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ntfs: fix use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp()

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 3 messages Aug 1, 2022

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 ntfs: fix use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp()

From: ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38c9c22a85aeed28d0831f230136e9cf6fa2ed44 ]

Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as follows:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880751acee8 by task a.out/879

CPU: 7 PID: 879 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-next-20220630-00001-gcc5218c8bd2c-dirty #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1c0/0x2b0
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x484
 print_report.cold+0x55/0x232
 kasan_report+0xbf/0xf0
 ntfs_ucsncmp+0x123/0x130
 ntfs_are_names_equal.cold+0x2b/0x41
 ntfs_attr_find+0x43b/0xb90
 ntfs_attr_lookup+0x16d/0x1e0
 ntfs_read_locked_attr_inode+0x4aa/0x2360
 ntfs_attr_iget+0x1af/0x220
 ntfs_read_locked_inode+0x246c/0x5120
 ntfs_iget+0x132/0x180
 load_system_files+0x1cc6/0x3480
 ntfs_fill_super+0xa66/0x1cf0
 mount_bdev+0x38d/0x460
 legacy_get_tree+0x10d/0x220
 vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300
 do_new_mount+0x2da/0x6d0
 path_mount+0x496/0x19d0
 __x64_sys_mount+0x284/0x300
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7f3f2118d9ea
Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc269deac8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3f2118d9ea
RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffc269dec00
RBP: 00007ffc269dec80 R08: 00007ffc269deb00 R09: 00007ffc269dec44
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055f81ab1d220
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:0000000085430378 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x555c6a81d pfn:0x751ac
memcg:ffff888101f7e180
anon flags: 0xfffffc00a0014(uptodate|lru|mappedtodisk|swapbacked|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 000fffffc00a0014 ffffea0001bf2988 ffffea0001de2448 ffff88801712e201
raw: 0000000555c6a81d 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff888101f7e180
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8880751acd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8880751ace00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8880751ace80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                                          ^
 ffff8880751acf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8880751acf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

The reason is that struct ATTR_RECORD->name_offset is 6485, end address of name string is out of bounds.

Fix this by adding sanity check on end address of attribute name string.

---
 fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs/attrib.c +6 -2
index 44a39a099b54..62b49197e5f6 100644
@@ -606,8 +606,12 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const ATTR_TYPE type, const ntfschar *name,
 		a = (ATTR_RECORD*)((u8*)ctx->attr +
 				le32_to_cpu(ctx->attr->length));
 	for (;;	a = (ATTR_RECORD*)((u8*)a + le32_to_cpu(a->length))) {
-		if ((u8*)a < (u8*)ctx->mrec || (u8*)a > (u8*)ctx->mrec +
-				le32_to_cpu(ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated))
+		u8 *mrec_end = (u8 *)ctx->mrec +
+		               le32_to_cpu(ctx->mrec->bytes_allocated);
+		u8 *name_end = (u8 *)a + le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset) +
+			       a->name_length * sizeof(ntfschar);
+		if ((u8*)a < (u8*)ctx->mrec || (u8*)a > mrec_end ||
+		    name_end > mrec_end)
 			break;
 		ctx->attr = a;
 		if (unlikely(le32_to_cpu(a->type) > le32_to_cpu(type) ||
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 spi: spi-rspi: Fix PIO fallback on RZ platforms

From: Biju Das <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b620aa3a7be346f04ae7789b165937615c6ee8d3 ]

RSPI IP on RZ/{A, G2L} SoC's has the same signal for both interrupt and DMA transfer request. Setting DMARS register for DMA transfer makes the signal to work as a DMA transfer request signal and subsequent interrupt requests to the interrupt controller are masked.

PIO fallback does not work as interrupt signal is disabled.

This patch fixes this issue by re-enabling the interrupts by calling dmaengine_synchronize().

---
 drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/spi/spi-rspi.c +4 -0
index f4a797a9d76e..2fb382050fe7 100644
@@ -603,6 +603,10 @@ static int rspi_dma_transfer(struct rspi_data *rspi, struct sg_table *tx,
 					       rspi->dma_callbacked, HZ);
 	if (ret > 0 && rspi->dma_callbacked) {
 		ret = 0;
+		if (tx)
+			dmaengine_synchronize(rspi->ctlr->dma_tx);
+		if (rx)
+			dmaengine_synchronize(rspi->ctlr->dma_rx);
 	} else {
 		if (!ret) {
 			dev_err(&rspi->master->dev, "DMA timeout\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 ARM: findbit: fix overflowing offset

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec85bd369fd2bfaed6f45dd678706429d4f75b48 ]

When offset is larger than the size of the bit array, we should not attempt to access the array as we can perform an access beyond the end of the array. Fix this by changing the pre-condition.

Using "cmp r2, r1; bhs ..." covers us for the size == 0 case, since this will always take the branch when r1 is zero, irrespective of the value of r2. This means we can fix this bug without adding any additional code!

---
 arch/arm/lib/findbit.S | 16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/arm/lib/findbit.S +8 -8
index 7848780e8834..20fef6c41f6f 100644
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ ENDPROC(_find_first_zero_bit_le)
  * Prototype: int find_next_zero_bit(void *addr, unsigned int maxbit, int offset)
  */
 ENTRY(_find_next_zero_bit_le)
-		teq	r1, #0
-		beq	3b
+		cmp	r2, r1
+		bhs	3b
 		ands	ip, r2, #7
 		beq	1b			@ If new byte, goto old routine
  ARM(		ldrb	r3, [r0, r2, lsr #3]	)
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ ENDPROC(_find_first_bit_le)
  * Prototype: int find_next_zero_bit(void *addr, unsigned int maxbit, int offset)
  */
 ENTRY(_find_next_bit_le)
-		teq	r1, #0
-		beq	3b
+		cmp	r2, r1
+		bhs	3b
 		ands	ip, r2, #7
 		beq	1b			@ If new byte, goto old routine
  ARM(		ldrb	r3, [r0, r2, lsr #3]	)
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ ENTRY(_find_first_zero_bit_be)
 ENDPROC(_find_first_zero_bit_be)
 
 ENTRY(_find_next_zero_bit_be)
-		teq	r1, #0
-		beq	3b
+		cmp	r2, r1
+		bhs	3b
 		ands	ip, r2, #7
 		beq	1b			@ If new byte, goto old routine
 		eor	r3, r2, #0x18		@ big endian byte ordering
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ ENTRY(_find_first_bit_be)
 ENDPROC(_find_first_bit_be)
 
 ENTRY(_find_next_bit_be)
-		teq	r1, #0
-		beq	3b
+		cmp	r2, r1
+		bhs	3b
 		ands	ip, r2, #7
 		beq	1b			@ If new byte, goto old routine
 		eor	r3, r2, #0x18		@ big endian byte ordering
Signature · 7 lines
2.35.1


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