x86/speculation: Add BHI_DIS support
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 x86/speculation: Add BHI_DIS support
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks can be mitigated using the BHI_DIS_S indirect predictor control bit located in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL register. Set BHI_DIS in MSR_IA32_SPC_CTRL to prevent predicted targets of indirect branches executed in CPL0, CPL1, or CPL2 from being selected based on branch history from branches executed in CPL3. Support for this feature is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[BHI_CTRL] (bit 4).
Users wanting BHI protection can specify spectre_v2=eibrs,bhi_dis to enable hardware BHI protections. On platforms where BHI protections are not available in the hardware revert to eibrs,retpoline mitigations.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 5 ++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 8 +++ 8 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +5 -0
@@ -605,6 +605,11 @@ kernel command line. eibrs enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs,bhi_dis enhanced IBRS + Hardware BHI prevention + + Specifying eibrs,bhi_dis on hardware that is missing that + feature will cause the software to fall back to + "eibrs,retpoline" mode. Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto.
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
@@ -5592,6 +5592,8 @@ eibrs - enhanced IBRS eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs,bhi_dis - enhanced IBRS + Hardware BHI + prevention ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -302,6 +302,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE (11*32+13)/* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK (11*32+14)/* "" Use REturn THUNK */ #define X86_FEATURE_UNRET (11*32+15)/* "" AMD BTB untrain return */ +#define X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL (11*32+16)/* "" Branch History Injection control */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4)/* AVX VNNI instructions */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +8 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6/* Disable RRSBA behavior */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT 10/* Disable Branch History Injection behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049/* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0)/* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -150,6 +152,12 @@* are restricted to targets in * kernel. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO BIT(20)/* +* Predicted targets of CPL0 +* indirect branches are not +* based on branch history from +* CPL3. +*/ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0)/*
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +1 -0
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ,SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ,SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE , +SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_BHI , SPECTRE_V2_IBRS, };
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +50 -3
119 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = { { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, CPUID_EBX, 0, 0x00000007, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 }, + { X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 4, 0x00000007, 2 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 }, { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +8 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT 6/* Disable RRSBA behavior */ #define SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S_SHIFT) +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT 10/* Disable Branch History Injection behavior */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S BIT(SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S_SHIFT)#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049/* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0)/* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
@@ -149,6 +151,12 @@* are restricted to targets in * kernel. */ +#define ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO BIT(20)/* +* Predicted targets of CPL0 +* indirect branches are not +* based on branch history from +* CPL3. +*/ #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0)/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Boris Petkov
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks can be mitigated using the
BHI_DIS_Sindirect predictor control bit located inMSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRLregister. SetBHI_DISinMSR_IA32_SPC_CTRLto prevent predicted targets of indirect branches executed in CPL0, CPL1, or CPL2 from being selected based on branch history from branches executed in CPL3. Support for this feature is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[BHI_CTRL] (bit 4).Users wanting BHI protection can specify spectre_v2=eibrs,bhi_dis to enable hardware BHI protections. On platforms where BHI protections are not available in the hardware revert to eibrs,retpoline mitigations.
Why is this a separately selectable option and not automatically enabled?
Signature · 1 line
Sent from a small device: formatting sux and brevity is inevitable.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Daniel Sneddon
Branch History Injection (BHI) attacks can be mitigated using the
BHI_DIS_Sindirect predictor control bit located inMSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRLregister. SetBHI_DISinMSR_IA32_SPC_CTRLto prevent predicted targets of indirect branches executed in CPL0, CPL1, or CPL2 from being selected based on branch history from branches executed in CPL3. Support for this feature is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[BHI_CTRL] (bit 4).
What actual hardware will have this?
Quoted 4 lines
Users wanting BHI protection can specify spectre_v2=eibrs,bhi_dis to enable hardware BHI protections. On platforms where BHI protections are not available in the hardware revert to eibrs,retpoline mitigations.
AFAICT this doesn't get auto-selected; how bad is performance for this to not be so?