efi: libstub: check Shim mode using MokSBStateRT
Subsystems (3)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 1/1 efi: libstub: check Shim mode using MokSBStateRT
We currently check the MokSBState variable to decide whether we should treat UEFI secure boot as being disabled, even if the firmware thinks otherwise. This is used by shim to indicate that it is not checking signatures on boot images. In the kernel, we use this to relax lockdown policies.
However, in cases where shim is not even being used, we don't want this variable to interfere with lockdown, given that the variable is non-volatile variable and therefore persists across a reboot. This means setting it once will persistently disable lockdown checks on a given system.
So switch to the mirrored version of this variable, called MokSBStateRT, which is supposed to be volatile, and this is something we can check.
--- arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 5 +++-- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/efi.c +3 -2
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;efi_status_t status;u8 moksbstate; +u32 attr;unsigned long size; mode =efi_get_secureboot_mode (efi.get_variable);
@@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = efi.get_variable (L"MokSBStateRT" , &shim_guid, -NULL , &size, &moksbstate); + &attr, &size, &moksbstate);/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled:
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +4 -4
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@/* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid =EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID ; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBState" ; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBStateRT" ;static efi_status_t get_var (efi_char16_t *name,efi_guid_t *vendor,u32 *attr,unsigned long *data_size,void *data)
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the -* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well -* honor that. +* variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as +* well honor that. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ) && moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Hi Ard
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
We currently check the MokSBState variable to decide whether we should treat UEFI secure boot as being disabled, even if the firmware thinks otherwise. This is used by shim to indicate that it is not checking signatures on boot images. In the kernel, we use this to relax lockdown policies.
Quoted 9 lines
However, in cases where shim is not even being used, we don't want this variable to interfere with lockdown, given that the variable is non-volatile variable and therefore persists across a reboot. This means setting it once will persistently disable lockdown checks on a given system.
So switch to the mirrored version of this variable, called MokSBStateRT, which is supposed to be volatile, and this is something we can check.
Just out of curiosity was the mirroring implemented at the same time in SHIM? IOW does MokSBState guarantee the presence of the -RT? Regardless of the answer this fixes an actual problem, so fwiw
Quoted 70 lines
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 5 +++-- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/xen/efi.c +3
-2@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;efi_status_t status;u8 moksbstate; +u32 attr;unsigned long size; mode =efi_get_secureboot_mode (efi.get_variable);@@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = efi.get_variable (L"MokSBStateRT" , &shim_guid, -NULL , &size, &moksbstate); + &attr, &size, &moksbstate);/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled:drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +4
-5@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@/* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid =EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID ; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBState" ; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBStateRT" ;static efi_status_t get_var (efi_char16_t *name,efi_guid_t *vendor,u32 *attr,unsigned long *data_size,void *data)@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the -* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well -* honor that. +* variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as +* well honor that. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ) && moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled: --2.35.1
Peter Jones
Reviewed-byQuoted 16 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
Hi Ard
Quoted 13 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
We currently check the MokSBState variable to decide whether we should treat UEFI secure boot as being disabled, even if the firmware thinks otherwise. This is used by shim to indicate that it is not checking signatures on boot images. In the kernel, we use this to relax lockdown policies.
However, in cases where shim is not even being used, we don't want this variable to interfere with lockdown, given that the variable is non-volatile variable and therefore persists across a reboot. This means setting it once will persistently disable lockdown checks on a given system.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
So switch to the mirrored version of this variable, called MokSBStateRT, which is supposed to be volatile, and this is something we can check.
Just out of curiosity was the mirroring implemented at the same time in SHIM? IOW does MokSBState guarantee the presence of the -RT? Regardless of the answer this fixes an actual problem, so fwiw
Yes, since 2016.
Quoted 73 lines
Reviewed-by Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>Quoted 70 lines
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 5 +++-- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/xen/efi.c +3
-2@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;efi_status_t status;u8 moksbstate; +u32 attr;unsigned long size; mode =efi_get_secureboot_mode (efi.get_variable);@@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = efi.get_variable (L"MokSBStateRT" , &shim_guid, -NULL , &size, &moksbstate); + &attr, &size, &moksbstate);/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled:drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +4
-5@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@/* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid =EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID ; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBState" ; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBStateRT" ;static efi_status_t get_var (efi_char16_t *name,efi_guid_t *vendor,u32 *attr,unsigned long *data_size,void *data)@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the -* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well -* honor that. +* variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as +* well honor that. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ) && moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled: --2.35.1
Signature · 1 line
Peter
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Peter Jones
Quoted 20 lines · Ilias Apalodimas
Hi Ard
Quoted 16 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
We currently check the MokSBState variable to decide whether we should treat UEFI secure boot as being disabled, even if the firmware thinks otherwise. This is used by shim to indicate that it is not checking signatures on boot images. In the kernel, we use this to relax lockdown policies.
However, in cases where shim is not even being used, we don't want this variable to interfere with lockdown, given that the variable is non-volatile variable and therefore persists across a reboot. This means setting it once will persistently disable lockdown checks on a given system.
So switch to the mirrored version of this variable, called MokSBStateRT, which is supposed to be volatile, and this is something we can check.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Just out of curiosity was the mirroring implemented at the same time in SHIM? IOW does MokSBState guarantee the presence of the -RT? Regardless of the answer this fixes an actual problem, so fwiw
Yes, since 2016.
Reviewed-by Peter Jones <[email protected]>Quoted 2 lines
Reviewed-by Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Thanks, I've queued this as a fix.
Quoted 75 lines
Quoted 66 lines
Quoted 66 lines
Signed-off-by Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 5 +++-- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/xen/efi.c +3
-2@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;efi_status_t status;u8 moksbstate; +u32 attr;unsigned long size; mode =efi_get_secureboot_mode (efi.get_variable);@@ -113,13 +114,13 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = efi.get_variable (L"MokSBStateRT" , &shim_guid, -NULL , &size, &moksbstate); + &attr, &size, &moksbstate);/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure. */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled; secure_boot_enabled:drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +4
-4@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@/* SHIM variables */ static const efi_guid_t shim_guid =EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID ; -static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBState" ; +static const efi_char16_t shim_MokSBState_name[] =L"MokSBStateRT" ;static efi_status_t get_var (efi_char16_t *name,efi_guid_t *vendor,u32 *attr,unsigned long *data_size,void *data)@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* * See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. If so, and if the -* variable doesn't have the runtime attribute set, we might as well -* honor that. +* variable doesn't have the non-volatile attribute set, we might as +* well honor that. */ size =sizeof (moksbstate); status = get_efi_var(shim_MokSBState_name, &shim_guid,@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(void)/* If it fails, we don't care why. Default to secure */ if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) goto secure_boot_enabled; -if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS ) && moksbstate ==1 ) +if (!(attr &EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE ) && moksbstate ==1 )return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c +0
-1secure_boot_enabled: --2.35.1
--
Peter