random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and "nordrand"
Subsystems (15)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH 1/1 random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and "nordrand"
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
So this commit simplifies things down to the two options that are actually used, and removes the confusing old ones that aren't used or useful.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ----- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 -------- arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 ---------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 --------------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 --------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 +--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 13 +------------ drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 --------- include/linux/random.h | 9 +-------- .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 22 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +0 -5
@@ -3733,11 +3733,6 @@ noreplace-smp [X86-32,SMP] Don't replace SMP instructions with UP alternatives - nordrand [X86] Disable kernel use of the RDRAND and - RDSEED instructions even if they are supported - by the processor. RDRAND and RDSEED are still - available to user space applications. - noresume [SWSUSP] Disables resume and restores original swap space.
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -8
@@ -1858,14 +1858,6 @@ config ARM64_E0PD This option enables E0PD for TTBR1 where available. -config ARCH_RANDOM - bool "Enable support for random number generation" - default y - help - Random number generation (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) - provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure - hardware random number generator. - config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -10
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -167,12 +165,4 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) }#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) -{ -return false; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -2
@@ -2416,7 +2416,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, },#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM { .desc = "Random Number Generator", .capability = ARM64_HAS_RNG,
@@ -2428,7 +2427,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI { .desc = "Branch Target Identification",
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0 -3
@@ -1248,9 +1248,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START default "0x00000000" endif -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool n - config PPC_LIB_RHEAP bool
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <asm/machdep.h> static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v)
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return rc; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV int powernv_hwrng_present (void );
arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h +0 -2
@@ -200,9 +200,7 @@ struct machdep_calls {ssize_t (*cpu_release)(const char *,size_t );#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM int (*get_random_seed)(unsigned long *v); -#endif };extern void e500_idle (void );
arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config PPC_MICROWATT select PPC_ICS_NATIVE select PPC_ICP_NATIVE select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM help This option enables support for FPGA-based Microwatt implementations.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config PPC_POWERNV select EPAPR_BOOT select PPC_INDIRECT_PIO select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM select CPU_FREQ select PPC_DOORBELL select MMU_NOTIFIER
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ config PPC_PSERIES select PPC_UDBG_16550 select PPC_DOORBELL select HOTPLUG_CPU - select ARCH_RANDOM select FORCE_SMP select SWIOTLB default y
arch/s390/Kconfig +0 -15
@@ -508,21 +508,6 @@ config KEXEC_SIG verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "s390 architectural random number generation API" - help - Enable the s390 architectural random number generation API - to provide random data for all consumers within the Linux - kernel. - - When enabled the arch_random_* functions declared in linux/random.h - are implemented. The implementation is based on the s390 CPACF - instruction subfunction TRNG which provides a real true random - number generator. - - If unsure, say Y. - config KERNEL_NOBP def_bool n prompt "Enable modified branch prediction for the kernel by default"
arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_TUNE_ZEC12=y # CONFIG_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_NR_CPUS=2 CONFIG_HZ_100=y -# CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not set # CONFIG_RELOCATABLE is not set # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
arch/s390/crypto/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o +obj-y += arch_random.o crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h>
@@ -50,5 +48,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return false; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -9
@@ -1833,15 +1833,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +1 -9
@@ -65,10 +65,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the -* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked, -* i.e. CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not defined. +* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -92,10 +90,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)extern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } - -#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ -#endif /* ASM_X86_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static void clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)return ;/* -* The nordrand option can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for +* The self test can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for * RDRAND support using the CPUID function directly. */ if (!(cpuid_ecx (1 ) &BIT (30 )) || rdrand_force)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +1 -12
@@ -11,14 +11,6 @@#include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/sections.h> -static int __init x86_rdrand_setup (char *s) -{ -setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ); -setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ); -return 1 ; -} -__setup ("nordrand" , x86_rdrand_setup); -/* * RDRAND has Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) that runs on every invocation. * Run the instruction a few times as a sanity check.
@@ -26,7 +18,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;
@@ -59,8 +50,6 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!changed)) -pr_emerg ( -"RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\"" ); +pr_emerg ("RDRAND gives funky smelling output; update microcode or firmware." ); } -#endif
drivers/char/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c +0 -9
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev, {u64 dev_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_dev_counter);u64 hwrng_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_hwrng_counter); -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM )u64 arch_counter =atomic64_read (&s390_arch_random_counter); return sysfs_emit(buf,
@@ -118,14 +117,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev,"total: %llu\n" , dev_counter, hwrng_counter, arch_counter, dev_counter + hwrng_counter + arch_counter); -#else -return sysfs_emit (buf, -"trng: %llu\n" -"hwrng: %llu\n" -"total: %llu\n" , - dev_counter, hwrng_counter, - dev_counter + hwrng_counter); -#endif } static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, trng_counter_show, NULL);
include/linux/random.h +1 -8
@@ -106,14 +106,7 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)*/ #include <linux/prandom.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -# include <asm/archrandom.h> -#else -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -#endif +#include <asm/archrandom.h> /* * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +0 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0
-1@@ -26,7 +18,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 53
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +1
-2@@ -59,8 +50,6 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!changed)) -pr_emerg ( -"RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\"" ); +pr_emerg ("RDRAND gives funky smelling output; update microcode or firmware." );
It is highly unlikely to get a BIOS or microcode update for that matter, for old systems:
7879fc4bdc75 ("x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output")
so I guess here you're better off saying that the kernel simply disables rdrand support and do
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
here too.
If I read the commit message above correctly, it sounds like RDRAND output is not that important anyway...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHey Borislav,
Quoted 20 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 9 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0
-1@@ -26,7 +18,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 53
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +1
-2@@ -59,8 +50,6 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) }if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!changed)) -pr_emerg ( -"RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\"" ); +pr_emerg ("RDRAND gives funky smelling output; update microcode or firmware." );It is highly unlikely to get a BIOS or microcode update for that matter, for old systems:
Quoted 8 lines
7879fc4bdc75("x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output")so I guess here you're better off saying that the kernel simply disables rdrand support and do
clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);here too.
Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider using random.trust_cpu=0," which is the thing that would actually make a security difference.
But actually, one thing that wasn't clear to me was: does nordrand affect what userspace sees? While random.c is okay in lots of circumstances, I could imagine nordrand playing a role in preventing userspace from using it, which might be desirable. Is this the case? If so, I can remove the nordrand chunk from this patch for v2. If not, I'll adjust the text to mention random.trust_cpu=0.
Quoted 2 lines
If I read the commit message above correctly, it sounds like RDRAND output is not that important anyway...
In the sense that random.c can handle mostly any input without making the quality worse. So, you can't accidentally taint it. The only risk is if it thinks RDRAND is good and trustable when it isn't, but that's what random.trust_cpu=0 is for.
Jason
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider using
random.trust_cpu=0," which is the thing that would actually make a security difference.
Why isn't that option documented inDocumentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt?
Quoted 6 lines
But actually, one thing that wasn't clear to me was: does
nordrandaffect what userspace sees? Whilerandom.cis okay in lots of circumstances, I could imaginenordrandplaying a role in preventing userspace from using it, which might be desirable. Is this the case? If so, I can remove the nordrand chunk from this patch for v2. If not, I'll adjust the text to mentionrandom.trust_cpu=0.
Unfortunately, it doesn't disable the instruction. It would be lovely if we had a switch like that...
That's why this message is supposed to be noisy so that people can pay attention at least.
Quoted 4 lines
In the sense that
random.ccan handle mostly any input without making the quality worse. So, you can't accidentally taint it. The only risk is if it thinks RDRAND is good and trustable when it isn't, but that's whatrandom.trust_cpu=0is for.
And that's why I'm saying that if you detect RDRAND returning the same thing over and over again, you should simply stop using it. Automatically. Not rely on the user to do anything.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteH. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 21 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider using
random.trust_cpu=0," which is the thing that would actually make a security difference.Why isn't that option documented in
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt?Quoted 6 lines
But actually, one thing that wasn't clear to me was: does
nordrandaffect what userspace sees? Whilerandom.cis okay in lots of circumstances, I could imaginenordrandplaying a role in preventing userspace from using it, which might be desirable. Is this the case? If so, I can remove the nordrand chunk from this patch for v2. If not, I'll adjust the text to mentionrandom.trust_cpu=0.Unfortunately, it doesn't disable the instruction. It would be lovely if we had a switch like that...
That's why this message is supposed to be noisy so that people can pay attention at least.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In the sense that
random.ccan handle mostly any input without making the quality worse. So, you can't accidentally taint it. The only risk is if it thinks RDRAND is good and trustable when it isn't, but that's whatrandom.trust_cpu=0is for.And that's why I'm saying that if you detect RDRAND returning the same thing over and over again, you should simply stop using it. Automatically. Not rely on the user to do anything.
It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way smaller than the likelihood of hardware failure. For example, the likelihood of m n-bit samples in a row being identical is 2^-(n*(m-3/2)), and the likelihood of the CPU being destroyed by a meterorite in the same microsecond is about 2^-100.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · H. Peter Anvin
It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way smaller than the likelihood of hardware failure.
That might be but the likelyhood of certain BIOSes dropping the ball after resume is 100%:
7879fc4bdc75 ("x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output")
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteH. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · H. Peter Anvin
It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way smaller than the likelihood of hardware failure.
That might be but the likelyhood of certain BIOSes dropping the ball after resume is 100%:
7879fc4bdc75("x86/rdrand: Sanity-check RDRAND output")
What I'm wondering is if we shouldn't be simply instrument *every* invocation, and set the trust to zero if we ever trip it.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · H. Peter Anvin
What I'm wondering is if we shouldn't be simply instrument *every* invocation, and set the trust to zero if we ever trip it.
I guess you can add some logic to rdrand_long() to sanity-check what it returns...
But would that be worth the effort?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteH. Peter Anvin
reviewerQuoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · H. Peter Anvin
What I'm wondering is if we shouldn't be simply instrument *every* invocation, and set the trust to zero if we ever trip it.
I guess you can add some logic to
rdrand_long()to sanity-check what it returns...But would that be worth the effort?
I think doing it centrally, as non-arch-specific code, and letting it subsume ad hoc checks for known failure conditions could be a win.
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHi Borislav, Peter,
Quoted 8 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Oh, huh. Maybe in that case I should adjust the message to say "consider using
random.trust_cpu=0," which is the thing that would actually make a security difference.Why isn't that option documented in
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt?
Maybe you're not grepping the right tree?
zx2c4@thinkpad ~/Projects/random-linux $ grep trust_cpu Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
random.trust_cpu={on,off}Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
But actually, one thing that wasn't clear to me was: does
nordrandaffect what userspace sees? Whilerandom.cis okay in lots of circumstances, I could imaginenordrandplaying a role in preventing userspace from using it, which might be desirable. Is this the case? If so, I can remove the nordrand chunk from this patch for v2. If not, I'll adjust the text to mentionrandom.trust_cpu=0.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Unfortunately, it doesn't disable the instruction. It would be lovely if we had a switch like that...
That's why this message is supposed to be noisy so that people can pay attention at least.
I was wondering if it somehow removed it from cpuid. But I guess that's not possible. So okay, no real userspace effect. I think I agree with you then:
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In the sense that
random.ccan handle mostly any input without making the quality worse. So, you can't accidentally taint it. The only risk is if it thinks RDRAND is good and trustable when it isn't, but that's whatrandom.trust_cpu=0is for.And that's why I'm saying that if you detect RDRAND returning the same thing over and over again, you should simply stop using it. Automatically. Not rely on the user to do anything.
Quoted 6 lines
It's just math. The only variable is your confidence level, i.e. at what level do you decide that the likelihood of pure chance is way smaller than the likelihood of hardware failure. For example, the likelihood of m n-bit samples in a row being identical is 2^-(n*(m-3/2)), and the likelihood of the CPU being destroyed by a meterorite in the same microsecond is about 2^-100.
I think I'm on board with that general plan of adding a little online selftest that's better than what's there now and using that to get rid of nordrand. I don't want to instrument every invocation like you suggested, because this has effects on forward secrecy (e.g. it's nice to burn previous results from memory). But doing a little test at boot up better than what we have now seems like a good idea.
So let's do this - I'll send a v2 changing this patch to be a bit more boring and just get rid of CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM. That'll be straight forward. And then Peter - do you want to take a stab at doing the selftest in order to get rid of nordrand? Or would you prefer I try? It sounds like you have a specific idea of what you'd like there, so maybe that's best?
For now, v2 of this patch sans nordrand is incoming shortly.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
So this commit simplifies things down to the two options that are actually used, and removes the confusing old ones that aren't used or useful. It leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 -------- arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 ---------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 --------------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 --------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 +--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 -- drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 --------- include/linux/random.h | 9 +-------- .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 20 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -8
@@ -1858,14 +1858,6 @@ config ARM64_E0PD This option enables E0PD for TTBR1 where available. -config ARCH_RANDOM - bool "Enable support for random number generation" - default y - help - Random number generation (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) - provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure - hardware random number generator. - config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -10
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -167,12 +165,4 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) }#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) -{ -return false; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -2
@@ -2416,7 +2416,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, },#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM { .desc = "Random Number Generator", .capability = ARM64_HAS_RNG,
@@ -2428,7 +2427,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI { .desc = "Branch Target Identification",
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0 -3
@@ -1248,9 +1248,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START default "0x00000000" endif -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool n - config PPC_LIB_RHEAP bool
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <asm/machdep.h> static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v)
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return rc; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV int powernv_hwrng_present (void );
arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h +0 -2
@@ -200,9 +200,7 @@ struct machdep_calls {ssize_t (*cpu_release)(const char *,size_t );#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM int (*get_random_seed)(unsigned long *v); -#endif };extern void e500_idle (void );
arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config PPC_MICROWATT select PPC_ICS_NATIVE select PPC_ICP_NATIVE select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM help This option enables support for FPGA-based Microwatt implementations.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config PPC_POWERNV select EPAPR_BOOT select PPC_INDIRECT_PIO select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM select CPU_FREQ select PPC_DOORBELL select MMU_NOTIFIER
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ config PPC_PSERIES select PPC_UDBG_16550 select PPC_DOORBELL select HOTPLUG_CPU - select ARCH_RANDOM select FORCE_SMP select SWIOTLB default y
arch/s390/Kconfig +0 -15
@@ -508,21 +508,6 @@ config KEXEC_SIG verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "s390 architectural random number generation API" - help - Enable the s390 architectural random number generation API - to provide random data for all consumers within the Linux - kernel. - - When enabled the arch_random_* functions declared in linux/random.h - are implemented. The implementation is based on the s390 CPACF - instruction subfunction TRNG which provides a real true random - number generator. - - If unsure, say Y. - config KERNEL_NOBP def_bool n prompt "Enable modified branch prediction for the kernel by default"
arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_TUNE_ZEC12=y # CONFIG_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_NR_CPUS=2 CONFIG_HZ_100=y -# CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not set # CONFIG_RELOCATABLE is not set # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
arch/s390/crypto/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o +obj-y += arch_random.o crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h>
@@ -50,5 +48,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return false; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -9
@@ -1833,15 +1833,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +1 -9
@@ -65,10 +65,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the -* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked, -* i.e. CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not defined. +* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -92,10 +90,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)extern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } - -#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ -#endif /* ASM_X86_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0 -2
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;
@@ -63,4 +62,3 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) "RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\""); } -#endif
drivers/char/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c +0 -9
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev, {u64 dev_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_dev_counter);u64 hwrng_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_hwrng_counter); -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM )u64 arch_counter =atomic64_read (&s390_arch_random_counter); return sysfs_emit(buf,
@@ -118,14 +117,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev,"total: %llu\n" , dev_counter, hwrng_counter, arch_counter, dev_counter + hwrng_counter + arch_counter); -#else -return sysfs_emit (buf, -"trng: %llu\n" -"hwrng: %llu\n" -"total: %llu\n" , - dev_counter, hwrng_counter, - dev_counter + hwrng_counter); -#endif } static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, trng_counter_show, NULL);
include/linux/random.h +1 -8
@@ -106,14 +106,7 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)*/ #include <linux/prandom.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -# include <asm/archrandom.h> -#else -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -#endif +#include <asm/archrandom.h> /* * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +0 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v2] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
Quoted 50 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up,
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use --
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUand "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
So this commit simplifies things down to the two options that are actually used, and removes the confusing old ones that aren't used or useful. It leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 -------- arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 ---------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 --------------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 ---
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 --------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 +--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 -- drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 --------- include/linux/random.h | 9 +-------- .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 20 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
Re: [PATCH v2] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldQuoted 36 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up,
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use --
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUand "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
So this commit simplifies things down to the two options that are actually used, and removes the confusing old ones that aren't used or useful. It leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>Cc Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
...
Quoted 4 lines
arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 --------------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 ---
For s390:
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v3 1/1 random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldWhen RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
So this commit simplifies things by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
---
Changes v2->v3:
- Keep compiling on archs with no ARCH_RANDOM.
Changes v1->v2:
- Get rid of nordrand change for now.
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 -------- arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 ++++---------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 15 ++------------- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 --------------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 7 ++++--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 --------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 +++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 -- drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 --------- include/linux/random.h | 12 +++++++++--- .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 20 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -8
@@ -1858,14 +1858,6 @@ config ARM64_E0PD This option enables E0PD for TTBR1 where available. -config ARCH_RANDOM - bool "Enable support for random number generation" - default y - help - Random number generation (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) - provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure - hardware random number generator. - config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +4 -10
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -72,6 +70,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)return true;return false; } +#define arch_get_random_long arch_get_random_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {
@@ -85,6 +84,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) }return false; } +#define arch_get_random_int arch_get_random_intstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)return false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_long arch_get_random_seed_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {
@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_int arch_get_random_seed_intstatic inline bool __init __early_cpu_has_rndr (void ) {
@@ -167,12 +169,4 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) }#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) -{ -return false; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -2
@@ -2416,7 +2416,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, },#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM { .desc = "Random Number Generator", .capability = ARM64_HAS_RNG,
@@ -2428,7 +2427,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI { .desc = "Branch Target Identification",
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0 -3
@@ -1248,9 +1248,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START default "0x00000000" endif -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool n - config PPC_LIB_RHEAP bool
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +2 -13
@@ -2,20 +2,8 @@#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <asm/machdep.h> -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) -{ - return false; -} - -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) -{ - return false; -} -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)
@@ -23,6 +11,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)return false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_long arch_get_random_seed_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {
@@ -35,7 +24,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return rc; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ +#define arch_get_random_seed_int arch_get_random_seed_int#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV int powernv_hwrng_present (void );
arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h +0 -2
@@ -200,9 +200,7 @@ struct machdep_calls {ssize_t (*cpu_release)(const char *,size_t );#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM int (*get_random_seed)(unsigned long *v); -#endif };extern void e500_idle (void );
arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config PPC_MICROWATT select PPC_ICS_NATIVE select PPC_ICP_NATIVE select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM help This option enables support for FPGA-based Microwatt implementations.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config PPC_POWERNV select EPAPR_BOOT select PPC_INDIRECT_PIO select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM select CPU_FREQ select PPC_DOORBELL select MMU_NOTIFIER
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ config PPC_PSERIES select PPC_UDBG_16550 select PPC_DOORBELL select HOTPLUG_CPU - select ARCH_RANDOM select FORCE_SMP select SWIOTLB default y
arch/s390/Kconfig +0 -15
@@ -508,21 +508,6 @@ config KEXEC_SIG verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "s390 architectural random number generation API" - help - Enable the s390 architectural random number generation API - to provide random data for all consumers within the Linux - kernel. - - When enabled the arch_random_* functions declared in linux/random.h - are implemented. The implementation is based on the s390 CPACF - instruction subfunction TRNG which provides a real true random - number generator. - - If unsure, say Y. - config KERNEL_NOBP def_bool n prompt "Enable modified branch prediction for the kernel by default"
arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_TUNE_ZEC12=y # CONFIG_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_NR_CPUS=2 CONFIG_HZ_100=y -# CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not set # CONFIG_RELOCATABLE is not set # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
arch/s390/crypto/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o +obj-y += arch_random.o crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +4 -3
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h>
@@ -28,11 +26,13 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)return s390_arch_get_random_long (v);return false; } +#define arch_get_random_long arch_get_random_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } +#define arch_get_random_int arch_get_random_intstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) }return false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_long arch_get_random_seed_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {
@@ -49,6 +50,6 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) }return false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_int arch_get_random_seed_int -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -9
@@ -1833,15 +1833,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +5 -9
@@ -65,37 +65,33 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the -* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked, -* i.e. CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not defined. +* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ) ?rdrand_long (v) : false; } +#define arch_get_random_long arch_get_random_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ) ?rdrand_int (v) : false; } +#define arch_get_random_int arch_get_random_intstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ) ?rdseed_long (v) : false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_long arch_get_random_seed_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ) ?rdseed_int (v) : false; } +#define arch_get_random_seed_int arch_get_random_seed_intextern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } - -#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ -#endif /* ASM_X86_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0 -2
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;
@@ -63,4 +62,3 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) "RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\""); } -#endif
drivers/char/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c +0 -9
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev, {u64 dev_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_dev_counter);u64 hwrng_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_hwrng_counter); -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM )u64 arch_counter =atomic64_read (&s390_arch_random_counter); return sysfs_emit(buf,
@@ -118,14 +117,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev,"total: %llu\n" , dev_counter, hwrng_counter, arch_counter, dev_counter + hwrng_counter + arch_counter); -#else -return sysfs_emit (buf, -"trng: %llu\n" -"hwrng: %llu\n" -"total: %llu\n" , - dev_counter, hwrng_counter, - dev_counter + hwrng_counter); -#endif } static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, trng_counter_show, NULL);
include/linux/random.h +9 -3
@@ -106,12 +106,18 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)*/ #include <linux/prandom.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -# include <asm/archrandom.h> -#else +#include <asm/archrandom.h> + +#ifndef arch_get_random_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } +#endif +#ifndef arch_get_random_intstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } +#endif +#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_longstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } +#endif +#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_intstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; }#endif
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +0 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v3] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
Quoted 1 line · Jason A. Donenfeld
So this commit simplifies things by removing
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, keeping
No need to say "this commit" or "this patch" - just write "as if you are giving orders to the codebase to change its behaviour."
In this case, "So simplify things by ... "
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 --------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 +++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 --
For those:
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJason A. Donenfeld
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
Hi Borislav,
Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Jason A. Donenfeld
So this commit simplifies things by removing
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, keepingNo need to say "this commit" or "this patch" - just write "as if you are giving orders to the codebase to change its behaviour."
In this case, "So simplify things by ... "
Thanks for the tip. I used to do this, and then in the last 3 weeks my style unwittingly slipped into this new thing for some reason. I've got to send a v+1 anyway for some more build breakage, so I'll fix that up.
Jason
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v4 1/1 random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
---
Changes v3->v4:
- Use asm-generic for fallback.
Changes v2->v3:
- Keep compiling on archs with no ARCH_RANDOM.
Changes v1->v2:
- Get rid of nordrand change for now.
arch/arm/include/asm/archrandom.h | 20 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 ----------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 +------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 -- drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 ------- include/asm-generic/Kbuild | 1 + include/asm-generic/archrandom.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/random.h | 9 +------ .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 23 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/archrandom.h
arch/arm/include/asm/archrandom.h +20 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,26 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} +static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) {return false;
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -8
@@ -1858,14 +1858,6 @@ config ARM64_E0PD This option enables E0PD for TTBR1 where available. -config ARCH_RANDOM - bool "Enable support for random number generation" - default y - help - Random number generation (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) - provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure - hardware random number generator. - config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -10
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -167,12 +165,4 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) }#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) -{ -return false; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -2
@@ -2416,7 +2416,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, },#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM { .desc = "Random Number Generator", .capability = ARM64_HAS_RNG,
@@ -2428,7 +2427,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI { .desc = "Branch Target Identification",
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0 -3
@@ -1252,9 +1252,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START default "0x00000000" endif -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool n - config PPC_LIB_RHEAP bool
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <asm/machdep.h> static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v)
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return rc; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV int powernv_hwrng_present (void );
arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h +0 -2
@@ -200,9 +200,7 @@ struct machdep_calls {ssize_t (*cpu_release)(const char *,size_t );#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM int (*get_random_seed)(unsigned long *v); -#endif };extern void e500_idle (void );
arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config PPC_MICROWATT select PPC_ICS_NATIVE select PPC_ICP_NATIVE select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM help This option enables support for FPGA-based Microwatt implementations.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config PPC_POWERNV select EPAPR_BOOT select PPC_INDIRECT_PIO select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM select CPU_FREQ select PPC_DOORBELL select MMU_NOTIFIER
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ config PPC_PSERIES select PPC_UDBG_16550 select PPC_DOORBELL select HOTPLUG_CPU - select ARCH_RANDOM select FORCE_SMP select SWIOTLB default y
arch/s390/Kconfig +0 -15
@@ -507,21 +507,6 @@ config KEXEC_SIG verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "s390 architectural random number generation API" - help - Enable the s390 architectural random number generation API - to provide random data for all consumers within the Linux - kernel. - - When enabled the arch_random_* functions declared in linux/random.h - are implemented. The implementation is based on the s390 CPACF - instruction subfunction TRNG which provides a real true random - number generator. - - If unsure, say Y. - config KERNEL_NOBP def_bool n prompt "Enable modified branch prediction for the kernel by default"
arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_TUNE_ZEC12=y # CONFIG_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_NR_CPUS=2 CONFIG_HZ_100=y -# CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not set # CONFIG_RELOCATABLE is not set # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
arch/s390/crypto/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o +obj-y += arch_random.o crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <asm/cpacf.h>
@@ -50,5 +48,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return false; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -9
@@ -1833,15 +1833,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +1 -9
@@ -65,10 +65,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the -* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked, -* i.e. CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not defined. +* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -92,10 +90,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)extern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } - -#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ -#endif /* ASM_X86_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0 -2
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ __setup("nordrand", x86_rdrand_setup);*/ #define SANITY_CHECK_LOOPS 8 -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {unsigned int changed =0 ;
@@ -63,4 +62,3 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) "RDRAND gives funky smelling output, might consider not using it by booting with \"nordrand\""); } -#endif
drivers/char/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c +0 -9
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev, {u64 dev_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_dev_counter);u64 hwrng_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_hwrng_counter); -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM )u64 arch_counter =atomic64_read (&s390_arch_random_counter); return sysfs_emit(buf,
@@ -118,14 +117,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev,"total: %llu\n" , dev_counter, hwrng_counter, arch_counter, dev_counter + hwrng_counter + arch_counter); -#else -return sysfs_emit (buf, -"trng: %llu\n" -"hwrng: %llu\n" -"total: %llu\n" , - dev_counter, hwrng_counter, - dev_counter + hwrng_counter); -#endif } static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, trng_counter_show, NULL);
include/asm-generic/Kbuild +1 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ # asm headers from the host architecutre.) mandatory-y += atomic.h +mandatory-y += archrandom.h mandatory-y += barrier.h mandatory-y += bitops.h mandatory-y += bug.h
include/asm-generic/archrandom.h new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ARCHRANDOM_H__ +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ARCHRANDOM_H__ + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} + +#endif
include/linux/random.h +1 -8
@@ -106,14 +106,7 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)*/ #include <linux/prandom.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -# include <asm/archrandom.h> -#else -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -#endif +#include <asm/archrandom.h> /* * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +0 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v5 1/1 random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use -- CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU and "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.
Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
Simplify the situation by removing CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM and using the ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
---
Changes v4->v5:
- Squelch warning on ARCH=um.
- Include asm-generic on arm instead of duplicating code. Changes v3->v4:
- Use asm-generic for fallback.
Changes v2->v3:
- Keep compiling on archs with no ARCH_RANDOM. Changes v1->v2:
- Get rid of nordrand change for now.
arch/arm/include/asm/archrandom.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 - arch/s390/Kconfig | 15 ----------- arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig | 1 - arch/s390/crypto/Makefile | 2 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ------- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 14 +++-------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c | 2 -- drivers/char/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c | 9 ------- include/asm-generic/Kbuild | 1 + include/asm-generic/archrandom.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/random.h | 9 +------ .../selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config | 1 - 23 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/archrandom.h
arch/arm/include/asm/archrandom.h +2 -0
@@ -7,4 +7,6 @@ static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng(void) return false; } +#include <asm-generic/archrandom.h> +#endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -8
@@ -1858,14 +1858,6 @@ config ARM64_E0PD This option enables E0PD for TTBR1 where available. -config ARCH_RANDOM - bool "Enable support for random number generation" - default y - help - Random number generation (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) - provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure - hardware random number generator. - config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete
arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -10
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -167,12 +165,4 @@ arch_get_random_seed_long_early(unsigned long *v) }#define arch_get_random_seed_long_early arch_get_random_seed_long_early -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline bool __init smccc_probe_trng (void ) -{ -return false; -} - -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +0 -2
@@ -2416,7 +2416,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .cpu_enable = cpu_enable_e0pd, },#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM { .desc = "Random Number Generator", .capability = ARM64_HAS_RNG,
@@ -2428,7 +2427,6 @@ static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = { .sign = FTR_UNSIGNED, .min_field_value = 1, }, -#endif #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI { .desc = "Branch Target Identification",
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +0 -3
@@ -1252,9 +1252,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START default "0x00000000" endif -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool n - config PPC_LIB_RHEAP bool
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_POWERPC_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <asm/machdep.h> static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v)
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)return rc; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV int powernv_hwrng_present (void );
arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h +0 -2
@@ -200,9 +200,7 @@ struct machdep_calls {ssize_t (*cpu_release)(const char *,size_t );#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM int (*get_random_seed)(unsigned long *v); -#endif };extern void e500_idle (void );
arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config PPC_MICROWATT select PPC_ICS_NATIVE select PPC_ICP_NATIVE select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM help This option enables support for FPGA-based Microwatt implementations.
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ config PPC_POWERNV select EPAPR_BOOT select PPC_INDIRECT_PIO select PPC_UDBG_16550 - select ARCH_RANDOM select CPU_FREQ select PPC_DOORBELL select MMU_NOTIFIER
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ config PPC_PSERIES select PPC_UDBG_16550 select PPC_DOORBELL select HOTPLUG_CPU - select ARCH_RANDOM select FORCE_SMP select SWIOTLB default y
arch/s390/Kconfig +0 -15
@@ -507,21 +507,6 @@ config KEXEC_SIG verification for the corresponding kernel image type being loaded in order for this to work. -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "s390 architectural random number generation API" - help - Enable the s390 architectural random number generation API - to provide random data for all consumers within the Linux - kernel. - - When enabled the arch_random_* functions declared in linux/random.h - are implemented. The implementation is based on the s390 CPACF - instruction subfunction TRNG which provides a real true random - number generator. - - If unsure, say Y. - config KERNEL_NOBP def_bool n prompt "Enable modified branch prediction for the kernel by default"
arch/s390/configs/zfcpdump_defconfig +0 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_TUNE_ZEC12=y # CONFIG_COMPAT is not set CONFIG_NR_CPUS=2 CONFIG_HZ_100=y -# CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not set # CONFIG_RELOCATABLE is not set # CONFIG_CHSC_SCH is not set # CONFIG_SCM_BUS is not set
arch/s390/crypto/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA_S390) += chacha_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_S390_PRNG) += prng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_S390) += ghash_s390.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_S390) += crc32-vx_s390.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM) += arch_random.o +obj-y += arch_random.o crc32-vx_s390-y := crc32-vx.o crc32le-vx.o crc32be-vx.o chacha_s390-y := chacha-glue.o chacha-s390.o
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -3
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@#ifndef _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H#define _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -#include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <asm/cpacf.h>
@@ -50,5 +48,4 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return false; } -#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #endif /* _ASM_S390_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/Kconfig +0 -9
@@ -1833,15 +1833,6 @@ config ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED def_bool y depends on X86_PAT -config ARCH_RANDOM - def_bool y - prompt "x86 architectural random number generator" if EXPERT - help - Enable the x86 architectural RDRAND instruction - (Intel Bull Mountain technology) to generate random numbers. - If supported, this is a high bandwidth, cryptographically - secure hardware random number generator. - config X86_UMIP def_bool y prompt "User Mode Instruction Prevention" if EXPERT
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +4 -10
@@ -65,10 +65,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check rdseed_int(unsigned int *v)/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the -* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked, -* i.e. CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM is not defined. +* stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {
@@ -90,12 +88,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) return static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) ? rdseed_int(v) : false; } -extern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); - -#else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ - -static inline void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { } - -#endif /* !CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ +#ifndef CONFIG_UML +void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); +#endif #endif /* ASM_X86_ARCHRANDOM_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c +0 -2
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@* If it fails, it is simple to disable RDRAND and RDSEED here. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {enum {SAMPLES =8 ,MIN_CHANGE =5 };
@@ -60,4 +59,3 @@ void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)pr_emerg ("RDRAND and RDSEED are not reliable on this platform; disabling.\n" ); } } -#endif
drivers/char/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
drivers/char/hw_random/s390-trng.c +0 -9
@@ -108,7 +108,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev, {u64 dev_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_dev_counter);u64 hwrng_counter =atomic64_read (&trng_hwrng_counter); -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM )u64 arch_counter =atomic64_read (&s390_arch_random_counter); return sysfs_emit(buf,
@@ -118,14 +117,6 @@ static ssize_t trng_counter_show(struct device *dev,"total: %llu\n" , dev_counter, hwrng_counter, arch_counter, dev_counter + hwrng_counter + arch_counter); -#else -return sysfs_emit (buf, -"trng: %llu\n" -"hwrng: %llu\n" -"total: %llu\n" , - dev_counter, hwrng_counter, - dev_counter + hwrng_counter); -#endif } static DEVICE_ATTR(byte_counter, 0444, trng_counter_show, NULL);
include/asm-generic/Kbuild +1 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ # asm headers from the host architecutre.) mandatory-y += atomic.h +mandatory-y += archrandom.h mandatory-y += barrier.h mandatory-y += bitops.h mandatory-y += bug.h
include/asm-generic/archrandom.h new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_GENERIC_ARCHRANDOM_H__ +#define __ASM_GENERIC_ARCHRANDOM_H__ + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) +{ +return false; +} + +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) +{ +return false; +} + +#endif
include/linux/random.h +1 -8
@@ -106,14 +106,7 @@ declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)*/ #include <linux/prandom.h> -#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM -# include <asm/archrandom.h> -#else -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -#endif +#include <asm/archrandom.h> /* * Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once
tools/testing/selftests/wireguard/qemu/kernel.config +0 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=n CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC=n CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y -CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH v5] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
Quoted 26 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up,
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use --
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUand "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
Simplify the situation by removing
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOMand using the ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
Quoted 10 lines
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>Acked-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
For arm64:
Re: [PATCH v5] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldQuoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up,
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.
...
Quoted 11 lines
arch/arm/include/asm/archrandom.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/Kconfig | 8 ------ arch/arm64/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 -- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 3 --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/machdep.h | 2 -- arch/powerpc/platforms/microwatt/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Kconfig | 1 - arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/Kconfig | 1 -
cheers
Re: [PATCH v5] random: remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
In reply to Jason A. DonenfeldHi Jason,
Quoted 26 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
When RDRAND was introduced, there was much discussion on whether it should be trusted and how the kernel should handle that. Initially, two mechanisms cropped up,
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM, a compile time switch, and "nordrand", a boot-time switch.Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious. Rather, the issue is whether those values are being *trusted* to be good or not. And so a new set of options were introduced as the real ones that people use --
CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPUand "random.trust_cpu". With these options, RDRAND is used, but it's not always credited. So in the worst case, it does nothing, and in the best case, maybe it helps.Along the way, CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM's meaning got sort of pulled into the center and became something certain platforms force-select.
The old options don't really help with much, and it's a bit odd to have special handling for these instructions when the kernel can deal fine with the existence or untrusted existence or broken existence or non-existence of that CPU capability.
Simplify the situation by removing
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOMand using the ordinary asm-generic fallback pattern instead, keeping the two options that are actually used. For now it leaves "nordrand" for now, as the removal of that will take a different route.
Quoted 10 lines
Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>Cc Alexander Gordeev <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>Acked-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Thanks for your patch, which is now commit 9592eef7c16ec5fb ("random:
remove CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM") upstream.
drivers/char/Kconfig config ADI · line 436
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/Kconfig +0
-1@@ -431,7 +431,6 @@ config ADI config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU bool "Initialize RNG using CPU RNG instructions" default y - depends on ARCH_RANDOM help Initialize the RNG using random numbers supplied by the CPU's RNG instructions (e.g. RDRAND), if supported and available. These
This change means everyone configuring a kernel will be asked this question, even when configuring for an architecture that does not support RNG instructions.
Perhaps this question should be hidden behind EXPERT?
Gr{oetje,eeting}s,
Geert
--
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- [email protected]
In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
-- Linus Torvalds
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Maybe you're not grepping the right tree?
zx2c4@thinkpad ~/Projects/random-linux $ grep
trust_cpuDocumentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txtrandom.trust_cpu={on,off}
I was looking at the wrong option, sorry about that.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteTheodore Ts'o
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
I personally think it's totally fine to remove nordrand. However, the reason why it was there was that there were some rather extreme tin-foil-hatters who believed that if (the completely unavailable to the public for auditing) RDRAND implementation *were* malicious *and* the microcode had access to the register file and/or the instruction pipeline, then in theory, a malicious CPU could subvert how the RDRAND is mixed into the getrandom output to force a particular output.
Personally, I've always considered it to be insane, since a much easier way to compromise a CPU would be to drop a Minix system hidden into the CPU running a web server that had massive security bugs in it that were only discovered years later. And if you don't trust the CPU manufacture to that extent, you should probably simply not use CPU's from that manufacturer. :-)
- Ted
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHi Ted,
Quoted 12 lines · Theodore Ts'o
Quoted 2 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Later the thinking evolved. With a properly designed RNG, using RDRAND values alone won't harm anything, even if the outputs are malicious.
I personally think it's totally fine to remove nordrand. However, the reason why it was there was that there were some rather extreme tin-foil-hatters who believed that if (the completely unavailable to the public for auditing) RDRAND implementation *were* malicious *and* the microcode had access to the register file and/or the instruction pipeline, then in theory, a malicious CPU could subvert how the RDRAND is mixed into the getrandom output to force a particular output.
Quoted 6 lines
Personally, I've always considered it to be insane, since a much easier way to compromise a CPU would be to drop a Minix system hidden into the CPU running a web server that had massive security bugs in it that were only discovered years later. And if you don't trust the CPU manufacture to that extent, you should probably simply not use CPU's from that manufacturer. :-)
That specific attack scenario is actually something I've fixed over the last few months, by ensuring that all RDRAND values go through the hash function. So even if the CPU is super malicious, it'd still need a hash preimage, which isn't considered to be computable for blake2s.
Minix in the cpu... haha.. surely that would never happen... haha surely...
Jason