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package/git: security bump to version 2.31.5

PATCH In review Fabrice Fontaine 2 participants 3 messages Nov 26, 2022 – Dec 7, 2022

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PATCH 1/1 package/git: security bump to version 2.31.5

Fixes:
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the --local clone optimization, Git dereferences symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are present in a repository's $GIT_DIR when cloning from a malicious repository.

Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the --local clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that have symbolic links present in the $GIT_DIR/objects directory.

Additionally, the value of protocol.file.allow is changed to be "user" by default.

* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to git shell can result in overflow in split_cmdline(), leading to arbitrary heap writes and remote code execution when git shell is exposed and the directory $HOME/git-shell-commands exists.

git shell is taught to refuse interactive commands that are longer than 4MiB in size. split_cmdline() is hardened to reject inputs larger than 2GiB.

https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.31.5/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.5.txt

---
 package/git/git.hash | 2 +-
 package/git/git.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
package/git/git.hash +1 -1
index 41afa83f86..af09ea817b 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # From: https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/sha256sums.asc
-sha256  84fc20acf8fbea5cad7d5d7be0dfeb32494f1dac8e6c61675c904d1fd3d8c016  git-2.31.4.tar.xz
+sha256  dbc80f88d36fcde2c7acaaa9343cfab0f56effe9aee60e5eb00f3f36b8a619b4  git-2.31.5.tar.xz
 # Locally calculated
 sha256  5b2198d1645f767585e8a88ac0499b04472164c0d2da22e75ecf97ef443ab32e  COPYING
 sha256  1922f45d2c49e390032c9c0ba6d7cac904087f7cec51af30c2b2ad022ce0e76a  LGPL-2.1
package/git/git.mk +1 -1
index dc587170e8..653b4f46ad 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-GIT_VERSION = 2.31.4
+GIT_VERSION = 2.31.5
 GIT_SOURCE = git-$(GIT_VERSION).tar.xz
 GIT_SITE = $(BR2_KERNEL_MIRROR)/software/scm/git
 GIT_LICENSE = GPL-2.0, LGPL-2.1+
Signature · 6 lines
2.35.1

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines
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"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes:
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the --local clone optimization, Git dereferences symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are present in a repository's $GIT_DIR when cloning from a malicious repository.

Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the --local clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that have symbolic links present in the $GIT_DIR/objects directory.

Additionally, the value of protocol.file.allow is changed to be "user" by default.

* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to git shell can result in overflow in split_cmdline(), leading to arbitrary heap writes and remote code execution when git shell is exposed and the directory $HOME/git-shell-commands exists.

Quoted 7 lines

git shell is taught to refuse interactive commands that are longer than 4MiB in size. split_cmdline() is hardened to reject inputs larger than 2GiB.

https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.31.5/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.5.txt

Committed, thanks.

Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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#2 lore raw
In reply to Fabrice Fontaine
Quoted 24 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes:
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the --local clone optimization, Git dereferences symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository. This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are present in a repository's $GIT_DIR when cloning from a malicious repository.

Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the --local clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that have symbolic links present in the $GIT_DIR/objects directory.

Additionally, the value of protocol.file.allow is changed to be "user" by default.

* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to git shell can result in overflow in split_cmdline(), leading to arbitrary heap writes and remote code execution when git shell is exposed and the directory $HOME/git-shell-commands exists.

Quoted 7 lines

git shell is taught to refuse interactive commands that are longer than 4MiB in size. split_cmdline() is hardened to reject inputs larger than 2GiB.

https://github.com/git/git/blob/v2.31.5/Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.5.txt

Committed to 2022.08.x and 2022.02.x, thanks.

Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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