tools/kvm_stat: fix attack vector with user controlled FUSE mounts
PATCH 1/1 tools/kvm_stat: fix attack vector with user controlled FUSE mounts
The first field in /proc/mounts can be influenced by unprivileged users through the widespread fusermount setuid-root program. Example:
``` user$ mkdir ~/mydebugfs user$ export _FUSE_COMMFD=0 user$ fusermount ~/mydebugfs -ononempty,fsname=debugfs user$ grep debugfs /proc/mounts debugfs /home/user/mydebugfs fuse rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=1000,group_id=100 0 0 ```
If there is no debugfs already mounted in the system then this can be used by unprivileged users to trick kvm_stat into using a user controlled file system location for obtaining KVM statistics.
To exploit this also a race condition has to be won, since the code checks for the existence of the 'kvm' subdirectory of the resulting path. This doesn't work on a FUSE mount, because the root user is not allowed to access non-root FUSE mounts for security reasons. If an attacker manages to unmount the FUSE mount in time again then kvm_stat would be using the resulting path, though.
The impact if winning the race condition is mostly a denial-of-service or damaged information integrity. The files in debugfs are only opened for reading. So the attacker can cause very large data to be read in by kvm_stat or fake data to be processed by kvm_stat. I don't see any viable way to turn this into a privilege escalation.
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in /proc/mounts thus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.
--- tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat +1 -1
@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ def assign_globals(): debugfs = '' for line in open('/proc/mounts'): - if line.split(' ')[0] == 'debugfs': + if line.split(' ')[2] == 'debugfs': debugfs = line.split(' ')[1] break if debugfs == '':
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Matthias Gerstner
The first field in
/proc/mountscan be influenced by unprivileged users through the widespreadfusermountsetuid-root program. Example:``` user$ mkdir ~/mydebugfs user$ export _FUSE_COMMFD=0 user$ fusermount ~/mydebugfs -ononempty,fsname=debugfs user$ grep debugfs /proc/mounts debugfs /home/user/mydebugfs fuse rw,nosuid,nodev,relatime,user_id=1000,group_id=100 0 0 ```If there is no debugfs already mounted in the system then this can be used by unprivileged users to trick
kvm_statinto using a user controlled file system location for obtaining KVM statistics.To exploit this also a race condition has to be won, since the code checks for the existence of the 'kvm' subdirectory of the resulting path. This doesn't work on a FUSE mount, because the root user is not allowed to access non-root FUSE mounts for security reasons. If an attacker manages to unmount the FUSE mount in time again then
kvm_statwould be using the resulting path, though.
Quoted 5 lines
The impact if winning the race condition is mostly a denial-of-service or damaged information integrity. The files in debugfs are only opened for reading. So the attacker can cause very large data to be read in by
kvm_stator fake data to be processed bykvm_stat. I don't see any viable way to turn this into a privilege escalation.
Ok, thanks for confirming. I will tweak the commit message.
Paolo
Quoted 20 lines
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in
/proc/mountsthus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.--- tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat +1
-1@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ def assign_globals(): debugfs = '' for line in open('/proc/mounts'): - if line.split(' ')[0] == 'debugfs': + if line.split(' ')[2] == 'debugfs': debugfs = line.split(' ')[1] break if debugfs == '':
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Matthias Gerstner
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in
/proc/mountsthus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.
Can you please send a patch to replace seq_printf with seq_escape in afs_show_devname though? I couldn't find anything that prevents cell->name and volume->name from containing a space, so better safe than sorry.
Paolo
Quoted 9 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 3 lines · Matthias Gerstner
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in
/proc/mountsthus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.Can you please send a patch to replace
seq_printfwithseq_escapeinafs_show_devnamethough? I couldn't find anything that preventscell->nameandvolume->namefrom containing a space, so better safe than sorry.
I only checked this during runtime using a tmpfs and assumed this would be true for all file systems.
Sure I can come up with a patch. Should I send a new single patch containing both changes, a new patch series with two patches or do I need to send the afs change to a different mailing list? Sorry - I'm new to kernel development.
Cheers
Matthias
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Matthias Gerstner
Sure I can come up with a patch. Should I send a new single patch containing both changes, a new patch series with two patches or do I need to send the afs change to a different mailing list? Sorry - I'm new to kernel development.
Yes, please send the AFS patch to [email protected]. In the meanwhile I will queue this patch as it is already an improvement.
Paolo
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Matthias Gerstner
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in
/proc/mountsthus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.--- tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Matthias, both this patch and the one you sent to linux-afs need to include a "Signed-off-by" line, for example:
###
### Signed-off-by: Matthias Gerstner <[email protected]>
###
The meaning of this is visible at https://developercertificate.org/.
For this patch you can just reply to the message with the above line (without the "###" in front) and I'll accept it. However, for linux-afs I suggest that you just resend it. Just committing your patch with the "-s" command line argument will include the line for you.
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 13 lines
tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat +1
-1@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ def assign_globals(): debugfs = '' for line in open('/proc/mounts'): - if line.split(' ')[0] == 'debugfs': + if line.split(' ')[2] == 'debugfs': debugfs = line.split(' ')[1] break if debugfs == '':
Quoted 41 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 7 lines · Matthias Gerstner
The fix is simply to use the file system type field instead. Whitespace in the mount path is escaped in
/proc/mountsthus no further safety measures in the parsing should be necessary to make this correct.--- tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)Matthias, both this patch and the one you sent to linux-afs need to include a "Signed-off-by" line, for example:
###
### Signed-off-by: Matthias Gerstner <[email protected]>
###The meaning of this is visible at https://developercertificate.org/.
For this patch you can just reply to the message with the above line (without the "###" in front) and I'll accept it. However, for linux-afs I suggest that you just resend it. Just committing your patch with the "-s" command line argument will include the line for you.
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 13 lines
tools/kvm/kvm_stat/kvm_stat +1
-1@@ -1756,7 +1756,7 @@ def assign_globals(): debugfs = '' for line in open('/proc/mounts'): - if line.split(' ')[0] == 'debugfs': + if line.split(' ')[2] == 'debugfs': debugfs = line.split(' ')[1] break if debugfs == '':