KVM: EFER.LMSLE cleanup
cover KVM: EFER.LMSLE cleanup
KVM has never properly virtualized EFER.LMSLE. However, when the "nested" module parameter is set, KVM lets the guest set EFER.LMSLE. Ostensibly, this is so that SLES11 Xen 4.0 will boot as a nested hypervisor.
KVM passes EFER.LMSLE to the hardware through the VMCB, so the setting works most of the time, but the KVM instruction emulator completely ignores the bit, so incorrect guest behavior is almost certainly assured.
With Zen3, AMD has abandoned EFER.LMSLE. KVM still allows it, though, as long as "nested" is set. However, since the hardware doesn't support it, the next VMRUN after the emulated WRMSR will fail with "invalid VMCB."
My preference would be to simply scrub all references to LMSLE from the Linux kernel, but I don't want to break any guests that rely in it (on hardware that supports it).
So, here's a series to clean things up.
I have not been successful in getting new macros into cpufeatures.h in the past, but I'm going to try again, because I am a glutton for punishment.
Jim Mattson (5):
x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE
KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
KVM: x86: Report host's X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in
KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
KVM: x86: Enforce X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in guest cpuid
KVM: svm: Set X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE when !nested
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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PATCH 1/5 x86/cpufeatures: Introduce X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE
When AMD introduced "Long Mode Segment Limit Enable" (a.k.a. "VMware mode"), the feature was not enumerated by a CPUID bit. Now that VMware has abandoned binary translation, AMD has deprecated EFER.LMSLE.
The absence of the feature *is* now enumerated by a CPUID bit (a la Intel's X86_FEATURE_ZERO_FCS_DCS and X86_FEATURE_FDP_EXCPTN_ONLY).
This defeature bit is already present in feature word 13, but it was previously anonymous. Name it X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE, so that KVM can reference it when deciding whether or not EFER.LMSLE should be a reserved bit in a KVM guest.
Since this bit indicates the absence of a feature, don't enumerate it in /proc/cpuinfo.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14)/* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON (13*32+17)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors always-on preferred */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE (13*32+20)/* "" EFER_LMSLE is unsupported */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN (13*32+23)/* Protected Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD (13*32+24)/* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25)/* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
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PATCH 2/5 KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
In reply to Jim MattsonKVM has never properly virtualized EFER.LMSLE. When the "nested" module parameter is true, it allows an SVM guest to set EFER.LMSLE, and it passes the bit through in the VMCB, but the KVM emulator doesn't perform the required data segment limit checks in 64-bit mode.
With Zen3, AMD has dropped support for EFER.LMSLE. Hence, if a Zen3 guest sets EFER.LMSLE, the next VMRUN will fail with "invalid VMCB."
When the host reports X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE, treat EFER.LMSLE as a reserved bit in the guest. Now, if a guest tries to set EFER.LMSLE on a host without support for EFER.LMSLE, the WRMSR will raise a #GP.
At the moment, the #GP may come as a surprise, but it's an improvement over the failed VMRUN. The #GP will be vindicated anon.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3 -1
@@ -5012,7 +5012,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)if (nested) {printk (KERN_INFO "kvm: Nested Virtualization enabled\n" ); -kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME ); +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE )) +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_LMSLE ); }/*
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Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 26 lines · Jim Mattson
KVM has never properly virtualized EFER.LMSLE. When the "nested" module parameter is true, it allows an SVM guest to set EFER.LMSLE, and it passes the bit through in the VMCB, but the KVM emulator doesn't perform the required data segment limit checks in 64-bit mode.
With Zen3, AMD has dropped support for EFER.LMSLE. Hence, if a Zen3 guest sets EFER.LMSLE, the next VMRUN will fail with "invalid VMCB."
When the host reports
X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE, treat EFER.LMSLE as a reserved bit in the guest. Now, if a guest tries to set EFER.LMSLE on a host without support for EFER.LMSLE, the WRMSR will raise a #GP.At the moment, the #GP may come as a surprise, but it's an improvement over the failed VMRUN. The #GP will be vindicated anon.
Fixes eec4b140c924 ("KVM: SVM: Allow EFER.LMSLE to be set with nested svm")Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) · line 5017
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3
-1@@ -5012,7 +5012,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)if (nested) {printk (KERN_INFO "kvm: Nested Virtualization enabled\n" ); -kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME ); +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE )) +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_LMSLE );
Since KVM doesn't correctly virtualize EFER.LMSLE, I wonder if we can get away with dropping support entirely. I.e. delete the reference to EFER_LMSLE and unconditionally set F(NO_LMSLE) in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
Re: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 29 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 27 lines · Jim Mattson
KVM has never properly virtualized EFER.LMSLE. When the "nested" module parameter is true, it allows an SVM guest to set EFER.LMSLE, and it passes the bit through in the VMCB, but the KVM emulator doesn't perform the required data segment limit checks in 64-bit mode.
With Zen3, AMD has dropped support for EFER.LMSLE. Hence, if a Zen3 guest sets EFER.LMSLE, the next VMRUN will fail with "invalid VMCB."
When the host reports
X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE, treat EFER.LMSLE as a reserved bit in the guest. Now, if a guest tries to set EFER.LMSLE on a host without support for EFER.LMSLE, the WRMSR will raise a #GP.At the moment, the #GP may come as a surprise, but it's an improvement over the failed VMRUN. The #GP will be vindicated anon.
Fixes eec4b140c924 ("KVM: SVM: Allow EFER.LMSLE to be set with nested svm")Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0@@ -5012,7 +5012,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) · line 5017
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3
-1if (nested) {printk (KERN_INFO "kvm: Nested Virtualization enabled\n" ); -kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME |EFER_LMSLE ); +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_SVME ); +if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE )) +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_LMSLE );Since KVM doesn't correctly virtualize EFER.LMSLE, I wonder if we can get away with dropping support entirely. I.e. delete the reference to
EFER_LMSLEand unconditionally setF(NO_LMSLE)inKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
It's possible that SLES11 Xen 4.0 sets the bit, but never actually uses truncated segments in 64-bit mode. In any case, according to the original commit, it won't boot if setting EFER.LMSLE is not allowed.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 3 lines · Jim Mattson
It's possible that SLES11 Xen 4.0 sets the bit, but never actually uses truncated segments in 64-bit mode. In any case, according to the original commit, it won't boot if setting EFER.LMSLE is not allowed.
How is SLE11 at all relevant to the upstream kernel?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Jim Mattson
It's possible that SLES11 Xen 4.0 sets the bit, but never actually uses truncated segments in 64-bit mode. In any case, according to the original commit, it won't boot if setting EFER.LMSLE is not allowed.
How is SLE11 at all relevant to the upstream kernel?
Yeah, I'm inclined to revert the original commit and advertise NO_LSMLE unconditionally. I don't like the idea of knowingly ignoring the fact that KVM doesn't correctly virtualize LMSLE.
Xen itself already does exactly this:
commit 23ccf530431561268b0190f0f1b740b618771b7b
Author: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Date: Fri Apr 2 14:10:25 2021 +0100
x86/cpuid: Advertise no-lmsl unilaterally to hvm guests
While part of the original AMD64 spec, Long Mode Segment Limit was a feature not picked up by Intel, and therefore didn't see much adoption in software. AMD have finally dropped the feature from hardware, and allocated a CPUID bit to indicate its absence.
Xen has never supported the feature for guests, even when running on capable hardware, so advertise the feature's absence unilaterally.
There is nothing specifically wrong with exposing this bit to PV guests, but the PV ABI doesn't include a working concept of MSR_EFER in the first place, so exposing it to PV guests would be out-of-place.
because as noted in commit f2c6084442 ("x86/SVM: correct boot time cpu_data[] handling"), Xen broke detection of LMSLE support shortly after it was added in 2010, presumably before any official release. "Support" was added for HVM guests in by commit
727bc17d20 ("svm: support EFER.LMSLE for guests")
and then broken a few weeks later by commit
566ddbe833 ("x86: Fail CPU bringup cleanly if it cannot initialise HVM.")
Note that Xen did a "safe" WRMSR+RDMSR to detect LMSLE, so either someone added extra out-of-tree code that caused Xen to fail to boot, or "necessary ... to boot with nested svm" only meant being able to expose SVM to L2.
Either way, KVM appears to be carrying a half-baked "fix" for a buggy guest that's long since gone. So like we did in commit 8805875aa473 ("Revert "KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls when guest MPX disabled""), I think we should just revert the "fix".
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
...
Either way, KVM appears to be carrying a half-baked "fix" for a buggy guest that's long since gone. So like we did in commit8805875aa473("Revert "KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls when guest MPX disabled""), I think we should just revert the "fix".
If, as message 0/5 says, setting this bit so that SLE11 Xen 4.0 boots as a nested hypervisor is the use case, then sure, unconditional NO_LSMLE and we all should go on with our lives.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH 2/5] KVM: svm: Disallow EFER.LMSLE on hardware that doesn't support it
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Sean Christopherson
...
Either way, KVM appears to be carrying a half-baked "fix" for a buggy guest that's long since gone. So like we did in commit8805875aa473("Revert "KVM: nVMX: Do not expose MPX VMX controls when guest MPX disabled""), I think we should just revert the "fix".If, as message 0/5 says, setting this bit so that SLE11 Xen 4.0 boots as a nested hypervisor is the use case, then sure, unconditional
NO_LSMLEand we all should go on with our lives.
Fantastic! That's what I'll do in V2.
PATCH 3/5 KVM: x86: Report host's X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
In reply to Jim MattsonEFER.LMSLE is not supported in a KVM guest if it is not supported on the underlying hardware. Inform the guest by exposing the host's value of X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES );kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0008_EBX , -F (CLZERO ) |F (XSAVEERPTR ) | +F (CLZERO ) |F (XSAVEERPTR ) |F (NO_LMSLE ) |F (WBNOINVD ) |F (AMD_IBPB ) |F (AMD_IBRS ) |F (AMD_SSBD ) |F (VIRT_SSBD ) |F (AMD_SSB_NO ) |F (AMD_STIBP ) |F (AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON ) | __feature_bit(KVM_X86_FEATURE_PSFD)
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PATCH 4/5 KVM: x86: Enforce X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in guest cpuid
In reply to Jim MattsonWhen the guest CPUID reports that EFER.LMSLE is not supported, treat the bit as reserved.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -0
@@ -1686,6 +1686,9 @@ static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)if (efer &EFER_NX && !guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_NX ))return false; +if (efer &EFER_LMSLE &&guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE )) +return false; +return true; }
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PATCH 5/5 KVM: svm: Set X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE when !nested
In reply to Jim MattsonKVM has never allowed a guest to set EFER.LMSLE when the "nested" module parameter was false. In the past, there was no way for a guest to know whether or not this was a legal EFER bit. Now, we can let the guest know this bit is illegal by reporting X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE in KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2 -0
@@ -4945,6 +4945,8 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ) ||boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD ); +if (!nested) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NO_LMSLE );/* AMD PMU PERFCTR_CORE CPUID */ if (enable_pmu &&boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PERFCTR_CORE ))
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