bpf_panic() helper
Subsystems (9)
cover bpf_panic() helper
eBPF is often used for kernel debugging, and one of the widely used and powerful debugging techniques is post-mortem debugging with a full memory dump. Triggering a panic at exactly the right moment allows the user to get such a dump and thus a better view at the system's state. This patchset adds bpf_panic() helper to do exactly that.
I realize that even though there are multiple guards present, a helper like this is contrary to BPF being "safe", so this is sent as RFC to have a discussion on whether adding destructive capabilities is deemed acceptable.
Artem Savkov (4):
bpf: add a sysctl to enable destructive bpf helpers
bpf: add BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD
bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
selftests/bpf: bpf_panic selftest
include/linux/bpf.h | 8 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 33 +++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 + kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 + tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
RFC PATCH 1/4 bpf: add a sysctl to enable destructive bpf helpers
Add a kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl knob to allow enabling bpf helpers that can be destructive to the system. One such helper, bpf_panic(), is added later in the series.
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +6 -0
@@ -1641,6 +1641,7 @@ bpf_map_alloc_percpu(const struct bpf_map *map, size_t size, size_t align,#endif extern int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; +extern int sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled;static inline bool bpf_allow_ptr_leaks (void ) {
@@ -1926,6 +1927,11 @@ static inline bool unprivileged_ebpf_enabled(void) return !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled; } +static inline bool destructive_ebpf_enabled (void ) +{ +return sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ static inline struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get (u32 ufd) {
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +29 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(link_idr_lock);int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled__read_mostly =IS_BUILTIN (CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF ) ?2 :0 ; +int sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled__read_mostly =0 ; +static const struct bpf_map_ops *const bpf_map_types[] = { #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type) #define BPF_MAP_TYPE(_id, _ops) \
@@ -5226,6 +5228,24 @@ static int bpf_unpriv_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,return ret; } +static int bpf_destructive_handler (struct ctl_table *table,int write, +void *buffer,size_t *lenp,loff_t *ppos) +{ +int ret, destructive_enable = *(int *)table->data; +struct ctl_table tmp = *table; + +if (write && !capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + + tmp.data = &destructive_enable; + ret =proc_dointvec_minmax (&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +if (write && !ret) { + *(int *)table->data = destructive_enable; + } + +return ret; +} +static struct ctl_table bpf_syscall_table[] = { { .procname ="unprivileged_bpf_disabled" ,
@@ -5236,6 +5256,15 @@ static struct ctl_table bpf_syscall_table[] = { .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, .extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO, }, + { + .procname = "destructive_bpf_enabled", + .data = &sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled, + .maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_destructive_bpf_enabled), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = bpf_destructive_handler, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, { .procname = "bpf_stats_enabled", .data = &bpf_stats_enabled_key.key,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
RFC PATCH 2/4 bpf: add BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD
In reply to Artem SavkovAdd a BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE will be required to be supplied to BPF_PROG_LOAD for programs to utilize destructive helpers such as bpf_panic().
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 +++- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/bpf.h +1 -0
@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {bool sleepable;bool tail_call_reachable;bool xdp_has_frags; +bool destructive;bool use_bpf_prog_pack;/* BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO for valid attach_btf_id */ const struct btf_type *attach_func_proto;
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +6 -0
@@ -1121,6 +1121,12 @@ enum bpf_link_type {*/ #define BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS (1U << 5) +/* If BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE is used in BPF_PROG_LOAD command, the loaded program +* will be able to perform destructive operations such as calling bpf_panic() +* helper. +*/ +#define BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE (1U << 6) +/* link_create.kprobe_multi.flags used in LINK_CREATE command for * BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI attach type to create return probe. */
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +3 -1
@@ -2449,7 +2449,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ |BPF_F_SLEEPABLE |BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 | - BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS)) +BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS | + BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE)) return -EINVAL; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
@@ -2536,6 +2537,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) prog->aux->offload_requested = !!attr->prog_ifindex; prog->aux->sleepable = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_SLEEPABLE ; prog->aux->xdp_has_frags = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS ; + prog->aux->destructive = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE ; err =security_bpf_prog_alloc (prog->aux);if (err)
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +6 -0
@@ -1121,6 +1121,12 @@ enum bpf_link_type {*/ #define BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS (1U << 5) +/* If BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE is used in BPF_PROG_LOAD command, the loaded program +* will be able to perform destructive operations such as calling bpf_panic() +* helper. +*/ +#define BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE (1U << 6) +/* link_create.kprobe_multi.flags used in LINK_CREATE command for * BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI attach type to create return probe. */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: add BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD
Quoted 3 lines · Artem Savkov
Add a
BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVEwill be required to be supplied toBPF_PROG_LOADfor programs to utilize destructive helpers such asbpf_panic().
I'd think that having kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl knob enabled would be enough to enable that helper from any program, not sure having extra load flag adds more security
jirka
Quoted 80 lines
Signed-off-by Artem Savkov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 +++- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/bpf.h +1
-0@@ -1041,6 +1041,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {bool sleepable;bool tail_call_reachable;bool xdp_has_frags; +bool destructive;bool use_bpf_prog_pack;/* BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO for valid attach_btf_id */ const struct btf_type *attach_func_proto;include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +6
-0@@ -1121,6 +1121,12 @@ enum bpf_link_type {*/ #define BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS (1U << 5) +/* If BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE is used in BPF_PROG_LOAD command, the loaded program +* will be able to perform destructive operations such as calling bpf_panic() +* helper. +*/ +#define BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE (1U << 6) +/* link_create.kprobe_multi.flags used in LINK_CREATE command for * BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI attach type to create return probe. */ kernel/bpf/syscall.c +3
-1@@ -2449,7 +2449,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ |BPF_F_SLEEPABLE |BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32 | - BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS)) +BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS | + BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE)) return -EINVAL; if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&@@ -2536,6 +2537,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr) prog->aux->offload_requested = !!attr->prog_ifindex; prog->aux->sleepable = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_SLEEPABLE ; prog->aux->xdp_has_frags = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS ; + prog->aux->destructive = attr->prog_flags &BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE ; err =security_bpf_prog_alloc (prog->aux);if (err)tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +6
-0@@ -1121,6 +1121,12 @@ enum bpf_link_type {*/ #define BPF_F_XDP_HAS_FRAGS (1U << 5) +/* If BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE is used in BPF_PROG_LOAD command, the loaded program +* will be able to perform destructive operations such as calling bpf_panic() +* helper. +*/ +#define BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE (1U << 6) +/* link_create.kprobe_multi.flags used in LINK_CREATE command for * BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI attach type to create return probe. */ Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 2/4] bpf: add BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag for BPF_PROG_LOAD
Quoted 8 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 3 lines · Artem Savkov
Add a
BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVEwill be required to be supplied toBPF_PROG_LOADfor programs to utilize destructive helpers such asbpf_panic().I'd think that having kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl knob enabled would be enough to enable that helper from any program, not sure having extra load flag adds more security
I agree it doesn't add more security. The idea was to have a way for a developer to explicitly state he understand this will be dangerous. This flag can also translate well into something like a --destructive option for bpftrace without needing to keep a list of destructive helpers on their side.
Signature · 1 line
Artem
RFC PATCH 3/4 bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
In reply to Artem SavkovAdd a helper that will make the kernel panic immediately with specified message. Using this helper requires kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl to be enabled, BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag to be supplied on program load as well as CAP_SYS_BOOT capabilities.
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 13 +++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 ++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++++++ 7 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +1 -0
@@ -2339,6 +2339,7 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtol_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtoul_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_sock_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto; +extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_event_output_data_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_ringbuf_output_proto;
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +7 -0
@@ -3927,6 +3927,12 @@ union bpf_attr {* Return * The 64 bit jiffies * +* void bpf_panic(const char *msg) +* Description +* Make the kernel panic immediately +* Return +* void +* * long bpf_read_branch_records(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags) * Description * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the
@@ -5452,6 +5458,7 @@ union bpf_attr {FN (tcp_send_ack), \FN (send_signal_thread), \FN (jiffies64), \ +FN (panic), \FN (read_branch_records), \FN (get_ns_current_pid_tgid), \ FN(xdp_output), \
kernel/bpf/core.c +1 -0
@@ -2649,6 +2649,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem_proto __weak;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_lock_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_unlock_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto__weak ; +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto__weak ;
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +13 -0
@@ -374,6 +374,19 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, }; +BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg); +return 0 ; +} + +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto = { + .func = bpf_panic, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type =RET_VOID , + .arg1_type =ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS BPF_CALL_0 (bpf_get_current_cgroup_id) {
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7 -0
@@ -7285,6 +7285,13 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));return -EACCES ; } +break ; +case BPF_FUNC_panic: +struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; +if (!aux->destructive) { +verbose (env,"bpf_panic() calls require BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag\n" ); +return -EACCES ; + } }if (err)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +2 -0
@@ -1304,6 +1304,8 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)return &bpf_find_vma_proto;case BPF_FUNC_trace_vprintk:return bpf_get_trace_vprintk_proto (); +case BPF_FUNC_panic: +return capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT ) &&destructive_ebpf_enabled () ? &bpf_panic_proto :NULL ;default :return bpf_base_func_proto (func_id); }
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +7 -0
@@ -3927,6 +3927,12 @@ union bpf_attr {* Return * The 64 bit jiffies * +* void bpf_panic(const char *msg) +* Description +* Make the kernel panic immediately +* Return +* void +* * long bpf_read_branch_records(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags) * Description * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the
@@ -5452,6 +5458,7 @@ union bpf_attr {FN (tcp_send_ack), \FN (send_signal_thread), \FN (jiffies64), \ +FN (panic), \FN (read_branch_records), \FN (get_ns_current_pid_tgid), \ FN(xdp_output), \
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
On Mon, Jul 11, 2022 at 10:32:19AM +0200, Artem Savkov wrote:
SNIP
Quoted 18 lines
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +6
-0@@ -3927,6 +3927,12 @@ union bpf_attr {* Return * The 64 bit jiffies * +* void bpf_panic(const char *msg) +* Description +* Make the kernel panic immediately +* Return +* void +* * long bpf_read_branch_records(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags) * Description * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h union bpf_attr { · line 5464
Quoted 7 lines
tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +1
-0@@ -5452,6 +5458,7 @@ union bpf_attr {FN (tcp_send_ack), \FN (send_signal_thread), \FN (jiffies64), \ +FN (panic), \FN (read_branch_records), \FN (get_ns_current_pid_tgid), \ FN(xdp_output), \
new helper needs to be added at the end of the list
jirka
Song Liu
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
In reply to Artem SavkovQuoted 71 lines · Artem Savkov
Add a helper that will make the kernel panic immediately with specified message. Using this helper requires kernel.destructive_bpf_enabled sysctl to be enabled,
BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVEflag to be supplied on program load as well asCAP_SYS_BOOTcapabilities.Signed-off-by Artem Savkov <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 13 +++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 ++ tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 7 +++++++ 7 files changed, 38 insertions(+)include/linux/bpf.h +1
-0@@ -2339,6 +2339,7 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtol_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strtoul_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_tcp_sock_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto; +extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_ns_current_pid_tgid_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_event_output_data_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_ringbuf_output_proto;include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +7
-0@@ -3927,6 +3927,12 @@ union bpf_attr {* Return * The 64 bit jiffies * +* void bpf_panic(const char *msg) +* Description +* Make the kernel panic immediately +* Return +* void +* * long bpf_read_branch_records(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags) * Description * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the @@ -5452,6 +5458,7 @@ union bpf_attr {FN (tcp_send_ack), \FN (send_signal_thread), \FN (jiffies64), \ +FN (panic), \FN (read_branch_records), \FN (get_ns_current_pid_tgid), \ FN(xdp_output), \kernel/bpf/core.c +1
-0@@ -2649,6 +2649,7 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_map_lookup_percpu_elem_proto __weak;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_lock_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_spin_unlock_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto__weak ; +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto__weak ;const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_smp_processor_id_proto__weak ;kernel/bpf/helpers.c +0
-0
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0@@ -374,6 +374,19 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, }; +BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);
I think we should also check
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()
here. Or at least, destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.
In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
Thanks,
Song
Quoted 72 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +10
-0+return 0 ; +} + +const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_panic_proto = { + .func = bpf_panic, + .gpl_only = false, + .ret_type =RET_VOID , + .arg1_type =ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR , +}; +#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS BPF_CALL_0 (bpf_get_current_cgroup_id) {kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0@@ -7285,6 +7285,13 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));return -EACCES ; } +break ; +case BPF_FUNC_panic: +struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux; +if (!aux->destructive) { +verbose (env,"bpf_panic() calls require BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag\n" ); +return -EACCES ; + } }if (err)kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +2
-0@@ -1304,6 +1304,8 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)return &bpf_find_vma_proto;case BPF_FUNC_trace_vprintk:return bpf_get_trace_vprintk_proto (); +case BPF_FUNC_panic: +return capable (CAP_SYS_BOOT ) &&destructive_ebpf_enabled () ? &bpf_panic_proto :NULL ;default :return bpf_base_func_proto (func_id); }tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +7
-1@@ -3927,6 +3927,12 @@ union bpf_attr {* Return * The 64 bit jiffies * +* void bpf_panic(const char *msg) +* Description +* Make the kernel panic immediately +* Return +* void +* * long bpf_read_branch_records(struct bpf_perf_event_data *ctx, void *buf, u32 size, u64 flags) * Description * For an eBPF program attached to a perf event, retrieve the @@ -5452,6 +5458,7 @@ union bpf_attr {FN (tcp_send_ack), \FN (send_signal_thread), \FN (jiffies64), \ +FN (panic), \FN (read_branch_records), \FN (get_ns_current_pid_tgid), \ FN(xdp_output), \ --2.35.3
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
Quoted 8 lines · Song Liu
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);I think we should also check
Quoted 8 lines
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()here. Or at least,
destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
+1. New syscal isn't warranted here.
Just CAP_SYS_BOOT would be enough here.
Also full blown panic() seems unnecessary.
If the motivation is to get a memory dump then crash_kexec() helper would be more suitable.
If the goal is to reboot the system then the wrapper of sys_reboot() is better.
Unfortunately the cover letter lacks these details.
Why this destructive action cannot be delegated to user space?
btw, we should avoid adding new uapi helpers in most cases. Ideally all of them should be added as new kfunc-s, because they're unstable and we can rip them out later if our judgement call turns out to be problematic for whatever reason.
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
Quoted 14 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 13 lines · Song Liu
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);I think we should also check
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()here. Or at least,
destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
+1. New syscal isn't warranted here.
JustCAP_SYS_BOOTwould be enough here.
Point taken, I'll remove sysctl knob in any further versions.
Quoted 6 lines
Also full blown
panic()seems unnecessary.
If the motivation is to get a memory dump thencrash_kexec()helper would be more suitable.
If the goal is to reboot the system then the wrapper ofsys_reboot()is better.
Unfortunately the cover letter lacks these details.
The main goal is to get the memory dump, so crash_kexec() should be enough. However panic() is a bit more versatile and it's consequences are configurable to some extent. Are there any downsides to using it?
Quoted 1 line
Why this destructive action cannot be delegated to user space?
Going through userspace adds delays and makes it impossible to hit "exactly the right moment" thus making it unusable in most cases.
I'll add this to the cover letter.
Quoted 4 lines
btw, we should avoid adding new uapi helpers in most cases. Ideally all of them should be added as new kfunc-s, because they're unstable and we can rip them out later if our judgement call turns out to be problematic for whatever reason.
Ok, I'll look into doing it this way.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Artem
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
Quoted 32 lines · Artem Savkov
Quoted 14 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 13 lines · Song Liu
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);I think we should also check
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()here. Or at least,
destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
+1. New syscal isn't warranted here.
JustCAP_SYS_BOOTwould be enough here.Point taken, I'll remove sysctl knob in any further versions.
Quoted 6 lines
Also full blown
panic()seems unnecessary.
If the motivation is to get a memory dump thencrash_kexec()helper would be more suitable.
If the goal is to reboot the system then the wrapper ofsys_reboot()is better.
Unfortunately the cover letter lacks these details.
Quoted 3 lines
The main goal is to get the memory dump, so
crash_kexec()should be enough. Howeverpanic()is a bit more versatile and it's consequences are configurable to some extent. Are there any downsides to using it?
versatile? In what sense? That it does a lot more than kexec? That's a disadvantage.
We should provide bpf with minimal building blocks and let bpf program decide what to do.
If dmesg (that is part of panic) is useful it should be its own kfunc.
If halt is necessary -> separate kfunc as well. reboot -> another kfunc.
Also panic() is not guaranteed to do kexec and just panic is not what you stated is the goal of the helper.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why this destructive action cannot be delegated to user space?
Going through userspace adds delays and makes it impossible to hit "exactly the right moment" thus making it unusable in most cases.
What would be an example of that?
kexec is not instant either.
Quoted 13 lines
I'll add this to the cover letter.
Quoted 4 lines
btw, we should avoid adding new uapi helpers in most cases. Ideally all of them should be added as new kfunc-s, because they're unstable and we can rip them out later if our judgement call turns out to be problematic for whatever reason.
Ok, I'll look into doing it this way.
--
Regards,
Artem
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
Quoted 46 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 32 lines · Artem Savkov
Quoted 14 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 13 lines · Song Liu
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);I think we should also check
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()here. Or at least,
destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
+1. New syscal isn't warranted here.
JustCAP_SYS_BOOTwould be enough here.Point taken, I'll remove sysctl knob in any further versions.
Quoted 6 lines
Also full blown
panic()seems unnecessary.
If the motivation is to get a memory dump thencrash_kexec()helper would be more suitable.
If the goal is to reboot the system then the wrapper ofsys_reboot()is better.
Unfortunately the cover letter lacks these details.Quoted 3 lines
The main goal is to get the memory dump, so
crash_kexec()should be enough. Howeverpanic()is a bit more versatile and it's consequences are configurable to some extent. Are there any downsides to using it?versatile? In what sense? That it does a lot more than kexec? That's a disadvantage.
We should provide bpf with minimal building blocks and let bpf program decide what to do.
If dmesg (that is part of panic) is useful it should be its own kfunc.
If halt is necessary -> separate kfunc as well. reboot -> another kfunc.
Quoted 2 lines
Also
panic()is not guaranteed to do kexec and just panic is not what you stated is the goal of the helper.
Alright, if the aim is to provide the smallest building blocks then crash_kexec() is a better choice.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why this destructive action cannot be delegated to user space?
Going through userspace adds delays and makes it impossible to hit "exactly the right moment" thus making it unusable in most cases.
What would be an example of that?
kexec is not instant either.
With kexec at least the thread it got called in is in a proper state. I guess it is possible to achieve this by signalling userspace to do kexec/panic and then block the thread somehow but that won't work in a single-cpu case. Or am I missing something?
Signature · 1 line
Artem
Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
Quoted 60 lines · Artem Savkov
Quoted 46 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 32 lines · Artem Savkov
Quoted 14 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 13 lines · Song Liu
kernel/bpf/helpers.c const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_jiffies64_proto = { · line 379
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/helpers.c +3
-0+BPF_CALL_1(bpf_panic, const char *, msg) +{ +panic (msg);I think we should also check
capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) && destructive_ebpf_enabled()here. Or at least,
destructive_ebpf_enabled(). Otherwise, we may trigger panic after the sysctl is disabled.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
In general, I don't think sysctl is a good API, as it is global, and the user can easily forget to turn it back off. If possible, I would rather avoid adding new BPF related sysctls.
+1. New syscal isn't warranted here.
JustCAP_SYS_BOOTwould be enough here.Point taken, I'll remove sysctl knob in any further versions.
Quoted 6 lines
Also full blown
panic()seems unnecessary.
If the motivation is to get a memory dump thencrash_kexec()helper would be more suitable.
If the goal is to reboot the system then the wrapper ofsys_reboot()is better.
Unfortunately the cover letter lacks these details.Quoted 3 lines
The main goal is to get the memory dump, so
crash_kexec()should be enough. Howeverpanic()is a bit more versatile and it's consequences are configurable to some extent. Are there any downsides to using it?versatile? In what sense? That it does a lot more than kexec? That's a disadvantage.
We should provide bpf with minimal building blocks and let bpf program decide what to do.
If dmesg (that is part of panic) is useful it should be its own kfunc.
If halt is necessary -> separate kfunc as well. reboot -> another kfunc.Quoted 2 lines
Also
panic()is not guaranteed to do kexec and just panic is not what you stated is the goal of the helper.Alright, if the aim is to provide the smallest building blocks then
crash_kexec()is a better choice.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Why this destructive action cannot be delegated to user space?
Going through userspace adds delays and makes it impossible to hit "exactly the right moment" thus making it unusable in most cases.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What would be an example of that?
kexec is not instant either.With kexec at least the thread it got called in is in a proper state. I guess it is possible to achieve this by signalling userspace to do kexec/panic and then block the thread somehow but that won't work in a single-cpu case. Or am I missing something?
Something like this.
We can extend bpf_send_signal to send a signal to pid 1 or another user agent.
It's still not clear to me why you want that memory dump.
kernel test robot
build botRe: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/4] bpf: add bpf_panic() helper
In reply to Artem Savkov[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in…
Hi Artem,
[FYI, it's a private test report for your RFC patch.]
[auto build test ERROR on bpf/master]
[also build test ERROR on net/master linus/master v5.19-rc6] [cannot apply to bpf-next/master net-next/master next-20220714] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Artem-Savkov/bpf_panic-helper/20220711-163442 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git master config: arm64-buildonly-randconfig-r006-20220714 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220715/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 15.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 5e61b9c556267086ef9b743a0b57df302eef831b)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install arm64 cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-aarch64-linux-gnu
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/8aba500c3f61dcf538c8458a34f90f81279269a2
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Artem-Savkov/bpf_panic-helper/20220711-163442
git checkout 8aba500c3f61dcf538c8458a34f90f81279269a2
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=arm64 SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:7266:3: error: expected expression
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
^
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:7267:8: error: use of undeclared identifier 'aux'
if (!aux->destructive) {
^2 errors generated.
vim +7266 kernel/bpf/verifier.c
7102
7103 static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
7104 int *insn_idx_p)
7105 {
7106 const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
7107 enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
7108 enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag;
7109 struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
7110 struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
7111 int insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;
7112 bool changes_data;
7113 int i, err, func_id;
7114
7115 /* find function prototype */
7116 func_id = insn->imm;
7117 if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
7118 verbose(env, "invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
7119 func_id);
7120 return -EINVAL;
7121 }
7122
7123 if (env->ops->get_func_proto)
7124 fn = env->ops->get_func_proto(func_id, env->prog);
7125 if (!fn) {
7126 verbose(env, "unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id),
7127 func_id);
7128 return -EINVAL;
7129 }
7130
7131 /* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
7132 if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
7133 verbose(env, "cannot call GPL-restricted function from non-GPL compatible program\n");
7134 return -EINVAL;
7135 }
7136
7137 if (fn->allowed && !fn->allowed(env->prog)) {
7138 verbose(env, "helper call is not allowed in probe\n");
7139 return -EINVAL;
7140 }
7141
7142 /* With LD_ABS/IND some JITs save/restore skb from r1. */
7143 changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
7144 if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
7145 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
7146 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7147 return -EINVAL;
7148 }
7149
7150 memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
7151 meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
7152
7153 err = check_func_proto(fn, func_id, &meta);
7154 if (err) {
7155 verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
7156 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7157 return err;
7158 }
7159
7160 meta.func_id = func_id;
7161 /* check args */
7162 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
7163 err = check_func_arg(env, i, &meta, fn);
7164 if (err)
7165 return err;
7166 }
7167
7168 err = record_func_map(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
7169 if (err)
7170 return err;
7171
7172 err = record_func_key(env, &meta, func_id, insn_idx);
7173 if (err)
7174 return err;
7175
7176 /* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
7177 * is inferred from register state.
7178 */
7179 for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
7180 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
7181 BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
7182 if (err)
7183 return err;
7184 }
7185
7186 regs = cur_regs(env);
7187
7188 if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) {
7189 /* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
7190 for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
7191 err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno,
7192 i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
7193 if (err)
7194 return err;
7195 }
7196
7197 err = mark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno],
7198 fn->arg_type[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno - BPF_REG_1],
7199 insn_idx);
7200 if (err)
7201 return err;
7202 }
7203
7204 if (meta.release_regno) {
7205 err = -EINVAL;
7206 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1]))
7207 err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, ®s[meta.release_regno]);
7208 else if (meta.ref_obj_id)
7209 err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
7210 /* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
7211 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
7212 */
7213 else if (register_is_null(®s[meta.release_regno]))
7214 err = 0;
7215 if (err) {
7216 verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
7217 func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7218 return err;
7219 }
7220 }
7221
7222 switch (func_id) {
7223 case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
7224 err = check_reference_leak(env);
7225 if (err) {
7226 verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n");
7227 return err;
7228 }
7229 break;
7230 case BPF_FUNC_get_local_storage:
7231 /* check that flags argument in get_local_storage(map, flags) is 0,
7232 * this is required because get_local_storage() can't return an error.
7233 */
7234 if (!register_is_null(®s[BPF_REG_2])) {
7235 verbose(env, "get_local_storage() doesn't support non-zero flags\n");
7236 return -EINVAL;
7237 }
7238 break;
7239 case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
7240 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7241 set_map_elem_callback_state);
7242 break;
7243 case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback:
7244 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7245 set_timer_callback_state);
7246 break;
7247 case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
7248 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7249 set_find_vma_callback_state);
7250 break;
7251 case BPF_FUNC_snprintf:
7252 err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
7253 break;
7254 case BPF_FUNC_loop:
7255 err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
7256 set_loop_callback_state);
7257 break;
7258 case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem:
7259 if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7260 verbose(env, "Unsupported reg type %s for bpf_dynptr_from_mem data\n",
7261 reg_type_str(env, regs[BPF_REG_1].type));
7262 return -EACCES;
7263 }
7264 break;
7265 case BPF_FUNC_panic:
> 7266 struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
> 7267 if (!aux->destructive) { 7268 verbose(env, "bpf_panic() calls require BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE flag\n");
7269 return -EACCES;
7270 }
7271 }
7272
7273 if (err)
7274 return err;
7275
7276 /* reset caller saved regs */
7277 for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
7278 mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
7279 check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
7280 }
7281
7282 /* helper call returns 64-bit value. */
7283 regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
7284
7285 /* update return register (already marked as written above) */
7286 ret_type = fn->ret_type;
7287 ret_flag = type_flag(fn->ret_type);
7288 if (ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
7289 /* sets type to SCALAR_VALUE */
7290 mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7291 } else if (ret_type == RET_VOID) {
7292 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
7293 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
7294 /* There is no offset yet applied, variable or fixed */
7295 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7296 /* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
7297 * can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
7298 * to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
7299 */
7300 if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
7301 verbose(env,
7302 "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
7303 return -EINVAL;
7304 }
7305 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
7306 regs[BPF_REG_0].map_uid = meta.map_uid;
7307 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag;
7308 if (!type_may_be_null(ret_type) &&
7309 map_value_has_spin_lock(meta.map_ptr)) {
7310 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
7311 }
7312 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_SOCKET) {
7313 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7314 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCKET | ret_flag;
7315 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON) {
7316 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7317 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | ret_flag;
7318 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK) {
7319 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7320 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | ret_flag;
7321 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM) {
7322 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7323 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
7324 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.mem_size;
7325 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_MEM_OR_BTF_ID) {
7326 const struct btf_type *t;
7327
7328 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7329 t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(meta.ret_btf, meta.ret_btf_id, NULL);
7330 if (!btf_type_is_struct(t)) {
7331 u32 tsize;
7332 const struct btf_type *ret;
7333 const char *tname;
7334
7335 /* resolve the type size of ksym. */
7336 ret = btf_resolve_size(meta.ret_btf, t, &tsize);
7337 if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
7338 tname = btf_name_by_offset(meta.ret_btf, t->name_off);
7339 verbose(env, "unable to resolve the size of type '%s': %ld\n",
7340 tname, PTR_ERR(ret));
7341 return -EINVAL;
7342 }
7343 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
7344 regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
7345 } else {
7346 /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
7347 * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
7348 * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
7349 * check_mem_access().
7350 */
7351 ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
7352
7353 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
7354 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
7355 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
7356 }
7357 } else if (base_type(ret_type) == RET_PTR_TO_BTF_ID) {
7358 struct btf *ret_btf;
7359 int ret_btf_id;
7360
7361 mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
7362 regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
7363 if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
7364 ret_btf = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf;
7365 ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_off_desc->kptr.btf_id;
7366 } else {
7367 ret_btf = btf_vmlinux;
7368 ret_btf_id = *fn->ret_btf_id;
7369 }
7370 if (ret_btf_id == 0) {
7371 verbose(env, "invalid return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
7372 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id),
7373 func_id);
7374 return -EINVAL;
7375 }
7376 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
7377 regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
7378 } else {
7379 verbose(env, "unknown return type %u of func %s#%d\n",
7380 base_type(ret_type), func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
7381 return -EINVAL;
7382 }
7383
7384 if (type_may_be_null(regs[BPF_REG_0].type))
7385 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
7386
7387 if (is_ptr_cast_function(func_id)) {
7388 /* For release_reference() */
7389 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
7390 } else if (is_acquire_function(func_id, meta.map_ptr)) {
7391 int id = acquire_reference_state(env, insn_idx);
7392
7393 if (id < 0)
7394 return id;
7395 /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */
7396 regs[BPF_REG_0].id = id;
7397 /* For release_reference() */
7398 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = id;
7399 } else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data) {
7400 int dynptr_id = 0, i;
7401
7402 /* Find the id of the dynptr we're acquiring a reference to */
7403 for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS; i++) {
7404 if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[i])) {
7405 if (dynptr_id) {
7406 verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple dynptr args in func\n");
7407 return -EFAULT;
7408 }
7409 dynptr_id = stack_slot_get_id(env, ®s[BPF_REG_1 + i]);
7410 }
7411 }
7412 /* For release_reference() */
7413 regs[BPF_REG_0].ref_obj_id = dynptr_id;
7414 }
7415
7416 do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta);
7417
7418 err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id);
7419 if (err)
7420 return err;
7421
7422 if ((func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_stack ||
7423 func_id == BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack) &&
7424 !env->prog->has_callchain_buf) {
7425 const char *err_str;
7426
Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://01.org/lkp
RFC PATCH 4/4 selftests/bpf: bpf_panic selftest
In reply to Artem SavkovAdd a selftest for bpf_panic() checking that the program will only load if all the prerequisites are met.
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 144 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c new file +144 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. */ + +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <bpf/btf.h> + +#include "cap_helpers.h" + +static int sysctl_get (const char *sysctl_path,char *old_val) +{ +int ret =0 ; +FILE *fp; + + fp =fopen (sysctl_path,"r" ); +if (!fp) +return -errno; + +if (fscanf (fp,"%s" , old_val) <=0 ) + ret = -ENOENT ; + +fclose (fp); + +return ret; +} + +static int sysctl_set (const char *sysctl_path,const char *new_val) +{ +int ret =0 ; +FILE *fp; + + fp =fopen (sysctl_path,"w" ); +if (!fp) +return -errno; + +if (fprintf (fp,"%s" , new_val) <0 ) + ret = -errno; + +fclose (fp); + +return ret; +} + +static char bpf_vlog[UINT_MAX >>8 ]; + +static void test_bpf_panic_conditions (void ) +{ +int fd_prog; +int map_fd; +struct bpf_insn prog_insns[] = { +BPF_LD_MAP_VALUE (BPF_REG_1 ,0 ,0 ), +BPF_RAW_INSN (BPF_JMP |BPF_CALL ,0 ,0 ,0 , BPF_FUNC_panic), +BPF_MOV64_IMM (BPF_REG_0 ,0 ), +BPF_EXIT_INSN (), + }; +const size_t prog_insn_cnt =sizeof (prog_insns) /sizeof (struct bpf_insn ); +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_prog_load_opts, load_opts); +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_map_create_opts, map_create_opts); +int attach_btf_id; +__u64 save_caps =0 ; + +if (!ASSERT_OK (sysctl_set ("/proc/sys/kernel/destructive_bpf_enabled" , +"1" ),"set destructive_bpf_enabled" )) +return ; + + load_opts.log_level =1 ; + load_opts.log_buf = bpf_vlog; + load_opts.log_size =sizeof (bpf_vlog); + load_opts.expected_attach_type =BPF_TRACE_FENTRY ; + + attach_btf_id =libbpf_find_vmlinux_btf_id ("dentry_open" , load_opts.expected_attach_type); +if (!ASSERT_GE (attach_btf_id,0 ,"attach_btf_id" )) +return ; + + load_opts.attach_btf_id = attach_btf_id; + + map_create_opts.map_flags =BPF_F_RDONLY_PROG ; + map_fd =bpf_map_create (BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY ,NULL ,4 ,8 ,1 , &map_create_opts); +if (!ASSERT_GE (map_fd,0 ,"bpf_map_create" )) +return ; +ASSERT_OK (bpf_map_freeze (map_fd),"bpf_map_freeze" ); + + prog_insns[0 ].imm = map_fd; + + fd_prog =bpf_prog_load (BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING ,"bpf_panic" ,"GPL" , prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts); + +if (ASSERT_EQ (fd_prog, -EACCES ,"BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE required" )) { +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR ( +strstr (bpf_vlog,"require BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE" ), +"BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE verifier log" )) { +printf ("verifier log:\n%s\n" , bpf_vlog); + } + } + + load_opts.prog_flags =BPF_F_DESTRUCTIVE ; + fd_prog =bpf_prog_load (BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING ,"bpf_panic" ,"GPL" , prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts); + +if (ASSERT_GE (fd_prog,0 ,"successful load" )) { +close (fd_prog); + }else { +printf ("verifier log:\n%s\n" , bpf_vlog); + } + + +if (ASSERT_OK (cap_disable_effective (1ULL <<CAP_SYS_BOOT , &save_caps),"disable caps" )) { + fd_prog =bpf_prog_load (BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING ,"bpf_panic" ,"GPL" , prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts); +ASSERT_EQ (fd_prog, -EINVAL ,"CAP_SYS_BOOT required" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR ( +strstr (bpf_vlog,"unknown func bpf_panic" ), +"CAP_SYS_BOOT verifier log" )) { +printf ("verifier log:\n%s\n" , bpf_vlog); + } +cap_enable_effective (save_caps,NULL ); + } + +if (ASSERT_OK (sysctl_set ("/proc/sys/kernel/destructive_bpf_enabled" , +"0" ),"unset destructive_bpf_enabled" )) { + fd_prog =bpf_prog_load (BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING ,"bpf_panic" ,"GPL" , prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts); +ASSERT_EQ (fd_prog, -EINVAL ,"!destructive_bpf_enabled" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR ( +strstr (bpf_vlog,"unknown func bpf_panic" ), +"!destructive_bpf_enabled verifier log" )) { +printf ("verifier log:\n%s\n" , bpf_vlog); + } + } +close (map_fd); +} + +void test_bpf_panic (void ) +{ +char destructive_bpf_enabled_orig[32 ] = {}; + +if (!ASSERT_OK (sysctl_get ("/proc/sys/kernel/destructive_bpf_enabled" , + destructive_bpf_enabled_orig),"read destructive_bpf_enabled" )) + goto cleanup; + +libbpf_set_strict_mode (LIBBPF_STRICT_ALL ); +if (test__start_subtest ("bpf_panic_conditions" )) +test_bpf_panic_conditions (); + +cleanup: +if (strlen (destructive_bpf_enabled_orig) >0 ) +sysctl_set ("/proc/sys/kernel/destructive_bpf_enabled" , + destructive_bpf_enabled_orig); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
Quoted 5 lines · Artem Savkov
eBPF is often used for kernel debugging, and one of the widely used and powerful debugging techniques is post-mortem debugging with a full memory dump. Triggering a panic at exactly the right moment allows the user to get such a dump and thus a better view at the system's state. This patchset adds
bpf_panic()helper to do exactly that.
FWIW I was asked for such helper some time ago from Daniel Vacek, cc-ed
jirka
Quoted 26 lines
I realize that even though there are multiple guards present, a helper like this is contrary to BPF being "safe", so this is sent as RFC to have a discussion on whether adding destructive capabilities is deemed acceptable.
Artem Savkov (4):
bpf: add a sysctl to enable destructive bpf helpers
bpf: addBPF_F_DESTRUCTIVEflag forBPF_PROG_LOAD
bpf: addbpf_panic()helper
selftests/bpf:bpf_panicselftestinclude/linux/bpf.h | 8 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 33 +++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 + kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 + tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.cSignature · 1 line
2.35.3
Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 5 lines · Artem Savkov
eBPF is often used for kernel debugging, and one of the widely used and powerful debugging techniques is post-mortem debugging with a full memory dump. Triggering a panic at exactly the right moment allows the user to get such a dump and thus a better view at the system's state. This patchset adds
bpf_panic()helper to do exactly that.FWIW I was asked for such helper some time ago from Daniel Vacek, cc-ed
Nice :-)
This is totally welcome. Though, IIRC, I was asking if I could do a NULL pointer dereference within perf probe (or ftrace) back then. Still, the outcome is similar. So kudos to Artem.
--nX
Quoted 29 lines
jirka
Quoted 26 lines
I realize that even though there are multiple guards present, a helper like this is contrary to BPF being "safe", so this is sent as RFC to have a discussion on whether adding destructive capabilities is deemed acceptable.
Artem Savkov (4):
bpf: add a sysctl to enable destructive bpf helpers
bpf: addBPF_F_DESTRUCTIVEflag forBPF_PROG_LOAD
bpf: addbpf_panic()helper
selftests/bpf:bpf_panicselftestinclude/linux/bpf.h | 8 + include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/core.c | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 13 ++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 33 +++- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 + kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 + tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 13 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c | 144 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_panic.c--
2.35.3