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Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

PATCH Superseded Arne Schwabe 3 participants 10 messages Jan 5, 2023 – Jan 10, 2023

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PATCH 1/1 Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

OpenVPN will announce once per period how many packets it dropped:

Dropped 11 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

to inform an amdin about the consequence of this feature.

---
 Changes.rst                         |  4 ++
 doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 19 ++++++
 src/openvpn/Makefile.am             |  1 +
 src/openvpn/mudp.c                  | 14 +++++
 src/openvpn/multi.c                 |  4 ++
 src/openvpn/multi.h                 |  2 +
 src/openvpn/options.c               | 24 ++++++++
 src/openvpn/options.h               |  5 ++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c        | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h        | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 234 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h
Changes.rst +4 -0
index 47933ae09..187d03fcf 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ Cookie based handshake for UDP server
     shake. The tls-crypt-v2 option allows controlling if older clients are
     accepted.
 
+    By default the rate of initial packet responses is limited to 100 per 10s
+    interval to avoid OpenVPN servers being abused in reflection attacks
+    (see ``--connect-freq-initial``).
+
 Data channel offloading with ovpn-dco
     2.6.0+ implements support for data-channel offloading where the data packets
     are directly processed and forwarded in kernel space thanks to the ovpn-dco
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +19 -0
index 99263fff3..cbb2c3c92 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,25 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.
 
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from to clients.
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
index e80a35abd..35d60a65b 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ openvpn_SOURCES = \
 	ps.c ps.h \
 	push.c push.h \
 	pushlist.h \
+	reflect_filter.c reflect_filter.h \
 	reliable.c reliable.h \
 	route.c route.h \
 	run_command.c run_command.h \
src/openvpn/mudp.c +14 -0
index c27c6da5b..4ef2f355b 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-req-initial */
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 0ba509fa0..1a7f278f7 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);
src/openvpn/multi.h +2 -0
index 370d795c9..713c63eee 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mtcp.h"
 #include "perf.h"
 #include "vlan.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 #define MULTI_PREFIX_MAX_LENGTH 256
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ struct multi_context {
                                  *   as external transport. */
     struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool;
     struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter;
+    struct initial_packet_rate_limit *initial_rate_limiter;
     struct mroute_helper *route_helper;
     struct multi_reap *reaper;
     struct mroute_addr local;
src/openvpn/options.c +24 -0
index ee3783046..cf8622f46 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -2613,6 +2618,10 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options,
         {
             msg(M_USAGE, "--connect-freq only works with --mode server --proto udp.  Try --max-clients instead.");
         }
+        if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && (options->cf_initial_max || options->cf_initial_per))
+        {
+            msg(M_USAGE, "--connect-freq only works with --mode server --proto udp.  Try --max-clients instead.");
+        }
         if (!(dev == DEV_TYPE_TAP || (dev == DEV_TYPE_TUN && options->topology == TOP_SUBNET)) && options->ifconfig_pool_netmask)
         {
             msg(M_USAGE, "The third parameter to --ifconfig-pool (netmask) is only valid in --dev tap mode");
@@ -7452,6 +7461,21 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        int cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        cf_max = atoi(p[1]);
+        cf_per = atoi(p[2]);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0)
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parms must be > 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;
src/openvpn/options.h +5 -0
index fec1eace5..48315b10e 100644
@@ -513,8 +513,13 @@ struct options
     bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_blocked;                    /* IPv6 */
     bool enable_c2c;
     bool duplicate_cn;
+
     int cf_max;
     int cf_per;
+
+    int cf_initial_max;
+    int cf_initial_per;
+
     int max_clients;
     int max_routes_per_client;
     int stale_routes_check_interval;
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +91 -0

91 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h new file +70 -0

70 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
#1 lore raw

Hi,

first of all, feature-ACK, and "structure-ACK" - this is a lightweight implementation that can go into 2.6 with not much testing, which should "get the thing done" for most cases. A more sophisticated implementation with per-IP hashing (to avoid (ab-)using the rate-limiter to drown-out legitimate clients) can follwo for 2.7.

This said, most of the code looks good, except for this part:

src/openvpn/options.c init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc) · line 869

Quoted 9 lines · Arne Schwabe

index ee3783046..cf8622f46 100644

src/openvpn/options.c +2 -0
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;

... so this is on-by-default...

src/openvpn/options.c options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, · line 2624

Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
@@ -2613,6 +2618,10 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options,
         {
             msg(M_USAGE, "--connect-freq only works with --mode server --proto udp.  Try --max-clients instead.");
         }
+        if (!proto_is_udp(ce->proto) && (options->cf_initial_max || options->cf_initial_per))
+        {
+            msg(M_USAGE, "--connect-freq only works with --mode server --proto udp.  Try --max-clients instead.");
+        }

... and if it is enabled for !UDP modes, we'll refuse cooperation.

But wouldn't that trigger for *all* TCP servers now, since it defaults to "active"?

Besides that, the "--connect-freq" there is wrong and needs to be "--connect-freq-initial" ;-)

[..]

src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7471

Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +8 -0
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        int cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        cf_max = atoi(p[1]);
+        cf_per = atoi(p[2]);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0)

" < 0 " or " <= 0"?

src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7475

Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +4 -0
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parms must be > 0");
+            goto err;
+        }

... because the inverse of ">0" is not "<0"...

src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7478

Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +3 -0
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }

... now we could of course document "0 turns it off", but then the message needs to be ">= 0".

Quoted 8 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +8 -0
+bool
+reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(struct initial_packet_rate_limit *irl)
+{
+    if (now > irl->last_period_reset + irl->period_length)
+    {
+        int dropped = max_int(irl->curr_period_counter - irl->max_per_period, 0);
+        if (dropped > 0)
+        {

src/openvpn/options.c

Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +10 -0
+            msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW, "Dropped %d initial handshake packets due to "
+                "--connect-freq-initial %d %d",
+                dropped, irl->max_per_period, irl->period_length);
+        }
+        irl->last_period_reset = now;
+        irl->curr_period_counter = 0;
+    }
+    /* avoid overflow by capping the counter to INT_MAX -1. Still counting
+     * the number of packets during a period is still useful */
+    irl->curr_period_counter = min_int(irl->curr_period_counter + 1, INT_MAX - 1);

This looks uglysh.

With a 10-seconds bucket, an (32bit) "int" would overflow at about 430 million packets per seconds - which is, I think, way beyond what any reasonable system can handle (10G ethernet saturates at 15 Mpps).

But if you are really worried about overflows - why not use a (64bit) long here?

gert

Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you 
 feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted 
 it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
                             Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

In reply to Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

OpenVPN will announce once per period how many packets it dropped:

Dropped 11 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

to inform an amdin about the consequence of this feature.

Patch v2: use strtol instead of atoi to be able to differentiate between
an error parsing and parsing 0. Use int64_t instead int to avoid overflow errors.

---
 Changes.rst                         |  4 ++
 doc/man-sections/server-options.rst | 19 ++++++
 src/openvpn/Makefile.am             |  1 +
 src/openvpn/mudp.c                  | 14 +++++
 src/openvpn/multi.c                 |  4 ++
 src/openvpn/multi.h                 |  2 +
 src/openvpn/options.c               | 21 +++++++
 src/openvpn/options.h               |  5 ++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c        | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h        | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 234 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h
Changes.rst +4 -0
index 47933ae09..187d03fcf 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ Cookie based handshake for UDP server
     shake. The tls-crypt-v2 option allows controlling if older clients are
     accepted.
 
+    By default the rate of initial packet responses is limited to 100 per 10s
+    interval to avoid OpenVPN servers being abused in reflection attacks
+    (see ``--connect-freq-initial``).
+
 Data channel offloading with ovpn-dco
     2.6.0+ implements support for data-channel offloading where the data packets
     are directly processed and forwarded in kernel space thanks to the ovpn-dco
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +19 -0
index 99263fff3..cbb2c3c92 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,25 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.
 
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from to clients.
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
index e80a35abd..35d60a65b 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ openvpn_SOURCES = \
 	ps.c ps.h \
 	push.c push.h \
 	pushlist.h \
+	reflect_filter.c reflect_filter.h \
 	reliable.c reliable.h \
 	route.c route.h \
 	run_command.c run_command.h \
src/openvpn/mudp.c +14 -0
index c27c6da5b..4ef2f355b 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-req-initial */
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 0ba509fa0..1a7f278f7 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);
src/openvpn/multi.h +2 -0
index 370d795c9..713c63eee 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mtcp.h"
 #include "perf.h"
 #include "vlan.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 #define MULTI_PREFIX_MAX_LENGTH 256
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ struct multi_context {
                                  *   as external transport. */
     struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool;
     struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter;
+    struct initial_packet_rate_limit *initial_rate_limiter;
     struct mroute_helper *route_helper;
     struct multi_reap *reaper;
     struct mroute_addr local;
src/openvpn/options.c +21 -0
index ee3783046..e756af948 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -7452,6 +7457,22 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        long cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        char *e1, *e2;
+        cf_max = strtol(p[1], &e1, 10);
+        cf_per = strtol(p[2], &e2, 10);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0 || *e1 != '\0' || *e2 != '\0')
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parameters must be integers and >= 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;
src/openvpn/options.h +5 -0
index fec1eace5..48315b10e 100644
@@ -513,8 +513,13 @@ struct options
     bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_blocked;                    /* IPv6 */
     bool enable_c2c;
     bool duplicate_cn;
+
     int cf_max;
     int cf_per;
+
+    int cf_initial_max;
+    int cf_initial_per;
+
     int max_clients;
     int max_routes_per_client;
     int stale_routes_check_interval;
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +93 -0

93 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h new file +71 -0

71 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
#3 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 3 lines · Arne Schwabe

Patch v2: use strtol instead of atoi to be able to differentiate between
an error parsing and parsing 0. Use int64_t instead int to avoid overflow errors.

I find this easier to read, so thanks.

This said...

src/openvpn/mudp.c do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m, · line 92

Quoted 6 lines
src/openvpn/mudp.c +6 -0
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }

This does "we kill the packet if reflect_filter returns false(!)".

[..]

Quoted 3 lines
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +3 -0
+bool
+reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(struct initial_packet_rate_limit *irl)
+{

[..]

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+    return irl->curr_period_counter > irl->max_per_period;
+}

This does "return false *while under the limit*".

So it kills all UDP for me.

2023-01-09 09:03:01 us=694540 rrl: curr_period_counter=1, max_pp=100
2023-01-09 09:03:01 us=694598 connection killed by reflect_filter
2023-01-09 09:03:17 us=494917 rrl: curr_period_counter=1, max_pp=100
2023-01-09 09:03:17 us=495003 connection killed by reflect_filter
2023-01-09 09:03:22 us=773712 rrl: curr_period_counter=2, max_pp=100
2023-01-09 09:03:22 us=773773 connection killed by reflect_filter
2023-01-09 09:03:25 us=243757 rrl: curr_period_counter=3, max_pp=100
2023-01-09 09:03:25 us=243827 connection killed by reflect_filter

Turning around the condition in reflect_filter.c

+ return irl->curr_period_counter < irl->max_per_period;

makes things well-behaved - as in, normal connections succeed, excess RESET_V3 fail - tested with your sendOvpn.py

$ python3.9 sendOvpn.py 1000
generating packets
creating sockets
Round 0
sending packets
sleeping
99 packets received
2023-01-09 09:22:47 us=429929 Connection Attempt Dropped 900 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

While at it, I wonder if it would be a useful addition to do a single message if the rate limiter kicks in, like this

    if ( irl->curr_period_counter == irl->max_per_period )
    {
	msg( M_WARN, "connect-freq-initial rate limiter activated, dropping incoming UDP for the next %d seconds", 
            (irl->last_period_reset + irl->period_length)-now );
    }

we do have a log entry after the end of the period, but that might be an arbitrary time ("when the next packet comes in") further down the log, with no indication why OpenVPN decided to play dead at this point.

gert

Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you 
 feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted 
 it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
                             Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
#4 lore raw
In reply to Arne Schwabe
Quoted 16 lines · Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

[...]

doc/man-sections/server-options.rst fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode. · line 185

Quoted 7 lines
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +0 -0
index 99263fff3..cbb2c3c92 100644
@@ -184,6 +184,25 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.

I think we should add a sentence about the relationship between connect-freq and connect-freq-initial. Because users will wonder. Specifically are there attacks that connect-freq protects against that connect-freq-initial does not?

doc/man-sections/server-options.rst fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode. · line 189

Quoted 4 lines
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +3 -0
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from to clients.

Remove "from"?

Quoted 19 lines
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +16 -0
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client

[...]

Quoted 22 lines
src/openvpn/mudp.c +10 -0
index c27c6da5b..4ef2f355b 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that

src/openvpn/mudp.c multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated) · line 258

Quoted 5 lines
src/openvpn/mudp.c +2 -0
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-req-initial */

"connect-freq-initial"

Quoted 34 lines
src/openvpn/mudp.c +2 -0
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 0ba509fa0..1a7f278f7 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);

[...]

Quoted 43 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +14 -0
index ee3783046..e756af948 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -7452,6 +7457,22 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        long cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        char *e1, *e2;
+        cf_max = strtol(p[1], &e1, 10);
+        cf_per = strtol(p[2], &e2, 10);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0 || *e1 != '\0' || *e2 != '\0')

src/openvpn/options.c add_option(struct options *options, · line 7478

Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/options.c +7 -0
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parameters must be integers and >= 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;

Regards,

Signature · 1 line
  Frank Lichtenheld
#5 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/1 Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

In reply to Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

OpenVPN will announce once per period when starting dropping packets and ultimatively how many packets it dropped:

Connection Attempt Note: --connect-freq-initial 100 10 rate limit exceeded, dropping initial handshake packets for the next 10 seconds

Connection Attempt Dropped 217 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

to inform an amdin about the consequence of this feature.

Patch v2: use strtol instead of atoi to be able to differentiate between
an error parsing and parsing 0. Use int64_t instead int to avoid overflow errors.

Patch v3: Add message when we start dropping. Add a few fixes to the logic.
improve docs

---
 Changes.rst                         |   4 +
 doc/man-sections/server-options.rst |  24 ++++++
 src/openvpn/Makefile.am             |   1 +
 src/openvpn/mudp.c                  |  14 ++++
 src/openvpn/multi.c                 |   4 +
 src/openvpn/multi.h                 |   2 +
 src/openvpn/options.c               |  21 ++++++
 src/openvpn/options.h               |   5 ++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c        | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h        |  75 +++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 261 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h
Changes.rst +4 -0
index 47933ae09..187d03fcf 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ Cookie based handshake for UDP server
     shake. The tls-crypt-v2 option allows controlling if older clients are
     accepted.
 
+    By default the rate of initial packet responses is limited to 100 per 10s
+    interval to avoid OpenVPN servers being abused in reflection attacks
+    (see ``--connect-freq-initial``).
+
 Data channel offloading with ovpn-dco
     2.6.0+ implements support for data-channel offloading where the data packets
     are directly processed and forwarded in kernel space thanks to the ovpn-dco
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +24 -0
index 99263fff3..dbe35d6e1 100644
@@ -178,12 +178,36 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   with connection requests using certificates which will ultimately fail
   to authenticate.
 
+  This limit applies after ``--connect-freq-initial`` and
+  only applies to client that have completed the three-way handshake
+  or client that use ``--tls-crypt-v2`` without cookie support
+  (``allow-noncookie`` argument to ``--tls-crypt-v2``).
+
   This is an imperfect solution however, because in a real DoS scenario,
   legitimate connections might also be refused.
 
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.
 
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from the OpenVPN server to clients.
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
index e80a35abd..35d60a65b 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ openvpn_SOURCES = \
 	ps.c ps.h \
 	push.c push.h \
 	pushlist.h \
+	reflect_filter.c reflect_filter.h \
 	reliable.c reliable.h \
 	route.c route.h \
 	run_command.c run_command.h \
src/openvpn/mudp.c +14 -0
index c27c6da5b..77560425f 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-freq-initial */
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 186e88192..26904859f 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);
src/openvpn/multi.h +2 -0
index 370d795c9..713c63eee 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mtcp.h"
 #include "perf.h"
 #include "vlan.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 #define MULTI_PREFIX_MAX_LENGTH 256
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ struct multi_context {
                                  *   as external transport. */
     struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool;
     struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter;
+    struct initial_packet_rate_limit *initial_rate_limiter;
     struct mroute_helper *route_helper;
     struct multi_reap *reaper;
     struct mroute_addr local;
src/openvpn/options.c +21 -0
index ee3783046..e756af948 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -7452,6 +7457,22 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        long cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        char *e1, *e2;
+        cf_max = strtol(p[1], &e1, 10);
+        cf_per = strtol(p[2], &e2, 10);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0 || *e1 != '\0' || *e2 != '\0')
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parameters must be integers and >= 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;
src/openvpn/options.h +5 -0
index fec1eace5..48315b10e 100644
@@ -513,8 +513,13 @@ struct options
     bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_blocked;                    /* IPv6 */
     bool enable_c2c;
     bool duplicate_cn;
+
     int cf_max;
     int cf_per;
+
+    int cf_initial_max;
+    int cf_initial_per;
+
     int max_clients;
     int max_routes_per_client;
     int stale_routes_check_interval;
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +111 -0

111 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h new file +75 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/1 Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

In reply to Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

OpenVPN will announce once per period when starting dropping packets and ultimatively how many packets it dropped:

Connection Attempt Note: --connect-freq-initial 100 10 rate limit exceeded, dropping initial handshake packets for the next 10 seconds

Connection Attempt Dropped 217 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

to inform an amdin about the consequence of this feature.

Patch v2: use strtol instead of atoi to be able to differentiate between
an error parsing and parsing 0. Use int64_t instead int to avoid overflow errors.

Patch v3: Add message when we start dropping. Add a few fixes to the logic.
improve docs

Patch v4: missing missing return statement.

---
 Changes.rst                         |   4 ++
 doc/man-sections/server-options.rst |  24 +++++++
 src/openvpn/Makefile.am             |   1 +
 src/openvpn/mudp.c                  |  14 ++++
 src/openvpn/multi.c                 |   4 ++
 src/openvpn/multi.h                 |   2 +
 src/openvpn/options.c               |  21 ++++++
 src/openvpn/options.h               |   5 ++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c        | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h        |  75 +++++++++++++++++++
 10 files changed, 257 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h
Changes.rst +4 -0
index 47933ae09..187d03fcf 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ Cookie based handshake for UDP server
     shake. The tls-crypt-v2 option allows controlling if older clients are
     accepted.
 
+    By default the rate of initial packet responses is limited to 100 per 10s
+    interval to avoid OpenVPN servers being abused in reflection attacks
+    (see ``--connect-freq-initial``).
+
 Data channel offloading with ovpn-dco
     2.6.0+ implements support for data-channel offloading where the data packets
     are directly processed and forwarded in kernel space thanks to the ovpn-dco
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +24 -0
index 99263fff3..dbe35d6e1 100644
@@ -178,12 +178,36 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   with connection requests using certificates which will ultimately fail
   to authenticate.
 
+  This limit applies after ``--connect-freq-initial`` and
+  only applies to client that have completed the three-way handshake
+  or client that use ``--tls-crypt-v2`` without cookie support
+  (``allow-noncookie`` argument to ``--tls-crypt-v2``).
+
   This is an imperfect solution however, because in a real DoS scenario,
   legitimate connections might also be refused.
 
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.
 
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from the OpenVPN server to clients.
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
index e80a35abd..35d60a65b 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ openvpn_SOURCES = \
 	ps.c ps.h \
 	push.c push.h \
 	pushlist.h \
+	reflect_filter.c reflect_filter.h \
 	reliable.c reliable.h \
 	route.c route.h \
 	run_command.c run_command.h \
src/openvpn/mudp.c +14 -0
index c27c6da5b..77560425f 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-freq-initial */
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 186e88192..26904859f 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);
src/openvpn/multi.h +2 -0
index 370d795c9..713c63eee 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mtcp.h"
 #include "perf.h"
 #include "vlan.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 #define MULTI_PREFIX_MAX_LENGTH 256
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ struct multi_context {
                                  *   as external transport. */
     struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool;
     struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter;
+    struct initial_packet_rate_limit *initial_rate_limiter;
     struct mroute_helper *route_helper;
     struct multi_reap *reaper;
     struct mroute_addr local;
src/openvpn/options.c +21 -0
index ee3783046..e756af948 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -7452,6 +7457,22 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        long cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        char *e1, *e2;
+        cf_max = strtol(p[1], &e1, 10);
+        cf_per = strtol(p[2], &e2, 10);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0 || *e1 != '\0' || *e2 != '\0')
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parameters must be integers and >= 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;
src/openvpn/options.h +5 -0
index fec1eace5..48315b10e 100644
@@ -513,8 +513,13 @@ struct options
     bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_blocked;                    /* IPv6 */
     bool enable_c2c;
     bool duplicate_cn;
+
     int cf_max;
     int cf_per;
+
+    int cf_initial_max;
+    int cf_initial_per;
+
     int max_clients;
     int max_routes_per_client;
     int stale_routes_check_interval;
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +107 -0

107 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h new file +75 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
#7 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 4 lines · Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

v4 works perfectly well for unixy platforms, but breaks Windows compilation, due to "there is a new source module that MSVC does not know about".

https://github.com/cron2/openvpn/actions/runs/3878016110/jobs/6613714099

:(

gert

Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you 
 feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted 
 it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
                             Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress

Gert Doering - Munich, Germany                             [email protected]...
#8 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

In reply to Arne Schwabe

This limits the nubmer of packets OpenVPN will respond to. This avoid OpenVPN server being abused for refelection attacks in a large scale as we gotten a lot more efficient with the cookie approach in our initial connection approach.

The defaults of 100 attempts per 10s should work for most people, esepcially since completed three way handshakes are not counted. So the default will throttle connection attempts on server with high packet loss or that are actually under a DOS.

The 100 per 10s are similar in size to the old 2.5 and earlier behaviour where every initial connection attempt would take up a slot of the max-clients sessions and those would only expire after the TLS timeout. This roughly translates to 1024 connection attempts in 60s on an empty server.

OpenVPN will announce once per period when starting dropping packets and ultimatively how many packets it dropped:

Connection Attempt Note: --connect-freq-initial 100 10 rate limit exceeded, dropping initial handshake packets for the next 10 seconds

Connection Attempt Dropped 217 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

to inform an amdin about the consequence of this feature.

Patch v2: use strtol instead of atoi to be able to differentiate between
an error parsing and parsing 0. Use int64_t instead int to avoid overflow errors.

Patch v3: Add message when we start dropping. Add a few fixes to the logic.
improve docs

Patch v4: missing missing return statement.
Patch v5: add build files for msvc build

---
 Changes.rst                         |   4 ++
 doc/man-sections/server-options.rst |  24 +++++++
 src/openvpn/Makefile.am             |   1 +
 src/openvpn/mudp.c                  |  14 ++++
 src/openvpn/multi.c                 |   4 ++
 src/openvpn/multi.h                 |   2 +
 src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj         |   2 +
 src/openvpn/options.c               |  21 ++++++
 src/openvpn/options.h               |   5 ++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c        | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h        |  75 +++++++++++++++++++
 11 files changed, 259 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c
 create mode 100644 src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h
Changes.rst +4 -0
index 47933ae09..187d03fcf 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ Cookie based handshake for UDP server
     shake. The tls-crypt-v2 option allows controlling if older clients are
     accepted.
 
+    By default the rate of initial packet responses is limited to 100 per 10s
+    interval to avoid OpenVPN servers being abused in reflection attacks
+    (see ``--connect-freq-initial``).
+
 Data channel offloading with ovpn-dco
     2.6.0+ implements support for data-channel offloading where the data packets
     are directly processed and forwarded in kernel space thanks to the ovpn-dco
doc/man-sections/server-options.rst +24 -0
index 99263fff3..dbe35d6e1 100644
@@ -178,12 +178,36 @@ fast hardware. SSL/TLS authentication must be used in this mode.
   with connection requests using certificates which will ultimately fail
   to authenticate.
 
+  This limit applies after ``--connect-freq-initial`` and
+  only applies to client that have completed the three-way handshake
+  or client that use ``--tls-crypt-v2`` without cookie support
+  (``allow-noncookie`` argument to ``--tls-crypt-v2``).
+
   This is an imperfect solution however, because in a real DoS scenario,
   legitimate connections might also be refused.
 
   For the best protection against DoS attacks in server mode, use
   ``--proto udp`` and either ``--tls-auth`` or ``--tls-crypt``.
 
+--connect-freq-initial args
+  (UDP only) Allow a maximum of ``n`` initial connection packet responses
+  per ``sec`` seconds from the OpenVPN server to clients.
+
+  Valid syntax:
+  ::
+
+     connect-freq-initial n sec
+
+  OpenVPN starting at 2.6 is very efficient in responding to initial
+  connection packets. When not limiting the initial responses
+  an OpenVPN daemon can be abused in reflection attacks.
+  This option is designed to limit the rate OpenVPN will respond to initial
+  attacks.
+
+  Connection attempts that complete the initial three-way handshake
+  will not be counted against the limit. The default is to allow
+  100 initial connection per 10s.
+
 --duplicate-cn
   Allow multiple clients with the same common name to concurrently
   connect. In the absence of this option, OpenVPN will disconnect a client
src/openvpn/Makefile.am +1 -0
index e80a35abd..35d60a65b 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ openvpn_SOURCES = \
 	ps.c ps.h \
 	push.c push.h \
 	pushlist.h \
+	reflect_filter.c reflect_filter.h \
 	reliable.c reliable.h \
 	route.c route.h \
 	run_command.c run_command.h \
src/openvpn/mudp.c +14 -0
index c27c6da5b..77560425f 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
     struct openvpn_sockaddr *from = &m->top.c2.from.dest;
     int handwindow = m->top.options.handshake_window;
 
+    if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3 || verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2)
+    {
+        /* Check if we are still below our limit for sending out
+         * responses */
+        if (!reflect_filter_rate_limit_check(m->initial_rate_limiter))
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+
     if (verdict == VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V3)
     {
         /* Extract the packet id to check if it has the special format that
@@ -244,6 +254,10 @@ multi_get_create_instance_udp(struct multi_context *m, bool *floated)
 
                 if (frequency_limit_event_allowed(m->new_connection_limiter))
                 {
+                    /* a successful three-way handshake only counts against
+                     * connect-freq but not against connect-freq-initial */
+                    reflect_filter_rate_limit_decrease(m->initial_rate_limiter);
+
                     mi = multi_create_instance(m, &real);
                     if (mi)
                     {
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
index 186e88192..26904859f 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 #include "crypto_backend.h"
 #include "ssl_util.h"
 #include "dco.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 /*#define MULTI_DEBUG_EVENT_LOOP*/
 
@@ -368,6 +369,8 @@ multi_init(struct multi_context *m, struct context *t, bool tcp_mode)
      */
     m->new_connection_limiter = frequency_limit_init(t->options.cf_max,
                                                      t->options.cf_per);
+    m->initial_rate_limiter = initial_rate_limit_init(t->options.cf_initial_max,
+                                                      t->options.cf_initial_per);
 
     /*
      * Allocate broadcast/multicast buffer list
@@ -729,6 +732,7 @@ multi_uninit(struct multi_context *m)
         mbuf_free(m->mbuf);
         ifconfig_pool_free(m->ifconfig_pool);
         frequency_limit_free(m->new_connection_limiter);
+        initial_rate_limit_free(m->initial_rate_limiter);
         multi_reap_free(m->reaper);
         mroute_helper_free(m->route_helper);
         multi_tcp_free(m->mtcp);
src/openvpn/multi.h +2 -0
index 370d795c9..713c63eee 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "mtcp.h"
 #include "perf.h"
 #include "vlan.h"
+#include "reflect_filter.h"
 
 #define MULTI_PREFIX_MAX_LENGTH 256
 
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ struct multi_context {
                                  *   as external transport. */
     struct ifconfig_pool *ifconfig_pool;
     struct frequency_limit *new_connection_limiter;
+    struct initial_packet_rate_limit *initial_rate_limiter;
     struct mroute_helper *route_helper;
     struct multi_reap *reaper;
     struct mroute_addr local;
src/openvpn/openvpn.vcxproj +2 -0
index 13755dae9..97baf678c 100644
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@
     <ClCompile Include="proxy.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="ps.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="push.c" />
+    <ClCompile Include="reflect_filter.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="reliable.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="route.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="run_command.c" />
@@ -417,6 +418,7 @@
     <ClInclude Include="ps.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="push.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="pushlist.h" />
+    <ClInclude Include="reflect_filter.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="reliable.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="ring_buffer.h" />
     <ClInclude Include="route.h" />
src/openvpn/options.c +21 -0
index ee3783046..e756af948 100644
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static const char usage_message[] =
     "                  as well as pushes it to connecting clients.\n"
     "--learn-address cmd : Run command cmd to validate client virtual addresses.\n"
     "--connect-freq n s : Allow a maximum of n new connections per s seconds.\n"
+    "--connect-freq-initial n s : Allow a maximum of n replies for initial connections attempts per s seconds.\n"
     "--max-clients n : Allow a maximum of n simultaneously connected clients.\n"
     "--max-routes-per-client n : Allow a maximum of n internal routes per client.\n"
     "--stale-routes-check n [t] : Remove routes with a last activity timestamp\n"
@@ -864,6 +865,8 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc)
     o->n_bcast_buf = 256;
     o->tcp_queue_limit = 64;
     o->max_clients = 1024;
+    o->cf_initial_per = 10;
+    o->cf_initial_max = 100;
     o->max_routes_per_client = 256;
     o->stale_routes_check_interval = 0;
     o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq = 600;
@@ -1555,6 +1558,8 @@ show_p2mp_parms(const struct options *o)
     SHOW_BOOL(duplicate_cn);
     SHOW_INT(cf_max);
     SHOW_INT(cf_per);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_max);
+    SHOW_INT(cf_initial_per);
     SHOW_INT(max_clients);
     SHOW_INT(max_routes_per_client);
     SHOW_STR(auth_user_pass_verify_script);
@@ -7452,6 +7457,22 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
         options->cf_max = cf_max;
         options->cf_per = cf_per;
     }
+    else if (streq(p[0], "connect-freq-initial") && p[1] && p[2] && !p[3])
+    {
+        long cf_max, cf_per;
+
+        VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_GENERAL);
+        char *e1, *e2;
+        cf_max = strtol(p[1], &e1, 10);
+        cf_per = strtol(p[2], &e2, 10);
+        if (cf_max < 0 || cf_per < 0 || *e1 != '\0' || *e2 != '\0')
+        {
+            msg(msglevel, "--connect-freq-initial parameters must be integers and >= 0");
+            goto err;
+        }
+        options->cf_initial_max = cf_max;
+        options->cf_initial_per = cf_per;
+    }
     else if (streq(p[0], "max-clients") && p[1] && !p[2])
     {
         int max_clients;
src/openvpn/options.h +5 -0
index fec1eace5..48315b10e 100644
@@ -513,8 +513,13 @@ struct options
     bool push_ifconfig_ipv6_blocked;                    /* IPv6 */
     bool enable_c2c;
     bool duplicate_cn;
+
     int cf_max;
     int cf_per;
+
+    int cf_initial_max;
+    int cf_initial_per;
+
     int max_clients;
     int max_routes_per_client;
     int stale_routes_check_interval;
src/openvpn/reflect_filter.c new file +107 -0

107 lines not on this page · raw message

src/openvpn/reflect_filter.h new file +75 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.1 (Apple Git-137.1)
Acked-by on v5 1/1
#9 lore raw

The following tests were all done on v4. diff v4->v5 is only the extra MSVC build files, so I did not completely re-test v5.

Stare-at-code looks good now (thanks). Fixed a bit of wording in the commit message and reflect_filter.h comments.

Tested on the Linux server test rig, with "normal" traffic, "gremlins" (~100 UDP gremlins) and "just bombarding with RESET packets". Everything worked fine, and the new logs nicely show what is happening:

Jan  9 20:47:48 gentoo tun-udp-p2mp[1718]: Connection Attempt Note: --connect-freq-initial 100 10 rate limit exceeded, dropping initial handshake packets for the next 1 seconds
Jan  9 20:47:57 gentoo tun-udp-p2mp[1718]: Dropped 920 initial handshake packets due to --connect-freq-initial 100 10

I have also tested actually using the new option to change defaults :-)

2023-01-09 22:38:31 us=987098 Connection Attempt Note: --connect-freq-initial 200 30 rate limit exceeded, dropping initial handshake packets for the next 30 seconds

(and it does that)

MSVC builds succeed now (GHA), with v5, and for good measure I've thrown in a "make distcheck" ("new source files") which succeeds as well.

Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.6 branch.

commit b520c68c67b6e52cd71b16675f1c436abf18d4dc (master) commit 93d8d92319816a36f53ef8772bd6705f6abc2df9 (release/2.6)

Author: Arne Schwabe
Date:   Tue Jan 10 02:59:01 2023 +0100
     Add connect-freq-initial option to limit initial connection responses

     Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
     Acked-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>
     Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
     URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg25938.html
     Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>

--
kind regards,

Gert Doering