KVM: VMX: Avoid a JMP over the RSB-stuffing sequence
PATCH v3 1/1 KVM: VMX: Avoid a JMP over the RSB-stuffing sequence
RSB-stuffing after VM-exit is only needed for legacy CPUs without eIBRS. Instead of jumping over the RSB-stuffing sequence on modern CPUs, just return immediately.
Note that CPUs that are subject to SpectreRSB attacks need RSB-stuffing on VM-exit whether or not RETPOLINE is in use as a SpectreBTB mitigation. However, I am leaving the existing mitigation strategy alone.
---
v1 -> v2: Simplified the control flow
v2 -> v3: Updated the shortlog and commit message to match v2
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +2 -2
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmenter) */ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE - ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lvmexit_skip_rsb", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + ALTERNATIVE "RET", "", X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE + /* Preserve guest's RAX, it's used to stuff the RSB. */ push %_ASM_AX
@@ -87,7 +88,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(vmx_vmexit) or $1, %_ASM_AX pop %_ASM_AX -.Lvmexit_skip_rsb: #endif RET SYM_FUNC_END(vmx_vmexit)
Signature · 1 line
2.37.0.rc0.161.g10f37bed90-goog
Quoted 11 lines · Jim Mattson
RSB-stuffing after VM-exit is only needed for legacy CPUs without eIBRS. Instead of jumping over the RSB-stuffing sequence on modern CPUs, just return immediately.
Note that CPUs that are subject to SpectreRSB attacks need RSB-stuffing on VM-exit whether or not RETPOLINE is in use as a SpectreBTB mitigation. However, I am leaving the existing mitigation strategy alone.
Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>---