acl: handle idmapped mounts for idmapped filesystems
Subsystems (2)
Christian Brauner
maintainerPATCH 1/2 acl: handle idmapped mounts for idmapped filesystems
Ensure that POSIX ACLs checking, getting, and setting works correctly for filesystems mountable with a filesystem idmapping ("fs_idmapping") that want to support idmapped mounts ("mnt_idmapping").
Note that no filesystems mountable with an fs_idmapping do yet support idmapped mounts. This is required infrastructure work to unblock this.
As we explained in detail in [1] the fs_idmapping is irrelevant for getxattr() and setxattr() when mapping the ACL_{GROUP,USER} {g,u}ids stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry in posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user().
But for acl_permission_check() and posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() the fs_idmapping matters.
acl_permission_check():
During lookup POSIX ACLs are retrieved directly via i_op->get_acl() and are returned via the kernel internal struct posix_acl which contains e_{g,u}id members of type k{g,u}id_t that already take the fs_idmapping into acccount.
For example, a POSIX ACL stored with u4 on the backing store is mapped to k10000004 in the fs_idmapping. The mnt_idmapping remaps the POSIX ACL to k20000004. In order to do that the fs_idmapping needs to be taken into account but that doesn't happen yet (Again, this is a counterfactual currently as fuse doesn't support idmapped mounts currently. It's just used as a convenient example.):
fs_idmapping: u0:k10000000:r65536
mnt_idmapping: u0:v20000000:r65536
ACL_USER: k10000004
acl_permission_check()
-> check_acl()
-> get_acl()
-> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl()
-> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...)
{
k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */,
u4 /* ACL_USER */);
}
-> posix_acl_permission()
{
-1 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */,
&init_user_ns,
k10000004);
vfsuid_eq_kuid(-1, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */)
} In order to correctly map from the fs_idmapping into mnt_idmapping we require the relevant fs_idmaping to be passed:
acl_permission_check()
-> check_acl()
-> get_acl()
-> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl()
-> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...)
{
k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */,
u4 /* ACL_USER */);
}
-> posix_acl_permission()
{
v20000004 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */,
u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */,
k10000004);
vfsuid_eq_kuid(v20000004, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */)
} The initial_idmapping is only correct for the current situation because all filesystems that currently support idmapped mounts do not support being mounted with an fs_idmapping.
Note that ovl_get_acl() is used to retrieve the POSIX ACLs from the relevant lower layer and the lower layer's mnt_idmapping needs to be taken into account and so does the fs_idmapping. See 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl:
move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") for more details.
For posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() it is not as obvious why the fs_idmapping matters as it is for acl_permission_check(). Especially because it doesn't matter for posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user() (See
[1] for more context.).
Because posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() operate on the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry which contains {g,u}id_t values and thus give the impression that the fs_idmapping is irrelevant as at this point appropriate {g,u}id_t values have seemlingly been generated.
As we've stated multiple times this assumption is wrong and in fact the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry is taking idmappings into account depending at what place it is operated on.
posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt()
When posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are mapped according to the fs_idmapping. This happened when they were read from the backing store and then translated from struct posix_acl into the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry during posix_acl_to_xattr().
In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry have been generated by it.
So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during make_vfsuid() in posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt().
posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt()
When posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() is called the values stored as {g,u}id_t in uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that ultimately get turned back into a k{g,u}id_t in posix_acl_from_xattr() (which turns the uapi
struct posix_acl_xattr_entry into the kernel internal struct posix_acl).
In other words, the fs_idmapping matters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi struct posix_acl_xattr_entry are intended to be the values that will be undone in the fs_idmapping when writing to the backing store.
So we need to take the fs_idmapping into account during from_vfsuid() in posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt().
--- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 11 +++++++---- fs/posix_acl.c | 15 +++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +7 -4
@@ -460,9 +460,12 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)* of the POSIX ACLs retrieved from the lower layer to this function to not * alter the POSIX ACLs for the underlying filesystem. */ -static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl (struct inode *realinode, +struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct posix_acl *acl) { +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (realinode); +for (unsigned int i =0 ; i < acl->a_count; i++) {vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;
@@ -470,11 +473,11 @@ static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct posix_acl_entry *e = &acl->a_entries[i];switch (e->e_tag) {case ACL_USER : - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, e->e_uid); + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, e->e_uid); e->e_uid =vfsuid_into_kuid (vfsuid);break ;case ACL_GROUP : - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, e->e_gid); + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, e->e_gid); e->e_gid =vfsgid_into_kgid (vfsgid);break ; }
@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)if (!clone) clone =ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );else -ovl_idmap_posix_acl (mnt_user_ns (realpath.mnt), clone); +ovl_idmap_posix_acl (realinode,mnt_user_ns (realpath.mnt), clone);/* * Since we're not in RCU path walk we always need to release the * original ACLs.
fs/posix_acl.c +9 -6
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want) {const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int found =0 ;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;
@@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, goto check_perm;break ;case ACL_USER : - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, pa->e_uid);if (vfsuid_eq_kuid (vfsuid,current_fsuid ())) goto mask;
@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, }break ;case ACL_GROUP : - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, pa->e_gid);if (vfsgid_in_group_p (vfsgid)) { found =1 ;
@@ -736,6 +737,7 @@ void posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, {struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header +1 ), *end; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int count;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;
@@ -753,13 +755,13 @@ void posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,switch (le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag)) {case ACL_USER : uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, uid); + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, uid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kuid (&init_user_ns,vfsuid_into_kuid (vfsuid)));break ;case ACL_GROUP : gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, gid); + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, gid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kgid (&init_user_ns,vfsgid_into_kgid (vfsgid)));break ;
@@ -775,6 +777,7 @@ void posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, {struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header +1 ), *end; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int count;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;
@@ -793,13 +796,13 @@ void posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,case ACL_USER : uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); vfsuid =VFSUIDT_INIT (uid); - uid =from_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, vfsuid); + uid =from_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsuid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid));break ;case ACL_GROUP : gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); vfsgid =VFSGIDT_INIT (gid); - gid =from_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, vfsgid); + gid =from_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsgid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kgid (&init_user_ns, gid));break ;default :
base-commit: 568035b01cfb107af8d2e4bd2fb9aea22cf5b868
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Christian Brauner
maintainerPATCH 2/2 MAINTAINERS: update idmapping tree
Since Seth joined as a maintainer in ba40a57ff08b ("Add Seth Forshee as co-maintainer for idmapped mounts") it was best to get a shared git tree instead of using our personal repositories. So we requested and Konstantin suggested and gave us a new "idmapping" repository under the pre-existing but mainly unused vfs namespace. Just makes it easier for Seth to send fixes in case I'm out or someone else ever takes over.
--- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
MAINTAINERS +1 -1
@@ -9780,7 +9780,7 @@ M: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> M: Seth Forshee <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained -T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux.git +T: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping.git F: Documentation/filesystems/idmappings.rst F: tools/testing/selftests/mount_setattr/ F: include/linux/mnt_idmapping.h
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 118 lines · Christian Brauner
Ensure that POSIX ACLs checking, getting, and setting works correctly for filesystems mountable with a filesystem idmapping ("
fs_idmapping") that want to support idmapped mounts ("mnt_idmapping").Note that no filesystems mountable with an
fs_idmappingdo yet support idmapped mounts. This is required infrastructure work to unblock this.As we explained in detail in [1] the
fs_idmappingis irrelevant forgetxattr()andsetxattr()when mapping the ACL_{GROUP,USER} {g,u}ids stored in the uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryin posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user().But for
acl_permission_check()and posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() thefs_idmappingmatters.
acl_permission_check():
During lookup POSIX ACLs are retrieved directly viai_op->get_acl()and are returned via the kernel internal structposix_aclwhich contains e_{g,u}id members of type k{g,u}id_t that already take thefs_idmappinginto acccount.For example, a POSIX ACL stored with u4 on the backing store is mapped to k10000004 in the
fs_idmapping. Themnt_idmappingremaps the POSIX ACL to k20000004. In order to do that thefs_idmappingneeds to be taken into account but that doesn't happen yet (Again, this is a counterfactual currently as fuse doesn't support idmapped mounts currently. It's just used as a convenient example.):
fs_idmapping: u0:k10000000:r65536
mnt_idmapping: u0:v20000000:r65536
ACL_USER: k10000004acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { -1 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, &init_user_ns, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(-1, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) }In order to correctly map from the
fs_idmappingintomnt_idmappingwe require the relevantfs_idmapingto be passed:acl_permission_check() -> check_acl() -> get_acl() -> i_op->get_acl() == fuse_get_acl() -> posix_acl_from_xattr(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, ...) { k10000004 = make_kuid(u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, u4 /* ACL_USER */); } -> posix_acl_permission() { v20000004 = make_vfsuid(u0:v20000000:r65536 /* mnt_idmapping */, u0:k10000000:r65536 /* fs_idmapping */, k10000004); vfsuid_eq_kuid(v20000004, k10000004 /* caller_fsuid */) }The
initial_idmappingis only correct for the current situation because all filesystems that currently support idmapped mounts do not support being mounted with anfs_idmapping.Note that
ovl_get_acl()is used to retrieve the POSIX ACLs from the relevant lower layer and the lower layer'smnt_idmappingneeds to be taken into account and so does thefs_idmapping. See0c5fd887d2bb("acl:
move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") for more details.For posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() it is not as obvious why the
fs_idmappingmatters as it is foracl_permission_check(). Especially because it doesn't matter for posix_acl_fix_xattr_{from,to}_user() (See
[1] for more context.).Because posix_acl_{g,s}etxattr_idmapped_mnt() operate on the uapi struct
posix_acl_xattr_entrywhich contains {g,u}id_t values and thus give the impression that thefs_idmappingis irrelevant as at this point appropriate {g,u}id_t values have seemlingly been generated.As we've stated multiple times this assumption is wrong and in fact the uapi struct
posix_acl_xattr_entryis taking idmappings into account depending at what place it is operated on.
posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt()
Whenposix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt()is called the values stored in the uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryare mapped according to thefs_idmapping. This happened when they were read from the backing store and then translated from structposix_aclinto the uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryduringposix_acl_to_xattr().In other words, the
fs_idmappingmatters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryhave been generated by it.So we need to take the
fs_idmappinginto account duringmake_vfsuid()inposix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt().
posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt()
Whenposix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt()is called the values stored as {g,u}id_t in uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryare intended to be the values that ultimately get turned back into a k{g,u}id_t inposix_acl_from_xattr()(which turns the uapi
structposix_acl_xattr_entryinto the kernel internal structposix_acl).In other words, the
fs_idmappingmatters as the values stored as {g,u}id_t in the uapi structposix_acl_xattr_entryare intended to be the values that will be undone in thefs_idmappingwhen writing to the backing store.
Quoted 7 lines
So we need to take the
fs_idmappinginto account duringfrom_vfsuid()inposix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt().Fixes 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")Cc Seth Forshee <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]>
Looks good to me.
Quoted 129 lines
--- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 11 +++++++---- fs/posix_acl.c | 15 +++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)fs/overlayfs/inode.c +7
-4@@ -460,9 +460,12 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)* of the POSIX ACLs retrieved from the lower layer to this function to not * alter the POSIX ACLs for the underlying filesystem. */ -static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl (struct inode *realinode, +struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct posix_acl *acl) { +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (realinode); +for (unsigned int i =0 ; i < acl->a_count; i++) {vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;@@ -470,11 +473,11 @@ static void ovl_idmap_posix_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct posix_acl_entry *e = &acl->a_entries[i];switch (e->e_tag) {case ACL_USER : - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, e->e_uid); + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, e->e_uid); e->e_uid =vfsuid_into_kuid (vfsuid);break ;case ACL_GROUP : - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, e->e_gid); + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, e->e_gid); e->e_gid =vfsgid_into_kgid (vfsgid);break ; }@@ -536,7 +539,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)if (!clone) clone =ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );else -ovl_idmap_posix_acl (mnt_user_ns (realpath.mnt), clone); +ovl_idmap_posix_acl (realinode,mnt_user_ns (realpath.mnt), clone);/* * Since we're not in RCU path walk we always need to release the * original ACLs. fs/posix_acl.c +9
-6@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const struct posix_acl *acl, int want) {const struct posix_acl_entry *pa, *pe, *mask_obj; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int found =0 ;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;@@ -376,7 +377,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, goto check_perm;break ;case ACL_USER : - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, pa->e_uid);if (vfsuid_eq_kuid (vfsuid,current_fsuid ())) goto mask;@@ -390,7 +391,7 @@ posix_acl_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, }break ;case ACL_GROUP : - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, pa->e_gid);if (vfsgid_in_group_p (vfsgid)) { found =1 ;@@ -736,6 +737,7 @@ void posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, {struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header +1 ), *end; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int count;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;@@ -753,13 +755,13 @@ void posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,switch (le16_to_cpu (entry->e_tag)) {case ACL_USER : uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); - vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, uid); + vfsuid =make_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, uid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kuid (&init_user_ns,vfsuid_into_kuid (vfsuid)));break ;case ACL_GROUP : gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); - vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, gid); + vfsgid =make_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, gid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kgid (&init_user_ns,vfsgid_into_kgid (vfsgid)));break ;@@ -775,6 +777,7 @@ void posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, {struct posix_acl_xattr_header *header = value;struct posix_acl_xattr_entry *entry = (void *)(header +1 ), *end; +struct user_namespace *fs_userns =i_user_ns (inode);int count;vfsuid_t vfsuid;vfsgid_t vfsgid;@@ -793,13 +796,13 @@ void posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,case ACL_USER : uid =make_kuid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); vfsuid =VFSUIDT_INIT (uid); - uid =from_vfsuid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, vfsuid); + uid =from_vfsuid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsuid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid));break ;case ACL_GROUP : gid =make_kgid (&init_user_ns,le32_to_cpu (entry->e_id)); vfsgid =VFSGIDT_INIT (gid); - gid =from_vfsgid (mnt_userns, &init_user_ns, vfsgid); + gid =from_vfsgid (mnt_userns, fs_userns, vfsgid); entry->e_id =cpu_to_le32 (from_kgid (&init_user_ns, gid));break ;default :base-commit:
568035b01cfb107af8d2e4bd2fb9aea22cf5b868Signature · 1 line
2.34.1