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efi: random: zero out secret after use and do not take minimum

PATCH Superseded Jason A. Donenfeld 2 participants 5 messages Nov 16, 2022 – Nov 18, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 efi: random: zero out secret after use and do not take minimum

Taking the minimum is wrong, if the bootloader or EFI stub is actually passing on a bunch of bytes that it expects the kernel to hash itself. Ideally, a bootloader will hash it for us, but STUB won't do that, so we should map all the bytes. Also, all those bytes must be zeroed out after use to preserve forward secrecy.

Fixes 161a438d730d ("efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes")
Cc [email protected] # v4.14+
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2 -1
index f73709f7589a..819409b7b43b 100644
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
 		seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		if (seed != NULL) {
-			size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
+			size = seed->size;
 			early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		} else {
 			pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
@@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 			if (seed != NULL) {
 				pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
 				add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, size);
+				memzero_explicit(seed->bits, size);
 				early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			} else {
 				pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Taking the minimum is wrong, if the bootloader or EFI stub is actually passing on a bunch of bytes that it expects the kernel to hash itself.

We still need some kind of limit, just so things don't explode if seed->size is bogus.

Quoted 37 lines

Ideally, a bootloader will hash it for us, but STUB won't do that, so we should map all the bytes. Also, all those bytes must be zeroed out after use to preserve forward secrecy.

Fixes 161a438d730d ("efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes")
Cc [email protected] # v4.14+
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2 -2
index f73709f7589a..819409b7b43b 100644
@@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
                seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
                if (seed != NULL) {
-                       size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
+                       size = seed->size;
                        early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
                } else {
                        pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
@@ -641,6 +641,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
                        if (seed != NULL) {
                                pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
                                add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, size);
+                               memzero_explicit(seed->bits, size);
                                early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        } else {
                                pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
--

2.38.1

#2 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 3 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Taking the minimum is wrong, if the bootloader or EFI stub is actually passing on a bunch of bytes that it expects the kernel to hash itself.

We still need some kind of limit, just so things don't explode if seed->size is bogus.

Alright, let's just say 1k then. Will send a v2.

Jason

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 efi: random: zero out secret after use and do not take minimum

Taking the minimum is wrong, if the bootloader or EFI stub is actually passing on a bunch of bytes that it expects the kernel to hash itself. Ideally, a bootloader will hash it for us, but STUB won't do that, so we should map all the bytes. Also, all those bytes must be zeroed out after use to preserve forward secrecy.

Fixes 161a438d730d ("efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes")
Cc [email protected] # v4.14+
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>

---
Changes v1->v2:
- Cap size to 1k.

 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2 -1
index a46df5d1d094..c7c7178902c2 100644
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
 		seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		if (seed != NULL) {
-			size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
+			size = min_t(u32, SZ_1K, seed->size);
 			early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
 		} else {
 			pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
@@ -622,6 +622,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 			if (seed != NULL) {
 				pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
 				add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, size);
+				memzero_explicit(seed->bits, size);
 				early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
 			} else {
 				pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
maintainer
#4 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld

Taking the minimum is wrong, if the bootloader or EFI stub is actually passing on a bunch of bytes that it expects the kernel to hash itself. Ideally, a bootloader will hash it for us, but STUB won't do that, so we should map all the bytes. Also, all those bytes must be zeroed out after use to preserve forward secrecy.

Fixes 161a438d730d ("efi: random: reduce seed size to 32 bytes")
Cc [email protected] # v4.14+
Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Cc Ilias Apalodimas <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines

---
Changes v1->v2:
- Cap size to 1k.

 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Thanks. I'll just incorporate this into the patch that does the concatenation of seeds in the stub, which is queued up for v6.2

Quoted 24 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +2 -2
index a46df5d1d094..c7c7178902c2 100644
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
 
                seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
                if (seed != NULL) {
-                       size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
+                       size = min_t(u32, SZ_1K, seed->size);
                        early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
                } else {
                        pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
@@ -622,6 +622,7 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
                        if (seed != NULL) {
                                pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
                                add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, size);
+                               memzero_explicit(seed->bits, size);
                                early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
                        } else {
                                pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
--

2.38.1