security/ima: limit the scope of the LTP policy rules based on the UUID
PATCH 1/1 security/ima: limit the scope of the LTP policy rules based on the UUID
The LTP policy rules either replace or extend the global IMA policy. As a result, the ordering of the LTP IMA tests is important and affects the ability of re-running the tests. For example, ima_conditionals.sh defines a rule to measure user files, while ima_measuremnets.sh verifies not measuring user files. Not limiting the LTP IMA policy scope could also affect the running system.
To allow the LTP tests to be re-run without rebooting the system, limit the scope of the LTP policy rules to the loopback mounted filesystem based on the UUID.
--- .../security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh | 2 +- .../kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh | 7 ++++++- testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ verify_measurement() ROD rm -f $test_file tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $request" - ROD echo "measure $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY + ROD echo "measure $FSUUID $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $request test" \> $test_file case "$request" in
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +6 -1
@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1 - cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; then + sed "s/measure /measure $FSUUID /" $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + else + cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + fi + ret=$? exec 4>&-
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +4 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ ima_setup() if [ "$TST_MOUNT_DEVICE" = 1 ]; then tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" + + loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ') + FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi [ -n "$TST_SETUP_CALLER" ] && $TST_SETUP_CALLER
Signature · 5 lines
2.31.1 -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 10 lines
The LTP policy rules either replace or extend the global IMA policy. As a result, the ordering of the LTP IMA tests is important and affects the ability of re-running the tests. For example,
ima_conditionals.shdefines a rule to measure user files, whileima_measuremnets.shverifies not measuring user files. Not limiting the LTP IMA policy scope could also affect the running system.To allow the LTP tests to be re-run without rebooting the system, limit the scope of the LTP policy rules to the loopback mounted filesystem based on the UUID.
Thanks a lot for this, that'll be a great simplification for IMA testing. I'll have a deeper look tomorrow, but what we need is to ima_setup.sh is to always have loopback device. ATM it's just only if TMPDIR is tmpfs. See patch below (untested, I'll test it tomorrow).
Also is the kernel code path very different to use UUID from the current code? If yes, we might want also to keep the old behavior enabled with some environment variable (the default would be to use UUID). Or not worth of keeping it?
I'd also wish to have simple C implementation instead requesting blkid (although util-linux is very common, it's an extra dependency).
I might write simple C code which finds which UUID in /dev/disk/by-uuid/ is for loop device should be pretty simple code. But for now it's ok to use blkid, although it should be added into TST_NEEDS_CMDS.
...
Quoted 18 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh +1
-1@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ verify_measurement() ROD rm -f $test_file tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $request" - ROD echo "measure $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY + ROD echo "measure $FSUUID $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $request test" \> $test_file case "$request" intestcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +0
-0
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh load_policy() · line 30
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +1
-1@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1 - cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; then
Interesting, would it be correct if there is no UUID with my changes below (i.e. always use the loop device)? Actually, do we also want to have way to disable loop device (obviously only on TMPDIR not being tmpfs).
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +5
-0+ sed "s/measure /measure $FSUUID /" $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + else + cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + fi + ret=$? exec 4>&-testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +0
-0
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 182
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ ima_setup() if [ "$TST_MOUNT_DEVICE" = 1 ]; then tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" + + loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ')
We have $TST_DEVICE for this.
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 187
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0+ FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi [ -n "$TST_SETUP_CALLER" ] && $TST_SETUP_CALLER
Proposed (not yet tested) changes.
Kind regards,
Petr
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2 -11
@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ TST_CLEANUP_CALLER="$TST_CLEANUP" TST_CLEANUP="ima_cleanup" TST_NEEDS_ROOT=1 TST_MOUNT_DEVICE=1 - -# TST_MOUNT_DEVICE can be unset, therefore specify explicitly -TST_NEEDS_TMPDIR=1 +TST_NEEDS_CMDS="$TST_NEEDS_CMDS blkid" SYSFS="/sys" UMOUNT=
@@ -179,8 +177,7 @@ ima_setup() tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" - loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ') - FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $TST_DEVICE | cut -f2 -d'"')" tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi
@@ -339,10 +336,4 @@ require_evmctl() fi } -# loop device is needed to use only for tmpfs -TMPDIR="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" -if tst_supported_fs -d $TMPDIR -s "tmpfs"; then - unset TST_MOUNT_DEVICE -fi - . tst_test.sh
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Petr,
Quoted 9 lines · Petr Vorel
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 6 lines
The LTP policy rules either replace or extend the global IMA policy. As a result, the ordering of the LTP IMA tests is important and affects the ability of re-running the tests. For example,
ima_conditionals.shdefines a rule to measure user files, whileima_measuremnets.shverifies not measuring user files. Not limiting the LTP IMA policy scope could also affect the running system.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
To allow the LTP tests to be re-run without rebooting the system, limit the scope of the LTP policy rules to the loopback mounted filesystem based on the UUID.
Thanks a lot for this, that'll be a great simplification for IMA testing.
By limiting the scope of the IMA policy rules, not everything would have to be signed on the file system, which brings us one step closer to defining LTP appraise policy rules.
Quoted 3 lines
I'll have a deeper look tomorrow, but what we need is to
ima_setup.shis to always have loopback device. ATM it's just only if TMPDIR is tmpfs. See patch below (untested, I'll test it tomorrow).
Agreed. Seems to be working. :)
Quoted 2 lines
Also is the kernel code path very different to use UUID from the current code?
The code path is the same - either the policy rule matches or it doesn't. Previously, however, the test files being measured could have been located on any filesystem. With this change, the test files now have to be on the UUID filesystem.
Quoted 2 lines
If yes, we might want also to keep the old behavior enabled with some environment variable (the default would be to use UUID). Or not worth of keeping it?
Instead of keeping the old behavior, how about defining additional file
tests that do not match the new UUID policy rule? These files will
not be measured.
Quoted 5 lines
I'd also wish to have simple C implementation instead requesting blkid (although util-linux is very common, it's an extra dependency).
I might write simple C code which finds which UUID in/dev/disk/by-uuid/is for loop device should be pretty simple code. But for now it's ok to use blkid, although it should be added intoTST_NEEDS_CMDS.
Sure. I posted this patch more as a proof of concept than anything else.
Quoted 22 lines
...
Quoted 20 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh +1
-1@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ verify_measurement() ROD rm -f $test_file tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $request" - ROD echo "measure $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY + ROD echo "measure $FSUUID $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $request test" \> $test_file case "$request" intestcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +0
-0@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh load_policy() · line 29
Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +1
-1- cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; thenInteresting, would it be correct if there is no UUID with my changes below (i.e. always use the loop device)? Actually, do we also want to have way to disable loop device (obviously only on TMPDIR not being tmpfs).
If/when using a non loopback device, there should at least be a major warning that the global policy has been modified.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +5
-0+ sed "s/measure /measure $FSUUID /" $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + else + cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + fi + ret=$? exec 4>&-testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +0
-0testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 182
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ ima_setup() if [ "$TST_MOUNT_DEVICE" = 1 ]; then tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" + + loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ')We have $TST_DEVICE for this.
Quoted 8 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 187
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0+ FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi [ -n "$TST_SETUP_CALLER" ] && $TST_SETUP_CALLERProposed (not yet tested) changes.
Thanks, the proposed changes seem to be working.
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 37 lines
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-11@@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ TST_CLEANUP_CALLER="$TST_CLEANUP" TST_CLEANUP="ima_cleanup" TST_NEEDS_ROOT=1 TST_MOUNT_DEVICE=1 - -# TST_MOUNT_DEVICE can be unset, therefore specify explicitly -TST_NEEDS_TMPDIR=1 +TST_NEEDS_CMDS="$TST_NEEDS_CMDS blkid" SYSFS="/sys" UMOUNT=@@ -179,8 +177,7 @@ ima_setup() tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" - loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ') - FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $TST_DEVICE | cut -f2 -d'"')" tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi@@ -339,10 +336,4 @@ require_evmctl() fi } -# loop device is needed to use only for tmpfs -TMPDIR="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}" -if tst_supported_fs -d $TMPDIR -s "tmpfs"; then - unset TST_MOUNT_DEVICE -fi - . tst_test.sh
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 21 lines
Hi Petr,
Quoted 9 lines · Petr Vorel
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 6 lines
The LTP policy rules either replace or extend the global IMA policy. As a result, the ordering of the LTP IMA tests is important and affects the ability of re-running the tests. For example,
ima_conditionals.shdefines a rule to measure user files, whileima_measuremnets.shverifies not measuring user files. Not limiting the LTP IMA policy scope could also affect the running system.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
To allow the LTP tests to be re-run without rebooting the system, limit the scope of the LTP policy rules to the loopback mounted filesystem based on the UUID.
Thanks a lot for this, that'll be a great simplification for IMA testing.
By limiting the scope of the IMA policy rules, not everything would have to be signed on the file system, which brings us one step closer to defining LTP appraise policy rules.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I'll have a deeper look tomorrow, but what we need is to
ima_setup.shis to always have loopback device. ATM it's just only if TMPDIR is tmpfs. See patch below (untested, I'll test it tomorrow).Agreed. Seems to be working. :)
Thanks!
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Also is the kernel code path very different to use UUID from the current code?
The code path is the same - either the policy rule matches or it doesn't. Previously, however, the test files being measured could have been located on any filesystem. With this change, the test files now have to be on the UUID filesystem.
Good to know. Also, we have new feature in shell API: $TST_ALL_FILESYSTEMS (it has been for long time for C API as .all_filesystems, which loops the test over various filesystems: ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, vfat, exfat, ntfs, tmpfs. Test therefore takes much longer, but it's worth for tests which can behave differently on various filesystems. I suppose IMA does not need it, right?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If yes, we might want also to keep the old behavior enabled with some environment variable (the default would be to use UUID). Or not worth of keeping it?
Instead of keeping the old behavior, how about defining additional file
tests that do not match the new UUID policy rule? These files will
not be measured.
Correct measurement outside of the loop device? I.e. something in $TST_TMPDIR? (i.e. /tmp/foo - test unique working directory, $TST_MNTPOINT is mounted on /tmp/foo/mntpoint, so that we still have working place outside mounted loop device). Do you mean trying to measure something what expects to fail?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I'd also wish to have simple C implementation instead requesting blkid (although util-linux is very common, it's an extra dependency).
I might write simple C code which finds which UUID in/dev/disk/by-uuid/is for loop device should be pretty simple code. But for now it's ok to use blkid, although it should be added intoTST_NEEDS_CMDS.Sure. I posted this patch more as a proof of concept than anything else.
+1
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 21 lines
...
Quoted 20 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_conditionals.sh +1
-1@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ verify_measurement() ROD rm -f $test_file tst_res TINFO "verify measuring user files when requested via $request" - ROD echo "measure $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY + ROD echo "measure $FSUUID $request=$value" \> $IMA_POLICY ROD echo "$(cat /proc/uptime) $request test" \> $test_file case "$request" intestcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +0
-0@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh load_policy() · line 29
Quoted 2 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +1
-1- cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; thenInteresting, would it be correct if there is no UUID with my changes below (i.e. always use the loop device)? Actually, do we also want to have way to disable loop device (obviously only on TMPDIR not being tmpfs).
If/when using a non loopback device, there should at least be a major warning that the global policy has been modified.
OK not quiting whole test with TBROK, but add TWARN (test continue, but later exits with non-zero).
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +5
-0+ sed "s/measure /measure $FSUUID /" $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + else + cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + fi + ret=$? exec 4>&-testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +0
-0testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 182
Quoted 5 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ ima_setup() if [ "$TST_MOUNT_DEVICE" = 1 ]; then tst_res TINFO "\$TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop device" cd "$TST_MNTPOINT" + + loopdev=$(mount | grep $TST_MNTPOINT | cut -f1 -d' ')We have $TST_DEVICE for this.
Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +2
-0+ FSUUID="fsuuid=$(blkid | grep $loopdev | cut -f2 -d'"')" + tst_res TINFO "LTP IMA policy rules based on $FSUUID" fi
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh ima_setup() · line 186
Quoted 1 line
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_setup.sh +0
-0[ -n "$TST_SETUP_CALLER" ] && $TST_SETUP_CALLERProposed (not yet tested) changes.
Thanks, the proposed changes seem to be working.
Thanks a lot for testing. I give it try today and merge it today or early next week.
Kind regards,
Petr
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Petr,
Quoted 7 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Also is the kernel code path very different to use UUID from the current code?
The code path is the same - either the policy rule matches or it doesn't. Previously, however, the test files being measured could have been located on any filesystem. With this change, the test files now have to be on the UUID filesystem.
Quoted 5 lines
Good to know. Also, we have new feature in shell API: $TST_ALL_FILESYSTEMS (it has been for long time for C API as .all_filesystems, which loops the test over various filesystems: ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, vfat, exfat, ntfs, tmpfs. Test therefore takes much longer, but it's worth for tests which can behave differently on various filesystems. I suppose IMA does not need it, right?
Nice! IMA code paths are different on filesystems with/withouti_version support. With the proposed i_version kernel
changes, ima_measurement.sh test2 is really important.
On filesystems without i_version support, after a file has been opened for write, on fput IMA assumes the file has been modified. On next access, the file is re-verified/re-measured.
I'm not sure if ima_measurement.sh test2, which is limited to filesystems with i_version support, should be extended or a new test defined to detect whether a file is properly re-measured after it has been modified on all filesystems, even those without i_version support.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
If yes, we might want also to keep the old behavior enabled with some environment variable (the default would be to use UUID). Or not worth of keeping it?
Instead of keeping the old behavior, how about defining additional file
tests that do not match the new UUID policy rule? These files will
not be measured.Correct measurement outside of the loop device? I.e. something in $TST_TMPDIR? (i.e.
/tmp/foo- test unique working directory, $TST_MNTPOINT is mounted on/tmp/foo/mntpoint, so that we still have working place outside mounted loop device). Do you mean trying to measure something what expects to fail?
Yes, there shouldn't be a new measurement.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh load_policy() · line 30
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +1
-1@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1 - cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; thenInteresting, would it be correct if there is no UUID with my changes below (i.e. always use the loop device)? Actually, do we also want to have way to disable loop device (obviously only on TMPDIR not being tmpfs).
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If/when using a non loopback device, there should at least be a major warning that the global policy has been modified.
OK not quiting whole test with TBROK, but add TWARN (test continue, but later exits with non-zero).
Sounds good.
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Quoted 37 lines
Hi Petr,
Quoted 7 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Also is the kernel code path very different to use UUID from the current code?
The code path is the same - either the policy rule matches or it doesn't. Previously, however, the test files being measured could have been located on any filesystem. With this change, the test files now have to be on the UUID filesystem.
Quoted 5 lines
Good to know. Also, we have new feature in shell API: $TST_ALL_FILESYSTEMS (it has been for long time for C API as .all_filesystems, which loops the test over various filesystems: ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, vfat, exfat, ntfs, tmpfs. Test therefore takes much longer, but it's worth for tests which can behave differently on various filesystems. I suppose IMA does not need it, right?
Nice! IMA code paths are different on filesystems with/without
i_versionsupport. With the proposedi_versionkernel
changes,ima_measurement.shtest2 is really important.On filesystems without
i_versionsupport, after a file has been opened for write, on fput IMA assumes the file has been modified. On next access, the file is re-verified/re-measured.I'm not sure if
ima_measurement.shtest2, which is limited to filesystems withi_versionsupport, should be extended or a new test defined to detect whether a file is properly re-measured after it has been modified on all filesystems, even those withouti_versionsupport.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If yes, we might want also to keep the old behavior enabled with some environment variable (the default would be to use UUID). Or not worth of keeping it?
Instead of keeping the old behavior, how about defining additional file
tests that do not match the new UUID policy rule? These files will
not be measured.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Correct measurement outside of the loop device? I.e. something in $TST_TMPDIR? (i.e.
/tmp/foo- test unique working directory, $TST_MNTPOINT is mounted on/tmp/foo/mntpoint, so that we still have working place outside mounted loop device). Do you mean trying to measure something what expects to fail?Yes, there shouldn't be a new measurement.
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh load_policy() · line 30
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_policy.sh +1
-1@@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ load_policy() exec 2>/dev/null 4>$IMA_POLICY [ $? -eq 0 ] || exit 1 - cat $1 >&4 2> /dev/null + if [ -n "$FSUUID" ]; thenInteresting, would it be correct if there is no UUID with my changes below (i.e. always use the loop device)? Actually, do we also want to have way to disable loop device (obviously only on TMPDIR not being tmpfs).
BTW using fsuuid= depends on v3.9, on commit:85865c1fa189 ("ima: add policy support for file system uuid")
v3.9 is quite old, it shouldn't be a problem, but it'd be better to add TST_MIN_KVER="3.9"
I'll send v2, just for you to check the changes.
Kind regards,
Petr
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If/when using a non loopback device, there should at least be a major warning that the global policy has been modified.
OK not quiting whole test with TBROK, but add TWARN (test continue, but later exits with non-zero).
Sounds good.
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
FYI I have problems with ima_violations.sh, when run whole runtest/ima:
tst_device.c:89: TINFO: Found free device 0 '/dev/loop0'ima_violations 1 TINFO: Formatting ext3 with opts='/dev/loop0'ima_violations 1 TINFO: Mounting device: mount -t ext3 /dev/loop0 /tmp/LTP_ima_violations.Og149san78/mntpointima_violations 1 TINFO: timeout per run is 0h 5m 0sima_violations 1 TINFO: IMA kernel config:ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256"ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=yima_violations 1 TINFO: /proc/cmdline: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.19.12-1-default root=UUID=6de93d21-b5ed-4aa4-a9e4-00a7ab77c6d9 splash=silent video=1024x768 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty kernel.softlockup_panic=1 resume=/dev/disk/by-uuid/570474ff-969e-41e6-883e-ecff2fd15015 security=apparmor mitigations=auto ignore_loglevel lsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb ima_violations 1 TINFO: $TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop deviceima_violations 1 TINFO: LTP IMA policy rules based on fsuuid=7ab2cd65-3060-4dbc-b786-72703604a33eima_violations 1 TINFO: using log /var/log/audit/audit.logima_violations 1 TINFO: verify open writers violationima_violations 1 TFAIL: open_writers violation not addedima_violations 2 TINFO: verify ToMToU violationima_violations 2 TFAIL: ToMToU violation not addedima_violations 3 TINFO: verify open_writers using mmapped files
tst_test.c:1526: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s
ima_mmap.c:38: TINFO: sleep 3sima_violations 3 TFAIL: open_writers violation not added
ima_mmap.c:41: TPASS: test completed
My fix [1] does not help. Problems are with my changes or just with your original patch. Continue debugging.
Kind regards,
Petr
[1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/[email protected]/
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Quoted 25 lines · Petr Vorel
Hi Mimi,
FYI I have problems with
ima_violations.sh, when run whole runtest/ima:tst_device.c:89: TINFO: Found free device 0 '
/dev/loop0'ima_violations1 TINFO: Formatting ext3 with opts='/dev/loop0'ima_violations1 TINFO: Mounting device: mount -t ext3/dev/loop0/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.Og149san78/mntpointima_violations1 TINFO: timeout per run is 0h 5m 0sima_violations1 TINFO: IMA kernel config:ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256"ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=y
Quoted 7 lines
ima_violations1 TINFO:/proc/cmdline: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz- 5.19.12-1-default root=UUID=6de93d21-b5ed-4aa4-a9e4-00a7ab77c6d9 splash=silent video=1024x768 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty kernel.softlockup_panic=1 resume=/dev/disk/by-uuid/570474ff-969e-41e6-883e-ecff2fd15015 security=apparmor mitigations=autoignore_loglevellsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb
I would use either use the original "security=" or the new "lsm=" boot command line option.
Quoted 13 lines
ima_violations1 TINFO: $TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop deviceima_violations1 TINFO: LTP IMA policy rules based on fsuuid=7ab2cd65-3060-4dbc-b786-72703604a33eima_violations1 TINFO: using log/var/log/audit/audit.logima_violations1 TINFO: verify open writers violationima_violations1 TFAIL:open_writersviolation not addedima_violations2 TINFO: verify ToMToU violationima_violations2 TFAIL: ToMToU violation not addedima_violations3 TINFO: verifyopen_writersusing mmapped files
tst_test.c:1526: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s
ima_mmap.c:38: TINFO: sleep 3sima_violations3 TFAIL:open_writersviolation not added
ima_mmap.c:41: TPASS: test completed
Quoted 6 lines
My fix [1] does not help. Problems are with my changes or just with your original patch. Continue debugging.
Kind regards,
Petr[1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/[email protected]/
Only the ima_conditionals.sh and ima_policy.sh tests define policy rules based on fsuuid. The other tests are still based on the builtin "ima_policy=tcb" rules.
Without seeing the output of "cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy" it's hard to understand what's causing these errors.
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 34 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 25 lines
Hi Mimi,
FYI I have problems with
ima_violations.sh, when run whole runtest/ima:tst_device.c:89: TINFO: Found free device 0 '
/dev/loop0'ima_violations1 TINFO: Formatting ext3 with opts='/dev/loop0'ima_violations1 TINFO: Mounting device: mount -t ext3/dev/loop0/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.Og149san78/mntpointima_violations1 TINFO: timeout per run is 0h 5m 0sima_violations1 TINFO: IMA kernel config:ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256"ima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=yima_violations1 TINFO:CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=yQuoted 7 lines
ima_violations1 TINFO:/proc/cmdline: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz- 5.19.12-1-default root=UUID=6de93d21-b5ed-4aa4-a9e4-00a7ab77c6d9 splash=silent video=1024x768 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty kernel.softlockup_panic=1 resume=/dev/disk/by-uuid/570474ff-969e-41e6-883e-ecff2fd15015 security=apparmor mitigations=autoignore_loglevellsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb
Quoted 2 lines
I would use either use the original "security=" or the new "lsm=" boot command line option.
FYI lsm= ima_policy=tcb would break booting, although on 5.19 I don't se the warning lsm asking to have integrity among the values. That's the old problem, it'd be good to move integrity off the security hook as you suggested [2]. Therefore only "security=" or without both "lsm" or "security" kernel boots.
BTW security=apparmor is in the result of the setup from openSUSE installer. It got back to using security, due previously mentioned problem with boot..
Although "security=apparmor lsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb" might not be a good idea, it does not cause ima_violations.sh. Actually with all of these fails ima_violations.sh fails:
* lsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb (without security=apparmor)
* security= ima_policy=tcb
* ima_policy=tcb
For some reason ima_violations.sh works, when run as the first test after boot (at least with only "ima_policy=tcb" setup), but not when whole ima runtest file is run (as there are tests run before it). I'm still trying to figure out what's wrong. What do you use for running LTP IMA tests? And do you run whole runtest file?
Questions:
* which kernel cmdline options (IMA related) makes sense to use on testing IMA?
* is it feasible to have cmdline setup which which would be suitable for all tests (running ima runtest file) + any of these tests? At least have a detection and TCONF instead of failure.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 17 lines
ima_violations1 TINFO: $TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop deviceima_violations1 TINFO: LTP IMA policy rules based on fsuuid=7ab2cd65-3060-4dbc-b786-72703604a33eima_violations1 TINFO: using log/var/log/audit/audit.logima_violations1 TINFO: verify open writers violationima_violations1 TFAIL:open_writersviolation not addedima_violations2 TINFO: verify ToMToU violationima_violations2 TFAIL: ToMToU violation not addedima_violations3 TINFO: verifyopen_writersusing mmapped files
tst_test.c:1526: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s
ima_mmap.c:38: TINFO: sleep 3sima_violations3 TFAIL:open_writersviolation not added
ima_mmap.c:41: TPASS: test completedMy fix [1] does not help. Problems are with my changes or just with your original patch. Continue debugging.
Kind regards,
Petr
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
[1] https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/[email protected]/
Only the
ima_conditionals.shandima_policy.shtests define policy rules based on fsuuid. The other tests are still based on the builtin "ima_policy=tcb" rules.
Ah, correct. What was the reason not to transform the rest? Maybe my following patch which uses loop device for all tests wasn't a good idea.
Quoted 2 lines
Without seeing the output of "cat
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy" it's hard to understand what's causing these errors.
It's empty. with fsuuid based setup I'll try to use policy examples, so that it won't TCONF, but that's a next step after we solve this.
Kind regards,
Petr
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/[email protected]/
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Petr,
Quoted 4 lines · Petr Vorel
For some reason
ima_violations.shworks, when run as the first test after boot (at least with only "ima_policy=tcb" setup), but not when whole ima runtest file is run (as there are tests run before it). I'm still trying to figure out what's wrong.
Sounds like initially the tests are run with the builtin "tcb" policy. Loading any IMA policy rules replaces the existing builtin policy with the new custom policy.
Signature · 7 lines
thanks, Mimi -- Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 10 lines
Hi Petr,
Quoted 4 lines · Petr Vorel
For some reason
ima_violations.shworks, when run as the first test after boot (at least with only "ima_policy=tcb" setup), but not when whole ima runtest file is run (as there are tests run before it). I'm still trying to figure out what's wrong.Sounds like initially the tests are run with the builtin "tcb" policy.
Yes, since LTP does not support reboot and IMA ima_measurements.sh requires ima_policy=tcb, I configured VM to run all tests with ima_policy=tcb.
Quoted 2 lines
Loading any IMA policy rules replaces the existing builtin policy with the new custom policy.
Yes, done in ima_policy.sh, which is the second test (valid policy: measure.policy). Thus only ima_measurements.sh and ima_policy.sh are run with ima_policy=tcb. I haven't had a time to look into ascii_runtime_measurements, but this changed with fsuuid= (previously was working, now vails in ima_violations.sh). I'll have look soon (I'm wasting your time if I ask before proper debugging).
As I wrote before, it'd be great if 1) running whole runtest/ima worked (either TPASS or TCONF detect missing something in kernel or in kernel params, ...).
2) running any single tests also TPASS or TCONF.
Testers then could run tests with a different setup (builtin policies, custom policies, ...).
Kind regards,
Petr
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Hi Mimi,
I'm sorry, it took me long time to look into the issue.
Quoted 3 lines
Only the
ima_conditionals.shandima_policy.shtests define policy rules based on fsuuid. The other tests are still based on the builtin "ima_policy=tcb" rules.
Yes.
Quoted 2 lines
Without seeing the output of "cat
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy" it's hard to understand what's causing these errors.
1) In current master content of /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy when booted with ima_policy=tcb, which is required by ima_policy.sh:dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4ddont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8cdont_measure fsmagic=0x43415d53dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0ebdont_measure fsmagic=0x63677270dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673dont_measure fsmagic=0xde5e81e4
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ euid=0
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ uid=0
measure func=MODULE_CHECK
measure func=FIRMWARE_CHECK
measure func=POLICY_CHECK
2) if I run ima_violations.sh now (in runtest/ima is run after ima_policy.sh.), policy does not change as test does not touch it and test pass.
3) Then run ima_policy.sh, the policy changed:dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
4) Obviously the policy file is the same after repeated run of ima_policy.sh.
Now with your patchset.
The policy file after 1) and 2) is obviously the same.
3) Now ima_policy.sh with your patchset:ima_policy 1 TINFO: Formatting ext3 with opts='/dev/loop0'ima_policy 1 TINFO: Mounting device: mount -t ext3 /dev/loop0 /tmp/LTP_ima_policy.c0pGs7haPF/mntpointima_policy 1 TINFO: timeout per run is 0h 5m 0sima_policy 1 TINFO: IMA kernel config:ima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10ima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"ima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256"ima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=yima_policy 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=yima_policy 1 TINFO: /proc/cmdline: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-6.0.7-1-default root=UUID=6de93d21-b5ed-4aa4-a9e4-00a7ab77c6d9 splash=silent video=1024x768 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty kernel.softlockup_panic=1 resume=/dev/disk/by-uuid/570474ff-969e-41e6-883e-ecff2fd15015 mitigations=auto ignore_loglevel lsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb ima_policy 1 TINFO: $TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop deviceima_policy 1 TINFO: LTP IMA policy rules based on fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0fima_policy 1 TINFO: verify that invalid policy isn't loadedima_policy 1 TPASS: didn't load invalid policyima_policy 2 TINFO: verify that policy file is not opened concurrently and able to loaded multiple timesima_policy 2 TPASS: policy was loaded just by one process and able to loaded multiple times
The default ima_policy=tcb is changed by fsuuid in ima_policy.sh:dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f dont_measure fsmagic=0x1021994 fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f measure func=MMAP_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ fsuuid=7e3ca343-13c0-4464-8375-489cd3a57c0f uid=0
4) running ima_violations.sh after ima_policy.sh no longer works, because there is nothing new in /var/log/audit/audit.log. I don't know why, but ima_violations.sh requires either the default ima_policy=tcb policy or policy created by ima_policy.sh *without* fsuuid.
FYI below is content of /var/log/audit/audit.log.
Also looking at things twice, fsuuid does not help testing much. Because main blocker for testing is not the scope of the policy, but write once policy - CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY not being set on distro kernels thus repeated write of the policy will need reboot.
Rebooting actually might be possible sooner or later with new runltp-ng from Andrea [1] (the feature is not here yet, but will be sooner or later). runltp-ng is close to upstream, there was first attempt [2].
Other option would be to prepare policy which would be suitable for all tests, with help of fsuuid. But that has drawback:
Currently we use LTP API to mount directories on loop device after test has started. These devices are temporary, e.g. /tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txt will be unmounted and deleted after each test run. But for fsuuid we'd need to first permanently mount the devices to get their UUID. Therefore there would have to be some special setup script needed to be run for all tests. This has proven to be problematic in the past. I'd have to extend the API to create something permanent.
Other question is whether IMA is tested by anybody with different build configuration.
I also looked to kselftest, but the only tests I found are some bpf related (bpf_ima_*_hash tests: bpf/ima_setup.sh, used by bpf/prog_tests/test_ima.c, bpf/progs/ima.c, which require also CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY, thus not usable on distro kernels). There are tests in ima-evm-utils, but I thought they target to test evmctl, although that's actually some testing of whole kernel and userspace IMA.
Kind regards,
Petr
[1] https://github.com/acerv/runltp-ng
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/[email protected]/
=== current master ===
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_violations.sh
type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.178:126): pid=1438 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.186:127): pid=1374 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.190:128): pid=1441 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.202:129): pid=1445 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.206:130): pid=1374 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.210:131): pid=1448 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857707.218:132): pid=1452 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857708.230:133): pid=1374 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857708.246:134): pid=1458 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 => test passes
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_policy.sh
type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.235:139): pid=1476 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.243:140): pid=1476 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.247:141): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.247:142): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.247:143): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.247:144): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.247:145): UNKNOWN=dnt_measure res=0
type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.247:146): pid=1519 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=update_policy cause=invalid-policy comm="cat" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.251:147): pid=1518 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.259:148): pid=1476 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:149): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:150): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:151): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:152): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:153): action=dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:154): action=measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:155): action=measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857735.263:156): action=measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857735.267:157): pid=1523 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=1 errno=0
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_violations.sh
type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.427:158): pid=1581 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.435:159): pid=1539 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.F0oDEcjtAh/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.439:160): pid=1584 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.451:161): pid=1588 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.451:162): pid=1539 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.F0oDEcjtAh/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.455:163): pid=1591 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857748.467:164): pid=1595 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857749.475:165): pid=1539 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.F0oDEcjtAh/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857749.487:166): pid=1601 uid=0 auid=0 ses=3 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 => again, test passes, logs produced by ima_violations.sh are the same as were on previous run
=== your v1 patchset ===
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_violations.sh
type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.171:130): pid=1504 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.179:131): pid=1434 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.gLp6AVWCuS/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.183:132): pid=1507 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.191:133): pid=1511 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.195:134): pid=1434 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=ToMToU comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.gLp6AVWCuS/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.199:135): pid=1514 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857298.211:136): pid=1518 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857299.223:137): pid=1434 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="ima_violations." name="/tmp/LTP_ima_violations.gLp6AVWCuS/mntpoint/test.txt" dev="loop0" ino=6073 res=1 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_PCR msg=audit(1670857299.235:138): pid=1524 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=invalid_pcr cause=open_writers comm="grep" name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" dev="vda2" ino=8182 res=1 errno=0 => so far so good
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_policy.sh
type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.435:139): pid=1541 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.443:140): pid=1541 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.447:141): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x9fa0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.447:142): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x62656572 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.447:143): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x64626720 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.447:144): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x01021994 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.447:145): UNKNOWN=dnt_measure res=0
type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.447:146): pid=1594 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=update_policy cause=invalid-policy comm="sed" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.451:147): pid=1593 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.455:148): pid=1541 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=policy_update cause=failed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=0 errno=0 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:149): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x9fa0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:150): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x62656572 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:151): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x64626720 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:152): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x01021994 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:153): action=dont_measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa fsmagic=0x73636673 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:154): action=measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:155): action=measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC res=1 type=INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE msg=audit(1670857346.463:156): action=measure fsuuid=23a85f4a-3f53-49e4-9079-2c7e5ba1c9fa func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0 res=1 type=INTEGRITY_STATUS msg=audit(1670857346.463:157): pid=1598 uid=0 auid=0 ses=1 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="ima_policy.sh" res=1 errno=0 => obviously, there is fsuuid=... and comm="sed" instead of comm="cat"
# PATH="/opt/ltp/testcases/bin:$PATH" ./ima_violations.sh
tst_device.c:93: TINFO: Found free device 0 '/dev/loop0'ima_violations 1 TINFO: Formatting ext3 with opts='/dev/loop0'ima_violations 1 TINFO: Mounting device: mount -t ext3 /dev/loop0 /tmp/LTP_ima_violations.6QLCCXonjt/mntpointima_violations 1 TINFO: timeout per run is 0h 5m 0sima_violations 1 TINFO: IMA kernel config:ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256"ima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=yima_violations 1 TINFO: CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS=yima_violations 1 TINFO: /proc/cmdline: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-6.0.7-1-default root=UUID=6de93d21-b5ed-4aa4-a9e4-00a7ab77c6d9 splash=silent video=1024x768 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty kernel.softlockup_panic=1 resume=/dev/disk/by-uuid/570474ff-969e-41e6-883e-ecff2fd15015 mitigations=auto ignore_loglevel lsm=integrity ima_policy=tcb ima_violations 1 TINFO: $TMPDIR is on tmpfs => run on loop deviceima_violations 1 TINFO: LTP IMA policy rules based on fsuuid=b1314073-12d0-49c7-bbd0-19bcbaa37182ima_violations 1 TINFO: using log /var/log/audit/audit.logima_violations 1 TINFO: verify open writers violationima_violations 1 TFAIL: open_writers violation not addedima_violations 2 TINFO: verify ToMToU violationima_violations 2 TFAIL: ToMToU violation not addedima_violations 3 TINFO: verify open_writers using mmapped files
tst_test.c:1558: TINFO: Timeout per run is 0h 00m 30s
ima_mmap.c:38: TINFO: sleep 3sima_violations 3 TFAIL: open_writers violation not added
ima_mmap.c:41: TPASS: test completed
=> There is no outpout in /var/log/audit/audit.log, thus test is correct that
it fails. On a previous (good) run, 2 new violations are added to/sys/kernel/security/ima/violations, on the following (bad) run no new
violation is added (obviously).
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Quoted 8 lines · Petr Vorel
Hi Mimi,
I'm sorry, it took me long time to look into the issue.
Quoted 3 lines
Only the
ima_conditionals.shandima_policy.shtests define policy rules based on fsuuid. The other tests are still based on the builtin "ima_policy=tcb" rules.Yes.
< trimmed >
Quoted 4 lines
4) running
ima_violations.shafterima_policy.shno longer works, because there is nothing new in/var/log/audit/audit.log. I don't know why, butima_violations.shrequires either the default ima_policy=tcb policy or policy created byima_policy.sh*without* fsuuid.
Violations occur when a file in policy is already opened for read and is being opened for write, or the reverse. After the builtin policy is replaced with the custom policy based on the UUID, running the violation test fails because the UUID is reset by the call to ima_setup(). So the file being opened doesn't match any policy rule.
Quoted 6 lines
FYI below is content of
/var/log/audit/audit.log.Also looking at things twice, fsuuid does not help testing much. Because main blocker for testing is not the scope of the policy, but write once policy -
CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICYnot being set on distro kernels thus repeated write of the policy will need reboot.
Oh, I didn't realize this. Fedora (and RHEL) enable CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
Quoted 3 lines
Rebooting actually might be possible sooner or later with new runltp-ng from Andrea [1] (the feature is not here yet, but will be sooner or later). runltp-ng is close to upstream, there was first attempt [2].
Let's try to avoid this solution as much as possible.
Quoted 2 lines
Other option would be to prepare policy which would be suitable for all tests, with help of fsuuid.
Ok, I'll look into this.
Quoted 8 lines
But that has drawback:
Currently we use LTP API to mount directories on loop device after test has started. These devices are temporary, e.g./tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txtwill be unmounted and deleted after each test run. But for fsuuid we'd need to first permanently mount the devices to get their UUID. Therefore there would have to be some special setup script needed to be run for all tests. This has proven to be problematic in the past. I'd have to extend the API to create something permanent.
Instead of ima_setup() setting the UUID to a new different value, if additional rules cannot be written (require_policy_writable) the UUID could be set to the existing policy rules UUID.
Thanks,
Mimi
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
Quoted 17 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 8 lines
Hi Mimi,
I'm sorry, it took me long time to look into the issue.
Quoted 3 lines
Only the
ima_conditionals.shandima_policy.shtests define policy rules based on fsuuid. The other tests are still based on the builtin "ima_policy=tcb" rules.Yes.
< trimmed >
Quoted 4 lines
4) running
ima_violations.shafterima_policy.shno longer works, because there is nothing new in/var/log/audit/audit.log. I don't know why, butima_violations.shrequires either the default ima_policy=tcb policy or policy created byima_policy.sh*without* fsuuid.
Quoted 5 lines
Violations occur when a file in policy is already opened for read and is being opened for write, or the reverse. After the builtin policy is replaced with the custom policy based on the UUID, running the violation test fails because the UUID is reset by the call to
ima_setup(). So the file being opened doesn't match any policy rule.
Yes, I was just surprised that test ima_violations.sh really depends on ima_policy=tcb or policy created by ima_policy.sh test.
This also means if somebody wants to test just ima_violations.sh, he would need to have ima_policy=tcb. Dependency between IMA tests is something LTP does not expect nor want.
Unfortunately due failures described above it'd be not good to accept this patch. But it's a very nice proof of concept how to use fsuuid, thank you.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
FYI below is content of
/var/log/audit/audit.log.Also looking at things twice, fsuuid does not help testing much. Because main blocker for testing is not the scope of the policy, but write once policy -
CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICYnot being set on distro kernels thus repeated write of the policy will need reboot.Oh, I didn't realize this. Fedora (and RHEL) enable
CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY.
Yes, but this config is 'n' by default. I wonder: shouldn't it be 'y' by default, so that people who does not care get it enabled? Or is it a security concern to get it enabled during just on boot by systemd?
Even if it were 'y' by default, there still might be some distros/people who disable it... This is the source of all complications.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Rebooting actually might be possible sooner or later with new runltp-ng from Andrea [1] (the feature is not here yet, but will be sooner or later). runltp-ng is close to upstream, there was first attempt [2].
Let's try to avoid this solution as much as possible.
Sure, reboot is complication.
But you need to accept exact order of the tests. Or have detection, but the detection does not work on disabled CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY (which is the default when CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY is not set - again people can have it unset). Actually ima_kexec.sh has broken detection - this gives TWARN and TBROK (= failure) on disabled CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY:
if [ "$policy_readable" != 1 ]; then
tst_res TWARN "policy not readable, it might not contain required policy '$REQUIRED_POLICY'" res=TBROK
fi
tst_brk $res "unable to find a correct measurement"
Exact order is first test anything with ima_policy=tcb, then have custom policy. Also, one should run tests with no IMA setup, then with ima_policy=tcb. Then there are other unsupported/untested policies: ima_policy=secure_boot and ima_policy=appraise_tcb, supporting them would obviously require reboot.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Other option would be to prepare policy which would be suitable for all tests, with help of fsuuid.
Ok, I'll look into this.
Thank you, very much appreciated!
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
But that has drawback:
Currently we use LTP API to mount directories on loop device after test has started. These devices are temporary, e.g./tmp/LTP_ima_violations.pEvyfJO7Af/mntpoint/test.txtwill be unmounted and deleted after each test run. But for fsuuid we'd need to first permanently mount the devices to get their UUID. Therefore there would have to be some special setup script needed to be run for all tests. This has proven to be problematic in the past. I'd have to extend the API to create something permanent.
Quoted 3 lines
Instead of
ima_setup()setting the UUID to a new different value, if additional rules cannot be written (require_policy_writable) the UUID could be set to the existing policy rules UUID.
Not sure if I understand you. FYI no mounted directory exists before test run, nothing survives after test finishes.
Test is supposed to write *only* to it's temporary directory $TST_TMPDIR, which is created by TST_NEEDS_TMPDIR=1 after test has started, this is the directory which gets deleted.
Kind regards,
Petr
Signature · 1 line
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp