lockdown: s390: kexec_file: don't skip signature verification when not secure IPLed
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 lockdown: s390: kexec_file: don't skip signature verification when not secure IPLed
Currently for s390, lockdown doesn't prevent unsigned kernel image from being kexec'ed when secure IPL is disabled. Fix it by always verifying the signature regardless secure IPL is enabled or not.
--- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0 -4
@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)unsigned long sig_len;int ret; -/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ -if (!ipl_secure_flag) -return 0 ; -if (marker_len > kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ;
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
Vasily Gorbik
maintainerarch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 38
Quoted 9 lines · Coiby Xu
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0
-3@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)unsigned long sig_len;int ret; -/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ -if (!ipl_secure_flag) -return 0 ;
Looking at s390_verify_sig() especially before commit 0828c4a39be5 ("kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification") I think this condition actually expresses 2 things:
1. the firmware is secure IPL capable and secure IPL keys are provided and present in platform keyring.
2. secure IPL is enabled.
Wouldn't this change have implications for machines with older firmware which doesn't support secure IPL? In this case platform keyring won't have any secure IPL keys (since firmware doesn't provide them) and any properly signed kernels will be rejected for kexec in this function. Unless secure IPL keys are also present in built-in or secondary keyring (which is possible after commit 0828c4a39be5) - is that what distributions normally do?
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
Quoted 19 lines · Vasily Gorbik
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 38
Quoted 9 lines · Coiby Xu
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0
-3@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)unsigned long sig_len;int ret; -/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ -if (!ipl_secure_flag) -return 0 ;Looking at
s390_verify_sig()especially before commit0828c4a39be5("kexec, KEYS, s390: Make use of built-in and secondary keyring for signature verification") I think this condition actually expresses 2 things:
1. the firmware is secure IPL capable and secure IPL keys are provided and present in platform keyring.
2. secure IPL is enabled.
Quoted 7 lines
Wouldn't this change have implications for machines with older firmware which doesn't support secure IPL? In this case platform keyring won't have any secure IPL keys (since firmware doesn't provide them) and any properly signed kernels will be rejected for kexec in this function. Unless secure IPL keys are also present in built-in or secondary keyring (which is possible after commit
0828c4a39be5) - is that what distributions normally do?
Thanks for pointing me to the above commit and reminding me older firmware doesn't support secure IPL! But I don't think this change will break machines with older firmwares which doesn't support secure IPL. Distributions like Fedora/RHEL have downstream-only patch that enable lockdown automatically when secure boot is enabled. Since there is no secure IPL, lockdown won't be enabled which means kimage_validate_signature (kernel/kexec_file.c) doesn't enforce signature verification (sorry I should change the commit subject which is misleading). For the case where users manually enables lockdown, I assume they know what lockdown means and expect signature verification to be enforced instead to be silently bypassed.
Signature · 8 lines
Best regards, Coiby _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec