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tls-crypt-v2: bail out if the client key is too small

PATCH In review Antonio Quartulli 3 participants 3 messages Jun 28, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 tls-crypt-v2: bail out if the client key is too small

The tls-crypt-v2 key should be at least 2 bytes long in order to read the actual length.

Bail out if the key is too short.
Failing to do so will lead to a read out of the buffer boundary.

While at it improve the error message a bit.

---
 src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/openvpn/tls_crypt.c +2 -1
index 88730a99..2fc79111 100644
@@ -557,7 +557,8 @@ tls_crypt_v2_extract_client_key(struct buffer *buf,
 
     if (BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) < sizeof(net_len))
     {
-        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "failed to read length");
+        msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Can not read tls-crypt-v2 client key length");
+        return false;
     }
     memcpy(&net_len, BEND(&wrapped_client_key) - sizeof(net_len),
            sizeof(net_len));
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Acked-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

Am 28.06.22 um 11:41 schrieb Antonio Quartulli:

Quoted 5 lines

The tls-crypt-v2 key should be at least 2 bytes long in order to read the actual length.

Bail out if the key is too short.
Failing to do so will lead to a read out of the buffer boundary.

Actually not. We read from BEND(), so this is defined for TCP since the minimum length there is 3 bytes (pkt len + opcode). For UDP we might read past the beginning of the packet but since they are buffers coming from the packet stack we have the headroom/tailroom, so might read some random data (but not out of bound!).

So we copy some more or less random number into net_len/wkc_len but without actually reading from undefined memory.

The next line will then almost definitively fail

if (!buf_advance(&wrapped_client_key, BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) -
wkc_len))

Since BLEN(wrapped_client_key) is 0 or 1 or wkc_len has to be 0 or 1 to not fail this check

and then in turn

tls_crypt_v2_unwrap_client_key

will fail at

if (BLEN(&wrapped_client_key) < sizeof(net_len))

Quoted 2 lines

While at it improve the error message a bit.

#2 lore raw
In reply to Antonio Quartulli

I have taken the "why is this not a problem?" text from Arne's ACK and included it into the commit message.

Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.5 branch.

commit 462339a45089ef655faf02232d7d792def9b8afb (master) commit ce24bec7e2518d4ea7aa931021454d1191f4906b (release/2.5)

Author: Antonio Quartulli
Date:   Tue Jun 28 11:41:44 2022 +0200
     tls-crypt-v2: bail out if the client key is too small

     Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg24580.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering