5.18.16-rc1 review
Subsystems (3)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 5.18.16-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 5.18.16-rc1
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>
x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB at firmware entry when IBPB is not available
Waiman Long <[email protected]>
locking/rwsem: Allow slowpath writer to ignore handoff bit if not set by first waiter
Eiichi Tsukata <[email protected]>
docs/kernel-parameters: Update descriptions for "mitigations=" param with retbleed
Sherry Sun <[email protected]>
EDAC/synopsys: Re-enable the error interrupts on v3 hw
Sherry Sun <[email protected]>
EDAC/synopsys: Use the correct register to disable the error interrupt on v3 hw
Toshi Kani <[email protected]>
EDAC/ghes: Set the DIMM label unconditionally
Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
ARM: 9216/1: Fix MAX_DMA_ADDRESS overflow
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows.
Jaewon Kim <[email protected]>
page_alloc: fix invalid watermark check on a negative value
Ralph Campbell <[email protected]>
mm/hmm: fault non-owner device private entries
Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
stmmac: dwmac-mediatek: fix resource leak in probe
Dimitris Michailidis <[email protected]>
net/funeth: Fix fun_xdp_tx() and XDP packet reclaim
Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: leave the err path free in sctp_stream_init to sctp_stream_free
Alejandro Lucero <[email protected]>
sfc: disable softirqs for ptp TX
Leo Yan <[email protected]>
perf symbol: Correct address for bss symbols
Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: fix the race between refill work and close
Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
mptcp: don't send RST for single subflow
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: core: Fix a race condition related to device management
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: Support clearing multiple commands at once
Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_queue: do not allow packet truncation below transport header offset
Sunil Goutham <[email protected]>
octeontx2-pf: cn10k: Fix egress ratelimit configuration
Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
sctp: fix sleep in atomic context bug in timer handlers
Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
net: dsa: fix reference counting for LAG FDBs
Michal Maloszewski <[email protected]>
i40e: Fix interface init with MSI interrupts (no MSI-X)
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: Fix data-races around sysctl_[rw]mem(_offset)?.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sk_pacing_rate.
Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
net: mld: fix reference count leak in mld_{query | report}_work()
Jianglei Nie <[email protected]>
net: macsec: fix potential resource leak in macsec_add_rxsa() and macsec_add_txsa()
Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
macsec: always read MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN as a u64
Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
macsec: limit replay window size with XPN
Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
macsec: fix error message in macsec_add_rxsa and _txsa
Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
macsec: fix NULL deref in macsec_add_rxsa
Xin Long <[email protected]>
Documentation: fix sctp_wmem in ip-sysctl.rst
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_autocorking.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs.
Tom Rix <[email protected]>
mlxsw: spectrum_router: simplify list unwinding
Liang He <[email protected]>
net: sungem_phy: Add of_node_put() for reference returned by of_get_parent()
Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
net: pcs: xpcs: propagate xpcs_read error to xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii
Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>
net/tls: Remove the context from the list in tls_device_down
Ziyang Xuan <[email protected]>
ipv6/addrconf: fix a null-ptr-deref bug for ip6_ptr
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
net: ping6: Fix memleak in ipv6_renew_options().
David Jeffery <[email protected]>
scsi: mpt3sas: Stop fw fault watchdog work item during system shutdown
Jason Yan <[email protected]>
scsi: core: Fix warning in scsi_alloc_sgtables()
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf.
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: md5: fix IPv4-mapped support
Subbaraya Sundeep <[email protected]>
octeontx2-pf: Fix UDP/TCP src and dst port tc filters
Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Revert "tcp: change pingpong threshold to 3"
Liang He <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: host: Hold reference returned by of_parse_phandle()
Anirudh Venkataramanan <[email protected]>
ice: Fix VSIs unable to share unicast MAC
Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
ice: do not setup vlan for loopback VSI
Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
ice: check (DD | EOF) bits on Rx descriptor rather than (EOP | RS)
Przemyslaw Patynowski <[email protected]>
ice: Fix max VLANs available for VF
Benjamin Poirier <[email protected]>
bridge: Do not send empty IFLA_AF_SPEC attribute
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_frto.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_app_win.
Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_dsack.
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
watch_queue: Fix missing locking in add_watch_to_object()
David Howells <[email protected]>
watch_queue: Fix missing rcu annotation
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
drm/simpledrm: Fix return type of simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_mode_valid()
Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
nouveau/svm: Fix to migrate all requested pages
Waiman Long <[email protected]>
intel_idle: Fix false positive RCU splats due to incorrect hardirqs state
Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
s390/archrandom: prevent CPACF trng invocations in interrupt context
Lukas Bulwahn <[email protected]>
asm-generic: remove a broken and needless ifdef conditional
Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
hugetlb: fix memoryleak in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte
Muchun Song <[email protected]>
mm: fix missing wake-up event for FSDAX pages
Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
mm: fix page leak with multiple threads mapping the same page
Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate
Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>
fs: sendfile handles O_NONBLOCK of out_fd
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]>
ntfs: fix use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp()
Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
userfaultfd: provide properly masked address for huge-pages
Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
Revert "ocfs2: mount shared volume without ha stack"
Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
ARM: pxa2xx: Fix GPIO descriptor tables
Michael Walle <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: lan966x: fix sys_clk frequency
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put
Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Always set event mask on suspend
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 + Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 9 +- Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/lan966x.dtsi | 2 +- arch/arm/include/asm/dma.h | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/corgi.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/hx4700.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/icontrol.c | 4 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/littleton.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/spitz.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/z2.c | 4 +- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 + drivers/edac/ghes_edac.c | 11 ++- drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c | 44 +++++---- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c | 6 +- drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/simpledrm.c | 2 +- drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 8 +- drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_rx.c | 5 +- drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_tx.c | 20 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_txrx.h | 6 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 4 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 3 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 10 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 40 -------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 3 +- .../net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_tc.c | 106 ++++++++++++++------- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 20 ++-- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c | 22 +++++ .../net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-mediatek.c | 9 +- drivers/net/macsec.c | 33 ++++--- drivers/net/pcs/pcs-xpcs.c | 2 +- drivers/net/sungem_phy.c | 1 + drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 37 ++++++- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 1 + drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c | 15 ++- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 98 +++++++++++++------ fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 8 +- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h | 4 +- fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c | 46 ++++----- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 21 ---- fs/read_write.c | 3 + fs/userfaultfd.c | 12 ++- include/asm-generic/io.h | 2 - include/linux/mm.h | 14 ++- include/net/addrconf.h | 3 + include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 + include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 10 +- include/net/sock.h | 8 +- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 30 ++++-- kernel/watch_queue.c | 58 ++++++----- mm/gup.c | 6 +- mm/hmm.c | 19 ++-- mm/hugetlb.c | 1 + mm/memory.c | 7 +- mm/memremap.c | 6 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ++- mm/secretmem.c | 33 +++++-- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 6 +- net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 61 +++++++++--- net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 8 +- net/decnet/af_decnet.c | 4 +- net/dsa/switch.c | 1 + net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 23 +++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 41 ++++---- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 10 +- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 27 +++--- net/ipv6/mcast.c | 14 +-- net/ipv6/ping.c | 6 ++ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 4 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 8 +- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 10 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 7 +- net/sctp/associola.c | 5 +- net/sctp/stream.c | 19 +--- net/sctp/stream_sched.c | 2 +- net/tipc/socket.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls_device.c | 7 +- tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 45 ++++++++- 84 files changed, 727 insertions(+), 455 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/88 Bluetooth: Always set event mask on suspend
From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <[email protected]>
commit ef61b6ea154464fefd8a6712d7a3b43b445c3d4a upstream.
When suspending, always set the event mask once disconnects are successful. Otherwise, if wakeup is disallowed, the event mask is not set before suspend continues and can result in an early wakeup.
--- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +3 -3
@@ -4942,6 +4942,9 @@ int hci_suspend_sync(struct hci_dev *hdereturn err; } +/* Update event mask so only the allowed event can wakeup the host */ +hci_set_event_mask_sync (hdev); +/* Only configure accept list if disconnect succeeded and wake * isn't being prevented. */
@@ -4953,9 +4956,6 @@ int hci_suspend_sync(struct hci_dev *hde/* Unpause to take care of updating scanning params */ hdev->scanning_paused = false; -/* Update event mask so only the allowed event can wakeup the host */ -hci_set_event_mask_sync (hdev); -/* Enable event filter for paired devices */ hci_update_event_filter_sync (hdev);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/88 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
commit d0be8347c623e0ac4202a1d4e0373882821f56b0 upstream.
This fixes the following trace which is caused by hci_rx_work starting up *after* the final channel reference has been put() during sock_close() but *before* the references to the channel have been destroyed, so instead the code now rely on kref_get_unless_zero/l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero to prevent referencing a channel that is about to be destroyed.
refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc114f5bf18 by task kworker/u17:14/705 CPU: 4 PID: 705 Comm: kworker/u17:14 Tainted: G S W 4.14.234-00003-g1fb6d0bd49a4-dirty #28 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM sm8150 Flame DVT (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x378 show_stack+0x20/0x2c dump_stack+0x124/0x148 print_address_description+0x80/0x2e8 __kasan_report+0x168/0x188 kasan_report+0x10/0x18 __asan_load4+0x84/0x8c refcount_dec_and_test+0x20/0xd0 l2cap_chan_put+0x48/0x12c l2cap_recv_frame+0x4770/0x6550 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x44c/0x7a4 hci_acldata_packet+0x100/0x188 hci_rx_work+0x178/0x23c process_one_work+0x35c/0x95c worker_thread+0x4cc/0x960 kthread+0x1a8/0x1c4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
--- include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h | 1 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +1 -0
@@ -847,6 +847,7 @@ enum { };void l2cap_chan_hold (struct l2cap_chan *c); +struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero (struct l2cap_chan *c);void l2cap_chan_put (struct l2cap_chan *c);static inline void l2cap_chan_lock (struct l2cap_chan *chan)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +48 -13
180 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/88 ARM: dts: lan966x: fix sys_clk frequency
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael Walle <[email protected]>
commit ef0324b6415db6742bd632dc0dfbb8fbc111473b upstream.
The sys_clk frequency is 165.625MHz. The register reference of the Generic Clock controller lists the CPU clock as 600MHz, the DDR clock as 300MHz and the SYS clock as 162.5MHz. This is wrong. It was first noticed during the fan driver development and it was measured and verified via the CLK_MON output of the SoC which can be configured to output sys_clk/64.
The core PLL settings (which drives the SYS clock) seems to be as follows:
DIVF = 52
DIVQ = 3
DIVR = 1
With a refernce clock of 25MHz, this means we have a post divider clock
Fpfd = Fref / (DIVR + 1) = 25MHz / (1 + 1) = 12.5MHz
The resulting VCO frequency is then
Fvco = Fpfd * (DIVF + 1) * 2 = 12.5MHz * (52 + 1) * 2 = 1325MHz
And the output frequency is
Fout = Fvco / 2^DIVQ = 1325MHz / 2^3 = 165.625Mhz
This all adds up to the constrains of the PLL:
10MHz <= Fpfd <= 200MHz
20MHz <= Fout <= 1000MHz1000MHz <= Fvco <= 2000MHz
--- arch/arm/boot/dts/lan966x.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/lan966x.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ clocks { sys_clk: sys_clk { compatible = "fixed-clock"; #clock-cells = <0>; - clock-frequency = <162500000>; + clock-frequency = <165625000>; }; cpu_clk: cpu_clk {
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/88 ARM: pxa2xx: Fix GPIO descriptor tables
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
commit c5cdb9286913aa5a5ebb81bcca0c17df3b0e2c79 upstream.
Laurence reports:
"Kernel >5.18 on Zaurus has a bug where the power management code can't talk to devices, emitting the following errors:
sharpsl-pm sharpsl-pm: Error: AC check failed: voltage -22. sharpsl-pm sharpsl-pm: Charging Error!
sharpsl-pm sharpsl-pm: Warning: Cannot read main battery!
Looking at the recent changes, I found that commit 31455bbda208 ("spi:pxa2xx_spi: Convert to use GPIO descriptors") replaced the deprecated SPI chip select platform device code with a gpiod lookup table. However, this didn't seem to work until I changed the dev_id member from the device name to the bus id. I'm not entirely sure why this is necessary, but I suspect it is related to the fact that in sysfs SPI devices are attached under /sys/devices/.../dev_name/spi_master/spiB/spiB.C, rather than directly to the device."
After reviewing the change I conclude that the same fix is needed for all affected boards.
--- arch/arm/mach-pxa/corgi.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/hx4700.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/icontrol.c | 4 ++-- arch/arm/mach-pxa/littleton.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/spitz.c | 2 +- arch/arm/mach-pxa/z2.c | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mach-pxa/corgi.c +1 -1
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static struct pxa2xx_spi_controller corg };static struct gpiod_lookup_table corgi_spi_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.1" , + .dev_id ="spi1" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,CORGI_GPIO_ADS7846_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,CORGI_GPIO_LCDCON_CS ,"cs" ,1 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),
arch/arm/mach-pxa/hx4700.c +1 -1
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static struct pxa2xx_spi_controller pxa_ };static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp2_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.2" , + .dev_id ="spi2" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,GPIO88_HX4700_TSC2046_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ), { },
arch/arm/mach-pxa/icontrol.c +2 -2
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ struct platform_device pxa_spi_ssp4 = { };static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp3_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.3" , + .dev_id ="spi3" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" , ICONTROL_MCP251x_nCS1,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" , ICONTROL_MCP251x_nCS2,"cs" ,1 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp };static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp4_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.4" , + .dev_id ="spi4" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" , ICONTROL_MCP251x_nCS3,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" , ICONTROL_MCP251x_nCS4,"cs" ,1 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),
arch/arm/mach-pxa/littleton.c +1 -1
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static struct spi_board_info littleton_s };static struct gpiod_lookup_table littleton_spi_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.2" , + .dev_id ="spi2" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,LITTLETON_GPIO_LCD_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ), { },
arch/arm/mach-pxa/magician.c +1 -1
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static struct pxa2xx_spi_controller magi };static struct gpiod_lookup_table magician_spi_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.2" , + .dev_id ="spi2" , .table = {/* NOTICE must be GPIO, incompatibility with hw PXA SPI framing */ GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,GPIO14_MAGICIAN_TSC2046_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),
arch/arm/mach-pxa/spitz.c +1 -1
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ static struct pxa2xx_spi_controller spit };static struct gpiod_lookup_table spitz_spi_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.2" , + .dev_id ="spi2" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,SPITZ_GPIO_ADS7846_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,SPITZ_GPIO_LCDCON_CS ,"cs" ,1 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ),
arch/arm/mach-pxa/z2.c +2 -2
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static struct pxa2xx_spi_controller pxa_ };static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp1_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.1" , + .dev_id ="spi1" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,GPIO24_ZIPITZ2_WIFI_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ), { },
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp };static struct gpiod_lookup_table pxa_ssp2_gpio_table = { - .dev_id ="pxa2xx-spi.2" , + .dev_id ="spi2" , .table = {GPIO_LOOKUP_IDX ("gpio-pxa" ,GPIO88_ZIPITZ2_LCD_CS ,"cs" ,0 ,GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW ), { },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/88 Revert "ocfs2: mount shared volume without ha stack"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
commit c80af0c250c8f8a3c978aa5aafbe9c39b336b813 upstream.
This reverts commit 912f655d78c5d4ad05eac287f23a435924df7144.
This commit introduced a regression that can cause mount hung. The changes in __ocfs2_find_empty_slot causes that any node with none-zero node number can grab the slot that was already taken by node 0, so node 1 will access the same journal with node 0, when it try to grab journal cluster lock, it will hung because it was already acquired by node 0. It's very easy to reproduce this, in one cluster, mount node 0 first, then node 1, you will see the following call trace from node 1.
[13148.735424] INFO: task mount.ocfs2:53045 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [13148.739691] Not tainted 5.15.0-2148.0.4.el8uek.mountracev2.x86_64 #2 [13148.742560] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [13148.745846] task:mount.ocfs2 state:D stack: 0 pid:53045 ppid: 53044 flags:0x00004000 [13148.749354] Call Trace: [13148.750718] <TASK> [13148.752019] ? usleep_range+0x90/0x89 [13148.753882] __schedule+0x210/0x567 [13148.755684] schedule+0x44/0xa8 [13148.757270] schedule_timeout+0x106/0x13c [13148.759273] ? __prepare_to_swait+0x53/0x78 [13148.761218] __wait_for_common+0xae/0x163 [13148.763144] __ocfs2_cluster_lock.constprop.0+0x1d6/0x870 [ocfs2] [13148.765780] ? ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x18d/0x398 [ocfs2] [13148.768312] ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x18d/0x398 [ocfs2] [13148.770968] ocfs2_journal_init+0x91/0x340 [ocfs2] [13148.773202] ocfs2_check_volume+0x39/0x461 [ocfs2] [13148.775401] ? iput+0x69/0xba [13148.777047] ocfs2_mount_volume.isra.0.cold+0x40/0x1f5 [ocfs2] [13148.779646] ocfs2_fill_super+0x54b/0x853 [ocfs2] [13148.781756] mount_bdev+0x190/0x1b7 [13148.783443] ? ocfs2_remount+0x440/0x440 [ocfs2] [13148.785634] legacy_get_tree+0x27/0x48 [13148.787466] vfs_get_tree+0x25/0xd0 [13148.789270] do_new_mount+0x18c/0x2d9 [13148.791046] __x64_sys_mount+0x10e/0x142 [13148.792911] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x89 [13148.794667] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x170/0x0 [13148.797051] RIP: 0033:0x7f2309f6e26e [13148.798784] RSP: 002b:00007ffdcee7d408 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [13148.801974] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdcee7d4a0 RCX: 00007f2309f6e26e [13148.804815] RDX: 0000559aa762a8ae RSI: 0000559aa939d340 RDI: 0000559aa93a22b0 [13148.807719] RBP: 00007ffdcee7d5b0 R08: 0000559aa93a2290 R09: 00007f230a0b4820 [13148.810659] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcee7d420 [13148.813609] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000559aa939f000 R15: 0000000000000000 [13148.816564] </TASK>
To fix it, we can just fix __ocfs2_find_empty_slot. But original commit introduced the feature to mount ocfs2 locally even it is cluster based, that is a very dangerous, it can easily cause serious data corruption, there is no way to stop other nodes mounting the fs and corrupting it. Setup ha or other cluster-aware stack is just the cost that we have to take for avoiding corruption, otherwise we have to do it in kernel.
--- fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h | 4 +--- fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 21 --------------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/ocfs2.h +1 -3
@@ -277,7 +277,6 @@ enum ocfs2_mount_optionsOCFS2_MOUNT_JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT =1 <<15 ,/* Journal Async Commit */ OCFS2_MOUNT_ERRORS_CONT =1 <<16 ,/* Return EIO to the calling process on error */ OCFS2_MOUNT_ERRORS_ROFS = 1 << 17, /* Change filesystem to read-only on error */ - OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER = 1 << 18, /* No cluster aware filesystem mount */ };#define OCFS2_OSB_SOFT_RO 0x0001
@@ -673,8 +672,7 @@ static inline int ocfs2_cluster_o2cb_glostatic inline int ocfs2_mount_local (struct ocfs2_super *osb) { -return ((osb->s_feature_incompat &OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_LOCAL_MOUNT ) - || (osb->s_mount_opt &OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER )); +return (osb->s_feature_incompat &OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_LOCAL_MOUNT ); }static inline int ocfs2_uses_extended_slot_map (struct ocfs2_super *osb)
fs/ocfs2/slot_map.c +19 -27
65 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ocfs2/super.c +0 -21
@@ -172,7 +172,6 @@ enum { Opt_dir_resv_level, Opt_journal_async_commit, Opt_err_cont, - Opt_nocluster, Opt_err, };
@@ -206,7 +205,6 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_dir_resv_level, "dir_resv_level=%u"}, {Opt_journal_async_commit, "journal_async_commit"}, {Opt_err_cont, "errors=continue"}, - {Opt_nocluster, "nocluster"}, {Opt_err, NULL} };
@@ -618,13 +616,6 @@ static int ocfs2_remount(struct super_bl goto out; } - tmp =OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER ; -if ((osb->s_mount_opt & tmp) != (parsed_options.mount_opt & tmp)) { - ret = -EINVAL ; -mlog (ML_ERROR ,"Cannot change nocluster option on remount\n" ); - goto out; - } - tmp =OCFS2_MOUNT_HB_LOCAL |OCFS2_MOUNT_HB_GLOBAL |OCFS2_MOUNT_HB_NONE ;if ((osb->s_mount_opt & tmp) != (parsed_options.mount_opt & tmp)) {
@@ -865,7 +856,6 @@ static int ocfs2_verify_userspace_stack( }if (ocfs2_userspace_stack (osb) && - !(osb->s_mount_opt &OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER ) &&strncmp (osb->osb_cluster_stack, mopt->cluster_stack,OCFS2_STACK_LABEL_LEN )) { mlog(ML_ERROR,
@@ -1144,11 +1134,6 @@ static int ocfs2_fill_super(struct super osb->s_mount_opt &OCFS2_MOUNT_DATA_WRITEBACK ?"writeback" : "ordered"); -if ((osb->s_mount_opt &OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER ) && - !(osb->s_feature_incompat &OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_LOCAL_MOUNT )) -printk (KERN_NOTICE "ocfs2: The shared device (%s) is mounted " -"without cluster aware mode.\n" , osb->dev_str); -atomic_set (&osb->vol_state,VOLUME_MOUNTED );wake_up (&osb->osb_mount_event);
@@ -1455,9 +1440,6 @@ static int ocfs2_parse_options(struct sucase Opt_journal_async_commit: mopt->mount_opt |=OCFS2_MOUNT_JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT ;break ; -case Opt_nocluster: - mopt->mount_opt |=OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER ; -break ;default :mlog (ML_ERROR , "Unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
@@ -1569,9 +1551,6 @@ static int ocfs2_show_options(struct seqif (opts &OCFS2_MOUNT_JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT )seq_printf (s,",journal_async_commit" ); -if (opts &OCFS2_MOUNT_NOCLUSTER ) -seq_printf (s,",nocluster" ); -return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/88 userfaultfd: provide properly masked address for huge-pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
commit d172b1a3bd065dd89234eac547fc62cf80681631 upstream.
Commit 824ddc601adc ("userfaultfd: provide unmasked address on page-fault") was introduced to fix an old bug, in which the offset in the address of a page-fault was masked. Concerns were raised - although were never backed by actual code - that some userspace code might break because the bug has been around for quite a while. To address these concerns a new flag was introduced, and only when this flag is set by the user, userfaultfd provides the exact address of the page-fault.
The commit however had a bug, and if the flag is unset, the offset was always masked based on a base-page granularity. Yet, for huge-pages, the behavior prior to the commit was that the address is masked to the huge-page granulrity.
While there are no reports on real breakage, fix this issue. If the flag is unset, use the address with the masking that was done before.
--- fs/userfaultfd.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/userfaultfd.c +7 -5
@@ -191,17 +191,19 @@ static inline void msg_init(struct uffd_ }static inline struct uffd_msg userfault_msg (unsigned long address, +unsigned long real_address,unsigned int flags,unsigned long reason,unsigned int features) {struct uffd_msg msg; +msg_init (&msg); msg.event =UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT ; -if (!(features &UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS )) - address &=PAGE_MASK ; - msg.arg.pagefault.address = address; + msg.arg.pagefault.address = (features &UFFD_FEATURE_EXACT_ADDRESS ) ? + real_address : address; +/* * These flags indicate why the userfault occurred: * - UFFD_PAGEFAULT_FLAG_WP indicates a write protect fault.
@@ -485,8 +487,8 @@ vm_fault_t handle_userfault(struct vm_fainit_waitqueue_func_entry (&uwq.wq, userfaultfd_wake_function); uwq.wq.private = current; - uwq.msg =userfault_msg (vmf->real_address, vmf->flags, reason, - ctx->features); + uwq.msg =userfault_msg (vmf->address, vmf->real_address, vmf->flags, + reason, ctx->features); uwq.ctx = ctx; uwq.waken = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/88 ntfs: fix use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]>
commit 38c9c22a85aeed28d0831f230136e9cf6fa2ed44 upstream.
Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879
CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484
print_report.cold+0x55/0x232
kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0
ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41
ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90
ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0
ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360
ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220
ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120
ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180
load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480
ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0
mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460
legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220
vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300
do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0
path_mount+0x496/0x19d0
__x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea
Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00
RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac
memcg:ffff888101f7e180
anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201
raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of name string is out of bounds.
Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string.
--- fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs/attrib.c +6 -2
@@ -592,8 +592,12 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const ATTR_TYP a = (ATTR_RECORD *)((u8 *)ctx->attr +le32_to_cpu (ctx->attr->length));for (;; a = (ATTR_RECORD *)((u8 *)a +le32_to_cpu (a->length))) { -if ((u8 *)a < (u8 *)ctx->mrec || (u8 *)a > (u8 *)ctx->mrec + -le32_to_cpu (ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated)) +u8 *mrec_end = (u8 *)ctx->mrec + +le32_to_cpu (ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated); +u8 *name_end = (u8 *)a +le16_to_cpu (a->name_offset) + + a->name_length *sizeof (ntfschar); +if ((u8 *)a < (u8 *)ctx->mrec || (u8 *)a > mrec_end || + name_end > mrec_end)break ; ctx->attr = a; if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(a->type) > le32_to_cpu(type) ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/88 fs: sendfile handles O_NONBLOCK of out_fd
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andrei Vagin <[email protected]>
commit bdeb77bc2c405fa9f954c20269db175a0bd2793f upstream.
sendfile has to return EAGAIN if out_fd is nonblocking and the write into it would block.
Here is a small reproducer for the problem:
#define _GNU_SOURCE /* See feature_test_macros(7) */ #include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
#define FILE_SIZE (1UL << 30)
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int p[2], fd;
if (pipe2(p, O_NONBLOCK))
return 1;
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR | O_TMPFILE, 0666);
if (fd < 0)
return 1;
ftruncate(fd, FILE_SIZE);
if (sendfile(p[1], fd, 0, FILE_SIZE) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL\n");
}
if (sendfile(p[1], fd, 0, FILE_SIZE) != -1 || errno != EAGAIN) {
fprintf(stderr, "FAIL\n");
}
return 0;
}It worked before b964bf53e540, it is stuck after b964bf53e540, and it works again with this fix.
This regression occurred because do_splice_direct() calls pipe_write that handles O_NONBLOCK. Here is a trace log from the reproducer:
1) | __x64_sys_sendfile64() {
1) | do_sendfile() {
1) | __fdget()
1) | rw_verify_area()
1) | __fdget()
1) | rw_verify_area()
1) | do_splice_direct() {
1) | rw_verify_area()
1) | splice_direct_to_actor() {
1) | do_splice_to() {
1) | rw_verify_area()
1) | generic_file_splice_read()
1) + 74.153 us | }
1) | direct_splice_actor() {
1) | iter_file_splice_write() {
1) | __kmalloc()
1) 0.148 us | pipe_lock();
1) 0.153 us | splice_from_pipe_next.part.0();
1) 0.162 us | page_cache_pipe_buf_confirm();
... 16 times
1) 0.159 us | page_cache_pipe_buf_confirm();
1) | vfs_iter_write() {
1) | do_iter_write() {
1) | rw_verify_area()
1) | do_iter_readv_writev() {
1) | pipe_write() {
1) | mutex_lock()
1) 0.153 us | mutex_unlock();
1) 1.368 us | }
1) 1.686 us | }
1) 5.798 us | }
1) 6.084 us | }
1) 0.174 us | kfree();
1) 0.152 us | pipe_unlock();
1) + 14.461 us | }
1) + 14.783 us | }
1) 0.164 us | page_cache_pipe_buf_release();
... 16 times
1) 0.161 us | page_cache_pipe_buf_release();
1) | touch_atime()
1) + 95.854 us | }
1) + 99.784 us | }
1) ! 107.393 us | }
1) ! 107.699 us | }--- fs/read_write.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/read_write.c +3 -0
@@ -1247,6 +1247,9 @@ static ssize_t do_sendfile(int out_fd, i count, fl);file_end_write (out.file); }else { +if (out.file->f_flags &O_NONBLOCK ) + fl |=SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK ; + retval =splice_file_to_pipe (in.file, opipe, &pos, count, fl); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/88 secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
commit 84ac013046ccc438af04b7acecd4d3ab84fe4bde upstream.
syzkaller reports the following issue:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005 PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64 Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005 RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005 R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb FS: 00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline] folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline] truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline] truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899 RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: ffff888021f7e005 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards.
Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive.
--- mm/secretmem.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
mm/secretmem.c +26 -7
@@ -55,22 +55,28 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(structgfp_t gfp = vmf->gfp_mask;unsigned long addr;struct page *page; +vm_fault_t ret;int err;if (((loff_t )vmf->pgoff <<PAGE_SHIFT ) >=i_size_read (inode))return vmf_error (-EINVAL ); +filemap_invalidate_lock_shared (mapping); + retry: page =find_lock_page (mapping, offset);if (!page) { page =alloc_page (gfp | __GFP_ZERO); -if (!page) -return VM_FAULT_OOM ; +if (!page) { + ret =VM_FAULT_OOM ; + goto out; + } err =set_direct_map_invalid_noflush (page);if (err) {put_page (page); -return vmf_error (err); + ret =vmf_error (err); + goto out; }__SetPageUptodate (page);
@@ -86,7 +92,8 @@ retry:if (err == -EEXIST ) goto retry; -return vmf_error (err); + ret =vmf_error (err); + goto out; } addr = (unsigned long )page_address (page);
@@ -94,7 +101,11 @@ retry: } vmf->page = page; -return VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; + ret =VM_FAULT_LOCKED ; + +out: +filemap_invalidate_unlock_shared (mapping); +return ret; }static const struct vm_operations_struct secretmem_vm_ops = {
@@ -162,12 +173,20 @@ static int secretmem_setattr(struct user struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); +struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; +int ret; + +filemap_invalidate_lock (mapping);if ((ia_valid &ATTR_SIZE ) && inode->i_size) -return -EINVAL ; + ret = -EINVAL ; +else + ret =simple_setattr (mnt_userns, dentry, iattr); + +filemap_invalidate_unlock (mapping); -return simple_setattr (mnt_userns, dentry, iattr); +return ret; } static const struct inode_operations secretmem_iops = {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/88 mm: fix page leak with multiple threads mapping the same page
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>
commit 3fe2895cfecd03ac74977f32102b966b6589f481 upstream.
We have an application with a lot of threads that use a shared mmap backed by tmpfs mounted with -o huge=within_size. This application started leaking loads of huge pages when we upgraded to a recent kernel.
Using the page ref tracepoints and a BPF program written by Tejun Heo we were able to determine that these pages would have multiple refcounts from the page fault path, but when it came to unmap time we wouldn't drop the number of refs we had added from the faults.
I wrote a reproducer that mmap'ed a file backed by tmpfs with -o huge=always, and then spawned 20 threads all looping faulting random offsets in this map, while using madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) randomly for huge page aligned ranges. This very quickly reproduced the problem.
The problem here is that we check for the case that we have multiple threads faulting in a range that was previously unmapped. One thread maps the PMD, the other thread loses the race and then returns 0. However at this point we already have the page, and we are no longer putting this page into the processes address space, and so we leak the page. We actually did the correct thing prior to f9ce0be71d1f, however it looks like Kirill copied what we do in the anonymous page case. In the anonymous page case we don't yet have a page, so we don't have to drop a reference on anything. Previously we did the correct thing for file based faults by returning VM_FAULT_NOPAGE so we correctly drop the reference on the page we faulted in.
Fix this by returning VM_FAULT_NOPAGE in the pmd_devmap_trans_unstable() case, this makes us drop the ref on the page properly, and now my reproducer no longer leaks the huge pages.
--- mm/memory.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/memory.c +5 -2
@@ -4108,9 +4108,12 @@ vm_fault_t finish_fault(struct vm_faultreturn VM_FAULT_OOM ; } -/* See comment in handle_pte_fault() */ +/* +* See comment in handle_pte_fault() for how this scenario happens, we +* need to return NOPAGE so that we drop this page. +*/ if (pmd_devmap_trans_unstable (vmf->pmd)) -return 0 ; +return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE ; vmf->pte =pte_offset_map_lock (vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/88 mm: fix missing wake-up event for FSDAX pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Muchun Song <[email protected]>
commit f4f451a16dd1f478fdb966bcbb612c1e4ce6b962 upstream.
FSDAX page refcounts are 1-based, rather than 0-based: if refcount is 1, then the page is freed. The FSDAX pages can be pinned through GUP, then they will be unpinned via unpin_user_page() using a folio variant to put the page, however, folio variants did not consider this special case, the result will be to miss a wakeup event (like the user of __fuse_dax_break_layouts()). This results in a task being permanently stuck in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE state.
Since FSDAX pages are only possibly obtained by GUP users, so fix GUP instead of folio_put() to lower overhead.
--- include/linux/mm.h | 14 +++++++++----- mm/gup.c | 6 ++++-- mm/memremap.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +9 -5
@@ -1130,23 +1130,27 @@ static inline bool is_zone_movable_page(#if defined(CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE ) && defined(CONFIG_FS_DAX )DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (devmap_managed_key); -bool __put_devmap_managed_page (struct page *page); -static inline bool put_devmap_managed_page (struct page *page) +bool __put_devmap_managed_page_refs (struct page *page,int refs); +static inline bool put_devmap_managed_page_refs (struct page *page,int refs) {if (!static_branch_unlikely (&devmap_managed_key))return false;if (!is_zone_device_page (page))return false; -return __put_devmap_managed_page (page); +return __put_devmap_managed_page_refs (page, refs); } -#else /* CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE && CONFIG_FS_DAX */ -static inline bool put_devmap_managed_page (struct page *page) +static inline bool put_devmap_managed_page_refs (struct page *page,int refs) {return false; }#endif /* CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE && CONFIG_FS_DAX */ +static inline bool put_devmap_managed_page (struct page *page) +{ +return put_devmap_managed_page_refs (page,1 ); +} +/* 127: arbitrary random number, small enough to assemble well */ #define folio_ref_zero_or_close_to_overflow (folio) \ ((unsigned int) folio_ref_count(folio) + 127u <= 127u)
mm/gup.c +4 -2
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ retry:* belongs to this folio. */ if (unlikely (page_folio (page) != folio)) { -folio_put_refs (folio, refs); +if (!put_devmap_managed_page_refs (&folio->page, refs)) +folio_put_refs (folio, refs); goto retry; }
@@ -143,7 +144,8 @@ static void gup_put_folio(struct folio * refs *=GUP_PIN_COUNTING_BIAS ; } -folio_put_refs (folio, refs); +if (!put_devmap_managed_page_refs (&folio->page, refs)) +folio_put_refs (folio, refs); }/**
mm/memremap.c +3 -3
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ void free_zone_device_page(struct page * }#ifdef CONFIG_FS_DAX -bool __put_devmap_managed_page (struct page *page) +bool __put_devmap_managed_page_refs (struct page *page,int refs) {if (page->pgmap->type !=MEMORY_DEVICE_FS_DAX )return false;
@@ -499,9 +499,9 @@ bool __put_devmap_managed_page(struct pa* refcount is 1, then the page is free and the refcount is * stable because nobody holds a reference on the page. */ -if (page_ref_dec_return (page) ==1 ) +if (page_ref_sub_return (page, refs) ==1 )wake_up_var (&page->_refcount); return true; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (__put_devmap_managed_page); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__put_devmap_managed_page_refs);#endif /* CONFIG_FS_DAX */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/88 hugetlb: fix memoryleak in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
commit da9a298f5fad0dc615079a340da42928bc5b138e upstream.
When alloc_huge_page fails, *pagep is set to NULL without put_page first. So the hugepage indicated by *pagep is leaked.
--- mm/hugetlb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
mm/hugetlb.c +1 -0
@@ -5822,6 +5822,7 @@ int hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(struct mm_s page =alloc_huge_page (dst_vma, dst_addr,0 );if (IS_ERR (page)) { +put_page (*pagep); ret = -ENOMEM ; *pagep =NULL ; goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/88 asm-generic: remove a broken and needless ifdef conditional
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lukas Bulwahn <[email protected]>
commit e2a619ca0b38f2114347b7078b8a67d72d457a3d upstream.
Commit 527701eda5f1 ("lib: Add a generic version of devmem_is_allowed()") introduces the config symbol GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED, but then falsely refers to CONFIG_GENERIC_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED (note the missing LIB in the reference) in ./include/asm-generic/io.h.
Luckily, ./scripts/checkkconfigsymbols.py warns on non-existing configs:
GENERIC_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
Referencing files: include/asm-generic/io.h
The actual fix, though, is simply to not to make this function declaration dependent on any kernel config. For architectures that intend to use the generic version, the arch's 'select GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED' will lead to picking the function definition, and for other architectures, this function is simply defined elsewhere.
The wrong '#ifndef' on a non-existing config symbol also always had the same effect (although more by mistake than by intent). So, there is no functional change.
Remove this broken and needless ifdef conditional.
--- include/asm-generic/io.h | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
include/asm-generic/io.h +0 -2
@@ -1125,9 +1125,7 @@ static inline void memcpy_toio(volatile }#endif -#ifndef CONFIG_GENERIC_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED extern int devmem_is_allowed (unsigned long pfn); -#endif #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/88 s390/archrandom: prevent CPACF trng invocations in interrupt context
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
commit 918e75f77af7d2e049bb70469ec0a2c12782d96a upstream.
This patch slightly reworks the s390 arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}
implementation: Make sure the CPACF trng instruction is never called in any interrupt context. This is done by adding an additional condition in_task().
Justification:
There are some constrains to satisfy for the invocation of the arch_get_random_seed_{int,long}() functions:
- They should provide good random data during kernel initialization.
- They should not be called in interrupt context as the TRNG instruction is relatively heavy weight and may for example make some network loads cause to timeout and buck.
However, it was not clear what kind of interrupt context is exactly encountered during kernel init or network traffic eventually calling arch_get_random_seed_long().
After some days of investigations it is clear that the s390 start_kernel function is not running in any interrupt context and so the trng is called:
Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<00000001064e90ca>] arch_get_random_seed_long.part.0+0x32/0x70 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010715f246>] random_init+0xf6/0x238 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010712545c>] start_kernel+0x4a4/0x628 Jul 11 18:33:39 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000010590402a>] startup_continue+0x2a/0x40
The condition in_task() is true and the CPACF trng provides random data during kernel startup.
The network traffic however, is more difficult. A typical call stack looks like this:
Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5600fc>] extract_entropy.constprop.0+0x23c/0x240 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b560136>] crng_reseed+0x36/0xd8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5604b8>] crng_make_state+0x78/0x340 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b5607e0>] _get_random_bytes+0x60/0xf8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b56108a>] get_random_u32+0xda/0x248 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aefe7a8>] kfence_guarded_alloc+0x48/0x4b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aeff35e>] __kfence_alloc+0x18e/0x1b8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008aef7f10>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x368/0x4d8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611eac>] kmalloc_reserve+0x44/0xa0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b611f98>] __alloc_skb+0x90/0x178 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b6120dc>] __napi_alloc_skb+0x5c/0x118 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f06b4>] qeth_extract_skb+0x13c/0x680 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b8f6526>] qeth_poll+0x256/0x3f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63d76e>] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x46/0x2f8 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b63dbec>] net_rx_action+0x1cc/0x408 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b937302>] __do_softirq+0x132/0x6b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf46ce>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x13e/0x170 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abf531a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x22/0x50 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b922506>] do_io_irq+0xe6/0x198 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935826>] io_int_handler+0xd6/0x110 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b9358a6>] psw_idle_exit+0x0/0xa Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: ([<000000008ab9c59a>] arch_cpu_idle+0x52/0xe0) Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b933cfe>] default_idle_call+0x6e/0xd0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac59f4e>] do_idle+0xf6/0x1b0 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008ac5a28e>] cpu_startup_entry+0x36/0x40 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008abb0d90>] smp_start_secondary+0x148/0x158 Jul 06 17:37:07 t35lp54 kernel: [<000000008b935b9e>] restart_int_handler+0x6e/0x90
which confirms that the call is in softirq context. So in_task() covers exactly the cases where we want to have CPACF trng called: not in nmi, not in hard irq, not in soft irq but in normal task context and during kernel init.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h +6 -3
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@/* * Kernel interface for the s390 arch_random_* functions * -* Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2020 +* Copyright IBM Corp. 2017, 2022 * * Author: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]> *
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM #include <linux/static_key.h> +#include <linux/preempt.h> #include <linux/atomic.h> #include <asm/cpacf.h>
@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_getstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) { -if (static_branch_likely (&s390_arch_random_available)) { +if (static_branch_likely (&s390_arch_random_available) && +in_task ()) {cpacf_trng (NULL ,0 , (u8 *)v,sizeof (*v));atomic64_add (sizeof (*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);return true;
@@ -42,7 +44,8 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_getstatic inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) { -if (static_branch_likely (&s390_arch_random_available)) { +if (static_branch_likely (&s390_arch_random_available) && +in_task ()) {cpacf_trng (NULL ,0 , (u8 *)v,sizeof (*v));atomic64_add (sizeof (*v), &s390_arch_random_counter);return true;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/88 intel_idle: Fix false positive RCU splats due to incorrect hardirqs state
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit d295ad34f236c3518634fb6403d4c0160456e470 upstream.
Commit 32d4fd5751ea ("cpuidle,intel_idle: Fix CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE") uses raw_local_irq_enable/local_irq_disable() around call to __intel_idle() in intel_idle_irq().
With interrupt enabled, timer tick interrupt can happen and a subsequently call to __do_softirq() may change the lockdep hardirqs state of a debug kernel back to 'on'. This will result in a mismatch between the cpu hardirqs state (off) and the lockdep hardirqs state (on) causing a number of false positive "WARNING: suspicious RCU usage" splats.
Fix that by using local_irq_disable() to disable interrupt in intel_idle_irq().
--- drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/idle/intel_idle.c +7 -1
@@ -162,7 +162,13 @@ static __cpuidle int intel_idle_irq(struct cpuidle_device *dev,raw_local_irq_enable (); ret =__intel_idle (dev, drv, index); -raw_local_irq_disable (); + +/* +* The lockdep hardirqs state may be changed to 'on' with timer +* tick interrupt followed by __do_softirq(). Use local_irq_disable() +* to keep the hardirqs state correct. +*/ +local_irq_disable ();return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/88 nouveau/svm: Fix to migrate all requested pages
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alistair Popple <[email protected]>
commit 66cee9097e2b74ff3c8cc040ce5717c521a0c3fa upstream.
Users may request that pages from an OpenCL SVM allocation be migrated to the GPU with clEnqueueSVMMigrateMem(). In Nouveau this will call into nouveau_dmem_migrate_vma() to do the migration. If the total range to be migrated exceeds SG_MAX_SINGLE_ALLOC the pages will be migrated in chunks of size SG_MAX_SINGLE_ALLOC. However a typo in updating the starting address means that only the first chunk will get migrated.
Fix the calculation so that the entire range will get migrated if possible.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_dmem.c +5 -1
@@ -680,7 +680,11 @@ nouveau_dmem_migrate_vma(struct nouveau_ goto out_free_dma;for (i =0 ; i < npages; i += max) { - args.end = start + (max <<PAGE_SHIFT ); +if (args.start + (max <<PAGE_SHIFT ) > end) + args.end = end; +else + args.end = args.start + (max <<PAGE_SHIFT ); + ret =migrate_vma_setup (&args);if (ret) goto out_free_pfns;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/88 drm/simpledrm: Fix return type of simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_mode_valid()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 0c09bc33aa8e9dc867300acaadc318c2f0d85a1e upstream.
When booting a kernel compiled with clang's CFI protection (CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), there is a CFI failure in drm_simple_kms_crtc_mode_valid() when trying to call simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_mode_valid() through ->mode_valid():
[ 0.322802] CFI failure (target: simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_mode_valid+0x0/0x8): ... [ 0.324928] Call trace: [ 0.324969] __ubsan_handle_cfi_check_fail+0x58/0x60 [ 0.325053] __cfi_check_fail+0x3c/0x44 [ 0.325120] __cfi_slowpath_diag+0x178/0x200 [ 0.325192] drm_simple_kms_crtc_mode_valid+0x58/0x80 [ 0.325279] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0x31c/0x464
...
The ->mode_valid() member in 'struct drm_simple_display_pipe_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Correct it to fix the CFI failure.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/simpledrm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/simpledrm.c +1 -1
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static const struct drm_connector_funcs .atomic_destroy_state = drm_atomic_helper_connector_destroy_state, }; -static int +static enum drm_mode_status simpledrm_simple_display_pipe_mode_valid (struct drm_simple_display_pipe *pipe,const struct drm_display_mode *mode) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/88 watch_queue: Fix missing rcu annotation
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit e0339f036ef4beb9b20f0b6532a1e0ece7f594c6 upstream.
Since __post_watch_notification() walks wlist->watchers with only the RCU read lock held, we need to use RCU methods to add to the list (we already use RCU methods to remove from the list).
Fix add_watch_to_object() to use hlist_add_head_rcu() instead of hlist_add_head() for that list.
--- kernel/watch_queue.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/watch_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ int add_watch_to_object(struct watch *waunlock_wqueue (wqueue); } -hlist_add_head (&watch->list_node, &wlist->watchers); +hlist_add_head_rcu (&watch->list_node, &wlist->watchers);return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (add_watch_to_object);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/88 watch_queue: Fix missing locking in add_watch_to_object()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit e64ab2dbd882933b65cd82ff6235d705ad65dbb6 upstream.
If a watch is being added to a queue, it needs to guard against interference from addition of a new watch, manual removal of a watch and removal of a watch due to some other queue being destroyed.
KEYCTL_WATCH_KEY guards against this for the same {key,queue} pair by holding the key->sem writelocked and by holding refs on both the key and the queue - but that doesn't prevent interaction from other {key,queue} pairs.
While add_watch_to_object() does take the spinlock on the event queue, it doesn't take the lock on the source's watch list. The assumption was that the caller would prevent that (say by taking key->sem) - but that doesn't prevent interference from the destruction of another queue.
Fix this by locking the watcher list in add_watch_to_object().
--- kernel/watch_queue.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
kernel/watch_queue.c +36 -22
@@ -454,6 +454,33 @@ void init_watch(struct watch *watch, strrcu_assign_pointer (watch->queue, wqueue); } +static int add_one_watch (struct watch *watch,struct watch_list *wlist,struct watch_queue *wqueue) +{ +const struct cred *cred; +struct watch *w; + +hlist_for_each_entry (w, &wlist->watchers, list_node) { +struct watch_queue *wq =rcu_access_pointer (w->queue); +if (wqueue == wq && watch->id == w->id) +return -EBUSY ; + } + + cred =current_cred (); +if (atomic_inc_return (&cred->user->nr_watches) >task_rlimit (current,RLIMIT_NOFILE )) { +atomic_dec (&cred->user->nr_watches); +return -EAGAIN ; + } + + watch->cred =get_cred (cred); +rcu_assign_pointer (watch->watch_list, wlist); + +kref_get (&wqueue->usage); +kref_get (&watch->usage); +hlist_add_head (&watch->queue_node, &wqueue->watches); +hlist_add_head_rcu (&watch->list_node, &wlist->watchers); +return 0 ; +} +/** * add_watch_to_object - Add a watch on an object to a watch list * @watch: The watch to add
@@ -468,34 +495,21 @@ void init_watch(struct watch *watch, str*/ int add_watch_to_object (struct watch *watch,struct watch_list *wlist) { -struct watch_queue *wqueue =rcu_access_pointer (watch->queue); -struct watch *w; +struct watch_queue *wqueue; +int ret = -ENOENT ; -hlist_for_each_entry (w, &wlist->watchers, list_node) { -struct watch_queue *wq =rcu_access_pointer (w->queue); -if (wqueue == wq && watch->id == w->id) -return -EBUSY ; - } - - watch->cred =get_current_cred (); -rcu_assign_pointer (watch->watch_list, wlist); - -if (atomic_inc_return (&watch->cred->user->nr_watches) > -task_rlimit (current,RLIMIT_NOFILE )) { -atomic_dec (&watch->cred->user->nr_watches); -put_cred (watch->cred); -return -EAGAIN ; - } +rcu_read_lock (); + wqueue =rcu_access_pointer (watch->queue);if (lock_wqueue (wqueue)) { -kref_get (&wqueue->usage); -kref_get (&watch->usage); -hlist_add_head (&watch->queue_node, &wqueue->watches); +spin_lock (&wlist->lock); + ret =add_one_watch (watch, wlist, wqueue); +spin_unlock (&wlist->lock);unlock_wqueue (wqueue); } -hlist_add_head_rcu (&watch->list_node, &wlist->watchers); -return 0 ; +rcu_read_unlock (); +return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (add_watch_to_object);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_dsack.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 58ebb1c8b35a8ef38cd6927431e0fa7b173a632d upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_dsack, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -2
@@ -4426,7 +4426,7 @@ static void tcp_dsack_set(struct sock *s {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk); -if (tcp_is_sack (tp) &&sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack) { +if (tcp_is_sack (tp) &&READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack)) {int mib_idx;if (before (seq, tp->rcv_nxt))
@@ -4473,7 +4473,7 @@ static void tcp_send_dupack(struct sockNET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_DELAYEDACKLOST );tcp_enter_quickack_mode (sk,TCP_MAX_QUICKACKS ); -if (tcp_is_sack (tp) &&sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack) { +if (tcp_is_sack (tp) &&READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack)) {u32 end_seq =TCP_SKB_CB (skb)->end_seq;tcp_rcv_spurious_retrans (sk, skb);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_app_win.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 02ca527ac5581cf56749db9fd03d854e842253dd upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_app_win, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -534,7 +534,7 @@ static void tcp_grow_window(struct sock*/ static void tcp_init_buffer_space (struct sock *sk) { -int tcp_app_win =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win; +int tcp_app_win =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win);struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);int maxwin;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 36eeee75ef0157e42fb6593dcc65daab289b559e upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- include/net/tcp.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/tcp.h +1 -1
@@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(const strstatic inline int tcp_win_from_space (const struct sock *sk,int space) { -int tcp_adv_win_scale =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale; +int tcp_adv_win_scale =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale);return tcp_adv_win_scale <=0 ? (space>>(-tcp_adv_win_scale)) :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_frto.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 706c6202a3589f290e1ef9be0584a8f4a3cc0507 upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_frto, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@ void tcp_enter_loss(struct sock *sk)* loss recovery is underway except recurring timeout(s) on * the same SND.UNA (sec 3.2). Disable F-RTO on path MTU probing */ - tp->frto = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto && + tp->frto =READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto) && (new_recovery || icsk->icsk_retransmits) && !inet_csk (sk)->icsk_mtup.probe_size; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 8499a2454d9e8a55ce616ede9f9580f36fd5b0f3 upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c +1 -1
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk)int m;sk_dst_confirm (sk); -if (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save || !dst) +if (READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save) || !dst)return ;rcu_read_lock ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit ab1ba21b523ab496b1a4a8e396333b24b0a18f9a upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c +4 -4
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk)if (tcp_in_initial_slowstart (tp)) {/* Slow start still did not finish. */ -if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save && +if (!READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save) && !tcp_metric_locked (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH )) { val =tcp_metric_get (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH );if (val && (tcp_snd_cwnd (tp) >>1 ) > val)
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk) }else if (!tcp_in_slow_start (tp) && icsk->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Open) {/* Cong. avoidance phase, cwnd is reliable. */ -if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save && +if (!READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save) && !tcp_metric_locked (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH ))tcp_metric_set (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH ,max (tcp_snd_cwnd (tp) >>1 , tp->snd_ssthresh));
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ void tcp_update_metrics(struct sock *sk)tcp_metric_set (tm,TCP_METRIC_CWND , (val + tp->snd_ssthresh) >>1 ); } -if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save && +if (!READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save) && !tcp_metric_locked (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH )) { val =tcp_metric_get (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH );if (val && tp->snd_ssthresh > val)
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void tcp_init_metrics(struct sock *sk)if (tcp_metric_locked (tm,TCP_METRIC_CWND )) tp->snd_cwnd_clamp =tcp_metric_get (tm,TCP_METRIC_CWND ); - val = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save ? + val =READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save) ?0 :tcp_metric_get (tm,TCP_METRIC_SSTHRESH );if (val) { tp->snd_ssthresh = val;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/88 bridge: Do not send empty IFLA_AF_SPEC attribute
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Benjamin Poirier <[email protected]>
commit 9b134b1694ec8926926ba6b7b80884ea829245a0 upstream.
After commit b6c02ef54913 ("bridge: Netlink interface fix."), br_fill_ifinfo() started to send an empty IFLA_AF_SPEC attribute when a bridge vlan dump is requested but an interface does not have any vlans configured.
iproute2 ignores such an empty attribute since commit b262a9becbcb ("bridge: Fix output with empty vlan lists") but older iproute2 versions as well as other utilities have their output changed by the cited kernel commit, resulting in failed test cases. Regardless, emitting an empty attribute is pointless and inefficient.
Avoid this change by canceling the attribute if no AF_SPEC data was added.
--- net/bridge/br_netlink.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_netlink.c +6 -2
@@ -589,9 +589,13 @@ static int br_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff } done: +if (af) { +if (nlmsg_get_pos (skb) - (void *)af >nla_attr_size (0 )) +nla_nest_end (skb, af); +else +nla_nest_cancel (skb, af); + } -if (af) -nla_nest_end (skb, af);nlmsg_end (skb, nlh);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/88 ice: Fix max VLANs available for VF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Przemyslaw Patynowski <[email protected]>
commit 1e308c6fb7127371f48a0fb9770ea0b30a6b5698 upstream.
Legacy VLAN implementation allows for untrusted VF to have 8 VLAN filters, not counting VLAN 0 filters. Current VLAN_V2 implementation lowers available filters for VF, by counting in VLAN 0 filter for both TPIDs.
Fix this by counting only non zero VLAN filters.
Without this patch, untrusted VF would not be able to access 8 VLAN filters.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c +2 -1
@@ -2966,7 +2966,8 @@ ice_vc_validate_add_vlan_filter_list(strstruct virtchnl_vlan_filtering_caps *vfc, struct virtchnl_vlan_filter_list_v2 *vfl) { - u16 num_requested_filters = vsi->num_vlan + vfl->num_elements; + u16 num_requested_filters = ice_vsi_num_non_zero_vlans(vsi) + + vfl->num_elements;if (num_requested_filters > vfc->max_filters)return false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/88 ice: check (DD | EOF) bits on Rx descriptor rather than (EOP | RS)
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
commit 283d736ff7c7e96ac5b32c6c0de40372f8eb171e upstream.
Tx side sets EOP and RS bits on descriptors to indicate that a particular descriptor is the last one and needs to generate an irq when it was sent. These bits should not be checked on completion path regardless whether it's the Tx or the Rx. DD bit serves this purpose and it indicates that a particular descriptor is either for Rx or was successfully Txed. EOF is also set as loopback test does not xmit fragmented frames.
Look at (DD | EOF) bits setting in ice_lbtest_receive_frames() instead of EOP and RS pair.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +2 -1
@@ -660,7 +660,8 @@ static int ice_lbtest_receive_frames(str rx_desc =ICE_RX_DESC (rx_ring, i);if (!(rx_desc->wb.status_error0 & -cpu_to_le16 (ICE_TX_DESC_CMD_EOP |ICE_TX_DESC_CMD_RS ))) + (cpu_to_le16 (BIT (ICE_RX_FLEX_DESC_STATUS0_DD_S )) | +cpu_to_le16 (BIT (ICE_RX_FLEX_DESC_STATUS0_EOF_S )))))continue ; rx_buf = &rx_ring->rx_buf[i];
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/88 ice: do not setup vlan for loopback VSI
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
commit cc019545a238518fa9da1e2a889f6e1bb1005a63 upstream.
Currently loopback test is failiing due to the error returned from ice_vsi_vlan_setup(). Skip calling it when preparing loopback VSI.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +5 -3
@@ -5994,10 +5994,12 @@ int ice_vsi_cfg(struct ice_vsi *vsi)if (vsi->netdev) {ice_set_rx_mode (vsi->netdev); - err =ice_vsi_vlan_setup (vsi); +if (vsi->type !=ICE_VSI_LB ) { + err =ice_vsi_vlan_setup (vsi); -if (err) -return err; +if (err) +return err; + } }ice_vsi_cfg_dcb_rings (vsi);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/88 ice: Fix VSIs unable to share unicast MAC
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Anirudh Venkataramanan <[email protected]>
commit 5c8e3c7ff3e7bd7b938659be704f75cc746b697f upstream.
The driver currently does not allow two VSIs in the same PF domain to have the same unicast MAC address. This is incorrect in the sense that a policy decision is being made in the driver when it must be left to the user. This approach was causing issues when rebooting the system with VFs spawned not being able to change their MAC addresses. Such errors were present in dmesg:
[ 7921.068237] ice 0000:b6:00.2 ens2f2: Unicast MAC 6a:0d:e4:70:ca:d1 already
exists on this PF. Preventing setting VF 7 unicast MAC address to 6a:0d:e4:70:ca:d1
Fix that by removing this restriction. Doing this also allows us to remove some additional code that's checking if a unicast MAC filter already exists.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c | 2 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 40 ----------------------------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c +2 -0
@@ -4640,6 +4640,8 @@ ice_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const stice_set_safe_mode_caps (hw); } + hw->ucast_shared = true; + err =ice_init_pf (pf);if (err) {dev_err (dev,"ice_init_pf failed: %d\n" , err);
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +0 -40
@@ -1310,39 +1310,6 @@ out_put_vf: }/** -* ice_unicast_mac_exists - check if the unicast MAC exists on the PF's switch -* @pf: PF used to reference the switch's rules -* @umac: unicast MAC to compare against existing switch rules -* -* Return true on the first/any match, else return false -*/ -static bool ice_unicast_mac_exists (struct ice_pf *pf,u8 *umac) -{ -struct ice_sw_recipe *mac_recipe_list = - &pf->hw.switch_info->recp_list[ICE_SW_LKUP_MAC ]; -struct ice_fltr_mgmt_list_entry *list_itr; -struct list_head *rule_head; -struct mutex *rule_lock;/* protect MAC filter list access */ - - rule_head = &mac_recipe_list->filt_rules; - rule_lock = &mac_recipe_list->filt_rule_lock; - -mutex_lock (rule_lock); -list_for_each_entry (list_itr, rule_head, list_entry) { -u8 *existing_mac = &list_itr->fltr_info.l_data.mac.mac_addr[0 ]; - -if (ether_addr_equal (existing_mac, umac)) { -mutex_unlock (rule_lock); -return true; - } - } - -mutex_unlock (rule_lock); - -return false; -} - -/** * ice_set_vf_mac * @netdev: network interface device structure * @vf_id: VF identifier
@@ -1376,13 +1343,6 @@ int ice_set_vf_mac(struct net_device *neif (ret) goto out_put_vf; -if (ice_unicast_mac_exists (pf, mac)) { -netdev_err (netdev,"Unicast MAC %pM already exists on this PF. Preventing setting VF %u unicast MAC address to %pM\n" , - mac, vf_id, mac); - ret = -EINVAL ; - goto out_put_vf; - } -mutex_lock (&vf->cfg_lock);/* VF is notified of its new MAC via the PF's response to the
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/88 scsi: ufs: host: Hold reference returned by of_parse_phandle()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Liang He <[email protected]>
commit a3435afba87dc6cd83f5595e7607f3c40f93ef01 upstream.
In ufshcd_populate_vreg(), we should hold the reference returned by of_parse_phandle() and then use it to call of_node_put() for refcount balance.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd-pltfrm.c +13 -2
@@ -107,9 +107,20 @@ out:return ret; } +static bool phandle_exists (const struct device_node *np, +const char *phandle_name,int index) +{ +struct device_node *parse_np =of_parse_phandle (np, phandle_name, index); + +if (parse_np) +of_node_put (parse_np); + +return parse_np !=NULL ; +} +#define MAX_PROP_SIZE 32static int ufshcd_populate_vreg (struct device *dev,const char *name, -struct ufs_vreg **out_vreg) +struct ufs_vreg **out_vreg) {char prop_name[MAX_PROP_SIZE ];struct ufs_vreg *vreg =NULL ;
@@ -121,7 +132,7 @@ static int ufshcd_populate_vreg(struct d }snprintf (prop_name,MAX_PROP_SIZE ,"%s-supply" , name); -if (!of_parse_phandle (np, prop_name,0 )) { +if (!phandle_exists (np, prop_name,0 )) {dev_info (dev,"%s: Unable to find %s regulator, assuming enabled\n" , __func__, prop_name); goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/88 Revert "tcp: change pingpong threshold to 3"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wei Wang <[email protected]>
commit 4d8f24eeedc58d5f87b650ddda73c16e8ba56559 upstream.
This reverts commit 4a41f453bedfd5e9cd040bad509d9da49feb3e2c.
This to-be-reverted commit was meant to apply a stricter rule for the stack to enter pingpong mode. However, the condition used to check for interactive session "before(tp->lsndtime, icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime)" is jiffy based and might be too coarse, which delays the stack entering pingpong mode.
We revert this patch so that we no longer use the above condition to determine interactive session, and also reduce pingpong threshold to 1.
--- include/net/inet_connection_sock.h | 10 +--------- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 15 ++++++--------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/net/inet_connection_sock.h +1 -9
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ void inet_csk_update_fastreuse(struct instruct dst_entry *inet_csk_update_pmtu (struct sock *sk,u32 mtu); -#define TCP_PINGPONG_THRESH 3 +#define TCP_PINGPONG_THRESH 1static inline void inet_csk_enter_pingpong_mode (struct sock *sk) {
@@ -340,14 +340,6 @@ static inline bool inet_csk_in_pingpong_return inet_csk (sk)->icsk_ack.pingpong >=TCP_PINGPONG_THRESH ; } -static inline void inet_csk_inc_pingpong_cnt (struct sock *sk) -{ -struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk); - -if (icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong <U8_MAX ) - icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong++; -} -static inline bool inet_csk_has_ulp (struct sock *sk) {return inet_sk (sk)->is_icsk && !!inet_csk (sk)->icsk_ulp_ops;
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +6 -9
@@ -167,16 +167,13 @@ static void tcp_event_data_sent(struct tif (tcp_packets_in_flight (tp) ==0 )tcp_ca_event (sk,CA_EVENT_TX_START ); -/* If this is the first data packet sent in response to the -* previous received data, -* and it is a reply for ato after last received packet, -* increase pingpong count. -*/ -if (before (tp->lsndtime, icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime) && - (u32)(now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime) < icsk->icsk_ack.ato) -inet_csk_inc_pingpong_cnt (sk); - tp->lsndtime = now; + +/* If it is a reply for ato after last received +* packet, enter pingpong mode. +*/ +if ((u32)(now - icsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime) < icsk->icsk_ack.ato) +inet_csk_enter_pingpong_mode (sk); }/* Account for an ACK we sent. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/88 octeontx2-pf: Fix UDP/TCP src and dst port tc filters
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Subbaraya Sundeep <[email protected]>
commit 59e1be6f83b928a04189bbf3ab683a1fc6248db3 upstream.
Check the mask for non-zero value before installing tc filters for L4 source and destination ports. Otherwise installing a filter for source port installs destination port too and vice-versa.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_tc.c | 30 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_tc.c +18 -12
@@ -614,21 +614,27 @@ static int otx2_tc_prepare_flow(struct o flow_spec->dport = match.key->dst; flow_mask->dport = match.mask->dst; -if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_UDP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_UDP ); -else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_TCP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_TCP ); -else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_SCTP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_SCTP ); + +if (flow_mask->dport) { +if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_UDP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_UDP ); +else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_TCP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_TCP ); +else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_SCTP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_DPORT_SCTP ); + } flow_spec->sport = match.key->src; flow_mask->sport = match.mask->src; -if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_UDP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_UDP ); -else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_TCP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_TCP ); -else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_SCTP ) - req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_SCTP ); + +if (flow_mask->sport) { +if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_UDP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_UDP ); +else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_TCP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_TCP ); +else if (ip_proto ==IPPROTO_SCTP ) + req->features |=BIT_ULL (NPC_SPORT_SCTP ); + } }return otx2_tc_parse_actions (nic, &rule->action, req, f, node);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/88 tcp: md5: fix IPv4-mapped support
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit e62d2e110356093c034998e093675df83057e511 upstream.
After the blamed commit, IPv4 SYN packets handled
by a dual stack IPv6 socket are dropped, even if
perfectly valid.
$ nstat | grep MD5 TcpExtTCPMD5Failure 5 0.0
For a dual stack listener, an incoming IPv4 SYN packet would call tcp_inbound_md5_hash() with @family == AF_INET, while tp->af_specific is pointing to tcp_sock_ipv6_specific.
Only later when an IPv4-mapped child is created, tp->af_specific is changed to tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific.
--- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +12 -3
@@ -4481,9 +4481,18 @@ tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_MD5UNEXPECTED ; } -/* check the signature */ - genhash = tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash (newhash, hash_expected, -NULL , skb); +/* Check the signature. +* To support dual stack listeners, we need to handle +* IPv4-mapped case. +*/ +if (family ==AF_INET ) + genhash =tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb (newhash, + hash_expected, +NULL , skb); +else + genhash = tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash (newhash, + hash_expected, +NULL , skb);if (genhash ||memcmp (hash_location, newhash,16 ) !=0 ) {NET_INC_STATS (sock_net (sk),LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5FAILURE );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 780476488844e070580bfc9e3bc7832ec1cea883 upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ void tcp_rcv_space_adjust(struct sock *s* <prev RTT . ><current RTT .. ><next RTT .... > */ -if (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf && +if (READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf) && !(sk->sk_userlocks &SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK )) {int rcvmem, rcvbuf;u64 rcvwin, grow;
net/mptcp/protocol.c +1 -1
@@ -1882,7 +1882,7 @@ static void mptcp_rcv_space_adjust(strucif (msk->rcvq_space.copied <= msk->rcvq_space.space) goto new_measure; -if (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf && +if (READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf) && !(sk->sk_userlocks &SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK )) {int rcvmem, rcvbuf;u64 rcvwin, grow;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit 9fb90193fbd66b4c5409ef729fd081861f8b6351 upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +1 -1
@@ -2502,7 +2502,7 @@ static bool tcp_small_queue_check(struct sk->sk_pacing_rate >> READ_ONCE(sk->sk_pacing_shift));if (sk->sk_pacing_status ==SK_PACING_NONE ) limit = min_t(unsigned long, limit, -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes); +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes)); limit <<= factor; if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_tx_delay_enabled) &&
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit db3815a2fa691da145cfbe834584f31ad75df9ff upstream.
While reading sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -3629,7 +3629,7 @@ static void tcp_send_challenge_ack(struc/* Then check host-wide RFC 5961 rate limit. */ now = jiffies /HZ ;if (now != challenge_timestamp) { -u32 ack_limit = net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit; +u32 ack_limit =READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit);u32 half = (ack_limit +1 ) >>1 ; challenge_timestamp = now;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/88 scsi: core: Fix warning in scsi_alloc_sgtables()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
commit d9a434fa0c12ed5f7afe1e9dd30003ab5d059b85 upstream.
As explained in SG_IO howto[1]:
"If iovec_count is non-zero then 'dxfer_len' should be equal to the sum of iov_len lengths. If not, the minimum of the two is the transfer length."
When iovec_count is non-zero and dxfer_len is zero, the sg_io() just genarated a null bio, and finally caused a warning below. To fix it, skip generating a bio for this request if dxfer_len is zero.
[1] https://tldp.org/HOWTO/SCSI-Generic-HOWTO/x198.html
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3643 at drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1032 scsi_alloc_sgtables+0xc7d/0xf70 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1032 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 3643 Comm: syz-executor397 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3-syzkaller-00316-gb81b1829e7e3 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-204/01/2014 RIP: 0010:scsi_alloc_sgtables+0xc7d/0xf70 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1032 Code: e7 fc 31 ff 44 89 f6 e8 c1 4e e7 fc 45 85 f6 0f 84 1a f5 ff ff e8 93 4c e7 fc 83 c5 01 0f b7 ed e9 0f f5 ff ff e8 83 4c e7 fc <0f> 0b 41 bc 0a 00 00 00 e9 2b fb ff ff 41 bc 09 00 00 00 e9 20 fb RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d07558 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88801bfc96a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88801c876000 RSI: ffffffff849060bd RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff849055b9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888012b8c000 R13: ffff88801bfc9580 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801432c000 FS: 00007effdec8e700(0000) GS:ffff88802cc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007effdec6d718 CR3: 00000000206d6000 CR4: 0000000000150ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> scsi_setup_scsi_cmnd drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1219 [inline] scsi_prepare_cmd drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1614 [inline] scsi_queue_rq+0x283e/0x3630 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1730 blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x6ea/0x22e0 block/blk-mq.c:1851 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x20b/0x410 block/blk-mq-sched.c:299 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xfb/0x180 block/blk-mq-sched.c:332 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xf9/0x350 block/blk-mq.c:1968 __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x5b6/0x6c0 block/blk-mq.c:2045 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x30f/0x480 block/blk-mq.c:2096 blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x340/0x440 block/blk-mq-sched.c:451 blk_execute_rq+0xcc/0x340 block/blk-mq.c:1231 sg_io+0x67c/0x1210 drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:485 scsi_ioctl_sg_io drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:866 [inline] scsi_ioctl+0xa66/0x1560 drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c:921 sd_ioctl+0x199/0x2a0 drivers/scsi/sd.c:1576 blkdev_ioctl+0x37a/0x800 block/ioctl.c:588 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:874 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:860 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:860 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7effdecdc5d9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 81 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007effdec8e2f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007effded664c0 RCX: 00007effdecdc5d9
RDX: 0000000020002300 RSI: 0000000000002285 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007effded34034 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007effded34054 R14: 2f30656c69662f2e R15: 00007effded664c8
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static int sg_io(struct scsi_device *sde goto out_put_request; ret =0 ; -if (hdr->iovec_count) { +if (hdr->iovec_count && hdr->dxfer_len) {struct iov_iter i;struct iovec *iov =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/88 scsi: mpt3sas: Stop fw fault watchdog work item during system shutdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: David Jeffery <[email protected]>
commit 0fde22c5420ed258ee538a760291c2f3935f6a01 upstream.
During system shutdown or reboot, mpt3sas will reset the firmware back to ready state. However, the driver leaves running a watchdog work item intended to keep the firmware in operational state. This causes a second, unneeded reset on shutdown and moves the firmware back to operational instead of in ready state as intended. And if the mpt3sas_fwfault_debug module parameter is set, this extra reset also panics the system.
mpt3sas's scsih_shutdown needs to stop the watchdog before resetting the firmware back to ready state.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c +1 -0
@@ -11386,6 +11386,7 @@ scsih_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)_scsih_ir_shutdown (ioc);_scsih_nvme_shutdown (ioc);mpt3sas_base_mask_interrupts (ioc); +mpt3sas_base_stop_watchdog (ioc); ioc->shost_recovery =1 ;mpt3sas_base_make_ioc_ready (ioc,SOFT_RESET ); ioc->shost_recovery =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/88 net: ping6: Fix memleak in ipv6_renew_options().
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
commit e27326009a3d247b831eda38878c777f6f4eb3d1 upstream.
When we close ping6 sockets, some resources are left unfreed because pingv6_prot is missing sk->sk_prot->destroy(). As reported by syzbot [0], just three syscalls leak 96 bytes and easily cause OOM.
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *hdr;
char data[24] = {0};
int fd;
hdr = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)data;
hdr->hdrlen = 2;
hdr->type = IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4;
fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, NEXTHDR_ICMP);
setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, data, 24);
close(fd);To fix memory leaks, let's add a destroy function.
Note the socket() syscall checks if the GID is within the range of net.ipv4.ping_group_range. The default value is [1, 0] so that no GID meets the condition (1 <= GID <= 0). Thus, the local DoS does not succeed until we change the default value. However, at least Ubuntu/Fedora/RHEL loosen it.
$ cat /usr/lib/sysctl.d/50-default.conf
...
-net.ipv4.ping_group_range = 0 2147483647Also, there could be another path reported with these options, and some of them require CAP_NET_RAW.
setsockopt
IPV6_ADDRFORM (inet6_sk(sk)->pktoptions)
IPV6_RECVPATHMTU (inet6_sk(sk)->rxpmtu)
IPV6_HOPOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_RTHDR (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_DSTOPTS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)
IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS (inet6_sk(sk)->opt)getsockopt
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR (inet6_sk(sk)->ipv6_fl_list)
For the record, I left a different splat with syzbot's one.
unreferenced object 0xffff888006270c60 (size 96):
comm "repro2", pid 231, jiffies 4294696626 (age 13.118s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....D...........
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f6bc7ea9>] sock_kmalloc (net/core/sock.c:2564 net/core/sock.c:2554)
[<000000006d699550>] do_ipv6_setsockopt.constprop.0 (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:715)
[<00000000c3c3b1f5>] ipv6_setsockopt (net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024)
[<000000007096a025>] __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2254)
[<000000003a8ff47b>] __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2265 net/socket.c:2262 net/socket.c:2262)
[<000000007c409dcb>] do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
[<00000000e939c4a9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)[0]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a8430774139ec3ab7176
--- net/ipv6/ping.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/ping.c +6 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <net/ping.h> +static void ping_v6_destroy (struct sock *sk) +{ +inet6_destroy_sock (sk); +} +/* Compatibility glue so we can support IPv6 when it's compiled as a module */ static int dummy_ipv6_recv_error (struct sock *sk,struct msghdr *msg,int len,int *addr_len)
@@ -181,6 +186,7 @@ struct proto pingv6_prot = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .init = ping_init_sock, .close = ping_close, + .destroy = ping_v6_destroy, .connect = ip6_datagram_connect_v6_only, .disconnect = __udp_disconnect, .setsockopt = ipv6_setsockopt,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/88 ipv6/addrconf: fix a null-ptr-deref bug for ip6_ptr
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ziyang Xuan <[email protected]>
commit 85f0173df35e5462d89947135a6a5599c6c3ef6f upstream.
Change net device's MTU to smaller than IPV6_MIN_MTU or unregister device while matching route. That may trigger null-ptr-deref bug for ip6_ptr probability as following.
=========================================================
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in find_match.part.0+0x70/0x134 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000308 by task ping6/263 CPU: 2 PID: 263 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc7+ #14 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1a8/0x230 show_stack+0x20/0x70 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0xc4/0x120 kasan_report+0x84/0x120 __asan_load4+0x94/0xd0 find_match.part.0+0x70/0x134 __find_rr_leaf+0x408/0x470 fib6_table_lookup+0x264/0x540 ip6_pol_route+0xf4/0x260 ip6_pol_route_output+0x58/0x70 fib6_rule_lookup+0x1a8/0x330 ip6_route_output_flags_noref+0xd8/0x1a0 ip6_route_output_flags+0x58/0x160 ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x5b4/0x85c ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x98/0x120 rawv6_sendmsg+0x49c/0xc70 inet_sendmsg+0x68/0x94
Reproducer as following:
Firstly, prepare conditions:
$ip netns add ns1
$ip netns add ns2
$ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
$ip link set veth1 netns ns1
$ip link set veth2 netns ns2
$ip netns exec ns1 ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::1/64 dev veth1 $ip netns exec ns2 ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::2/64 dev veth2 $ip netns exec ns1 ifconfig veth1 up
$ip netns exec ns2 ifconfig veth2 up
$ip netns exec ns1 ip -6 route add 2000::/64 dev veth1 metric 1 $ip netns exec ns2 ip -6 route add 2001::/64 dev veth2 metric 1
Secondly, execute the following two commands in two ssh windows
respectively:
$ip netns exec ns1 sh
$while true; do ip -6 addr add 2001:0db8:0:f101::1/64 dev veth1; ip -6 route add 2000::/64 dev veth1 metric 1; ping6 2000::2; done
$ip netns exec ns1 sh
$while true; do ip link set veth1 mtu 1000; ip link set veth1 mtu 1500; sleep 5; done
It is because ip6_ptr has been assigned to NULL in addrconf_ifdown() firstly, then ip6_ignore_linkdown() accesses ip6_ptr directly without NULL check.
cpu0 cpu1 fib6_table_lookup __find_rr_leaf addrconf_notify [ NETDEV_CHANGEMTU ] addrconf_ifdown RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip6_ptr, NULL)
find_matchip6_ignore_linkdown
So we can add NULL check for ip6_ptr before using in ip6_ignore_linkdown() to fix the null-ptr-deref bug.
--- include/net/addrconf.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
include/net/addrconf.h +3 -0
@@ -405,6 +405,9 @@ static inline bool ip6_ignore_linkdown(c {const struct inet6_dev *idev =__in6_dev_get (dev); +if (unlikely (!idev)) +return true; +return !!idev->cnf.ignore_routes_with_linkdown; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/88 net/tls: Remove the context from the list in tls_device_down
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Maxim Mikityanskiy <[email protected]>
commit f6336724a4d4220c89a4ec38bca84b03b178b1a3 upstream.
tls_device_down takes a reference on all contexts it's going to move to the degraded state (software fallback). If sk_destruct runs afterwards, it can reduce the reference counter back to 1 and return early without destroying the context. Then tls_device_down will release the reference it took and call tls_device_free_ctx. However, the context will still stay in tls_device_down_list forever. The list will contain an item, memory for which is released, making a memory corruption possible.
Fix the above bug by properly removing the context from all lists before any call to tls_device_free_ctx.
--- net/tls/tls_device.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tls/tls_device.c +6 -1
@@ -1351,8 +1351,13 @@ static int tls_device_down(struct net_de* by tls_device_free_ctx. rx_conf and tx_conf stay in TLS_HW. * Now release the ref taken above. */ -if (refcount_dec_and_test (&ctx->refcount)) +if (refcount_dec_and_test (&ctx->refcount)) { +/* sk_destruct ran after tls_device_down took a ref, and +* it returned early. Complete the destruction here. +*/ +list_del (&ctx->list);tls_device_free_ctx (ctx); + } }up_write (&device_offload_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/88 net: pcs: xpcs: propagate xpcs_read error to xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 27161db0904ee48e59140aa8d0835939a666c1f1 ]
While phylink_pcs_ops :: pcs_get_state does return void, xpcs_get_state() does check for a non-zero return code from xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii() and prints that as a message to the kernel log.
However, a non-zero return code from xpcs_read() is translated into "return false" (i.e. zero as int) and the I/O error is therefore not printed. Fix that.
--- drivers/net/pcs/pcs-xpcs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/pcs/pcs-xpcs.c +1 -1
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ static int xpcs_get_state_c37_sgmii(struct dw_xpcs *xpcs,*/ ret =xpcs_read (xpcs,MDIO_MMD_VEND2 ,DW_VR_MII_AN_INTR_STS );if (ret <0 ) -return false; +return ret;if (ret &DW_VR_MII_C37_ANSGM_SP_LNKSTS ) {int speed_value;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/88 net: sungem_phy: Add of_node_put() for reference returned by of_get_parent()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Liang He <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ebbbe23fdf6070e31509638df3321688358cc211 ]
In bcm5421_init(), we should call of_node_put() for the reference returned by of_get_parent() which has increased the refcount.
--- drivers/net/sungem_phy.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/sungem_phy.c +1 -0
@@ -454,6 +454,7 @@ static int bcm5421_init(struct mii_phy* phy)int can_low_power =1 ;if (np ==NULL ||of_get_property (np,"no-autolowpower" ,NULL )) can_low_power =0 ; +of_node_put (np);if (can_low_power) {/* Enable automatic low-power */ sungem_phy_write (phy,0x1c ,0x9002 );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/88 mlxsw: spectrum_router: simplify list unwinding
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Tom Rix <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6f2f36e5f932c58e370bff79aba7f05963ea1c2a ]
The setting of i hereerr_nexthop6_group_get:
i = nrt6;
Is redundant, i is already nrt6. So remove
this statement.
The for loop for the unwindingerr_rt6_create:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--) {
Is equivelent to
for (; i > 0; i--) {Two consecutive labels can be reduced to one.
--- .../ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 20 ++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c +8 -12
@@ -7022,7 +7022,7 @@ mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_nexthop_add(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, mlxsw_sp_rt6 =mlxsw_sp_rt6_create (rt_arr[i]);if (IS_ERR (mlxsw_sp_rt6)) { err =PTR_ERR (mlxsw_sp_rt6); - goto err_rt6_create; + goto err_rt6_unwind; }list_add_tail (&mlxsw_sp_rt6->list, &fib6_entry->rt6_list);
@@ -7031,14 +7031,12 @@ mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_nexthop_add(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, err =mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_update (mlxsw_sp, op_ctx, fib6_entry);if (err) - goto err_nexthop6_group_update; + goto err_rt6_unwind;return 0 ; -err_nexthop6_group_update: - i = nrt6; -err_rt6_create: -for (i--; i >=0 ; i--) { +err_rt6_unwind: +for (; i >0 ; i--) { fib6_entry->nrt6--; mlxsw_sp_rt6 =list_last_entry (&fib6_entry->rt6_list, struct mlxsw_sp_rt6, list);
@@ -7166,7 +7164,7 @@ mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, mlxsw_sp_rt6 =mlxsw_sp_rt6_create (rt_arr[i]);if (IS_ERR (mlxsw_sp_rt6)) { err =PTR_ERR (mlxsw_sp_rt6); - goto err_rt6_create; + goto err_rt6_unwind; }list_add_tail (&mlxsw_sp_rt6->list, &fib6_entry->rt6_list); fib6_entry->nrt6++;
@@ -7174,7 +7172,7 @@ mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, err =mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get (mlxsw_sp, fib6_entry);if (err) - goto err_nexthop6_group_get; + goto err_rt6_unwind; err =mlxsw_sp_nexthop_group_vr_link (fib_entry->nh_group, fib_node->fib);
@@ -7193,10 +7191,8 @@ mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp,mlxsw_sp_nexthop_group_vr_unlink (fib_entry->nh_group, fib_node->fib); err_nexthop_group_vr_link:mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_put (mlxsw_sp, fib_entry); -err_nexthop6_group_get: - i = nrt6; -err_rt6_create: -for (i--; i >=0 ; i--) { +err_rt6_unwind: +for (; i >0 ; i--) { fib6_entry->nrt6--; mlxsw_sp_rt6 =list_last_entry (&fib6_entry->rt6_list, struct mlxsw_sp_rt6, list);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e0bb4ab9dfddd872622239f49fb2bd403b70853b ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +1 -1
@@ -1990,7 +1990,7 @@ static u32 tcp_tso_segs(struct sock *sk, unsigned int mss_now) min_tso = ca_ops->min_tso_segs ? ca_ops->min_tso_segs (sk) : -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs; +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs); tso_segs =tcp_tso_autosize (sk, mss_now, min_tso);return min_t (u32, tso_segs, sk->sk_gso_max_segs);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2455e61b85e9c99af38cd889a7101f1d48b33cb4 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +1 -1
@@ -1971,7 +1971,7 @@ static u32 tcp_tso_autosize(const struct sock *sk, unsigned int mss_now, bytes = sk->sk_pacing_rate >>READ_ONCE (sk->sk_pacing_shift); - r =tcp_min_rtt (tcp_sk (sk)) >>sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log; + r =tcp_min_rtt (tcp_sk (sk)) >>READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log);if (r <BITS_PER_TYPE (sk->sk_gso_max_size)) bytes += sk->sk_gso_max_size >> r;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1330ffacd05fc9ac4159d19286ce119e22450ed2 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -3058,7 +3058,7 @@ static void tcp_fastretrans_alert(struct sock *sk, const u32 prior_snd_una,static void tcp_update_rtt_min (struct sock *sk,u32 rtt_us,const int flag) { -u32 wlen =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen *HZ ; +u32 wlen =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen) *HZ ;struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);if ((flag &FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED ) && rtt_us >tcp_min_rtt (tp)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_autocorking.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 85225e6f0a76e6745bc841c9f25169c509b573d8 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_autocorking, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +1 -1
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ static bool tcp_should_autocork(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int size_goal) {return skb->len < size_goal && -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking && +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking) && !tcp_rtx_queue_empty (sk) &&refcount_read (&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) > skb->truesize &&tcp_skb_can_collapse_to (skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2afdbe7b8de84c28e219073a6661080e1b3ded48 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -1
@@ -3581,7 +3581,8 @@ static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib_idx,if (*last_oow_ack_time) {s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time); -if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit) { +if (0 <= elapsed && + elapsed <READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit)) {NET_INC_STATS (net, mib_idx);return true;/* rate-limited: don't send yet! */ }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/88 Documentation: fix sctp_wmem in ip-sysctl.rst
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aa709da0e032cee7c202047ecd75f437bb0126ed ]
Since commit 1033990ac5b2 ("sctp: implement memory accounting on tx path"), SCTP has supported memory accounting on tx path where 'sctp_wmem' is used by sk_wmem_schedule(). So we should fix the description for this option in ip-sysctl.rst accordingly.
v1->v2:
- Improve the description as Marcelo suggested.
--- Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst +8 -1
@@ -2848,7 +2848,14 @@ sctp_rmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max Default: 4K sctp_wmem - vector of 3 INTEGERs: min, default, max - Currently this tunable has no effect. + Only the first value ("min") is used, "default" and "max" are + ignored. + + min: Minimum size of send buffer that can be used by SCTP sockets. + It is guaranteed to each SCTP socket (but not association) even + under moderate memory pressure. + + Default: 4K addr_scope_policy - INTEGER Control IPv4 address scoping - draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/88 macsec: fix NULL deref in macsec_add_rxsa
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f46040eeaf2e523a4096199fd93a11e794818009 ]
Commit 48ef50fa866a added a test on tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN], but nothing guarantees that it's not NULL at this point. The same code was added to macsec_add_txsa, but there it's not a problem because validate_add_txsa checks that the MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN attribute is present.
Note: it's not possible to reproduce with iproute, because iproute doesn't allow creating an SA without specifying the PN.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -1
@@ -1753,7 +1753,8 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) } pn_len = secy->xpn ?MACSEC_XPN_PN_LEN :MACSEC_DEFAULT_PN_LEN ; -if (nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) != pn_len) { +if (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ] && +nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) != pn_len) {pr_notice ("macsec: nl: add_rxsa: bad pn length: %d != %d\n" ,nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]), pn_len);rtnl_unlock ();
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/88 macsec: fix error message in macsec_add_rxsa and _txsa
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3240eac4ff20e51b87600dbd586ed814daf313db ]
The expected length is MACSEC_SALT_LEN, not MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -2
@@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ]) !=MACSEC_SALT_LEN ) {pr_notice ("macsec: nl: add_rxsa: bad salt length: %d != %d\n" ,nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ]), -MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ); +MACSEC_SALT_LEN );rtnl_unlock ();return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -2012,7 +2012,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ]) !=MACSEC_SALT_LEN ) {pr_notice ("macsec: nl: add_txsa: bad salt length: %d != %d\n" ,nla_len (tb_sa[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ]), -MACSEC_SA_ATTR_SALT ); +MACSEC_SALT_LEN );rtnl_unlock ();return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/88 macsec: limit replay window size with XPN
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b07a0e2044057f201d694ab474f5c42a02b6465b ]
IEEE 802.1AEbw-2013 (section 10.7.8) specifies that the maximum value of the replay window is 2^30-1, to help with recovery of the upper bits of the PN.
To avoid leaving the existing macsec device in an inconsistent state if this test fails during changelink, reuse the cleanup mechanism introduced for HW offload. This wasn't needed until now because macsec_changelink_common could not fail during changelink, as modifying the cipher suite was not allowed.
Finally, this must happen after handling IFLA_MACSEC_CIPHER_SUITE so that secy->xpn is set.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +12 -4
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ static struct macsec_cb *macsec_skb_cb(struct sk_buff *skb)#define DEFAULT_SEND_SCI true#define DEFAULT_ENCRYPT false#define DEFAULT_ENCODING_SA 0 +#define MACSEC_XPN_MAX_REPLAY_WINDOW (((1 << 30) - 1))static bool send_sci (const struct macsec_secy *secy) {
@@ -3746,9 +3747,6 @@ static int macsec_changelink_common(struct net_device *dev, secy->operational = tx_sa && tx_sa->active; } -if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW ]) - secy->replay_window =nla_get_u32 (data[IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW ]); -if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_ENCRYPT ]) tx_sc->encrypt = !!nla_get_u8 (data[IFLA_MACSEC_ENCRYPT ]);
@@ -3794,6 +3792,16 @@ static int macsec_changelink_common(struct net_device *dev, } } +if (data[IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW ]) { + secy->replay_window =nla_get_u32 (data[IFLA_MACSEC_WINDOW ]); + +/* IEEE 802.1AEbw-2013 10.7.8 - maximum replay window +* for XPN cipher suites */ +if (secy->xpn && + secy->replay_window >MACSEC_XPN_MAX_REPLAY_WINDOW ) +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; }
@@ -3823,7 +3831,7 @@ static int macsec_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], ret =macsec_changelink_common (dev, data);if (ret) -return ret; + goto cleanup;/* If h/w offloading is available, propagate to the device */ if (macsec_is_offloaded (macsec)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/88 macsec: always read MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN as a u64
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c630d1fe6219769049c87d1a6a0e9a6de55328a1 ]
Currently, MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN is handled inconsistently, sometimes as a u32, sometimes forced into a u64 without checking the actual length of the attribute. Instead, we can use nla_get_u64 everywhere, which will read up to 64 bits into a u64, capped by the actual length of the attribute coming from userspace.
This fixes several issues:
- the check in validate_add_rxsa doesn't work with 32-bit attributes
- the checks in validate_add_txsa and validate_upd_sa incorrectly reject X << 32 (with X != 0)
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +3 -3
@@ -1698,7 +1698,7 @@ static bool validate_add_rxsa(struct nlattr **attrs)return false;if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ] && - *(u64 *)nla_data (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 ) +nla_get_u64 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 )return false;if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE ]) {
@@ -1941,7 +1941,7 @@ static bool validate_add_txsa(struct nlattr **attrs)if (nla_get_u8 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN ]) >=MACSEC_NUM_AN )return false; -if (nla_get_u32 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 ) +if (nla_get_u64 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 )return false;if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE ]) {
@@ -2295,7 +2295,7 @@ static bool validate_upd_sa(struct nlattr **attrs)if (nla_get_u8 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_AN ]) >=MACSEC_NUM_AN )return false; -if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ] &&nla_get_u32 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 ) +if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ] &&nla_get_u64 (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_PN ]) ==0 )return false;if (attrs[MACSEC_SA_ATTR_ACTIVE ]) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/88 net: macsec: fix potential resource leak in macsec_add_rxsa() and macsec_add_txsa()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jianglei Nie <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c7b205fbbf3cffa374721bb7623f7aa8c46074f1 ]
init_rx_sa() allocates relevant resource for rx_sa->stats and rx_sa-> key.tfm with alloc_percpu() and macsec_alloc_tfm(). When some error occurs after init_rx_sa() is called in macsec_add_rxsa(), the function released rx_sa with kfree() without releasing rx_sa->stats and rx_sa-> key.tfm, which will lead to a resource leak.
We should call macsec_rxsa_put() instead of kfree() to decrease the ref count of rx_sa and release the relevant resource if the refcount is 0. The same bug exists in macsec_add_txsa() for tx_sa as well. This patch fixes the above two bugs.
--- drivers/net/macsec.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +2 -2
@@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@ static int macsec_add_rxsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)return 0 ; cleanup: -kfree (rx_sa); +macsec_rxsa_put (rx_sa);rtnl_unlock ();return err; }
@@ -2087,7 +2087,7 @@ static int macsec_add_txsa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) cleanup: secy->operational = was_operational; -kfree (tx_sa); +macsec_txsa_put (tx_sa);rtnl_unlock ();return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/88 net: mld: fix reference count leak in mld_{query | report}_work()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Taehee Yoo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e7d18b9dca388940a19cae30bfc1f76dccd8c28 ]
mld_{query | report}_work() processes queued events.
If there are too many events in the queue, it re-queue a work. And then, it returns without in6_dev_put().
But if queuing is failed, it should call in6_dev_put(), but it doesn't. So, a reference count leak would occur.
THREAD0 THREAD1mld_report_work()
spin_lock_bh() if (!mod_delayed_work()) in6_dev_hold(); spin_unlock_bh() spin_lock_bh() schedule_delayed_work() spin_unlock_bh()
Script to reproduce(by Hangbin Liu):
ip netns add ns1
ip netns add ns2
ip netns exec ns1 sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.force_mld_version=1 ip netns exec ns2 sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.all.force_mld_version=1
ip -n ns1 link add veth0 type veth peer name veth0 netns ns2 ip -n ns1 link set veth0 up
ip -n ns2 link set veth0 up
for i in `seq 50`; do
for j in `seq 100`; do
ip -n ns1 addr add 2021:${i}::${j}/64 dev veth0
ip -n ns2 addr add 2022:${i}::${j}/64 dev veth0
done
done
modprobe -r veth
ip -a netns delsplat looks like:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become free. Usage count = 2 leaked reference.
ipv6_add_dev+0x324/0xec0 addrconf_notify+0x481/0xd10 raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe3/0x120 call_netdevice_notifiers+0x106/0x160 register_netdevice+0x114c/0x16b0 veth_newlink+0x48b/0xa50 [veth] rtnl_newlink+0x11a2/0x1a40 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x63f/0xc00 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x3e0 netlink_unicast+0x5de/0x850 netlink_sendmsg+0x6c9/0xa90 ____sys_sendmsg+0x76a/0x780 __sys_sendmsg+0x27c/0x340 do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
--- net/ipv6/mcast.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/mcast.c +8 -6
@@ -1522,7 +1522,6 @@ static void mld_query_work(struct work_struct *work)if (++cnt >=MLD_MAX_QUEUE ) { rework = true; -schedule_delayed_work (&idev->mc_query_work,0 );break ; } }
@@ -1533,8 +1532,10 @@ static void mld_query_work(struct work_struct *work)__mld_query_work (skb);mutex_unlock (&idev->mc_lock); -if (!rework) -in6_dev_put (idev); +if (rework &&queue_delayed_work (mld_wq, &idev->mc_query_work,0 )) +return ; + +in6_dev_put (idev); }/* called with rcu_read_lock() */
@@ -1624,7 +1625,6 @@ static void mld_report_work(struct work_struct *work)if (++cnt >=MLD_MAX_QUEUE ) { rework = true; -schedule_delayed_work (&idev->mc_report_work,0 );break ; } }
@@ -1635,8 +1635,10 @@ static void mld_report_work(struct work_struct *work)__mld_report_work (skb);mutex_unlock (&idev->mc_lock); -if (!rework) -in6_dev_put (idev); +if (rework &&queue_delayed_work (mld_wq, &idev->mc_report_work,0 )) +return ; + +in6_dev_put (idev); } static bool is_in(struct ifmcaddr6 *pmc, struct ip6_sf_list *psf, int type,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sk_pacing_rate.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 59bf6c65a09fff74215517aecffbbdcd67df76e3 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_pacing_(ss|ca)_ratio, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -2
@@ -910,9 +910,9 @@ static void tcp_update_pacing_rate(struct sock *sk)* end of slow start and should slow down. */ if (tcp_snd_cwnd (tp) < tp->snd_ssthresh /2 ) - rate *=sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio; + rate *=READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio);else - rate *=sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio; + rate *=READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio); rate *=max (tcp_snd_cwnd (tp), tp->packets_out);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/88 net: Fix data-races around sysctl_[rw]mem(_offset)?.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 02739545951ad4c1215160db7fbf9b7a918d3c0b ]
While reading these sysctl variables, they can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to their readers.
- .sysctl_rmem
- .sysctl_rwmem
- .sysctl_rmem_offset
- .sysctl_wmem_offset
- sysctl_tcp_rmem[1, 2]
- sysctl_tcp_wmem[1, 2]
- sysctl_decnet_rmem[1]
- sysctl_decnet_wmem[1]
- sysctl_tipc_rmem[1]
--- include/net/sock.h | 8 ++++---- net/decnet/af_decnet.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 13 +++++++------ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 2 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 6 +++--- net/tipc/socket.c | 2 +- 7 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/net/sock.h +4 -4
@@ -2834,18 +2834,18 @@ static inline int sk_get_wmem0(const struct sock *sk, const struct proto *proto) {/* Does this proto have per netns sysctl_wmem ? */ if (proto->sysctl_wmem_offset) -return *(int *)((void *)sock_net (sk) + proto->sysctl_wmem_offset); +return READ_ONCE (*(int *)((void *)sock_net (sk) + proto->sysctl_wmem_offset)); -return *proto->sysctl_wmem; +return READ_ONCE (*proto->sysctl_wmem); }static inline int sk_get_rmem0 (const struct sock *sk,const struct proto *proto) {/* Does this proto have per netns sysctl_rmem ? */ if (proto->sysctl_rmem_offset) -return *(int *)((void *)sock_net (sk) + proto->sysctl_rmem_offset); +return READ_ONCE (*(int *)((void *)sock_net (sk) + proto->sysctl_rmem_offset)); -return *proto->sysctl_rmem; +return READ_ONCE (*proto->sysctl_rmem); }/* Default TCP Small queue budget is ~1 ms of data (1sec >> 10)
net/decnet/af_decnet.c +2 -2
@@ -480,8 +480,8 @@ static struct sock *dn_alloc_sock(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, gfp_t gf sk->sk_family = PF_DECnet; sk->sk_protocol =0 ; sk->sk_allocation = gfp; - sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_decnet_wmem[1 ]; - sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_decnet_rmem[1 ]; + sk->sk_sndbuf =READ_ONCE (sysctl_decnet_wmem[1 ]); + sk->sk_rcvbuf =READ_ONCE (sysctl_decnet_rmem[1 ]);/* Initialization of DECnet Session Control Port */ scp =DN_SK (sk);
net/ipv4/tcp.c +3 -3
@@ -452,8 +452,8 @@ void tcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk) icsk->icsk_sync_mss = tcp_sync_mss; -WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf,sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[1 ]); -WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf,sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[1 ]); +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf,READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[1 ])); +WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf,READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[1 ]));sk_sockets_allocated_inc (sk); }
@@ -1743,7 +1743,7 @@ int tcp_set_rcvlowat(struct sock *sk, int val)if (sk->sk_userlocks &SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK ) cap = sk->sk_rcvbuf >>1 ;else - cap =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ] >>1 ; + cap =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]) >>1 ; val =min (val, cap);WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvlowat, val ? :1 );
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +7 -6
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static void tcp_sndbuf_expand(struct sock *sk)if (sk->sk_sndbuf < sndmem)WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_sndbuf, -min (sndmem,sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[2 ])); +min (sndmem,READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[2 ]))); }/* 2. Tuning advertised window (window_clamp, rcv_ssthresh)
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static int __tcp_grow_window(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);/* Optimize this! */ int truesize =tcp_win_from_space (sk, skbtruesize) >>1 ; -int window =tcp_win_from_space (sk,sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]) >>1 ; +int window =tcp_win_from_space (sk,READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ])) >>1 ;while (tp->rcv_ssthresh <= window) {if (truesize <= skb->len)
@@ -574,16 +574,17 @@ static void tcp_clamp_window(struct sock *sk)struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk);struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk);struct net *net =sock_net (sk); +int rmem2; icsk->icsk_ack.quick =0 ; + rmem2 =READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]); -if (sk->sk_rcvbuf < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ] && +if (sk->sk_rcvbuf < rmem2 && !(sk->sk_userlocks &SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK ) && !tcp_under_memory_pressure (sk) &&sk_memory_allocated (sk) <sk_prot_mem_limits (sk,0 )) {WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf, -min (atomic_read (&sk->sk_rmem_alloc), - net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ])); +min (atomic_read (&sk->sk_rmem_alloc), rmem2)); }if (atomic_read (&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf) tp->rcv_ssthresh =min (tp->window_clamp,2U * tp->advmss);
@@ -745,7 +746,7 @@ void tcp_rcv_space_adjust(struct sock *sk)do_div (rcvwin, tp->advmss); rcvbuf =min_t (u64, rcvwin * rcvmem, -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]); +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]));if (rcvbuf > sk->sk_rcvbuf) {WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_rcvbuf, rcvbuf);
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +1 -1
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(const struct sock *sk, int __space, __u32 mss, *rcv_wscale =0 ;if (wscale_ok) {/* Set window scaling on max possible window */ - space =max_t (u32, space,sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]); + space =max_t (u32, space,READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ])); space =max_t (u32, space, sysctl_rmem_max); space =min_t (u32, space, *window_clamp); *rcv_wscale = clamp_t(int, ilog2(space) - 15,
net/mptcp/protocol.c +3 -3
@@ -1900,7 +1900,7 @@ static void mptcp_rcv_space_adjust(struct mptcp_sock *msk, int copied)do_div (rcvwin, advmss); rcvbuf =min_t (u64, rcvwin * rcvmem, -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]); +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]));if (rcvbuf > sk->sk_rcvbuf) {u32 window_clamp;
@@ -2597,8 +2597,8 @@ static int mptcp_init_sock(struct sock *sk)mptcp_ca_reset (sk);sk_sockets_allocated_inc (sk); - sk->sk_rcvbuf =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[1 ]; - sk->sk_sndbuf =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[1 ]; + sk->sk_rcvbuf =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem[1 ]); + sk->sk_sndbuf =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem[1 ]);return 0 ; }
net/tipc/socket.c +1 -1
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static int tipc_sk_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,timer_setup (&sk->sk_timer, tipc_sk_timeout,0 ); sk->sk_shutdown =0 ; sk->sk_backlog_rcv = tipc_sk_backlog_rcv; - sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tipc_rmem[1 ]; + sk->sk_rcvbuf =READ_ONCE (sysctl_tipc_rmem[1 ]); sk->sk_data_ready = tipc_data_ready; sk->sk_write_space = tipc_write_space; sk->sk_destruct = tipc_sock_destruct;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4866b2b0f7672b6d760c4b8ece6fb56f965dcc8a ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +2 -1
@@ -5546,7 +5546,8 @@ static void __tcp_ack_snd_check(struct sock *sk, int ofo_possible)if (tp->srtt_us && tp->srtt_us < rtt) rtt = tp->srtt_us; - delay = min_t(unsigned long, sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns, + delay = min_t(unsigned long, +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns), rtt * (NSEC_PER_USEC >>3 )/20 );sock_hold (sk); hrtimer_start_range_ns(&tp->compressed_ack_timer, ns_to_ktime(delay),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 22396941a7f343d704738360f9ef0e6576489d43 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -5551,7 +5551,7 @@ static void __tcp_ack_snd_check(struct sock *sk, int ofo_possible) rtt * (NSEC_PER_USEC >> 3)/20);sock_hold (sk);hrtimer_start_range_ns (&tp->compressed_ack_timer,ns_to_ktime (delay), -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns, +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns),HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED_SOFT ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/88 tcp: Fix a data-race around sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 79f55473bfc8ac51bd6572929a679eeb4da22251 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its reader.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +1 -1
@@ -5525,7 +5525,7 @@ static void __tcp_ack_snd_check(struct sock *sk, int ofo_possible) }if (!tcp_is_sack (tp) || - tp->compressed_ack >=sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr) + tp->compressed_ack >=READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr)) goto send_now;if (tp->compressed_ack_rcv_nxt != tp->rcv_nxt) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 870e3a634b6a6cb1543b359007aca73fe6a03ac5 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c +2 -2
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static int tcp_v4_send_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,if (skb) {__tcp_v4_send_check (skb, ireq->ir_loc_addr, ireq->ir_rmt_addr); - tos =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos ? + tos =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos) ? (tcp_rsk (req)->syn_tos & ~INET_ECN_MASK ) | (inet_sk (sk)->tos &INET_ECN_MASK ) :inet_sk (sk)->tos;
@@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,/* Set ToS of the new socket based upon the value of incoming SYN. * ECT bits are set later in tcp_init_transfer(). */ -if (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos) +if (READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos)) newinet->tos =tcp_rsk (req)->syn_tos & ~INET_ECN_MASK ;if (!dst) {
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c +2 -2
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,if (np->repflow && ireq->pktopts) fl6->flowlabel =ip6_flowlabel (ipv6_hdr (ireq->pktopts)); - tclass =sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos ? + tclass =READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos) ? (tcp_rsk (req)->syn_tos & ~INET_ECN_MASK ) | (np->tclass &INET_ECN_MASK ) : np->tclass;
@@ -1314,7 +1314,7 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff */* Set ToS of the new socket based upon the value of incoming SYN. * ECT bits are set later in tcp_init_transfer(). */ -if (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos) +if (READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos)) newnp->tclass =tcp_rsk (req)->syn_tos & ~INET_ECN_MASK ;/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/88 ipv4: Fix data-races around sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 96b9bd8c6d125490f9adfb57d387ef81a55a103e ]
While reading sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +5 -2
@@ -1042,6 +1042,7 @@ fib_find_matching_alias(struct net *net, const struct fib_rt_info *fri)void fib_alias_hw_flags_set (struct net *net,const struct fib_rt_info *fri) { +u8 fib_notify_on_flag_change;struct fib_alias *fa_match;struct sk_buff *skb;int err;
@@ -1063,14 +1064,16 @@ void fib_alias_hw_flags_set(struct net *net, const struct fib_rt_info *fri)WRITE_ONCE (fa_match->offload, fri->offload);WRITE_ONCE (fa_match->trap, fri->trap); + fib_notify_on_flag_change =READ_ONCE (net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change); +/* 2 means send notifications only if offload_failed was changed. */ -if (net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change ==2 && +if (fib_notify_on_flag_change ==2 &&READ_ONCE (fa_match->offload_failed) == fri->offload_failed) goto out;WRITE_ONCE (fa_match->offload_failed, fri->offload_failed); -if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change) +if (!fib_notify_on_flag_change) goto out; skb =nlmsg_new (fib_nlmsg_size (fa_match->fa_info),GFP_ATOMIC );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/88 i40e: Fix interface init with MSI interrupts (no MSI-X)
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michal Maloszewski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5fcbb711024aac6d4db385623e6f2fdf019f7782 ]
Fix the inability to bring an interface up on a setup with only MSI interrupts enabled (no MSI-X).
Solution is to add a default number of QPs = 1. This is enough, since without MSI-X support driver enables only a basic feature set.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +4 -0
@@ -1920,11 +1920,15 @@ static void i40e_vsi_setup_queue_map(struct i40e_vsi *vsi,* non-zero req_queue_pairs says that user requested a new * queue count via ethtool's set_channels, so use this * value for queues distribution across traffic classes +* We need at least one queue pair for the interface +* to be usable as we see in else statement. */ if (vsi->req_queue_pairs >0 ) vsi->num_queue_pairs = vsi->req_queue_pairs;else if (pf->flags &I40E_FLAG_MSIX_ENABLED ) vsi->num_queue_pairs = pf->num_lan_msix; +else + vsi->num_queue_pairs =1 ; }/* Number of queues per enabled TC */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/88 net: dsa: fix reference counting for LAG FDBs
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c7560d1203b7a1ea0b99a5c575547e95d564b2a8 ]
Due to an invalid conflict resolution on my side while working on 2 different series (LAG FDBs and FDB isolation), dsa_switch_do_lag_fdb_add() does not store the database associated with a dsa_mac_addr structure.
So after adding an FDB entry associated with a LAG, dsa_mac_addr_find() fails to find it while deleting it, because &a->db is zeroized memory for all stored FDB entries of lag->fdbs, and dsa_switch_do_lag_fdb_del() returns -ENOENT rather than deleting the entry.
--- net/dsa/switch.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/dsa/switch.c +1 -0
@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ static int dsa_switch_do_lag_fdb_add(struct dsa_switch *ds, struct dsa_lag *lag,ether_addr_copy (a->addr, addr); a->vid = vid; + a->db = db;refcount_set (&a->refcount,1 );list_add_tail (&a->list, &lag->fdbs);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/88 sctp: fix sleep in atomic context bug in timer handlers
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b89fc26f741d9f9efb51cba3e9b241cf1380ec5a ]
There are sleep in atomic context bugs in timer handlers of sctp such as sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event(), sctp_generate_probe_event(), sctp_generate_t1_init_event(), sctp_generate_timeout_event(), sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event() and so on.
The root cause is sctp_sched_prio_init_sid() with GFP_KERNEL parameter that may sleep could be called by different timer handlers which is in interrupt context.
One of the call paths that could trigger bug is shown below:
(interrupt context)sctp_generate_probe_event
sctp_do_sm
sctp_side_effects
sctp_cmd_interpreter
sctp_outq_teardown
sctp_outq_init
sctp_sched_set_sched
n->init_sid(..,GFP_KERNEL)
sctp_sched_prio_init_sid //may sleep
This patch changes gfp_t parameter of init_sid in sctp_sched_set_sched() from GFP_KERNEL to GFP_ATOMIC in order to prevent sleep in atomic context bugs.
--- net/sctp/stream_sched.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/stream_sched.c +1 -1
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int sctp_sched_set_sched(struct sctp_association *asoc,if (!SCTP_SO (&asoc->stream, i)->ext)continue ; - ret = n->init_sid (&asoc->stream, i,GFP_KERNEL ); + ret = n->init_sid (&asoc->stream, i,GFP_ATOMIC );if (ret) goto err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/88 octeontx2-pf: cn10k: Fix egress ratelimit configuration
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sunil Goutham <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b354eaeec8637d87003945439209251d76a2bb95 ]
NIX_AF_TLXX_PIR/CIR register format has changed from OcteonTx2 to CN10K. CN10K supports larger burst size. Fix burst exponent and burst mantissa configuration for CN10K.
Also fixed 'maxrate' from u32 to u64 since 'police.rate_bytes_ps' passed by stack is also u64.
--- .../ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_tc.c | 76 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/nic/otx2_tc.c +55 -21
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@#define MAX_RATE_EXPONENT 0x0FULL#define MAX_RATE_MANTISSA 0xFFULL +#define CN10K_MAX_BURST_MANTISSA 0x7FFFULL +#define CN10K_MAX_BURST_SIZE 8453888ULL +/* Bitfields in NIX_TLX_PIR register */ #define TLX_RATE_MANTISSA GENMASK_ULL(8, 1)#define TLX_RATE_EXPONENT GENMASK_ULL(12, 9)
@@ -35,6 +38,9 @@#define TLX_BURST_MANTISSA GENMASK_ULL(36, 29)#define TLX_BURST_EXPONENT GENMASK_ULL(40, 37) +#define CN10K_TLX_BURST_MANTISSA GENMASK_ULL(43, 29) +#define CN10K_TLX_BURST_EXPONENT GENMASK_ULL(47, 44) +struct otx2_tc_flow_stats {u64 bytes;u64 pkts;
@@ -77,33 +83,42 @@ int otx2_tc_alloc_ent_bitmap(struct otx2_nic *nic) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (otx2_tc_alloc_ent_bitmap); -static void otx2_get_egress_burst_cfg (u32 burst,u32 *burst_exp, -u32 *burst_mantissa) +static void otx2_get_egress_burst_cfg (struct otx2_nic *nic,u32 burst, +u32 *burst_exp,u32 *burst_mantissa) { +int max_burst, max_mantissa;unsigned int tmp; +if (is_dev_otx2 (nic->pdev)) { + max_burst =MAX_BURST_SIZE ; + max_mantissa =MAX_BURST_MANTISSA ; + }else { + max_burst =CN10K_MAX_BURST_SIZE ; + max_mantissa =CN10K_MAX_BURST_MANTISSA ; + } +/* Burst is calculated as * ((256 + BURST_MANTISSA) << (1 + BURST_EXPONENT)) / 256 * Max supported burst size is 130,816 bytes. */ - burst =min_t (u32, burst,MAX_BURST_SIZE ); + burst =min_t (u32, burst, max_burst);if (burst) { *burst_exp =ilog2 (burst) ?ilog2 (burst) -1 :0 ; tmp = burst -rounddown_pow_of_two (burst); -if (burst <MAX_BURST_MANTISSA ) +if (burst < max_mantissa) *burst_mantissa = tmp *2 ;else *burst_mantissa = tmp / (1ULL << (*burst_exp -7 )); }else { *burst_exp =MAX_BURST_EXPONENT ; - *burst_mantissa =MAX_BURST_MANTISSA ; + *burst_mantissa = max_mantissa; } } -static void otx2_get_egress_rate_cfg (u32 maxrate,u32 *exp, +static void otx2_get_egress_rate_cfg (u64 maxrate,u32 *exp,u32 *mantissa,u32 *div_exp) { -unsigned int tmp; +u64 tmp;/* Rate calculation by hardware *
@@ -132,21 +147,44 @@ static void otx2_get_egress_rate_cfg(u32 maxrate, u32 *exp, } } -static int otx2_set_matchall_egress_rate (struct otx2_nic *nic,u32 burst,u32 maxrate) +static u64 otx2_get_txschq_rate_regval (struct otx2_nic *nic, +u64 maxrate,u32 burst) { -struct otx2_hw *hw = &nic->hw; -struct nix_txschq_config *req;u32 burst_exp, burst_mantissa;u32 exp, mantissa, div_exp; +u64 regval =0 ; + +/* Get exponent and mantissa values from the desired rate */ +otx2_get_egress_burst_cfg (nic, burst, &burst_exp, &burst_mantissa); +otx2_get_egress_rate_cfg (maxrate, &exp, &mantissa, &div_exp); + +if (is_dev_otx2 (nic->pdev)) { + regval =FIELD_PREP (TLX_BURST_EXPONENT , (u64 )burst_exp) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_BURST_MANTISSA , (u64 )burst_mantissa) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_DIVIDER_EXPONENT , div_exp) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_EXPONENT , exp) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_MANTISSA , mantissa) |BIT_ULL (0 ); + }else { + regval =FIELD_PREP (CN10K_TLX_BURST_EXPONENT , (u64 )burst_exp) | +FIELD_PREP (CN10K_TLX_BURST_MANTISSA , (u64 )burst_mantissa) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_DIVIDER_EXPONENT , div_exp) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_EXPONENT , exp) | +FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_MANTISSA , mantissa) |BIT_ULL (0 ); + } + +return regval; +} + +static int otx2_set_matchall_egress_rate (struct otx2_nic *nic, +u32 burst,u64 maxrate) +{ +struct otx2_hw *hw = &nic->hw; +struct nix_txschq_config *req;int txschq, err;/* All SQs share the same TL4, so pick the first scheduler */ txschq = hw->txschq_list[NIX_TXSCH_LVL_TL4 ][0 ]; -/* Get exponent and mantissa values from the desired rate */ -otx2_get_egress_burst_cfg (burst, &burst_exp, &burst_mantissa); -otx2_get_egress_rate_cfg (maxrate, &exp, &mantissa, &div_exp); -mutex_lock (&nic->mbox.lock); req =otx2_mbox_alloc_msg_nix_txschq_cfg (&nic->mbox);if (!req) {
@@ -157,11 +195,7 @@ static int otx2_set_matchall_egress_rate(struct otx2_nic *nic, u32 burst, u32 ma req->lvl =NIX_TXSCH_LVL_TL4 ; req->num_regs =1 ; req->reg[0 ] =NIX_AF_TL4X_PIR (txschq); - req->regval[0 ] =FIELD_PREP (TLX_BURST_EXPONENT , burst_exp) | -FIELD_PREP (TLX_BURST_MANTISSA , burst_mantissa) | -FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_DIVIDER_EXPONENT , div_exp) | -FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_EXPONENT , exp) | -FIELD_PREP (TLX_RATE_MANTISSA , mantissa) |BIT_ULL (0 ); + req->regval[0 ] =otx2_get_txschq_rate_regval (nic, maxrate, burst); err =otx2_sync_mbox_msg (&nic->mbox);mutex_unlock (&nic->mbox.lock);
@@ -230,7 +264,7 @@ static int otx2_tc_egress_matchall_install(struct otx2_nic *nic,struct netlink_ext_ack *extack = cls->common.extack;struct flow_action *actions = &cls->rule->action;struct flow_action_entry *entry; -u32 rate; +u64 rate;int err; err =otx2_tc_validate_flow (nic, actions, extack);
@@ -256,7 +290,7 @@ static int otx2_tc_egress_matchall_install(struct otx2_nic *nic, }/* Convert bytes per second to Mbps */ rate = entry->police.rate_bytes_ps *8 ; - rate =max_t (u32, rate /1000000 ,1 ); + rate =max_t (u64, rate /1000000 ,1 ); err =otx2_set_matchall_egress_rate (nic, entry->police.burst, rate);if (err)return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/88 netfilter: nf_queue: do not allow packet truncation below transport header offset
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 99a63d36cb3ed5ca3aa6fcb64cffbeaf3b0fb164 ]
Domingo Dirutigliano and Nicola Guerrera report kernel panic when sending nf_queue verdict with 1-byte nfta_payload attribute.
The IP/IPv6 stack pulls the IP(v6) header from the packet after the input hook.
If user truncates the packet below the header size, this skb_pull() will result in a malformed skb (skb->len < 0).
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +6 -1
@@ -843,11 +843,16 @@ nfqnl_enqueue_packet(struct nf_queue_entry *entry, unsigned int queuenum) }static int -nfqnl_mangle (void *data,int data_len,struct nf_queue_entry *e,int diff) +nfqnl_mangle (void *data,unsigned int data_len,struct nf_queue_entry *e,int diff) {struct sk_buff *nskb;if (diff <0 ) { +unsigned int min_len =skb_transport_offset (e->skb); + +if (data_len < min_len) +return -EINVAL ; +if (pskb_trim (e->skb, data_len))return -ENOMEM ; }else if (diff >0 ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/88 scsi: ufs: Support clearing multiple commands at once
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d1a7644648b7cdacaf8d1013a4285001911e9bc8 ]
Modify ufshcd_clear_cmd() such that it supports clearing multiple commands at once instead of one command at a time. This change will be used in a later patch to reduce the time spent in the reset handler.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +28 -14
@@ -734,17 +734,28 @@ static enum utp_ocs ufshcd_get_tr_ocs(struct ufshcd_lrb *lrbp) }/** -* ufshcd_utrl_clear - Clear a bit in UTRLCLR register +* ufshcd_utrl_clear() - Clear requests from the controller request list. * @hba: per adapter instance -* @pos: position of the bit to be cleared +* @mask: mask with one bit set for each request to be cleared */ -static inline void ufshcd_utrl_clear (struct ufs_hba *hba,u32 pos) +static inline void ufshcd_utrl_clear (struct ufs_hba *hba,u32 mask) {if (hba->quirks &UFSHCI_QUIRK_BROKEN_REQ_LIST_CLR ) -ufshcd_writel (hba, (1 << pos),REG_UTP_TRANSFER_REQ_LIST_CLEAR ); -else -ufshcd_writel (hba, ~(1 << pos), -REG_UTP_TRANSFER_REQ_LIST_CLEAR ); + mask = ~mask; +/* +* From the UFSHCI specification: "UTP Transfer Request List CLear +* Register (UTRLCLR): This field is bit significant. Each bit +* corresponds to a slot in the UTP Transfer Request List, where bit 0 +* corresponds to request slot 0. A bit in this field is set to ‘0’ +* by host software to indicate to the host controller that a transfer +* request slot is cleared. The host controller +* shall free up any resources associated to the request slot +* immediately, and shall set the associated bit in UTRLDBR to ‘0’. The +* host software indicates no change to request slots by setting the +* associated bits in this field to ‘1’. Bits in this field shall only +* be set ‘1’ or ‘0’ by host software when UTRLRSR is set to ‘1’." +*/ +ufshcd_writel (hba, ~mask,REG_UTP_TRANSFER_REQ_LIST_CLEAR ); }/**
@@ -2853,16 +2864,19 @@ static int ufshcd_compose_dev_cmd(struct ufs_hba *hba,return ufshcd_compose_devman_upiu (hba, lrbp); } -static int -ufshcd_clear_cmd (struct ufs_hba *hba,int tag) +/* +* Clear all the requests from the controller for which a bit has been set in +* @mask and wait until the controller confirms that these requests have been +* cleared. +*/ +static int ufshcd_clear_cmds (struct ufs_hba *hba,u32 mask) {int err =0 ;unsigned long flags; -u32 mask =1 << tag;/* clear outstanding transaction before retry */ spin_lock_irqsave (hba->host->host_lock, flags); -ufshcd_utrl_clear (hba, tag); +ufshcd_utrl_clear (hba, mask);spin_unlock_irqrestore (hba->host->host_lock, flags);/*
@@ -2953,7 +2967,7 @@ static int ufshcd_wait_for_dev_cmd(struct ufs_hba *hba, err = -ETIMEDOUT ;dev_dbg (hba->dev,"%s: dev_cmd request timedout, tag %d\n" , __func__, lrbp->task_tag); -if (!ufshcd_clear_cmd (hba, lrbp->task_tag)) +if (!ufshcd_clear_cmds (hba,1U << lrbp->task_tag))/* successfully cleared the command, retry if needed */ err = -EAGAIN ;/*
@@ -6988,7 +7002,7 @@ static int ufshcd_eh_device_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd)/* clear the commands that were pending for corresponding LUN */ for_each_set_bit (pos, &hba->outstanding_reqs, hba->nutrs) {if (hba->lrb[pos].lun == lun) { - err =ufshcd_clear_cmd (hba, pos); + err =ufshcd_clear_cmds (hba,1U << pos);if (err)break ;__ufshcd_transfer_req_compl (hba,1U << pos);
@@ -7090,7 +7104,7 @@ static int ufshcd_try_to_abort_task(struct ufs_hba *hba, int tag) goto out; } - err =ufshcd_clear_cmd (hba, tag); + err =ufshcd_clear_cmds (hba,1U << tag);if (err)dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: Failed clearing cmd at tag %d, err %d\n" , __func__, tag, err);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/88 scsi: ufs: core: Fix a race condition related to device management
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f5c2976e0cb0f6236013bfb479868531b04f61d4 ]
If a device management command completion happens after wait_for_completion_timeout() times out and before ufshcd_clear_cmds() is called, then the completion code may crash on the complete() call in __ufshcd_transfer_req_compl().
Fix the following crash:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 Call trace: complete+0x64/0x178 __ufshcd_transfer_req_compl+0x30c/0x9c0 ufshcd_poll+0xf0/0x208 ufshcd_sl_intr+0xb8/0xf0 ufshcd_intr+0x168/0x2f4 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xa0/0x30c handle_irq_event+0x84/0x178 handle_fasteoi_irq+0x150/0x2e8 __handle_domain_irq+0x114/0x1e4 gic_handle_irq.31846+0x58/0x300 el1_irq+0xe4/0x1c0 efi_header_end+0x110/0x680 __irq_exit_rcu+0x108/0x124 __handle_domain_irq+0x118/0x1e4 gic_handle_irq.31846+0x58/0x300 el1_irq+0xe4/0x1c0 cpuidle_enter_state+0x3ac/0x8c4 do_idle+0x2fc/0x55c cpu_startup_entry+0x84/0x90 kernel_init+0x0/0x310 start_kernel+0x0/0x608 start_kernel+0x4ec/0x608
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +40 -18
@@ -2947,37 +2947,59 @@ ufshcd_dev_cmd_completion(struct ufs_hba *hba, struct ufshcd_lrb *lrbp)static int ufshcd_wait_for_dev_cmd (struct ufs_hba *hba,struct ufshcd_lrb *lrbp,int max_timeout) { -int err =0 ; -unsigned long time_left; +unsigned long time_left =msecs_to_jiffies (max_timeout);unsigned long flags; +bool pending; +int err; +retry: time_left =wait_for_completion_timeout (hba->dev_cmd.complete, -msecs_to_jiffies (max_timeout)); + time_left); -spin_lock_irqsave (hba->host->host_lock, flags); - hba->dev_cmd.complete =NULL ;if (likely (time_left)) { +/* +* The completion handler called complete() and the caller of +* this function still owns the @lrbp tag so the code below does +* not trigger any race conditions. +*/ + hba->dev_cmd.complete =NULL ; err =ufshcd_get_tr_ocs (lrbp);if (!err) err =ufshcd_dev_cmd_completion (hba, lrbp); - } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (hba->host->host_lock, flags); - -if (!time_left) { + }else { err = -ETIMEDOUT ;dev_dbg (hba->dev,"%s: dev_cmd request timedout, tag %d\n" , __func__, lrbp->task_tag); -if (!ufshcd_clear_cmds (hba,1U << lrbp->task_tag)) +if (ufshcd_clear_cmds (hba,1U << lrbp->task_tag) ==0 ) {/* successfully cleared the command, retry if needed */ err = -EAGAIN ; -/* -* in case of an error, after clearing the doorbell, -* we also need to clear the outstanding_request -* field in hba -*/ -spin_lock_irqsave (&hba->outstanding_lock, flags); -__clear_bit (lrbp->task_tag, &hba->outstanding_reqs); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hba->outstanding_lock, flags); +/* +* Since clearing the command succeeded we also need to +* clear the task tag bit from the outstanding_reqs +* variable. +*/ +spin_lock_irqsave (&hba->outstanding_lock, flags); + pending =test_bit (lrbp->task_tag, + &hba->outstanding_reqs); +if (pending) { + hba->dev_cmd.complete =NULL ; +__clear_bit (lrbp->task_tag, + &hba->outstanding_reqs); + } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hba->outstanding_lock, flags); + +if (!pending) { +/* +* The completion handler ran while we tried to +* clear the command. +*/ + time_left =1 ; + goto retry; + } + }else { +dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: failed to clear tag %d\n" , + __func__, lrbp->task_tag); + } }return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/88 mptcp: dont send RST for single subflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1761fed2567807f26fbd53032ff622f55978c7a9 ]
When a bad checksum is detected and a single subflow is in use, don't send RST + MP_FAIL, send data_ack + MP_FAIL instead.
So invoke tcp_send_active_reset() only when mptcp_has_another_subflow() is true.
--- net/mptcp/subflow.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/subflow.c +5 -5
@@ -1221,14 +1221,14 @@ static bool subflow_check_data_avail(struct sock *ssk)/* RFC 8684 section 3.7. */ if (subflow->send_mp_fail) {if (mptcp_has_another_subflow (ssk)) { + ssk->sk_err =EBADMSG ; +tcp_set_state (ssk,TCP_CLOSE ); + subflow->reset_transient =0 ; + subflow->reset_reason =MPTCP_RST_EMIDDLEBOX ; +tcp_send_active_reset (ssk,GFP_ATOMIC );while ((skb =skb_peek (&ssk->sk_receive_queue)))sk_eat_skb (ssk, skb); } - ssk->sk_err =EBADMSG ; -tcp_set_state (ssk,TCP_CLOSE ); - subflow->reset_transient =0 ; - subflow->reset_reason =MPTCP_RST_EMIDDLEBOX ; -tcp_send_active_reset (ssk,GFP_ATOMIC );WRITE_ONCE (subflow->data_avail,MPTCP_SUBFLOW_NODATA );return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH 5.18 72/88] mptcp: dont send RST for single subflow
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
1761fed2567807f26fbd53032ff622f55978c7a9]When a bad checksum is detected and a single subflow is in use, don't send RST +
MP_FAIL, senddata_ack+MP_FAILinstead.
Quoted 7 lines
So invoke
tcp_send_active_reset()only whenmptcp_has_another_subflow()is true.Signed-off-by Geliang Tang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mat Martineau <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Hi Greg -
Please drop this patch from the 5.18-stable queue. It was the first of an 8-patch series and doesn't really stand alone.
This commit message lacks the Fixes: tag and the magic commit message words that I've seen the scripts pick up, so I'm curious: was this patch selected by hand?
Thanks,
Mat
Quoted 34 lines
---
net/mptcp/subflow.c| 10 +++++-----1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)net/mptcp/subflow.c +5
-5@@ -1221,14 +1221,14 @@ static bool subflow_check_data_avail(struct sock *ssk)/* RFC 8684 section 3.7. */ if (subflow->send_mp_fail) {if (mptcp_has_another_subflow (ssk)) { + ssk->sk_err =EBADMSG ; +tcp_set_state (ssk,TCP_CLOSE ); + subflow->reset_transient =0 ; + subflow->reset_reason =MPTCP_RST_EMIDDLEBOX ; +tcp_send_active_reset (ssk,GFP_ATOMIC );while ((skb =skb_peek (&ssk->sk_receive_queue)))sk_eat_skb (ssk, skb); } - ssk->sk_err =EBADMSG ; -tcp_set_state (ssk,TCP_CLOSE ); - subflow->reset_transient =0 ; - subflow->reset_reason =MPTCP_RST_EMIDDLEBOX ; -tcp_send_active_reset (ssk,GFP_ATOMIC );WRITE_ONCE (subflow->data_avail,MPTCP_SUBFLOW_NODATA );return true; }Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
--
Mat Martineau
Intel
Sasha Levin
maintainerRe: [PATCH 5.18 72/88] mptcp: dont send RST for single subflow
Quoted 17 lines · Mat Martineau
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
1761fed2567807f26fbd53032ff622f55978c7a9]When a bad checksum is detected and a single subflow is in use, don't send RST +
MP_FAIL, senddata_ack+MP_FAILinstead.Quoted 7 lines
So invoke
tcp_send_active_reset()only whenmptcp_has_another_subflow()is true.Signed-off-by Geliang Tang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mat Martineau <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
Hi Greg -
Please drop this patch from the 5.18-stable queue. It was the first of an 8-patch series and doesn't really stand alone.
This commit message lacks the Fixes: tag and the magic commit message words that I've seen the scripts pick up, so I'm curious: was this patch selected by hand?
Yup, between the commit message and the code itself, it looked like a fix for AUTOSEL.
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 5.18 72/88] mptcp: dont send RST for single subflow
Quoted 23 lines · Sasha Levin
Quoted 22 lines · Mat Martineau
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Geliang Tang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
1761fed2567807f26fbd53032ff622f55978c7a9]When a bad checksum is detected and a single subflow is in use, don't send RST +
MP_FAIL, senddata_ack+MP_FAILinstead.Quoted 7 lines
So invoke
tcp_send_active_reset()only whenmptcp_has_another_subflow()is true.Signed-off-by Geliang Tang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Mat Martineau <[email protected]>Signed-off-by David S. Miller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>Hi Greg -
Please drop this patch from the 5.18-stable queue. It was the first of an 8-patch series and doesn't really stand alone.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
This commit message lacks the Fixes: tag and the magic commit message words that I've seen the scripts pick up, so I'm curious: was this patch selected by hand?
Yup, between the commit message and the code itself, it looked like a fix for AUTOSEL.
Ok, now dropped, thanks for the review.
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/88 virtio-net: fix the race between refill work and close
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5a159128faff151b7fe5f4eb0f310b1e0a2d56bf ]
We try using cancel_delayed_work_sync() to prevent the work from enabling NAPI. This is insufficient since we don't disable the source of the refill work scheduling. This means an NAPI poll callback after cancel_delayed_work_sync() can schedule the refill work then can re-enable the NAPI that leads to use-after-free [1].
Since the work can enable NAPI, we can't simply disable NAPI before calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(). So fix this by introducing a dedicated boolean to control whether or not the work could be scheduled from NAPI.
[1]
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in refill_work+0x43/0xd4 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810562c92e by task kworker/2:1/42 CPU: 2 PID: 42 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc1+ #480 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events refill_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 print_report.cold+0xbb/0x6ac ? _printk+0xad/0xde ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4 kasan_report+0xa8/0x130 ? refill_work+0x43/0xd4 refill_work+0x43/0xd4 process_one_work+0x43d/0x780 worker_thread+0x2a0/0x6f0 ? process_one_work+0x780/0x780 kthread+0x167/0x1a0 ? kthread_exit+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK>
...
--- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +34 -3
@@ -242,9 +242,15 @@ struct virtnet_info {/* Packet virtio header size */ u8 hdr_len; -/* Work struct for refilling if we run low on memory. */ +/* Work struct for delayed refilling if we run low on memory. */ struct delayed_work refill; +/* Is delayed refill enabled? */ +bool refill_enabled; + +/* The lock to synchronize the access to refill_enabled */ +spinlock_t refill_lock; +/* Work struct for config space updates */ struct work_struct config_work;
@@ -348,6 +354,20 @@ static struct page *get_a_page(struct receive_queue *rq, gfp_t gfp_mask)return p; } +static void enable_delayed_refill (struct virtnet_info *vi) +{ +spin_lock_bh (&vi->refill_lock); + vi->refill_enabled = true; +spin_unlock_bh (&vi->refill_lock); +} + +static void disable_delayed_refill (struct virtnet_info *vi) +{ +spin_lock_bh (&vi->refill_lock); + vi->refill_enabled = false; +spin_unlock_bh (&vi->refill_lock); +} +static void virtqueue_napi_schedule (struct napi_struct *napi,struct virtqueue *vq) {
@@ -1527,8 +1547,12 @@ static int virtnet_receive(struct receive_queue *rq, int budget, }if (rq->vq->num_free >min ((unsigned int )budget,virtqueue_get_vring_size (rq->vq)) /2 ) { -if (!try_fill_recv (vi, rq,GFP_ATOMIC )) -schedule_delayed_work (&vi->refill,0 ); +if (!try_fill_recv (vi, rq,GFP_ATOMIC )) { +spin_lock (&vi->refill_lock); +if (vi->refill_enabled) +schedule_delayed_work (&vi->refill,0 ); +spin_unlock (&vi->refill_lock); + } }u64_stats_update_begin (&rq->stats.syncp);
@@ -1651,6 +1675,8 @@ static int virtnet_open(struct net_device *dev)struct virtnet_info *vi =netdev_priv (dev);int i, err; +enable_delayed_refill (vi); +for (i =0 ; i < vi->max_queue_pairs; i++) {if (i < vi->curr_queue_pairs)/* Make sure we have some buffers: if oom use wq. */
@@ -2033,6 +2059,8 @@ static int virtnet_close(struct net_device *dev)struct virtnet_info *vi =netdev_priv (dev);int i; +/* Make sure NAPI doesn't schedule refill work */ +disable_delayed_refill (vi);/* Make sure refill_work doesn't re-enable napi! */ cancel_delayed_work_sync (&vi->refill);
@@ -2792,6 +2820,8 @@ static int virtnet_restore_up(struct virtio_device *vdev)virtio_device_ready (vdev); +enable_delayed_refill (vi); +if (netif_running (vi->dev)) { err =virtnet_open (vi->dev);if (err)
@@ -3534,6 +3564,7 @@ static int virtnet_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) vdev->priv = vi;INIT_WORK (&vi->config_work, virtnet_config_changed_work); +spin_lock_init (&vi->refill_lock);/* If we can receive ANY GSO packets, we must allocate large ones. */ if (virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) ||
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/88 perf symbol: Correct address for bss symbols
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Leo Yan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d86612aacb7805f72873691a2644d7279ed0630 ]
When using 'perf mem' and 'perf c2c', an issue is observed that tool reports the wrong offset for global data symbols. This is a common issue on both x86 and Arm64 platforms.
Let's see an example, for a test program, below is the disassembly for its .bss section which is dumped with objdump:
...
Disassembly of section .bss:
0000000000004040 <completed.0>:
...
0000000000004080 <buf1>:
...
00000000000040c0 <buf2>:
...
0000000000004100 <thread>:
...
First we used 'perf mem record' to run the test program and then used 'perf --debug verbose=4 mem report' to observe what's the symbol info for 'buf1' and 'buf2' structures.
# ./perf mem record -e ldlat-loads,ldlat-stores -- false_sharing.exe 8
# ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report
...
dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028
symbol__new: buf2 0x30a8-0x30e8
...
dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 sh_addr: 0x4040 sh_offset: 0x3028
symbol__new: buf1 0x3068-0x30a8
...The perf tool relies on libelf to parse symbols, in executable and shared object files, 'st_value' holds a virtual address; 'sh_addr' is the address at which section's first byte should reside in memory, and 'sh_offset' is the byte offset from the beginning of the file to the first byte in the section. The perf tool uses below formula to convert a symbol's memory address to a file address:
file_address = st_value - sh_addr + sh_offset
^
` Memory address
We can see the final adjusted address ranges for buf1 and buf2 are [0x30a8-0x30e8) and [0x3068-0x30a8) respectively, apparently this is incorrect, in the code, the structure for 'buf1' and 'buf2' specifies compiler attribute with 64-byte alignment.
The problem happens for 'sh_offset', libelf returns it as 0x3028 which is not 64-byte aligned, combining with disassembly, it's likely libelf doesn't respect the alignment for .bss section, therefore, it doesn't return the aligned value for 'sh_offset'.
Suggested by Fangrui Song, ELF file contains program header which contains PT_LOAD segments, the fields p_vaddr and p_offset in PT_LOAD segments contain the execution info. A better choice for converting memory address to file address is using the formula:
file_address = st_value - p_vaddr + p_offset
This patch introduces elf_read_program_header() which returns the program header based on the passed 'st_value', then it uses the formula above to calculate the symbol file address; and the debugging log is updated respectively.
After applying the change:
# ./perf --debug verbose=4 mem report
...
dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x40c0 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28
symbol__new: buf2 0x30c0-0x3100
...
dso__load_sym_internal: adjusting symbol: st_value: 0x4080 p_vaddr: 0x3d28 p_offset: 0x2d28
symbol__new: buf1 0x3080-0x30c0
...--- tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +41 -4
@@ -233,6 +233,33 @@ Elf_Scn *elf_section_by_name(Elf *elf, GElf_Ehdr *ep,return NULL ; } +static int elf_read_program_header (Elf *elf,u64 vaddr,GElf_Phdr *phdr) +{ +size_t i, phdrnum; +u64 sz; + +if (elf_getphdrnum (elf, &phdrnum)) +return -1 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < phdrnum; i++) { +if (gelf_getphdr (elf, i, phdr) ==NULL ) +return -1 ; + +if (phdr->p_type !=PT_LOAD ) +continue ; + + sz =max (phdr->p_memsz, phdr->p_filesz); +if (!sz) +continue ; + +if (vaddr >= phdr->p_vaddr && (vaddr < phdr->p_vaddr + sz)) +return 0 ; + } + +/* Not found any valid program header */ +return -1 ; +} +static bool want_demangle (bool is_kernel_sym) {return is_kernel_sym ? symbol_conf.demangle_kernel : symbol_conf.demangle;
@@ -1209,6 +1236,7 @@ dso__load_sym_internal(struct dso *dso, struct map *map, struct symsrc *syms_ss, sym.st_value); used_opd = true; } +/* * When loading symbols in a data mapping, ABS symbols (which * has a value of SHN_ABS in its st_shndx) failed at
@@ -1262,11 +1290,20 @@ dso__load_sym_internal(struct dso *dso, struct map *map, struct symsrc *syms_ss, goto out_elf_end; }else if ((used_opd && runtime_ss->adjust_symbols) || (!used_opd && syms_ss->adjust_symbols)) { +GElf_Phdr phdr; + +if (elf_read_program_header (syms_ss->elf, + (u64 )sym.st_value, &phdr)) { +pr_warning ("%s: failed to find program header for " +"symbol: %s st_value: %#" PRIx64"\n" , + __func__, elf_name, (u64 )sym.st_value); +continue ; + }pr_debug4 ("%s: adjusting symbol: st_value: %#" PRIx64" " -"sh_addr: %#" PRIx64" sh_offset: %#" PRIx64"\n" , __func__, - (u64 )sym.st_value, (u64 )shdr.sh_addr, - (u64 )shdr.sh_offset); - sym.st_value -= shdr.sh_addr - shdr.sh_offset; +"p_vaddr: %#" PRIx64" p_offset: %#" PRIx64"\n" , + __func__, (u64 )sym.st_value, (u64 )phdr.p_vaddr, + (u64 )phdr.p_offset); + sym.st_value -= phdr.p_vaddr - phdr.p_offset; } demangled =demangle_sym (dso, kmodule, elf_name);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/88 sfc: disable softirqs for ptp TX
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Alejandro Lucero <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 67c3b611d92fc238c43734878bc3e232ab570c79 ]
Sending a PTP packet can imply to use the normal TX driver datapath but invoked from the driver's ptp worker. The kernel generic TX code disables softirqs and preemption before calling specific driver TX code, but the ptp worker does not. Although current ptp driver functionality does not require it, there are several reasons for doing so:
1) The invoked code is always executed with softirqs disabled for non PTP packets.
2) Better if a ptp packet transmission is not interrupted by softirq handling which could lead to high latencies.
3) netdev_xmit_more used by the TX code requires preemption to be disabled.
Indeed a solution for dealing with kernel preemption state based on static kernel configuration is not possible since the introduction of dynamic preemption level configuration at boot time using the static calls functionality.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ptp.c +22 -0
@@ -1100,7 +1100,29 @@ static void efx_ptp_xmit_skb_queue(struct efx_nic *efx, struct sk_buff *skb) tx_queue =efx_channel_get_tx_queue (ptp_data->channel, type);if (tx_queue && tx_queue->timestamping) { +/* This code invokes normal driver TX code which is always +* protected from softirqs when called from generic TX code, +* which in turn disables preemption. Look at __dev_queue_xmit +* which uses rcu_read_lock_bh disabling preemption for RCU +* plus disabling softirqs. We do not need RCU reader +* protection here. +* +* Although it is theoretically safe for current PTP TX/RX code +* running without disabling softirqs, there are three good +* reasond for doing so: +* +* 1) The code invoked is mainly implemented for non-PTP +* packets and it is always executed with softirqs +* disabled. +* 2) This being a single PTP packet, better to not +* interrupt its processing by softirqs which can lead +* to high latencies. +* 3) netdev_xmit_more checks preemption is disabled and +* triggers a BUG_ON if not. +*/ +local_bh_disable ();efx_enqueue_skb (tx_queue, skb); +local_bh_enable (); }else {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"PTP channel has no timestamped tx queue\n" );dev_kfree_skb_any (skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/88 sctp: leave the err path free in sctp_stream_init to sctp_stream_free
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xin Long <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 181d8d2066c000ba0a0e6940a7ad80f1a0e68e9d ]
A NULL pointer dereference was reported by Wei Chen:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x26/0x80 Call Trace: <TASK> sctp_sched_dequeue_common+0x1c/0x90 sctp_sched_prio_dequeue+0x67/0x80 __sctp_outq_teardown+0x299/0x380 sctp_outq_free+0x15/0x20 sctp_association_free+0xc3/0x440 sctp_do_sm+0x1ca7/0x2210 sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1f6/0x340
This happens when calling sctp_sendmsg without connecting to server first. In this case, a data chunk already queues up in send queue of client side when processing the INIT_ACK from server in sctp_process_init() where it calls sctp_stream_init() to alloc stream_in. If it fails to alloc stream_in all stream_out will be freed in sctp_stream_init's err path. Then in the asoc freeing it will crash when dequeuing this data chunk as stream_out is missing.
As we can't free stream out before dequeuing all data from send queue, and this patch is to fix it by moving the err path stream_out/in freeing in sctp_stream_init() to sctp_stream_free() which is eventually called when freeing the asoc in sctp_association_free(). This fix also makes the code in sctp_process_init() more clear.
Note that in sctp_association_init() when it fails in sctp_stream_init(), sctp_association_free() will not be called, and in that case it should go to 'stream_free' err path to free stream instead of 'fail_init'.
--- net/sctp/associola.c | 5 ++--- net/sctp/stream.c | 19 +++---------------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/sctp/associola.c +2 -3
@@ -229,9 +229,8 @@ static struct sctp_association *sctp_association_init(if (!sctp_ulpq_init (&asoc->ulpq, asoc)) goto fail_init; -if (sctp_stream_init (&asoc->stream, asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams, -0 , gfp)) - goto fail_init; +if (sctp_stream_init (&asoc->stream, asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams,0 , gfp)) + goto stream_free;/* Initialize default path MTU. */ asoc->pathmtu = sp->pathmtu;
net/sctp/stream.c +3 -16
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int sctp_stream_init(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 outcnt, __u16 incnt, ret =sctp_stream_alloc_out (stream, outcnt, gfp);if (ret) - goto out_err; +return ret;for (i =0 ; i < stream->outcnt; i++)SCTP_SO (stream, i)->state =SCTP_STREAM_OPEN ;
@@ -145,22 +145,9 @@ int sctp_stream_init(struct sctp_stream *stream, __u16 outcnt, __u16 incnt, handle_in:sctp_stream_interleave_init (stream);if (!incnt) - goto out; - - ret =sctp_stream_alloc_in (stream, incnt, gfp); -if (ret) - goto in_err; - - goto out; +return 0 ; -in_err: - sched->free (stream); -genradix_free (&stream->in); -out_err: -genradix_free (&stream->out); - stream->outcnt =0 ; -out: -return ret; +return sctp_stream_alloc_in (stream, incnt, gfp); }int sctp_stream_init_ext (struct sctp_stream *stream,__u16 sid)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/88 net/funeth: Fix fun_xdp_tx() and XDP packet reclaim
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dimitris Michailidis <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 51a83391d77bb0f7ff0aef06ca4c7f5aa9e80b4c ]
The current implementation of fun_xdp_tx(), used for XPD_TX, is incorrect in that it takes an address/length pair and later releases it with page_frag_free(). It is OK for XDP_TX but the same code is used by ndo_xdp_xmit. In that case it loses the XDP memory type and releases the packet incorrectly for some of the types. Assorted breakage follows.
Change fun_xdp_tx() to take xdp_frame and rely on xdp_return_frame() in reclaim.
--- .../net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_rx.c | 5 ++++- .../net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_tx.c | 20 +++++++++---------- .../ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_txrx.h | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_rx.c +4 -1
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static void *fun_run_xdp(struct funeth_rxq *q, skb_frag_t *frags, void *buf_va, int ref_ok, struct funeth_txq *xdp_q) { struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog; +struct xdp_frame *xdpf;struct xdp_buff xdp;u32 act;
@@ -163,7 +164,9 @@ static void *fun_run_xdp(struct funeth_rxq *q, skb_frag_t *frags, void *buf_va,case XDP_TX :if (unlikely (!ref_ok)) goto pass; -if (!fun_xdp_tx (xdp_q, xdp.data, xdp.data_end - xdp.data)) + + xdpf =xdp_convert_buff_to_frame (&xdp); +if (!xdpf || !fun_xdp_tx (xdp_q, xdpf)) goto xdp_error;FUN_QSTAT_INC (q, xdp_tx); q->xdp_flush |=FUN_XDP_FLUSH_TX ;
drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_tx.c +9 -11
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static unsigned int fun_xdpq_clean(struct funeth_txq *q, unsigned int budget) do { fun_xdp_unmap(q, reclaim_idx); - page_frag_free(q->info[reclaim_idx].vaddr); + xdp_return_frame(q->info[reclaim_idx].xdpf); trace_funeth_tx_free(q, reclaim_idx, 1, head);
@@ -479,11 +479,11 @@ static unsigned int fun_xdpq_clean(struct funeth_txq *q, unsigned int budget)return npkts; } -bool fun_xdp_tx (struct funeth_txq *q,void *data,unsigned int len) +bool fun_xdp_tx (struct funeth_txq *q,struct xdp_frame *xdpf) {struct fun_eth_tx_req *req;struct fun_dataop_gl *gle; -unsigned int idx; +unsigned int idx, len;dma_addr_t dma;if (fun_txq_avail (q) <FUN_XDP_CLEAN_THRES )
@@ -494,7 +494,8 @@ bool fun_xdp_tx(struct funeth_txq *q, void *data, unsigned int len)return false; } - dma =dma_map_single (q->dma_dev, data, len,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); + len = xdpf->len; + dma =dma_map_single (q->dma_dev, xdpf->data, len,DMA_TO_DEVICE );if (unlikely (dma_mapping_error (q->dma_dev, dma))) {FUN_QSTAT_INC (q, tx_map_err);return false;
@@ -514,7 +515,7 @@ bool fun_xdp_tx(struct funeth_txq *q, void *data, unsigned int len) gle = (struct fun_dataop_gl *)req->dataop.imm;fun_dataop_gl_init (gle,0 ,0 , len, dma); - q->info[idx].vaddr = data; + q->info[idx].xdpf = xdpf;u64_stats_update_begin (&q->syncp); q->stats.tx_bytes += len;
@@ -545,12 +546,9 @@ int fun_xdp_xmit_frames(struct net_device *dev, int n,if (unlikely (q_idx >= fp->num_xdpqs))return -ENXIO ; -for (q = xdpqs[q_idx], i =0 ; i < n; i++) { -const struct xdp_frame *xdpf = frames[i]; - -if (!fun_xdp_tx (q, xdpf->data, xdpf->len)) +for (q = xdpqs[q_idx], i =0 ; i < n; i++) +if (!fun_xdp_tx (q, frames[i]))break ; - }if (unlikely (flags &XDP_XMIT_FLUSH ))fun_txq_wr_db (q);
@@ -577,7 +575,7 @@ static void fun_xdpq_purge(struct funeth_txq *q)unsigned int idx = q->cons_cnt & q->mask;fun_xdp_unmap (q, idx); -page_frag_free (q->info[idx].vaddr); +xdp_return_frame (q->info[idx].xdpf); q->cons_cnt++; } }
drivers/net/ethernet/fungible/funeth/funeth_txrx.h +3 -3
@@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ struct funeth_txq_stats { /* per Tx queue SW counters */struct funeth_tx_info {/* per Tx descriptor state */ union { -struct sk_buff *skb;/* associated packet */ -void *vaddr;/* start address for XDP */ +struct sk_buff *skb;/* associated packet (sk_buff path) */ +struct xdp_frame *xdpf;/* associated XDP frame (XDP path) */ }; };
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static inline int fun_irq_node(const struct fun_irq *p)int fun_rxq_napi_poll (struct napi_struct *napi,int budget);int fun_txq_napi_poll (struct napi_struct *napi,int budget);netdev_tx_t fun_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *netdev); -bool fun_xdp_tx (struct funeth_txq *q,void *data,unsigned int len); +bool fun_xdp_tx (struct funeth_txq *q,struct xdp_frame *xdpf);int fun_xdp_xmit_frames (struct net_device *dev,int n,struct xdp_frame **frames,u32 flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/88 stmmac: dwmac-mediatek: fix resource leak in probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d3d3a1b244fd54629a6b7047f39a7bbc8d11910 ]
If mediatek_dwmac_clks_config() fails, then call stmmac_remove_config_dt() before returning. Otherwise it is a resource leak.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-mediatek.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-mediatek.c +5 -4
@@ -688,18 +688,19 @@ static int mediatek_dwmac_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret =mediatek_dwmac_clks_config (priv_plat, true);if (ret) -return ret; + goto err_remove_config_dt; ret =stmmac_dvr_probe (&pdev->dev, plat_dat, &stmmac_res); -if (ret) { -stmmac_remove_config_dt (pdev, plat_dat); +if (ret) goto err_drv_probe; - }return 0 ; err_drv_probe:mediatek_dwmac_clks_config (priv_plat, false); +err_remove_config_dt: +stmmac_remove_config_dt (pdev, plat_dat); +return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 79/88 mm/hmm: fault non-owner device private entries
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ralph Campbell <[email protected]>
commit 8a295dbbaf7292c582a40ce469c326f472d51f66 upstream.
If hmm_range_fault() is called with the HMM_PFN_REQ_FAULT flag and a device private PTE is found, the hmm_range::dev_private_owner page is used to determine if the device private page should not be faulted in. However, if the device private page is not owned by the caller, hmm_range_fault() returns an error instead of calling migrate_to_ram() to fault in the page.
For example, if a page is migrated to GPU private memory and a RDMA fault capable NIC tries to read the migrated page, without this patch it will get an error. With this patch, the page will be migrated back to system memory and the NIC will be able to read the data.
--- mm/hmm.c | 19 ++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
mm/hmm.c +8 -11
@@ -212,14 +212,6 @@ int hmm_vma_handle_pmd(struct mm_walk *w unsigned long end, unsigned long hmm_pfns[], pmd_t pmd);#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ -static inline bool hmm_is_device_private_entry (struct hmm_range *range, -swp_entry_t entry) -{ -return is_device_private_entry (entry) && -pfn_swap_entry_to_page (entry)->pgmap->owner == - range->dev_private_owner; -} -static inline unsigned long pte_to_hmm_pfn_flags (struct hmm_range *range,pte_t pte) {
@@ -252,10 +244,12 @@ static int hmm_vma_handle_pte(struct mm_swp_entry_t entry =pte_to_swp_entry (pte);/* -* Never fault in device private pages, but just report -* the PFN even if not present. +* Don't fault in device private pages owned by the caller, +* just report the PFN. */ -if (hmm_is_device_private_entry (range, entry)) { +if (is_device_private_entry (entry) && +pfn_swap_entry_to_page (entry)->pgmap->owner == + range->dev_private_owner) { cpu_flags =HMM_PFN_VALID ;if (is_writable_device_private_entry (entry)) cpu_flags |=HMM_PFN_WRITE ;
@@ -273,6 +267,9 @@ static int hmm_vma_handle_pte(struct mm_if (!non_swap_entry (entry)) goto fault; +if (is_device_private_entry (entry)) + goto fault; +if (is_device_exclusive_entry (entry)) goto fault;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/88 page_alloc: fix invalid watermark check on a negative value
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jaewon Kim <[email protected]>
commit 9282012fc0aa248b77a69f5eb802b67c5a16bb13 upstream.
There was a report that a task is waiting at the throttle_direct_reclaim. The pgscan_direct_throttle in vmstat was increasing.
This is a bug where zone_watermark_fast returns true even when the free is very low. The commit f27ce0e14088 ("page_alloc: consider highatomic reserve in watermark fast") changed the watermark fast to consider highatomic reserve. But it did not handle a negative value case which can be happened when reserved_highatomic pageblock is bigger than the actual free.
If watermark is considered as ok for the negative value, allocating contexts for order-0 will consume all free pages without direct reclaim, and finally free page may become depleted except highatomic free.
Then allocating contexts may fall into throttle_direct_reclaim. This symptom may easily happen in a system where wmark min is low and other reclaimers like kswapd does not make free pages quickly.
Handle the negative case by using MIN.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +8 -4
@@ -3953,11 +3953,15 @@ static inline bool zone_watermark_fast(s* need to be calculated. */ if (!order) { -long fast_free; +long usable_free; +long reserved; - fast_free = free_pages; - fast_free -=__zone_watermark_unusable_free (z,0 , alloc_flags); -if (fast_free > mark + z->lowmem_reserve[highest_zoneidx]) + usable_free = free_pages; + reserved =__zone_watermark_unusable_free (z,0 , alloc_flags); + +/* reserved may over estimate high-atomic reserves. */ + usable_free -=min (usable_free, reserved); +if (usable_free > mark + z->lowmem_reserve[highest_zoneidx])return true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/88 tcp: Fix data-races around sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0f1e4d06591d0a7907c71f7b6d1c79f8a4de8098 ]
While reading sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows, it can be changed concurrently. Thus, we need to add READ_ONCE() to its readers.
--- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +2 -2
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ void tcp_select_initial_window(const struct sock *sk, int __space, __u32 mss,* which we interpret as a sign the remote TCP is not * misinterpreting the window field as a signed quantity. */ -if (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows) +if (READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows)) (*rcv_wnd) =min (space,MAX_TCP_WINDOW );else (*rcv_wnd) =min_t (u32, space,U16_MAX );
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ static u16 tcp_select_window(struct sock *sk)* scaled window. */ if (!tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale && -sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows) +READ_ONCE (sock_net (sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows)) new_win =min (new_win,MAX_TCP_WINDOW );else new_win =min (new_win, (65535U << tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale));
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/88 ARM: 9216/1: Fix MAX_DMA_ADDRESS overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fb0fd3469ead5b937293c213daa1f589b4b7ce46 ]
Commit 26f09e9b3a06 ("mm/memblock: add memblock memory allocation apis") added a check to determine whether arm_dma_zone_size is exceeding the amount of kernel virtual address space available between the upper 4GB virtual address limit and PAGE_OFFSET in order to provide a suitable definition of MAX_DMA_ADDRESS that should fit within the 32-bit virtual address space. The quantity used for comparison was off by a missing trailing 0, leading to MAX_DMA_ADDRESS to be overflowing a 32-bit quantity.
This was caught thanks to CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL on the bcm2711 platform where we define a dma_zone_size of 1GB and we have a PAGE_OFFSET value of 0xc000_0000 (CONFIG_VMSPLIT_3G) leading to MAX_DMA_ADDRESS being 0x1_0000_0000 which overflows the unsigned long type used throughout __pa() and then __virt_addr_valid(). Because the virtual address passed to __virt_addr_valid() would now be 0, the function would loudly warn and flood the kernel log, thus making the platform unable to boot properly.
--- arch/arm/include/asm/dma.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/dma.h +1 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@#else #define MAX_DMA_ADDRESS ({ \ extern phys_addr_t arm_dma_zone_size; \ - arm_dma_zone_size && arm_dma_zone_size < (0x10000000 - PAGE_OFFSET) ? \ + arm_dma_zone_size && arm_dma_zone_size < (0x100000000ULL - PAGE_OFFSET) ? \ (PAGE_OFFSET + arm_dma_zone_size) : 0xffffffffUL; })#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/88 EDAC/ghes: Set the DIMM label unconditionally
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Toshi Kani <[email protected]>
commit 5e2805d5379619c4a2e3ae4994e73b36439f4bad upstream.
The commit
cb51a371d08e ("EDAC/ghes: Setup DIMM label from DMI and use it in error reports")
enforced that both the bank and device strings passed to dimm_setup_label() are not NULL.
However, there are BIOSes, for example on a
HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 03/15/2019
which don't populate both strings:
Handle 0x0020, DMI type 17, 84 bytes
Memory Device
Array Handle: 0x0013
Error Information Handle: Not Provided
Total Width: 72 bits
Data Width: 64 bits
Size: 32 GB
Form Factor: DIMM
Set: None
Locator: PROC 1 DIMM 1 <===== device
Bank Locator: Not Specified <===== bank
This results in a buffer overflow because ghes_edac_register() calls strlen() on an uninitialized label, which had non-zero values left over from krealloc_array():
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:983!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G I 5.18.6-200.fc36.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 03/15/2019
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ghes_edac_register.cold
ghes_probe
platform_probe
really_probe
__driver_probe_device
driver_probe_device
__driver_attach
? __device_attach_driver
bus_for_each_dev
bus_add_driver
driver_register
acpi_ghes_init
acpi_init
? acpi_sleep_proc_init
do_one_initcallThe label contains garbage because the commit in Fixes reallocs the DIMMs array while scanning the system but doesn't clear the newly allocated memory.
Change dimm_setup_label() to always initialize the label to fix the issue. Set it to the empty string in case BIOS does not provide both bank and device so that ghes_edac_register() can keep the default label given by edac_mc_alloc_dimms().
[ bp: Rewrite commit message. ]
--- drivers/edac/ghes_edac.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/ghes_edac.c +8 -3
@@ -101,9 +101,14 @@ static void dimm_setup_label(struct dimmdmi_memdev_name (handle, &bank, &device); -/* both strings must be non-zero */ -if (bank && *bank && device && *device) -snprintf (dimm->label,sizeof (dimm->label),"%s %s" , bank, device); +/* +* Set to a NULL string when both bank and device are zero. In this case, +* the label assigned by default will be preserved. +*/ +snprintf (dimm->label,sizeof (dimm->label),"%s%s%s" , + (bank && *bank) ? bank :"" , + (bank && *bank && device && *device) ?" " :"" , + (device && *device) ? device :"" ); }static void assign_dmi_dimm_info (struct dimm_info *dimm,struct memdev_dmi_entry *entry)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 84/88 EDAC/synopsys: Use the correct register to disable the error interrupt on v3 hw
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>
commit be76ceaf03bc04e74be5e28f608316b73c2b04ad upstream.
v3.x Synopsys EDAC DDR doesn't have the QOS Interrupt register. Use the ECC Clear Register to disable the error interrupts instead.
--- drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c +5 -2
@@ -865,8 +865,11 @@ static void enable_intr(struct synps_edastatic void disable_intr (struct synps_edac_priv *priv) {/* Disable UE/CE Interrupts */ -writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , - priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_DB_OFST ); +if (priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ) +writel (0x0 , priv->baseaddr +ECC_CLR_OFST ); +else +writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , + priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_DB_OFST ); } static int setup_irq(struct mem_ctl_info *mci,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 85/88 EDAC/synopsys: Re-enable the error interrupts on v3 hw
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>
commit 4bcffe941758ee17becb43af3b25487f848f6512 upstream.
zynqmp_get_error_info() writes 0 to the ECC_CLR_OFST register after an interrupt for a {un-,}correctable error is raised, which disables the error interrupts. Then the interrupt handler will be called only once. Therefore, re-enable the error interrupt line at the end of intr_handler() for v3.x Synopsys EDAC DDR.
--- drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/synopsys_edac.c +25 -22
@@ -527,6 +527,28 @@ static void handle_error(struct mem_ctl_memset (p,0 ,sizeof (*p)); } +static void enable_intr (struct synps_edac_priv *priv) +{ +/* Enable UE/CE Interrupts */ +if (priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ) +writel (DDR_UE_MASK |DDR_CE_MASK , + priv->baseaddr +ECC_CLR_OFST ); +else +writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , + priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_EN_OFST ); + +} + +static void disable_intr (struct synps_edac_priv *priv) +{ +/* Disable UE/CE Interrupts */ +if (priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ) +writel (0x0 , priv->baseaddr +ECC_CLR_OFST ); +else +writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , + priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_DB_OFST ); +} +/** * intr_handler - Interrupt Handler for ECC interrupts. * @irq: IRQ number.
@@ -568,6 +590,9 @@ static irqreturn_t intr_handler(int irq,/* v3.0 of the controller does not have this register */ if (!(priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ))writel (regval, priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_STAT_OFST ); +else +enable_intr (priv); +return IRQ_HANDLED ; }
@@ -850,28 +875,6 @@ static void mc_init(struct mem_ctl_infoinit_csrows (mci); } -static void enable_intr (struct synps_edac_priv *priv) -{ -/* Enable UE/CE Interrupts */ -if (priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ) -writel (DDR_UE_MASK |DDR_CE_MASK , - priv->baseaddr +ECC_CLR_OFST ); -else -writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , - priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_EN_OFST ); - -} - -static void disable_intr (struct synps_edac_priv *priv) -{ -/* Disable UE/CE Interrupts */ -if (priv->p_data->quirks &DDR_ECC_INTR_SELF_CLEAR ) -writel (0x0 , priv->baseaddr +ECC_CLR_OFST ); -else -writel (DDR_QOSUE_MASK |DDR_QOSCE_MASK , - priv->baseaddr +DDR_QOS_IRQ_DB_OFST ); -} -static int setup_irq (struct mem_ctl_info *mci,struct platform_device *pdev) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/88 docs/kernel-parameters: Update descriptions for "mitigations=" param with retbleed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eiichi Tsukata <[email protected]>
commit ea304a8b89fd0d6cf94ee30cb139dc23d9f1a62f upstream.
Updates descriptions for "mitigations=off" and "mitigations=auto,nosmt" with the respective retbleed= settings.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +2 -0
@@ -3106,6 +3106,7 @@ no_entry_flush [PPC] no_uaccess_flush [PPC] mmio_stale_data=off [X86] + retbleed=off [X86] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on
@@ -3128,6 +3129,7 @@ mds=full,nosmt [X86] tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86] mmio_stale_data=full,nosmt [X86] + retbleed=auto,nosmt [X86] mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 87/88 locking/rwsem: Allow slowpath writer to ignore handoff bit if not set by first waiter
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Waiman Long <[email protected]>
commit 6eebd5fb20838f5971ba17df9f55cc4f84a31053 upstream.
With commit d257cc8cb8d5 ("locking/rwsem: Make handoff bit handling more consistent"), the writer that sets the handoff bit can be interrupted out without clearing the bit if the wait queue isn't empty. This disables reader and writer optimistic lock spinning and stealing.
Now if a non-first writer in the queue is somehow woken up or a new waiter enters the slowpath, it can't acquire the lock. This is not the case before commit d257cc8cb8d5 as the writer that set the handoff bit will clear it when exiting out via the out_nolock path. This is less efficient as the busy rwsem stays in an unlock state for a longer time.
In some cases, this new behavior may cause lockups as shown in [1] and [2].
This patch allows a non-first writer to ignore the handoff bit if it is not originally set or initiated by the first waiter. This patch is shown to be effective in fixing the lockup problem reported in [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- kernel/locking/rwsem.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
kernel/locking/rwsem.c +20 -10
@@ -334,8 +334,6 @@ struct rwsem_waiter {struct task_struct *task;enum rwsem_waiter_type type;unsigned long timeout; - -/* Writer only, not initialized in reader */ bool handoff_set; };#define rwsem_first_waiter (sem) \
@@ -455,10 +453,12 @@ static void rwsem_mark_wake(struct rw_se* to give up the lock), request a HANDOFF to * force the issue. */ -if (!(oldcount &RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF ) && -time_after (jiffies, waiter->timeout)) { - adjustment -=RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF ; -lockevent_inc (rwsem_rlock_handoff); +if (time_after (jiffies, waiter->timeout)) { +if (!(oldcount &RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF )) { + adjustment -=RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF ; +lockevent_inc (rwsem_rlock_handoff); + } + waiter->handoff_set = true; }atomic_long_add (-adjustment, &sem->count);
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static void rwsem_mark_wake(struct rw_sestatic inline bool rwsem_try_write_lock (struct rw_semaphore *sem,struct rwsem_waiter *waiter) { -bool first =rwsem_first_waiter (sem) == waiter; +struct rwsem_waiter *first =rwsem_first_waiter (sem);long count, new;lockdep_assert_held (&sem->wait_lock);
@@ -578,11 +578,20 @@ static inline bool rwsem_try_write_lock(bool has_handoff = !!(count &RWSEM_FLAG_HANDOFF );if (has_handoff) { -if (!first) +/* +* Honor handoff bit and yield only when the first +* waiter is the one that set it. Otherwisee, we +* still try to acquire the rwsem. +*/ +if (first->handoff_set && (waiter != first))return false; -/* First waiter inherits a previously set handoff bit */ - waiter->handoff_set = true; +/* +* First waiter can inherit a previously set handoff +* bit and spin on rwsem if lock acquisition fails. +*/ +if (waiter == first) + waiter->handoff_set = true; } new = count;
@@ -972,6 +981,7 @@ queue: waiter.task = current; waiter.type =RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_READ ; waiter.timeout = jiffies +RWSEM_WAIT_TIMEOUT ; + waiter.handoff_set = false;raw_spin_lock_irq (&sem->wait_lock);if (list_empty (&sem->wait_list)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 88/88 x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB at firmware entry when IBPB is not available
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>
commit 571c30b1a88465a1c85a6f7762609939b9085a15 upstream.
Some cloud hypervisors do not provide IBPB on very recent CPU processors, including AMD processors affected by Retbleed.
Using IBPB before firmware calls on such systems would cause a GPF at boot like the one below. Do not enable such calls when IBPB support is not present.
EFI Variables Facility v0.08 2004-May-17
general protection fault, maybe for address 0x1: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/u2:1 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts RIP: 0010:efi_call_rts Code: e8 37 33 58 ff 41 bf 48 00 00 00 49 89 c0 44 89 f9 48 83 c8 01 4c 89 c2 48 c1 ea 20 66 90 b9 49 00 00 00 b8 01 00 00 00 31 d2 <0f> 30 e8 7b 9f 5d ff e8 f6 f8 ff ff 4c 89 f1 4c 89 ea 4c 89 e6 48 RSP: 0018:ffffb373800d7e38 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000000049 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff94fbc19d8fe0 RDI: ffff94fbc1b2b300 RBP: ffffb373800d7e70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000000000000b R11: 000000000000000b R12: ffffb3738001fd78 R13: ffff94fbc2fcfc00 R14: ffffb3738001fd80 R15: 0000000000000048 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94fc3da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff94fc30201000 CR3: 000000006f610000 CR4: 00000000000406f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __wake_up process_one_work worker_thread ? rescuer_thread kthread ? kthread_complete_and_exit ret_from_fork </TASK> Modules linked in:
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -0
@@ -1513,6 +1513,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit* enable IBRS around firmware calls. */ if (boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ) && +boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_IBPB ) && (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor ==X86_VENDOR_AMD || boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor ==X86_VENDOR_HYGON )) {
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v5.18:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
28 boots: 28 pass, 0 fail
130 tests: 130 pass, 0 failLinux version: 5.18.16-rc1-g7e8a7b1c9805
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
Hello!
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro's test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
## Build
* kernel: 5.18.16-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.18.y
* git commit: 7e8a7b1c98057a3014222a505c28c6bd43ed5666
* git describe: v5.18.14-248-g7e8a7b1c9805
* test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.18.y/build/v5.18.14-248-g7e8a7b1c9805
## No test regressions (compared to v5.18.14-159-g63d1be154edd)
## No metric regressions (compared to v5.18.14-159-g63d1be154edd)
## No test fixes (compared to v5.18.14-159-g63d1be154edd)
## No metric fixes (compared to v5.18.14-159-g63d1be154edd)
## Test result summary
total: 136635, pass: 122379, fail: 825, skip: 12686, xfail: 745
## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 311 total, 308 passed, 3 failed
* arm64: 68 total, 66 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 57 total, 51 passed, 6 failed
* mips: 50 total, 47 passed, 3 failed
* parisc: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 65 total, 56 passed, 9 failed
* riscv: 32 total, 27 passed, 5 failed
* s390: 23 total, 20 passed, 3 failed
* sh: 26 total, 24 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 61 total, 59 passed, 2 failed
## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
Greetings!
Daniel Díaz
[email protected]
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Hi Greg,
Compiled and booted on my test system Lenovo P50s: Intel Core i7 No emergency and critical messages in the dmesg
./perf bench sched all
# Running sched/messaging benchmark...
# 20 sender and receiver processes per group
# 10 groups == 400 processes run
Total time: 0.718 [sec]
# Running sched/pipe benchmark...
# Executed 1000000 pipe operations between two processes
Total time: 13.324 [sec]
13.324520 usecs/op
75049 ops/secThanks
-Zan
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 154 pass: 154 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 489 pass: 489 fail: 0
Guenter
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.18.16-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.18.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Tested rc1 against the Fedora build system (aarch64, armv7, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64), and boot tested x86_64. No regressions noted.
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0) and powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.1.0).
Signature · 1 line
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
Hi Greg,
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.18.16 release. There are 88 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 03 Aug 2022 11:41:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build test (gcc version 12.1.1 20220724):
mips: 59 configs -> no failure
arm: 99 configs -> no failure
arm64: 3 configs -> no failurex86_64: 4 configs -> no failure
alpha allmodconfig -> no failure
csky allmodconfig -> no failure
powerpc allmodconfig -> no failure
riscv allmodconfig -> no failure
s390 allmodconfig -> no failure
xtensa allmodconfig -> no failure
Boot test:x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
arm64: Booted on rpi4b (4GB model). No regression. [2]
mips: Booted on ci20 board. No regression. [3]
[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1607
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1608
[3]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/1611
--
Regards
Sudip