4.19.256-rc1 review

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6a5068854cfe372da7dee3224dcf023ed5b00cb ]

Since commit dcea997beed6 ("faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures, the sequel"), faddr2line is completely broken on arm64.

For some reason, on arm64, the vmlinux ELF object file type is ET_DYN rather than ET_EXEC. Check for both when determining whether the object is vmlinux.

Modules and vmlinux.o have type ET_REL on all arches.

---
 scripts/faddr2line | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 2571caac3156..70f8c3ecd555 100755
@@ -112,7 +112,9 @@ __faddr2line() {
 	# section offsets.
 	local file_type=$(${READELF} --file-header $objfile |
 		${AWK} '$1 == "Type:" { print $2; exit }')
-	[[ $file_type = "EXEC" ]] && is_vmlinux=1
+	if [[ $file_type = "EXEC" ]] || [[ $file_type == "DYN" ]]; then
+		is_vmlinux=1
+	fi
 
 	# Go through each of the object's symbols which match the func name.
 	# In rare cases there might be duplicates, in which case we print all

2.35.1

From: Siddh Raman Pant <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 625395c4a0f4775e0fe00f616888d2e6c1ba49db ]

GCC-12 started triggering a new warning:

arch/x86/mm/numa.c: In function ‘cpumask_of_node’:
arch/x86/mm/numa.c:916:39: warning: the comparison will always evaluate as ‘false’ for the address of ‘node_to_cpumask_map’ will never be NULL [-Waddress]

    916 |         if (node_to_cpumask_map[node] == NULL) {
        |                                       ^~

node_to_cpumask_map is of type cpumask_var_t[].

When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is set, cpumask_var_t is typedef'd to a pointer for dynamic allocation, else to an array of one element. The "wicked game" can be checked on line 700 of include/linux/cpumask.h.

The original code in debug_cpumask_set_cpu() and cpumask_of_node() were probably written by the original authors with CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y (i.e. dynamic allocation) in mind, checking if the cpumask was available via a direct NULL check.

When CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is not set, GCC gives the above warning while compiling the kernel.

Fix that by using cpumask_available(), which does the NULL check when CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK is set, otherwise returns true. Use it wherever such checks are made.

Conditional definitions of cpumask_available() can be found along with the definition of cpumask_var_t. Check the cpumask.h reference mentioned above.

---
 arch/x86/mm/numa.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index fa150855647c..b4ff063a4371 100644
@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ void debug_cpumask_set_cpu(int cpu, int node, bool enable)
 		return;
 	}
 	mask = node_to_cpumask_map[node];
-	if (!mask) {
+	if (!cpumask_available(mask)) {
 		pr_err("node_to_cpumask_map[%i] NULL\n", node);
 		dump_stack();
 		return;

@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ const struct cpumask *cpumask_of_node(int node)
 		dump_stack();
 		return cpu_none_mask;
 	}
-	if (node_to_cpumask_map[node] == NULL) {
+	if (!cpumask_available(node_to_cpumask_map[node])) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 			"cpumask_of_node(%d): no node_to_cpumask_map!\n",
 			node);

2.35.1

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f1c4523f7a3aaabe7e53d3ebd378292947e95c8 ]

Since the user can control the arguments of the ioctl() from the user
space, under special arguments that may result in a divide-by-zero bug
in:
drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:784: ark_set_pixclock(info, (hdiv * info->var.pixclock) / hmul);
with hdiv=1, pixclock=1 and hmul=2 you end up with (1*1)/2 = (int) 0.
and then in:
drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:504: rv = dac_set_freq(par->dac, 0, 1000000000 / pixclock);
we'll get a division-by-zero.

The following log can reveal it:

divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI

RIP: 0010:ark_set_pixclock drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:504 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arkfb_set_par+0x10fc/0x24c0 drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c:784
Call Trace:
 fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1034
 do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1110
 fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1189

Fix this by checking the argument of ark_set_pixclock() first.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 13ba371e70aa..bfa221b68d71 100644
@@ -778,7 +778,12 @@ static int arkfb_set_par(struct fb_info *info)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	ark_set_pixclock(info, (hdiv * info->var.pixclock) / hmul);
+	value = (hdiv * info->var.pixclock) / hmul;
+	if (!value) {
+		fb_dbg(info, "invalid pixclock\n");
+		value = 1;
+	}
+	ark_set_pixclock(info, value);
 	svga_set_timings(par->state.vgabase, &ark_timing_regs, &(info->var), hmul, hdiv,
 			 (info->var.vmode & FB_VMODE_DOUBLE)     ? 2 : 1,
 			 (info->var.vmode & FB_VMODE_INTERLACED) ? 2 : 1,

2.35.1

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c58cf40e3a1d2f47c09d3489857e9476316788a ]

A build with -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 enabled will produce the following warnings:

sysfs.c:63:30: warning: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing up to 255 bytes into a region of size between 0 and 255 [-Wformat-truncation=]

  snprintf(filepath, 256, "%s/%s", path, filename);
                              ^~

Bump up the buffer to PATH_MAX which is the limit and account for all of the possible NUL and separators that could lead to exceeding the allocated buffer sizes.

---
 tools/thermal/tmon/sysfs.c | 24 +++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

index 18f523557983..1b17cbc54c9d 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <libintl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <syslog.h>

@@ -42,9 +43,9 @@ int sysfs_set_ulong(char *path, char *filename, unsigned long val)
 {
 	FILE *fd;
 	int ret = -1;
-	char filepath[256];
+	char filepath[PATH_MAX + 2]; /* NUL and '/' */
 
-	snprintf(filepath, 256, "%s/%s", path, filename);
+	snprintf(filepath, sizeof(filepath), "%s/%s", path, filename);
 
 	fd = fopen(filepath, "w");
 	if (!fd) {

@@ -66,9 +67,9 @@ static int sysfs_get_ulong(char *path, char *filename, unsigned long *p_ulong)
 {
 	FILE *fd;
 	int ret = -1;
-	char filepath[256];
+	char filepath[PATH_MAX + 2]; /* NUL and '/' */
 
-	snprintf(filepath, 256, "%s/%s", path, filename);
+	snprintf(filepath, sizeof(filepath), "%s/%s", path, filename);
 
 	fd = fopen(filepath, "r");
 	if (!fd) {

@@ -85,9 +86,9 @@ static int sysfs_get_string(char *path, char *filename, char *str)
 {
 	FILE *fd;
 	int ret = -1;
-	char filepath[256];
+	char filepath[PATH_MAX + 2]; /* NUL and '/' */
 
-	snprintf(filepath, 256, "%s/%s", path, filename);
+	snprintf(filepath, sizeof(filepath), "%s/%s", path, filename);
 
 	fd = fopen(filepath, "r");
 	if (!fd) {

@@ -208,8 +209,8 @@ static int find_tzone_cdev(struct dirent *nl, char *tz_name,
 {
 	unsigned long trip_instance = 0;
 	char cdev_name_linked[256];
-	char cdev_name[256];
-	char cdev_trip_name[256];
+	char cdev_name[PATH_MAX];
+	char cdev_trip_name[PATH_MAX];
 	int cdev_id;
 
 	if (nl->d_type == DT_LNK) {

@@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ static int find_tzone_cdev(struct dirent *nl, char *tz_name,
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		/* find the link to real cooling device record binding */
-		snprintf(cdev_name, 256, "%s/%s", tz_name, nl->d_name);
+		snprintf(cdev_name, sizeof(cdev_name) - 2, "%s/%s",
+			 tz_name, nl->d_name);
 		memset(cdev_name_linked, 0, sizeof(cdev_name_linked));
 		if (readlink(cdev_name, cdev_name_linked,
 				sizeof(cdev_name_linked) - 1) != -1) {

@@ -235,8 +237,8 @@ static int find_tzone_cdev(struct dirent *nl, char *tz_name,
 			/* find the trip point in which the cdev is binded to
 			 * in this tzone
 			 */
-			snprintf(cdev_trip_name, 256, "%s%s", nl->d_name,
-				"_trip_point");
+			snprintf(cdev_trip_name, sizeof(cdev_trip_name) - 1,
+				"%s%s", nl->d_name, "_trip_point");
 			sysfs_get_ulong(tz_name, cdev_trip_name,
 					&trip_instance);
 			/* validate trip point range, e.g. trip could return -1

2.35.1

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ec0754c60217248fa77cc9005d66b2b55200ac06 ]

In the function vt8623fb_set_par(), the value of 'screen_size' is calculated by the user input. If the user provides the improper value, the value of 'screen_size' may larger than 'info->screen_size', which may cause the following bug:

[  583.339036] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90005000000
[  583.339049] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  583.339052] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  583.339074] RIP: 0010:memset_orig+0x33/0xb0
[  583.339110] Call Trace:
[  583.339118]  vt8623fb_set_par+0x11cd/0x21e0
[  583.339146]  fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0
[  583.339181]  do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670
[  583.339209]  fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130

Fix the this by checking the value of 'screen_size' before memset_io().

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/vt8623fb.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 5cac871db3ee..cbae9c510092 100644
@@ -504,6 +504,8 @@ static int vt8623fb_set_par(struct fb_info *info)
 			 (info->var.vmode & FB_VMODE_DOUBLE) ? 2 : 1, 1,
 			 1, info->node);
 
+	if (screen_size > info->screen_size)
+		screen_size = info->screen_size;
 	memset_io(info->screen_base, 0x00, screen_size);
 
 	/* Device and screen back on */

2.35.1

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96b550971c65d54d64728d8ba973487878a06454 ]

In the function arkfb_set_par(), the value of 'screen_size' is calculated by the user input. If the user provides the improper value, the value of 'screen_size' may larger than 'info->screen_size', which may cause the following bug:

[  659.399066] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90003000000
[  659.399077] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[  659.399079] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[  659.399094] RIP: 0010:memset_orig+0x33/0xb0
[  659.399116] Call Trace:
[  659.399122]  arkfb_set_par+0x143f/0x24c0
[  659.399130]  fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0
[  659.399161]  do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670
[  659.399189]  fb_ioctl+0xdd/0x130

Fix the this by checking the value of 'screen_size' before memset_io().

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/arkfb.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index bfa221b68d71..f7920987dd24 100644
@@ -794,6 +794,8 @@ static int arkfb_set_par(struct fb_info *info)
 	value = ((value * hmul / hdiv) / 8) - 5;
 	vga_wcrt(par->state.vgabase, 0x42, (value + 1) / 2);
 
+	if (screen_size > info->screen_size)
+		screen_size = info->screen_size;
 	memset_io(info->screen_base, 0x00, screen_size);
 	/* Device and screen back on */
 	svga_wcrt_mask(par->state.vgabase, 0x17, 0x80, 0x80);

2.35.1

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ba592fa014f21f35a8ee8da4ca7b95a018f13e8 ]

In the function s3fb_set_par(), the value of 'screen_size' is calculated by the user input. If the user provides the improper value, the value of 'screen_size' may larger than 'info->screen_size', which may cause the following bug:

[   54.083733] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90003000000
[   54.083742] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[   54.083744] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[   54.083760] RIP: 0010:memset_orig+0x33/0xb0
[   54.083782] Call Trace:
[   54.083788]  s3fb_set_par+0x1ec6/0x4040
[   54.083806]  fb_set_var+0x604/0xeb0
[   54.083836]  do_fb_ioctl+0x234/0x670

Fix the this by checking the value of 'screen_size' before memset_io().

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/s3fb.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index d63f23e26f7d..b17b806b4187 100644
@@ -902,6 +902,8 @@ static int s3fb_set_par(struct fb_info *info)
 	value = clamp((htotal + hsstart + 1) / 2 + 2, hsstart + 4, htotal + 1);
 	svga_wcrt_multi(par->state.vgabase, s3_dtpc_regs, value);
 
+	if (screen_size > info->screen_size)
+		screen_size = info->screen_size;
 	memset_io(info->screen_base, 0x00, screen_size);
 	/* Device and screen back on */
 	svga_wcrt_mask(par->state.vgabase, 0x17, 0x80, 0x80);

2.35.1

From: Steffen Maier <[email protected]>

commit 4da8c5f76825269f28d6a89fa752934a4bcb6dfa upstream.

Case (1):
The only waiter on wka_port->completion_wq is zfcp_fc_wka_port_get() trying to open a WKA port. As such it should only be woken up by WKA port *open* responses, not by WKA port close responses.

Case (2):
A close WKA port response coming in just after having sent a new open WKA port request and before blocking for the open response with wait_event() in zfcp_fc_wka_port_get() erroneously renders the wait_event a NOP because the close handler overwrites wka_port->status. Hence the wait_event condition is erroneously true and it does not enter blocking state.

With non-negligible probability, the following time space sequence happens depending on timing without this fix:

user process ERP thread zfcp work queue tasklet system work queue
============ ========== =============== ======= =================

$ echo 1 > online
zfcp_ccw_set_online
zfcp_ccw_activate
zfcp_erp_adapter_reopen
msleep scan backoff zfcp_erp_strategy
|                   ...
|                   zfcp_erp_action_cleanup
|                   ...
|                   queue delayed scan_work
|                   queue ns_up_work
|                              ns_up_work:
|                              zfcp_fc_wka_port_get
|                               open wka request
|                                              open response
|                              GSPN FC-GS
|                              RSPN FC-GS [NPIV-only]
|                              zfcp_fc_wka_port_put
|                               (--wka->refcount==0)
|                               sched delayed wka->work
|
~~~Case (1)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
zfcp_erp_wait
flush scan_work
|                                                      wka->work:
|                                                      wka->status=CLOSING
|                                                      close wka request
|                              scan_work:
|                              zfcp_fc_wka_port_get
|                               (wka->status==CLOSING)
|                               wka->status=OPENING
|                               open wka request
|                               wait_event
|                               |              close response
|                               |              wka->status=OFFLINE
|                               |              wake_up /*WRONG*/
~~~Case (2)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|                                                      wka->work:
|                                                      wka->status=CLOSING
|                                                      close wka request
zfcp_erp_wait
flush scan_work
|                              scan_work:
|                              zfcp_fc_wka_port_get
|                               (wka->status==CLOSING)
|                               wka->status=OPENING
|                               open wka request
|                                              close response
|                                              wka->status=OFFLINE
|                                              wake_up /*WRONG&NOP*/
|                               wait_event /*NOP*/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|                               (wka->status!=ONLINE)
|                               return -EIO
|                              return early
                                               open response
                                               wka->status=ONLINE
                                               wake_up /*NOP*/

So we erroneously end up with no automatic port scan. This is a big problem when it happens during boot. The timing is influenced by v3.19 commit 18f87a67e6d6 ("zfcp: auto port scan resiliency").

Fix it by fully mutually excluding zfcp_fc_wka_port_get() and zfcp_fc_wka_port_offline(). For that to work, we make the latter block until we got the response for a close WKA port. In order not to penalize the system workqueue, we move wka_port->work to our own adapter workqueue. Note that before v2.6.30 commit 828bc1212a68 ("[SCSI] zfcp: Set WKA-port to offline on adapter deactivation"), zfcp did block in zfcp_fc_wka_port_offline() as well, but with a different condition.

While at it, make non-functional cleanups to improve code reading in zfcp_fc_wka_port_get(). If we cannot send the WKA port open request, don't rely on the subsequent wait_event condition to immediately let this case pass without blocking. Also don't want to rely on the additional condition handling the refcount to be skipped just to finally return with -EIO.

---
 drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fc.c  |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fc.h  |    6 ++++--
 drivers/s390/scsi/zfcp_fsf.c |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -145,27 +145,33 @@ void zfcp_fc_enqueue_event(struct zfcp_a
 
 static int zfcp_fc_wka_port_get(struct zfcp_fc_wka_port *wka_port)
 {
+	int ret = -EIO;
+
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&wka_port->mutex))
 		return -ERESTARTSYS;
 
 	if (wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE ||
 	    wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_CLOSING) {
 		wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OPENING;
-		if (zfcp_fsf_open_wka_port(wka_port))
+		if (zfcp_fsf_open_wka_port(wka_port)) {
+			/* could not even send request, nothing to wait for */
 			wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
-	mutex_unlock(&wka_port->mutex);
-
-	wait_event(wka_port->completion_wq,
+	wait_event(wka_port->opened,
 		   wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_ONLINE ||
 		   wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE);
 
 	if (wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_ONLINE) {
 		atomic_inc(&wka_port->refcount);
-		return 0;
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	return -EIO;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&wka_port->mutex);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void zfcp_fc_wka_port_offline(struct work_struct *work)

@@ -181,9 +187,12 @@ static void zfcp_fc_wka_port_offline(str
 
 	wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_CLOSING;
 	if (zfcp_fsf_close_wka_port(wka_port)) {
+		/* could not even send request, nothing to wait for */
 		wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE;
-		wake_up(&wka_port->completion_wq);
+		goto out;
 	}
+	wait_event(wka_port->closed,
+		   wka_port->status == ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE);
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&wka_port->mutex);
 }

@@ -193,13 +202,15 @@ static void zfcp_fc_wka_port_put(struct
 	if (atomic_dec_return(&wka_port->refcount) != 0)
 		return;
 	/* wait 10 milliseconds, other reqs might pop in */
-	schedule_delayed_work(&wka_port->work, HZ / 100);
+	queue_delayed_work(wka_port->adapter->work_queue, &wka_port->work,
+			   msecs_to_jiffies(10));
 }
 
 static void zfcp_fc_wka_port_init(struct zfcp_fc_wka_port *wka_port, u32 d_id,
 				  struct zfcp_adapter *adapter)
 {
-	init_waitqueue_head(&wka_port->completion_wq);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&wka_port->opened);
+	init_waitqueue_head(&wka_port->closed);
 
 	wka_port->adapter = adapter;
 	wka_port->d_id = d_id;

@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ enum zfcp_fc_wka_status {
 /**
  * struct zfcp_fc_wka_port - representation of well-known-address (WKA) FC port
  * @adapter: Pointer to adapter structure this WKA port belongs to
- * @completion_wq: Wait for completion of open/close command
+ * @opened: Wait for completion of open command
+ * @closed: Wait for completion of close command
  * @status: Current status of WKA port
  * @refcount: Reference count to keep port open as long as it is in use
  * @d_id: FC destination id or well-known-address

@@ -180,7 +181,8 @@ enum zfcp_fc_wka_status {
  */
 struct zfcp_fc_wka_port {
 	struct zfcp_adapter	*adapter;
-	wait_queue_head_t	completion_wq;
+	wait_queue_head_t	opened;
+	wait_queue_head_t	closed;
 	enum zfcp_fc_wka_status	status;
 	atomic_t		refcount;
 	u32			d_id;

@@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ static void zfcp_fsf_open_wka_port_handl
 		wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_ONLINE;
 	}
 out:
-	wake_up(&wka_port->completion_wq);
+	wake_up(&wka_port->opened);
 }
 
 /**

@@ -1650,7 +1650,7 @@ static void zfcp_fsf_close_wka_port_hand
 	}
 
 	wka_port->status = ZFCP_FC_WKA_PORT_OFFLINE;
-	wake_up(&wka_port->completion_wq);
+	wake_up(&wka_port->closed);
 }
 
 /**

From: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]>

commit 3a2ba42cbd0b669ce3837ba400905f93dd06c79f upstream.

The bitops compile-time optimization series revealed one more problem in olpc-xo1-sci.c:send_ebook_state(), resulted in GCC warnings:

arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c: In function 'send_ebook_state':
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:63: warning: logical not is only applied to the left hand side of comparison [-Wlogical-not-parentheses]
83 | if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state)
| ^~
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:13: note: add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning

Despite this code working as intended, this redundant double negation of boolean value, together with comparing to char with no explicit conversion to bool, makes compilers think the author made some unintentional logical mistakes here. Make it the other way around and negate the char instead to silence the warnings.

---
 arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void send_ebook_state(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state)
+	if (test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == !!state)
 		return; /* Nothing new to report. */
 
 	input_report_switch(ebook_switch_idev, SW_TABLET_MODE, state);

From: David Collins <[email protected]>

commit 2af28b241eea816e6f7668d1954f15894b45d7e3 upstream.

trace_spmi_write_begin() and trace_spmi_read_end() both call memcpy() with a length of "len + 1". This leads to one extra byte being read beyond the end of the specified buffer. Fix this out-of-bound memory access by using a length of "len" instead.

Here is a KASAN log showing the issue:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffc0265b7540 by task [email protected]/1314
...
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e8
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c
 dump_stack_lvl+0xdc/0x11c
 print_address_description+0x74/0x384
 kasan_report+0x188/0x268
 kasan_check_range+0x270/0x2b0
 memcpy+0x90/0xe8
 trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
 spmi_read_cmd+0x294/0x3ac
 spmi_ext_register_readl+0x84/0x9c
 regmap_spmi_ext_read+0x144/0x1b0 [regmap_spmi]
 _regmap_raw_read+0x40c/0x754
 regmap_raw_read+0x3a0/0x514
 regmap_bulk_read+0x418/0x494
 adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0xe8/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]
 ...
 __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60
 invoke_syscall+0x80/0x218
 el0_svc_common+0xec/0x1c8
 ...

addr ffffffc0265b7540 is located in stack of task [email protected]/1314 at offset 32 in frame:
adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0x0/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]

this frame has 1 object:
[32, 33) 'status'

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffffffc0265b7400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
 ffffffc0265b7480: 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffc0265b7500: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
                                           ^
 ffffffc0265b7580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffffffc0265b7600: f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 07 f2 f2 f2 01 f3 00 00 00 00
==================================================================

---
 include/trace/events/spmi.h |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@ TRACE_EVENT(spmi_write_begin,
 		__field		( u8,         sid       )
 		__field		( u16,        addr      )
 		__field		( u8,         len       )
-		__dynamic_array	( u8,   buf,  len + 1   )
+		__dynamic_array	( u8,   buf,  len       )
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(
 		__entry->opcode = opcode;
 		__entry->sid    = sid;
 		__entry->addr   = addr;
-		__entry->len    = len + 1;
-		memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), buf, len + 1);
+		__entry->len    = len;
+		memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), buf, len);
 	),
 
 	TP_printk("opc=%d sid=%02d addr=0x%04x len=%d buf=0x[%*phD]",

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(spmi_read_end,
 		__field		( u16,        addr      )
 		__field		( int,        ret       )
 		__field		( u8,         len       )
-		__dynamic_array	( u8,   buf,  len + 1   )
+		__dynamic_array	( u8,   buf,  len       )
 	),
 
 	TP_fast_assign(

@@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(spmi_read_end,
 		__entry->sid    = sid;
 		__entry->addr   = addr;
 		__entry->ret    = ret;
-		__entry->len    = len + 1;
-		memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), buf, len + 1);
+		__entry->len    = len;
+		memcpy(__get_dynamic_array(buf), buf, len);
 	),
 
 	TP_printk("opc=%d sid=%02d addr=0x%04x ret=%d len=%02d buf=0x[%*phD]",

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 179b14152dcb6a24c3415200603aebca70ff13af upstream.

When adding an xattr to an inode, we must ensure that the inode_size is not less than EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + extra_isize + pad. Otherwise, the end position may be greater than the start position, resulting in UAF.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.h |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

@@ -95,6 +95,19 @@ struct ext4_xattr_entry {
 
 #define EXT4_ZERO_XATTR_VALUE ((void *)-1)
 
+/*
+ * If we want to add an xattr to the inode, we should make sure that
+ * i_extra_isize is not 0 and that the inode size is not less than
+ * EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + extra_isize + pad.
+ *   EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE   extra_isize header   entry   pad  data
+ * |--------------------------|------------|------|---------|---|-------|
+ */
+#define EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)				\
+	((EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize != 0) &&				\
+	 (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize +	\
+	  sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) + EXT4_XATTR_PAD <=	\
+	  EXT4_INODE_SIZE((inode)->i_sb)))
+
 struct ext4_xattr_info {
 	const char *name;
 	const void *value;

From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>

commit b8a04fe77ef1360fbf73c80fddbdfeaa9407ed1b upstream.

ext4_append() must always allocate a new block, otherwise we run the risk of overwriting existing directory block corrupting the directory tree in the process resulting in all manner of problems later on.

Add a sanity check to see if the logical block is already allocated and error out if it is.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |   16 ++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_append(h
 					struct inode *inode,
 					ext4_lblk_t *block)
 {
+	struct ext4_map_blocks map;
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
 	int err;
 

@@ -62,6 +63,21 @@ static struct buffer_head *ext4_append(h
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
 
 	*block = inode->i_size >> inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
+	map.m_lblk = *block;
+	map.m_len = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * We're appending new directory block. Make sure the block is not
+	 * allocated yet, otherwise we will end up corrupting the
+	 * directory.
+	 */
+	err = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+	if (err) {
+		EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "Logical block already allocated");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
+	}
 
 	bh = ext4_bread(handle, inode, *block, EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE);
 	if (IS_ERR(bh))

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 67d7d8ad99beccd9fe92d585b87f1760dc9018e3 upstream.

Hulk Robot reported a issue:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500
Write of size 4105 at addr ffff8881675ef5f4 by task syz-executor.0/7092

CPU: 1 PID: 7092 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #17
Call Trace:
[...]
 memcpy+0x34/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
 ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x18ab/0x3500 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1747
 ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set+0x86/0x2a0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2205
 ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x940/0x1300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2386
 ext4_xattr_set+0x1da/0x300 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2498
 __vfs_setxattr+0x112/0x170 fs/xattr.c:149
 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x11b/0x2a0 fs/xattr.c:180
 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x17b/0x250 fs/xattr.c:238
 vfs_setxattr+0xed/0x270 fs/xattr.c:255
 setxattr+0x235/0x330 fs/xattr.c:520
 path_setxattr+0x176/0x190 fs/xattr.c:539
 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:561 [inline]
 __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:557 [inline]
 __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0xc2/0x160 fs/xattr.c:557
 do_syscall_64+0xdf/0x530 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x459fe9
RSP: 002b:00007fa5e54b4c08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bd
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000051bf60 RCX: 0000000000459fe9
RDX: 00000000200003c0 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 000000000051bf60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000001009 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffc73c93fc0 R14: 000000000051bf60 R15: 00007fa5e54b4d80

[...]
==================================================================

Above issue may happen as follows:
-------------------------------------
ext4_xattr_set
ext4_xattr_set_handle
ext4_xattr_ibody_find
>> s->end < s->base
>> no EXT4_STATE_XATTR
>> xattr_check_inode is not executed
ext4_xattr_ibody_set
ext4_xattr_set_entry
>> size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base
>> UAF in memcpy

we can easily reproduce this problem with the following commands:
mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda
mount -o debug_want_extra_isize=128 /dev/sda /mnt
touch /mnt/file
setfattr -n user.cat -v seq -s z 4096|tr -d '[:digit:]' /mnt/file

In ext4_xattr_ibody_find, we have the following assignment logic:
header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode)
= raw_inode + EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + i_extra_isize
is->s.base = IFIRST(header)
= header + sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header)
is->s.end = raw_inode + s_inode_size

In ext4_xattr_set_entry
min_offs = s->end - s->base
= s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize -
sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header)
last = s->first
free = min_offs - ((void *)last - s->base) - sizeof(__u32)
= s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE - i_extra_isize -
sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_header) - sizeof(__u32)

In the calculation formula, all values except s_inode_size and i_extra_size are fixed values. When i_extra_size is the maximum value s_inode_size - EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE, min_offs is -4 and free is -8. The value overflows. As a result, the preceding issue is triggered when memcpy is executed.

Therefore, when finding xattr or setting xattr, check whether there is space for storing xattr in the inode to resolve this issue.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2188,8 +2188,9 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *
 	struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
 	int error;
 
-	if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0)
+	if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode))
 		return 0;
+
 	raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc);
 	header = IHDR(inode, raw_inode);
 	is->s.base = is->s.first = IFIRST(header);

@@ -2217,8 +2218,9 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t
 	struct ext4_xattr_search *s = &is->s;
 	int error;
 
-	if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0)
+	if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode))
 		return -ENOSPC;
+
 	error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode, false /* is_block */);
 	if (error)
 		return error;

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit de394a86658ffe4e89e5328fd4993abfe41b7435 upstream.

When doing an online resize, the on-disk superblock on-disk wasn't updated. This means that when the file system is unmounted and remounted, and the on-disk overhead value is non-zero, this would result in the results of statfs(2) to be incorrect.

This was partially fixed by Commits 10b01ee92df5 ("ext4: fix overhead calculation to account for the reserved gdt blocks"), 85d825dbf489 ("ext4: force overhead calculation if the s_overhead_cluster makes no sense"), and eb7054212eac ("ext4: update the cached overhead value in the superblock").

However, since it was too expensive to forcibly recalculate the overhead for bigalloc file systems at every mount, this didn't fix the problem for bigalloc file systems. This commit should address the problem when resizing file systems with the bigalloc feature enabled.

---
 fs/ext4/resize.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1483,6 +1483,7 @@ static void ext4_update_super(struct sup
 	 * Update the fs overhead information
 	 */
 	ext4_calculate_overhead(sb);
+	es->s_overhead_clusters = cpu_to_le32(sbi->s_overhead);
 
 	if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "EXT4-fs: added group %u:"

From: Eric Whitney <[email protected]>

commit 7f0d8e1d607c1a4fa9a27362a108921d82230874 upstream.

A race can occur in the unlikely event ext4 is unable to allocate a physical cluster for a delayed allocation in a bigalloc file system during writeback. Failure to allocate a cluster forces error recovery that includes a call to mpage_release_unused_pages(). That function removes any corresponding delayed allocated blocks from the extent status tree. If a new delayed write is in progress on the same cluster simultaneously, resulting in the addition of an new extent containing one or more blocks in that cluster to the extent status tree, delayed block accounting can be thrown off if that delayed write then encounters a similar cluster allocation failure during future writeback.

Write lock the i_data_sem in mpage_release_unused_pages() to fix this problem. Ext4's block/cluster accounting code for bigalloc relies on i_data_sem for mutual exclusion, as is found in the delayed write path, and the locking in mpage_release_unused_pages() is missing.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -1755,7 +1755,14 @@ static void mpage_release_unused_pages(s
 		ext4_lblk_t start, last;
 		start = index << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
 		last = end << (PAGE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
+
+		/*
+		 * avoid racing with extent status tree scans made by
+		 * ext4_insert_delayed_block()
+		 */
+		down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
 		ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, start, last - start + 1);
+		up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
 	}
 
 	pagevec_init(&pvec);

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit c9fd167d57133c5b748d16913c4eabc55e531c73 upstream.

If the ext4 inode does not have xattr space, 0 is returned in the get_max_inline_xattr_value_size function. Otherwise, the function returns a negative value when the inode does not contain EXT4_STATE_XATTR.

---
 fs/ext4/inline.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ static int get_max_inline_xattr_value_si
 	struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
 	int free, min_offs;
 
+	if (!EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode))
+		return 0;
+
 	min_offs = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size -
 			EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE -
 			EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize -

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit fd7e672ea98b95b9d4c9dae316639f03c16a749d upstream.

Use the EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE macro to more accurately determine whether the inode have xattr space.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -4844,8 +4844,7 @@ static inline int ext4_iget_extra_inode(
 	__le32 *magic = (void *)raw_inode +
 			EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize;
 
-	if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize + sizeof(__le32) <=
-	    EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) &&
+	if (EXT4_INODE_HAS_XATTR_SPACE(inode)  &&
 	    *magic == cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC)) {
 		ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_XATTR);
 		return ext4_find_inline_data_nolock(inode);

From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>

commit ff46a601afc5a66a81c3945b83d0a2caeb88e8bc upstream.

Add support for the Trace Hub in Raptor Lake-S CPU.

---
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
 	{
+		/* Raptor Lake-S CPU */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0xa76f),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
+	{
 		/* Rocket Lake CPU */
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x4c19),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,

From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>

commit 23e2de5826e2fc4dd43e08bab3a2ea1a5338b063 upstream.

Add support for the Trace Hub in Raptor Lake-S PCH.

---
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -251,6 +251,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
 	{
+		/* Raptor Lake-S */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x7a26),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
+	{
 		/* Rocket Lake CPU */
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x4c19),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,

From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>

commit 802a9a0b1d91274ef10d9fe429b4cc1e8c200aef upstream.

Add support for the Trace Hub in Meteor Lake-P.

---
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -256,6 +256,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
 	{
+		/* Meteor Lake-P */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x7e24),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
+	{
 		/* Rocket Lake CPU */
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x4c19),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 7dad24db59d2d2803576f2e3645728866a056dab upstream.

There is a KASAN warning in raid_resume when running the lvm test lvconvert-raid.sh. The reason for the warning is that mddev->raid_disks is greater than rs->raid_disks, so the loop touches one entry beyond the allocated length.

---
 drivers/md/dm-raid.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ static void attempt_restore_of_faulty_de
 
 	memset(cleared_failed_devices, 0, sizeof(cleared_failed_devices));
 
-	for (i = 0; i < mddev->raid_disks; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < rs->raid_disks; i++) {
 		r = &rs->dev[i].rdev;
 		/* HM FIXME: enhance journal device recovery processing */
 		if (test_bit(Journal, &r->flags))

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 1fbeea217d8f297fe0e0956a1516d14ba97d0396 upstream.

There is this warning when using a kernel with the address sanitizer and running this testsuite:
https://gitlab.com/cki-project/kernel-tests/-/tree/main/storage/swraid/scsi_raid

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in raid_status+0x1747/0x2820 [dm_raid]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888079d2c7e8 by task lvcreate/13319
CPU: 0 PID: 13319 Comm: lvcreate Not tainted 5.18.0-0.rc3.<snip> #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9c
 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1e0
 print_report.cold+0x55/0x244
 kasan_report+0xc9/0x100
 raid_status+0x1747/0x2820 [dm_raid]
 dm_ima_measure_on_table_load+0x4b8/0xca0 [dm_mod]
 table_load+0x35c/0x630 [dm_mod]
 ctl_ioctl+0x411/0x630 [dm_mod]
 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10 [dm_mod]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12a/0x1a0
 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80

The warning is caused by reading conf->max_nr_stripes in raid_status. The code in raid_status reads mddev->private, casts it to struct r5conf and reads the entry max_nr_stripes.

However, if we have different raid type than 4/5/6, mddev->private doesn't point to struct r5conf; it may point to struct r0conf, struct r1conf, struct r10conf or struct mpconf. If we cast a pointer to one of these structs to struct r5conf, we will be reading invalid memory and KASAN warns about it.

Fix this bug by reading struct r5conf only if raid type is 4, 5 or 6.

---
 drivers/md/dm-raid.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3533,7 +3533,7 @@ static void raid_status(struct dm_target
 {
 	struct raid_set *rs = ti->private;
 	struct mddev *mddev = &rs->md;
-	struct r5conf *conf = mddev->private;
+	struct r5conf *conf = rs_is_raid456(rs) ? mddev->private : NULL;
 	int i, max_nr_stripes = conf ? conf->max_nr_stripes : 0;
 	unsigned long recovery;
 	unsigned int raid_param_cnt = 1; /* at least 1 for chunksize */

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit ca7dc242e358e46d963b32f9d9dd829785a9e957 upstream.

dm-writecache has the capability to limit the number of writeback jobs in progress. However, this feature was off by default. As such there were some out-of-memory crashes observed when lowering the low watermark while the cache is full.

This commit enables writeback limit by default. It is set to 256MiB or 1/16 of total system memory, whichever is smaller.

---
 drivers/md/dm-writecache.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 
 #define HIGH_WATERMARK			50
 #define LOW_WATERMARK			45
-#define MAX_WRITEBACK_JOBS		0
+#define MAX_WRITEBACK_JOBS		min(0x10000000 / PAGE_SIZE, totalram_pages / 16)
 #define ENDIO_LATENCY			16
 #define WRITEBACK_LATENCY		64
 #define AUTOCOMMIT_BLOCKS_SSD		65536

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

commit 4f4179fcf420873002035cf1941d844c9e0e7cb3 upstream.

There is a problem with the current revision checks in is_cppc_supported() that they essentially prevent the CPPC support from working if a new _CPC package format revision being a proper superset of the v3 and only causing _CPC to return a package with more entries (while retaining the types and meaning of the entries defined by the v3) is introduced in the future and used by the platform firmware.

In that case, as long as the number of entries in the _CPC return package is at least CPPC_V3_NUM_ENT, it should be perfectly fine to use the v3 support code and disregard the additional package entries added by the new package format revision.

For this reason, drop is_cppc_supported() altogether, put the revision checks directly into acpi_cppc_processor_probe() so they are easier to follow and rework them to take the case mentioned above into account.

---
 drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c |   54 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 include/acpi/cppc_acpi.h |    2 -
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

@@ -630,33 +630,6 @@ int pcc_data_alloc(int pcc_ss_id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Check if CPPC revision + num_ent combination is supported */
-static bool is_cppc_supported(int revision, int num_ent)
-{
-	int expected_num_ent;
-
-	switch (revision) {
-	case CPPC_V2_REV:
-		expected_num_ent = CPPC_V2_NUM_ENT;
-		break;
-	case CPPC_V3_REV:
-		expected_num_ent = CPPC_V3_NUM_ENT;
-		break;
-	default:
-		pr_debug("Firmware exports unsupported CPPC revision: %d\n",
-			revision);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	if (expected_num_ent != num_ent) {
-		pr_debug("Firmware exports %d entries. Expected: %d for CPPC rev:%d\n",
-			num_ent, expected_num_ent, revision);
-		return false;
-	}
-
-	return true;
-}
-
 /*
  * An example CPC table looks like the following.
  *

@@ -752,7 +725,6 @@ int acpi_cppc_processor_probe(struct acp
 				cpc_obj->type);
 		goto out_free;
 	}
-	cpc_ptr->num_entries = num_ent;
 
 	/* Second entry should be revision. */
 	cpc_obj = &out_obj->package.elements[1];

@@ -763,10 +735,32 @@ int acpi_cppc_processor_probe(struct acp
 				cpc_obj->type);
 		goto out_free;
 	}
-	cpc_ptr->version = cpc_rev;
 
-	if (!is_cppc_supported(cpc_rev, num_ent))
+	if (cpc_rev < CPPC_V2_REV) {
+		pr_debug("Unsupported _CPC Revision (%d) for CPU:%d\n", cpc_rev,
+			 pr->id);
 		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Disregard _CPC if the number of entries in the return pachage is not
+	 * as expected, but support future revisions being proper supersets of
+	 * the v3 and only causing more entries to be returned by _CPC.
+	 */
+	if ((cpc_rev == CPPC_V2_REV && num_ent != CPPC_V2_NUM_ENT) ||
+	    (cpc_rev == CPPC_V3_REV && num_ent != CPPC_V3_NUM_ENT) ||
+	    (cpc_rev > CPPC_V3_REV && num_ent <= CPPC_V3_NUM_ENT)) {
+		pr_debug("Unexpected number of _CPC return package entries (%d) for CPU:%d\n",
+			 num_ent, pr->id);
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+	if (cpc_rev > CPPC_V3_REV) {
+		num_ent = CPPC_V3_NUM_ENT;
+		cpc_rev = CPPC_V3_REV;
+	}
+
+	cpc_ptr->num_entries = num_ent;
+	cpc_ptr->version = cpc_rev;
 
 	/* Iterate through remaining entries in _CPC */
 	for (i = 2; i < num_ent; i++) {

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 #include <acpi/pcc.h>
 #include <acpi/processor.h>
 
-/* Support CPPCv2 and CPPCv3  */
+/* CPPCv2 and CPPCv3 support */
 #define CPPC_V2_REV	2
 #define CPPC_V3_REV	3
 #define CPPC_V2_NUM_ENT	21

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>

commit 9ad36309e2719a884f946678e0296be10f0bb4c1 upstream.

When a route filter is replaced and the old filter has a 0 handle, the old one won't be removed from the hashtable, while it will still be freed.

The test was there since before commit 1109c00547fc ("net: sched: RCU cls_route"), when a new filter was not allocated when there was an old one. The old filter was reused and the reinserting would only be necessary if an old filter was replaced. That was still wrong for the same case where the old handle was 0.

Remove the old filter from the list independently from its handle value.

This fixes CVE-2022-2588, also reported as ZDI-CAN-17440.

---
 net/sched/cls_route.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ static int route4_change(struct net *net
 	rcu_assign_pointer(f->next, f1);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(*fp, f);
 
-	if (fold && fold->handle && f->handle != fold->handle) {
+	if (fold) {
 		th = to_hash(fold->handle);
 		h = from_hash(fold->handle >> 16);
 		b = rtnl_dereference(head->table[th]);

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit dc4d31684974d140250f3ee612c3f0cab13b3146 upstream.

[BUG]
If we have a btrfs image with dirty log, along with an unsupported RO compatible flag:

log_root 30474240
...
compat_flags 0x0
compat_ro_flags 0x40000003

			( FREE_SPACE_TREE |
			  FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID |
			  unknown flag: 0x40000000 )

Then even if we can only mount it RO, we will still cause metadata update for log replay:

BTRFS info (device dm-1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device dm-1): using free space tree
BTRFS info (device dm-1): has skinny extents
BTRFS info (device dm-1): start tree-log replay

This is definitely against RO compact flag requirement.

[CAUSE]
RO compact flag only forces us to do RO mount, but we will still do log replay for plain RO mount.

Thus this will result us to do log replay and update metadata.

This can be very problematic for new RO compat flag, for example older kernel can not understand v2 cache, and if we allow metadata update on RO mount and invalidate/corrupt v2 cache.

[FIX]
Just reject the mount unless rescue=nologreplay is provided:

BTRFS error (device dm-1): cannot replay dirty log with unsupport optional features (0x40000000), try rescue=nologreplay instead

We don't want to set rescue=nologreply directly, as this would make the end user to read the old data, and cause confusion.

Since the such case is really rare, we're mostly fine to just reject the mount with an error message, which also includes the proper workaround.

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -2920,6 +2920,20 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb,
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto fail_alloc;
 	}
+	/*
+	 * We have unsupported RO compat features, although RO mounted, we
+	 * should not cause any metadata write, including log replay.
+	 * Or we could screw up whatever the new feature requires.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(features && btrfs_super_log_root(disk_super) &&
+		     !btrfs_test_opt(fs_info, NOLOGREPLAY))) {
+		btrfs_err(fs_info,
+"cannot replay dirty log with unsupported compat_ro features (0x%llx), try rescue=nologreplay",
+			  features);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto fail_alloc;
+	}
+
 
 	ret = btrfs_init_workqueues(fs_info, fs_devices);
 	if (ret) {

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 0b8f11737cffc1a406d1134b58687abc29d76b52 upstream

Message-Id: <3a0998645c328bf0895f1290e61821b70f048549.1625186503.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h |   28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c      |   10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static inline bool is_error_page(struct
 #define KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD        (1 | KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
 #define KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER     2
 #define KVM_REQ_UNHALT            3
+#define KVM_REQ_VM_BUGGED         (4 | KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
 #define KVM_REQUEST_ARCH_BASE     8
 
 #define KVM_ARCH_REQ_FLAGS(nr, flags) ({ \

@@ -482,6 +483,7 @@ struct kvm {
 	struct srcu_struct srcu;
 	struct srcu_struct irq_srcu;
 	pid_t userspace_pid;
+	bool vm_bugged;
 };
 
 #define kvm_err(fmt, ...) \

@@ -510,6 +512,31 @@ struct kvm {
 #define vcpu_err(vcpu, fmt, ...)					\
 	kvm_err("vcpu%i " fmt, (vcpu)->vcpu_id, ## __VA_ARGS__)
 
+bool kvm_make_all_cpus_request(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int req);
+static inline void kvm_vm_bugged(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm->vm_bugged = true;
+	kvm_make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_VM_BUGGED);
+}
+
+#define KVM_BUG(cond, kvm, fmt...)				\
+({								\
+	int __ret = (cond);					\
+								\
+	if (WARN_ONCE(__ret && !(kvm)->vm_bugged, fmt))		\
+		kvm_vm_bugged(kvm);				\
+	unlikely(__ret);					\
+})
+
+#define KVM_BUG_ON(cond, kvm)					\
+({								\
+	int __ret = (cond);					\
+								\
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__ret && !(kvm)->vm_bugged))		\
+		kvm_vm_bugged(kvm);				\
+	unlikely(__ret);					\
+})
+
 static inline struct kvm_io_bus *kvm_get_bus(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus idx)
 {
 	return srcu_dereference_check(kvm->buses[idx], &kvm->srcu,

@@ -770,7 +797,6 @@ void kvm_reload_remote_mmus(struct kvm *
 
 bool kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int req,
 				 unsigned long *vcpu_bitmap, cpumask_var_t tmp);
-bool kvm_make_all_cpus_request(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int req);
 
 long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 			unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg);

@@ -2820,7 +2820,7 @@ static long kvm_vcpu_ioctl(struct file *
 	struct kvm_fpu *fpu = NULL;
 	struct kvm_sregs *kvm_sregs = NULL;
 
-	if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm)
+	if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm || vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (unlikely(_IOC_TYPE(ioctl) != KVMIO))

@@ -3026,7 +3026,7 @@ static long kvm_vcpu_compat_ioctl(struct
 	void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
 	int r;
 
-	if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm)
+	if (vcpu->kvm->mm != current->mm || vcpu->kvm->vm_bugged)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	switch (ioctl) {

@@ -3081,7 +3081,7 @@ static long kvm_device_ioctl(struct file
 {
 	struct kvm_device *dev = filp->private_data;
 
-	if (dev->kvm->mm != current->mm)
+	if (dev->kvm->mm != current->mm || dev->kvm->vm_bugged)
 		return -EIO;
 
 	switch (ioctl) {

@@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *fi
 	void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
 	int r;
 
-	if (kvm->mm != current->mm)
+	if (kvm->mm != current->mm || kvm->vm_bugged)
 		return -EIO;
 	switch (ioctl) {
 	case KVM_CREATE_VCPU:

@@ -3422,7 +3422,7 @@ static long kvm_vm_compat_ioctl(struct f
 	struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
 	int r;
 
-	if (kvm->mm != current->mm)
+	if (kvm->mm != current->mm || kvm->vm_bugged)
 		return -EIO;
 	switch (ioctl) {
 	case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {

From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>

commit 7ec37d1cbe17d8189d9562178d8b29167fe1c31a upstream

When KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC{,2} is activated, KVM already checks for irqchip_in_kernel() so normally SynIC irqs should never be set. It is, however, possible for a misbehaving VMM to write to SYNIC/STIMER MSRs causing erroneous behavior.

The immediate issue being fixed is that kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic() (kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast()) crashes when called with 'irq.shorthand = APIC_DEST_SELF' and 'src == NULL'.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -341,6 +341,9 @@ static int synic_set_irq(struct kvm_vcpu
 	struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
 	int ret, vector;
 
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu), vcpu->kvm))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (sint >= ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint))
 		return -EINVAL;
 

From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>

commit 00b5f37189d24ac3ed46cb7f11742094778c46ce upstream

When kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast() is called with APIC_DEST_SELF shorthand, 'src' must not be NULL. Crash the VM with KVM_BUG_ON() instead of crashing the host.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -961,6 +961,10 @@ bool kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast(struc
 	*r = -1;
 
 	if (irq->shorthand == APIC_DEST_SELF) {
+		if (KVM_BUG_ON(!src, kvm)) {
+			*r = 0;
+			return true;
+		}
 		*r = kvm_apic_set_irq(src->vcpu, irq, dest_map);
 		return true;
 	}

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit c4ee118561a0f74442439b7b5b486db1ac1ddfeb upstream.

sk_forced_mem_schedule() has a bug similar to ones fixed in commit 7c80b038d23e ("net: fix sk_wmem_schedule() and sk_rmem_schedule() errors")

While this bug has little chance to trigger in old kernels, we need to fix it before the following patch.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3079,11 +3079,12 @@ void tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(struct so
  */
 void sk_forced_mem_schedule(struct sock *sk, int size)
 {
-	int amt;
+	int delta, amt;
 
-	if (size <= sk->sk_forward_alloc)
+	delta = size - sk->sk_forward_alloc;
+	if (delta <= 0)
 		return;
-	amt = sk_mem_pages(size);
+	amt = sk_mem_pages(delta);
 	sk->sk_forward_alloc += amt * SK_MEM_QUANTUM;
 	sk_memory_allocated_add(sk, amt);
 

From: Tony Battersby <[email protected]>

commit 3455607fd7be10b449f5135c00dc306b85dc0d21 upstream.

When a SCSI device is removed while in active use, currently sg will immediately return -ENODEV on any attempt to wait for active commands that were sent before the removal. This is problematic for commands that use SG_FLAG_DIRECT_IO since the data buffer may still be in use by the kernel when userspace frees or reuses it after getting ENODEV, leading to corrupted userspace memory (in the case of READ-type commands) or corrupted data being sent to the device (in the case of WRITE-type commands). This has been seen in practice when logging out of a iscsi_tcp session, where the iSCSI driver may still be processing commands after the device has been marked for removal.

Change the policy to allow userspace to wait for active sg commands even when the device is being removed. Return -ENODEV only when there are no more responses to read.

---
 drivers/scsi/sg.c |   57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static void sg_link_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp,
 static void sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp);
 static Sg_fd *sg_add_sfp(Sg_device * sdp);
 static void sg_remove_sfp(struct kref *);
-static Sg_request *sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id);
+static Sg_request *sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id, bool *busy);
 static Sg_request *sg_add_request(Sg_fd * sfp);
 static int sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp);
 static Sg_device *sg_get_dev(int dev);

@@ -417,6 +417,7 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *
 	Sg_fd *sfp;
 	Sg_request *srp;
 	int req_pack_id = -1;
+	bool busy;
 	sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
 	struct sg_header *old_hdr = NULL;
 	int retval = 0;

@@ -464,25 +465,19 @@ sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *
 		} else
 			req_pack_id = old_hdr->pack_id;
 	}
-	srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id);
+	srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id, &busy);
 	if (!srp) {		/* now wait on packet to arrive */
-		if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
-			retval = -ENODEV;
-			goto free_old_hdr;
-		}
 		if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
 			retval = -EAGAIN;
 			goto free_old_hdr;
 		}
 		retval = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
-			(atomic_read(&sdp->detaching) ||
-			(srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id))));
-		if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
-			retval = -ENODEV;
-			goto free_old_hdr;
-		}
-		if (retval) {
-			/* -ERESTARTSYS as signal hit process */
+			((srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id, &busy)) ||
+			(!busy && atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))));
+		if (!srp) {
+			/* signal or detaching */
+			if (!retval)
+				retval = -ENODEV;
 			goto free_old_hdr;
 		}
 	}

@@ -933,9 +928,7 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int
 		if (result < 0)
 			return result;
 		result = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
-			(srp_done(sfp, srp) || atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)));
-		if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
-			return -ENODEV;
+			srp_done(sfp, srp));
 		write_lock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
 		if (srp->done) {
 			srp->done = 2;

@@ -2079,19 +2072,28 @@ sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_reques
 }
 
 static Sg_request *
-sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id)
+sg_get_rq_mark(Sg_fd * sfp, int pack_id, bool *busy)
 {
 	Sg_request *resp;
 	unsigned long iflags;
 
+	*busy = false;
 	write_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
 	list_for_each_entry(resp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
-		/* look for requests that are ready + not SG_IO owned */
-		if ((1 == resp->done) && (!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
+		/* look for requests that are not SG_IO owned */
+		if ((!resp->sg_io_owned) &&
 		    ((-1 == pack_id) || (resp->header.pack_id == pack_id))) {
-			resp->done = 2;	/* guard against other readers */
-			write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
-			return resp;
+			switch (resp->done) {
+			case 0: /* request active */
+				*busy = true;
+				break;
+			case 1: /* request done; response ready to return */
+				resp->done = 2;	/* guard against other readers */
+				write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
+				return resp;
+			case 2: /* response already being returned */
+				break;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);

@@ -2145,6 +2147,15 @@ sg_remove_request(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_reques
 		res = 1;
 	}
 	write_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the device is detaching, wakeup any readers in case we just
+	 * removed the last response, which would leave nothing for them to
+	 * return other than -ENODEV.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(atomic_read(&sfp->parentdp->detaching)))
+		wake_up_interruptible_all(&sfp->read_wait);
+
 	return res;
 }
 

From: Jose Alonso <[email protected]>

commit 6fd2c17fb6e02a8c0ab51df1cfec82ce96b8e83d upstream.

This reverts commit 36a15e1cb134c0395261ba1940762703f778438c.

The usage of FLAG_SEND_ZLP causes problems to other firmware/hardware versions that have no issues.

The FLAG_SEND_ZLP is not safe to use in this context. See:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/1270599787.8900.8.camel@Linuxdev4-laptop/#118378
The original problem needs another way to solve.

---
 drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c |   16 ++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -1706,7 +1706,7 @@ static const struct driver_info ax88179_
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static const struct driver_info ax88178a
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ static const struct driver_info cypress_
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1745,7 +1745,7 @@ static const struct driver_info dlink_du
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1758,7 +1758,7 @@ static const struct driver_info sitecom_
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ static const struct driver_info samsung_
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1784,7 +1784,7 @@ static const struct driver_info lenovo_i
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset = ax88179_reset,
 	.stop = ax88179_stop,
-	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags = FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

@@ -1797,7 +1797,7 @@ static const struct driver_info belkin_i
 	.link_reset = ax88179_link_reset,
 	.reset	= ax88179_reset,
 	.stop	= ax88179_stop,
-	.flags	= FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX | FLAG_SEND_ZLP,
+	.flags	= FLAG_ETHER | FLAG_FRAMING_AX,
 	.rx_fixup = ax88179_rx_fixup,
 	.tx_fixup = ax88179_tx_fixup,
 };

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit 332f1795ca202489c665a75e62e18ff6284de077 upstream.

The patch d0be8347c623: "Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free caused by l2cap_chan_put" from Jul 21, 2022, leads to the following Smatch static checker warning:

net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1977 l2cap_global_chan_by_psm()
error: we previously assumed 'c' could be null (see line 1996)

---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c |   13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -1804,11 +1804,11 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_c
 						   bdaddr_t *dst,
 						   u8 link_type)
 {
-	struct l2cap_chan *c, *c1 = NULL;
+	struct l2cap_chan *c, *tmp, *c1 = NULL;
 
 	read_lock(&chan_list_lock);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(c, &chan_list, global_l) {
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(c, tmp, &chan_list, global_l) {
 		if (state && c->state != state)
 			continue;
 

@@ -1827,11 +1827,10 @@ static struct l2cap_chan *l2cap_global_c
 			dst_match = !bacmp(&c->dst, dst);
 			if (src_match && dst_match) {
 				c = l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero(c);
-				if (!c)
-					continue;
-
-				read_unlock(&chan_list_lock);
-				return c;
+				if (c) {
+					read_unlock(&chan_list_lock);
+					return c;
+				}
 			}
 
 			/* Closest match */

From: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>

commit aa7aeee169480e98cf41d83c01290a37e569be6d upstream.

Ensure that the fid's iounit field is set to zero when a new fid is created. Certain 9P operations, such as OPEN and CREATE, allow the server to reply with an iounit size which the client code assigns to the p9_fid struct shortly after the fid is created by p9_fid_create(). On the other hand, an XATTRWALK operation doesn't allow for the server to specify an iounit value. The iounit field of the newly allocated p9_fid struct remained uninitialized in that case. Depending on allocation patterns, the iounit value could have been something reasonable that was carried over from previously freed fids or, in the worst case, could have been arbitrary values from non-fid related usages of the memory location.

The bug was detected in the Windows Subsystem for Linux 2 (WSL2) kernel after the uninitialized iounit field resulted in the typical sequence of two getxattr(2) syscalls, one to get the size of an xattr and another after allocating a sufficiently sized buffer to fit the xattr value, to hit an unexpected ERANGE error in the second call to getxattr(2). An uninitialized iounit field would sometimes force rsize to be smaller than the xattr value size in p9_client_read_once() and the 9P server in WSL refused to chunk up the READ on the attr_fid and, instead, returned ERANGE to the client. The virtfs server in QEMU seems happy to chunk up the READ and this problem goes undetected there.

[tyhicks: Adjusted context due to:
- Lack of fid refcounting introduced in v5.11 commit 6636b6dcc3db ("9p:
add refcount to p9_fid struct")
- Difference in how buffer sizes are specified v5.16 commit 6e195b0f7c8e ("9p: fix a bunch of checkpatch warnings")]

---
 net/9p/client.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -908,16 +908,13 @@ static struct p9_fid *p9_fid_create(stru
 	struct p9_fid *fid;
 
 	p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_FID, "clnt %p\n", clnt);
-	fid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct p9_fid), GFP_KERNEL);
+	fid = kzalloc(sizeof(struct p9_fid), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!fid)
 		return NULL;
 
-	memset(&fid->qid, 0, sizeof(struct p9_qid));
 	fid->mode = -1;
 	fid->uid = current_fsuid();
 	fid->clnt = clnt;
-	fid->rdir = NULL;
-	fid->fid = 0;
 
 	idr_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
 	spin_lock_irq(&clnt->lock);

From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>

commit 02799571714dc5dd6948824b9d080b44a295f695 upstream.

Follows up on:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

handle of 0 implies from/to of universe realm which is not very sensible.

Lets see what this patch will do:
$sudo tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1:0 prio

//lets manufacture a way to insert handle of 0
$sudo tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 \
route to 0 from 0 classid 1:10 action ok

//gets rejected...
Error: handle of 0 is not valid.
We have an error talking to the kernel, -1

//lets create a legit entry..
sudo tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 route from 10 \
classid 1:10 action ok

//what did the kernel insert?
$sudo tc filter ls dev $DEV parent 1:0
filter protocol ip pref 100 route chain 0
filter protocol ip pref 100 route chain 0 fh 0x000a8000 flowid 1:10 from 10
action order 1: gact action pass
random type none pass val 0
index 1 ref 1 bind 1

//Lets try to replace that legit entry with a handle of 0

$ sudo tc filter replace dev $DEV parent 1:0 protocol ip prio 100 \
handle 0x000a8000 route to 0 from 0 classid 1:10 action drop

Error: Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid.
We have an error talking to the kernel, -1

And last, lets run Cascardo's POC:

$ ./poc
0
0
-22
-22
-22

---
 net/sched/cls_route.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

@@ -427,6 +427,11 @@ static int route4_set_parms(struct net *
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!nhandle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replacing with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	h1 = to_hash(nhandle);
 	b = rtnl_dereference(head->table[h1]);
 	if (!b) {

@@ -480,6 +485,11 @@ static int route4_change(struct net *net
 	int err;
 	bool new = true;
 
+	if (!handle) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Creating with handle of 0 is invalid");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (opt == NULL)
 		return handle ? -EINVAL : 0;
 

From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>

commit 689640efc0a2c4e07e6f88affe6d42cd40cc3f85 upstream.

When scpi probe fails, at any point, we need to ensure that the scpi_info is not set and will remain NULL until the probe succeeds. If it is not taken care, then it could result use-after-free as the value is exported via get_scpi_ops() and could refer to a memory allocated via devm_kzalloc() but freed when the probe fails.

---
 drivers/firmware/arm_scpi.c |   61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

@@ -826,7 +826,7 @@ static int scpi_init_versions(struct scp
 		info->firmware_version = le32_to_cpu(caps.platform_version);
 	}
 	/* Ignore error if not implemented */
-	if (scpi_info->is_legacy && ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+	if (info->is_legacy && ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		return 0;
 
 	return ret;

@@ -916,13 +916,14 @@ static int scpi_probe(struct platform_de
 	struct resource res;
 	struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
 	struct device_node *np = dev->of_node;
+	struct scpi_drvinfo *scpi_drvinfo;
 
-	scpi_info = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*scpi_info), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!scpi_info)
+	scpi_drvinfo = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*scpi_drvinfo), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scpi_drvinfo)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	if (of_match_device(legacy_scpi_of_match, &pdev->dev))
-		scpi_info->is_legacy = true;
+		scpi_drvinfo->is_legacy = true;
 
 	count = of_count_phandle_with_args(np, "mboxes", "#mbox-cells");
 	if (count < 0) {

@@ -930,19 +931,19 @@ static int scpi_probe(struct platform_de
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
-	scpi_info->channels = devm_kcalloc(dev, count, sizeof(struct scpi_chan),
-					   GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!scpi_info->channels)
+	scpi_drvinfo->channels =
+		devm_kcalloc(dev, count, sizeof(struct scpi_chan), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!scpi_drvinfo->channels)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = devm_add_action(dev, scpi_free_channels, scpi_info);
+	ret = devm_add_action(dev, scpi_free_channels, scpi_drvinfo);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	for (; scpi_info->num_chans < count; scpi_info->num_chans++) {
+	for (; scpi_drvinfo->num_chans < count; scpi_drvinfo->num_chans++) {
 		resource_size_t size;
-		int idx = scpi_info->num_chans;
-		struct scpi_chan *pchan = scpi_info->channels + idx;
+		int idx = scpi_drvinfo->num_chans;
+		struct scpi_chan *pchan = scpi_drvinfo->channels + idx;
 		struct mbox_client *cl = &pchan->cl;
 		struct device_node *shmem = of_parse_phandle(np, "shmem", idx);
 

@@ -986,49 +987,57 @@ static int scpi_probe(struct platform_de
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	scpi_info->commands = scpi_std_commands;
+	scpi_drvinfo->commands = scpi_std_commands;
 
-	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, scpi_info);
+	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, scpi_drvinfo);
 
-	if (scpi_info->is_legacy) {
+	if (scpi_drvinfo->is_legacy) {
 		/* Replace with legacy variants */
 		scpi_ops.clk_set_val = legacy_scpi_clk_set_val;
-		scpi_info->commands = scpi_legacy_commands;
+		scpi_drvinfo->commands = scpi_legacy_commands;
 
 		/* Fill priority bitmap */
 		for (idx = 0; idx < ARRAY_SIZE(legacy_hpriority_cmds); idx++)
 			set_bit(legacy_hpriority_cmds[idx],
-				scpi_info->cmd_priority);
+				scpi_drvinfo->cmd_priority);
 	}
 
-	ret = scpi_init_versions(scpi_info);
+	scpi_info = scpi_drvinfo;
+
+	ret = scpi_init_versions(scpi_drvinfo);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "incorrect or no SCP firmware found\n");
+		scpi_info = NULL;
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (scpi_info->is_legacy && !scpi_info->protocol_version &&
-	    !scpi_info->firmware_version)
+	if (scpi_drvinfo->is_legacy && !scpi_drvinfo->protocol_version &&
+	    !scpi_drvinfo->firmware_version)
 		dev_info(dev, "SCP Protocol legacy pre-1.0 firmware\n");
 	else
 		dev_info(dev, "SCP Protocol %lu.%lu Firmware %lu.%lu.%lu version\n",
 			 FIELD_GET(PROTO_REV_MAJOR_MASK,
-				   scpi_info->protocol_version),
+				   scpi_drvinfo->protocol_version),
 			 FIELD_GET(PROTO_REV_MINOR_MASK,
-				   scpi_info->protocol_version),
+				   scpi_drvinfo->protocol_version),
 			 FIELD_GET(FW_REV_MAJOR_MASK,
-				   scpi_info->firmware_version),
+				   scpi_drvinfo->firmware_version),
 			 FIELD_GET(FW_REV_MINOR_MASK,
-				   scpi_info->firmware_version),
+				   scpi_drvinfo->firmware_version),
 			 FIELD_GET(FW_REV_PATCH_MASK,
-				   scpi_info->firmware_version));
-	scpi_info->scpi_ops = &scpi_ops;
+				   scpi_drvinfo->firmware_version));
 
 	ret = devm_device_add_groups(dev, versions_groups);
 	if (ret)
 		dev_err(dev, "unable to create sysfs version group\n");
 
-	return devm_of_platform_populate(dev);
+	scpi_drvinfo->scpi_ops = &scpi_ops;
+
+	ret = devm_of_platform_populate(dev);
+	if (ret)
+		scpi_info = NULL;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id scpi_of_match[] = {

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit 97026b5a5ac26541b3d294146f5c941491a9e609 upstream.

To reduce the complexity of flag_array, and allow the removal of default 0 value of non existing flags, lets have one flag_array table for each platform family with only the really existing flags.

---
 arch/powerpc/mm/Makefile                        |    7 +
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-8xx.c      |   82 ++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-book3s64.c |  115 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-generic.c  |   82 ++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.c          |  155 ------------------------
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.h          |   19 ++
 6 files changed, 307 insertions(+), 153 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-8xx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-book3s64.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-generic.c
 create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables.h

@@ -43,5 +43,12 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HIGHMEM)		+= highmem.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_COPRO_BASE)	+= copro_fault.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU)	+= mmu_context_iommu.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_PTDUMP)	+= dump_linuxpagetables.o
+ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PTDUMP
+obj-$(CONFIG_4xx)		+= dump_linuxpagetables-generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_8xx)		+= dump_linuxpagetables-8xx.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_MMU)	+= dump_linuxpagetables-generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32)	+= dump_linuxpagetables-generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64)	+= dump_linuxpagetables-book3s64.o
+endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_HTDUMP)	+= dump_hashpagetable.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEM_KEYS)	+= pkeys.o

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct flag_info {
+	u64		mask;
+	u64		val;
+	const char	*set;
+	const char	*clear;
+	bool		is_val;
+	int		shift;
+};
+
+struct pgtable_level {
+	const struct flag_info *flag;
+	size_t num;
+	u64 mask;
+};
+
+extern struct pgtable_level pg_level[5];

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

commit dd8de84b57b02ba9c1fe530a6d916c0853f136bd upstream.

On FSL_BOOK3E, _PAGE_RW is defined with two bits, one for user and one for supervisor. As soon as one of the two bits is set, the page has to be display as RW. But the way it is implemented today requires both bits to be set in order to display it as RW.

Instead of display RW when _PAGE_RW bits are set and R otherwise, reverse the logic and display R when _PAGE_RW bits are all 0 and RW otherwise.

This change has no impact on other platforms as _PAGE_RW is a single bit on all of them.

---
 arch/powerpc/mm/dump_linuxpagetables-generic.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ static const struct flag_info flag_array
 		.clear	= "    ",
 	}, {
 		.mask	= _PAGE_RW,
-		.val	= _PAGE_RW,
-		.set	= "rw",
-		.clear	= "r ",
+		.val	= 0,
+		.set	= "r ",
+		.clear	= "rw",
 	}, {
 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_32
 		.mask	= _PAGE_EXEC,

From: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]>

commit 9be080edcca330be4af06b19916c35227891e8bc upstream.

When using callback there was a flow of

	ret = -EINVAL
	if (callback) {
		offset = callback();
		goto out;
	}
	...
	offset = some other value in case of no callback;
	ret = offset;
out:
	return ret;

which causes the snd_info_entry_llseek() to return -EINVAL when there is callback handler. Fix this by setting "ret" directly to callback return value before jumping to "out".

---
 sound/core/info.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -127,9 +127,9 @@ static loff_t snd_info_entry_llseek(stru
 	entry = data->entry;
 	mutex_lock(&entry->access);
 	if (entry->c.ops->llseek) {
-		offset = entry->c.ops->llseek(entry,
-					      data->file_private_data,
-					      file, offset, orig);
+		ret = entry->c.ops->llseek(entry,
+					   data->file_private_data,
+					   file, offset, orig);
 		goto out;
 	}
 

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 9f414eb409daf4f778f011cf8266d36896bb930b upstream.

The functions clear_bit and set_bit do not imply a memory barrier, thus it may be possible that the waitqueue_active function (which does not take any locks) is moved before clear_bit and it could miss a wakeup event.

Fix this bug by adding a memory barrier after clear_bit.

---
 net/rds/ib_recv.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static int acquire_refill(struct rds_con
 static void release_refill(struct rds_connection *conn)
 {
 	clear_bit(RDS_RECV_REFILL, &conn->c_flags);
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
 
 	/* We don't use wait_on_bit()/wake_up_bit() because our waking is in a
 	 * hot path and finding waiters is very rare.  We don't want to walk

From: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>

commit d3122bf9aa4c974f5e2c0112f799757b3a2779da upstream.

Add the missing command name for ATA_CMD_NCQ_NON_DATA to ata_get_cmd_name().

---
 drivers/ata/libata-eh.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2350,6 +2350,7 @@ const char *ata_get_cmd_descript(u8 comm
 		{ ATA_CMD_WRITE_QUEUED_FUA_EXT, "WRITE DMA QUEUED FUA EXT" },
 		{ ATA_CMD_FPDMA_READ,		"READ FPDMA QUEUED" },
 		{ ATA_CMD_FPDMA_WRITE,		"WRITE FPDMA QUEUED" },
+		{ ATA_CMD_NCQ_NON_DATA,		"NCQ NON-DATA" },
 		{ ATA_CMD_FPDMA_SEND,		"SEND FPDMA QUEUED" },
 		{ ATA_CMD_FPDMA_RECV,		"RECEIVE FPDMA QUEUED" },
 		{ ATA_CMD_PIO_READ,		"READ SECTOR(S)" },

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

commit b886f54c300d31c109d2e4336b22922b64e7ba7d upstream.

The commit in Fixes: has introduced an new error handling without branching to the existing error handling path.

Update it now and release some resources if pxamci_init_ocr() fails.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int pxamci_probe(struct platform_
 
 	ret = pxamci_init_ocr(host);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 
 	mmc->caps = 0;
 	host->cmdat = 0;

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

commit 98d7c5e5792b8ce3e1352196dac7f404bb1b46ec upstream.

The commit in Fixes: has moved some code around without updating gotos to the error handling path.

Update it now and release some resources if pxamci_of_init() fails.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static int pxamci_probe(struct platform_
 
 	ret = pxamci_of_init(pdev, mmc);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 
 	host = mmc_priv(mmc);
 	host->mmc = mmc;

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 7a6b75b79902e47f46328b57733f2604774fa2d9 upstream.

During log replay, when processing inode references, if we get an error when looking up for an extended reference at __add_inode_ref(), we ignore it and proceed, returning success (0) if no other error happens after the lookup. This is obviously wrong because in case an extended reference exists and it encodes some name not in the log, we need to unlink it, otherwise the filesystem state will not match the state it had after the last fsync.

So just make __add_inode_ref() return an error it gets from the extended reference lookup.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1081,7 +1081,9 @@ again:
 	extref = btrfs_lookup_inode_extref(NULL, root, path, name, namelen,
 					   inode_objectid, parent_objectid, 0,
 					   0);
-	if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(extref)) {
+	if (IS_ERR(extref)) {
+		return PTR_ERR(extref);
+	} else if (extref) {
 		u32 item_size;
 		u32 cur_offset = 0;
 		unsigned long base;

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

commit b2380577d4fe1c0ef3fa50417f1e441c016e4cbe upstream.

Make filtering consistent with histograms. As "cpu" can be a field of an event, allow for "common_cpu" to keep it from being confused with the "cpu" field of the event.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_events.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static int trace_define_generic_fields(v
 
 	__generic_field(int, CPU, FILTER_CPU);
 	__generic_field(int, cpu, FILTER_CPU);
+	__generic_field(int, common_cpu, FILTER_CPU);
 	__generic_field(char *, COMM, FILTER_COMM);
 	__generic_field(char *, comm, FILTER_COMM);
 

From: Marc Kleine-Budde <[email protected]>

commit a4cb6e62ea4d36e53fb3c0f18ea4503d7b76674f upstream.

clang emits a -Wunaligned-access warning on struct __packed ems_cpc_msg.

The reason is that the anonymous union msg (not declared as packed) is being packed right after some non naturally aligned variables (3*8 bits + 2*32) inside a packed struct:

| struct __packed ems_cpc_msg {
| 	u8 type;	/* type of message */
| 	u8 length;	/* length of data within union 'msg' */
| 	u8 msgid;	/* confirmation handle */
| 	__le32 ts_sec;	/* timestamp in seconds */
| 	__le32 ts_nsec;	/* timestamp in nano seconds */
|	/* ^ not naturally aligned */
|
| 	union {
| 	/* ^ not declared as packed */
| 		u8 generic[64];
| 		struct cpc_can_msg can_msg;
| 		struct cpc_can_params can_params;
| 		struct cpc_confirm confirmation;
| 		struct cpc_overrun overrun;
| 		struct cpc_can_error error;
| 		struct cpc_can_err_counter err_counter;
| 		u8 can_state;
| 	} msg;
| };

Starting from LLVM 14, having an unpacked struct nested in a packed struct triggers a warning. c.f. [1].

Fix the warning by marking the anonymous union as packed.

[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/55520

---
 drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ struct __packed ems_cpc_msg {
 	__le32 ts_sec;	/* timestamp in seconds */
 	__le32 ts_nsec;	/* timestamp in nano seconds */
 
-	union {
+	union __packed {
 		u8 generic[64];
 		struct cpc_can_msg can_msg;
 		struct cpc_can_params can_params;

From: John Johansen <[email protected]>

commit 68ff8540cc9e4ab557065b3f635c1ff4c96e1f1c upstream.

Global quieting of denied AppArmor generated file events is not handled correctly. Unfortunately the is checking if quieting of all audit events is set instead of just denied events.

---
 security/apparmor/audit.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile
 	}
 	if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET ||
 	    (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED &&
-	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET))
+	     AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED))
 		return aad(sa)->error;
 
 	if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED)

From: John Johansen <[email protected]>

commit 511f7b5b835726e844a5fc7444c18e4b8672edfd upstream.

AppArmor is prefixing secids that are converted to secctx with the = to indicate the secctx should only be parsed from an absolute root POV. This allows catching errors where secctx are reparsed back into internal labels.

Unfortunately because audit is using secid to secctx conversion this means that subject and object labels can result in a very unfortunate == that can break audit parsing.

eg. the subj==unconfined term in the below audit message

type=USER_LOGIN msg=audit(1639443365.233:160): pid=1633 uid=0 auid=1000 ses=3 subj==unconfined msg='op=login id=1000 exe="/usr/sbin/sshd" hostname=192.168.122.1 addr=192.168.122.1 terminal=/dev/pts/1 res=success'

Fix this by switch the prepending of = to a _. This still works as a special character to flag this case without breaking audit. Also move this check behind debug as it should not be needed during normal operqation.

---
 security/apparmor/include/lib.h |    5 +++++
 security/apparmor/label.c       |    7 ++++---
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
  */
 
 #define DEBUG_ON (aa_g_debug)
+/*
+ * split individual debug cases out in preparation for finer grained
+ * debug controls in the future.
+ */
+#define AA_DEBUG_LABEL DEBUG_ON
 #define dbg_printk(__fmt, __args...) pr_debug(__fmt, ##__args)
 #define AA_DEBUG(fmt, args...)						\
 	do {								\

@@ -1641,9 +1641,9 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t
 	AA_BUG(!str && size != 0);
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 
-	if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) {
+	if (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT)) {
 		ns = root_ns;
-		len = snprintf(str, size, "=");
+		len = snprintf(str, size, "_");
 		update_for_len(total, len, size, str);
 	} else if (!ns) {
 		ns = labels_ns(label);

@@ -1905,7 +1905,8 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_strn_parse(str
 	AA_BUG(!str);
 
 	str = skipn_spaces(str, n);
-	if (str == NULL || (*str == '=' && base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
+	if (str == NULL || (AA_DEBUG_LABEL && *str == '_' &&
+			    base != &root_ns->unconfined->label))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	len = label_count_strn_entries(str, end - str);

From: John Johansen <[email protected]>

commit ec240b5905bbb09a03dccffee03062cf39e38dc2 upstream.

When the mount check fails due to a permission check failure instead of explicitly at one of the subcomponent checks, AppArmor is reporting a failure in the flags match. However this is not true and AppArmor can not attribute the error at this point to any particular component, and should only indicate the mount failed due to missing permissions.

---
 security/apparmor/mount.c |    7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ static const char * const mnt_info_table
 	"failed srcname match",
 	"failed type match",
 	"failed flags match",
-	"failed data match"
+	"failed data match",
+	"failed perms check"
 };
 
 /*

@@ -287,8 +288,8 @@ static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *d
 			return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* failed at end of flags match */
-	return 4;
+	/* failed at perms check, don't confuse with flags match */
+	return 6;
 }
 
 

From: Tom Rix <[email protected]>

commit 3e2a3a0830a2090e766d0d887d52c67de2a6f323 upstream.

Clang static analysis reports this issue label.c:1802:3: warning: 2nd function call argument
is an uninitialized value
pr_info("%s", str);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

str is set from a successful call to aa_label_asxprint(&str, ...) On failure a negative value is returned, not a -1. So change the check.

---
 security/apparmor/label.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer
 	if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) ||
 	    display_mode(ns, label, flags)) {
 		len  = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}

@@ -1782,7 +1782,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file
 		int len;
 
 		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}

@@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns,
 		int len;
 
 		len = aa_label_asxprint(&str, ns, label, flags, gfp);
-		if (len == -1) {
+		if (len < 0) {
 			AA_DEBUG("label print error");
 			return;
 		}

From: John Johansen <[email protected]>

commit 2504db207146543736e877241f3b3de005cbe056 upstream.

When finding the profile via patterned attachments, the longest left match is being set to the static compile time value and not using the runtime computed value.

Fix this by setting the candidate value to the greater of the precomputed value or runtime computed value.

---
 security/apparmor/domain.c         |    2 +-
 security/apparmor/include/policy.h |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ restart:
 				 * xattrs, or a longer match
 				 */
 				candidate = profile;
-				candidate_len = profile->xmatch_len;
+				candidate_len = max(count, profile->xmatch_len);
 				candidate_xattrs = ret;
 				conflict = false;
 			}

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	const char *attach;
 	struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
-	int xmatch_len;
+	unsigned int xmatch_len;
 	enum audit_mode audit;
 	long mode;
 	u32 path_flags;

From: Xin Xiong <[email protected]>

commit 11c3627ec6b56c1525013f336f41b79a983b4d46 upstream.

The aa_pivotroot() function has a reference counting bug in a specific path. When aa_replace_current_label() returns on success, the function forgets to decrement the reference count of “target”, which is increased earlier by build_pivotroot(), causing a reference leak.

Fix it by decreasing the refcount of “target” in that path.

---
 security/apparmor/mount.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -686,6 +686,7 @@ int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label,
 			aa_put_label(target);
 			goto out;
 		}
+		aa_put_label(target);
 	} else
 		/* already audited error */
 		error = PTR_ERR(target);

From: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>

commit 417ea9fe972d2654a268ad66e89c8fcae67017c3 upstream.

When copy_from_user failed, the memory is freed by kvfree. however the management struct and data blob are allocated independently, so only kvfree(data) cause a memleak issue here. Use aa_put_loaddata(data) to fix this issue.

---
 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_wri
 
 	data->size = copy_size;
 	if (copy_from_user(data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) {
-		kvfree(data);
+		aa_put_loaddata(data);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
 	}
 

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit 51fd2eb52c0ca8275a906eed81878ef50ae94eb0 upstream.

nfs_idmap_instantiate() will cause the process that is waiting in request_key_with_auxdata() to wake up and exit. If there is a second process waiting for the idmap->idmap_mutex, then it may wake up and start a new call to request_key_with_auxdata(). If the call to idmap_pipe_downcall() from the first process has not yet finished calling nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(), then we may end up triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE() in nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall().

The fix is to ensure that we clear idmap->idmap_upcall_data before calling nfs_idmap_instantiate().

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

@@ -547,22 +547,20 @@ nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall(struct idm
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void
-nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(struct idmap *idmap, int ret)
+static void nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall(struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data,
+					   int ret)
 {
-	struct key *authkey = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->authkey;
-
-	kfree(idmap->idmap_upcall_data);
-	idmap->idmap_upcall_data = NULL;
-	complete_request_key(authkey, ret);
-	key_put(authkey);
+	complete_request_key(data->authkey, ret);
+	key_put(data->authkey);
+	kfree(data);
 }
 
-static void
-nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(struct idmap *idmap, int ret)
+static void nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(struct idmap *idmap,
+					struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data,
+					int ret)
 {
-	if (idmap->idmap_upcall_data != NULL)
-		nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(idmap, ret);
+	if (cmpxchg(&idmap->idmap_upcall_data, data, NULL) == data)
+		nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall(data, ret);
 }
 
 static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key *authkey, void *aux)

@@ -599,7 +597,7 @@ static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struc
 
 	ret = rpc_queue_upcall(idmap->idmap_pipe, msg);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, ret);
+		nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, data, ret);
 
 	return ret;
 out2:

@@ -655,6 +653,7 @@ idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, c
 	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	struct rpc_inode *rpci = RPC_I(file_inode(filp));
 	struct idmap *idmap = (struct idmap *)rpci->private;
+	struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data;
 	struct key *authkey;
 	struct idmap_msg im;
 	size_t namelen_in;

@@ -664,10 +663,11 @@ idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, c
 	 * will have been woken up and someone else may now have used
 	 * idmap_key_cons - so after this point we may no longer touch it.
 	 */
-	if (idmap->idmap_upcall_data == NULL)
+	data = xchg(&idmap->idmap_upcall_data, NULL);
+	if (data == NULL)
 		goto out_noupcall;
 
-	authkey = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->authkey;
+	authkey = data->authkey;
 	rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
 
 	if (mlen != sizeof(im)) {

@@ -689,18 +689,17 @@ idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, c
 	if (namelen_in == 0 || namelen_in == IDMAP_NAMESZ) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
-}
+	}
 
-	ret = nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message(&im,
-			&idmap->idmap_upcall_data->idmap_msg,
-			rka->target_key, authkey);
+	ret = nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message(&im, &data->idmap_msg,
+						rka->target_key, authkey);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
 		key_set_timeout(rka->target_key, nfs_idmap_cache_timeout);
 		ret = mlen;
 	}
 
 out:
-	nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(idmap, ret);
+	nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall(data, ret);
 out_noupcall:
 	return ret;
 }

@@ -714,7 +713,7 @@ idmap_pipe_destroy_msg(struct rpc_pipe_m
 	struct idmap *idmap = data->idmap;
 
 	if (msg->errno)
-		nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, msg->errno);
+		nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, data, msg->errno);
 }
 
 static void

@@ -722,8 +721,11 @@ idmap_release_pipe(struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct rpc_inode *rpci = RPC_I(inode);
 	struct idmap *idmap = (struct idmap *)rpci->private;
+	struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data;
 
-	nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, -EPIPE);
+	data = xchg(&idmap->idmap_upcall_data, NULL);
+	if (data)
+		nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall(data, -EPIPE);
 }
 
 int nfs_map_name_to_uid(const struct nfs_server *server, const char *name, size_t namelen, kuid_t *uid)

From: Zhang Xianwei <[email protected]>

commit e35a5e782f67ed76a65ad0f23a484444a95f000f upstream.

A client should be able to handle getting an EACCES error while doing a mount operation to reclaim state due to NFS4CLNT_RECLAIM_REBOOT being set. If the server returns RPC_AUTH_BADCRED because authentication failed when we execute "exportfs -au", then RECLAIM_COMPLETE will go a wrong way. After mount succeeds, all OPEN call will fail due to an NFS4ERR_GRACE error being returned. This patch is to fix it by resending a RPC request.

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -8701,6 +8701,9 @@ static int nfs41_reclaim_complete_handle
 		rpc_delay(task, NFS4_POLL_RETRY_MAX);
 		/* fall through */
 	case -NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP:
+	case -EACCES:
+		dprintk("%s: failed to reclaim complete error %d for server %s, retrying\n",
+			__func__, task->tk_status, clp->cl_hostname);
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	case -NFS4ERR_BADSESSION:
 	case -NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION:

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit 2135e5d56278ffdb1c2e6d325dc6b87f669b9dac upstream.

If someone cancels the open RPC call, then we must not try to free either the open slot or the layoutget operation arguments, since they are likely still in use by the hung RPC call.

---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -2920,12 +2920,13 @@ static int _nfs4_open_and_get_state(stru
 	}
 
 out:
-	if (opendata->lgp) {
-		nfs4_lgopen_release(opendata->lgp);
-		opendata->lgp = NULL;
-	}
-	if (!opendata->cancelled)
+	if (!opendata->cancelled) {
+		if (opendata->lgp) {
+			nfs4_lgopen_release(opendata->lgp);
+			opendata->lgp = NULL;
+		}
 		nfs4_sequence_free_slot(&opendata->o_res.seq_res);
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 

From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>

commit 6622e3a73112fc336c1c2c582428fb5ef18e456a upstream.

When we're reusing the backchannel requests instead of freeing them, then we should reinitialise any values of the send/receive xdr_bufs so that they reflect the available space.

---
 net/sunrpc/backchannel_rqst.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

@@ -69,6 +69,17 @@ static void xprt_free_allocation(struct
 	kfree(req);
 }
 
+static void xprt_bc_reinit_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf)
+{
+	buf->head[0].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+	buf->tail[0].iov_len = 0;
+	buf->pages = NULL;
+	buf->page_len = 0;
+	buf->flags = 0;
+	buf->len = 0;
+	buf->buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
 static int xprt_alloc_xdr_buf(struct xdr_buf *buf, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
 	struct page *page;

@@ -291,6 +302,9 @@ void xprt_free_bc_rqst(struct rpc_rqst *
 	 */
 	spin_lock_bh(&xprt->bc_pa_lock);
 	if (xprt_need_to_requeue(xprt)) {
+		xprt_bc_reinit_xdr_buf(&req->rq_snd_buf);
+		xprt_bc_reinit_xdr_buf(&req->rq_rcv_buf);
+		req->rq_rcv_buf.len = PAGE_SIZE;
 		list_add_tail(&req->rq_bc_pa_list, &xprt->bc_pa_list);
 		xprt->bc_alloc_count++;
 		req = NULL;

From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>

commit 4b32e054335ea0ce50967f63a7bfd4db058b14b9 upstream.

of_parse_phandle() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak."

---
 drivers/pinctrl/nomadik/pinctrl-nomadik.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1455,8 +1455,10 @@ static int nmk_pinctrl_dt_subnode_to_map
 
 	has_config = nmk_pinctrl_dt_get_config(np, &configs);
 	np_config = of_parse_phandle(np, "ste,config", 0);
-	if (np_config)
+	if (np_config) {
 		has_config |= nmk_pinctrl_dt_get_config(np_config, &configs);
+		of_node_put(np_config);
+	}
 	if (has_config) {
 		const char *gpio_name;
 		const char *pin;

From: Nikita Travkin <[email protected]>

commit 44339391c666e46cba522d19c65a6ad1071c68b7 upstream.

GPIO 31, 32 can be muxed to GCC_CAMSS_GP(1,2)_CLK respectively but the function was never assigned to the pingroup (even though the function exists already).

Add this mode to the related pins.

---
 drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm8916.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -852,8 +852,8 @@ static const struct msm_pingroup msm8916
 	PINGROUP(28, pwr_modem_enabled_a, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b, NA, atest_combodac),
 	PINGROUP(29, cci_i2c, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b, NA, atest_combodac),
 	PINGROUP(30, cci_i2c, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b),
-	PINGROUP(31, cci_timer0, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA),
-	PINGROUP(32, cci_timer1, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA),
+	PINGROUP(31, cci_timer0, flash_strobe, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA),
+	PINGROUP(32, cci_timer1, flash_strobe, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA),
 	PINGROUP(33, cci_async, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b),
 	PINGROUP(34, pwr_nav_enabled_a, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b),
 	PINGROUP(35, pwr_crypto_enabled_a, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, NA, qdss_tracedata_b),

From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>

commit 85140ef275f577f64e8a2c5789447222dfc14fc4 upstream.

The value acpi_add_nondev_subnodes() returns is bool so change the return type of the function to match that.

---
 drivers/acpi/property.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@ static bool acpi_nondev_subnode_ok(acpi_
 	return acpi_nondev_subnode_data_ok(handle, link, list, parent);
 }
 
-static int acpi_add_nondev_subnodes(acpi_handle scope,
-				    const union acpi_object *links,
-				    struct list_head *list,
-				    struct fwnode_handle *parent)
+static bool acpi_add_nondev_subnodes(acpi_handle scope,
+				     const union acpi_object *links,
+				     struct list_head *list,
+				     struct fwnode_handle *parent)
 {
 	bool ret = false;
 	int i;

From: Matthias May <[email protected]>

commit ca2bb69514a8bc7f83914122f0d596371352416c upstream.

According to Guillaume Nault RT_TOS should never be used for IPv6.

Quote:
RT_TOS() is an old macro used to interprete IPv4 TOS as described in the obsolete RFC 1349. It's conceptually wrong to use it even in IPv4 code, although, given the current state of the code, most of the existing calls have no consequence.

But using RT_TOS() in IPv6 code is always a bug: IPv6 never had a "TOS" field to be interpreted the RFC 1349 way. There's no historical compatibility to worry about.

---
 drivers/net/geneve.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -799,8 +799,7 @@ static struct dst_entry *geneve_get_v6_d
 		use_cache = false;
 	}
 
-	fl6->flowlabel = ip6_make_flowinfo(RT_TOS(prio),
-					   info->key.label);
+	fl6->flowlabel = ip6_make_flowinfo(prio, info->key.label);
 	dst_cache = (struct dst_cache *)&info->dst_cache;
 	if (use_cache) {
 		dst = dst_cache_get_ip6(dst_cache, &fl6->saddr);

From: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>

commit 7e97cfed9929eaabc41829c395eb0d1350fccb9d upstream.

An O_NONBLOCK vsock_connect() request may try to reschedule @connect_work. Imagine the following sequence of vsock_connect() requests:

1. The 1st, non-blocking request schedules @connect_work, which will

     expire after 200 jiffies.  Socket state is now SS_CONNECTING;

2. Later, the 2nd, blocking request gets interrupted by a signal after a few jiffies while waiting for the connection to be established. Socket state is back to SS_UNCONNECTED, but @connect_work is still pending, and will expire after 100 jiffies.

3. Now, the 3rd, non-blocking request tries to schedule @connect_work again. Since @connect_work is already scheduled, schedule_delayed_work() silently returns. sock_hold() is called twice, but sock_put() will only be called once in vsock_connect_timeout(), causing a memory leak reported by syzbot:

  BUG: memory leak
  unreferenced object 0xffff88810ea56a40 (size 1232):
    comm "syz-executor756", pid 3604, jiffies 4294947681 (age 12.350s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
      28 00 07 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  (..@............
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff837c830e>] sk_prot_alloc+0x3e/0x1b0 net/core/sock.c:1930
      [<ffffffff837cbe22>] sk_alloc+0x32/0x2e0 net/core/sock.c:1989
      [<ffffffff842ccf68>] __vsock_create.constprop.0+0x38/0x320 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c:734
      [<ffffffff842ce8f1>] vsock_create+0xc1/0x2d0 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c:2203
      [<ffffffff837c0cbb>] __sock_create+0x1ab/0x2b0 net/socket.c:1468
      [<ffffffff837c3acf>] sock_create net/socket.c:1519 [inline]
      [<ffffffff837c3acf>] __sys_socket+0x6f/0x140 net/socket.c:1561
      [<ffffffff837c3bba>] __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1570 [inline]
      [<ffffffff837c3bba>] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1568 [inline]
      [<ffffffff837c3bba>] __x64_sys_socket+0x1a/0x20 net/socket.c:1568
      [<ffffffff84512815>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
      [<ffffffff84512815>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
      [<ffffffff84600068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  <...>

Use mod_delayed_work() instead: if @connect_work is already scheduled, reschedule it, and undo sock_hold() to keep the reference count balanced.

---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1215,7 +1215,14 @@ static int vsock_stream_connect(struct s
 			 * timeout fires.
 			 */
 			sock_hold(sk);
-			schedule_delayed_work(&vsk->connect_work, timeout);
+
+			/* If the timeout function is already scheduled,
+			 * reschedule it, then ungrab the socket refcount to
+			 * keep it balanced.
+			 */
+			if (mod_delayed_work(system_wq, &vsk->connect_work,
+					     timeout))
+				sock_put(sk);
 
 			/* Skip ahead to preserve error code set above. */
 			goto out_wait;

From: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>

commit a3e7b29e30854ed67be0d17687e744ad0c769c4b upstream.

Imagine two non-blocking vsock_connect() requests on the same socket. The first request schedules @connect_work, and after it times out, vsock_connect_timeout() sets *sock* state back to TCP_CLOSE, but keeps *socket* state as SS_CONNECTING.

Later, the second request returns -EALREADY, meaning the socket "already has a pending connection in progress", even though the first request has already timed out.

As suggested by Stefano, fix it by setting *socket* state back to SS_UNCONNECTED, so that the second request will return -ETIMEDOUT.

---
 net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1118,6 +1118,7 @@ static void vsock_connect_timeout(struct
 	if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT &&
 	    (sk->sk_shutdown != SHUTDOWN_MASK)) {
 		sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
+		sk->sk_socket->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
 		sk->sk_err = ETIMEDOUT;
 		sk->sk_error_report(sk);
 		vsock_transport_cancel_pkt(vsk);

From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>

commit 5b245985a6de5ac18b5088c37068816d413fb8ed upstream.

Switch to new EVP API for detecting libcrypto, as Fedora 36 returns an error when it encounters the deprecated function MD5_Init() and the others.

The error would be interpreted as missing libcrypto, while in reality it is not.

---
 tools/build/feature/test-libcrypto.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index a98174e0569c..bc34a5bbb504 100644
@@ -1,16 +1,23 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/sha.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
 
 int main(void)
 {
-	MD5_CTX context;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
 	unsigned char md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 	unsigned char dat[] = "12345";
+	unsigned int digest_len;
 
-	MD5_Init(&context);
-	MD5_Update(&context, &dat[0], sizeof(dat));
-	MD5_Final(&md[0], &context);
+	mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+	if (!mdctx)
+		return 0;
+
+	EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
+	EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, &dat[0], sizeof(dat));
+	EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, &md[0], &digest_len);
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
 
 	SHA1(&dat[0], sizeof(dat), &md[0]);
 

2.37.2

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit 45e1058b77feade4e36402828bfe3e0d3363177b upstream.

The call to:

	ret = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, offp, ubuf, size);

will return success if it is able to write even one byte to "buf". The value of "*offp" controls which byte. This could result in reading uninitialized data when we do the sscanf() on the next line.

This code is not really desigined to handle partial writes where *offp is non-zero and the "buf" is preserved and re-used between writes. Just ban partial writes and replace the simple_write_to_buffer() with copy_from_user().

---
 drivers/ntb/test/ntb_tool.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -367,14 +367,16 @@ static ssize_t tool_fn_write(struct tool
 	u64 bits;
 	int n;
 
+	if (*offp)
+		return 0;
+
 	buf = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ret = simple_write_to_buffer(buf, size, offp, ubuf, size);
-	if (ret < 0) {
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, size)) {
 		kfree(buf);
-		return ret;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	buf[size] = 0;