xfrm: Fix bugs in supporting stacked XFRM-I tunnels
Subsystems (3)
cover xfrm: Fix bugs in supporting stacked XFRM-I tunnels
This patch set fixes bugs that prevent stacked IPsec tunnels (via XFRM interfaces) from receiving packets properly. The apparent cause of the issues is that the inner tunnel’s policy checks fail to validate the outer tunnel’s secpath entries (since it no longer has a reference to the outer tunnel policies, and each call validates ALL secpath entries) prior to verifying the inner tunnel’s. This patch set fixes this by caching the list of verified secpath entries, and skipping them upon future validation runs.
PATCH 1/2 Ensures that policies for nested tunnel mode transforms are checked before additional decapsulation. This ensures that entries in the secpath are verified while the context (intermediate IP addresses, marks, etc) can be appropriately matched.
PATCH 2/2 Skips template matching for previously verified entries in the secpath. This ensures that each tunnel is responsible for incrementally verifying the secpath entries associated with it.
RFC 1/2 xfrm: Check policy for nested XFRM packets in xfrm_input
This change ensures that all nested XFRM packets have their policy checked before decryption of the next layer, so that policies are verified at each intermediate step of the decryption process.
This is necessary especially for nested tunnels, as the IP addresses, protocol and ports may all change, thus not matching the previous policies. In order to ensure that packets match the relevant inbound templates, the xfrm_policy_check should be done before handing off to the inner XFRM protocol to decrypt and decapsulate.
Test: Tested against Android Kernel Unit Tests
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +7 -0
@@ -585,6 +585,13 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type) goto drop; } +// If nested tunnel, check outer states before context is lost. +if (x->outer_mode.flags &XFRM_MODE_FLAG_TUNNEL + && sp->len >0 + && !xfrm_policy_check (NULL ,XFRM_POLICY_IN , skb, family)) { + goto drop; + } + skb->mark =xfrm_smark_get (skb->mark, x); sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog
RFC 2/2 xfrm: Skip checking of already-verified secpath entries
In reply to Benedict WongThis change fixes a bug where inbound packets to nested IPsec tunnels fails to pass policy checks due to the inner tunnel's policy checks not having a reference to the outer policy/template. This causes the policy check to fail, since the first entries in the secpath correlate to the outer tunnel, while the templates being verified are for the inner tunnel.
In order to ensure that the appropriate policy and template context is searchable, the policy checks must be done incrementally after each decryption step. As such, this marks secpath entries as having been successfully matched, skipping these on subsequent policy checks.
By skipping the immediate error return in the case where the secpath entry had previously been validated, this change allows secpath entries that matched a policy/template previously, while still requiring that each searched template find a match in the secpath.
For security:
- All templates must have matching secpath entries
- Unchanged by current patch; templates that do not match any secpath entry still return -1. This patch simply allows skipping earlier blocks of verified secpath entries
- All entries (except trailing transport mode entries) must have a matching template
- Unvalidated entries, including transport-mode entries still return the errored index if it does not match the correct template.
Test: Tested against Android Kernel Unit Tests
--- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 3 ++- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 ++++++++++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +1 -0
@@ -1031,6 +1031,7 @@ struct xfrm_offload {struct sec_path {int len;int olen; +int verified_cnt;struct xfrm_state *xvec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH ];struct xfrm_offload ovec[XFRM_MAX_OFFLOAD_DEPTH ];
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +2 -1
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ struct sec_path *secpath_set(struct sk_buff *skb)memset (sp->ovec,0 ,sizeof (sp->ovec)); sp->olen =0 ; sp->len =0 ; + sp->verified_cnt =0 ;return sp; }
@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)// If nested tunnel, check outer states before context is lost. if (x->outer_mode.flags &XFRM_MODE_FLAG_TUNNEL - && sp->len >0 + && sp->len > sp->verified_cnt && !xfrm_policy_check (NULL ,XFRM_POLICY_IN , skb, family)) { goto drop; }
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +10 -1
@@ -3261,7 +3261,7 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,*/ static inline int xfrm_policy_ok (const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl,const struct sec_path *sp,int start, -unsigned short family) +unsigned short family) {int idx = start;
@@ -3274,6 +3274,11 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int starif (xfrm_state_ok (tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family))return ++idx;if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode !=XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT ) { +if (idx < sp->verified_cnt) { +// Secpath entry previously verified, continue searching +continue ; + } +if (start ==-1 ) start =-2 -idx;break ;
@@ -3650,6 +3655,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,* Order is _important_. Later we will implement * some barriers, but at the moment barriers * are implied between each two transformations. +* Skips verifying secpath entries that have already been +* verified in the past. */ for (i = xfrm_nr-1 , k =0 ; i >=0 ; i--) { k =xfrm_policy_ok (tpp[i], sp, k, family);
@@ -3668,6 +3675,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, }xfrm_pols_put (pols, npols); + sp->verified_cnt = k; +return 1 ; }XFRM_INC_STATS (net,LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK );
Signature · 1 line
2.37.1.559.g78731f0fdb-goog