fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size
Subsystems (11)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate BOOT record_size
From: edward lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0b66046266690454dc04e6307bcff4a5605b42a1 ]
When the NTFS BOOT record_size field < 0, it represents a shift value. However, there is no sanity check on the shift result and the sbi->record_bits calculation through blksize_bits() assumes the size always > 256, which could lead to NPD while mounting a malformed NTFS image.
[ 318.675159] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 318.675682] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 318.675869] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 318.676246] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 318.676502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 318.676934] CPU: 0 PID: 259 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0 #5 [ 318.677289] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 318.678136] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0 [ 318.678656] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180 [ 318.679848] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 318.680104] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ 318.680790] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 318.681679] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 318.682577] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080 [ 318.683015] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 318.683618] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 318.684280] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 318.684651] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 318.685623] Call Trace: [ 318.686607] <TASK> [ 318.686872] ? ntfs_alloc_inode+0x1a/0x60 [ 318.687235] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x2b/0xa0 [ 318.687468] mi_read+0xbb/0x250 [ 318.687576] ntfs_iget5+0x114/0xd90 [ 318.687750] ntfs_fill_super+0x588/0x11b0 [ 318.687953] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130 [ 318.688065] ? snprintf+0x49/0x70 [ 318.688164] ? put_ntfs+0x130/0x130 [ 318.688256] get_tree_bdev+0x16a/0x260 [ 318.688407] vfs_get_tree+0x20/0xb0 [ 318.688519] path_mount+0x2dc/0x9b0 [ 318.688877] do_mount+0x74/0x90 [ 318.689142] __x64_sys_mount+0x89/0xd0 [ 318.689636] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 318.689998] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 318.690318] RIP: 0033:0x7fd9e133c48a [ 318.690687] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 318.691357] RSP: 002b:00007ffd374406c8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 318.691632] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564d0b051080 RCX: 00007fd9e133c48a [ 318.691920] RDX: 0000564d0b051280 RSI: 0000564d0b051300 RDI: 0000564d0b0596a0 [ 318.692123] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564d0b0512a0 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 318.692349] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564d0b0596a0 [ 318.692673] R13: 0000564d0b051280 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 318.693007] </TASK> [ 318.693271] Modules linked in: [ 318.693614] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 318.694446] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 318.694779] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0x2d/0x1c0 [ 318.694952] Code: 89 ca 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 cc 55 48 89 fd 53 48 89 d3 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 180 [ 318.696042] RSP: 0018:ffffa6c8c0297bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 [ 318.696531] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000080 [ 318.698114] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 318.699286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 318.699795] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: 0000000000000080 [ 318.700236] R13: ffff8d5582e68400 R14: 0000000000000100 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 318.700973] FS: 00007fd9e1c81e40(0000) GS:ffff8d55fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 318.701688] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 318.702190] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000002e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 318.726510] mount (259) used greatest stack depth: 13320 bytes left
This patch adds a sanity check.
--- fs/ntfs3/super.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ntfs3/super.c +1 -1
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static int ntfs_init_from_boot(struct super_block *sb, u32 sector_size, : (u32)boot->record_size << sbi->cluster_bits; -if (record_size >MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_MFT ) +if (record_size >MAXIMUM_BYTES_PER_MFT || record_size <SECTOR_SIZE ) goto out; sbi->record_bits =blksize_bits (record_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/28 fs/ntfs3: Add overflow check for attribute size
From: edward lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e19c6277652efba203af4ecd8eed4bd30a0054c9 ]
The offset addition could overflow and pass the used size check given an attribute with very large size (e.g., 0xffffff7f) while parsing MFT attributes. This could lead to out-of-bound memory R/W if we try to access the next attribute derived by Add2Ptr(attr, asize)
[ 32.963847] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff956a83c76067 [ 32.964301] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 32.964526] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 32.964893] PGD 4dc01067 P4D 4dc01067 PUD 0 [ 32.965316] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 32.965727] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #6 [ 32.966050] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 32.966628] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110 [ 32.967239] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a [ 32.968101] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283 [ 32.968364] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f [ 32.968651] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8 [ 32.968963] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f [ 32.969249] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000 [ 32.969870] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170 [ 32.970655] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.971098] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.971378] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 32.972098] Call Trace: [ 32.972842] <TASK> [ 32.973341] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xda/0xf0 [ 32.974087] ntfs_iget5+0x1db/0xde0 [ 32.974386] ? slab_post_alloc_hook+0x53/0x270 [ 32.974778] ? ntfs_fill_super+0x4c7/0x12a0 [ 32.975115] ntfs_fill_super+0x5d6/0x12a0 [ 32.975336] get_tree_bdev+0x175/0x270 [ 32.975709] ? put_ntfs+0x150/0x150 [ 32.975956] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 32.976191] vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0xc0 [ 32.976374] ? capable+0x19/0x20 [ 32.976572] path_mount+0x484/0xaa0 [ 32.977025] ? putname+0x57/0x70 [ 32.977380] do_mount+0x80/0xa0 [ 32.977555] __x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0 [ 32.978105] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 32.978830] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 32.979311] RIP: 0033:0x7fdab72e948a [ 32.980015] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 32.981251] RSP: 002b:00007ffd15b87588 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 32.981832] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000557de0aaf060 RCX: 00007fdab72e948a [ 32.982234] RDX: 0000557de0aaf260 RSI: 0000557de0aaf2e0 RDI: 0000557de0ab7ce0 [ 32.982714] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000557de0aaf280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 32.983046] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000557de0ab7ce0 [ 32.983494] R13: 0000557de0aaf260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 32.984094] </TASK> [ 32.984352] Modules linked in: [ 32.984753] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 [ 32.985911] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 32.986555] RIP: 0010:mi_enum_attr+0x44/0x110 [ 32.987217] Code: 89 f0 48 29 c8 48 89 c1 39 c7 0f 86 94 00 00 00 8b 56 04 83 fa 17 0f 86 88 00 00 00 89 d0 01 ca 48 01 f0 8d 4a 08 39 f9a [ 32.988232] RSP: 0018:ffffba15c06a7c38 EFLAGS: 00000283 [ 32.988532] RAX: ffff956a83c76067 RBX: ffff956983c76050 RCX: 000000000000006f [ 32.988916] RDX: 0000000000000067 RSI: ffff956983c760e8 RDI: 00000000000001c8 [ 32.989356] RBP: ffffba15c06a7c38 R08: 0000000000000064 R09: 00000000ffffff7f [ 32.989994] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffff956983c760e8 R12: ffff95698225e000 [ 32.990415] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffba15c06a7cd8 R15: ffff95698225e170 [ 32.991011] FS: 00007fdab8189e40(0000) GS:ffff9569fdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 32.991524] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 32.991936] CR2: ffff956a83c76067 CR3: 0000000002c58000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
This patch adds an overflow check
--- fs/ntfs3/record.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/record.c +5 -0
@@ -220,6 +220,11 @@ struct ATTRIB *mi_enum_attr(struct mft_inode *mi, struct ATTRIB *attr)return NULL ; } +if (off + asize < off) { +/* overflow check */ +return NULL ; + } + attr =Add2Ptr (attr, asize); off += asize; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6db620863f8528ed9a9aa5ad323b26554a17881d ]
This adds sanity checks for data run offset. We should make sure data run offset is legit before trying to unpack them, otherwise we may encounter use-after-free or some unexpected memory access behaviors.
[ 82.940342] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.941180] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888008a8487f by task mount/240 [ 82.941670] [ 82.942069] CPU: 0 PID: 240 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.19.0+ #15 [ 82.942482] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 82.943720] Call Trace: [ 82.944204] <TASK> [ 82.944471] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 82.944908] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x67b [ 82.945141] ? __wait_on_bit+0x106/0x120 [ 82.945750] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.946626] kasan_report+0xa7/0x120 [ 82.947046] ? run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947280] __asan_load1+0x51/0x60 [ 82.947483] run_unpack+0x2e3/0x570 [ 82.947709] ? memcpy+0x4e/0x70 [ 82.947927] ? run_pack+0x7a0/0x7a0 [ 82.948158] run_unpack_ex+0xad/0x3f0 [ 82.948399] ? mi_enum_attr+0x14a/0x200 [ 82.948717] ? run_unpack+0x570/0x570 [ 82.949072] ? ni_enum_attr_ex+0x1b2/0x1c0 [ 82.949332] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 82.949611] ? mi_read+0x262/0x2c0 [ 82.949970] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 82.950249] ntfs_iget5+0x632/0x1870 [ 82.950621] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 82.951192] ? evict+0x223/0x280 [ 82.951525] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 82.951969] ntfs_fill_super+0x1321/0x1e20 [ 82.952436] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.952822] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 82.953188] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 82.953379] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 82.954001] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 82.954438] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 82.954700] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 82.955049] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 82.955292] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 82.955615] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.955955] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 82.956310] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 82.956723] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 82.957023] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 82.957411] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 82.957638] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 82.957948] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 82.958310] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 82.958719] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 82.959341] RIP: 0033:0x7fd0d1ce948a [ 82.960193] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 82.961532] RSP: 002b:00007ffe59ff69a8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 82.962527] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564dcc107060 RCX: 00007fd0d1ce948a [ 82.963266] RDX: 0000564dcc107260 RSI: 0000564dcc1072e0 RDI: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.963686] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564dcc107280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 82.964272] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564dcc10fce0 [ 82.964785] R13: 0000564dcc107260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
--- fs/ntfs3/attrib.c | 13 +++++++++++++ fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c | 5 +++++ fs/ntfs3/frecord.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 9 +++++++++ fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/attrib.c +13 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static int attr_load_runs(struct ATTRIB *attr, struct ntfs_inode *ni, asize =le32_to_cpu (attr->size); run_off =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); + +if (run_off > asize) +return -EINVAL ; + err =run_unpack_ex (run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, vcn ? *vcn : svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, run_off), asize - run_off);
@@ -1232,6 +1236,10 @@ int attr_load_runs_vcn(struct ntfs_inode *ni, enum ATTR_TYPE type, } ro =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); + +if (ro >le32_to_cpu (attr->size)) +return -EINVAL ; + err =run_unpack_ex (run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, ro),le32_to_cpu (attr->size) - ro);if (err <0 )
@@ -1901,6 +1909,11 @@ int attr_collapse_range(struct ntfs_inode *ni, u64 vbo, u64 bytes)u16 le_sz;u16 roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); +if (roff >le32_to_cpu (attr->size)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } +run_unpack_ex (RUN_DEALLOCATE , sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn1 -1 , svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, roff),le32_to_cpu (attr->size) - roff);
fs/ntfs3/attrlist.c +5 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ int ntfs_load_attr_list(struct ntfs_inode *ni, struct ATTRIB *attr)run_init (&ni->attr_list.run); +if (run_off >le32_to_cpu (attr->size)) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + err = run_unpack_ex(&ni->attr_list.run, ni->mi.sbi, ni->mi.rno, 0, le64_to_cpu(attr->nres.evcn), 0, Add2Ptr(attr, run_off),
fs/ntfs3/frecord.c +14 -0
@@ -568,6 +568,12 @@ static int ni_repack(struct ntfs_inode *ni) } roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); + +if (roff >le32_to_cpu (attr->size)) { + err = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + err =run_unpack (&run, sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, roff),le32_to_cpu (attr->size) - roff);
@@ -1589,6 +1595,9 @@ int ni_delete_all(struct ntfs_inode *ni) asize =le32_to_cpu (attr->size); roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); +if (roff > asize) +return -EINVAL ; +/* run==1 means unpack and deallocate. */ run_unpack_ex (RUN_DEALLOCATE , sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), asize - roff);
@@ -2291,6 +2300,11 @@ int ni_decompress_file(struct ntfs_inode *ni) asize =le32_to_cpu (attr->size); roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); +if (roff > asize) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } +/*run==1 Means unpack and deallocate. */ run_unpack_ex (RUN_DEALLOCATE , sbi, ni->mi.rno, svcn, evcn, svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), asize - roff);
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +9 -0
@@ -2727,6 +2727,9 @@ static inline bool check_attr(const struct MFT_REC *rec,return false; } +if (run_off > asize) +return false; +if (run_unpack (NULL , sbi,0 , svcn, evcn, svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, run_off), asize - run_off) <0 ) {return false;
@@ -4771,6 +4774,12 @@ int log_replay(struct ntfs_inode *ni, bool *initialized)u16 roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off);CLST svcn =le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.svcn); +if (roff > t32) { +kfree (oa->attr); + oa->attr =NULL ; + goto fake_attr; + } + err =run_unpack (&oa->run0, sbi, inode->i_ino, svcn,le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.evcn), svcn,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), t32 - roff);
fs/ntfs3/inode.c +5 -0
@@ -364,6 +364,11 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode, attr_unpack_run: roff =le16_to_cpu (attr->nres.run_off); +if (roff > asize) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + t64 =le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.svcn); err =run_unpack_ex (run, sbi, ino, t64,le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.evcn), t64,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), asize - roff);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/28 fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check to attr_load_runs_vcn
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2681631c29739509eec59cc0b34e977bb04c6cf1 ]
Some metadata files are handled before MFT. This adds a null pointer check for some corner cases that could lead to NPD while reading these metadata files for a malformed NTFS image.
[ 240.190827] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000158 [ 240.191583] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 240.191956] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 240.192391] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 240.192897] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 240.193805] CPU: 0 PID: 242 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 5.19.0+ #17 [ 240.194477] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 240.195152] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.195679] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.196642] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.197019] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.197523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.197877] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.198292] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.198647] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.199410] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.199895] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.200314] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 240.200839] Call Trace: [ 240.201104] <TASK> [ 240.201502] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 240.202297] ? ___slab_alloc+0x465/0x830 [ 240.202614] attr_load_runs_vcn+0x8c/0x1a0 [ 240.202886] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x32/0x90 [ 240.203157] ? attr_data_write_resident+0x250/0x250 [ 240.203543] mi_read+0x133/0x2c0 [ 240.203785] mi_get+0x70/0x140 [ 240.204012] ni_load_mi_ex+0xfa/0x190 [ 240.204346] ? ni_std5+0x90/0x90 [ 240.204588] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.204859] ni_enum_attr_ex+0xf1/0x1c0 [ 240.205107] ? ni_fname_type.part.0+0xd0/0xd0 [ 240.205600] ? ntfs_load_attr_list+0xbe/0x300 [ 240.205864] ? ntfs_cmp_names_cpu+0x125/0x180 [ 240.206157] ntfs_iget5+0x56c/0x1870 [ 240.206510] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 240.206776] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 240.207030] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.207545] ntfs_fill_super+0xb8f/0x1e20 [ 240.207839] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.208069] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 240.208467] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 240.208846] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 240.209221] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 240.209804] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 240.210519] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 240.210991] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 240.211455] path_mount+0x645/0xfd0 [ 240.211806] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.212112] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 240.212559] ? kmem_cache_free+0x110/0x390 [ 240.212906] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 240.213329] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 240.213829] ? path_mount+0xfd0/0xfd0 [ 240.214246] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 240.214774] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 240.215080] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 240.215442] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 240.215811] RIP: 0033:0x7f233b4e948a [ 240.216104] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 240.217615] RSP: 002b:00007fff02211ec8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 240.218718] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdc35b060 RCX: 00007f233b4e948a [ 240.219556] RDX: 0000561cdc35b260 RSI: 0000561cdc35b2e0 RDI: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.219975] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdc35b280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 240.220403] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561cdc363af0 [ 240.220803] R13: 0000561cdc35b260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 240.221256] </TASK> [ 240.221567] Modules linked in: [ 240.222028] CR2: 0000000000000158 [ 240.223291] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 240.223669] RIP: 0010:ni_find_attr+0xae/0x300 [ 240.224058] Code: c8 48 c7 45 88 c0 4e 5e 86 c7 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 c7 40 04 00 f3 f3 f3 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 e8 e2 d9f [ 240.225033] RSP: 0018:ffff88800812f690 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 240.225968] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85ef037a [ 240.226624] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff88e95f60 [ 240.227307] RBP: ffff88800812f738 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff11d2bed [ 240.227816] R10: ffffffff88e95f67 R11: fffffbfff11d2bec R12: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228330] R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 240.228729] FS: 00007f233c33be40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 240.229281] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 240.230298] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 0000000004d32000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
--- fs/ntfs3/attrib.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/attrib.c +5 -0
@@ -1221,6 +1221,11 @@ int attr_load_runs_vcn(struct ntfs_inode *ni, enum ATTR_TYPE type,CLST svcn, evcn;u16 ro; +if (!ni) { +/* Is record corrupted? */ +return -ENOENT ; + } + attr =ni_find_attr (ni,NULL ,NULL , type, name, name_len, &vcn,NULL );if (!attr) {/* Is record corrupted? */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 5/28 fs/ntfs3: Fix memory leak on ntfs_fill_super() error path
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 51e76a232f8c037f1d9e9922edc25b003d5f3414 ]
syzbot reported kmemleak as below:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8880122f1540 (size 32):
comm "a.out", pid 6664, jiffies 4294939771 (age 25.500s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ed ff ed ff 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff81b16052>] ntfs_init_fs_context+0x22/0x1c0
[<ffffffff8164aaa7>] alloc_fs_context+0x217/0x430
[<ffffffff81626dd4>] path_mount+0x704/0x1080
[<ffffffff81627e7c>] __x64_sys_mount+0x18c/0x1d0
[<ffffffff84593e14>] do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[<ffffffff84600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcdThis patch fixes this issue by freeing mount options on error path of ntfs_fill_super().
--- fs/ntfs3/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/ntfs3/super.c +1 -0
@@ -1281,6 +1281,7 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)* Free resources here. * ntfs_fs_free will be called with fc->s_fs_info = NULL */ +put_mount_options (sbi->options);put_ntfs (sbi); sb->s_fs_info =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 6/28 fs/ntfs3: Add null pointer check for inode operations
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c1ca8ef0262b25493631ecbd9cb8c9893e1481a1 ]
This adds a sanity check for the i_op pointer of the inode which is returned after reading Root directory MFT record. We should check the i_op is valid before trying to create the root dentry, otherwise we may encounter a NPD while mounting a image with a funny Root directory MFT record.
[ 114.484325] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 114.484811] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 114.485084] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 114.485606] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 114.485975] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 114.486570] CPU: 0 PID: 237 Comm: mount Tainted: G B 6.0.0-rc4 #28 [ 114.486977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 114.488169] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110 [ 114.488816] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241 [ 114.490326] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296 [ 114.490695] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea [ 114.490986] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020 [ 114.491364] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05 [ 114.491675] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 114.491954] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750 [ 114.492397] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.492797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.493150] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 114.493671] Call Trace: [ 114.493890] <TASK> [ 114.494075] __d_instantiate+0x24/0x1c0 [ 114.494505] d_instantiate.part.0+0x35/0x50 [ 114.494754] d_make_root+0x53/0x80 [ 114.494998] ntfs_fill_super+0x1232/0x1b50 [ 114.495260] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 114.495499] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 114.495723] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 114.495964] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 114.496272] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 114.496502] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 114.496859] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 114.497099] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 114.497507] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.497933] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 114.498362] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.498571] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 114.498819] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 114.499069] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 114.499343] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 114.499683] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 114.500133] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 114.500592] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 114.500930] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 114.501294] RIP: 0033:0x7fdc898e948a [ 114.501542] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 114.502716] RSP: 002b:00007ffd793e58f8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 114.503175] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564b2228f060 RCX: 00007fdc898e948a [ 114.503588] RDX: 0000564b2228f260 RSI: 0000564b2228f2e0 RDI: 0000564b22297ce0 [ 114.504925] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000564b2228f280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 114.505484] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564b22297ce0 [ 114.505823] R13: 0000564b2228f260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 114.506562] </TASK> [ 114.506887] Modules linked in: [ 114.507648] CR2: 0000000000000008 [ 114.508884] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 114.509675] RIP: 0010:d_flags_for_inode+0xe0/0x110 [ 114.510140] Code: 24 f7 ff 49 83 3e 00 74 41 41 83 cd 02 66 44 89 6b 02 eb 92 48 8d 7b 20 e8 6d 24 f7 ff 4c 8b 73 20 49 8d 7e 08 e8 60 241 [ 114.511762] RSP: 0018:ffff8880065e7aa8 EFLAGS: 00000296 [ 114.512401] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888008ccd750 RCX: ffffffff84af2aea [ 114.513103] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff87abd020 [ 114.513512] RBP: ffff8880065e7ac8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff0f57a05 [ 114.513831] R10: ffffffff87abd027 R11: fffffbfff0f57a04 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 114.514757] R13: 0000000000000008 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888008ccd750 [ 114.515411] FS: 00007fdc8a627e40(0000) GS:ffff888058200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.515794] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.516208] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000000013ba000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
--- fs/ntfs3/super.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/super.c +2 -2
@@ -1260,9 +1260,9 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) ref.low =cpu_to_le32 (MFT_REC_ROOT ); ref.seq =cpu_to_le16 (MFT_REC_ROOT ); inode =ntfs_iget5 (sb, &ref, &NAME_ROOT ); -if (IS_ERR (inode)) { +if (IS_ERR (inode) || !inode->i_op) {ntfs_err (sb,"Failed to load root." ); - err =PTR_ERR (inode); + err =IS_ERR (inode) ?PTR_ERR (inode) : -EINVAL ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 7/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate attribute name offset
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4f1dc7d9756e66f3f876839ea174df2e656b7f79 ]
Although the attribute name length is checked before comparing it to some common names (e.g., $I30), the offset isn't. This adds a sanity check for the attribute name offset, guarantee the validity and prevent possible out-of-bound memory accesses.
[ 191.720056] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.721060] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 191.721586] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 191.722079] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 191.722571] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 191.723179] CPU: 0 PID: 244 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #28 [ 191.723749] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 191.724832] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.725870] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.727375] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.727897] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.728531] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.729183] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.729628] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.730158] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.730645] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.731328] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.731667] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 191.732568] Call Trace: [ 191.733231] <TASK> [ 191.733860] kvfree+0x2c/0x40 [ 191.734632] ni_clear+0x180/0x290 [ 191.735085] ntfs_evict_inode+0x45/0x70 [ 191.735495] evict+0x199/0x280 [ 191.735996] iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 191.736438] iput+0x32/0x50 [ 191.736811] iget_failed+0x23/0x30 [ 191.737270] ntfs_iget5+0x337/0x1890 [ 191.737629] ? ntfs_clear_mft_tail+0x20/0x260 [ 191.738201] ? ntfs_get_block_bmap+0x70/0x70 [ 191.738482] ? ntfs_objid_init+0xf6/0x140 [ 191.738779] ? ntfs_reparse_init+0x140/0x140 [ 191.739266] ntfs_fill_super+0x121b/0x1b50 [ 191.739623] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.739984] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 191.740466] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.740787] ? sb_set_blocksize+0x6a/0x80 [ 191.741272] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 191.741829] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 191.742669] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 191.743132] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 191.743457] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 191.743938] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.744271] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 191.744582] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745053] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 191.745403] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 191.745616] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 191.745887] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 191.746287] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 191.746582] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 191.746850] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 191.747122] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 191.747517] RIP: 0033:0x7f351fee948a [ 191.748332] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 191.749341] RSP: 002b:00007ffd51cf3af8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 191.749960] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b903733060 RCX: 00007f351fee948a [ 191.750589] RDX: 000055b903733260 RSI: 000055b9037332e0 RDI: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751115] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b903733280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 191.751537] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055b90373bce0 [ 191.751946] R13: 000055b903733260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 191.752519] </TASK> [ 191.752782] Modules linked in: [ 191.753785] CR2: ffffebde00000008 [ 191.754937] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 191.755429] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x56/0x3b0 [ 191.755725] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 65 03 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 2c 06 dd 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 0a 069 [ 191.756744] RSP: 0018:ffff8880076f7878 EFLAGS: 00000286 [ 191.757218] RAX: ffffebde00000000 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: ffffffff8528d5b9 [ 191.757580] RDX: 0000777f80000000 RSI: ffffffff8522d49c RDI: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758016] RBP: ffff8880076f78a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 191.758570] R10: ffff888008949fd8 R11: ffffed10011293fd R12: 0000000000000040 [ 191.758957] R13: ffff888008949f98 R14: ffff888008949ec0 R15: ffff888008949fb0 [ 191.759317] FS: 00007f3520cd7e40(0000) GS:ffff88805ba00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 191.759711] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 191.760118] CR2: ffffebde00000008 CR3: 0000000009704000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
--- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/inode.c +3 -0
@@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode, rsize = attr->non_res ?0 :le32_to_cpu (attr->res.data_size); asize =le32_to_cpu (attr->size); +if (le16_to_cpu (attr->name_off) + attr->name_len > asize) + goto out; +switch (attr->type) {case ATTR_STD : if (attr->non_res ||
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 8/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate buffer length while parsing index
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d42ecda239cc13738d6fd84d098a32e67b368b9 ]
indx_read is called when we have some NTFS directory operations that need more information from the index buffers. This adds a sanity check to make sure the returned index buffer length is legit, or we may have some out-of-bound memory accesses.
[ 560.897595] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.898321] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888009497238 by task exp/245 [ 560.898760] [ 560.899129] CPU: 0 PID: 245 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37 [ 560.899505] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 560.900170] Call Trace: [ 560.900407] <TASK> [ 560.900732] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 560.901108] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 560.901395] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.901716] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 560.901950] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.902208] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90 [ 560.902427] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 560.902846] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0 [ 560.903363] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90 [ 560.903883] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190 [ 560.904196] ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x750/0x750 [ 560.904969] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0xe0/0x130 [ 560.905259] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.905599] ? up_read+0x1a/0x90 [ 560.905853] ? indx_read+0x22c/0x380 [ 560.906096] indx_find+0x2ef/0x470 [ 560.906352] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 560.906692] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 560.906977] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 560.907220] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450 [ 560.907464] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.907747] ? mutex_lock+0x8f/0xe0 [ 560.907970] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x20/0x20 [ 560.908214] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0 [ 560.908459] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100 [ 560.908788] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220 [ 560.909050] ? lookup_fast+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 560.909309] ? lookup_fast+0x13f/0x1b0 [ 560.909601] walk_component+0x187/0x230 [ 560.909944] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660 [ 560.910285] ? handle_lookup_down+0x90/0x90 [ 560.910618] ? path_init+0x642/0x6e0 [ 560.911084] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x6e/0xf0 [ 560.912559] ? __alloc_file+0x114/0x170 [ 560.913008] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10 [ 560.913419] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0 [ 560.913815] ? kasan_save_stack+0x3a/0x50 [ 560.914125] ? kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 560.914542] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90 [ 560.914924] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x143/0x4b0 [ 560.915339] ? getname_flags+0x73/0x2b0 [ 560.915647] ? getname+0x12/0x20 [ 560.916114] ? __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.916460] ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x230/0x230 [ 560.916867] ? __isolate_free_page+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 560.917194] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0 [ 560.917448] ? may_open_dev+0x60/0x60 [ 560.917696] ? expand_files+0xa4/0x3a0 [ 560.917923] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 560.918185] ? _raw_spin_lock+0x88/0xdb [ 560.918409] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100 [ 560.918783] ? _find_next_bit+0x4a/0x130 [ 560.919026] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x19/0x40 [ 560.919276] ? alloc_fd+0x14b/0x2d0 [ 560.919635] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0 [ 560.920035] ? file_open_root+0x230/0x230 [ 560.920336] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 [ 560.920813] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0 [ 560.921208] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60 [ 560.921482] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x49/0x180 [ 560.921867] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.922128] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 560.922369] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 560.923030] RIP: 0033:0x7f7dff2e4469 [ 560.923681] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 560.924451] RSP: 002b:00007ffd41a210b8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002 [ 560.925168] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7dff2e4469 [ 560.925655] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007ffd41a211f0 [ 560.926085] RBP: 00007ffd41a252a0 R08: 00007f7dff60fba0 R09: 00007ffd41a25388 [ 560.926405] R10: 0000000000400b80 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000000004004e0 [ 560.926867] R13: 00007ffd41a25380 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 560.927241] </TASK> [ 560.927491] [ 560.927755] Allocated by task 245: [ 560.928409] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 560.929271] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 560.929778] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 560.930023] indx_read+0x249/0x380 [ 560.930224] indx_find+0x2a2/0x470 [ 560.930695] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 560.930892] ntfs_lookup+0xe0/0x100 [ 560.931115] __lookup_slow+0x116/0x220 [ 560.931323] walk_component+0x187/0x230 [ 560.931570] link_path_walk.part.0+0x3f0/0x660 [ 560.931791] path_openat+0x19c/0x1d10 [ 560.932008] do_filp_open+0x15c/0x1f0 [ 560.932226] do_sys_openat2+0x32a/0x4b0 [ 560.932413] do_sys_open+0x99/0xf0 [ 560.932709] __x64_sys_open+0x4c/0x60 [ 560.933417] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 560.933776] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 560.934235] [ 560.934486] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009497000 [ 560.934486] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 [ 560.935239] The buggy address is located 56 bytes to the right of [ 560.935239] 512-byte region [ffff888009497000, ffff888009497200) [ 560.936153] [ 560.937326] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 560.938228] page:0000000062a3dfae refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x9496 [ 560.939616] head:0000000062a3dfae order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 560.940219] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 560.942702] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000164f80 dead000000000005 ffff888001041c80 [ 560.943932] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 560.944568] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 560.945735] [ 560.946112] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 560.946870] ffff888009497100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 560.947242] ffff888009497180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 560.947611] >ffff888009497200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 560.947915] ^ [ 560.948249] ffff888009497280: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 560.948687] ffff888009497300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
--- fs/ntfs3/index.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/index.c +6 -0
@@ -1017,6 +1017,12 @@ int indx_read(struct ntfs_index *indx, struct ntfs_inode *ni, CLST vbn, err =0 ; } +/* check for index header length */ +if (offsetof(struct INDEX_BUFFER , ihdr) + ib->ihdr.used > bytes) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + in->index = ib; *node = in;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 9/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate resident attribute name
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 54e45702b648b7c0000e90b3e9b890e367e16ea8 ]
Though we already have some sanity checks while enumerating attributes, resident attribute names aren't included. This patch checks the resident attribute names are in the valid ranges.
[ 259.209031] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.210770] Write of size 426 at addr ffff88800632f2b2 by task exp/255 [ 259.211551] [ 259.212035] CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: exp Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6 #37 [ 259.212955] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 259.214387] Call Trace: [ 259.214640] <TASK> [ 259.214895] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 259.215284] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 259.215565] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.215778] ? kasan_unpoison+0x28/0x60 [ 259.215991] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216270] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 259.216481] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.216719] kasan_check_range+0x15a/0x1d0 [ 259.216939] memcpy+0x3c/0x70 [ 259.217136] ni_create_attr_list+0x1e1/0x850 [ 259.217945] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x280 [ 259.218384] ? ni_remove_attr+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.218712] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.219064] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.219434] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.219668] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [ 259.219904] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 259.220140] ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 [ 259.220561] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.220984] ? ni_create_attr_list+0x850/0x850 [ 259.221532] ? run_deallocate+0x120/0x120 [ 259.221972] ? vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.222688] ? setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.222921] ? path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.223431] ? __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.223828] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.224417] ? mi_find_attr+0x3c/0xf0 [ 259.224772] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.225216] ? ni_ins_attr_ext+0x5c0/0x5c0 [ 259.225504] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x119/0x450 [ 259.225775] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.226316] ? ni_insert_nonresident+0x400/0x400 [ 259.227001] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.227468] ? __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.227773] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.228216] ? ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x2a/0xb0 [ 259.228494] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.228838] ? ntfs_read_ea+0x450/0x450 [ 259.229098] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x24/0x40 [ 259.229418] ? kernel_text_address+0xcf/0xe0 [ 259.229681] ? __kernel_text_address+0x12/0x40 [ 259.229948] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60 [ 259.230271] ? write_profile+0x270/0x270 [ 259.230537] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 259.230836] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.231099] ? ntfs_set_acl_ex+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 259.231529] ? evm_protected_xattr_common+0x6d/0x100 [ 259.231817] ? posix_xattr_acl+0x13/0x80 [ 259.232073] ? evm_protect_xattr+0x1f7/0x440 [ 259.232351] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.232635] ? xattr_resolve_name+0x180/0x180 [ 259.232912] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.233219] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.233492] ? kasan_poison+0x3c/0x50 [ 259.233744] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.234002] ? __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x160/0x160 [ 259.234837] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.235567] ? vmemdup_user+0x53/0x90 [ 259.236212] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.236491] ? do_setxattr+0x170/0x170 [ 259.236791] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.237232] ? kasan_quarantine_put+0x57/0x180 [ 259.237605] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.237870] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 259.238234] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 259.238500] ? preempt_count_sub+0x18/0xc0 [ 259.238775] ? __mnt_want_write+0xaa/0x100 [ 259.238990] ? mnt_want_write+0x8b/0x150 [ 259.239290] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.239605] ? setxattr+0x140/0x140 [ 259.239849] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20 [ 259.240174] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x67/0x80 [ 259.240411] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.240715] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.240934] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.241697] RIP: 0033:0x7fc6b26e4469 [ 259.242647] Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 088 [ 259.244512] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3c7841f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [ 259.245086] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc6b26e4469 [ 259.246025] RDX: 00007ffc3c784380 RSI: 00007ffc3c7842e0 RDI: 00007ffc3c784238 [ 259.246961] RBP: 00007ffc3c788410 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc3c7884f8 [ 259.247775] R10: 000000000000007f R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 00000000004004e0 [ 259.248534] R13: 00007ffc3c7884f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 259.249368] </TASK> [ 259.249644] [ 259.249888] Allocated by task 255: [ 259.250283] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50 [ 259.250957] __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0 [ 259.251826] __kmalloc+0x192/0x320 [ 259.252745] ni_create_attr_list+0x11e/0x850 [ 259.253298] ni_ins_attr_ext+0x52c/0x5c0 [ 259.253685] ni_insert_attr+0x1ba/0x420 [ 259.253974] ni_insert_resident+0xc0/0x1c0 [ 259.254311] ntfs_set_ea+0x6bf/0xb30 [ 259.254629] ntfs_setxattr+0x114/0x5c0 [ 259.254859] __vfs_setxattr+0xda/0x120 [ 259.255155] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x93/0x300 [ 259.255445] __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x141/0x160 [ 259.255862] vfs_setxattr+0x128/0x300 [ 259.256251] do_setxattr+0xb8/0x170 [ 259.256522] setxattr+0x126/0x140 [ 259.256911] path_setxattr+0x164/0x180 [ 259.257308] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x6d/0x80 [ 259.257637] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 259.257970] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 259.258550] [ 259.258772] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800632f000 [ 259.258772] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 [ 259.260190] The buggy address is located 690 bytes inside of [ 259.260190] 1024-byte region [ffff88800632f000, ffff88800632f400) [ 259.261412] [ 259.261743] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 259.262354] page:0000000081e8cac9 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x632c [ 259.263722] head:0000000081e8cac9 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 259.264284] flags: 0xfffffc0010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 259.265312] raw: 000fffffc0010200 ffffea0000060d00 dead000000000004 ffff888001041dc0 [ 259.265772] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 259.266305] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 259.266588] [ 259.266728] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 259.267225] ffff88800632f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.267841] ffff88800632f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 259.269111] >ffff88800632f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.269626] ^ [ 259.270162] ffff88800632f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 259.270810] ffff88800632f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
--- fs/ntfs3/record.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/record.c +5 -0
@@ -265,6 +265,11 @@ struct ATTRIB *mi_enum_attr(struct mft_inode *mi, struct ATTRIB *attr)if (t16 + t32 > asize)return NULL ; +if (attr->name_len && +le16_to_cpu (attr->name_off) +sizeof (short ) * attr->name_len > t16) { +return NULL ; + } +return attr; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 10/28 fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Hawkins Jiawei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 887bfc546097fbe8071dac13b2fef73b77920899 ]
Syzkaller reports slab-out-of-bounds bug as follows:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801bbdff02 by task syz-executor131/3611
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline]
print_report.cold+0x2ba/0x719 mm/kasan/report.c:433
kasan_report+0xb1/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:495
run_unpack+0x8b7/0x970 fs/ntfs3/run.c:944
run_unpack_ex+0xb0/0x7c0 fs/ntfs3/run.c:1057
ntfs_read_mft fs/ntfs3/inode.c:368 [inline]
ntfs_iget5+0xc20/0x3280 fs/ntfs3/inode.c:501
ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x124/0x5d0 fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c:272
ntfs_fill_super+0x1eff/0x37f0 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1018
get_tree_bdev+0x440/0x760 fs/super.c:1323
vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2f0 fs/super.c:1530
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline]
path_mount+0x1326/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
</TASK>
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00006ef600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1bbd8
head:ffffea00006ef600 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88801bbdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801bbdfe80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801bbdff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88801bbdff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801bbe0000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================Kernel will tries to read record and parse MFT from disk in ntfs_read_mft().
Yet the problem is that during enumerating attributes in record, kernel doesn't check whether run_off field loading from the disk is a valid value.
To be more specific, if attr->nres.run_off is larger than attr->size, kernel will passes an invalid argument run_buf_size in run_unpack_ex(), which having an integer overflow. Then this invalid argument will triggers the slab-out-of-bounds Read bug as above.
This patch solves it by adding the sanity check between the offset to packed runs and attribute size.
--- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs3/inode.c +7 -0
@@ -373,6 +373,13 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode, } t64 =le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.svcn); + +/* offset to packed runs is out-of-bounds */ +if (roff > asize) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + err =run_unpack_ex (run, sbi, ino, t64,le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.evcn), t64,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), asize - roff);if (err <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 11/28 soundwire: dmi-quirks: add quirk variant for LAPBC710 NUC15
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f74495761df10c25a98256d16ea7465191b6e2cd ]
Some NUC15 LAPBC710 devices don't expose the same DMI information as the Intel reference, add additional entry in the match table.
--- drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/soundwire/dmi-quirks.c +8 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id adr_remap_quirk_table[] = { }, .driver_data = (void *)intel_tgl_bios, }, + { +/* quirk used for NUC15 LAPBC710 skew */ + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_BOARD_VENDOR ,"Intel Corporation" ), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "LAPBC710"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)intel_tgl_bios, + }, { .matches = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Dell Inc"),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 12/28 phy: sun4i-usb: Introduce port2 SIDDQ quirk
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b45c6d80325bec2b78c716629a518b6442d8bdc6 ]
At least the Allwinner H616 SoC requires a weird quirk to make most USB PHYs work: Only port2 works out of the box, but all other ports need some help from this port2 to work correctly: The CLK_BUS_PHY2 and RST_USB_PHY2 clock and reset need to be enabled, and the SIDDQ bit in the PMU PHY control register needs to be cleared. For this register to be accessible, CLK_BUS_ECHI2 needs to be ungated. Don't ask ....
Instead of disguising this as some generic feature, treat it more like a quirk (what it really is):
If the quirk bit is set, and we initialise a PHY other than PHY2, ungate this one special clock, and clear the SIDDQ bit. We also pick the clock and reset from PHY2 and enable them as well.
--- drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+)
drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c +59 -0
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg {u8 phyctl_offset;bool dedicated_clocks;bool phy0_dual_route; +bool needs_phy2_siddq;int missing_phys; };
@@ -289,6 +290,50 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_init(struct phy *_phy)return ret; } +/* Some PHYs on some SoCs need the help of PHY2 to work. */ +if (data->cfg->needs_phy2_siddq && phy->index !=2 ) { +struct sun4i_usb_phy *phy2 = &data->phys[2 ]; + + ret =clk_prepare_enable (phy2->clk); +if (ret) { +reset_control_assert (phy->reset); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk2); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk); +return ret; + } + + ret =reset_control_deassert (phy2->reset); +if (ret) { +clk_disable_unprepare (phy2->clk); +reset_control_assert (phy->reset); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk2); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk); +return ret; + } + +/* +* This extra clock is just needed to access the +* REG_HCI_PHY_CTL PMU register for PHY2. +*/ + ret =clk_prepare_enable (phy2->clk2); +if (ret) { +reset_control_assert (phy2->reset); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy2->clk); +reset_control_assert (phy->reset); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk2); +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk); +return ret; + } + +if (phy2->pmu && data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear) { + val =readl (phy2->pmu +REG_HCI_PHY_CTL ); + val &= ~data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear; +writel (val, phy2->pmu +REG_HCI_PHY_CTL ); + } + +clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk2); + } +if (phy->pmu && data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear) { val =readl (phy->pmu +REG_HCI_PHY_CTL ); val &= ~data->cfg->hci_phy_ctl_clear;
@@ -354,6 +399,13 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_exit(struct phy *_phy) data->phy0_init = false; } +if (data->cfg->needs_phy2_siddq && phy->index !=2 ) { +struct sun4i_usb_phy *phy2 = &data->phys[2 ]; + +clk_disable_unprepare (phy2->clk); +reset_control_assert (phy2->reset); + } +sun4i_usb_phy_passby (phy,0 );reset_control_assert (phy->reset);clk_disable_unprepare (phy->clk2);
@@ -785,6 +837,13 @@ static int sun4i_usb_phy_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)dev_err (dev,"failed to get clock %s\n" , name);return PTR_ERR (phy->clk2); } + }else { +snprintf (name,sizeof (name),"pmu%d_clk" , i); + phy->clk2 =devm_clk_get_optional (dev, name); +if (IS_ERR (phy->clk2)) { +dev_err (dev,"failed to get clock %s\n" , name); +return PTR_ERR (phy->clk2); + } }snprintf (name,sizeof (name),"usb%d_reset" , i);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 13/28 phy: sun4i-usb: Add support for the H616 USB PHY
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0f607406525d25019dd9c498bcc0b42734fc59d5 ]
The USB PHY used in the Allwinner H616 SoC inherits some traits from its various predecessors: it has four full PHYs like the H3, needs some extra bits to be set like the H6, and puts SIDDQ on a different bit like the A100. Plus it needs this weird PHY2 quirk.
Name all those properties in a new config struct and assign a new compatible name to it.
--- drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/phy/allwinner/phy-sun4i-usb.c +12 -0
@@ -1032,6 +1032,17 @@ static const struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg sun50i_h6_cfg = { .missing_phys = BIT(1) | BIT(2), }; +static const struct sun4i_usb_phy_cfg sun50i_h616_cfg = { + .num_phys =4 , + .type = sun50i_h6_phy, + .disc_thresh =3 , + .phyctl_offset =REG_PHYCTL_A33 , + .dedicated_clocks = true, + .phy0_dual_route = true, + .hci_phy_ctl_clear =PHY_CTL_SIDDQ , + .needs_phy2_siddq = true, +}; +static const struct of_device_id sun4i_usb_phy_of_match[] = { { .compatible ="allwinner,sun4i-a10-usb-phy" , .data = &sun4i_a10_cfg }, { .compatible ="allwinner,sun5i-a13-usb-phy" , .data = &sun5i_a13_cfg },
@@ -1047,6 +1058,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id sun4i_usb_phy_of_match[] = { { .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-a64-usb-phy", .data = &sun50i_a64_cfg}, { .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h6-usb-phy", .data = &sun50i_h6_cfg }, + { .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h616-usb-phy", .data = &sun50i_h616_cfg }, { }, };MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (of, sun4i_usb_phy_of_match);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 14/28 fs/ntfs3: Validate index root when initialize NTFS security
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Edward Lo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bfcdbae0523bd95eb75a739ffb6221a37109881e ]
This enhances the sanity check for $SDH and $SII while initializing NTFS security, guarantees these index root are legit.
[ 162.459513] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.460176] Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880037bca99 by task mount/243 [ 162.460851] [ 162.461252] CPU: 0 PID: 243 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.0.0-rc7 #42 [ 162.461744] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 162.462609] Call Trace: [ 162.462954] <TASK> [ 162.463276] dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x63 [ 162.463822] print_report.cold+0xf5/0x689 [ 162.464608] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x3a/0x60 [ 162.465766] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.466975] kasan_report+0xa7/0x130 [ 162.467506] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0xc0/0xf0 [ 162.467998] ? hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.468536] __asan_load2+0x68/0x90 [ 162.468923] hdr_find_e.isra.0+0x10c/0x320 [ 162.469282] ? cmp_uints+0xe0/0xe0 [ 162.469557] ? cmp_sdh+0x90/0x90 [ 162.469864] ? ni_find_attr+0x214/0x300 [ 162.470217] ? ni_load_mi+0x80/0x80 [ 162.470479] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 162.470931] ? ntfs_bread_run+0x190/0x190 [ 162.471307] ? indx_get_root+0xe4/0x190 [ 162.471556] ? indx_get_root+0x140/0x190 [ 162.471833] ? indx_init+0x1e0/0x1e0 [ 162.472069] ? fnd_clear+0x115/0x140 [ 162.472363] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x100/0x100 [ 162.472731] indx_find+0x184/0x470 [ 162.473461] ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0 [ 162.474429] ? indx_find_buffer+0x2d0/0x2d0 [ 162.474704] ? do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 162.474962] dir_search_u+0x196/0x2f0 [ 162.475381] ? ntfs_nls_to_utf16+0x450/0x450 [ 162.475661] ? ntfs_security_init+0x3d6/0x440 [ 162.475906] ? is_sd_valid+0x180/0x180 [ 162.476191] ntfs_extend_init+0x13f/0x2c0 [ 162.476496] ? ntfs_fix_post_read+0x130/0x130 [ 162.476861] ? iput.part.0+0x286/0x320 [ 162.477325] ntfs_fill_super+0x11e0/0x1b50 [ 162.477709] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 162.477970] ? vsprintf+0x20/0x20 [ 162.478258] ? set_blocksize+0x95/0x150 [ 162.478538] get_tree_bdev+0x232/0x370 [ 162.478789] ? put_ntfs+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 162.479038] ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [ 162.479374] vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x130 [ 162.479729] path_mount+0x654/0xfe0 [ 162.480124] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.480484] ? finish_automount+0x2e0/0x2e0 [ 162.480894] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.481467] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1c4/0x440 [ 162.482280] ? putname+0x80/0xa0 [ 162.482714] do_mount+0xd6/0xf0 [ 162.483264] ? path_mount+0xfe0/0xfe0 [ 162.484782] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 162.485593] __x64_sys_mount+0xca/0x110 [ 162.486024] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 162.486543] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 162.487141] RIP: 0033:0x7f9d374e948a [ 162.488324] Code: 48 8b 0d 11 fa 2a 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 008 [ 162.489728] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30e73d18 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 162.490971] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000561cdb43a060 RCX: 00007f9d374e948a [ 162.491669] RDX: 0000561cdb43a260 RSI: 0000561cdb43a2e0 RDI: 0000561cdb442af0 [ 162.492050] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000561cdb43a280 R09: 0000000000000020 [ 162.492459] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561cdb442af0 [ 162.493183] R13: 0000561cdb43a260 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff [ 162.493644] </TASK> [ 162.493908] [ 162.494214] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 162.494761] page:000000003e38a3d5 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x37bc [ 162.496064] flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 162.497278] raw: 000fffffc0000000 ffffea00000df1c8 ffffea00000df008 0000000000000000 [ 162.498928] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000240000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 162.500542] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 162.501057] [ 162.501242] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 162.502230] ffff8880037bc980: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.502977] ffff8880037bca00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.503522] >ffff8880037bca80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.503963] ^ [ 162.504370] ffff8880037bcb00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff [ 162.504766] ffff8880037bcb80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
--- fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/fsntfs.c +6 -4
@@ -1849,9 +1849,10 @@ int ntfs_security_init(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi) goto out; } - root_sdh =resident_data (attr); + root_sdh =resident_data_ex (attr,sizeof (struct INDEX_ROOT ));if (root_sdh->type !=ATTR_ZERO || - root_sdh->rule !=NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_SECURITY_HASH ) { + root_sdh->rule !=NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_SECURITY_HASH || + offsetof(struct INDEX_ROOT , ihdr) + root_sdh->ihdr.used > attr->res.data_size) { err = -EINVAL ; goto out; }
@@ -1867,9 +1868,10 @@ int ntfs_security_init(struct ntfs_sb_info *sbi) goto out; } - root_sii =resident_data (attr); + root_sii =resident_data_ex (attr,sizeof (struct INDEX_ROOT ));if (root_sii->type !=ATTR_ZERO || - root_sii->rule !=NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_UINT ) { + root_sii->rule !=NTFS_COLLATION_TYPE_UINT || + offsetof(struct INDEX_ROOT , ihdr) + root_sii->ihdr.used > attr->res.data_size) { err = -EINVAL ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 15/28 fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at wnd_init()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0d0f659bf713662fabed973f9996b8f23c59ca51 ]
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at wnd_init() [1], for a crafted filesystem can become wnd->nwnd close to UINT_MAX. Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by using kvcalloc().
--- fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ntfs3/bitmap.c +1 -1
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ int wnd_init(struct wnd_bitmap *wnd, struct super_block *sb, size_t nbits)if (!wnd->bits_last) wnd->bits_last = wbits; - wnd->free_bits =kcalloc (wnd->nwnd,sizeof (u16),GFP_NOFS ); + wnd->free_bits =kcalloc (wnd->nwnd,sizeof (u16),GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);if (!wnd->free_bits)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 16/28 fs/ntfs3: Use __GFP_NOWARN allocation at ntfs_fill_super()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 59bfd7a483da36bd202532a3d9ea1f14f3bf3aaf ]
syzbot is reporting too large allocation at ntfs_fill_super() [1], for a crafted filesystem can contain bogus inode->i_size. Add __GFP_NOWARN in order to avoid too large allocation warning, than exhausting memory by using kvmalloc().
--- fs/ntfs3/super.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ntfs3/super.c +1 -1
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int ntfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) goto put_inode_out; } bytes = inode->i_size; - sbi->def_table = t =kmalloc (bytes,GFP_NOFS ); + sbi->def_table = t =kmalloc (bytes,GFP_NOFS | __GFP_NOWARN);if (!t) { err = -ENOMEM ; goto put_inode_out;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 17/28 fs/ntfs3: Delete duplicate condition in ntfs_read_mft()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 658015167a8432b88f5d032e9d85d8fd50e5bf2c ]
There were two patches which addressed the same bug and added the same condition:
commit 6db620863f85 ("fs/ntfs3: Validate data run offset") commit 887bfc546097 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in run_unpack")
Delete one condition.
--- fs/ntfs3/inode.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/inode.c +0 -6
@@ -374,12 +374,6 @@ static struct inode *ntfs_read_mft(struct inode *inode, t64 =le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.svcn); -/* offset to packed runs is out-of-bounds */ -if (roff > asize) { - err = -EINVAL ; - goto out; - } - err =run_unpack_ex (run, sbi, ino, t64,le64_to_cpu (attr->nres.evcn), t64,Add2Ptr (attr, roff), asize - roff);if (err <0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 18/28 fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in r_page
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Yin Xiujiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ecfbd57cf9c5ca225184ae266ce44ae473792132 ]
When PAGE_SIZE is 64K, if read_log_page is called by log_read_rst for the first time, the size of *buffer would be equal to DefaultLogPageSize(4K).But for *buffer operations like memcpy, if the memory area size(n) which being assigned to buffer is larger than 4K (log->page_size(64K) or bytes(64K-page_off)), it will cause an out of boundary error.
Call trace: [...] kasan_report+0x44/0x130 check_memory_region+0xf8/0x1a0 memcpy+0xc8/0x100 ntfs_read_run_nb+0x20c/0x460 read_log_page+0xd0/0x1f4 log_read_rst+0x110/0x75c log_replay+0x1e8/0x4aa0 ntfs_loadlog_and_replay+0x290/0x2d0 ntfs_fill_super+0x508/0xec0 get_tree_bdev+0x1fc/0x34c [...]
Fix this by setting variable r_page to NULL in log_read_rst.
--- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 26 ++------------------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +2 -24
@@ -1132,7 +1132,7 @@ static int read_log_page(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 vbo,return -EINVAL ;if (!*buffer) { - to_free =kmalloc (bytes,GFP_NOFS ); + to_free =kmalloc (log->page_size,GFP_NOFS );if (!to_free)return -ENOMEM ; *buffer = to_free;
@@ -1180,10 +1180,7 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first, struct restart_info *info) {u32 skip, vbo; -struct RESTART_HDR *r_page =kmalloc (DefaultLogPageSize,GFP_NOFS ); - -if (!r_page) -return -ENOMEM ; +struct RESTART_HDR *r_page =NULL ;/* Determine which restart area we are looking for. */ if (first) {
@@ -1197,7 +1194,6 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first,/* Loop continuously until we succeed. */ for (; vbo < l_size; vbo =2 * vbo + skip, skip =0 ) {bool usa_error; -u32 sys_page_size;bool brst, bchk;struct RESTART_AREA *ra;
@@ -1251,24 +1247,6 @@ static int log_read_rst(struct ntfs_log *log, u32 l_size, bool first, goto check_result; } -/* Read the entire restart area. */ - sys_page_size =le32_to_cpu (r_page->sys_page_size); -if (DefaultLogPageSize != sys_page_size) { -kfree (r_page); - r_page =kzalloc (sys_page_size,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!r_page) -return -ENOMEM ; - -if (read_log_page (log, vbo, - (struct RECORD_PAGE_HDR **)&r_page, - &usa_error)) { -/* Ignore any errors. */ -kfree (r_page); - r_page =NULL ; -continue ; - } - } -if (is_client_area_valid (r_page, usa_error)) { info->valid_page = true; ra =Add2Ptr (r_page,le16_to_cpu (r_page->ra_off));
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 19/28 objtool: Fix SEGFAULT
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit efb11fdb3e1a9f694fa12b70b21e69e55ec59c36 ]
find_insn() will return NULL in case of failure. Check insn in order to avoid a kernel Oops for NULL pointer dereference.
--- tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +1 -1
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,return false; insn =find_insn (file, func->sec, func->offset); -if (!insn->func) +if (!insn || !insn->func)return false;func_for_each_insn (file, func, insn) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 20/28 iommu/mediatek: Fix crash on isr after kexec()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 00ef8885a945c37551547d8ac8361cacd20c4e42 ]
If the system is rebooted via isr(), the IRQ handler might be triggered before the domain is initialized. Resulting on an invalid memory access error.
Fix:
[ 0.500930] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000070 [ 0.501166] Call trace: [ 0.501174] report_iommu_fault+0x28/0xfc [ 0.501180] mtk_iommu_isr+0x10c/0x1c0
--- drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/mtk_iommu.c +1 -1
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mtk_iommu_isr(int irq, void *dev_id) fault_larb = data->plat_data->larbid_remap[fault_larb][sub_comm]; } -if (report_iommu_fault (&dom->domain, bank->parent_dev, fault_iova, +if (!dom ||report_iommu_fault (&dom->domain, bank->parent_dev, fault_iova, write ?IOMMU_FAULT_WRITE :IOMMU_FAULT_READ )) { dev_err_ratelimited( bank->parent_dev,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 21/28 powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ]
rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could hang.
Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time, cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for "ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +10 -3
@@ -889,6 +889,7 @@ void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)/* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */ static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048 ]; +static s32 ibm_os_term_token =RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ;void rtas_os_term (char *str) {
@@ -900,14 +901,13 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)* this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid * since it interferes with panic_timeout. */ -if (RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ==rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ) || -RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ==rtas_token ("ibm,extended-os-term" )) +if (ibm_os_term_token ==RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE )return ;snprintf (rtas_os_term_buf,2048 ,"OS panic: %s" , str);do { - status =rtas_call (rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ),1 ,1 ,NULL , + status =rtas_call (ibm_os_term_token,1 ,1 ,NULL ,__pa (rtas_os_term_buf)); }while (rtas_busy_delay (status));
@@ -1277,6 +1277,13 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void) no_entry =of_property_read_u32 (rtas.dev,"linux,rtas-entry" , &entry); rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry; +/* +* Discover these now to avoid device tree lookups in the +* panic path. +*/ +if (of_property_read_bool (rtas.dev,"ibm,extended-os-term" )) + ibm_os_term_token =rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ); +/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for * the stop-self token if any */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 22/28 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]
It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200
Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +6 -1
@@ -906,10 +906,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)snprintf (rtas_os_term_buf,2048 ,"OS panic: %s" , str); +/* +* Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status, +* but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially +* schedules. +*/ do { status =rtas_call (ibm_os_term_token,1 ,1 ,NULL ,__pa (rtas_os_term_buf)); - }while (rtas_busy_delay (status)); + }while (rtas_busy_delay_time (status));if (status !=0 )printk (KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n" , status);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 23/28 rtc: msc313: Fix function prototype mismatch in msc313_rtc_probe()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 21b8a1dd56a163825e5749b303858fb902ebf198 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.
msc313_rtc_probe() was passing clk_disable_unprepare() directly, which did not have matching prototypes for devm_add_action_or_reset()'s callback argument. Refactor to use devm_clk_get_enabled() instead.
This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type, which only checks for type width mismatches.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c | 12 +----------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-msc313.c +1 -11
@@ -212,22 +212,12 @@ static int msc313_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)return ret; } - clk =devm_clk_get (dev,NULL ); + clk =devm_clk_get_enabled (dev,NULL );if (IS_ERR (clk)) {dev_err (dev,"No input reference clock\n" );return PTR_ERR (clk); } - ret =clk_prepare_enable (clk); -if (ret) { -dev_err (dev,"Failed to enable the reference clock, %d\n" , ret); -return ret; - } - - ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (dev, (void (*) (void *))clk_disable_unprepare, clk); -if (ret) -return ret; - rate =clk_get_rate (clk);writew (rate &0xFFFF , priv->rtc_base +REG_RTC_FREQ_CW_L );writew ((rate >>16 ) &0xFFFF , priv->rtc_base +REG_RTC_FREQ_CW_H );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 24/28 NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open()
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dai Ngo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 75333d48f92256a0dec91dbf07835e804fc411c0 ]
Problem caused by source's vfsmount being unmounted but remains on the delayed unmount list. This happens when nfs42_ssc_open() return errors.
Fixed by removing nfsd4_interssc_connect(), leave the vfsmount for the laundromat to unmount when idle time expires.
We don't need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive when nfs42_ssc_open return errors since the file was not opened so nfs_server->active was not incremented. Same as in nfsd4_copy, if we fail to launch nfsd4_do_async_copy thread then there's no need to call nfs_do_sb_deactive
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 20 +++++--------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +5 -15
@@ -1463,13 +1463,6 @@ nfsd4_interssc_connect(struct nl4_server *nss, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,return status; } -static void -nfsd4_interssc_disconnect (struct vfsmount *ss_mnt) -{ -nfs_do_sb_deactive (ss_mnt->mnt_sb); -mntput (ss_mnt); -} -/* * Verify COPY destination stateid. *
@@ -1572,11 +1565,6 @@ nfsd4_cleanup_inter_ssc(struct vfsmount *ss_mnt, struct file *filp, { } -static void -nfsd4_interssc_disconnect (struct vfsmount *ss_mnt) -{ -} -static struct file *nfs42_ssc_open (struct vfsmount *ss_mnt,struct nfs_fh *src_fh,nfs4_stateid *stateid)
@@ -1771,7 +1759,7 @@ static int nfsd4_do_async_copy(void *data)default : nfserr = nfserr_offload_denied; } -nfsd4_interssc_disconnect (copy->ss_mnt); +/* ss_mnt will be unmounted by the laundromat */ goto do_callback; } nfserr = nfsd4_do_copy(copy, filp, copy->nf_dst->nf_file,
@@ -1852,8 +1840,10 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,if (async_copy)cleanup_async_copy (async_copy); status =nfserrno (-ENOMEM ); -if (nfsd4_ssc_is_inter (copy)) -nfsd4_interssc_disconnect (copy->ss_mnt); +/* +* source's vfsmount of inter-copy will be unmounted +* by the laundromat +*/ goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
PATCH 24/28 NFSD: fix use-after-free in __nfs42_ssc_open()
Hello,
Does this patch need to be backported to 5.15 and all other supported LTS branches or only 6.1 is affected?
Thank you
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 25/28 kprobes: kretprobe events missing on 2-core KVM guest
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: wuqiang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b7ddab8a19aefc768f345fd3782af35b4a68d9b ]
Default value of maxactive is set as num_possible_cpus() for nonpreemptable systems. For a 2-core system, only 2 kretprobe instances would be allocated in default, then these 2 instances for execve kretprobe are very likely to be used up with a pipelined command.
Here's the testcase: a shell script was added to crontab, and the content of the script is:
#!/bin/sh
do_something_magic tr -dc a-z < /dev/urandom | head -c 10
cron will trigger a series of program executions (4 times every hour). Then events loss would be noticed normally after 3-4 hours of testings.
The issue is caused by a burst of series of execve requests. The best number of kretprobe instances could be different case by case, and should be user's duty to determine, but num_possible_cpus() as the default value is inadequate especially for systems with small number of cpus.
This patch enables the logic for preemption as default, thus increases the minimum of maxactive to 10 for nonpreemptable systems.
--- Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst | 3 +-- kernel/kprobes.c | 8 ++------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Documentation/trace/kprobes.rst +1 -2
@@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ For example, if the function is non-recursive and is called with a spinlock held, maxactive = 1 should be enough. If the function is non-recursive and can never relinquish the CPU (e.g., via a semaphore or preemption), NR_CPUS should be enough. If maxactive <= 0, it is -set to a default value. If CONFIG_PREEMPT is enabled, the default -is max(10, 2*NR_CPUS). Otherwise, the default is NR_CPUS. +set to a default value: max(10, 2*NR_CPUS). It's not a disaster if you set maxactive too low; you'll just miss some probes. In the kretprobe struct, the nmissed field is set to
kernel/kprobes.c +2 -6
@@ -2213,13 +2213,9 @@ int register_kretprobe(struct kretprobe *rp) rp->kp.post_handler =NULL ;/* Pre-allocate memory for max kretprobe instances */ -if (rp->maxactive <=0 ) { -#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPTION +if (rp->maxactive <=0 ) rp->maxactive = max_t(unsigned int, 10, 2*num_possible_cpus()); -#else - rp->maxactive =num_possible_cpus (); -#endif - } +#ifdef CONFIG_KRETPROBE_ON_RETHOOK rp->rh =rethook_alloc ((void *)rp, kretprobe_rethook_handler);if (!rp->rh)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 26/28 powerpc/msi: Fix deassociation of MSI descriptors
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4545c6a3d6ba71747eaa984c338ddd745e56e23f ]
Since 2f2940d16823 ("genirq/msi: Remove filter from msi_free_descs_free_range()"), the core MSI code relies on the msi_desc->irq field to have been cleared before the descriptor can be freed, as it indicates that there is no association with a device anymore.
The irq domain code provides this guarantee, and so does s390, which is one of the two architectures not using irq domains for MSIs.
Powerpc, however, is missing this particular requirements, leading in a splat and leaked MSI descriptors.
Adding the now required irq reset to the handful of powerpc backends that implement MSIs fixes that particular problem.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/hsta_msi.c | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/axon_msi.c | 1 + arch/powerpc/platforms/pasemi/msi.c | 1 + arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c | 1 + arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_u3msi.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/hsta_msi.c +1 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ static void hsta_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs (&ppc4xx_hsta_msi.bmp, irq,1 );pr_debug ("%s: Teardown IRQ %u (index %u)\n" , __func__, entry->irq, irq); + entry->irq =0 ; } }
arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/axon_msi.c +1 -0
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ static void axon_msi_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *dev)msi_for_each_desc (entry, &dev->dev,MSI_DESC_ASSOCIATED ) {irq_set_msi_desc (entry->irq,NULL );irq_dispose_mapping (entry->irq); + entry->irq =0 ; } }
arch/powerpc/platforms/pasemi/msi.c +1 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static void pasemi_msi_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *pdev) hwirq =virq_to_hw (entry->irq);irq_set_msi_desc (entry->irq,NULL );irq_dispose_mapping (entry->irq); + entry->irq =0 ;msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs (&msi_mpic->msi_bitmap, hwirq,ALLOC_CHUNK ); } }
arch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_msi.c +1 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ static void fsl_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *pdev) msi_data =irq_get_chip_data (entry->irq);irq_set_msi_desc (entry->irq,NULL );irq_dispose_mapping (entry->irq); + entry->irq =0 ;msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs (&msi_data->bitmap, hwirq,1 ); } }
arch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic_u3msi.c +1 -0
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@ static void u3msi_teardown_msi_irqs(struct pci_dev *pdev) hwirq =virq_to_hw (entry->irq);irq_set_msi_desc (entry->irq,NULL );irq_dispose_mapping (entry->irq); + entry->irq =0 ;msi_bitmap_free_hwirqs (&msi_mpic->msi_bitmap, hwirq,1 ); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 27/28 HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: José Expósito <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4eab1c2fe06c98a4dff258dd64800b6986c101e9 ]
The HID descriptor of this device contains two mouse collections, one for mouse emulation and the other for the trackpoint.
Both collections get merged and, because the first one defines X and Y, the movemenent events reported by the trackpoint collection are ignored.
Set the MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT class for this device to be able to receive its reports.
This fix is similar to/based on commit 40d5bb87377a ("HID: multitouch:
enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices").
--- drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +4 -0
@@ -1967,6 +1967,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {HID_DEVICE (BUS_I2C ,HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8 , USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x313a) }, + { .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT, +HID_DEVICE (BUS_I2C ,HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8 , + USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x3148) }, + /* Elitegroup panel */ { .driver_data = MT_CLS_SERIAL, MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ELITEGROUP,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 28/28 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Terry Junge <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]
I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.
Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)
Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.
The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms.
End quote
--- drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 3 +++ drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
@@ -995,7 +995,10 @@#define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_IHOME_IMAC_A210S 0x8003#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS 0x047f +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES 0xc055#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES 0xc056 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES 0xc057 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES 0xc058#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC 0x04da#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780 0x1044
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c +9 -0
@@ -198,9 +198,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, }static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = { + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS ,USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES ), .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS ,HID_ANY_ID ) }, { } };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1