x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
RFC PATCH 1/1 x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guest XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.
---
This patch is logically part of the SVM guest shadow stack support series seen here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Sending this patch separately from the main series as it should apply to the tip tree as opposed to the kvm tree as this patch is related to guest kernel support.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +15 -0
@@ -887,6 +887,21 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0 (ghcb,1 ); +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && regs->ax ==0xd ) { +unsigned long lo, hi; +u64 xss; + +/* +* Since vc_handle_cpuid may be used during early boot, the +* rdmsr wrappers are incompatible and should not be used. +* Invoke the instruction directly. +*/ + asmvolatile ("rdmsr" :"=a" (lo),"=d" (hi) + :"c" (MSR_IA32_XSS )); + xss = (hi <<32 ) | lo; +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb, xss); + } + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt,SVM_EXIT_CPUID ,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Sean Christopherson
reviewerQuoted 2 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guest
s/KVM will/the hypervisor may
Quoted 1 line
XSS value.
Heh, "need" is debatable.
Quoted 24 lines
For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be
included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
This patch is logically part of the SVM guest shadow stack support series seen here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Sending this patch separately from the main series as it should apply to the tip tree as opposed to the kvm tree as this patch is related to guest kernel support.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 890
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +1
-0@@ -887,6 +887,21 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0 (ghcb,1 ); +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && regs->ax ==0xd ) {
IIRC, XCR0 and XSS are only needed for sub-leafs 0 and 1, i.e. this and the code above don't need to expose XCR0/XSS to the host for ECX > 1.
FWIW, I think it's ridiculous that the guest willingly exposes state to the host, it's not _that_ difficult to do the math in the guest.
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 900
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +10
-0+unsigned long lo, hi; +u64 xss; + +/* +* Since vc_handle_cpuid may be used during early boot, the +* rdmsr wrappers are incompatible and should not be used. +* Invoke the instruction directly. +*/ + asmvolatile ("rdmsr" :"=a" (lo),"=d" (hi) + :"c" (MSR_IA32_XSS ));
Doesn't __rdmsr() do what you want? But even that seems unnecessary, isn't the current XSS available in xfeatures_mask_supervisor()?
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +4
-0+ xss = (hi <<32 ) | lo; +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb, xss); + } + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt,SVM_EXIT_CPUID ,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Quoted 37 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 2 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guests/KVM will/the hypervisor may
Quoted 1 line
XSS value.
Heh, "need" is debatable.
Quoted 27 lines
For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be
included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
This patch is logically part of the SVM guest shadow stack support series seen here:
https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flore.kernel.org%2Fall%2F20221012203910.204793-1-john.allen%40amd.com%2F&data=05%7C01%7Cjohn.allen%40amd.com%7C2ed48fc57d2247f809ed08daae227f2d%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C638013760436182289%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C3000%7C%7C%7C&sdata=OIO3X5EQdTazOozvCHIF9E2tT%2B6aMqarmkA8o41wJ7M%3D&reserved=0Sending this patch separately from the main series as it should apply to the tip tree as opposed to the kvm tree as this patch is related to guest kernel support.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +0
-0@@ -887,6 +887,21 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0 (ghcb,1 );
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 890
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +1
-0+if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && regs->ax ==0xd ) {IIRC, XCR0 and XSS are only needed for sub-leafs 0 and 1, i.e. this and the code above don't need to expose XCR0/XSS to the host for ECX > 1.
FWIW, I think it's ridiculous that the guest willingly exposes state to the host, it's not _that_ difficult to do the math in the guest.
That makes sense to me. I think given that the XSS code here is tied in with the SVM shadow stack patches, I'll submit a separate patch to first address only exposing XCR0 for sub-leafs 0 and 1. Then I'll address XSS in the next version of the SVM shadow stack patches.
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 900
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +10
-0+unsigned long lo, hi; +u64 xss; + +/* +* Since vc_handle_cpuid may be used during early boot, the +* rdmsr wrappers are incompatible and should not be used. +* Invoke the instruction directly. +*/ + asmvolatile ("rdmsr" :"=a" (lo),"=d" (hi) + :"c" (MSR_IA32_XSS ));Doesn't
__rdmsr()do what you want? But even that seems unnecessary, isn't the current XSS available inxfeatures_mask_supervisor()?
Yes, I think you're right. That should make this change a lot more palatable.
Thanks,
John
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +4
-0+ xss = (hi <<32 ) | lo; +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb, xss); + } + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt,SVM_EXIT_CPUID ,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;Signature · 1 line
2.34.3
Quoted 60 lines · John Allen
Quoted 42 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 2 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guests/KVM will/the hypervisor may
Quoted 1 line
XSS value.
Heh, "need" is debatable.
Quoted 24 lines
For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be
included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
This patch is logically part of the SVM guest shadow stack support series seen here:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Sending this patch separately from the main series as it should apply to the tip tree as opposed to the kvm tree as this patch is related to guest kernel support.
---
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c| 15 +++++++++++++++1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb · line 890
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +1
-0@@ -887,6 +887,21 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, /* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1); + if (has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && regs->ax == 0xd) {IIRC, XCR0 and XSS are only needed for sub-leafs 0 and 1, i.e. this and the code above don't need to expose XCR0/XSS to the host for ECX > 1.
Quoted 2 lines
FWIW, I think it's ridiculous that the guest willingly exposes state to the host, it's not _that_ difficult to do the math in the guest.
That makes sense to me. I think given that the XSS code here is tied in with the SVM shadow stack patches, I'll submit a separate patch to first address only exposing XCR0 for sub-leafs 0 and 1. Then I'll address XSS in the next version of the SVM shadow stack patches.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +10
-0+ unsigned long lo, hi; + u64 xss; + + /* + * Since vc_handle_cpuid may be used during early boot, the + * rdmsr wrappers are incompatible and should not be used. + * Invoke the instruction directly. + */ + asm volatile("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) + : "c" (MSR_IA32_XSS));
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Doesn't
__rdmsr()do what you want? But even that seems unnecessary, isn't the current XSS available inxfeatures_mask_supervisor()?Yes, I think you're right. That should make this change a lot more palatable.
That may depend on how early this CPUID leaf is requested. If requested before xfeatures_mask_supervisor is initialized, then it can't be used, yet. Maybe there is something that can be checked to see if xfeatures_mask_supervisor has been setup and then use it, otherwise read the MSR.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 16 lines
Thanks,
JohnQuoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +4
-0+ xss = (hi << 32) | lo; + ghcb_set_xss(ghcb, xss); + } + ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_CPUID, 0, 0); if (ret != ES_OK) return ret;Signature · 1 line
2.34.3