ac->ac_sb)));
+
 	/* don't cover already allocated blocks in selected range */
 	if (ar->pleft && start <= ar->lleft) {
 		size -= ar->lleft + 1 - start;
author maintainer
#224 lore raw

PATCH 224/237 ext4: make variable "count" signed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ding Xiang <[email protected]>

commit bc75a6eb856cb1507fa907bf6c1eda91b3fef52f upstream.

Since dx_make_map() may return -EFSCORRUPTED now, so change "count" to be a signed integer so we can correctly check for an error code returned by dx_make_map().

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/namei.c +2 -1
@@ -1724,7 +1724,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *do_split
 			struct dx_hash_info *hinfo)
 {
 	unsigned blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
-	unsigned count, continued;
+	unsigned continued;
+	int count;
 	struct buffer_head *bh2;
 	ext4_lblk_t newblock;
 	u32 hash2;
author maintainer
#225 lore raw

PATCH 225/237 ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Yi <[email protected]>

commit b55c3cd102a6f48b90e61c44f7f3dda8c290c694 upstream.

We capture a NULL pointer issue when resizing a corrupt ext4 image which is freshly clear resize_inode feature (not run e2fsck). It could be simply reproduced by following steps. The problem is because of the resize_inode feature was cleared, and it will convert the filesystem to meta_bg mode in ext4_resize_fs(), but the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks was not reduced to zero, so could we mistakenly call reserve_backup_gdb() and passing an uninitialized resize_inode to it when adding new group descriptors.

mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda 3G
tune2fs -O ^resize_inode /dev/sda #forget to run requested e2fsck mount /dev/sda /mnt
resize2fs /dev/sda 8G

========

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028
 CPU: 19 PID: 3243 Comm: resize2fs Not tainted 5.18.0-rc7-00001-gfde086c5ebfd #748
 ...
 RIP: 0010:ext4_flex_group_add+0xe08/0x2570
 ...
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ext4_resize_fs+0xbec/0x1660
  __ext4_ioctl+0x1749/0x24e0
  ext4_ioctl+0x12/0x20
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa6/0x110
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
 RIP: 0033:0x7f2dd739617b
 ========

The fix is simple, add a check in ext4_resize_begin() to make sure that the es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks is zero when the resize_inode feature is disabled.

---
 fs/ext4/resize.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/resize.c +10 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ int ext4_resize_begin(struct super_block
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
+	 * If the reserved GDT blocks is non-zero, the resize_inode feature
+	 * should always be set.
+	 */
+	if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks &&
+	    !ext4_has_feature_resize_inode(sb)) {
+		ext4_error(sb, "resize_inode disabled but reserved GDT blocks non-zero");
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	}
+
+	/*
 	 * If we are not using the primary superblock/GDT copy don't resize,
          * because the user tools have no way of handling this.  Probably a
          * bad time to do it anyways.
author maintainer
#226 lore raw

PATCH 226/237 virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Murilo Opsfelder Araujo <[email protected]>

commit 7e415282b41bf0d15c6e0fe268f822d9b083f2f7 upstream.

GCC 12 enhanced -Waddress when comparing array address to null [0], which warns:

    drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c: In function ‘vp_del_vqs’:
    drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c:257:29: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘true’ for the pointer operand in ‘vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks + (sizetype)((long unsigned int)i * 256)’ must not be NULL [-Waddress]
      257 |                         if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
          |                             ^~~~~~

In fact, the verification is comparing the result of a pointer arithmetic, the address "msix_affinity_masks + i", which will always evaluate to true.

Under the hood, free_cpumask_var() calls kfree(), which is safe to pass NULL, not requiring non-null verification. So remove the verification to make compiler happy (happy compiler, happy life).

[0] https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102103

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/virtio/virtio_pci_common.c +1 -2
@@ -256,8 +256,7 @@ void vp_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vd
 
 	if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks) {
 		for (i = 0; i < vp_dev->msix_vectors; i++)
-			if (vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i])
-				free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
+			free_cpumask_var(vp_dev->msix_affinity_masks[i]);
 	}
 
 	if (vp_dev->msix_enabled) {
author maintainer
#227 lore raw

PATCH 227/237 l2tp: dont use inet_shutdown on ppp session destroy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Chapman <[email protected]>

commit 225eb26489d05c679a4c4197ffcb81c81e9dcaf4 upstream.

Previously, if a ppp session was closed, we called inet_shutdown to mark the socket as unconnected such that userspace would get errors and then close the socket. This could race with userspace closing the socket. Instead, leave userspace to close the socket in its own time (our session will be detached anyway).

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_shutdown+0x5d/0x1c0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff880010ea3ac0 by task syzbot_347bd5ac/8296

CPU: 3 PID: 8296 Comm: syzbot_347bd5ac Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #91
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x101/0x157
 ? inet_shutdown+0x5d/0x1c0
 print_address_description+0x78/0x260
 ? inet_shutdown+0x5d/0x1c0
 kasan_report+0x240/0x360
 __asan_load4+0x78/0x80
 inet_shutdown+0x5d/0x1c0
 ? pppol2tp_show+0x80/0x80
 pppol2tp_session_close+0x68/0xb0
 l2tp_tunnel_closeall+0x199/0x210
 ? udp_v6_flush_pending_frames+0x90/0x90
 l2tp_udp_encap_destroy+0x6b/0xc0
 ? l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x2e0/0x2e0
 udpv6_destroy_sock+0x8c/0x90
 sk_common_release+0x47/0x190
 udp_lib_close+0x15/0x20
 inet_release+0x85/0xd0
 inet6_release+0x43/0x60
 sock_release+0x53/0x100
 ? sock_alloc_file+0x260/0x260
 sock_close+0x1b/0x20
 __fput+0x19f/0x380
 ____fput+0x1a/0x20
 task_work_run+0xd2/0x110
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x18d/0x190
 do_syscall_64+0x389/0x3b0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b
RIP: 0033:0x7fe240a45259
RSP: 002b:00007fe241132df8 EFLAGS: 00000297 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe240a45259
RDX: 00007fe240a45259 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000000a5
RBP: 00007fe241132e20 R08: 00007fe241133700 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007fe241133700 R11: 0000000000000297 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc49aff84f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007fe241141040

Allocated by task 8331:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0
 kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x144/0x3e0
 sock_alloc_inode+0x22/0x130
 alloc_inode+0x3d/0xf0
 new_inode_pseudo+0x1c/0x90
 sock_alloc+0x30/0x110
 __sock_create+0xaa/0x4c0
 SyS_socket+0xbe/0x130
 do_syscall_64+0x128/0x3b0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b

Freed by task 8314:
 save_stack+0x43/0xd0
 __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
 kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x2b0
 sock_destroy_inode+0x49/0x50
 destroy_inode+0x77/0xb0
 evict+0x285/0x340
 iput+0x429/0x530
 dentry_unlink_inode+0x28c/0x2c0
 __dentry_kill+0x1e3/0x2f0
 dput.part.21+0x500/0x560
 dput+0x24/0x30
 __fput+0x2aa/0x380
 ____fput+0x1a/0x20
 task_work_run+0xd2/0x110
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x18d/0x190
 do_syscall_64+0x389/0x3b0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b
Fixes fd558d186df2c ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts")
Cc Lee Jones <[email protected]>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c |   10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +0 -10
@@ -439,16 +439,6 @@ abort:
  */
 static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
 {
-	struct sock *sk;
-
-	BUG_ON(session->magic != L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC);
-
-	sk = pppol2tp_session_get_sock(session);
-	if (sk) {
-		if (sk->sk_socket)
-			inet_shutdown(sk->sk_socket, SEND_SHUTDOWN);
-		sock_put(sk);
-	}
 }
 
 /* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if
author maintainer
#228 lore raw

PATCH 228/237 l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Chapman <[email protected]>

commit d02ba2a6110c530a32926af8ad441111774d2893 upstream.

pppol2tp_release uses call_rcu to put the final ref on its socket. But the session object doesn't hold a ref on the session socket so may be freed while the pppol2tp_put_sk RCU callback is scheduled. Fix this by having the session hold a ref on its socket until the session is destroyed. It is this ref that is dropped via call_rcu.

Sessions are also deleted via l2tp_tunnel_closeall. This must now also put the final ref via call_rcu. So move the call_rcu call site into pppol2tp_session_close so that this happens in both destroy paths. A common destroy path should really be implemented, perhaps with l2tp_tunnel_closeall calling l2tp_session_delete like pppol2tp_release does, but this will be looked at later.

ODEBUG: activate active (active state 1) object type: rcu_head hint: (null)

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 13407 at lib/debugobjects.c:291 debug_print_object+0x166/0x220
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 13407 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #38
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x166/0x220
RSP: 0018:ffff880013647a00 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ffffffff814d3333
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff88001a59f6d0
RBP: ffff880013647a40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff8800136479a8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffffff86161420 R14: ffffffff85648b60 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001a580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000006022000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
 debug_object_activate+0x38b/0x530
 ? debug_object_assert_init+0x3b0/0x3b0
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x85/0x8b0
 ? pppol2tp_session_destruct+0x110/0x110
 __call_rcu.constprop.66+0x39/0x890
 ? __call_rcu.constprop.66+0x39/0x890
 call_rcu_sched+0x17/0x20
 pppol2tp_release+0x2c7/0x440
 ? fcntl_setlk+0xca0/0xca0
 ? sock_alloc_file+0x340/0x340
 sock_release+0x92/0x1e0
 sock_close+0x1b/0x20
 __fput+0x296/0x6e0
 ____fput+0x1a/0x20
 task_work_run+0x127/0x1a0
 do_exit+0x7f9/0x2ce0
 ? SYSC_connect+0x212/0x310
 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x690/0x690
 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0
 do_group_exit+0x10d/0x330
 ? do_group_exit+0x330/0x330
 SyS_exit_group+0x22/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730
 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
RIP: 0033:0x7f362e471259
RSP: 002b:00007ffe389abe08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f362e471259
RDX: 00007f362e471259 RSI: 000000000000002e RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007ffe389abe30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f362e944270
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60
R13: 00007ffe389abf50 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 8d 3c dd a0 8f 64 85 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 7b 48 8b 14 dd a0 8f 64 85 4c 89 f6 48 c7 c7 20 85 64 85 e

8 2a 55 14 ff <0f> 0b 83 05 ad 2a 68 04 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41

Fixes ee40fb2e1eb5b ("l2tp: protect sock pointer of struct pppol2tp_session with RCU")
Cc Lee Jones <[email protected]>
---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c +27 -25
@@ -435,10 +435,28 @@ abort:
  * Session (and tunnel control) socket create/destroy.
  *****************************************************************************/
 
+static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
+	ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
+	sock_put(ps->__sk);
+}
+
 /* Called by l2tp_core when a session socket is being closed.
  */
 static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
 {
+	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
+	ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+	mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+	ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+					     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
+	RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
+	if (ps->__sk)
+		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
+	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
 }
 
 /* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if
@@ -458,14 +476,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_session_destruct(st
 	}
 }
 
-static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_head *head)
-{
-	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
-	ps = container_of(head, typeof(*ps), rcu);
-	sock_put(ps->__sk);
-}
-
 /* Called when the PPPoX socket (session) is closed.
  */
 static int pppol2tp_release(struct socket *sock)
@@ -489,26 +499,17 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socke
 	sock_orphan(sk);
 	sock->sk = NULL;
 
+	/* If the socket is associated with a session,
+	 * l2tp_session_delete will call pppol2tp_session_close which
+	 * will drop the session's ref on the socket.
+	 */
 	session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
-
-	if (session != NULL) {
-		struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
+	if (session) {
 		l2tp_session_delete(session);
-
-		ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-		mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
-		ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
-						     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
-		RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
-		mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
-		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
-
-		/* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
-		 * dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
-		 * The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
-		 */
+		/* drop the ref obtained by pppol2tp_sock_to_session */
+		sock_put(sk);
 	}
+
 	release_sock(sk);
 
 	/* This will delete the session context via
@@ -820,6 +821,7 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
 
 out_no_ppp:
 	/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
+	sock_hold(sk);
 	sk->sk_user_data = session;
 	rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
 	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
author maintainer
#229 lore raw

PATCH 229/237 s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>

commit 3ae11dbcfac906a8c3a480e98660a823130dc16a upstream.

The switch to a keyed guest does not require a classic sske as the other guest CPUs are not accessing the key before the switch is complete. By using the NQ SSKE things are faster especially with multiple guests.

---
 arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c +1 -1
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void ptep_zap_key(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	pgste_val(pgste) |= PGSTE_GR_BIT | PGSTE_GC_BIT;
 	ptev = pte_val(*ptep);
 	if (!(ptev & _PAGE_INVALID) && (ptev & _PAGE_WRITE))
-		page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 1);
+		page_set_storage_key(ptev & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_DEFAULT_KEY, 0);
 	pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
 	preempt_enable();
 }
author maintainer
#230 lore raw

PATCH 230/237 usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC address

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marian Postevca <[email protected]>

commit b337af3a4d6147000b7ca6b3438bf5c820849b37 upstream.

In systemd systems setting a fixed MAC address through the "dev_addr" module argument fails systematically. When checking the MAC address after the interface is created it always has the same but different MAC address to the one supplied as argument.

This is partially caused by systemd which by default will set an internally generated permanent MAC address for interfaces that are marked as having a randomly generated address.

Commit 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase") didn't take into account the fact that the interface must be marked as having a set MAC address when it's set as module argument.

Fixed by marking the interface with NET_ADDR_SET when the "dev_addr" module argument is supplied.

Fixes 890d5b40908bfd1a ("usb: gadget: u_ether: fix race in setting MAC address in setup phase")
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c |   11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c +9 -2
@@ -776,9 +776,13 @@ struct eth_dev *gether_setup_name(struct
 	dev->qmult = qmult;
 	snprintf(net->name, sizeof(net->name), "%s%%d", netname);
 
-	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr))
+	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, net->dev_addr)) {
+		net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
 		dev_warn(&g->dev,
 			"using random %s ethernet address\n", "self");
+	} else {
+		net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
+	}
 	if (get_ether_addr(host_addr, dev->host_mac))
 		dev_warn(&g->dev,
 			"using random %s ethernet address\n", "host");
@@ -835,6 +839,9 @@ struct net_device *gether_setup_name_def
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->tx_reqs);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->rx_reqs);
 
+	/* by default we always have a random MAC address */
+	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
+
 	skb_queue_head_init(&dev->rx_frames);
 
 	/* network device setup */
@@ -872,7 +879,6 @@ int gether_register_netdev(struct net_de
 	g = dev->gadget;
 
 	memcpy(net->dev_addr, dev->dev_mac, ETH_ALEN);
-	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_RANDOM;
 
 	status = register_netdev(net);
 	if (status < 0) {
@@ -912,6 +918,7 @@ int gether_set_dev_addr(struct net_devic
 	if (get_ether_addr(dev_addr, new_addr))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	memcpy(dev->dev_mac, new_addr, ETH_ALEN);
+	net->addr_assign_type = NET_ADDR_SET;
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gether_set_dev_addr);
author maintainer
#231 lore raw

PATCH 231/237 xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

commit 912288442cb2f431bf3c8cb097a5de83bc6dbac1 upstream.

Currently the header size calculations are using an assignment operator instead of a += operator when accumulating the header size leading to incorrect sizes. Fix this by using the correct operator.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")

Fixes 302d3deb2068 ("xprtrdma: Prevent inline overflow")
[bwh: Backported to 4.14: adjust context]
---
 net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c +2 -2
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_call_hea
 
 	/* Maximum Read list size */
 	maxsegs += 2;	/* segment for head and tail buffers */
-	size = maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
+	size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_read_chunk);
 
 	/* Minimal Read chunk size */
 	size += sizeof(__be32);	/* segment count */
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static unsigned int rpcrdma_max_reply_he
 
 	/* Maximum Write list size */
 	maxsegs += 2;	/* segment for head and tail buffers */
-	size = sizeof(__be32);		/* segment count */
+	size += sizeof(__be32);		/* segment count */
 	size += maxsegs * sizeof(struct rpcrdma_segment);
 	size += sizeof(__be32);	/* list discriminator */
 
author maintainer
#232 lore raw

PATCH 232/237 tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit c579bd1b4021c42ae247108f1e6f73dd3f08600c upstream.

Even when implementing RFC 6056 3.3.4 (Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm), a patient attacker could still be able to collect enough state from an otherwise idle host.

Idea of this patch is to inject some noise, in the cases __inet_hash_connect() found a candidate in the first attempt.

This noise should not significantly reduce the collision avoidance, and should be zero if connection table is already well used.

Note that this is not implementing RFC 6056 3.3.5
because we think Algorithm 5 could hurt typical
workloads.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +5 -0
@@ -694,6 +694,11 @@ next_port:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 ok:
+	/* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate
+	 * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise.
+	 */
+	if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16))
+		i = 2;
 	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
 
 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
author maintainer
#233 lore raw

PATCH 233/237 tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit 9e9b70ae923baf2b5e8a0ea4fd0c8451801ac526 upstream.

Amit Klein suggests that we use different parts of port_offset for the table's index and the port offset so that there is no direct relation between them.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +1 -1
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time
 	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
 	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
 
-	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
+	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
 	offset %= remaining;
 
 	/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
author maintainer
#234 lore raw

PATCH 234/237 tcp: add small random increments to the source port

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit ca7af0402550f9a0b3316d5f1c30904e42ed257d upstream.

Here we're randomly adding between 0 and 7 random increments to the selected source port in order to add some noise in the source port selection that will make the next port less predictable.

With the default port range of 32768-60999 this means a worst case reuse scenario of 14116/8=1764 connections between two consecutive uses of the same port, with an average of 14116/4.5=3137. This code was stressed at more than 800000 connections per second to a fixed target with all connections closed by the client using RSTs (worst condition) and only 2 connections failed among 13 billion, despite the hash being reseeded every 10 seconds, indicating a perfectly safe situation.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +5 -4
@@ -694,11 +694,12 @@ next_port:
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 ok:
-	/* If our first attempt found a candidate, skip next candidate
-	 * in 1/16 of cases to add some noise.
+	/* Here we want to add a little bit of randomness to the next source
+	 * port that will be chosen. We use a max() with a random here so that
+	 * on low contention the randomness is maximal and on high contention
+	 * it may be inexistent.
 	 */
-	if (!i && !(prandom_u32() % 16))
-		i = 2;
+	i = max_t(int, i, (prandom_u32() & 7) * 2);
 	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
 
 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
author maintainer
#235 lore raw

PATCH 235/237 tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit e9261476184be1abd486c9434164b2acbe0ed6c2 upstream.

We'll need to further increase the size of this table and it's likely that at some point its size will not be suitable anymore for a static table. Let's allocate it on boot from inet_hashinfo2_init(), which is called from tcp_init().

[bwh: Backported to 4.14:
- There is no inet_hashinfo2_init(), so allocate the table in inet_hashinfo_init() when called by TCP
- Adjust context]

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +13 -2
@@ -596,7 +596,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
  * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
  */
 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
-static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
+static u32 *table_perturb;
 
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 		struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
@@ -636,7 +637,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time
 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
 		remaining &= ~1U;
 
-	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
+	net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
+			    INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
 	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
 
 	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
@@ -741,6 +743,15 @@ void inet_hashinfo_init(struct inet_hash
 		INIT_HLIST_NULLS_HEAD(&h->listening_hash[i].nulls_head,
 				      i + LISTENING_NULLS_BASE);
 	}
+
+	if (h != &tcp_hashinfo)
+		return;
+
+	/* this one is used for source ports of outgoing connections */
+	table_perturb = kmalloc_array(INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE,
+				      sizeof(*table_perturb), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!table_perturb)
+		panic("TCP: failed to alloc table_perturb");
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_hashinfo_init);
 
author maintainer
#236 lore raw

PATCH 236/237 tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 upstream.

Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation, and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds.

Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers, database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few entries will be visited, like before.

A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance difference from the previous value.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +5 -4
@@ -591,11 +591,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
  * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
  * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
  * property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
  */
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
 #define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
 static u32 *table_perturb;
 
author maintainer
#237 lore raw

PATCH 237/237 tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>

commit e8161345ddbb66e449abde10d2fdce93f867eba9 upstream.

In commit 190cc82489f4 ("tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time"), the table_perturb[] array was introduced and an index was taken from the port_offset via hash_32(). But it turns out that hash_32() performs a multiplication while the input here comes from the output of SipHash in secure_seq, that is well distributed enough to avoid the need for yet another hash.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c +1 -1
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_time
 
 	net_get_random_once(table_perturb,
 			    INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE * sizeof(*table_perturb));
-	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+	index = port_offset & (INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE - 1);
 
 	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + (port_offset >> 32);
 	offset %= remaining;
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#238 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.285 release. There are 237 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 25 Jun 2022 16:43:11 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.285-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.14:

    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    32 tests:	32 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.14.285-rc1-g948a36f89e96
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#239 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.285 release. There are 237 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 25 Jun 2022 16:43:11 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 170 pass: 170 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 424 pass: 424 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#240 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.285 release. There are 237 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 25 Jun 2022 16:43:11 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.285-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 4.14.285-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-4.14.y
* git commit: 948a36f89e96c3d3bcaa8643911949a6115da893
* git describe: v4.14.284-238-g948a36f89e96
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14.284-238-g948a36f89e96

## Test Regressions (compared to v4.14.284-228-g0ecf242ba512) No test regressions found.

## Metric Regressions (compared to v4.14.284-228-g0ecf242ba512) No metric regressions found.

## Test Fixes (compared to v4.14.284-228-g0ecf242ba512) No test fixes found.

## Metric Fixes (compared to v4.14.284-228-g0ecf242ba512) No metric fixes found.

## Test result summary
total: 109413, pass: 96739, fail: 194, skip: 11203, xfail: 1277

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 289 total, 283 passed, 6 failed
* arm64: 52 total, 45 passed, 7 failed
* i386: 27 total, 23 passed, 4 failed
* mips: 22 total, 22 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 16 total, 16 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 12 total, 9 passed, 3 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 49 total, 47 passed, 2 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org