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6.0.8-rc1 review

PATCH NAK Greg Kroah-Hartman 15 participants 213 messages Nov 8, 2022 – Nov 10, 2022 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 164/197 ext4: fix warning in ext4_da_release_space

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

commit 1b8f787ef547230a3249bcf897221ef0cc78481b upstream.

Syzkaller report issue as follows:
EXT4-fs (loop0): Free/Dirty block details
EXT4-fs (loop0): free_blocks=0
EXT4-fs (loop0): dirty_blocks=0
EXT4-fs (loop0): Block reservation details
EXT4-fs (loop0): i_reserved_data_blocks=0
EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_da_release_space:1527: ext4_da_release_space: ino 18, to_free 1 with only 0 reserved data blocks

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 92 at fs/ext4/inode.c:1528 ext4_da_release_space+0x25e/0x370 fs/ext4/inode.c:1524
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 92 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-09423-g493ffd6605b2 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
RIP: 0010:ext4_da_release_space+0x25e/0x370 fs/ext4/inode.c:1528
RSP: 0018:ffffc900015f6c90 EFLAGS: 00010296
RAX: 42215896cd52ea00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 42215896cd52ea00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 1ffff1100e907d96 R08: ffffffff816aa79d R09: fffff520002bece5
R10: fffff520002bece5 R11: 1ffff920002bece4 R12: ffff888021fd2000
R13: ffff88807483ecb0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff88807483e740
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005555569ba628 CR3: 000000000c88e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_es_remove_extent+0x1ab/0x260 fs/ext4/extents_status.c:1461
 mpage_release_unused_pages+0x24d/0xef0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1589
 ext4_writepages+0x12eb/0x3be0 fs/ext4/inode.c:2852
 do_writepages+0x3c3/0x680 mm/page-writeback.c:2469
 __writeback_single_inode+0xd1/0x670 fs/fs-writeback.c:1587
 writeback_sb_inodes+0xb3b/0x18f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1870
 wb_writeback+0x41f/0x7b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2044
 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2187 [inline]
 wb_workfn+0x3cb/0xef0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227
 process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
 worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
 kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306
 </TASK>

Above issue may happens as follows:
ext4_da_write_begin
ext4_create_inline_data

    ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS);
    ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_INLINE_DATA);

__ext4_ioctl
ext4_ext_migrate -> will lead to eh->eh_entries not zero, and set extent flag
ext4_da_write_begin
ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent

    ext4_da_write_inline_data_begin
      ext4_da_map_blocks
        ext4_insert_delayed_block
	  if (!ext4_es_scan_clu(inode, &ext4_es_is_delonly, lblk))
	    if (!ext4_es_scan_clu(inode, &ext4_es_is_mapped, lblk))
	      ext4_clu_mapped(inode, EXT4_B2C(sbi, lblk)); -> will return 1
	       allocated = true;
          ext4_es_insert_delayed_block(inode, lblk, allocated);
ext4_writepages
  mpage_map_and_submit_extent(handle, &mpd, &give_up_on_write); -> return -ENOSPC
  mpage_release_unused_pages(&mpd, give_up_on_write); -> give_up_on_write == 1
    ext4_es_remove_extent
      ext4_da_release_space(inode, reserved);
        if (unlikely(to_free > ei->i_reserved_data_blocks))
	  -> to_free == 1  but ei->i_reserved_data_blocks == 0
	  -> then trigger warning as above

To solve above issue, forbid inode do migrate which has inline data.

---
 fs/ext4/migrate.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/migrate.c +2 -1
@@ -425,7 +425,8 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode
 	 * already is extent-based, error out.
 	 */
 	if (!ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb) ||
-	    (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
+	    ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS) ||
+	    ext4_has_inline_data(inode))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_blocks == 0)
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 165/197 ext4: fix BUG_ON() when directory entry has invalid rec_len

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luís Henriques <[email protected]>

commit 17a0bc9bd697f75cfdf9b378d5eb2d7409c91340 upstream.

The rec_len field in the directory entry has to be a multiple of 4. A corrupted filesystem image can be used to hit a BUG() in ext4_rec_len_to_disk(), called from make_indexed_dir().

 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 kernel BUG at fs/ext4/ext4.h:2413!
 ...
 RIP: 0010:make_indexed_dir+0x53f/0x5f0
 ...
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? add_dirent_to_buf+0x1b2/0x200
  ext4_add_entry+0x36e/0x480
  ext4_add_nondir+0x2b/0xc0
  ext4_create+0x163/0x200
  path_openat+0x635/0xe90
  do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160
  ? __create_object.isra.0+0x1de/0x3b0
  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x12/0x30
  do_sys_openat2+0x91/0x150
  __x64_sys_open+0x6c/0xa0
  do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

The fix simply adds a call to ext4_check_dir_entry() to validate the directory entry, returning -EFSCORRUPTED if the entry is invalid.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/namei.c +9 -1
@@ -2259,8 +2259,16 @@ static int make_indexed_dir(handle_t *ha
 	memset(de, 0, len); /* wipe old data */
 	de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) data2;
 	top = data2 + len;
-	while ((char *)(de2 = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize)) < top)
+	while ((char *)(de2 = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize)) < top) {
+		if (ext4_check_dir_entry(dir, NULL, de, bh2, data2, len,
+					 (data2 + (blocksize - csum_size) -
+					  (char *) de))) {
+			brelse(bh2);
+			brelse(bh);
+			return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		}
 		de = de2;
+	}
 	de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(data2 + (blocksize - csum_size) -
 					   (char *) de, blocksize);
 
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 166/197 ext4: update the backup superblocks at the end of the online resize

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit 9a8c5b0d061554fedd7dbe894e63aa34d0bac7c4 upstream.

When expanding a file system using online resize, various fields in the superblock (e.g., s_blocks_count, s_inodes_count, etc.) change. To update the backup superblocks, the online resize uses the function update_backups() in fs/ext4/resize.c. This function was not updating the checksum field in the backup superblocks. This wasn't a big deal previously, because e2fsck didn't care about the checksum field in the backup superblock. (And indeed, update_backups() goes all the way back to the ext3 days, well before we had support for metadata checksums.)

However, there is an alternate, more general way of updating superblock fields, ext4_update_primary_sb() in fs/ext4/ioctl.c. This function does check the checksum of the backup superblock, and if it doesn't match will mark the file system as corrupted. That was clearly not the intent, so avoid to aborting the resize when a bad superblock is found.

In addition, teach update_backups() to properly update the checksum in the backup superblocks. We will eventually want to unify updapte_backups() with the infrasture in ext4_update_primary_sb(), but that's for another day.

Note: The problem has been around for a while; it just didn't really matter until ext4_update_primary_sb() was added by commit bbc605cdb1e1 ("ext4: implement support for get/set fs label"). And it became trivially easy to reproduce after commit 827891a38acc ("ext4: update the s_overhead_clusters in the backup sb's when resizing") in v6.0.

Fixes bbc605cdb1e1 ("ext4: implement support for get/set fs label")
---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c  |    3 +--
 fs/ext4/resize.c |    5 +++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +1 -2
@@ -145,9 +145,8 @@ static int ext4_update_backup_sb(struct
 	if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb) &&
 	    es->s_checksum != ext4_superblock_csum(sb, es)) {
 		ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Invalid checksum for backup "
-		"superblock %llu\n", sb_block);
+		"superblock %llu", sb_block);
 		unlock_buffer(bh);
-		err = -EFSBADCRC;
 		goto out_bh;
 	}
 	func(es, arg);
fs/ext4/resize.c +5 -0
@@ -1158,6 +1158,7 @@ static void update_backups(struct super_
 	while (group < sbi->s_groups_count) {
 		struct buffer_head *bh;
 		ext4_fsblk_t backup_block;
+		struct ext4_super_block *es;
 
 		/* Out of journal space, and can't get more - abort - so sad */
 		err = ext4_resize_ensure_credits_batch(handle, 1);
@@ -1186,6 +1187,10 @@ static void update_backups(struct super_
 		memcpy(bh->b_data, data, size);
 		if (rest)
 			memset(bh->b_data + size, 0, rest);
+		es = (struct ext4_super_block *) bh->b_data;
+		es->s_block_group_nr = cpu_to_le16(group);
+		if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
+			es->s_checksum = ext4_superblock_csum(sb, es);
 		set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
 		unlock_buffer(bh);
 		err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bh);
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 167/197 x86/tdx: Prepare for using "INFO" call for a second purpose

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

commit a6dd6f39008bb3ef7c73ef0a2acc2a4209555bd8 upstream.

The TDG.VP.INFO TDCALL provides the guest with various details about the TDX system that the guest needs to run. Only one field is currently
used: 'gpa_width' which tells the guest which PTE bits mark pages shared or private.

A second field is now needed: the guest "TD attributes" to tell if virtualization exceptions are configured in a way that can harm the guest.

Make the naming and calling convention more generic and discrete from the mask-centric one.

Thanks to Sathya for the inspiration here, but there's no code, comments or changelogs left from where he started.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +3 -3
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static inline void tdx_module_call(u64 f
 		panic("TDCALL %lld failed (Buggy TDX module!)\n", fn);
 }
 
-static u64 get_cc_mask(void)
+static void tdx_parse_tdinfo(u64 *cc_mask)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
 	unsigned int gpa_width;
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static u64 get_cc_mask(void)
 	 * The highest bit of a guest physical address is the "sharing" bit.
 	 * Set it for shared pages and clear it for private pages.
 	 */
-	return BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
+	*cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST);
 
 	cc_set_vendor(CC_VENDOR_INTEL);
-	cc_mask = get_cc_mask();
+	tdx_parse_tdinfo(&cc_mask);
 	cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
 
 	/*
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 168/197 x86/tdx: Panic on bad configs that #VE on "private" memory access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>

commit 373e715e31bf4e0f129befe87613a278fac228d3 upstream.

All normal kernel memory is "TDX private memory". This includes everything from kernel stacks to kernel text. Handling exceptions on arbitrary accesses to kernel memory is essentially impossible because they can happen in horribly nasty places like kernel entry/exit. But, TDX hardware can theoretically _deliver_ a virtualization exception (#VE) on any access to private memory.

But, it's not as bad as it sounds. TDX can be configured to never deliver these exceptions on private memory with a "TD attribute" called ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE. The guest has no way to *set* this attribute, but it can check it.

Ensure ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE is set in early boot. panic() if it is unset. There is no sane way for Linux to run with this attribute clear so a panic() is appropriate.

There's small window during boot before the check where kernel has an early #VE handler. But the handler is only for port I/O and will also panic() as soon as it sees any other #VE, such as a one generated by a private memory access.

[ dhansen: Rewrite changelog and rebase on new tdx_parse_tdinfo().
Add Kirill's tested-by because I made changes since he wrote this. ]

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c |   21 ++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +16 -5
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #define VE_GET_PORT_NUM(e)	((e) >> 16)
 #define VE_IS_IO_STRING(e)	((e) & BIT(4))
 
+#define ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE	BIT(28)
+
 /*
  * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
  * return code.
@@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ static void tdx_parse_tdinfo(u64 *cc_mas
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
 	unsigned int gpa_width;
+	u64 td_attr;
 
 	/*
 	 * TDINFO TDX module call is used to get the TD execution environment
@@ -109,19 +112,27 @@ static void tdx_parse_tdinfo(u64 *cc_mas
 	 * information, etc. More details about the ABI can be found in TDX
 	 * Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI), section 2.4.2 TDCALL
 	 * [TDG.VP.INFO].
-	 *
-	 * The GPA width that comes out of this call is critical. TDX guests
-	 * can not meaningfully run without it.
 	 */
 	tdx_module_call(TDX_GET_INFO, 0, 0, 0, 0, &out);
 
-	gpa_width = out.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0);
-
 	/*
 	 * The highest bit of a guest physical address is the "sharing" bit.
 	 * Set it for shared pages and clear it for private pages.
+	 *
+	 * The GPA width that comes out of this call is critical. TDX guests
+	 * can not meaningfully run without it.
 	 */
+	gpa_width = out.rcx & GENMASK(5, 0);
 	*cc_mask = BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * The kernel can not handle #VE's when accessing normal kernel
+	 * memory.  Ensure that no #VE will be delivered for accesses to
+	 * TD-private memory.  Only VMM-shared memory (MMIO) will #VE.
+	 */
+	td_attr = out.rdx;
+	if (!(td_attr & ATTR_SEPT_VE_DISABLE))
+		panic("TD misconfiguration: SEPT_VE_DISABLE attibute must be set.\n");
 }
 
 /*
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 169/197 x86/syscall: Include asm/ptrace.h in syscall_wrapper header

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>

commit 9440c42941606af4c379afa3cf8624f0dc43a629 upstream.

With just the forward declaration of the 'struct pt_regs' in syscall_wrapper.h, the syscall stub functions:

__[x64|ia32]_sys_*(struct pt_regs *regs)

will have different definition of 'regs' argument in BTF data based on which object file they are defined in.

If the syscall's object includes 'struct pt_regs' definition, the BTF argument data will point to a 'struct pt_regs' record, like:

[226] STRUCT 'pt_regs' size=168 vlen=21

         'r15' type_id=1 bits_offset=0
         'r14' type_id=1 bits_offset=64
         'r13' type_id=1 bits_offset=128

...

If not, it will point to a fwd declaration record:

[15439] FWD 'pt_regs' fwd_kind=struct

and make bpf tracing program hooking on those functions unable to access fields from 'struct pt_regs'.

Include asm/ptrace.h directly in syscall_wrapper.h to make sure all syscalls see 'struct pt_regs' definition. This then results in BTF for '__*_sys_*(struct pt_regs *regs)' functions to point to the actual struct, not just the forward declaration.

[ bp: No Fixes tag as this is not really a bug fix but "adjustment" so
that BTF is happy. ]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h +1 -1
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_WRAPPER_H
 #define _ASM_X86_SYSCALL_WRAPPER_H
 
-struct pt_regs;
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
 
 extern long __x64_sys_ni_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs);
 extern long __ia32_sys_ni_syscall(const struct pt_regs *regs);
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 170/197 KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000006H

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit eeb69eab57c6604ac90b3fd8e5ac43f24a5535b1 upstream.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should only enumerate features that KVM actually supports. CPUID.80000006H:EDX[17:16] are reserved bits and should be masked off.

Fixes 43d05de2bee7 ("KVM: pass through CPUID(0x80000006)")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
@@ -1121,7 +1121,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
 		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_ECX);
 		break;
 	case 0x80000006:
-		/* L2 cache and TLB: pass through host info. */
+		/* Drop reserved bits, pass host L2 cache and TLB info. */
+		entry->edx &= ~GENMASK(17, 16);
 		break;
 	case 0x80000007: /* Advanced power management */
 		/* invariant TSC is CPUID.80000007H:EDX[8] */
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 171/197 KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.8000001AH

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 079f6889818dd07903fb36c252532ab47ebb6d48 upstream.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should only enumerate features that KVM actually supports. In the case of CPUID.8000001AH, only three bits are currently defined. The 125 reserved bits should be masked off.

Fixes 24c82e576b78 ("KVM: Sanitize cpuid")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +3 -0
@@ -1171,6 +1171,9 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
 		entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
 		break;
 	case 0x8000001a:
+		entry->eax &= GENMASK(2, 0);
+		entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+		break;
 	case 0x8000001e:
 		break;
 	case 0x8000001F:
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 172/197 KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000008H

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 7030d8530e533844e2f4b0e7476498afcd324634 upstream.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should only enumerate features that KVM actually supports. The following ranges of CPUID.80000008H are reserved and should be masked off:

    ECX[31:18]
    ECX[11:8]

In addition, the PerfTscSize field at ECX[17:16] should also be zero because KVM does not set the PERFTSC bit at CPUID.80000001H.ECX[27].

Fixes 24c82e576b78 ("KVM: Sanitize cpuid")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
@@ -1152,6 +1152,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
 			g_phys_as = phys_as;
 
 		entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
+		entry->ecx &= ~(GENMASK(31, 16) | GENMASK(11, 8));
 		entry->edx = 0;
 		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
 		break;
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 173/197 KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.80000001H

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 0469e56a14bf8cfb80507e51b7aeec0332cdbc13 upstream.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should only enumerate features that KVM actually supports. CPUID.80000001:EBX[27:16] are reserved bits and should be masked off.

Fixes 0771671749b5 ("KVM: Enhance guest cpuid management")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -0
@@ -1117,6 +1117,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
 			entry->eax = max(entry->eax, 0x80000021);
 		break;
 	case 0x80000001:
+		entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(27, 16);
 		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_EDX);
 		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_0001_ECX);
 		break;
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 174/197 KVM: x86: Mask off reserved bits in CPUID.8000001FH

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>

commit 86c4f0d547f6460d0426ebb3ba0614f1134b8cda upstream.

KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID should only enumerate features that KVM actually supports. CPUID.8000001FH:EBX[31:16] are reserved bits and should be masked off.

Fixes 8765d75329a3 ("KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -1
@@ -1183,7 +1183,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct
 			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
 		} else {
 			cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_8000_001F_EAX);
-
+			/* Clear NumVMPL since KVM does not support VMPL.  */
+			entry->ebx &= ~GENMASK(31, 12);
 			/*
 			 * Enumerate '0' for "PA bits reduction", the adjusted
 			 * MAXPHYADDR is enumerated directly (see 0x80000008).
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 175/197 KVM: VMX: Advertise PMU LBRs if and only if perf supports LBRs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 145dfad998eac74abc59219d936e905766ba2d98 upstream.

Advertise LBR support to userspace via MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES if and only if perf fully supports LBRs. Perf may disable LBRs (by zeroing the number of LBRs) even on platforms the allegedly support LBRs, e.g. if probing any LBR MSRs during setup fails.

Fixes be635e34c284 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Expose LBR_FMT in the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +3 -1
@@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(vo
 static inline u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilities(void)
 {
 	u64 perf_cap = PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES;
+	struct x86_pmu_lbr lbr;
 	u64 host_perf_cap = 0;
 
 	if (!enable_pmu)
@@ -412,7 +413,8 @@ static inline u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilit
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PDCM))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES, host_perf_cap);
 
-	perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT;
+	if (x86_perf_get_lbr(&lbr) >= 0 && lbr.nr)
+		perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT;
 
 	if (vmx_pebs_supported()) {
 		perf_cap |= host_perf_cap & PERF_CAP_PEBS_MASK;
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 176/197 KVM: VMX: Fold vmx_supported_debugctl() into vcpu_supported_debugctl()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit 18e897d213cb152c786abab14919196bd9dc3a9f upstream.

Fold vmx_supported_debugctl() into vcpu_supported_debugctl(), its only caller. Setting bits only to clear them a few instructions later is rather silly, and splitting the logic makes things seem more complicated than they actually are.

Opportunistically drop DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK now that there's a single reference to the pair of bits. The extra layer of indirection provides no meaningful value and makes it unnecessarily tedious to understand what KVM is doing.

No functional change.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |   15 ---------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |   12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +0 -15
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ extern int __read_mostly pt_mode;
 #define PMU_CAP_FW_WRITES	(1ULL << 13)
 #define PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT		0x3f
 
-#define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK		(DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI)
-
 struct nested_vmx_msrs {
 	/*
 	 * We only store the "true" versions of the VMX capability MSRs. We
@@ -425,19 +423,6 @@ static inline u64 vmx_get_perf_capabilit
 	return perf_cap;
 }
 
-static inline u64 vmx_supported_debugctl(void)
-{
-	u64 debugctl = 0;
-
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
-		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
-
-	if (vmx_get_perf_capabilities() & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT)
-		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK;
-
-	return debugctl;
-}
-
 static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +7 -5
@@ -2018,13 +2018,15 @@ static u64 nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_
 
 static u64 vcpu_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	u64 debugctl = vmx_supported_debugctl();
+	u64 debugctl = 0;
 
-	if (!intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
-		debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR_MASK;
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
 
-	if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
-		debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+	if ((vmx_get_perf_capabilities() & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) &&
+	    intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI;
 
 	return debugctl;
 }
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 177/197 KVM: VMX: Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to DEBUGCTL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit b333b8ebb85d62469f32b52fa03fd7d1522afc03 upstream.

Ignore guest CPUID for host userspace writes to the DEBUGCTL MSR, KVM's ABI is that setting CPUID vs. state can be done in any order, i.e. KVM allows userspace to stuff MSRs prior to setting the guest's CPUID that makes the new MSR "legal".

Keep the vmx_get_perf_capabilities() check for guest writes, even though it's technically unnecessary since the vCPU's PERF_CAPABILITIES is consulted when refreshing LBR support. A future patch will clean up vmx_get_perf_capabilities() to avoid the RDMSR on every call, at which point the paranoia will incur no meaningful overhead.

Note, prior to vmx_get_perf_capabilities() checking that the host fully supports LBRs via x86_perf_get_lbr(), KVM effectively relied on intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled() to guard against host userspace enabling LBRs on platforms without full support.

Fixes c646236344e9 ("KVM: vmx/pmu: Add PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT check when guest LBR is enabled")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6 -4
@@ -2016,16 +2016,16 @@ static u64 nested_vmx_truncate_sysenter_
 	return (unsigned long)data;
 }
 
-static u64 vcpu_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static u64 vmx_get_supported_debugctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool host_initiated)
 {
 	u64 debugctl = 0;
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
-	    guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+	    (host_initiated || guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)))
 		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
 
 	if ((vmx_get_perf_capabilities() & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) &&
-	    intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu))
+	    (host_initiated || intel_pmu_lbr_is_enabled(vcpu)))
 		debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR | DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI;
 
 	return debugctl;
@@ -2100,7 +2100,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR: {
-		u64 invalid = data & ~vcpu_supported_debugctl(vcpu);
+		u64 invalid;
+
+		invalid = data & ~vmx_get_supported_debugctl(vcpu, msr_info->host_initiated);
 		if (invalid & (DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF|DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR)) {
 			if (report_ignored_msrs)
 				vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "%s: BTF|LBR in IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x%llx, nop\n",
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 178/197 KVM: VMX: fully disable SGX if SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING unavailable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <[email protected]>

commit 1c1a41497ab879ac9608f3047f230af833eeef3d upstream.

Clear enable_sgx if ENCLS-exiting is not supported, i.e. if SGX cannot be virtualized. When KVM is loaded, adjust_vmx_controls checks that the bit is available before enabling the feature; however, other parts of the code check enable_sgx and not clearing the variable caused two different bugs, mostly affecting nested virtualization scenarios.

First, because enable_sgx remained true, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING would be marked available in the capability MSR that are accessed by a nested hypervisor. KVM would then propagate the control from vmcs12 to vmcs02 even if it isn't supported by the processor, thus causing an unexpected VM-Fail (exit code 0x7) in L1.

Second, vmx_set_cpu_caps() would not clear the SGX bits when hardware support is unavailable. This is a much less problematic bug as it only happens if SGX is soft-disabled (available in the processor but hidden in CPUID) or if SGX is supported for bare metal but not in the VMCS (will never happen when running on bare metal, but can theoertically happen when running in a VM).

Last but not least, this ensures that module params in sysfs reflect KVM's actual configuration.

RHBZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2127128

Fixes 72add915fbd5 ("KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +5 -0
@@ -8281,6 +8281,11 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
 		enable_vnmi = 0;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		enable_sgx = false;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
 	 * page upon invalidation.  No need to do anything if not
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 179/197 KVM: Initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache locks in dedicated helper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>

commit 52491a38b2c2411f3f0229dc6ad610349c704a41 upstream.

Move the gfn_to_pfn_cache lock initialization to another helper and call the new helper during VM/vCPU creation. There are race conditions possible due to kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init()'s ability to re-initialize the cache's locks.

For example: a race between ioctl(KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND) and kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init() leads to a corrupted shinfo gpc lock.

                (thread 1)                |           (thread 2)
                                          |
 kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast                  |
  read_lock_irqsave(&gpc->lock, ...)      |
                                          | kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init
                                          |  rwlock_init(&gpc->lock)
  read_unlock_irqrestore(&gpc->lock, ...) |

Rename "cache_init" and "cache_destroy" to activate+deactivate to avoid implying that the cache really is destroyed/freed.

Note, there more races in the newly named kvm_gpc_activate() that will be addressed separately.

Fixes 982ed0de4753 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")
[sean: call out that this is a bug fix]

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c       |   12 +++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/xen.c       |   57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h |   24 ++++++++++++++-----
 virt/kvm/pfncache.c      |   21 +++++++++--------
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +7 -5
@@ -2304,11 +2304,11 @@ static void kvm_write_system_time(struct
 
 	/* we verify if the enable bit is set... */
 	if (system_time & 1) {
-		kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time, vcpu,
-					  KVM_HOST_USES_PFN, system_time & ~1ULL,
-					  sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info));
+		kvm_gpc_activate(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time, vcpu,
+				 KVM_HOST_USES_PFN, system_time & ~1ULL,
+				 sizeof(struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info));
 	} else {
-		kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time);
+		kvm_gpc_deactivate(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time);
 	}
 
 	return;
@@ -3377,7 +3377,7 @@ static int kvm_pv_enable_async_pf_int(st
 
 static void kvmclock_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time);
+	kvm_gpc_deactivate(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.pv_time);
 	vcpu->arch.time = 0;
 }
 
@@ -11629,6 +11629,8 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu
 	vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~0;
 	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = ~0;
 
+	kvm_gpc_init(&vcpu->arch.pv_time);
+
 	if (!irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
 		vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
 	else
arch/x86/kvm/xen.c +30 -27

122 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/kvm_host.h +17 -7
@@ -1241,8 +1241,18 @@ int kvm_vcpu_write_guest(struct kvm_vcpu
 void kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn);
 
 /**
- * kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init - prepare a cached kernel mapping and HPA for a
- *                             given guest physical address.
+ * kvm_gpc_init - initialize gfn_to_pfn_cache.
+ *
+ * @gpc:	   struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object.
+ *
+ * This sets up a gfn_to_pfn_cache by initializing locks.  Note, the cache must
+ * be zero-allocated (or zeroed by the caller before init).
+ */
+void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc);
+
+/**
+ * kvm_gpc_activate - prepare a cached kernel mapping and HPA for a given guest
+ *                    physical address.
  *
  * @kvm:	   pointer to kvm instance.
  * @gpc:	   struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object.
@@ -1266,9 +1276,9 @@ void kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(struct kvm
  * kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_check() to ensure that the cache is valid before
  * accessing the target page.
  */
-int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc,
-			      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage,
-			      gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len);
+int kvm_gpc_activate(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc,
+		     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage,
+		     gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len);
 
 /**
  * kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_check - check validity of a gfn_to_pfn_cache.
@@ -1325,7 +1335,7 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(struct
 void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_unmap(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc);
 
 /**
- * kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy - destroy and unlink a gfn_to_pfn_cache.
+ * kvm_gpc_deactivate - deactivate and unlink a gfn_to_pfn_cache.
  *
  * @kvm:	   pointer to kvm instance.
  * @gpc:	   struct gfn_to_pfn_cache object.
@@ -1333,7 +1343,7 @@ void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_unmap(struct k
  * This removes a cache from the @kvm's list to be processed on MMU notifier
  * invocation.
  */
-void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc);
+void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc);
 
 void kvm_sigset_activate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void kvm_sigset_deactivate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
virt/kvm/pfncache.c +12 -9
@@ -346,17 +346,20 @@ void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_unmap(struct k
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_unmap);
 
+void kvm_gpc_init(struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc)
+{
+	rwlock_init(&gpc->lock);
+	mutex_init(&gpc->refresh_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_init);
 
-int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc,
-			      struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage,
-			      gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len)
+int kvm_gpc_activate(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc,
+		     struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum pfn_cache_usage usage,
+		     gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len)
 {
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(!usage || (usage & KVM_GUEST_AND_HOST_USE_PFN) != usage);
 
 	if (!gpc->active) {
-		rwlock_init(&gpc->lock);
-		mutex_init(&gpc->refresh_lock);
-
 		gpc->khva = NULL;
 		gpc->pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
 		gpc->uhva = KVM_HVA_ERR_BAD;
@@ -371,9 +374,9 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init(struct kvm
 	}
 	return kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(kvm, gpc, gpa, len);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_init);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_activate);
 
-void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc)
+void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc)
 {
 	if (gpc->active) {
 		spin_lock(&kvm->gpc_lock);
@@ -384,4 +387,4 @@ void kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy(struct
 		gpc->active = false;
 	}
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_destroy);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_deactivate);
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 180/197 KVM: Reject attempts to consume or refresh inactive gfn_to_pfn_cache

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

commit ecbcf030b45666ad11bc98565e71dfbcb7be4393 upstream.

Reject kvm_gpc_check() and kvm_gpc_refresh() if the cache is inactive. Not checking the active flag during refresh is particularly egregious, as KVM can end up with a valid, inactive cache, which can lead to a variety of use-after-free bugs, e.g. consuming a NULL kernel pointer or missing an mmu_notifier invalidation due to the cache not being on the list of gfns to invalidate.

Note, "active" needs to be set if and only if the cache is on the list of caches, i.e. is reachable via mmu_notifier events. If a relevant mmu_notifier event occurs while the cache is "active" but not on the list, KVM will not acquire the cache's lock and so will not serailize the mmu_notifier event with active users and/or kvm_gpc_refresh().

A race between KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO and KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND can be exploited to trigger the bug.

1. Deactivate shinfo cache:

kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr
case KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO
kvm_gpc_deactivate
kvm_gpc_unmap
gpc->valid = false
gpc->khva = NULL
gpc->active = false

Result: active = false, valid = false

2. Cause cache refresh:

kvm_arch_vm_ioctl
case KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND
kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send
kvm_xen_set_evtchn
kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast

    kvm_gpc_check
    return -EWOULDBLOCK because !gpc->valid
   kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast
    return -EWOULDBLOCK
   kvm_gpc_refresh
    hva_to_pfn_retry
     gpc->valid = true
     gpc->khva = not NULL

Result: active = false, valid = true

3. Race ioctl KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND against ioctl KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO:

kvm_arch_vm_ioctl
case KVM_XEN_HVM_EVTCHN_SEND
kvm_xen_hvm_evtchn_send
kvm_xen_set_evtchn
kvm_xen_set_evtchn_fast

    read_lock gpc->lock
                                          kvm_xen_hvm_set_attr case
                                          KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO
                                           mutex_lock kvm->lock
                                           kvm_xen_shared_info_init
                                            kvm_gpc_activate
                                             gpc->khva = NULL
    kvm_gpc_check
     [ Check passes because gpc->valid is
       still true, even though gpc->khva
       is already NULL. ]
    shinfo = gpc->khva
    pending_bits = shinfo->evtchn_pending
    CRASH: test_and_set_bit(..., pending_bits)
Fixes 982ed0de4753 ("KVM: Reinstate gfn_to_pfn_cache with invalidation support")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 virt/kvm/pfncache.c |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
virt/kvm/pfncache.c +34 -7
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ bool kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_check(struct k
 {
 	struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
 
+	if (!gpc->active)
+		return false;
+
 	if ((gpa & ~PAGE_MASK) + len > PAGE_SIZE)
 		return false;
 
@@ -240,10 +243,11 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(struct
 {
 	struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
 	unsigned long page_offset = gpa & ~PAGE_MASK;
-	kvm_pfn_t old_pfn, new_pfn;
+	bool unmap_old = false;
 	unsigned long old_uhva;
+	kvm_pfn_t old_pfn;
 	void *old_khva;
-	int ret = 0;
+	int ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * If must fit within a single page. The 'len' argument is
@@ -261,6 +265,11 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(struct
 
 	write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock);
 
+	if (!gpc->active) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
 	old_pfn = gpc->pfn;
 	old_khva = gpc->khva - offset_in_page(gpc->khva);
 	old_uhva = gpc->uhva;
@@ -291,6 +300,7 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(struct
 		/* If the HVA→PFN mapping was already valid, don't unmap it. */
 		old_pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
 		old_khva = NULL;
+		ret = 0;
 	}
 
  out:
@@ -305,14 +315,15 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(struct
 		gpc->khva = NULL;
 	}
 
-	/* Snapshot the new pfn before dropping the lock! */
-	new_pfn = gpc->pfn;
+	/* Detect a pfn change before dropping the lock! */
+	unmap_old = (old_pfn != gpc->pfn);
 
+out_unlock:
 	write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&gpc->refresh_lock);
 
-	if (old_pfn != new_pfn)
+	if (unmap_old)
 		gpc_unmap_khva(kvm, old_pfn, old_khva);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -366,11 +377,19 @@ int kvm_gpc_activate(struct kvm *kvm, st
 		gpc->vcpu = vcpu;
 		gpc->usage = usage;
 		gpc->valid = false;
-		gpc->active = true;
 
 		spin_lock(&kvm->gpc_lock);
 		list_add(&gpc->list, &kvm->gpc_list);
 		spin_unlock(&kvm->gpc_lock);
+
+		/*
+		 * Activate the cache after adding it to the list, a concurrent
+		 * refresh must not establish a mapping until the cache is
+		 * reachable by mmu_notifier events.
+		 */
+		write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+		gpc->active = true;
+		write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock);
 	}
 	return kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_refresh(kvm, gpc, gpa, len);
 }
@@ -379,12 +398,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_activate);
 void kvm_gpc_deactivate(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_pfn_cache *gpc)
 {
 	if (gpc->active) {
+		/*
+		 * Deactivate the cache before removing it from the list, KVM
+		 * must stall mmu_notifier events until all users go away, i.e.
+		 * until gpc->lock is dropped and refresh is guaranteed to fail.
+		 */
+		write_lock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+		gpc->active = false;
+		write_unlock_irq(&gpc->lock);
+
 		spin_lock(&kvm->gpc_lock);
 		list_del(&gpc->list);
 		spin_unlock(&kvm->gpc_lock);
 
 		kvm_gfn_to_pfn_cache_unmap(kvm, gpc);
-		gpc->active = false;
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gpc_deactivate);
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 181/197 KVM: arm64: Fix bad dereference on MTE-enabled systems

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ryan Roberts <[email protected]>

commit b6bcdc9f6b8321e4471ff45413b6410e16762a8d upstream.

enter_exception64() performs an MTE check, which involves dereferencing vcpu->kvm. While vcpu has already been fixed up to be a HYP VA pointer, kvm is still a pointer in the kernel VA space.

This only affects nVHE configurations with MTE enabled, as in other cases, the pointer is either valid (VHE) or not dereferenced (!MTE).

Fix this by first converting kvm to a HYP VA pointer.

Fixes ea7fc1bb1cd1 ("KVM: arm64: Introduce MTE VM feature")
[maz: commit message tidy-up]
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/exception.c +2 -1
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <hyp/adjust_pc.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
+#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
 
 #if !defined (__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__) && !defined (__KVM_VHE_HYPERVISOR__)
 #error Hypervisor code only!
@@ -115,7 +116,7 @@ static void enter_exception64(struct kvm
 	new |= (old & PSR_C_BIT);
 	new |= (old & PSR_V_BIT);
 
-	if (kvm_has_mte(vcpu->kvm))
+	if (kvm_has_mte(kern_hyp_va(vcpu->kvm)))
 		new |= PSR_TCO_BIT;
 
 	new |= (old & PSR_DIT_BIT);
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 182/197 KVM: arm64: Fix SMPRI_EL1/TPIDR2_EL0 trapping on VHE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

commit 4151bb636acf32bb2e6126cec8216b023117c0e9 upstream.

The trapping of SMPRI_EL1 and TPIDR2_EL0 currently only really work on nVHE, as only this mode uses the fine-grained trapping that controls these two registers.

Move the trapping enable/disable code into __{de,}activate_traps_common(), allowing it to be called when it actually matters on VHE, and remove the flipping of EL2 control for TPIDR2_EL0, which only affects the host access of this register.

Fixes 861262ab8627 ("KVM: arm64: Handle SME host state when running guests")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c        | 26 -------------------------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c         |  8 --------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h +20 -0
index 6cbbb6c02f66..3330d1b76bdd 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,17 @@ static inline void __activate_traps_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2_host = read_sysreg(mdcr_el2);
 	write_sysreg(vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2, mdcr_el2);
+
+	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
+		sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_HFGRTR_EL2,
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK |
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK,
+				   0);
+		sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_HFGWTR_EL2,
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK |
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK,
+				   0);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void __deactivate_traps_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -96,6 +107,15 @@ static inline void __deactivate_traps_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	write_sysreg(0, hstr_el2);
 	if (kvm_arm_support_pmu_v3())
 		write_sysreg(0, pmuserenr_el0);
+
+	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
+		sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_HFGRTR_EL2, 0,
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK |
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK);
+		sysreg_clear_set_s(SYS_HFGWTR_EL2, 0,
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK |
+				   HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK);
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void ___activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c +0 -26
index 8e9d49a964be..c2cb46ca4fb6 100644
@@ -55,18 +55,6 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
 	write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el2);
 
-	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
-		val = read_sysreg_s(SYS_HFGRTR_EL2);
-		val &= ~(HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK |
-			 HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK);
-		write_sysreg_s(val, SYS_HFGRTR_EL2);
-
-		val = read_sysreg_s(SYS_HFGWTR_EL2);
-		val &= ~(HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK |
-			 HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK);
-		write_sysreg_s(val, SYS_HFGWTR_EL2);
-	}
-
 	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)) {
 		struct kvm_cpu_context *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.ctxt;
 
@@ -110,20 +98,6 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	write_sysreg(this_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params)->hcr_el2, hcr_el2);
 
-	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME)) {
-		u64 val;
-
-		val = read_sysreg_s(SYS_HFGRTR_EL2);
-		val |= HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK |
-			HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK;
-		write_sysreg_s(val, SYS_HFGRTR_EL2);
-
-		val = read_sysreg_s(SYS_HFGWTR_EL2);
-		val |= HFGxTR_EL2_nTPIDR2_EL0_MASK |
-			HFGxTR_EL2_nSMPRI_EL1_MASK;
-		write_sysreg_s(val, SYS_HFGWTR_EL2);
-	}
-
 	cptr = CPTR_EL2_DEFAULT;
 	if (vcpu_has_sve(vcpu) && (vcpu->arch.fp_state == FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED))
 		cptr |= CPTR_EL2_TZ;
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c +0 -8
index 7acb87eaa092..1a97391fedd2 100644
@@ -63,10 +63,6 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
 	}
 
-	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
-		write_sysreg(read_sysreg(sctlr_el2) & ~SCTLR_ELx_ENTP2,
-			     sctlr_el2);
-
 	write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
 
 	write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el1);
@@ -88,10 +84,6 @@ static void __deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", "isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT));
 
-	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
-		write_sysreg(read_sysreg(sctlr_el2) | SCTLR_ELx_ENTP2,
-			     sctlr_el2);
-
 	write_sysreg(CPACR_EL1_DEFAULT, cpacr_el1);
 
 	if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 183/197 KVM: x86: smm: number of GPRs in the SMRAM image depends on the image format

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

commit 696db303e54f7352623d9f640e6c51d8fa9d5588 upstream.

On 64 bit host, if the guest doesn't have X86_FEATURE_LM, KVM will access 16 gprs to 32-bit smram image, causing out-ouf-bound ram access.

On 32 bit host, the rsm_load_state_64/enter_smm_save_state_64 is compiled out, thus access overflow can't happen.

Fixes b443183a25ab61 ("KVM: x86: Reduce the number of emulator GPRs to '8' for 32-bit KVM")

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +2 -2
@@ -2430,7 +2430,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_32(struct x86_
 	ctxt->eflags =             GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ff4) | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
 	ctxt->_eip =               GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7ff0);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < NR_EMULATOR_GPRS; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
 		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fd0 + i * 4);
 
 	val = GET_SMSTATE(u32, smstate, 0x7fcc);
@@ -2487,7 +2487,7 @@ static int rsm_load_state_64(struct x86_
 	u16 selector;
 	int i, r;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < NR_EMULATOR_GPRS; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
 		*reg_write(ctxt, i) = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7ff8 - i * 8);
 
 	ctxt->_eip   = GET_SMSTATE(u64, smstate, 0x7f78);
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 184/197 KVM: x86: emulator: em_sysexit should update ctxt->mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

commit 5015bb89b58225f97df6ac44383e7e8c8662c8c9 upstream.

SYSEXIT is one of the instructions that can change the processor mode, thus ctxt->mode should be updated after it.

Note that this is likely a benign bug, because the only problematic mode change is from 32 bit to 64 bit which can lead to truncation of RIP, and it is not possible to do with sysexit,
since sysexit running in 32 bit mode will be limited to 32 bit version.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +1 -0
@@ -2874,6 +2874,7 @@ static int em_sysexit(struct x86_emulate
 	ops->set_segment(ctxt, ss_sel, &ss, 0, VCPU_SREG_SS);
 
 	ctxt->_eip = rdx;
+	ctxt->mode = usermode;
 	*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = rcx;
 
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 185/197 KVM: x86: emulator: introduce emulator_recalc_and_set_mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

commit d087e0f79fa0dd336a9a6b2f79ec23120f5eff73 upstream.

Some instructions update the cpu execution mode, which needs to update the emulation mode.

Extract this code, and make assign_eip_far use it.

assign_eip_far now reads CS, instead of getting it via a parameter, which is ok, because callers always assign CS to the same value before calling this function.

No functional change is intended.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |   85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +57 -28
@@ -791,8 +791,7 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_
 			   ctxt->mode, linear);
 }
 
-static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
-			     enum x86emul_mode mode)
+static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
 	ulong linear;
 	int rc;
@@ -802,41 +801,71 @@ static inline int assign_eip(struct x86_
 
 	if (ctxt->op_bytes != sizeof(unsigned long))
 		addr.ea = dst & ((1UL << (ctxt->op_bytes << 3)) - 1);
-	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, mode, &linear);
+	rc = __linearize(ctxt, addr, &max_size, 1, false, true, ctxt->mode, &linear);
 	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		ctxt->_eip = addr.ea;
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static inline int emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	u64 efer;
+	struct desc_struct cs;
+	u16 selector;
+	u32 base3;
+
+	ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
+
+	if (!(ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_PE)) {
+		/* Real mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_REAL;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
+		/* Protected/VM86 mode. cpu must not have long mode active */
+		if (efer & EFER_LMA)
+			return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+		ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
+		return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	if (!ctxt->ops->get_segment(ctxt, &selector, &cs, &base3, VCPU_SREG_CS))
+		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+	if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
+		if (cs.l) {
+			/* Proper long mode */
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
+		} else if (cs.d) {
+			/* 32 bit compatibility mode*/
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
+		} else {
+			ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Legacy 32 bit / 16 bit mode */
+		ctxt->mode = cs.d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
+	}
+
+	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
 static inline int assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
-	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst, ctxt->mode);
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
 }
 
-static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst,
-			  const struct desc_struct *cs_desc)
+static int assign_eip_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst)
 {
-	enum x86emul_mode mode = ctxt->mode;
-	int rc;
+	int rc = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-	if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16) {
-		if (cs_desc->l) {
-			u64 efer = 0;
+	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+		return rc;
 
-			ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer);
-			if (efer & EFER_LMA)
-				mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64;
-		} else
-			mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32; /* temporary value */
-	}
-#endif
-	if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 || mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32)
-		mode = cs_desc->d ? X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32 : X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16;
-	rc = assign_eip(ctxt, dst, mode);
-	if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
-		ctxt->mode = mode;
-	return rc;
+	return assign_eip(ctxt, dst);
 }
 
 static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel)
@@ -2170,7 +2199,7 @@ static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
 	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
@@ -2248,7 +2277,7 @@ static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate
 				       &new_desc);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip);
 	/* Error handling is not implemented. */
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
@@ -3468,7 +3497,7 @@ static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulat
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val, &new_desc);
+	rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		goto fail;
 
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 186/197 KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after rsm

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

commit 055f37f84e304e59c046d1accfd8f08462f52c4c upstream.

Update the emulation mode after RSM so that RIP will be correctly written back, because the RSM instruction can switch the CPU mode from 32 bit (or less) to 64 bit.

This fixes a guest crash in case the #SMI is received while the guest runs a code from an address > 32 bit.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +1 -1
@@ -2660,7 +2660,7 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctx
 	 * those side effects need to be explicitly handled for both success
 	 * and shutdown.
 	 */
-	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+	return emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
 
 emulate_shutdown:
 	ctxt->ops->triple_fault(ctxt);
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 187/197 KVM: x86: emulator: update the emulation mode after CR0 write

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>

commit ad8f9e69942c7db90758d9d774157e53bce94840 upstream.

Update the emulation mode when handling writes to CR0, because toggling CR0.PE switches between Real and Protected Mode, and toggling CR0.PG when EFER.LME=1 switches between Long and Protected Mode.

This is likely a benign bug because there is no writeback of state, other than the RIP increment, and when toggling CR0.PE, the CPU has to execute code from a very low memory address.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +15 -1
@@ -3639,11 +3639,25 @@ static int em_movbe(struct x86_emulate_c
 
 static int em_cr_write(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
-	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, ctxt->src.val))
+	int cr_num = ctxt->modrm_reg;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, cr_num, ctxt->src.val))
 		return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
 
 	/* Disable writeback. */
 	ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
+
+	if (cr_num == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * CR0 write might have updated CR0.PE and/or CR0.PG
+		 * which can affect the cpu's execution mode.
+		 */
+		r = emulator_recalc_and_set_mode(ctxt);
+		if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+			return r;
+	}
+
 	return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
 }
 
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 188/197 ext4,f2fs: fix readahead of verity data

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>

commit 4fa0e3ff217f775cb58d2d6d51820ec519243fb9 upstream.

The recent change of page_cache_ra_unbounded() arguments was buggy in the two callers, causing us to readahead the wrong pages. Move the definition of ractl down to after the index is set correctly. This affected performance on configurations that use fs-verity.

Fixes 73bb49da50cd ("mm/readahead: make page_cache_ra_unbounded take a readahead_control")
Cc Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
 fs/ext4/verity.c |    3 ++-
 fs/f2fs/verity.c |    3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/verity.c +2 -1
@@ -365,13 +365,14 @@ static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tre
 					       pgoff_t index,
 					       unsigned long num_ra_pages)
 {
-	DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, NULL, NULL, inode->i_mapping, index);
 	struct page *page;
 
 	index += ext4_verity_metadata_pos(inode) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED);
 	if (!page || !PageUptodate(page)) {
+		DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, NULL, NULL, inode->i_mapping, index);
+
 		if (page)
 			put_page(page);
 		else if (num_ra_pages > 1)
fs/f2fs/verity.c +2 -1
@@ -262,13 +262,14 @@ static struct page *f2fs_read_merkle_tre
 					       pgoff_t index,
 					       unsigned long num_ra_pages)
 {
-	DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, NULL, NULL, inode->i_mapping, index);
 	struct page *page;
 
 	index += f2fs_verity_metadata_pos(inode) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, index, FGP_ACCESSED);
 	if (!page || !PageUptodate(page)) {
+		DEFINE_READAHEAD(ractl, NULL, NULL, inode->i_mapping, index);
+
 		if (page)
 			put_page(page);
 		else if (num_ra_pages > 1)
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 189/197 cifs: fix regression in very old smb1 mounts

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>

commit 2f6f19c7aaad5005dc75298a413eb0243c5d312d upstream.

BZ: 215375

Fixes 76a3c92ec9e0 ("cifs: remove support for NTLM and weaker authentication algorithms")
---
 fs/cifs/connect.c |   11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/connect.c +5 -6
@@ -3921,12 +3921,11 @@ CIFSTCon(const unsigned int xid, struct
 	pSMB->AndXCommand = 0xFF;
 	pSMB->Flags = cpu_to_le16(TCON_EXTENDED_SECINFO);
 	bcc_ptr = &pSMB->Password[0];
-	if (tcon->pipe || (ses->server->sec_mode & SECMODE_USER)) {
-		pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(1);	/* minimum */
-		*bcc_ptr = 0; /* password is null byte */
-		bcc_ptr++;              /* skip password */
-		/* already aligned so no need to do it below */
-	}
+
+	pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(1);	/* minimum */
+	*bcc_ptr = 0; /* password is null byte */
+	bcc_ptr++;              /* skip password */
+	/* already aligned so no need to do it below */
 
 	if (ses->server->sign)
 		smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE;
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 190/197 drm/rockchip: dsi: Clean up usage_mode when failing to attach

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Brian Norris <[email protected]>

commit 0be67e0556e469c57100ffe3c90df90abc796f3b upstream.

If we fail to attach the first time (especially: EPROBE_DEFER), we fail to clean up 'usage_mode', and thus will fail to attach on any subsequent attempts, with "dsi controller already in use".

Re-set to DW_DSI_USAGE_IDLE on attach failure.

This is especially common to hit when enabling asynchronous probe on a duel-DSI system (such as RK3399 Gru/Scarlet), such that we're more likely to fail dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_find_second() the first time.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip.c |   16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip.c +12 -4
@@ -1031,23 +1031,31 @@ static int dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_host_att
 	if (ret) {
 		DRM_DEV_ERROR(dsi->dev, "Failed to register component: %d\n",
 					ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto out;
 	}
 
 	second = dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_find_second(dsi);
-	if (IS_ERR(second))
-		return PTR_ERR(second);
+	if (IS_ERR(second)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(second);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	if (second) {
 		ret = component_add(second, &dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_ops);
 		if (ret) {
 			DRM_DEV_ERROR(second,
 				      "Failed to register component: %d\n",
 				      ret);
-			return ret;
+			goto out;
 		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
+
+out:
+	mutex_lock(&dsi->usage_mutex);
+	dsi->usage_mode = DW_DSI_USAGE_IDLE;
+	mutex_unlock(&dsi->usage_mutex);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_host_detach(void *priv_data,
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 191/197 drm/rockchip: dsi: Force synchronous probe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Brian Norris <[email protected]>

commit 81e592f86f7afdb76d655e7fbd7803d7b8f985d8 upstream.

We can't safely probe a dual-DSI display asynchronously (driver_async_probe='*' or driver_async_probe='dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip' cmdline), because dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_find_second() pokes one DSI device's drvdata from the other device without any locking.

Request synchronous probe, at least until this driver learns some appropriate locking for dual-DSI initialization.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip.c +6 -0
@@ -1642,5 +1642,11 @@ struct platform_driver dw_mipi_dsi_rockc
 		.of_match_table = dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_dt_ids,
 		.pm	= &dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_pm_ops,
 		.name	= "dw-mipi-dsi-rockchip",
+		/*
+		 * For dual-DSI display, one DSI pokes at the other DSI's
+		 * drvdata in dw_mipi_dsi_rockchip_find_second(). This is not
+		 * safe for asynchronous probe.
+		 */
+		.probe_type = PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS,
 	},
 };
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 192/197 drm/amdgpu: disable GFXOFF during compute for GFX11

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Graham Sider <[email protected]>

commit a3e5ce56f3d260f2ec8e5242c33f57e60ae9eba7 upstream.

Temporary workaround to fix issues observed in some compute applications when GFXOFF is enabled on GFX11.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd.c +7 -0
@@ -703,6 +703,13 @@ err:
 
 void amdgpu_amdkfd_set_compute_idle(struct amdgpu_device *adev, bool idle)
 {
+	/* Temporary workaround to fix issues observed in some
+	 * compute applications when GFXOFF is enabled on GFX11.
+	 */
+	if (IP_VERSION_MAJ(adev->ip_versions[GC_HWIP][0]) == 11) {
+		pr_debug("GFXOFF is %s\n", idle ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+		amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, idle);
+	}
 	amdgpu_dpm_switch_power_profile(adev,
 					PP_SMC_POWER_PROFILE_COMPUTE,
 					!idle);
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 193/197 drm/amd/display: Update latencies on DCN321

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dillon Varone <[email protected]>

commit c580d758ba1b79de9ea7a475d95a6278736ae462 upstream.

Update DF related latencies based on new measurements.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn321/dcn321_fpu.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dml/dcn321/dcn321_fpu.c +5 -5
@@ -119,15 +119,15 @@ struct _vcs_dpi_soc_bounding_box_st dcn3
 		},
 	},
 	.num_states = 1,
-	.sr_exit_time_us = 12.36,
-	.sr_enter_plus_exit_time_us = 16.72,
+	.sr_exit_time_us = 19.95,
+	.sr_enter_plus_exit_time_us = 24.36,
 	.sr_exit_z8_time_us = 285.0,
 	.sr_enter_plus_exit_z8_time_us = 320,
 	.writeback_latency_us = 12.0,
 	.round_trip_ping_latency_dcfclk_cycles = 263,
-	.urgent_latency_pixel_data_only_us = 4.0,
-	.urgent_latency_pixel_mixed_with_vm_data_us = 4.0,
-	.urgent_latency_vm_data_only_us = 4.0,
+	.urgent_latency_pixel_data_only_us = 9.35,
+	.urgent_latency_pixel_mixed_with_vm_data_us = 9.35,
+	.urgent_latency_vm_data_only_us = 9.35,
 	.fclk_change_latency_us = 20,
 	.usr_retraining_latency_us = 2,
 	.smn_latency_us = 2,
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 194/197 drm/amd/display: Update DSC capabilitie for DCN314

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Leo Chen <[email protected]>

commit 341421084d705475817f7f0d68e130370d10b20d upstream.

dcn314 has 4 DSC - conflicted hardware document updated and confirmed.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn314/dcn314_resource.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn314/dcn314_resource.c +1 -1
@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static const struct resource_caps res_ca
 	.num_ddc = 5,
 	.num_vmid = 16,
 	.num_mpc_3dlut = 2,
-	.num_dsc = 3,
+	.num_dsc = 4,
 };
 
 static const struct dc_plane_cap plane_cap = {
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 195/197 drm/i915/sdvo: Filter out invalid outputs more sensibly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 3e206b6aa6df7eed4297577e0cf8403169b800a2 upstream.

We try to filter out the corresponding xxx1 output if the xxx0 output is not present. But the way that is being done is pretty awkward. Make it less so.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_sdvo.c |   27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_sdvo.c +22 -5
@@ -2926,16 +2926,33 @@ err:
 	return false;
 }
 
+static u16 intel_sdvo_filter_output_flags(u16 flags)
+{
+	flags &= SDVO_OUTPUT_MASK;
+
+	/* SDVO requires XXX1 function may not exist unless it has XXX0 function.*/
+	if (!(flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS0))
+		flags &= ~SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS1;
+
+	if (!(flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB0))
+		flags &= ~SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB1;
+
+	if (!(flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS0))
+		flags &= ~SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS1;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static bool
 intel_sdvo_output_setup(struct intel_sdvo *intel_sdvo, u16 flags)
 {
-	/* SDVO requires XXX1 function may not exist unless it has XXX0 function.*/
+	flags = intel_sdvo_filter_output_flags(flags);
 
 	if (flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS0)
 		if (!intel_sdvo_dvi_init(intel_sdvo, 0))
 			return false;
 
-	if ((flags & SDVO_TMDS_MASK) == SDVO_TMDS_MASK)
+	if (flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS1)
 		if (!intel_sdvo_dvi_init(intel_sdvo, 1))
 			return false;
 
@@ -2956,7 +2973,7 @@ intel_sdvo_output_setup(struct intel_sdv
 		if (!intel_sdvo_analog_init(intel_sdvo, 0))
 			return false;
 
-	if ((flags & SDVO_RGB_MASK) == SDVO_RGB_MASK)
+	if (flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB1)
 		if (!intel_sdvo_analog_init(intel_sdvo, 1))
 			return false;
 
@@ -2964,11 +2981,11 @@ intel_sdvo_output_setup(struct intel_sdv
 		if (!intel_sdvo_lvds_init(intel_sdvo, 0))
 			return false;
 
-	if ((flags & SDVO_LVDS_MASK) == SDVO_LVDS_MASK)
+	if (flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS1)
 		if (!intel_sdvo_lvds_init(intel_sdvo, 1))
 			return false;
 
-	if ((flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_MASK) == 0) {
+	if (flags == 0) {
 		unsigned char bytes[2];
 
 		intel_sdvo->controlled_output = 0;
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 196/197 drm/i915/sdvo: Setup DDC fully before output init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit e79762512120f11c51317570519a1553c70805d8 upstream.

Call intel_sdvo_select_ddc_bus() before initializing any of the outputs. And before that is functional (assuming no VBT) we have to set up the controlled_outputs thing. Otherwise DDC won't be functional during the output init but LVDS really needs it for the fixed mode setup.

Note that the whole multi output support still looks very bogus, and more work will be needed to make it correct. But for now this should at least fix the LVDS EDID fixed mode setup.

Fixes aa2b88074a56 ("drm/i915/sdvo: Fix multi function encoder stuff")
(cherry picked from commit 64b7b557dc8a96d9cfed6aedbf81de2df80c025d)
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_sdvo.c |   31 +++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_sdvo.c +12 -19
@@ -2747,13 +2747,10 @@ intel_sdvo_dvi_init(struct intel_sdvo *i
 	if (!intel_sdvo_connector)
 		return false;
 
-	if (device == 0) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS0;
+	if (device == 0)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS0;
-	} else if (device == 1) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS1;
+	else if (device == 1)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS1;
-	}
 
 	intel_connector = &intel_sdvo_connector->base;
 	connector = &intel_connector->base;
@@ -2808,7 +2805,6 @@ intel_sdvo_tv_init(struct intel_sdvo *in
 	encoder->encoder_type = DRM_MODE_ENCODER_TVDAC;
 	connector->connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_SVIDEO;
 
-	intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= type;
 	intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = type;
 
 	if (intel_sdvo_connector_init(intel_sdvo_connector, intel_sdvo) < 0) {
@@ -2849,13 +2845,10 @@ intel_sdvo_analog_init(struct intel_sdvo
 	encoder->encoder_type = DRM_MODE_ENCODER_DAC;
 	connector->connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_VGA;
 
-	if (device == 0) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB0;
+	if (device == 0)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB0;
-	} else if (device == 1) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB1;
+	else if (device == 1)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_RGB1;
-	}
 
 	if (intel_sdvo_connector_init(intel_sdvo_connector, intel_sdvo) < 0) {
 		kfree(intel_sdvo_connector);
@@ -2885,13 +2878,10 @@ intel_sdvo_lvds_init(struct intel_sdvo *
 	encoder->encoder_type = DRM_MODE_ENCODER_LVDS;
 	connector->connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_LVDS;
 
-	if (device == 0) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS0;
+	if (device == 0)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS0;
-	} else if (device == 1) {
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output |= SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS1;
+	else if (device == 1)
 		intel_sdvo_connector->output_flag = SDVO_OUTPUT_LVDS1;
-	}
 
 	if (intel_sdvo_connector_init(intel_sdvo_connector, intel_sdvo) < 0) {
 		kfree(intel_sdvo_connector);
@@ -2946,8 +2936,14 @@ static u16 intel_sdvo_filter_output_flag
 static bool
 intel_sdvo_output_setup(struct intel_sdvo *intel_sdvo, u16 flags)
 {
+	struct drm_i915_private *i915 = to_i915(intel_sdvo->base.base.dev);
+
 	flags = intel_sdvo_filter_output_flags(flags);
 
+	intel_sdvo->controlled_output = flags;
+
+	intel_sdvo_select_ddc_bus(i915, intel_sdvo);
+
 	if (flags & SDVO_OUTPUT_TMDS0)
 		if (!intel_sdvo_dvi_init(intel_sdvo, 0))
 			return false;
@@ -2988,7 +2984,6 @@ intel_sdvo_output_setup(struct intel_sdv
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		unsigned char bytes[2];
 
-		intel_sdvo->controlled_output = 0;
 		memcpy(bytes, &intel_sdvo->caps.output_flags, 2);
 		DRM_DEBUG_KMS("%s: Unknown SDVO output type (0x%02x%02x)\n",
 			      SDVO_NAME(intel_sdvo),
@@ -3400,8 +3395,6 @@ bool intel_sdvo_init(struct drm_i915_pri
 	 */
 	intel_sdvo->base.cloneable = 0;
 
-	intel_sdvo_select_ddc_bus(dev_priv, intel_sdvo);
-
 	/* Set the input timing to the screen. Assume always input 0. */
 	if (!intel_sdvo_set_target_input(intel_sdvo))
 		goto err_output;
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 197/197 wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential buffer overflow in brcmf_fweh_event_worker()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dokyung Song <[email protected]>

commit 6788ba8aed4e28e90f72d68a9d794e34eac17295 upstream.

This patch fixes an intra-object buffer overflow in brcmfmac that occurs when the device provides a 'bsscfgidx' equal to or greater than the buffer size. The patch adds a check that leads to a safe failure if that is the case.

This fixes CVE-2022-3628.

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/fweh.c
index 52 is out of range for type 'brcmf_if *[16]'
CPU: 0 PID: 1898 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G           O      5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events brcmf_fweh_event_worker
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x69/0x80
 ? memcpy+0x39/0x60
 brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0xae1/0xc00
 ? brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0
 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0
 kthread+0x379/0x450
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
================================================================================
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe5601c0020023fff: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x2b0100010011fff8-0x2b0100010011ffff]
CPU: 0 PID: 1898 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G           O      5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events brcmf_fweh_event_worker
RIP: 0010:brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x42/0x100
Code: 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 e8 79 0b 38 fe 48 85 ed 74 7e e8 6f 0b 38 fe 48 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 8b 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d 00 44 89 e0 48 ba 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000259fbd8 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115d8cd50 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0560200020023fff RSI: ffffffff8304bc91 RDI: ffff888115d8cd50
RBP: 2b0100010011ffff R08: ffff888112340050 R09: ffffed1023549809
R10: ffff88811aa4c047 R11: ffffed1023549808 R12: 0000000000000045
R13: ffffc9000259fca0 R14: ffff888112340050 R15: ffff888112340000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000004053ccc0 CR3: 0000000112740000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 brcmf_fweh_event_worker+0x117/0xc00
 ? brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0
 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0
 kthread+0x379/0x450
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Modules linked in: 88XXau(O) 88x2bu(O)
---[ end trace 41d302138f3ff55a ]---
RIP: 0010:brcmf_fweh_call_event_handler.isra.0+0x42/0x100
Code: 89 f5 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 e8 79 0b 38 fe 48 85 ed 74 7e e8 6f 0b 38 fe 48 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 8b 00 00 00 4c 8b 7d 00 44 89 e0 48 ba 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000259fbd8 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115d8cd50 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0560200020023fff RSI: ffffffff8304bc91 RDI: ffff888115d8cd50
RBP: 2b0100010011ffff R08: ffff888112340050 R09: ffffed1023549809
R10: ffff88811aa4c047 R11: ffffed1023549808 R12: 0000000000000045
R13: ffffc9000259fca0 R14: ffff888112340050 R15: ffff888112340000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000004053ccc0 CR3: 0000000112740000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/fweh.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/fweh.c +4 -0
@@ -228,6 +228,10 @@ static void brcmf_fweh_event_worker(stru
 			  brcmf_fweh_event_name(event->code), event->code,
 			  event->emsg.ifidx, event->emsg.bsscfgidx,
 			  event->emsg.addr);
+		if (event->emsg.bsscfgidx >= BRCMF_MAX_IFS) {
+			bphy_err(drvr, "invalid bsscfg index: %u\n", event->emsg.bsscfgidx);
+			goto event_free;
+		}
 
 		/* convert event message */
 		emsg_be = &event->emsg;
Tested-by on the v1 series
#201 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Tested rc1 against the Fedora build system (aarch64, armv7, ppc64le, s390x, x86_64), and boot tested x86_64. No regressions noted.

Tested-by on the v1 series
#202 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Tested-by on the v1 series
#203 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Quoted 9 lines

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

Compiled and booted on my x86_64 and ARM64 test systems. No errors or regressions.

Thanks.

Tested-by on the v1 series
#204 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).

Tested-by on the v1 series
#205 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 152 pass: 152 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 500 pass: 500 fail: 0

Guenter

#207 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro's test farm.

kselftest: net: ip_defrag.sh fails on x86_64 and i386. Our bisect scripts are running.

This failure is also noticed on recent mainline master branch.

Test log did not have details of failure.
# selftests: net: ip_defrag.sh
not ok 19 selftests: net: ip_defrag.sh # exit=1

Stable-rc Linux-6.0:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.0.y/build/v6.0.7-198-g87175bf36da5/testrun/12904204/suite/kselftest-net/test/net.ip_defrag.sh/history/

Mainline master:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-mainline-master/build/v6.1-rc4/testrun/12848742/suite/kselftest-net/test/net.ip_defrag.sh/history/

## Build
* kernel: 6.0.8-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-6.0.y
* git commit: 87175bf36da5ab43b42de327d6fdc5987b604269
* git describe: v6.0.7-198-g87175bf36da5
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-6.0.y/build/v6.0.7-198-g87175bf36da5

## Test Regressions (compared to v6.0.6-241-g436175d0f780)

* qemu_i386, kselftest-net
- net.ip_defrag.sh

* x86, kselftest-net
- net.ip_defrag.sh

## Metric Regressions (compared to v6.0.6-241-g436175d0f780)

## Test Fixes (compared to v6.0.6-241-g436175d0f780)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v6.0.6-241-g436175d0f780)

## Test result summary
total: 158003, pass: 133527, fail: 6163, skip: 17932, xfail: 381

## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 149 total, 146 passed, 3 failed
* arm64: 46 total, 46 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 37 total, 36 passed, 1 failed
* mips: 27 total, 26 passed, 1 failed
* parisc: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 34 total, 30 passed, 4 failed
* riscv: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 40 total, 40 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kself[
* kselft[
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_c_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_j_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_jc_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.bti_none_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.nohint_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.btitest.paciasp_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_c_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_j_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_jc_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.bti_none_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.nohint_func
* kselftest-arm64/arm64.nobtitest.paciasp_func
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simpl
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-math++
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* perf/Zstd-perf.data-compression
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Tested-by on the v1 series
#208 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 5 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Successfully cross-compiled for arm64 (bcm2711_defconfig, GCC 10.2.0) and powerpc (ps3_defconfig, GCC 12.2.0).

Signature · 1 line
An old man doll... just what I always wanted! - Clara
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#209 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v6.0:

    11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
    28 boots:	28 pass, 0 fail
    130 tests:	130 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 6.0.8-rc1-g87175bf36da5
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000,
                tegra20-ventana, tegra210-p2371-2180,
                tegra210-p3450-0000, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#210 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Hi Greg,

6.0.8-rc1 tested.

Run tested on:
- Intel Alder Lake x86_64 (nuc12 i7-1260P)

In addition - build tested for:
- Allwinner A64
- Allwinner H3
- Allwinner H5
- Allwinner H6
- NXP iMX6
- NXP iMX8
- Qualcomm Dragonboard
- Rockchip RK3288
- Rockchip RK3328
- Rockchip RK3399pro
- Samsung Exynos5422

--
Rudi

Tested-by on the v1 series
#211 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.0.8-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.0.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by on the v1 series
#212 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi Greg,

Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.0.8 release. There are 197 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu, 10 Nov 2022 13:33:17 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build test (gcc version 12.2.1 20221016):
mips: 52 configs -> no failure
arm: 100 configs -> no failure
arm64: 3 configs -> no failure
x86_64: 4 configs -> no failure alpha allmodconfig -> no failure csky allmodconfig -> no failure powerpc allmodconfig -> no failure riscv allmodconfig -> no failure s390 allmodconfig -> no failure xtensa allmodconfig -> no failure

Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]
arm64: Booted on rpi4b (4GB model). No regression. [2]

[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/2129
[2]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/2135

Signature · 2 lines
Regards
Sudip