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5.10.163-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 11 participants 795 messages Jan 12, 2023 – Jan 13, 2023 Page 4 of 6

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lore
author maintainer
#448 lore raw

PATCH 448/783 remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: detach power domains on remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luca Weiss <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 34d01df00b84127be04c914fc9f8e8be1fcdf851 ]

We need to detach from the power domains also on remove, not just on probe fail so a subsequent probe works as expected.

Otherwise the following error appears on re-probe:

[   29.452005] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/genpd:0:3000000.remoteproc'
[   29.477121] CPU: 1 PID: 483 Comm: sh Tainted: G        W          6.1.0-rc4-00075-g71a113770bda #78
[   29.510319] Hardware name: Fairphone 4 (DT)
[   29.538335] Call trace:
[   29.564470]  dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0
[   29.592602]  show_stack+0x18/0x30
[   29.619616]  dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
[   29.646834]  dump_stack+0x18/0x34
[   29.673541]  sysfs_warn_dup+0x60/0x7c
[   29.700592]  sysfs_create_dir_ns+0xec/0x110
[   29.728057]  kobject_add_internal+0xb8/0x374
[   29.755530]  kobject_add+0x9c/0x104
[   29.782072]  device_add+0xbc/0x8a0
[   29.808445]  device_register+0x20/0x30
[   29.835175]  genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_id+0xa4/0x190
[   29.862851]  genpd_dev_pm_attach_by_name+0x3c/0xb0
[   29.890472]  dev_pm_domain_attach_by_name+0x20/0x30
[   29.918212]  adsp_probe+0x278/0x580
[   29.944384]  platform_probe+0x68/0xc0
[   29.970603]  really_probe+0xbc/0x2dc
[   29.996662]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0xe0
[   30.023491]  device_driver_attach+0x48/0xac
[   30.050215]  bind_store+0xb8/0x114
[   30.075957]  drv_attr_store+0x24/0x3c
[   30.101874]  sysfs_kf_write+0x44/0x54
[   30.127751]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1f0
[   30.154448]  vfs_write+0x1ac/0x380
[   30.179937]  ksys_write+0x70/0x104
[   30.205274]  __arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x2c
[   30.231060]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
[   30.256594]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec
[   30.283183]  do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xd0
[   30.308320]  el0_svc+0x2c/0x84
[   30.333059]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x120
[   30.359001]  el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
[   30.384385] kobject_add_internal failed for genpd:0:3000000.remoteproc with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
[   30.406029] remoteproc remoteproc0: releasing 3000000.remoteproc
[   30.416064] qcom_q6v5_pas: probe of 3000000.remoteproc failed with error -17
Fixes 17ee2fb4e856 ("remoteproc: qcom: pas: Vote for active/proxy power domains")
---
 drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c +1 -0
index 99b206b00456..d8ef10fba8e8 100644
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ static int adsp_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	qcom_remove_sysmon_subdev(adsp->sysmon);
 	qcom_remove_smd_subdev(adsp->rproc, &adsp->smd_subdev);
 	qcom_remove_ssr_subdev(adsp->rproc, &adsp->ssr_subdev);
+	adsp_pds_detach(adsp, adsp->proxy_pds, adsp->proxy_pd_count);
 	device_init_wakeup(adsp->dev, false);
 	rproc_free(adsp->rproc);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#449 lore raw

PATCH 449/783 remoteproc: qcom_q6v5_pas: Fix missing of_node_put() in adsp_alloc_memory_region()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yuan Can <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38e7d9c19276832ebb0277f415b9214bf7baeb37 ]

The pointer node is returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented. We should use of_node_put() on it when done.

Fixes b9e718e950c3 ("remoteproc: Introduce Qualcomm ADSP PIL")
---
 drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_q6v5_pas.c +1 -0
index d8ef10fba8e8..1a0d6eb9425b 100644
@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ static int adsp_alloc_memory_region(struct qcom_adsp *adsp)
 	}
 
 	ret = of_address_to_resource(node, 0, &r);
+	of_node_put(node);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#450 lore raw

PATCH 450/783 powerpc/eeh: Drop redundant spinlock initialization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Haowen Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3def164a5cedad9117859dd4610cae2cc59cb6d2 ]

slot_errbuf_lock has declared and initialized by DEFINE_SPINLOCK, so we don't need to spin_lock_init again, drop it.

Stable-dep-of: 9aafbfa5f57a ("powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size")

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +1 -2
index 7ed38ebd0c7b..6ad8bda06345 100644
@@ -846,8 +846,7 @@ static int __init eeh_pseries_init(void)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* Initialize error log lock and size */
-	spin_lock_init(&slot_errbuf_lock);
+	/* Initialize error log size */
 	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
 	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
 		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#451 lore raw

PATCH 451/783 powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9aafbfa5f57a4b75bafd3bed0191e8429c5fa618 ]

rtas-error-log-max is not the name of an RTAS function, so rtas_token() is not the appropriate API for retrieving its value. We already have rtas_get_error_log_max() which returns a sensible value if the property is absent for any reason, so use that instead.

Fixes 8d633291b4fc ("powerpc/eeh: pseries platform EEH error log retrieval")
[mpe: Drop no-longer possible error handling as noticed by ajd]
---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +1 -10
index 6ad8bda06345..4601ad10ca7b 100644
@@ -847,16 +847,7 @@ static int __init eeh_pseries_init(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize error log size */
-	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
-	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
-			__func__);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = 1024;
-	} else if (eeh_error_buf_size > RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX) {
-		pr_info("%s: EEH error log size %d exceeds the maximal %d\n",
-			__func__, eeh_error_buf_size, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
-	}
+	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_get_error_log_max();
 
 	/* Set EEH probe mode */
 	eeh_add_flag(EEH_PROBE_MODE_DEVTREE | EEH_ENABLE_IO_FOR_LOG);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#452 lore raw

PATCH 452/783 netfilter: flowtable: really fix NAT IPv6 offload

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qingfang DENG <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5fb45f95eec682621748b7cb012c6a8f0f981e6a ]

The for-loop was broken from the start. It translates to:

	for (i = 0; i < 4; i += 4)

which means the loop statement is run only once, so only the highest 32-bit of the IPv6 address gets mangled.

Fix the loop increment.

Fixes 0e07e25b481a ("netfilter: flowtable: fix NAT IPv6 offload mangling")
Fixes 5c27d8d76ce8 ("netfilter: nf_flow_table_offload: add IPv6 support")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c +3 -3
index 28306cb66719..746ca77d0aad 100644
@@ -305,12 +305,12 @@ static void flow_offload_ipv6_mangle(struct nf_flow_rule *flow_rule,
 				     const __be32 *addr, const __be32 *mask)
 {
 	struct flow_action_entry *entry;
-	int i, j;
+	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < sizeof(struct in6_addr) / sizeof(u32); i += sizeof(u32), j++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(struct in6_addr) / sizeof(u32); i++) {
 		entry = flow_action_entry_next(flow_rule);
 		flow_offload_mangle(entry, FLOW_ACT_MANGLE_HDR_TYPE_IP6,
-				    offset + i, &addr[j], mask);
+				    offset + i * sizeof(u32), &addr[i], mask);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#453 lore raw

PATCH 453/783 rtc: st-lpc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in st_rtc_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5fb733d7bd6949e90028efdce8bd528c6ab7cf1e ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of clk_get_rate(), fix it.

Fixes b5b2bdfc2893 ("rtc: st: Add new driver for ST's LPC RTC")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c +1 -0
index 0c65448b85ee..7d53f7e2febc 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ static int st_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	rtc->clkrate = clk_get_rate(rtc->clk);
 	if (!rtc->clkrate) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(rtc->clk);
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to fetch clock rate\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#454 lore raw

PATCH 454/783 rtc: pic32: Move devm_rtc_allocate_device earlier in pic32_rtc_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 90cd5c88830140c9fade92a8027e0fb2c6e4cc49 ]

The pic32_rtc_enable(pdata, 0) and clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->clk) should be called in the error handling of devm_rtc_allocate_device(), so we should move devm_rtc_allocate_device earlier in pic32_rtc_probe() to fix it.

Fixes 6515e23b9fde ("rtc: pic32: convert to devm_rtc_allocate_device")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-pic32.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pic32.c +4 -4
index 2b6946744654..7be1ca1633fc 100644
@@ -324,16 +324,16 @@ static int pic32_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	spin_lock_init(&pdata->alarm_lock);
 
+	pdata->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc))
+		return PTR_ERR(pdata->rtc);
+
 	clk_prepare_enable(pdata->clk);
 
 	pic32_rtc_enable(pdata, 1);
 
 	device_init_wakeup(&pdev->dev, 1);
 
-	pdata->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev);
-	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc))
-		return PTR_ERR(pdata->rtc);
-
 	pdata->rtc->ops = &pic32_rtcops;
 	pdata->rtc->range_min = RTC_TIMESTAMP_BEGIN_2000;
 	pdata->rtc->range_max = RTC_TIMESTAMP_END_2099;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#455 lore raw

PATCH 455/783 rtc: pcf85063: fix pcf85063_clkout_control

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexandre Belloni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c2d12e85336f6d4172fb2bab5935027c446d7343 ]

pcf85063_clkout_control reads the wrong register but then update the correct one.

Fixes 8c229ab6048b ("rtc: pcf85063: Add pcf85063 clkout control to common clock framework")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c +1 -1
index d739b0c965aa..449204d84c61 100644
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static int pcf85063_clkout_control(struct clk_hw *hw, bool enable)
 	unsigned int buf;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = regmap_read(pcf85063->regmap, PCF85063_REG_OFFSET, &buf);
+	ret = regmap_read(pcf85063->regmap, PCF85063_REG_CTRL2, &buf);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 	buf &= PCF85063_REG_CLKO_F_MASK;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#456 lore raw

PATCH 456/783 NFSD: Remove spurious cb_setup_err tracepoint

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f57c6062bf3ce2c6ab9ba60040b34e8134ef259 ]

This path is not really an error path, so the tracepoint I added there is just noise.

Stable-dep-of: 3bc8edc98bd4 ("nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure")

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +1 -3
index 7325592b456e..4eceff561e5a 100644
@@ -915,10 +915,8 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
 		args.authflavor = clp->cl_cred.cr_flavor;
 		clp->cl_cb_ident = conn->cb_ident;
 	} else {
-		if (!conn->cb_xprt) {
-			trace_nfsd_cb_setup_err(clp, -EINVAL);
+		if (!conn->cb_xprt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 		clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 		clp->cl_cb_session = ses;
 		args.bc_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#457 lore raw

PATCH 457/783 nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Aloni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bc8edc98bd43540dbe648e4ef91f443d6d20a24 ]

On error situation clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt should not be given a reference to the xprt otherwise both client cleanup and the error handling path of the caller call to put it. Better to delay handing over the reference to a later branch.

[   72.530665] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[   72.531933] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 173 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[   72.533075] Modules linked in: nfsd(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfsv3(OE) nfs(OE) lockd(OE) compat_nfs_ssc(OE) nfs_acl(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(OE) auth_rpcgss(OE) rpcrdma(OE) dns_resolver fscache netfs grace rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm sunrpc(OE) mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf ib_uverbs ib_core xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nft_counter xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter bridge stp llc nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set overlay nf_tables nfnetlink crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xfs serio_raw virtio_net virtio_blk net_failover failover fuse [last unloaded: sunrpc]
[   72.540389] CPU: 0 PID: 173 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G           OE     5.15.82-dan #1
[   72.541511] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+1084+97b81f61 04/01/2014
[   72.542717] Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_run_cb_work [nfsd]
[   72.543575] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[   72.544299] Code: 55 00 0f 0b 5d e9 01 50 98 00 80 3d 75 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 e8 d1 60 8e c6 05 61 9e 39 08 01 e8 f6 51 55 00 <0f> 0b 5d e9 d9 4f 98 00 80 3d 4b 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 4c ff ff ff 48
[   72.546666] RSP: 0018:ffffb3f841157cf0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   72.547393] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff89ac6231d478 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   72.548324] RDX: ffff89adb7c2c2c0 RSI: ffff89adb7c205c0 RDI: ffff89adb7c205c0
[   72.549271] RBP: ffffb3f841157cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffefffff
[   72.550209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb3f841157ad0 R12: ffff89ac6231d180
[   72.551142] R13: ffff89ac6231d478 R14: ffff89ac40c06180 R15: ffff89ac6231d4b0
[   72.552089] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89adb7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   72.553175] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   72.553934] CR2: 0000563a310506a8 CR3: 0000000109a66000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[   72.554874] Call Trace:
[   72.555278]  <TASK>
[   72.555614]  svc_xprt_put+0xaf/0xe0 [sunrpc]
[   72.556276]  nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.11+0xb7/0x410 [nfsd]
[   72.557087]  ? update_load_avg+0x82/0x610
[   72.557652]  ? cpuacct_charge+0x60/0x70
[   72.558212]  ? dequeue_entity+0xdb/0x3e0
[   72.558765]  ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x20
[   72.559358]  nfsd4_run_cb_work+0xfc/0x270 [nfsd]
[   72.560031]  process_one_work+0x1df/0x390
[   72.560600]  worker_thread+0x37/0x3b0
[   72.561644]  ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[   72.562247]  kthread+0x12f/0x150
[   72.562710]  ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[   72.563309]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   72.563818]  </TASK>
[   72.564189] ---[ end trace 031117b1c72ec616 ]---
[   72.566019] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff89ac4977e538), but was ffff89ac4763e018. (next=ffff89ac4763e018).
[   72.567647] ------------[ cut here ]------------
Fixes a4abc6b12eb1 ("nfsd: Fix svc_xprt refcnt leak when setup callback client failed")
Cc Xiyu Yang <[email protected]>
Cc J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +3 -1
index 4eceff561e5a..af2064e36ac6 100644
@@ -917,7 +917,6 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
 	} else {
 		if (!conn->cb_xprt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 		clp->cl_cb_session = ses;
 		args.bc_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 		args.prognumber = clp->cl_cb_session->se_cb_prog;
@@ -937,6 +936,9 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
 		rpc_shutdown_client(client);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
+
+	if (clp->cl_minorversion != 0)
+		clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 	clp->cl_cb_client = client;
 	clp->cl_cb_cred = cred;
 	trace_nfsd_cb_setup(clp);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#458 lore raw

PATCH 458/783 net: macsec: fix net device access prior to holding a lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Emeel Hakim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3b4a00f0f62da252c598310698dfc82ef2f2e2e ]

Currently macsec offload selection update routine accesses the net device prior to holding the relevant lock. Fix by holding the lock prior to the device access.

Fixes dcb780fb2795 ("net: macsec: add nla support for changing the offloading selection")
---
 drivers/net/macsec.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/net/macsec.c +21 -13
index eb029456b594..4fdb970e3482 100644
@@ -2584,7 +2584,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_offload(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	const struct macsec_ops *ops;
 	struct macsec_context ctx;
 	struct macsec_dev *macsec;
-	int ret;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (!attrs[MACSEC_ATTR_IFINDEX])
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2597,28 +2597,36 @@ static int macsec_upd_offload(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 					macsec_genl_offload_policy, NULL))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	rtnl_lock();
+
 	dev = get_dev_from_nl(genl_info_net(info), attrs);
-	if (IS_ERR(dev))
-		return PTR_ERR(dev);
+	if (IS_ERR(dev)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dev);
+		goto out;
+	}
 	macsec = macsec_priv(dev);
 
-	if (!tb_offload[MACSEC_OFFLOAD_ATTR_TYPE])
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (!tb_offload[MACSEC_OFFLOAD_ATTR_TYPE]) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	offload = nla_get_u8(tb_offload[MACSEC_OFFLOAD_ATTR_TYPE]);
 	if (macsec->offload == offload)
-		return 0;
+		goto out;
 
 	/* Check if the offloading mode is supported by the underlying layers */
 	if (offload != MACSEC_OFFLOAD_OFF &&
-	    !macsec_check_offload(offload, macsec))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	    !macsec_check_offload(offload, macsec)) {
+		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	/* Check if the net device is busy. */
-	if (netif_running(dev))
-		return -EBUSY;
-
-	rtnl_lock();
+	if (netif_running(dev)) {
+		ret = -EBUSY;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	prev_offload = macsec->offload;
 	macsec->offload = offload;
@@ -2653,7 +2661,7 @@ static int macsec_upd_offload(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 rollback:
 	macsec->offload = prev_offload;
-
+out:
 	rtnl_unlock();
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#459 lore raw

PATCH 459/783 mISDN: hfcsusb: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ddc9648db162eee556edd5222d2808fe33730203 ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

It should use dev_kfree_skb_irq() or dev_consume_skb_irq() instead. The difference between them is free reason, dev_kfree_skb_irq() means the SKB is dropped in error and dev_consume_skb_irq() means the SKB is consumed in normal.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcusb_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

In tx_iso_complete(), dev_kfree_skb() is called to consume the transmitted SKB, so replace it with dev_consume_skb_irq().

Fixes 69f52adb2d53 ("mISDN: Add HFC USB driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c +8 -4
index cd5642cef01f..e8b37bd5e34a 100644
@@ -326,20 +326,24 @@ hfcusb_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 
 		if (hw->protocol == ISDN_P_NT_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			hfcsusb_ph_command(hw, HFC_L1_DEACTIVATE_NT);
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&hw->lock, flags);
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 #ifdef FIXME
 			if (test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L1_BUSY, &dch->Flags))
 				dchannel_sched_event(&hc->dch, D_CLEARBUSY);
@@ -1330,7 +1334,7 @@ tx_iso_complete(struct urb *urb)
 					printk("\n");
 				}
 
-				dev_kfree_skb(tx_skb);
+				dev_consume_skb_irq(tx_skb);
 				tx_skb = NULL;
 				if (fifo->dch && get_next_dframe(fifo->dch))
 					tx_skb = fifo->dch->tx_skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#460 lore raw

PATCH 460/783 mISDN: hfcpci: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0f596bd75a9d573ca9b587abb39cee0b916bb82 ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcpci_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

Fixes 1700fe1a10dc ("Add mISDN HFC PCI driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c +9 -4
index af17459c1a5c..eba58b99cd29 100644
@@ -1617,16 +1617,19 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 		if (hc->hw.protocol == ISDN_P_NT_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			/* prepare deactivation */
 			Write_hfc(hc, HFCPCI_STATES, 0x40);
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
@@ -1639,10 +1642,12 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			hc->hw.mst_m &= ~HFCPCI_MASTER;
 			Write_hfc(hc, HFCPCI_MST_MODE, hc->hw.mst_m);
 			ret = 0;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		} else {
 			ret = l1_event(dch->l1, hh->prim);
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
 		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
 		break;
 	}
 	if (!ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#461 lore raw

PATCH 461/783 mISDN: hfcmulti: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1232946cf522b8de9e398828bde325d7c41f29dd ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in handle_dmsg() and hfcm_l1callback(), kfree_skb() is called in them, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

Fixes af69fb3a8ffa ("Add mISDN HFC multiport driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c +13 -6
index 7013a3f08429..4c5b6772562d 100644
@@ -3219,6 +3219,7 @@ static int
 hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 {
 	struct hfc_multi	*hc = dch->hw;
+	struct sk_buff_head	free_queue;
 	u_long	flags;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -3247,6 +3248,7 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 		l1_event(dch->l1, HW_POWERUP_IND);
 		break;
 	case HW_DEACT_REQ:
+		__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 		/* start deactivation */
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 		if (hc->ctype == HFC_TYPE_E1) {
@@ -3266,20 +3268,21 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 				plxsd_checksync(hc, 0);
 			}
 		}
-		skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+		skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 		if (dch->tx_skb) {
-			dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+			__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 			dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 		}
 		dch->tx_idx = 0;
 		if (dch->rx_skb) {
-			dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+			__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 			dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 		}
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(FLG_BUSY_TIMER, &dch->Flags))
 			del_timer(&dch->timer);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+		__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		break;
 	case HW_POWERUP_REQ:
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
@@ -3386,6 +3389,9 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	case PH_DEACTIVATE_REQ:
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 		if (dch->dev.D.protocol != ISDN_P_TE_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 			if (debug & DEBUG_HFCMULTI_MSG)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG
@@ -3407,14 +3413,14 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 				/* deactivate */
 				dch->state = 1;
 			}
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
@@ -3426,6 +3432,7 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 #endif
 			ret = 0;
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		} else
 			ret = l1_event(dch->l1, hh->prim);
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#462 lore raw

PATCH 462/783 nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f28157778ede0d4f183f7ab3b46995bb400abbe ]

Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with memset() before they are used.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put
Call Trace:
 memcpy
 nla_put
 nfc_genl_dump_targets
 genl_lock_dumpit
 netlink_dump
 __netlink_dump_start
 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit
 genl_rcv_msg
 netlink_rcv_skb
 genl_rcv
 netlink_unicast
 netlink_sendmsg
 sock_sendmsg
 ____sys_sendmsg
 ___sys_sendmsg
 __sys_sendmsg
 do_syscall_64
Fixes 673088fb42d0 ("NFC: pn533: Send ATR_REQ directly for active device detection")
Fixes 361f3cb7f9cf ("NFC: DEP link hook implementation for pn533")
---
 drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c +4 -0
index 8d7e29d953b7..87e1296c6838 100644
@@ -1319,6 +1319,8 @@ static int pn533_poll_dep_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,
 	if (IS_ERR(resp))
 		return PTR_ERR(resp);
 
+	memset(&nfc_target, 0, sizeof(struct nfc_target));
+
 	rsp = (struct pn533_cmd_jump_dep_response *)resp->data;
 
 	rc = rsp->status & PN533_CMD_RET_MASK;
@@ -1960,6 +1962,8 @@ static int pn533_in_dep_link_up_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,
 
 		dev_dbg(dev->dev, "Creating new target\n");
 
+		memset(&nfc_target, 0, sizeof(struct nfc_target));
+
 		nfc_target.supported_protocols = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP_MASK;
 		nfc_target.nfcid1_len = 10;
 		memcpy(nfc_target.nfcid1, rsp->nfcid3t, nfc_target.nfcid1_len);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#463 lore raw

PATCH 463/783 r6040: Fix kmemleak in probe and remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Li Zetao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e43039a49c2da45edc1d9d7c9ede4003ab45a5f ]

There is a memory leaks reported by kmemleak:

unreferenced object 0xffff888116111000 (size 2048):

    comm "modprobe", pid 817, jiffies 4294759745 (age 76.502s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      00 c4 0a 04 81 88 ff ff 08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff  ................
      08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff815bcd82>] kmalloc_trace+0x22/0x60
      [<ffffffff827e20ee>] phy_device_create+0x4e/0x90
      [<ffffffff827e6072>] get_phy_device+0xd2/0x220
      [<ffffffff827e7844>] mdiobus_scan+0xa4/0x2e0
      [<ffffffff827e8be2>] __mdiobus_register+0x482/0x8b0
      [<ffffffffa01f5d24>] r6040_init_one+0x714/0xd2c [r6040]
      ...

The problem occurs in probe process as follows:
r6040_init_one:
mdiobus_register
mdiobus_scan <- alloc and register phy_device,
the reference count of phy_device is 3
r6040_mii_probe
phy_connect <- connect to the first phy_device,
so the reference count of the first phy_device is 4, others are 3
register_netdev <- fault inject succeeded, goto error handling path

// error handling path
err_out_mdio_unregister:
mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
err_out_mdio:
mdiobus_free(lp->mii_bus); <- the reference count of the first
phy_device is 1, it is not released and other phy_devices are released
// similarly, the remove process also has the same problem

The root cause is traced to the phy_device is not disconnected when removes one r6040 device in r6040_remove_one() or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully. In r6040_mii_probe(), a net ethernet device is connected to the first PHY device of mii_bus, in order to notify the connected driver when the link status changes, which is the default behavior of the PHY infrastructure to handle everything. Therefore the phy_device should be disconnected when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path.

Fix it by adding phy_disconnect() when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c +4 -1
index ccdfa930130b..4cff544f04c2 100644
@@ -1158,10 +1158,12 @@ static int r6040_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	err = register_netdev(dev);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register net device\n");
-		goto err_out_mdio_unregister;
+		goto err_out_phy_disconnect;
 	}
 	return 0;
 
+err_out_phy_disconnect:
+	phy_disconnect(dev->phydev);
 err_out_mdio_unregister:
 	mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
 err_out_mdio:
@@ -1185,6 +1187,7 @@ static void r6040_remove_one(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	struct r6040_private *lp = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	unregister_netdev(dev);
+	phy_disconnect(dev->phydev);
 	mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
 	mdiobus_free(lp->mii_bus);
 	netif_napi_del(&lp->napi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#464 lore raw

PATCH 464/783 net: switch to storing KCOV handle directly in sk_buff

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marco Elver <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa69ee5aa48b5b52e8028c2eb486906e9998d081 ]

It turns out that usage of skb extensions can cause memory leaks. Ido Schimmel reported: "[...] there are instances that blindly overwrite 'skb->extensions' by invoking skb_copy_header() after __alloc_skb()."

Therefore, give up on using skb extensions for KCOV handle, and instead directly store kcov_handle in sk_buff.

Fixes 6370cc3bbd8a ("net: add kcov handle to skb extensions")
Fixes 85ce50d337d1 ("net: kcov: don't select SKB_EXTENSIONS when there is no NET")
Fixes 97f53a08cba1 ("net: linux/skbuff.h: combine SKB_EXTENSIONS + KCOV handling")

Stable-dep-of: db0b124f02ba ("igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit")

---
 include/linux/skbuff.h | 37 +++++++++++++------------------------
 lib/Kconfig.debug      |  1 -
 net/core/skbuff.c      |  6 ------
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
include/linux/skbuff.h +13 -24
index 462b0e3ef2b2..521d66ec8d80 100644
@@ -702,6 +702,7 @@ typedef unsigned char *sk_buff_data_t;
  *	@transport_header: Transport layer header
  *	@network_header: Network layer header
  *	@mac_header: Link layer header
+ *	@kcov_handle: KCOV remote handle for remote coverage collection
  *	@tail: Tail pointer
  *	@end: End pointer
  *	@head: Head of buffer
@@ -906,6 +907,10 @@ struct sk_buff {
 	__u16			network_header;
 	__u16			mac_header;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV
+	u64			kcov_handle;
+#endif
+
 	/* private: */
 	__u32			headers_end[0];
 	/* public: */
@@ -4160,9 +4165,6 @@ enum skb_ext_id {
 #endif
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP)
 	SKB_EXT_MPTCP,
-#endif
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCOV)
-	SKB_EXT_KCOV_HANDLE,
 #endif
 	SKB_EXT_NUM, /* must be last */
 };
@@ -4618,35 +4620,22 @@ static inline void skb_reset_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb)
 #endif
 }
 
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCOV) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SKB_EXTENSIONS)
 static inline void skb_set_kcov_handle(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       const u64 kcov_handle)
 {
-	/* Do not allocate skb extensions only to set kcov_handle to zero
-	 * (as it is zero by default). However, if the extensions are
-	 * already allocated, update kcov_handle anyway since
-	 * skb_set_kcov_handle can be called to zero a previously set
-	 * value.
-	 */
-	if (skb_has_extensions(skb) || kcov_handle) {
-		u64 *kcov_handle_ptr = skb_ext_add(skb, SKB_EXT_KCOV_HANDLE);
-
-		if (kcov_handle_ptr)
-			*kcov_handle_ptr = kcov_handle;
-	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV
+	skb->kcov_handle = kcov_handle;
+#endif
 }
 
 static inline u64 skb_get_kcov_handle(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	u64 *kcov_handle = skb_ext_find(skb, SKB_EXT_KCOV_HANDLE);
-
-	return kcov_handle ? *kcov_handle : 0;
-}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV
+	return skb->kcov_handle;
 #else
-static inline void skb_set_kcov_handle(struct sk_buff *skb,
-				       const u64 kcov_handle) { }
-static inline u64 skb_get_kcov_handle(struct sk_buff *skb) { return 0; }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KCOV && CONFIG_SKB_EXTENSIONS */
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
 
 #endif	/* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif	/* _LINUX_SKBUFF_H */
lib/Kconfig.debug +0 -1
index 4aed8abb2022..19c28a34c5f1 100644
@@ -1915,7 +1915,6 @@ config KCOV
 	depends on CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC || GCC_PLUGINS
 	select DEBUG_FS
 	select GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV if !CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC
-	select SKB_EXTENSIONS if NET
 	help
 	  KCOV exposes kernel code coverage information in a form suitable
 	  for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing).
net/core/skbuff.c +0 -6
index 06169889b0ca..176bcbb07aab 100644
@@ -4258,9 +4258,6 @@ static const u8 skb_ext_type_len[] = {
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP)
 	[SKB_EXT_MPTCP] = SKB_EXT_CHUNKSIZEOF(struct mptcp_ext),
 #endif
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCOV)
-	[SKB_EXT_KCOV_HANDLE] = SKB_EXT_CHUNKSIZEOF(u64),
-#endif
 };
 
 static __always_inline unsigned int skb_ext_total_length(void)
@@ -4277,9 +4274,6 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int skb_ext_total_length(void)
 #endif
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MPTCP)
 		skb_ext_type_len[SKB_EXT_MPTCP] +
-#endif
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KCOV)
-		skb_ext_type_len[SKB_EXT_KCOV_HANDLE] +
 #endif
 		0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#465 lore raw

PATCH 465/783 net: add inline function skb_csum_is_sctp

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa82117010430aff2ce86400f7328f55a31b48a6 ]

This patch is to define a inline function skb_csum_is_sctp(), and also replace all places where it checks if it's a SCTP CSUM skb. This function would be used later in many networking drivers in the following patches.

Stable-dep-of: db0b124f02ba ("igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_txrx.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/skbuff.h                           | 5 +++++
 net/core/dev.c                                   | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/pensando/ionic/ionic_txrx.c +1 -1
index 46dbb49f837c..5463c8b8e43c 100644
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ static int ionic_tx_calc_csum(struct ionic_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		stats->vlan_inserted++;
 	}
 
-	if (skb->csum_not_inet)
+	if (skb_csum_is_sctp(skb))
 		stats->crc32_csum++;
 	else
 		stats->csum++;
include/linux/skbuff.h +5 -0
index 521d66ec8d80..39636fe7e8f0 100644
@@ -4620,6 +4620,11 @@ static inline void skb_reset_redirect(struct sk_buff *skb)
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline bool skb_csum_is_sctp(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return skb->csum_not_inet;
+}
+
 static inline void skb_set_kcov_handle(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				       const u64 kcov_handle)
 {
net/core/dev.c +1 -1
index 34b5aab42b91..a421c54331ea 100644
@@ -3631,7 +3631,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_vlan(struct sk_buff *skb,
 int skb_csum_hwoffload_help(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			    const netdev_features_t features)
 {
-	if (unlikely(skb->csum_not_inet))
+	if (unlikely(skb_csum_is_sctp(skb)))
 		return !!(features & NETIF_F_SCTP_CRC) ? 0 :
 			skb_crc32c_csum_help(skb);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#466 lore raw

PATCH 466/783 net: igc: use skb_csum_is_sctp instead of protocol check

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 609d29a9d2429a840a2f1f44e77b71d58e3e9a33 ]

Using skb_csum_is_sctp is a easier way to validate it's a SCTP CRC checksum offload packet, and yet it also makes igc support SCTP CRC checksum offload for UDP and GRE encapped packets, just as it does in igb driver.

Stable-dep-of: db0b124f02ba ("igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 14 +-------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +1 -13
index e7ffe63925fd..f438cdf83e55 100644
@@ -954,15 +954,6 @@ static void igc_tx_ctxtdesc(struct igc_ring *tx_ring,
 	}
 }
 
-static inline bool igc_ipv6_csum_is_sctp(struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-	unsigned int offset = 0;
-
-	ipv6_find_hdr(skb, &offset, IPPROTO_SCTP, NULL, NULL);
-
-	return offset == skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
-}
-
 static void igc_tx_csum(struct igc_ring *tx_ring, struct igc_tx_buffer *first)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb = first->skb;
@@ -985,10 +976,7 @@ static void igc_tx_csum(struct igc_ring *tx_ring, struct igc_tx_buffer *first)
 		break;
 	case offsetof(struct sctphdr, checksum):
 		/* validate that this is actually an SCTP request */
-		if ((first->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) &&
-		     (ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)) ||
-		    (first->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) &&
-		     igc_ipv6_csum_is_sctp(skb))) {
+		if (skb_csum_is_sctp(skb)) {
 			type_tucmd = IGC_ADVTXD_TUCMD_L4T_SCTP;
 			break;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#467 lore raw

PATCH 467/783 net: add a helper to avoid issues with HW TX timestamping and SO_TXTIME

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vladimir Oltean <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 847cbfc014adafeac401e19e349b0fd524f201c3 ]

As explained in commit 29d98f54a4fe ("net: enetc: allow hardware timestamping on TX queues with tc-etf enabled"), hardware TX timestamping requires an skb with skb->tstamp = 0. When a packet is sent with SO_TXTIME, the skb->skb_mstamp_ns corrupts the value of skb->tstamp, so the drivers need to explicitly reset skb->tstamp to zero after consuming the TX time.

Create a helper named skb_txtime_consumed() which does just that. All drivers which offload TC_SETUP_QDISC_ETF should implement it, and it would make it easier to assess during review whether they do the right thing in order to be compatible with hardware timestamping or not.

Stable-dep-of: db0b124f02ba ("igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c | 8 ++------
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c    | 2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c    | 2 +-
 include/net/pkt_sched.h                      | 9 +++++++++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c +2 -6
index 975762ccb66f..5f9603d4c049 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <net/pkt_sched.h>
 
 /* ENETC overhead: optional extension BD + 1 BD gap */
 #define ENETC_TXBDS_NEEDED(val)	((val) + 2)
@@ -384,12 +385,7 @@ static void enetc_tstamp_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, u64 tstamp)
 	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS) {
 		memset(&shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(shhwtstamps));
 		shhwtstamps.hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime(tstamp);
-		/* Ensure skb_mstamp_ns, which might have been populated with
-		 * the txtime, is not mistaken for a software timestamp,
-		 * because this will prevent the dispatch of our hardware
-		 * timestamp to the socket.
-		 */
-		skb->tstamp = ktime_set(0, 0);
+		skb_txtime_consumed(skb);
 		skb_tstamp_tx(skb, &shhwtstamps);
 	}
 }
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +1 -1
index f24f1a8ec2fb..2646601c3487 100644
@@ -5879,7 +5879,7 @@ static void igb_tx_ctxtdesc(struct igb_ring *tx_ring,
 	 */
 	if (tx_ring->launchtime_enable) {
 		ts = ktime_to_timespec64(first->skb->tstamp);
-		first->skb->tstamp = ktime_set(0, 0);
+		skb_txtime_consumed(first->skb);
 		context_desc->seqnum_seed = cpu_to_le32(ts.tv_nsec / 32);
 	} else {
 		context_desc->seqnum_seed = 0;
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +1 -1
index f438cdf83e55..48192594d3d7 100644
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ static void igc_tx_ctxtdesc(struct igc_ring *tx_ring,
 		struct igc_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(tx_ring->netdev);
 		ktime_t txtime = first->skb->tstamp;
 
-		first->skb->tstamp = ktime_set(0, 0);
+		skb_txtime_consumed(first->skb);
 		context_desc->launch_time = igc_tx_launchtime(adapter,
 							      txtime);
 	} else {
include/net/pkt_sched.h +9 -0
index 7e58b4470570..50d5ffbad473 100644
@@ -179,4 +179,13 @@ struct tc_taprio_qopt_offload *taprio_offload_get(struct tc_taprio_qopt_offload
 						  *offload);
 void taprio_offload_free(struct tc_taprio_qopt_offload *offload);
 
+/* Ensure skb_mstamp_ns, which might have been populated with the txtime, is
+ * not mistaken for a software timestamp, because this will otherwise prevent
+ * the dispatch of hardware timestamps to the socket.
+ */
+static inline void skb_txtime_consumed(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	skb->tstamp = ktime_set(0, 0);
+}
+
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#468 lore raw

PATCH 468/783 igc: Enhance Qbv scheduling by using first flag bit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vinicius Costa Gomes <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db0b124f02ba68de6517ac303d431af220ccfe9f ]

The I225 hardware has a limitation that packets can only be scheduled in the [0, cycle-time] interval. So, scheduling a packet to the start of the next cycle doesn't usually work.

To overcome this, we use the Transmit Descriptor first flag to indicates that a packet should be the first packet (from a queue) in a cycle according to the section 7.5.2.9.3.4 The First Packet on Each QBV Cycle in Intel Discrete I225/6 User Manual.

But this only works if there was any packet from that queue during the current cycle, to avoid this issue, we issue an empty packet if that's not the case. Also require one more descriptor to be available, to take into account the empty packet that might be issued.

Test Setup:

Talker: Use l2_tai to generate the launchtime into packet load.

Listener: Use timedump.c to compute the delta between packet arrival and LaunchTime packet payload.

Test Result:

Before:

1666000610127300000,1666000610127300096,96,621273 1666000610127400000,1666000610127400192,192,621274 1666000610127500000,1666000610127500032,32,621275 1666000610127600000,1666000610127600128,128,621276 1666000610127700000,1666000610127700224,224,621277 1666000610127800000,1666000610127800064,64,621278 1666000610127900000,1666000610127900160,160,621279 1666000610128000000,1666000610128000000,0,621280 1666000610128100000,1666000610128100096,96,621281 1666000610128200000,1666000610128200192,192,621282 1666000610128300000,1666000610128300032,32,621283 1666000610128400000,1666000610128301056,-98944,621284 1666000610128500000,1666000610128302080,-197920,621285 1666000610128600000,1666000610128302848,-297152,621286 1666000610128700000,1666000610128303872,-396128,621287 1666000610128800000,1666000610128304896,-495104,621288 1666000610128900000,1666000610128305664,-594336,621289 1666000610129000000,1666000610128306688,-693312,621290 1666000610129100000,1666000610128307712,-792288,621291 1666000610129200000,1666000610128308480,-891520,621292 1666000610129300000,1666000610128309504,-990496,621293 1666000610129400000,1666000610128310528,-1089472,621294 1666000610129500000,1666000610128311296,-1188704,621295 1666000610129600000,1666000610128312320,-1287680,621296 1666000610129700000,1666000610128313344,-1386656,621297 1666000610129800000,1666000610128314112,-1485888,621298 1666000610129900000,1666000610128315136,-1584864,621299 1666000610130000000,1666000610128316160,-1683840,621300 1666000610130100000,1666000610128316928,-1783072,621301 1666000610130200000,1666000610128317952,-1882048,621302 1666000610130300000,1666000610128318976,-1981024,621303 1666000610130400000,1666000610128319744,-2080256,621304 1666000610130500000,1666000610128320768,-2179232,621305 1666000610130600000,1666000610128321792,-2278208,621306 1666000610130700000,1666000610128322816,-2377184,621307 1666000610130800000,1666000610128323584,-2476416,621308 1666000610130900000,1666000610128324608,-2575392,621309 1666000610131000000,1666000610128325632,-2674368,621310 1666000610131100000,1666000610128326400,-2773600,621311 1666000610131200000,1666000610128327424,-2872576,621312 1666000610131300000,1666000610128328448,-2971552,621313 1666000610131400000,1666000610128329216,-3070784,621314 1666000610131500000,1666000610131500032,32,621315 1666000610131600000,1666000610131600128,128,621316 1666000610131700000,1666000610131700224,224,621317

After:

1666073510646200000,1666073510646200064,64,2676462 1666073510646300000,1666073510646300160,160,2676463 1666073510646400000,1666073510646400256,256,2676464 1666073510646500000,1666073510646500096,96,2676465 1666073510646600000,1666073510646600192,192,2676466 1666073510646700000,1666073510646700032,32,2676467 1666073510646800000,1666073510646800128,128,2676468 1666073510646900000,1666073510646900224,224,2676469 1666073510647000000,1666073510647000064,64,2676470 1666073510647100000,1666073510647100160,160,2676471 1666073510647200000,1666073510647200256,256,2676472 1666073510647300000,1666073510647300096,96,2676473 1666073510647400000,1666073510647400192,192,2676474 1666073510647500000,1666073510647500032,32,2676475 1666073510647600000,1666073510647600128,128,2676476 1666073510647700000,1666073510647700224,224,2676477 1666073510647800000,1666073510647800064,64,2676478 1666073510647900000,1666073510647900160,160,2676479 1666073510648000000,1666073510648000000,0,2676480 1666073510648100000,1666073510648100096,96,2676481 1666073510648200000,1666073510648200192,192,2676482 1666073510648300000,1666073510648300032,32,2676483 1666073510648400000,1666073510648400128,128,2676484 1666073510648500000,1666073510648500224,224,2676485 1666073510648600000,1666073510648600064,64,2676486 1666073510648700000,1666073510648700160,160,2676487 1666073510648800000,1666073510648800000,0,2676488 1666073510648900000,1666073510648900096,96,2676489 1666073510649000000,1666073510649000192,192,2676490 1666073510649100000,1666073510649100032,32,2676491 1666073510649200000,1666073510649200128,128,2676492 1666073510649300000,1666073510649300224,224,2676493 1666073510649400000,1666073510649400064,64,2676494 1666073510649500000,1666073510649500160,160,2676495 1666073510649600000,1666073510649600000,0,2676496 1666073510649700000,1666073510649700096,96,2676497 1666073510649800000,1666073510649800192,192,2676498 1666073510649900000,1666073510649900032,32,2676499 1666073510650000000,1666073510650000128,128,2676500

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc.h         |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_defines.h |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c    | 176 ++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc.h +2 -0
index a97bf7a5f1d6..970dd878d8a7 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ struct igc_ring {
 	u8 queue_index;                 /* logical index of the ring*/
 	u8 reg_idx;                     /* physical index of the ring */
 	bool launchtime_enable;         /* true if LaunchTime is enabled */
+	ktime_t last_tx_cycle;          /* end of the cycle with a launchtime transmission */
+	ktime_t last_ff_cycle;          /* Last cycle with an active first flag */
 
 	u32 start_time;
 	u32 end_time;
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_defines.h +2 -0
index 32f5fd684139..352b50d3881d 100644
@@ -278,6 +278,8 @@
 #define IGC_ADVTXD_L4LEN_SHIFT	8  /* Adv ctxt L4LEN shift */
 #define IGC_ADVTXD_MSS_SHIFT	16 /* Adv ctxt MSS shift */
 
+#define IGC_ADVTXD_TSN_CNTX_FIRST	0x00000080
+
 /* Transmit Control */
 #define IGC_TCTL_EN		0x00000002 /* enable Tx */
 #define IGC_TCTL_PSP		0x00000008 /* pad short packets */
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +147 -29

252 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#469 lore raw

PATCH 469/783 igc: Use strict cycles for Qbv scheduling

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Vinicius Costa Gomes <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d8f45be01dd9381065a3778a579385249ed011dc ]

Configuring strict cycle mode in the controller forces more well behaved transmissions when taprio is offloaded.

When set this strict_cycle and strict_end, transmission is not enabled if the whole packet cannot be completed before end of the Qbv cycle.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_tsn.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_tsn.c +2 -9
index 174103c4bea6..2d4db2a547b2 100644
@@ -92,15 +92,8 @@ static int igc_tsn_enable_offload(struct igc_adapter *adapter)
 		wr32(IGC_STQT(i), ring->start_time);
 		wr32(IGC_ENDQT(i), ring->end_time);
 
-		if (adapter->base_time) {
-			/* If we have a base_time we are in "taprio"
-			 * mode and we need to be strict about the
-			 * cycles: only transmit a packet if it can be
-			 * completed during that cycle.
-			 */
-			txqctl |= IGC_TXQCTL_STRICT_CYCLE |
-				IGC_TXQCTL_STRICT_END;
-		}
+		txqctl |= IGC_TXQCTL_STRICT_CYCLE |
+			IGC_TXQCTL_STRICT_END;
 
 		if (ring->launchtime_enable)
 			txqctl |= IGC_TXQCTL_QUEUE_MODE_LAUNCHT;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#470 lore raw

PATCH 470/783 igc: Add checking for basetime less than zero

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Muhammad Husaini Zulkifli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3b61764fb49a6e147ac90d71dccdddc9d5508ba1 ]

Using the tc qdisc command, the user can set basetime to any value. Checking should be done on the driver's side to prevent registering basetime values that are less than zero.

Fixes ec50a9d437f0 ("igc: Add support for taprio offloading")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +3 -0
index f4082ea7beaa..45069dc0ccc6 100644
@@ -4912,6 +4912,9 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	if (qopt->base_time < 0)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
 	if (adapter->base_time)
 		return -EALREADY;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#471 lore raw

PATCH 471/783 igc: recalculate Qbv end_time by considering cycle time

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tan Tee Min <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d05251d537a4d3835959a8cdd8cbbbdcdc0c904 ]

Qbv users can specify a cycle time that is not equal to the total GCL intervals. Hence, recalculation is necessary here to exclude the time interval that exceeds the cycle time. As those GCL which exceeds the cycle time will be truncated.

According to IEEE Std. 802.1Q-2018 section 8.6.9.2, once the end of the list is reached, it will switch to the END_OF_CYCLE state and leave the gates in the same state until the next cycle is started.

Fixes ec50a9d437f0 ("igc: Add support for taprio offloading")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +15 -0
index 45069dc0ccc6..94a608585f71 100644
@@ -4933,6 +4933,21 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 
 		end_time += e->interval;
 
+		/* If any of the conditions below are true, we need to manually
+		 * control the end time of the cycle.
+		 * 1. Qbv users can specify a cycle time that is not equal
+		 * to the total GCL intervals. Hence, recalculation is
+		 * necessary here to exclude the time interval that
+		 * exceeds the cycle time.
+		 * 2. According to IEEE Std. 802.1Q-2018 section 8.6.9.2,
+		 * once the end of the list is reached, it will switch
+		 * to the END_OF_CYCLE state and leave the gates in the
+		 * same state until the next cycle is started.
+		 */
+		if (end_time > adapter->cycle_time ||
+		    n + 1 == qopt->num_entries)
+			end_time = adapter->cycle_time;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < adapter->num_tx_queues; i++) {
 			struct igc_ring *ring = adapter->tx_ring[i];
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#472 lore raw

PATCH 472/783 igc: Lift TAPRIO schedule restriction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kurt Kanzenbach <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a5fd39464a4081ce11c801d7e20c4551ba7cb983 ]

Add support for Qbv schedules where one queue stays open in consecutive entries. Currently that's not supported.

Example schedule:

|tc qdisc replace dev ${INTERFACE} handle 100 parent root taprio num_tc 3 \
|   map 2 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 \
|   queues 1@0 1@1 2@2 \
|   base-time ${BASETIME} \
|   sched-entry S 0x01 300000 \ # Stream High/Low
|   sched-entry S 0x06 500000 \ # Management and Best Effort
|   sched-entry S 0x04 200000 \ # Best Effort
|   flags 0x02

Stable-dep-of: 72abeedd8398 ("igc: Set Qbv start_time and end_time to end_time if not being configured in GCL")

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +17 -6
index 94a608585f71..9420a169780c 100644
@@ -4862,9 +4862,10 @@ static bool validate_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 		return false;
 
 	for (n = 0; n < qopt->num_entries; n++) {
-		const struct tc_taprio_sched_entry *e;
+		const struct tc_taprio_sched_entry *e, *prev;
 		int i;
 
+		prev = n ? &qopt->entries[n - 1] : NULL;
 		e = &qopt->entries[n];
 
 		/* i225 only supports "global" frame preemption
@@ -4877,7 +4878,12 @@ static bool validate_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 			if (e->gate_mask & BIT(i))
 				queue_uses[i]++;
 
-			if (queue_uses[i] > 1)
+			/* There are limitations: A single queue cannot be
+			 * opened and closed multiple times per cycle unless the
+			 * gate stays open. Check for it.
+			 */
+			if (queue_uses[i] > 1 &&
+			    !(prev->gate_mask & BIT(i)))
 				return false;
 		}
 	}
@@ -4904,6 +4910,7 @@ static int igc_tsn_enable_launchtime(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 				 struct tc_taprio_qopt_offload *qopt)
 {
+	bool queue_configured[IGC_MAX_TX_QUEUES] = { };
 	u32 start_time = 0, end_time = 0;
 	size_t n;
 
@@ -4924,9 +4931,6 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 	adapter->cycle_time = qopt->cycle_time;
 	adapter->base_time = qopt->base_time;
 
-	/* FIXME: be a little smarter about cases when the gate for a
-	 * queue stays open for more than one entry.
-	 */
 	for (n = 0; n < qopt->num_entries; n++) {
 		struct tc_taprio_sched_entry *e = &qopt->entries[n];
 		int i;
@@ -4954,8 +4958,15 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 			if (!(e->gate_mask & BIT(i)))
 				continue;
 
-			ring->start_time = start_time;
+			/* Check whether a queue stays open for more than one
+			 * entry. If so, keep the start and advance the end
+			 * time.
+			 */
+			if (!queue_configured[i])
+				ring->start_time = start_time;
 			ring->end_time = end_time;
+
+			queue_configured[i] = true;
 		}
 
 		start_time += e->interval;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#473 lore raw

PATCH 473/783 igc: Set Qbv start_time and end_time to end_time if not being configured in GCL

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Tan Tee Min <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72abeedd83982c1bc6023f631e412db78374d9b4 ]

The default setting of end_time minus start_time is whole 1 second. Thus, if it's not being configured in any GCL entry then it will be staying at original 1 second.

This patch is changing the start_time and end_time to be end_time as if setting zero will be having weird HW behavior where the gate will not be fully closed.

Fixes ec50a9d437f0 ("igc: Add support for taprio offloading")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c +13 -1
index 9420a169780c..1a0aae7b128d 100644
@@ -4913,6 +4913,7 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 	bool queue_configured[IGC_MAX_TX_QUEUES] = { };
 	u32 start_time = 0, end_time = 0;
 	size_t n;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!qopt->enable) {
 		adapter->base_time = 0;
@@ -4933,7 +4934,6 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 
 	for (n = 0; n < qopt->num_entries; n++) {
 		struct tc_taprio_sched_entry *e = &qopt->entries[n];
-		int i;
 
 		end_time += e->interval;
 
@@ -4972,6 +4972,18 @@ static int igc_save_qbv_schedule(struct igc_adapter *adapter,
 		start_time += e->interval;
 	}
 
+	/* Check whether a queue gets configured.
+	 * If not, set the start and end time to be end time.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < adapter->num_tx_queues; i++) {
+		if (!queue_configured[i]) {
+			struct igc_ring *ring = adapter->tx_ring[i];
+
+			ring->start_time = end_time;
+			ring->end_time = end_time;
+		}
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#474 lore raw

PATCH 474/783 rtc: mxc_v2: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55d5a86618d3b1a768bce01882b74cbbd2651975 ]

The call to clk_disable_unprepare() is left out in the error handling of devm_rtc_allocate_device. Add it back.

Fixes 5490a1e018a4 ("rtc: mxc_v2: fix possible race condition")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-mxc_v2.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-mxc_v2.c +3 -1
index d349cef09cb7..48595b00ebb3 100644
@@ -337,8 +337,10 @@ static int mxc_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	pdata->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev);
-	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc))
+	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc)) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->clk);
 		return PTR_ERR(pdata->rtc);
+	}
 
 	pdata->rtc->ops = &mxc_rtc_ops;
 	pdata->rtc->range_max = U32_MAX;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#475 lore raw

PATCH 475/783 selftests: devlink: fix the fd redirect in dummy_reporter_test

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2fc60e2ff972d3dca836bff0b08cbe503c4ca1ce ]

$number + > bash means redirect FD $number, e.g. commonly used 2> redirects stderr (fd 2). The test uses 8192> to write the number 8192 to a file, this results in:

./devlink.sh: line 499: 8192: Bad file descriptor

Oddly the test also papers over this issue by checking for failure (expecting an error rather than success) so it passes, anyway.

Fixes ff18176ad806 ("selftests: Add a test of large binary to devlink health test")
---
 tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/netdevsim/devlink.sh | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/netdevsim/devlink.sh +2 -2
index 40909c254365..16d2de18591d 100755
@@ -495,8 +495,8 @@ dummy_reporter_test()
 
 	check_reporter_info dummy healthy 3 3 10 true
 
-	echo 8192> $DEBUGFS_DIR/health/binary_len
-	check_fail $? "Failed set dummy reporter binary len to 8192"
+	echo 8192 > $DEBUGFS_DIR/health/binary_len
+	check_err $? "Failed set dummy reporter binary len to 8192"
 
 	local dump=$(devlink health dump show $DL_HANDLE reporter dummy -j)
 	check_err $? "Failed show dump of dummy reporter"
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#476 lore raw

PATCH 476/783 openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68bb10101e6b0a6bb44e9c908ef795fc4af99eae ]

The commit mentioned below causes the ovs_flow_tbl_lookup() function to be called with the masked key. However, it's supposed to be called with the unmasked key. This due to the fact that the datapath supports installing wider flows, and OVS relies on this behavior. For example if ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0, dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0) exists, a wider flow (smaller mask) of ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/128.0.0.0,dst=192.1.1.2/ 128.0.0.0) is allowed to be added.

However, if we try to add a wildcard rule, the installation fails:

$ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \
  ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0,dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2
$ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \
  ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/0.0.0.0,dst=49.1.1.2/0.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2
ovs-vswitchd: updating flow table (File exists)

The reason is that the key used to determine if the flow is already present in the system uses the original key ANDed with the mask. This results in the IP address not being part of the (miniflow) key, i.e., being substituted with an all-zero value. When doing the actual lookup, this results in the key wrongfully matching the first flow, and therefore the flow does not get installed.

This change reverses the commit below, but rather than having the key on the stack, it's allocated.

Fixes 190aa3e77880 ("openvswitch: Fix Frame-size larger than 1024 bytes warning.")
---
 net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/datapath.c +16 -9
index 7ed97dc0b561..435f7f1be614 100644
@@ -933,6 +933,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct sw_flow_mask mask;
 	struct sk_buff *reply;
 	struct datapath *dp;
+	struct sw_flow_key *key;
 	struct sw_flow_actions *acts;
 	struct sw_flow_match match;
 	u32 ufid_flags = ovs_nla_get_ufid_flags(a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID_FLAGS]);
@@ -960,24 +961,26 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	/* Extract key. */
-	ovs_match_init(&match, &new_flow->key, false, &mask);
+	key = kzalloc(sizeof(*key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_kfree_key;
+	}
+
+	ovs_match_init(&match, key, false, &mask);
 	error = ovs_nla_get_match(net, &match, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY],
 				  a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MASK], log);
 	if (error)
 		goto err_kfree_flow;
 
+	ovs_flow_mask_key(&new_flow->key, key, true, &mask);
+
 	/* Extract flow identifier. */
 	error = ovs_nla_get_identifier(&new_flow->id, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID],
-				       &new_flow->key, log);
+				       key, log);
 	if (error)
 		goto err_kfree_flow;
 
-	/* unmasked key is needed to match when ufid is not used. */
-	if (ovs_identifier_is_key(&new_flow->id))
-		match.key = new_flow->id.unmasked_key;
-
-	ovs_flow_mask_key(&new_flow->key, &new_flow->key, true, &mask);
-
 	/* Validate actions. */
 	error = ovs_nla_copy_actions(net, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_ACTIONS],
 				     &new_flow->key, &acts, log);
@@ -1004,7 +1007,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	if (ovs_identifier_is_ufid(&new_flow->id))
 		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_ufid(&dp->table, &new_flow->id);
 	if (!flow)
-		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup(&dp->table, &new_flow->key);
+		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup(&dp->table, key);
 	if (likely(!flow)) {
 		rcu_assign_pointer(new_flow->sf_acts, acts);
 
@@ -1074,6 +1077,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (reply)
 		ovs_notify(&dp_flow_genl_family, reply, info);
+
+	kfree(key);
 	return 0;
 
 err_unlock_ovs:
@@ -1083,6 +1088,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(acts);
 err_kfree_flow:
 	ovs_flow_free(new_flow, false);
+err_kfree_key:
+	kfree(key);
 error:
 	return error;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#477 lore raw

PATCH 477/783 skbuff: Account for tail adjustment during pull operations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d7afdcbc9d32423f177ee12b7c93783aea338fb ]

Extending the tail can have some unexpected side effects if a program uses a helper like BPF_FUNC_skb_pull_data to read partial content beyond the head skb headlen when all the skbs in the gso frag_list are linear with no head_frag -

kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4219!

  pc : skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c
  lr : skb_segment+0x63c/0xd2c
  Call trace:
   skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c
   __udp_gso_segment+0xa4/0x544
   udp4_ufo_fragment+0x184/0x1c0
   inet_gso_segment+0x16c/0x3a4
   skb_mac_gso_segment+0xd4/0x1b0
   __skb_gso_segment+0xcc/0x12c
   udp_rcv_segment+0x54/0x16c
   udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x78/0x144
   udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x8c/0xa4
   __udp4_lib_rcv+0x490/0x68c
   udp_rcv+0x20/0x30
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1b0/0x33c
   ip_local_deliver+0xd8/0x1f0
   ip_rcv+0x98/0x1a4
   deliver_ptype_list_skb+0x98/0x1ec
   __netif_receive_skb_core+0x978/0xc60

Fix this by marking these skbs as GSO_DODGY so segmentation can handle the tail updates accordingly.

Fixes 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list")
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -0
index 176bcbb07aab..2b12e0730b85 100644
@@ -2115,6 +2115,9 @@ void *__pskb_pull_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, int delta)
 				insp = list;
 			} else {
 				/* Eaten partially. */
+				if (skb_is_gso(skb) && !list->head_frag &&
+				    skb_headlen(list))
+					skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
 
 				if (skb_shared(list)) {
 					/* Sucks! We need to fork list. :-( */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#478 lore raw

PATCH 478/783 mailbox: zynq-ipi: fix error handling while device_register() fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6792a0cdef0b1c2d77920246283a72537e60e94 ]

If device_register() fails, it has two issues:
1. The name allocated by dev_set_name() is leaked.
2. The parent of device is not NULL, device_unregister() is called in zynqmp_ipi_free_mboxes(), it will lead a kernel crash because of removing not added device.

Call put_device() to give up the reference, so the name is freed in kobject_cleanup(). Add device registered check in zynqmp_ipi_free_mboxes() to avoid null-ptr-deref.

Fixes 4981b82ba2ff ("mailbox: ZynqMP IPI mailbox controller")
---
 drivers/mailbox/zynqmp-ipi-mailbox.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mailbox/zynqmp-ipi-mailbox.c +3 -1
index f44079d62b1a..527204c6d5cd 100644
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ static int zynqmp_ipi_mbox_probe(struct zynqmp_ipi_mbox *ipi_mbox,
 	ret = device_register(&ipi_mbox->dev);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to register ipi mbox dev.\n");
+		put_device(&ipi_mbox->dev);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	mdev = &ipi_mbox->dev;
@@ -619,7 +620,8 @@ static void zynqmp_ipi_free_mboxes(struct zynqmp_ipi_pdata *pdata)
 		ipi_mbox = &pdata->ipi_mboxes[i];
 		if (ipi_mbox->dev.parent) {
 			mbox_controller_unregister(&ipi_mbox->mbox);
-			device_unregister(&ipi_mbox->dev);
+			if (device_is_registered(&ipi_mbox->dev))
+				device_unregister(&ipi_mbox->dev);
 		}
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#479 lore raw

PATCH 479/783 net_sched: reject TCF_EM_SIMPLE case for complex ematch module

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9cd3fd2054c3b3055163accbf2f31a4426f10317 ]

When TCF_EM_SIMPLE was introduced, it is supposed to be convenient for ematch implementation:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

"You don't have to, providing a 32bit data chunk without TCF_EM_SIMPLE set will simply result in allocating & copy. It's an optimization, nothing more."

So if an ematch module provides ops->datalen that means it wants a complex data structure (saved in its em->data) instead of a simple u32 value. We should simply reject such a combination, otherwise this u32 could be misinterpreted as a pointer.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
---
 net/sched/ematch.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/sched/ematch.c +2 -0
index f885bea5b452..b7154103e9cd 100644
@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ static int tcf_em_validate(struct tcf_proto *tp,
 			 * the value carried.
 			 */
 			if (em_hdr->flags & TCF_EM_SIMPLE) {
+				if (em->ops->datalen > 0)
+					goto errout;
 				if (data_len < sizeof(u32))
 					goto errout;
 				em->data = *(u32 *) data;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#480 lore raw

PATCH 480/783 rxrpc: Fix missing unlock in rxrpc_do_sendmsg()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4feb2c44629e6f9b459b41a5a60491069d346a95 ]

One of the error paths in rxrpc_do_sendmsg() doesn't unlock the call mutex before returning. Fix it to do this.

Note that this still doesn't get rid of the checker warning:

../net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:617:5: warning: context imbalance in 'rxrpc_do_sendmsg' - wrong count at exit

I think the interplay between the socket lock and the call's user_mutex may be too complicated for checker to analyse, especially as rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), which it calls, returns with the call's user_mutex if successful but unconditionally drops the socket lock.

Fixes e754eba685aa ("rxrpc: Provide a cmsg to specify the amount of Tx data for a call")
cc Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
---
 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +1 -1
index eef3c14fd1c1..a670553159ab 100644
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 			if (call->tx_total_len != -1 ||
 			    call->tx_pending ||
 			    call->tx_top != 0)
-				goto error_put;
+				goto out_put_unlock;
 			call->tx_total_len = p.call.tx_total_len;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#481 lore raw

PATCH 481/783 myri10ge: Fix an error handling path in myri10ge_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d83b950d44d2982c0e62e3d81b0f35ab09431008 ]

Some memory allocated in myri10ge_probe_slices() is not released in the error handling path of myri10ge_probe().

Add the corresponding kfree(), as already done in the remove function.

Fixes 0dcffac1a329 ("myri10ge: add multislices support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c +1 -0
index 1664e9184c9c..5a1ed4818baa 100644
@@ -3920,6 +3920,7 @@ static int myri10ge_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	myri10ge_free_slices(mgp);
 
 abort_with_firmware:
+	kfree(mgp->msix_vectors);
 	myri10ge_dummy_rdma(mgp, 0);
 
 abort_with_ioremap:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#482 lore raw

PATCH 482/783 net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0c8bccd40fc1c19e1d246c39bcf79e357e1ada3 ]

Changheon Lee reported TCP socket leaks, with a nice repro.

It seems we leak TCP sockets with the following sequence:

1) SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is enabled on the socket.

Each ACK will cook an skb put in error queue, from __skb_tstamp_tx(). __skb_tstamp_tx() is using skb_clone(), unless SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY was also requested.

2) If the application is also using MSG_ZEROCOPY, then we put in the error queue cloned skbs that had a struct ubuf_info attached to them.

Whenever an struct ubuf_info is allocated, sock_zerocopy_alloc() does a sock_hold().

As long as the cloned skbs are still in sk_error_queue, socket refcount is kept elevated.

3) Application closes the socket, while error queue is not empty.

Since tcp_close() no longer purges the socket error queue, we might end up with a TCP socket with at least one skb in error queue keeping the socket alive forever.

This bug can be (ab)used to consume all kernel memory and freeze the host.

We need to purge the error queue, with proper synchronization against concurrent writers.

Fixes 24bcbe1cc69f ("net: stream: don't purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()")
---
 net/core/stream.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/core/stream.c +6 -0
index a61130504827..d7c5413d16d5 100644
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ void sk_stream_kill_queues(struct sock *sk)
 	/* First the read buffer. */
 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
 
+	/* Next, the error queue.
+	 * We need to use queue lock, because other threads might
+	 * add packets to the queue without socket lock being held.
+	 */
+	skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
+
 	/* Next, the write queue. */
 	WARN_ON(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#483 lore raw

PATCH 483/783 rcu: Fix __this_cpu_read() lockdep warning in rcu_force_quiescent_state()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zqiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ceb1c8c9b8aa9199da46a0f29d2d5f08d9b44c15 ]

Running rcutorture with non-zero fqs_duration module parameter in a kernel built with CONFIG_PREEMPTION=y results in the following splat:

BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000]
code: rcu_torture_fqs/398
caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
CPU: 3 PID: 398 Comm: rcu_torture_fqs Not tainted 6.0.0-rc1-yoctodev-standard+
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x86
dump_stack+0x10/0x16
check_preemption_disabled+0xe5/0xf0
__this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
rcu_force_quiescent_state.part.0+0x1c/0x170
rcu_force_quiescent_state+0x1e/0x30
rcu_torture_fqs+0xca/0x160
? rcu_torture_boost+0x430/0x430
kthread+0x192/0x1d0
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK>

The problem is that rcu_force_quiescent_state() uses __this_cpu_read() in preemptible code instead of the proper raw_cpu_read(). This commit therefore changes __this_cpu_read() to raw_cpu_read().

---
 kernel/rcu/tree.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/rcu/tree.c +1 -1
index b10d6bcea77d..3fe7c75c371b 100644
@@ -2650,7 +2650,7 @@ void rcu_force_quiescent_state(void)
 	struct rcu_node *rnp_old = NULL;
 
 	/* Funnel through hierarchy to reduce memory contention. */
-	rnp = __this_cpu_read(rcu_data.mynode);
+	rnp = raw_cpu_read(rcu_data.mynode);
 	for (; rnp != NULL; rnp = rnp->parent) {
 		ret = (READ_ONCE(rcu_state.gp_flags) & RCU_GP_FLAG_FQS) ||
 		       !raw_spin_trylock(&rnp->fqslock);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#484 lore raw

PATCH 484/783 arm64: make is_ttbrX_addr() noinstr-safe

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d8c1d798a2e5091128c391c6dadcc9be334af3f5 ]

We use is_ttbr0_addr() in noinstr code, but as it's only marked as inline, it's theoretically possible for the compiler to place it out-of-line and instrument it, which would be problematic.

Mark is_ttbr0_addr() as __always_inline such that that can safely be used from noinstr code. For consistency, do the same to is_ttbr1_addr(). Note that while is_ttbr1_addr() calls arch_kasan_reset_tag(), this is a macro (and its callees are either macros or __always_inline), so there is not a risk of transient instrumentation.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +2 -2
index 7c546c3487c9..c628d8e3a403 100644
@@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ static inline void compat_start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
 }
 #endif
 
-static inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr)
+static __always_inline bool is_ttbr0_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	/* entry assembly clears tags for TTBR0 addrs */
 	return addr < TASK_SIZE;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr)
+static __always_inline bool is_ttbr1_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	/* TTBR1 addresses may have a tag if KASAN_SW_TAGS is in use */
 	return arch_kasan_reset_tag(addr) >= PAGE_OFFSET;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#485 lore raw

PATCH 485/783 video: hyperv_fb: Avoid taking busy spinlock on panic path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Guilherme G. Piccoli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d044ca035dc22df0d3b39e56f2881071d9118bd ]

The Hyper-V framebuffer code registers a panic notifier in order to try updating its fbdev if the kernel crashed. The notifier callback is straightforward, but it calls the vmbus_sendpacket() routine eventually, and such function takes a spinlock for the ring buffer operations.

Panic path runs in atomic context, with local interrupts and preemption disabled, and all secondary CPUs shutdown. That said, taking a spinlock might cause a lockup if a secondary CPU was disabled with such lock taken. Fix it here by checking if the ring buffer spinlock is busy on Hyper-V framebuffer panic notifier; if so, bail-out avoiding the potential lockup scenario.

---
 drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c        | 13 +++++++++++++
 drivers/video/fbdev/hyperv_fb.c |  8 +++++++-
 include/linux/hyperv.h          |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +13 -0
index 769851b6e74c..7ed6fad3fa8f 100644
@@ -246,6 +246,19 @@ void hv_ringbuffer_cleanup(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info)
 	mutex_unlock(&ring_info->ring_buffer_mutex);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check if the ring buffer spinlock is available to take or not; used on
+ * atomic contexts, like panic path (see the Hyper-V framebuffer driver).
+ */
+
+bool hv_ringbuffer_spinlock_busy(struct vmbus_channel *channel)
+{
+	struct hv_ring_buffer_info *rinfo = &channel->outbound;
+
+	return spin_is_locked(&rinfo->ring_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_ringbuffer_spinlock_busy);
+
 /* Write to the ring buffer. */
 int hv_ringbuffer_write(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 			const struct kvec *kv_list, u32 kv_count)
drivers/video/fbdev/hyperv_fb.c +7 -1
index 40baa79f8046..f0a66a344d87 100644
@@ -798,12 +798,18 @@ static void hvfb_ondemand_refresh_throttle(struct hvfb_par *par,
 static int hvfb_on_panic(struct notifier_block *nb,
 			 unsigned long e, void *p)
 {
+	struct hv_device *hdev;
 	struct hvfb_par *par;
 	struct fb_info *info;
 
 	par = container_of(nb, struct hvfb_par, hvfb_panic_nb);
-	par->synchronous_fb = true;
 	info = par->info;
+	hdev = device_to_hv_device(info->device);
+
+	if (hv_ringbuffer_spinlock_busy(hdev->channel))
+		return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+	par->synchronous_fb = true;
 	if (par->need_docopy)
 		hvfb_docopy(par, 0, dio_fb_size);
 	synthvid_update(info, 0, 0, INT_MAX, INT_MAX);
include/linux/hyperv.h +2 -0
index 1ce131f29f3b..eada4d8d6587 100644
@@ -1269,6 +1269,8 @@ struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info {
 int hv_ringbuffer_get_debuginfo(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info,
 				struct hv_ring_buffer_debug_info *debug_info);
 
+bool hv_ringbuffer_spinlock_busy(struct vmbus_channel *channel);
+
 /* Vmbus interface */
 #define vmbus_driver_register(driver)	\
 	__vmbus_driver_register(driver, THIS_MODULE, KBUILD_MODNAME)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#486 lore raw

PATCH 486/783 x86/hyperv: Remove unregister syscore call from Hyper-V cleanup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaurav Kohli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 32c97d980e2eef25465d453f2956a9ca68926a3c ]

Hyper-V cleanup code comes under panic path where preemption and irq is already disabled. So calling of unregister_syscore_ops might schedule out the thread even for the case where mutex lock is free. hyperv_cleanup
unregister_syscore_ops
mutex_lock(&syscore_ops_lock)
might_sleep
Here might_sleep might schedule out this thread, where voluntary preemption config is on and this thread will never comes back. And also this was added earlier to maintain the symmetry which is not required as this can comes during crash shutdown path only.

To prevent the same, removing unregister_syscore_ops function call.

---
 arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +0 -2
index 01860c0d324d..70fd21ebb9d5 100644
@@ -453,8 +453,6 @@ void hyperv_cleanup(void)
 {
 	union hv_x64_msr_hypercall_contents hypercall_msr;
 
-	unregister_syscore_ops(&hv_syscore_ops);
-
 	/* Reset our OS id */
 	wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, 0);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#487 lore raw

PATCH 487/783 binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flags

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a46bf558803dd2b959ca7435a5c143efe837217 ]

UBSAN reported a shift-out-of-bounds warning:

left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'

 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106
  ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:151
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x208 lib/ubsan.c:322
  check_special_flags fs/binfmt_misc.c:241 [inline]
  create_entry fs/binfmt_misc.c:456 [inline]
  bm_register_write+0x9d3/0xa20 fs/binfmt_misc.c:654
  vfs_write+0x11e/0x580 fs/read_write.c:582
  ksys_write+0xcf/0x120 fs/read_write.c:637
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0033:0x4194e1

Since the type of Node's flags is unsigned long, we should define these macros with same type too.

---
 fs/binfmt_misc.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/binfmt_misc.c +4 -4
index 11b5bf241955..ce0047feea72 100644
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ static LIST_HEAD(entries);
 static int enabled = 1;
 
 enum {Enabled, Magic};
-#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << 31)
-#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1 << 30)
-#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1 << 29)
-#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1 << 28)
+#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1UL << 31)
+#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1UL << 30)
+#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1UL << 29)
+#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1UL << 28)
 
 typedef struct {
 	struct list_head list;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#488 lore raw

PATCH 488/783 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 898f706695682b9954f280d95e49fa86ffa55d08 ]

Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.

Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp. Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +16 -6
index 0ce17ea8fa8a..b0a65aaed43e 100644
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	struct bmap *bmp;
 	struct dbmap_disk *dbmp_le;
 	struct metapage *mp;
-	int i;
+	int i, err;
 
 	/*
 	 * allocate/initialize the in-memory bmap descriptor
@@ -170,8 +170,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 			   BMAPBLKNO << JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->l2nbperpage,
 			   PSIZE, 0);
 	if (mp == NULL) {
-		kfree(bmp);
-		return -EIO;
+		err = -EIO;
+		goto err_kfree_bmp;
 	}
 
 	/* copy the on-disk bmap descriptor to its in-memory version. */
@@ -181,9 +181,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	bmp->db_l2nbperpage = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_l2nbperpage);
 	bmp->db_numag = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_numag);
 	if (!bmp->db_numag) {
-		release_metapage(mp);
-		kfree(bmp);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
 	}
 
 	bmp->db_maxlevel = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_maxlevel);
@@ -194,6 +193,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	bmp->db_agwidth = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agwidth);
 	bmp->db_agstart = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agstart);
 	bmp->db_agl2size = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agl2size);
+	if (bmp->db_agl2size > L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++)
 		bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]);
 	bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
@@ -214,6 +218,12 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	BMAP_LOCK_INIT(bmp);
 
 	return (0);
+
+err_release_metapage:
+	release_metapage(mp);
+err_kfree_bmp:
+	kfree(bmp);
+	return err;
 }
 
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#489 lore raw

PATCH 489/783 udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c791730f2554a9ebb8f18df9368dc27d4ebc38c2 ]

syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:

VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150
 smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0
 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
 ? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0
 ? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
 ? lock_release+0x587/0x810
 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
 on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80
 blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0
 blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0
 blkdev_put+0x222/0x760
 deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160
 deactivate_super+0xda/0x100
 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0
 task_work_run+0x149/0x240
 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
 do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40
 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0
 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 ? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0
 do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However, brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head becomes unbalanced.

This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename() when udf_find_entry() returns NULL.

---
 fs/udf/namei.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/udf/namei.c +4 -4
index aff5ca32e4f6..58120d2f265f 100644
@@ -1090,8 +1090,9 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ofi = udf_find_entry(old_dir, &old_dentry->d_name, &ofibh, &ocfi);
-	if (IS_ERR(ofi)) {
-		retval = PTR_ERR(ofi);
+	if (!ofi || IS_ERR(ofi)) {
+		if (IS_ERR(ofi))
+			retval = PTR_ERR(ofi);
 		goto end_rename;
 	}
 
@@ -1100,8 +1101,7 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 
 	brelse(ofibh.sbh);
 	tloc = lelb_to_cpu(ocfi.icb.extLocation);
-	if (!ofi || udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0)
-	    != old_inode->i_ino)
+	if (udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0) != old_inode->i_ino)
 		goto end_rename;
 
 	nfi = udf_find_entry(new_dir, &new_dentry->d_name, &nfibh, &ncfi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#490 lore raw

PATCH 490/783 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hoi Pok Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25e70c6162f207828dd405b432d8f2a98dbf7082 ]

This should be applied to most URSAN bugs found recently by syzbot, by guarding the dbMount. As syzbot feeding rubbish into the bmap descriptor.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +5 -0
index b0a65aaed43e..2c9493011aec 100644
@@ -198,6 +198,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 		goto err_release_metapage;
 	}
 
+	if (((bmp->db_mapsize - 1) >> bmp->db_agl2size) > MAXAG) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++)
 		bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]);
 	bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#491 lore raw

PATCH 491/783 ACPICA: Fix error code path in acpi_ds_call_control_method()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 404ec60438add1afadaffaed34bb5fe4ddcadd40 ]

A use-after-free in acpi_ps_parse_aml() after a failing invocaion of acpi_ds_call_control_method() is reported by KASAN [1] and code inspection reveals that next_walk_state pushed to the thread by acpi_ds_create_walk_state() is freed on errors, but it is not popped from the thread beforehand. Thus acpi_ds_get_current_walk_state() called by acpi_ps_parse_aml() subsequently returns it as the new walk state which is incorrect.

To address this, make acpi_ds_call_control_method() call acpi_ds_pop_walk_state() to pop next_walk_state from the thread before returning an error.

---
 drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c +8 -2
index cf67caff878a..97971c79c5f5 100644
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 	info = ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED(sizeof(struct acpi_evaluate_info));
 	if (!info) {
 		status = AE_NO_MEMORY;
-		goto cleanup;
+		goto pop_walk_state;
 	}
 
 	info->parameters = &this_walk_state->operands[0];
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 
 	ACPI_FREE(info);
 	if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
-		goto cleanup;
+		goto pop_walk_state;
 	}
 
 	next_walk_state->method_nesting_depth =
@@ -575,6 +575,12 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 
 	return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
 
+pop_walk_state:
+
+	/* On error, pop the walk state to be deleted from thread */
+
+	acpi_ds_pop_walk_state(thread);
+
 cleanup:
 
 	/* On error, we must terminate the method properly */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#492 lore raw

PATCH 492/783 nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds/overflow in nilfs_sb2_bad_offset()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 610a2a3d7d8be3537458a378ec69396a76c385b6 ]

Patch series "nilfs2: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warnings on mount time".

The first patch fixes a bug reported by syzbot, and the second one fixes the remaining bug of the same kind. Although they are triggered by the same super block data anomaly, I divided it into the above two because the details of the issues and how to fix it are different.

Both are required to eliminate the shift-out-of-bounds issues at mount time.

This patch (of 2):

If the block size exponent information written in an on-disk superblock is corrupted, nilfs_sb2_bad_offset helper function can trigger shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn is set):

shift exponent 38983 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long long'

 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
  ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x33d/0x3b0 lib/ubsan.c:322
  nilfs_sb2_bad_offset fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:449 [inline]
  nilfs_load_super_block+0xdf5/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:523
  init_nilfs+0xb7/0x7d0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:577
  nilfs_fill_super+0xb1/0x5d0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1047
  nilfs_mount+0x613/0x9b0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1317
  ...

In addition, since nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() performs multiplication without considering the upper bound, the computation may overflow if the disk layout parameters are not normal.

This fixes these issues by inserting preliminary sanity checks for those parameters and by converting the comparison from one involving multiplication and left bit-shifting to one using division and right bit-shifting.

---
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c +27 -4
index ce103dd39b89..6e2ccdd79c89 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
 #include <linux/crc32.h>
 #include "nilfs.h"
 #include "segment.h"
@@ -443,11 +444,33 @@ static int nilfs_valid_sb(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp)
 	return crc == le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_sum);
 }
 
-static int nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset)
+/**
+ * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset - check the location of the second superblock
+ * @sbp: superblock raw data buffer
+ * @offset: byte offset of second superblock calculated from device size
+ *
+ * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() checks if the position on the second
+ * superblock is valid or not based on the filesystem parameters
+ * stored in @sbp.  If @offset points to a location within the segment
+ * area, or if the parameters themselves are not normal, it is
+ * determined to be invalid.
+ *
+ * Return Value: true if invalid, false if valid.
+ */
+static bool nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset)
 {
-	return offset < ((le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments) *
-			  le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment)) <<
-			 (le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size) + 10));
+	unsigned int shift_bits = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size);
+	u32 blocks_per_segment = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment);
+	u64 nsegments = le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments);
+	u64 index;
+
+	if (blocks_per_segment < NILFS_SEG_MIN_BLOCKS ||
+	    shift_bits > ilog2(NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) - BLOCK_SIZE_BITS)
+		return true;
+
+	index = offset >> (shift_bits + BLOCK_SIZE_BITS);
+	do_div(index, blocks_per_segment);
+	return index < nsegments;
 }
 
 static void nilfs_release_super_block(struct the_nilfs *nilfs)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#493 lore raw

PATCH 493/783 nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds due to too large exponent of block size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ebeccaaef67a4895d2496ab8d9c2fb8d89201211 ]

If field s_log_block_size of superblock data is corrupted and too large, init_nilfs() and load_nilfs() still can trigger a shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn is set):

shift exponent 38973 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'

 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134
  ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x50
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold.12+0x17b/0x1f5
  init_nilfs.cold.11+0x18/0x1d [nilfs2]
  nilfs_mount+0x9b5/0x12b0 [nilfs2]
  ...

This fixes the issue by adding and using a new helper function for getting block size with sanity check.

---
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c +38 -4
index 6e2ccdd79c89..211937054c31 100644
@@ -193,6 +193,34 @@ static int nilfs_store_log_cursor(struct the_nilfs *nilfs,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/**
+ * nilfs_get_blocksize - get block size from raw superblock data
+ * @sb: super block instance
+ * @sbp: superblock raw data buffer
+ * @blocksize: place to store block size
+ *
+ * nilfs_get_blocksize() calculates the block size from the block size
+ * exponent information written in @sbp and stores it in @blocksize,
+ * or aborts with an error message if it's too large.
+ *
+ * Return Value: On success, 0 is returned. If the block size is too
+ * large, -EINVAL is returned.
+ */
+static int nilfs_get_blocksize(struct super_block *sb,
+			       struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, int *blocksize)
+{
+	unsigned int shift_bits = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size);
+
+	if (unlikely(shift_bits >
+		     ilog2(NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) - BLOCK_SIZE_BITS)) {
+		nilfs_err(sb, "too large filesystem blocksize: 2 ^ %u KiB",
+			  shift_bits);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	*blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << shift_bits;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * load_nilfs - load and recover the nilfs
  * @nilfs: the_nilfs structure to be released
@@ -246,11 +274,15 @@ int load_nilfs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, struct super_block *sb)
 		nilfs->ns_sbwtime = le64_to_cpu(sbp[0]->s_wtime);
 
 		/* verify consistency between two super blocks */
-		blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(sbp[0]->s_log_block_size);
+		err = nilfs_get_blocksize(sb, sbp[0], &blocksize);
+		if (err)
+			goto scan_error;
+
 		if (blocksize != nilfs->ns_blocksize) {
 			nilfs_warn(sb,
 				   "blocksize differs between two super blocks (%d != %d)",
 				   blocksize, nilfs->ns_blocksize);
+			err = -EINVAL;
 			goto scan_error;
 		}
 
@@ -609,9 +641,11 @@ int init_nilfs(struct the_nilfs *nilfs, struct super_block *sb, char *data)
 	if (err)
 		goto failed_sbh;
 
-	blocksize = BLOCK_SIZE << le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size);
-	if (blocksize < NILFS_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE ||
-	    blocksize > NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	err = nilfs_get_blocksize(sb, sbp, &blocksize);
+	if (err)
+		goto failed_sbh;
+
+	if (blocksize < NILFS_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		nilfs_err(sb,
 			  "couldn't mount because of unsupported filesystem blocksize %d",
 			  blocksize);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#494 lore raw

PATCH 494/783 acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5f31c655bcc01b6da53b836ac951c1556245305 ]

The integer overflow is descripted with following codes:

Quoted 3 lines

317 static comp_t encode_comp_t(u64 value)
318 {
319 int exp, rnd;

    ......
Quoted 4 lines
341         exp <<= MANTSIZE;
342         exp += value;
343         return exp;

344 }

Currently comp_t is defined as type of '__u16', but the variable 'exp' is type of 'int', so overflow would happen when variable 'exp' in line 343 is greater than 65535.

---
 kernel/acct.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/acct.c +2 -0
index f175df8f6aa4..12f7dacf560e 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static comp_t encode_comp_t(unsigned long value)
 		exp++;
 	}
 
+	if (exp > (((comp_t) ~0U) >> MANTSIZE))
+		return (comp_t) ~0U;
 	/*
 	 * Clean it up and polish it off.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#495 lore raw

PATCH 495/783 hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: ZhangPeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]

Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190
fs/hfs/string.c:84
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84
 __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75
 hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138
 hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462
 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]

If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename

OOB read occurred:
hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large

Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling hfs_brec_find().

---
 fs/hfs/inode.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/hfs/inode.c +2 -0
index f35a37c65e5f..e9b4249a4b01 100644
@@ -454,6 +454,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)
 		/* panic? */
 		return -EIO;
 
+	if (HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len > HFS_NAMELEN)
+		return -EIO;
 	fd.search_key->cat = HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key;
 	if (hfs_brec_find(&fd))
 		/* panic? */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#496 lore raw

PATCH 496/783 drm/etnaviv: add missing quirks for GC300

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Doug Brown <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc7d3fb446a91f24978a6aa59cbb578f92e22242 ]

The GC300's features register doesn't specify that a 2D pipe is available, and like the GC600, its idle register reports zero bits where modules aren't present.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gpu.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gpu.c +9 -2
index 2520b7dad6ce..f3281d56b1d8 100644
@@ -408,6 +408,12 @@ static void etnaviv_hw_identify(struct etnaviv_gpu *gpu)
 	if (gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC700)
 		gpu->identity.features &= ~chipFeatures_FAST_CLEAR;
 
+	/* These models/revisions don't have the 2D pipe bit */
+	if ((gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC500 &&
+	     gpu->identity.revision <= 2) ||
+	    gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC300)
+		gpu->identity.features |= chipFeatures_PIPE_2D;
+
 	if ((gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC500 &&
 	     gpu->identity.revision < 2) ||
 	    (gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC300 &&
@@ -441,8 +447,9 @@ static void etnaviv_hw_identify(struct etnaviv_gpu *gpu)
 				gpu_read(gpu, VIVS_HI_CHIP_MINOR_FEATURE_5);
 	}
 
-	/* GC600 idle register reports zero bits where modules aren't present */
-	if (gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC600)
+	/* GC600/300 idle register reports zero bits where modules aren't present */
+	if (gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC600 ||
+	    gpu->identity.model == chipModel_GC300)
 		gpu->idle_mask = VIVS_HI_IDLE_STATE_TX |
 				 VIVS_HI_IDLE_STATE_RA |
 				 VIVS_HI_IDLE_STATE_SE |
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#497 lore raw

PATCH 497/783 brcmfmac: return error when getting invalid max_flowrings from dongle

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wright Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2aca4f3734bd717e04943ddf340d49ab62299a00 ]

When firmware hit trap at initialization, host will read abnormal max_flowrings number from dongle, and it will cause kernel panic when doing iowrite to initialize dongle ring.
To detect this error at early stage, we directly return error when getting invalid max_flowrings(>256).

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/pcie.c +4 -0
index 4e9d2b3659f0..6a5621f17bf5 100644
@@ -1109,6 +1109,10 @@ static int brcmf_pcie_init_ringbuffers(struct brcmf_pciedev_info *devinfo)
 				BRCMF_NROF_H2D_COMMON_MSGRINGS;
 		max_completionrings = BRCMF_NROF_D2H_COMMON_MSGRINGS;
 	}
+	if (max_flowrings > 256) {
+		brcmf_err(bus, "invalid max_flowrings(%d)\n", max_flowrings);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	if (devinfo->dma_idx_sz != 0) {
 		bufsz = (max_submissionrings + max_completionrings) *
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#498 lore raw

PATCH 498/783 wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16ef02bad239f11f322df8425d302be62f0443ce ]

The bug arises when a USB device claims to be an ATH9K but doesn't have the expected endpoints. (In this case there was an interrupt endpoint where the driver expected a bulk endpoint.) The kernel needs to be able to handle such devices without getting an internal error.

usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 500 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 500 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.10.135-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Call Trace:
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:908 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_urbs+0x75e/0x1010 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1019
 ath9k_hif_usb_dev_init drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1109 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb+0x142/0x530 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1242
 request_firmware_work_func+0x12e/0x240 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:1097
 process_one_work+0x9af/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 worker_thread+0x61d/0x12f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2425
 kthread+0x3b4/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:299

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +14 -0
index e5d5b0761881..f938ac1a4abd 100644
@@ -1328,10 +1328,24 @@ static int send_eject_command(struct usb_interface *interface)
 static int ath9k_hif_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 			       const struct usb_device_id *id)
 {
+	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *bulk_in, *bulk_out, *int_in, *int_out;
 	struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
+	struct usb_host_interface *alt;
 	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	/* Verify the expected endpoints are present */
+	alt = interface->cur_altsetting;
+	if (usb_find_common_endpoints(alt, &bulk_in, &bulk_out, &int_in, &int_out) < 0 ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_in) != USB_WLAN_RX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_out) != USB_WLAN_TX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_in) != USB_REG_IN_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_out) != USB_REG_OUT_PIPE) {
+		dev_err(&udev->dev,
+			"ath9k_htc: Device endpoint numbers are not the expected ones\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
 	if (id->driver_info == STORAGE_DEVICE)
 		return send_eject_command(interface);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#499 lore raw

PATCH 499/783 wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a942a069c2a975478d719e98d83cdae1797 ]

syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]:

[   38.960489][    C3] ==================================================================
[   38.963216][    C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.964950][    C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0
[   38.966363][    C3]
[   38.967053][    C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18
[   38.968464][    C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
[   38.969959][    C3] Call Trace:
[   38.970841][    C3]  <IRQ>
[   38.971663][    C3]  dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174
[   38.972620][    C3]  print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752
[   38.973626][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.974644][    C3]  kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0
[   38.975720][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.976831][    C3]  ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.978412][    C3]  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0
[   38.979755][    C3]  usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430
[   38.981266][    C3]  dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0
[   38.982925][    C3]  ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0
[   38.984761][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.986242][    C3]  ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790
[   38.987323][    C3]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70
[   38.988483][    C3]  ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130
[   38.989621][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   38.990777][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.991919][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.993138][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.994890][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.996266][    C3]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230
[   38.997670][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.999116][    C3]  call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0
[   39.000668][    C3]  ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.002137][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.003809][    C3]  ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0
[   39.005509][    C3]  __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0
[   39.007025][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   39.008716][    C3]  ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0
[   39.010254][    C3]  ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10
[   39.011795][    C3]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40
[   39.013277][    C3]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0
[   39.014724][    C3]  run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0
[   39.016196][    C3]  __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be
[   39.017616][    C3]  __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190
[   39.019004][    C3]  irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[   39.020361][    C3]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0
[   39.021965][    C3]  </IRQ>
[   39.023237][    C3]  <TASK>

In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()):

ar5523_probe()
-> ar5523_host_available()
-> ar5523_cmd_read()

      -> ar5523_cmd()

If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure.

This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
index 1baec4b412c8..efe38b2c1df7 100644
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static void ar5523_cmd_tx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 	}
 }
 
+static void ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar)
+{
+	usb_kill_urb(ar->tx_cmd.urb_tx);
+}
+
 static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 		      int ilen, void *odata, int olen, int flags)
 {
@@ -280,6 +285,7 @@ static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 	}
 
 	if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&cmd->done, 2 * HZ)) {
+		ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(ar);
 		cmd->odata = NULL;
 		ar5523_err(ar, "timeout waiting for command %02x reply\n",
 			   code);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#500 lore raw

PATCH 500/783 ASoC: codecs: rt298: Add quirk for KBL-R RVP platform

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 953dbd1cef18ce9ac0d69c1bd735b929fe52a17e ]

KBL-R RVP platforms also use combojack, so we need to enable that configuration for them.

---
 sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c +7 -0
index dc0273a5a11f..1ca06213e3a3 100644
@@ -1168,6 +1168,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id force_combo_jack_table[] = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Geminilake")
 		}
 	},
+	{
+		.ident = "Intel Kabylake R RVP",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Kabylake Client platform")
+		}
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#501 lore raw

PATCH 501/783 ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Yuchen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36992eb6b9b83f7f9cdc8e74fb5799d7b52e83e9 ]

After the IPMI disconnect problem, the memory kept rising and we tried to unload the driver to free the memory. However, only part of the free memory is recovered after the driver is uninstalled. Using ebpf to hook free functions, we find that neither ipmi_user nor ipmi_smi_msg is free, only ipmi_recv_msg is free.

We find that the deliver_smi_err_response call in clean_smi_msgs does the destroy processing on each message from the xmit_msg queue without checking the return value and free ipmi_smi_msg.

deliver_smi_err_response is called only at this location. Adding the free handling has no effect.

To verify, try using ebpf to trace the free function.

  $ bpftrace -e 'kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_recv_msg {printf("alloc rcv
      %p\n",retval);} kprobe:free_recv_msg {printf("free recv %p\n",
      arg0)} kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_smi_msg {printf("alloc smi %p\n",
        retval);} kprobe:free_smi_msg {printf("free smi  %p\n",arg0)}'

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

[Fixed the comment above handle_one_recv_msg().]
---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +6 -2
index 05e7339752ac..223b90247648 100644
@@ -3540,12 +3540,16 @@ static void deliver_smi_err_response(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
 				     struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg,
 				     unsigned char err)
 {
+	int rv;
 	msg->rsp[0] = msg->data[0] | 4;
 	msg->rsp[1] = msg->data[1];
 	msg->rsp[2] = err;
 	msg->rsp_size = 3;
-	/* It's an error, so it will never requeue, no need to check return. */
-	handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+
+	/* This will never requeue, but it may ask us to free the message. */
+	rv = handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+	if (rv == 0)
+		ipmi_free_smi_msg(msg);
 }
 
 static void cleanup_smi_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#502 lore raw

PATCH 502/783 drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: gehao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d232afb1f3417ae8194ccf19ad3a8360e70e104e ]

In dce6(0,1,4)_create_resource_pool and dce80_create_resource_pool the allocated memory should be released if construct pool fails.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce60/dce60_resource.c | 3 +++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce80/dce80_resource.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce60/dce60_resource.c +3 -0
index 5a5a9cb77acb..bcdd8a958fc0 100644
@@ -1132,6 +1132,7 @@ struct resource_pool *dce60_create_resource_pool(
 	if (dce60_construct(num_virtual_links, dc, pool))
 		return &pool->base;
 
+	kfree(pool);
 	BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER();
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1329,6 +1330,7 @@ struct resource_pool *dce61_create_resource_pool(
 	if (dce61_construct(num_virtual_links, dc, pool))
 		return &pool->base;
 
+	kfree(pool);
 	BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER();
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1522,6 +1524,7 @@ struct resource_pool *dce64_create_resource_pool(
 	if (dce64_construct(num_virtual_links, dc, pool))
 		return &pool->base;
 
+	kfree(pool);
 	BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER();
 	return NULL;
 }
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce80/dce80_resource.c +2 -0
index a19be9de2df7..2eefa07762ae 100644
@@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@ struct resource_pool *dce80_create_resource_pool(
 	if (dce80_construct(num_virtual_links, dc, pool))
 		return &pool->base;
 
+	kfree(pool);
 	BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER();
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1338,6 +1339,7 @@ struct resource_pool *dce81_create_resource_pool(
 	if (dce81_construct(num_virtual_links, dc, pool))
 		return &pool->base;
 
+	kfree(pool);
 	BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER();
 	return NULL;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#503 lore raw

PATCH 503/783 qed (gcc13): use u16 for fid to be big enough

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d84118229bf7f7290438c85caa8e49de52d50c1 ]

gcc 13 correctly reports overflow in qed_grc_dump_addr_range():
In file included from drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed.h:23,
from drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c:10:
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c: In function 'qed_grc_dump_addr_range':
include/linux/qed/qed_if.h:1217:9: error: overflow in conversion from 'int' to 'u8' {aka 'unsigned char'} changes value from '(int)vf_id << 8 | 128' to '128' [-Werror=overflow]

We do:
u8 fid;
...
fid = vf_id << 8 | 128;

Since fid is 16bit (and the stored value above too), fid should be u16, not u8. Fix that.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_debug.c +2 -1
index 6ab3e60d4928..4b4077cf2d26 100644
@@ -1796,9 +1796,10 @@ static u32 qed_grc_dump_addr_range(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 				   u8 split_id)
 {
 	struct dbg_tools_data *dev_data = &p_hwfn->dbg_info;
-	u8 port_id = 0, pf_id = 0, vf_id = 0, fid = 0;
+	u8 port_id = 0, pf_id = 0, vf_id = 0;
 	bool read_using_dmae = false;
 	u32 thresh;
+	u16 fid;
 
 	if (!dump)
 		return len;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#504 lore raw

PATCH 504/783 bpf: make sure skb->len != 0 when redirecting to a tunneling device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 07ec7b502800ba9f7b8b15cb01dd6556bb41aaca ]

syzkaller managed to trigger another case where skb->len == 0 when we enter __dev_queue_xmit:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2069/0x35e0 net/core/dev.c:4295

Call Trace:
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4406
 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2115 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2140 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect+0x5fb/0xda0 net/core/filter.c:2163
 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2447 [inline]
 bpf_clone_redirect+0x247/0x390 net/core/filter.c:2419
 bpf_prog_48159a89cb4a9a16+0x59/0x5e
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:897 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:596 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:603 [inline]
 bpf_test_run+0x46c/0x890 net/bpf/test_run.c:402
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xbdc/0x14c0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1170
 bpf_prog_test_run+0x345/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3648
 __sys_bpf+0x43a/0x6c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5005
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

The reproducer doesn't really reproduce outside of syzkaller environment, so I'm taking a guess here. It looks like we do generate correct ETH_HLEN-sized packet, but we redirect the packet to the tunneling device. Before we do so, we __skb_pull l2 header and arrive again at skb->len == 0. Doesn't seem like we can do anything better than having an explicit check after __skb_pull?

---
 net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +4 -0
index ef7e74260afc..e3cdbd4996e0 100644
@@ -2132,6 +2132,10 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_no_mac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if (mlen) {
 		__skb_pull(skb, mlen);
+		if (unlikely(!skb->len)) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			return -ERANGE;
+		}
 
 		/* At ingress, the mac header has already been pulled once.
 		 * At egress, skb_pospull_rcsum has to be done in case that
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#505 lore raw

PATCH 505/783 net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63fe6ff674a96cfcfc0fa8df1051a27aa31c70b4 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c:1944:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netcp_ndo_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c +1 -1
index dc50e948195d..f145abb77a49 100644
@@ -1262,7 +1262,7 @@ static int netcp_tx_submit_skb(struct netcp_intf *netcp,
 }
 
 /* Submit the packet */
-static int netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
+static netdev_tx_t netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 {
 	struct netcp_intf *netcp = netdev_priv(ndev);
 	struct netcp_stats *tx_stats = &netcp->stats;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#506 lore raw

PATCH 506/783 hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5733e5b15d91ab679646ec3149e192996a27d5d ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c:1119:25: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = baycom_send_packet,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of baycom_send_packet() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c +1 -1
index e4e4981ac1d2..eea9d47157cf 100644
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ static void epp_bh(struct work_struct *work)
  * ===================== network driver interface =========================
  */
 
-static int baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct baycom_state *bc = netdev_priv(dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#507 lore raw

PATCH 507/783 wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c ]

This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller, brcmf_usb_probe_cb() or brcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c
shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G           O      5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb
 ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20
 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea
 ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250
 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0
 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0
 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120
 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0
 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590
 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90
 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20
 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40
 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260
 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50
 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230
 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280
 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790
 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0
 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0
 kthread+0x379/0x450
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5 -0
index a2b8d9171af2..060889bf6d05 100644
@@ -703,6 +703,11 @@ brcmf_fw_alloc_request(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,
 	u32 i, j;
 	char end = '\0';
 
+	if (chiprev >= BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)) {
+		brcmf_err("Invalid chip revision %u\n", chiprev);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < table_size; i++) {
 		if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip &&
 		    mapping_table[i].revmask & BIT(chiprev))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#508 lore raw

PATCH 508/783 igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0668716506ca66f90d395f36ccdaebc3e0e84801 ]

Avoid potential use-after-free condition under memory pressure. If the kzalloc() fails, q_vector will be freed but left in the original adapter->q_vector[v_idx] array position.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +6 -2
index 2646601c3487..0ea8e4024d63 100644
@@ -1204,8 +1204,12 @@ static int igb_alloc_q_vector(struct igb_adapter *adapter,
 	if (!q_vector) {
 		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	} else if (size > ksize(q_vector)) {
-		kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
-		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		struct igb_q_vector *new_q_vector;
+
+		new_q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (new_q_vector)
+			kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
+		q_vector = new_q_vector;
 	} else {
 		memset(q_vector, 0, size);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#509 lore raw

PATCH 509/783 drm/amdgpu: Fix type of second parameter in trans_msg() callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0d0f1087333714ee683cc134a95afe331d7ddd9 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mxgpu_ai.c:412:15: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, u32, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') with an expression of type 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.trans_msg = xgpu_ai_mailbox_trans_msg,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mxgpu_nv.c:435:15: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, u32, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') with an expression of type 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.trans_msg = xgpu_nv_mailbox_trans_msg,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

The type of the second parameter in the prototype should be 'enum idh_request' instead of 'u32'. Update it to clear up the warnings.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_virt.h | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_virt.h +4 -1
index aea49bad914f..fbd92fff8b06 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@ struct amdgpu_vf_error_buffer {
 	uint64_t data[AMDGPU_VF_ERROR_ENTRY_SIZE];
 };
 
+enum idh_request;
+
 /**
  * struct amdgpu_virt_ops - amdgpu device virt operations
  */
@@ -71,7 +73,8 @@ struct amdgpu_virt_ops {
 	int (*req_init_data)(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
 	int (*reset_gpu)(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
 	int (*wait_reset)(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
-	void (*trans_msg)(struct amdgpu_device *adev, u32 req, u32 data1, u32 data2, u32 data3);
+	void (*trans_msg)(struct amdgpu_device *adev, enum idh_request req,
+			  u32 data1, u32 data2, u32 data3);
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#510 lore raw

PATCH 510/783 drm/amdgpu: Fix type of second parameter in odn_edit_dpm_table() callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4d0ef752081e7aa6ffb7ccac11c499c732a2e05 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../pm/swsmu/amdgpu_smu.c:3008:29: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'int (*)(void *, uint32_t, long *, uint32_t)' (aka 'int (*)(void *, unsigned int, long *, unsigned int)') with an expression of type 'int (void *, enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND, long *, uint32_t)' (aka 'int (void *, enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND, long *, unsigned int)') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.odn_edit_dpm_table = smu_od_edit_dpm_table,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

There are only two implementations of ->odn_edit_dpm_table() in 'struct amd_pm_funcs': smu_od_edit_dpm_table() and pp_odn_edit_dpm_table(). One has a second parameter type of 'enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND' and the other uses 'u32'. Ultimately, smu_od_edit_dpm_table() calls ->od_edit_dpm_table() from 'struct pptable_funcs' and pp_odn_edit_dpm_table() calls ->odn_edit_dpm_table() from 'struct pp_hwmgr_func', which both have a second parameter type of 'enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND'.

Update the type parameter in both the prototype in 'struct amd_pm_funcs' and pp_odn_edit_dpm_table() to 'enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND', which cleans up the warning.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/kgd_pp_interface.h   | 3 ++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/include/kgd_pp_interface.h +2 -1
index 94132c70d7af..5e8876ad1a1b 100644
@@ -282,7 +282,8 @@ struct amd_pm_funcs {
 	int (*get_power_profile_mode)(void *handle, char *buf);
 	int (*set_power_profile_mode)(void *handle, long *input, uint32_t size);
 	int (*set_fine_grain_clk_vol)(void *handle, uint32_t type, long *input, uint32_t size);
-	int (*odn_edit_dpm_table)(void *handle, uint32_t type, long *input, uint32_t size);
+	int (*odn_edit_dpm_table)(void *handle, enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND type,
+				  long *input, uint32_t size);
 	int (*set_mp1_state)(void *handle, enum pp_mp1_state mp1_state);
 	int (*smu_i2c_bus_access)(void *handle, bool acquire);
 /* export to DC */
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/amd_powerplay.c +2 -1
index eab9768029c1..a98ea29b2fd5 100644
@@ -924,7 +924,8 @@ static int pp_set_fine_grain_clk_vol(void *handle, uint32_t type, long *input, u
 	return hwmgr->hwmgr_func->set_fine_grain_clk_vol(hwmgr, type, input, size);
 }
 
-static int pp_odn_edit_dpm_table(void *handle, uint32_t type, long *input, uint32_t size)
+static int pp_odn_edit_dpm_table(void *handle, enum PP_OD_DPM_TABLE_COMMAND type,
+				 long *input, uint32_t size)
 {
 	struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr = handle;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#511 lore raw

PATCH 511/783 s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa5bf80c3c067b82b4362cd6e8e2194623bcaca6 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1064:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcm_tx,
^~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1072:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcmpc_tx,
^~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c +2 -9
index d06809eac16d..fb0e8f1cabdc 100644
@@ -865,16 +865,9 @@ static int ctcmpc_transmit_skb(struct channel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- *  skb		Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- *  dev		Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * returns 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
 /* first merge version - leaving both functions separated */
-static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
 
@@ -917,7 +910,7 @@ static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 }
 
 /* unmerged MPC variant of ctcm_tx */
-static int ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	int len = 0;
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#512 lore raw

PATCH 512/783 s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88d86d18d7cf7e9137c95f9d212bb9fff8a1b4be ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c:1854:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netiucv_tx,
^~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netiucv_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c +1 -8
index 260860cf3aa1..a2f403c4ec38 100644
@@ -1260,15 +1260,8 @@ static int netiucv_close(struct net_device *dev)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- * @param skb Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- * @param dev Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * @return 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
-static int netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct netiucv_priv *privptr = netdev_priv(dev);
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#513 lore raw

PATCH 513/783 s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bb16db8393658e0978c3f0d30ae069e878264fa3 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2090:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2097:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of lcs_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

---
 drivers/s390/net/lcs.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c +3 -5
index 06a322bdced6..7e743f4717a9 100644
@@ -1518,9 +1518,8 @@ lcs_txbuffer_cb(struct lcs_channel *channel, struct lcs_buffer *buffer)
 /**
  * Packet transmit function called by network stack
  */
-static int
-__lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		 struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_header *header;
 	int rc = NETDEV_TX_OK;
@@ -1581,8 +1580,7 @@ __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int
-lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_card *card;
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#514 lore raw

PATCH 514/783 drm/msm: Use drm_mode_copy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b2a1c5ca50db22b3677676dd5bad5f6092429acf ]

struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.

Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.

Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.

@is_mode_copy@
@@
drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)

@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_display.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dp/dp_display.c +1 -1
index 5a152d505dfb..1c3dcbc6cce8 100644
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ static int dp_display_set_mode(struct msm_dp *dp_display,
 
 	dp = container_of(dp_display, struct dp_display_private, dp_display);
 
-	dp->panel->dp_mode.drm_mode = mode->drm_mode;
+	drm_mode_copy(&dp->panel->dp_mode.drm_mode, &mode->drm_mode);
 	dp->panel->dp_mode.bpp = mode->bpp;
 	dp->panel->dp_mode.capabilities = mode->capabilities;
 	dp_panel_init_panel_info(dp->panel);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#515 lore raw

PATCH 515/783 drm/rockchip: Use drm_mode_copy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2bfaa28000d2830d3209161a4541cce0660e1b84 ]

struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.

Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.

Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.

@is_mode_copy@
@@
drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)

@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/cdn-dp-core.c | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/inno_hdmi.c   | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rk3066_hdmi.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/cdn-dp-core.c +1 -1
index 857c47c69ef1..adeaa0140f0f 100644
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void cdn_dp_encoder_mode_set(struct drm_encoder *encoder,
 	video->v_sync_polarity = !!(mode->flags & DRM_MODE_FLAG_NVSYNC);
 	video->h_sync_polarity = !!(mode->flags & DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC);
 
-	memcpy(&dp->mode, adjusted, sizeof(*mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&dp->mode, adjusted);
 }
 
 static bool cdn_dp_check_link_status(struct cdn_dp_device *dp)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/inno_hdmi.c +1 -1
index 7afdc54eb3ec..78120da5e63a 100644
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static void inno_hdmi_encoder_mode_set(struct drm_encoder *encoder,
 	inno_hdmi_setup(hdmi, adj_mode);
 
 	/* Store the display mode for plugin/DPMS poweron events */
-	memcpy(&hdmi->previous_mode, adj_mode, sizeof(hdmi->previous_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hdmi->previous_mode, adj_mode);
 }
 
 static void inno_hdmi_encoder_enable(struct drm_encoder *encoder)
drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rk3066_hdmi.c +1 -1
index 1c546c3a8998..17e7c40a9e7b 100644
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ rk3066_hdmi_encoder_mode_set(struct drm_encoder *encoder,
 	struct rk3066_hdmi *hdmi = to_rk3066_hdmi(encoder);
 
 	/* Store the display mode for plugin/DPMS poweron events. */
-	memcpy(&hdmi->previous_mode, adj_mode, sizeof(hdmi->previous_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hdmi->previous_mode, adj_mode);
 }
 
 static void rk3066_hdmi_encoder_enable(struct drm_encoder *encoder)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#516 lore raw

PATCH 516/783 drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 442cf8e22ba25a77cb9092d78733fdbac9844e50 ]

struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.

Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.

Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.

@is_mode_copy@
@@
drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)

@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +1 -1
index ddb4184f0726..b0676a73a1d7 100644
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static void sti_dvo_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&dvo->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&dvo->mode, mode);
 
 	/* According to the path used (main or aux), the dvo clocks should
 	 * have a different parent clock. */
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +1 -1
index 5c2b650b561d..84109800143a 100644
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void sti_hda_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&hda->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hda->mode, mode);
 
 	if (!hda_get_mode_idx(hda->mode, &mode_idx)) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Undefined mode\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +1 -1
index 38a558768e53..412664dfb0b0 100644
@@ -934,7 +934,7 @@ static void sti_hdmi_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
 	/* Copy the drm display mode in the connector local structure */
-	memcpy(&hdmi->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hdmi->mode, mode);
 
 	/* Update clock framerate according to the selected mode */
 	ret = clk_set_rate(hdmi->clk_pix, mode->clock * 1000);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#517 lore raw

PATCH 517/783 drivers/md/md-bitmap: check the return value of md_bitmap_get_counter()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Li Zhong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bd548e5b819b8c0f2c9085de775c5c7bff9052f ]

Check the return value of md_bitmap_get_counter() in case it returns NULL pointer, which will result in a null pointer dereference.

v2: update the check to include other dereference

---
 drivers/md/md-bitmap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md-bitmap.c +15 -12
index d377ea060925..4e52fcf98d59 100644
@@ -2196,20 +2196,23 @@ int md_bitmap_resize(struct bitmap *bitmap, sector_t blocks,
 
 		if (set) {
 			bmc_new = md_bitmap_get_counter(&bitmap->counts, block, &new_blocks, 1);
-			if (*bmc_new == 0) {
-				/* need to set on-disk bits too. */
-				sector_t end = block + new_blocks;
-				sector_t start = block >> chunkshift;
-				start <<= chunkshift;
-				while (start < end) {
-					md_bitmap_file_set_bit(bitmap, block);
-					start += 1 << chunkshift;
+			if (bmc_new) {
+				if (*bmc_new == 0) {
+					/* need to set on-disk bits too. */
+					sector_t end = block + new_blocks;
+					sector_t start = block >> chunkshift;
+
+					start <<= chunkshift;
+					while (start < end) {
+						md_bitmap_file_set_bit(bitmap, block);
+						start += 1 << chunkshift;
+					}
+					*bmc_new = 2;
+					md_bitmap_count_page(&bitmap->counts, block, 1);
+					md_bitmap_set_pending(&bitmap->counts, block);
 				}
-				*bmc_new = 2;
-				md_bitmap_count_page(&bitmap->counts, block, 1);
-				md_bitmap_set_pending(&bitmap->counts, block);
+				*bmc_new |= NEEDED_MASK;
 			}
-			*bmc_new |= NEEDED_MASK;
 			if (new_blocks < old_blocks)
 				old_blocks = new_blocks;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#518 lore raw

PATCH 518/783 md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiang Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b611ad14006e5be2170d9e8e611bf49dff288911 ]

fail run raid1 array when we assemble array with the inactive disk only, but the mdx_raid1 thread were not stop, Even if the associated resources have been released. it will caused a NULL dereference when we do poweroff.

This causes the following Oops:

    [  287.587787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000070
    [  287.594762] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [  287.599912] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [  287.605061] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [  287.607612] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
    [  287.611287] CPU: 3 PID: 5265 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G     U            5.10.146 #0
    [  287.619029] Hardware name: xxxxxxx/To be filled by O.E.M, BIOS 5.19 06/16/2022
    [  287.626775] RIP: 0010:md_check_recovery+0x57/0x500 [md_mod]
    [  287.632357] Code: fe 01 00 00 48 83 bb 10 03 00 00 00 74 08 48 89 ......
    [  287.651118] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000433d78 EFLAGS: 00010202
    [  287.656347] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105986800 RCX: 0000000000000000
    [  287.663491] RDX: ffffc90000433bb0 RSI: 00000000ffffefff RDI: ffff888105986800
    [  287.670634] RBP: ffffc90000433da0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffefff
    [  287.677771] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffc90000433ba8 R12: ffff888105986800
    [  287.684907] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffe00 R15: ffff888100b6b500
    [  287.692052] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888277f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    [  287.700149] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    [  287.705897] CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 000000000320a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
    [  287.713033] Call Trace:
    [  287.715498]  raid1d+0x6c/0xbbb [raid1]
    [  287.719256]  ? __schedule+0x1ff/0x760
    [  287.722930]  ? schedule+0x3b/0xb0
    [  287.726260]  ? schedule_timeout+0x1ed/0x290
    [  287.730456]  ? __switch_to+0x11f/0x400
    [  287.734219]  md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.738328]  ? md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.742601]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
    [  287.746097]  ? md_register_thread+0xe0/0xe0 [md_mod]
    [  287.751064]  kthread+0x11a/0x140
    [  287.754300]  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
    [  287.757974]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

In fact, when raid1 array run fail, we need to do
md_unregister_thread() before raid1_free().

---
 drivers/md/raid1.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -0
index fb31e5dd54a6..6b5cc3f59fb3 100644
@@ -3115,6 +3115,7 @@ static int raid1_run(struct mddev *mddev)
 	 * RAID1 needs at least one disk in active
 	 */
 	if (conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded < 1) {
+		md_unregister_thread(&conf->thread);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto abort;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#519 lore raw

PATCH 519/783 drm/amd/display: fix array index out of bound error in bios parser

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4fc1ba4aa589ca267468ad23fedef37562227d32 ]

[Why&How]
Firmware headers dictate that gpio_pin array only has a size of 8. The count returned from vbios however is greater than 8.

Fix this by not using array indexing but incrementing the pointer since gpio_pin definition in atomfirmware.h is hardcoded to size 8

---
 .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c   | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +7 -9
index 29d64e7e304f..930d2b7d3448 100644
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ static enum bp_result get_gpio_i2c_info(
 	uint32_t count = 0;
 	unsigned int table_index = 0;
 	bool find_valid = false;
+	struct atom_gpio_pin_assignment *pin;
 
 	if (!info)
 		return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -379,20 +380,17 @@ static enum bp_result get_gpio_i2c_info(
 			- sizeof(struct atom_common_table_header))
 				/ sizeof(struct atom_gpio_pin_assignment);
 
+	pin = (struct atom_gpio_pin_assignment *) header->gpio_pin;
+
 	for (table_index = 0; table_index < count; table_index++) {
-		if (((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_CAP) == (
-		header->gpio_pin[table_index].gpio_id &
-						I2C_HW_CAP)) &&
-		((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_ENGINE_ID_MASK)  ==
-		(header->gpio_pin[table_index].gpio_id &
-					I2C_HW_ENGINE_ID_MASK)) &&
-		((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_LANE_MUX) ==
-		(header->gpio_pin[table_index].gpio_id &
-						I2C_HW_LANE_MUX))) {
+		if (((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_CAP) 				== (pin->gpio_id & I2C_HW_CAP)) &&
+		    ((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_ENGINE_ID_MASK)	== (pin->gpio_id & I2C_HW_ENGINE_ID_MASK)) &&
+		    ((record->i2c_id & I2C_HW_LANE_MUX) 		== (pin->gpio_id & I2C_HW_LANE_MUX))) {
 			/* still valid */
 			find_valid = true;
 			break;
 		}
+		pin = (struct atom_gpio_pin_assignment *)((uint8_t *)pin + sizeof(struct atom_gpio_pin_assignment));
 	}
 
 	/* If we don't find the entry that we are looking for then
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#520 lore raw

PATCH 520/783 net: add atomic_long_t to net_device_stats fields

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c1c5097781f563b70a81683ea6fdac21637573b ]

Long standing KCSAN issues are caused by data-race around some dev->stats changes.

Most performance critical paths already use per-cpu variables, or per-queue ones.

It is reasonable (and more correct) to use atomic operations for the slow paths.

This patch adds an union for each field of net_device_stats, so that we can convert paths that are not yet protected by a spinlock or a mutex.

netdev_stats_to_stats64() no longer has an #if BITS_PER_LONG==64

Note that the memcpy() we were using on 64bit arches had no provision to avoid load-tearing,
while atomic_long_read() is providing the needed protection at no cost.

---
 include/linux/netdevice.h | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 include/net/dst.h         |  5 ++--
 net/core/dev.c            | 14 ++--------
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
include/linux/netdevice.h +35 -23
index ef75567efd27..b478a16ef284 100644
@@ -166,31 +166,38 @@ static inline bool dev_xmit_complete(int rc)
  *	(unsigned long) so they can be read and written atomically.
  */
 
+#define NET_DEV_STAT(FIELD)			\
+	union {					\
+		unsigned long FIELD;		\
+		atomic_long_t __##FIELD;	\
+	}
+
 struct net_device_stats {
-	unsigned long	rx_packets;
-	unsigned long	tx_packets;
-	unsigned long	rx_bytes;
-	unsigned long	tx_bytes;
-	unsigned long	rx_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_dropped;
-	unsigned long	tx_dropped;
-	unsigned long	multicast;
-	unsigned long	collisions;
-	unsigned long	rx_length_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_over_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_crc_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_frame_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_fifo_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_missed_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_aborted_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_carrier_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_fifo_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_heartbeat_errors;
-	unsigned long	tx_window_errors;
-	unsigned long	rx_compressed;
-	unsigned long	tx_compressed;
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_packets);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_packets);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_bytes);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_bytes);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_dropped);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_dropped);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(multicast);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(collisions);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_length_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_over_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_crc_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_frame_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_fifo_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_missed_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_aborted_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_carrier_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_fifo_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_heartbeat_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_window_errors);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(rx_compressed);
+	NET_DEV_STAT(tx_compressed);
 };
+#undef NET_DEV_STAT
 
 
 #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -5256,4 +5263,9 @@ do {								\
 
 extern struct net_device *blackhole_netdev;
 
+/* Note: Avoid these macros in fast path, prefer per-cpu or per-queue counters. */
+#define DEV_STATS_INC(DEV, FIELD) atomic_long_inc(&(DEV)->stats.__##FIELD)
+#define DEV_STATS_ADD(DEV, FIELD, VAL) 	\
+		atomic_long_add((VAL), &(DEV)->stats.__##FIELD)
+
 #endif	/* _LINUX_NETDEVICE_H */
include/net/dst.h +2 -3
index acd15c544cf3..ae2cf57d796b 100644
@@ -356,9 +356,8 @@ static inline void __skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 static inline void skb_tunnel_rx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 				 struct net *net)
 {
-	/* TODO : stats should be SMP safe */
-	dev->stats.rx_packets++;
-	dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
+	DEV_STATS_INC(dev, rx_packets);
+	DEV_STATS_ADD(dev, rx_bytes, skb->len);
 	__skb_tunnel_rx(skb, dev, net);
 }
 
net/core/dev.c +3 -11
index a421c54331ea..37bb60a7e97e 100644
@@ -10320,24 +10320,16 @@ void netdev_run_todo(void)
 void netdev_stats_to_stats64(struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats64,
 			     const struct net_device_stats *netdev_stats)
 {
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*stats64) < sizeof(*netdev_stats));
-	memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*netdev_stats));
-	/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
-	memset((char *)stats64 + sizeof(*netdev_stats), 0,
-	       sizeof(*stats64) - sizeof(*netdev_stats));
-#else
-	size_t i, n = sizeof(*netdev_stats) / sizeof(unsigned long);
-	const unsigned long *src = (const unsigned long *)netdev_stats;
+	size_t i, n = sizeof(*netdev_stats) / sizeof(atomic_long_t);
+	const atomic_long_t *src = (atomic_long_t *)netdev_stats;
 	u64 *dst = (u64 *)stats64;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(n > sizeof(*stats64) / sizeof(u64));
 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
-		dst[i] = src[i];
+		dst[i] = atomic_long_read(&src[i]);
 	/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
 	memset((char *)stats64 + n * sizeof(u64), 0,
 	       sizeof(*stats64) - n * sizeof(u64));
-#endif
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(netdev_stats_to_stats64);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#521 lore raw

PATCH 521/783 mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Schspa Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab0377803dafc58f1e22296708c1c28e309414d6 ]

The caller of del_timer_sync must prevent restarting of the timer, If we have no this synchronization, there is a small probability that the cancellation will not be successful.

And syzbot report the fellowing crash:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605

Write at addr f9ff000024df6058 by task syz-fuzzer/2256 Pointer tag: [f9], memory tag: [fe]

CPU: 1 PID: 2256 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00008-
ge01d50cbd6ee #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 dump_backtrace arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:162 [inline]
 show_stack+0x18/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
 print_report+0x1a8/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0x94/0xb4 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 __do_kernel_fault+0x164/0x1e0 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:320
 do_bad_area arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:473 [inline]
 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x8c arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:749
 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:825
 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xd8/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:427
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:576
 hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
 enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605
 mod_timer+0x14/0x20 kernel/time/timer.c:1161
 mrp_periodic_timer_arm net/802/mrp.c:614 [inline]
 mrp_periodic_timer+0xa0/0xc0 net/802/mrp.c:627
 call_timer_fn.constprop.0+0x24/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
 expire_timers+0x98/0xc4 kernel/time/timer.c:1519

To fix it, we can introduce a new active flags to make sure the timer will not restart.

Reported-by [email protected]
---
 include/net/mrp.h |  1 +
 net/802/mrp.c     | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/net/mrp.h +1 -0
index 1c308c034e1a..a8102661fd61 100644
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct mrp_applicant {
 	struct sk_buff		*pdu;
 	struct rb_root		mad;
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	bool			active;
 };
 
 struct mrp_port {
net/802/mrp.c +13 -5
index 35e04cc5390c..c10a432a5b43 100644
@@ -606,7 +606,10 @@ static void mrp_join_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 
 	mrp_queue_xmit(app);
-	mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_lock(&app->lock);
+	if (likely(app->active))
+		mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 }
 
 static void mrp_periodic_timer_arm(struct mrp_applicant *app)
@@ -620,11 +623,12 @@ static void mrp_periodic_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	struct mrp_applicant *app = from_timer(app, t, periodic_timer);
 
 	spin_lock(&app->lock);
-	mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
-	mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+	if (likely(app->active)) {
+		mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
+		mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+		mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
-
-	mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
 }
 
 static int mrp_pdu_parse_end_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, int *offset)
@@ -872,6 +876,7 @@ int mrp_init_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 	app->dev = dev;
 	app->app = appl;
 	app->mad = RB_ROOT;
+	app->active = true;
 	spin_lock_init(&app->lock);
 	skb_queue_head_init(&app->queue);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(dev->mrp_port->applicants[appl->type], app);
@@ -900,6 +905,9 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(port->applicants[appl->type], NULL);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
+	app->active = false;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 	/* Delete timer and generate a final TX event to flush out
 	 * all pending messages before the applicant is gone.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#522 lore raw

PATCH 522/783 ppp: associate skb with a device at tx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f225444467b98579cf28d94f4ad053460dfdb84 ]

Syzkaller triggered flow dissector warning with the following:

r0 = openat$ppp(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0xc0802, 0x0)
ioctl$PPPIOCNEWUNIT(r0, 0xc004743e, &(0x7f00000000c0))
ioctl$PPPIOCSACTIVE(r0, 0x40107446, &(0x7f0000000240)={0x2, &(0x7f0000000180)=[{0x20, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff034}, {0x6}]}) pwritev(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)=[{&(0x7f0000000140)='\x00!', 0x2}], 0x1, 0x0, 0x0)

[    9.485814] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 329 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1016 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1ee0/0x1fa0
[    9.485929]  skb_get_poff+0x53/0xa0
[    9.485937]  bpf_skb_get_pay_offset+0xe/0x20
[    9.485944]  ? ppp_send_frame+0xc2/0x5b0
[    9.485949]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[    9.485958]  ? __ppp_xmit_process+0x7a/0xe0
[    9.485968]  ? ppp_xmit_process+0x5b/0xb0
[    9.485974]  ? ppp_write+0x12a/0x190
[    9.485981]  ? do_iter_write+0x18e/0x2d0
[    9.485987]  ? __import_iovec+0x30/0x130
[    9.485997]  ? do_pwritev+0x1b6/0x240
[    9.486016]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x47/0x50
[    9.486023]  ? __x64_sys_pwritev+0x24/0x30
[    9.486026]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[    9.486031]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Flow dissector tries to find skb net namespace either via device or via socket. Neigher is set in ppp_send_frame, so let's manually use ppp->dev.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +2 -0
index 2b9815ec4a62..b825c6a9b6dd 100644
@@ -1610,6 +1610,8 @@ ppp_send_frame(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int len;
 	unsigned char *cp;
 
+	skb->dev = ppp->dev;
+
 	if (proto < 0x8000) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER
 		/* check if we should pass this packet */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#523 lore raw

PATCH 523/783 bpf: Prevent decl_tag from being referenced in func_proto arg

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f17472d4599697d701aa239b4c475a506bccfd19 ]

Syzkaller managed to hit another decl_tag issue:

  btf_func_proto_check kernel/bpf/btf.c:4506 [inline]
  btf_check_all_types kernel/bpf/btf.c:4734 [inline]
  btf_parse_type_sec+0x1175/0x1980 kernel/bpf/btf.c:4763
  btf_parse kernel/bpf/btf.c:5042 [inline]
  btf_new_fd+0x65a/0xb00 kernel/bpf/btf.c:6709
  bpf_btf_load+0x6f/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4342
  __sys_bpf+0x50a/0x6c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5034
  __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5093 [inline]
  __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091 [inline]
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091
  do_syscall_64+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48

This seems similar to commit ea68376c8bed ("bpf: prevent decl_tag from being referenced in func_proto") but for the argument.

---
 kernel/bpf/btf.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/btf.c +5 -0
index 9232938e3f96..52e704860739 100644
@@ -3675,6 +3675,11 @@ static int btf_func_proto_check(struct btf_verifier_env *env,
 			break;
 		}
 
+		if (btf_type_is_resolve_source_only(arg_type)) {
+			btf_verifier_log_type(env, t, "Invalid arg#%u", i + 1);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		if (args[i].name_off &&
 		    (!btf_name_offset_valid(btf, args[i].name_off) ||
 		     !btf_name_valid_identifier(btf, args[i].name_off))) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#524 lore raw

PATCH 524/783 ethtool: avoiding integer overflow in ethtool_phys_id()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Maxim Korotkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 64a8f8f7127da228d59a39e2c5e75f86590f90b4 ]

The value of an arithmetic expression "n * id.data" is subject to possible overflow due to a failure to cast operands to a larger data type before performing arithmetic. Used macro for multiplication instead operator for avoiding overflow.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ethtool/ioctl.c +2 -1
index 80d2a00d3097..47c2dd4a9b9f 100644
@@ -1966,7 +1966,8 @@ static int ethtool_phys_id(struct net_device *dev, void __user *useraddr)
 	} else {
 		/* Driver expects to be called at twice the frequency in rc */
 		int n = rc * 2, interval = HZ / n;
-		u64 count = n * id.data, i = 0;
+		u64 count = mul_u32_u32(n, id.data);
+		u64 i = 0;
 
 		do {
 			rtnl_lock();
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#525 lore raw

PATCH 525/783 media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a15fe8d9f1bf460a804bcf18a890bfd2cf0d5caa ]

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c +1 -0
index da0ff7b44da4..68b92b4419cf 100644
@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ static int bcm3510_download_firmware(struct dvb_frontend* fe)
 		deb_info("firmware chunk, addr: 0x%04x, len: 0x%04x, total length: 0x%04zx\n",addr,len,fw->size);
 		if ((ret = bcm3510_write_ram(st,addr,&b[i+4],len)) < 0) {
 			err("firmware download failed: %d\n",ret);
+			release_firmware(fw);
 			return ret;
 		}
 		i += 4 + len;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#526 lore raw

PATCH 526/783 media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0fc044b2b5e2d05a1fa1fb0d7f270367a7855d79 ]

dvb_unregister_device() is known that prone to use-after-free. That is, the cleanup from dvb_unregister_device() releases the dvb_device even if there are pointers stored in file->private_data still refer to it.

This patch adds a reference counter into struct dvb_device and delays its deallocation until no pointer refers to the object.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c |  2 +-
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c   |  2 +-
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c         | 32 +++++++++++++++++++------
 include/media/dvbdev.h                  | 31 +++++++++++++-----------
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c +1 -1
index cfc27629444f..fd476536d32e 100644
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void dvb_ca_private_free(struct dvb_ca_private *ca)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	dvb_free_device(ca->dvbdev);
+	dvb_device_put(ca->dvbdev);
 	for (i = 0; i < ca->slot_count; i++)
 		vfree(ca->slot_info[i].rx_buffer.data);
 
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c +1 -1
index b28ea7204f23..b04638321b75 100644
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static void __dvb_frontend_free(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 	struct dvb_frontend_private *fepriv = fe->frontend_priv;
 
 	if (fepriv)
-		dvb_free_device(fepriv->dvbdev);
+		dvb_device_put(fepriv->dvbdev);
 
 	dvb_frontend_invoke_release(fe, fe->ops.release);
 
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +25 -7
index ec9ebff28552..7b28b483e4b2 100644
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int dvb_device_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		new_fops = fops_get(dvbdev->fops);
 		if (!new_fops)
 			goto fail;
-		file->private_data = dvbdev;
+		file->private_data = dvb_device_get(dvbdev);
 		replace_fops(file, new_fops);
 		if (file->f_op->open)
 			err = file->f_op->open(inode, file);
@@ -171,6 +171,9 @@ int dvb_generic_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	}
 
 	dvbdev->users++;
+
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_generic_release);
@@ -487,6 +490,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	memcpy(dvbdev, template, sizeof(struct dvb_device));
 	dvbdev->type = type;
 	dvbdev->id = id;
@@ -517,7 +521,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 #endif
 
 	dvbdev->minor = minor;
-	dvb_minors[minor] = dvbdev;
+	dvb_minors[minor] = dvb_device_get(dvbdev);
 	up_write(&minor_rwsem);
 
 	ret = dvb_register_media_device(dvbdev, type, minor, demux_sink_pads);
@@ -557,6 +561,7 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 
 	down_write(&minor_rwsem);
 	dvb_minors[dvbdev->minor] = NULL;
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
 	up_write(&minor_rwsem);
 
 	dvb_media_device_free(dvbdev);
@@ -568,21 +573,34 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_remove_device);
 
 
-void dvb_free_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+static void dvb_free_device(struct kref *ref)
 {
-	if (!dvbdev)
-		return;
+	struct dvb_device *dvbdev = container_of(ref, struct dvb_device, ref);
 
 	kfree (dvbdev->fops);
 	kfree (dvbdev);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_free_device);
+
+
+struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+{
+	kref_get(&dvbdev->ref);
+	return dvbdev;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_device_get);
+
+
+void dvb_device_put(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+{
+	if (dvbdev)
+		kref_put(&dvbdev->ref, dvb_free_device);
+}
 
 
 void dvb_unregister_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 {
 	dvb_remove_device(dvbdev);
-	dvb_free_device(dvbdev);
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_unregister_device);
 
include/media/dvbdev.h +17 -14
index e547cbeee431..6e736587aa1f 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ struct dvb_adapter {
  */
 struct dvb_device {
 	struct list_head list_head;
+	struct kref ref;
 	const struct file_operations *fops;
 	struct dvb_adapter *adapter;
 	enum dvb_device_type type;
@@ -187,6 +188,20 @@ struct dvb_device {
 	void *priv;
 };
 
+/**
+ * dvb_device_get - Increase dvb_device reference
+ *
+ * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
+ */
+struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
+
+/**
+ * dvb_device_get - Decrease dvb_device reference
+ *
+ * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
+ */
+void dvb_device_put(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
+
 /**
  * dvb_register_adapter - Registers a new DVB adapter
  *
@@ -231,29 +246,17 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap,
 /**
  * dvb_remove_device - Remove a registered DVB device
  *
- * This does not free memory.  To do that, call dvb_free_device().
+ * This does not free memory. dvb_free_device() will do that when
+ * reference counter is empty
  *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
 void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
-/**
- * dvb_free_device - Free memory occupied by a DVB device.
- *
- * Call dvb_unregister_device() before calling this function.
- *
- * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
- */
-void dvb_free_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
 /**
  * dvb_unregister_device - Unregisters a DVB device
  *
- * This is a combination of dvb_remove_device() and dvb_free_device().
- * Using this function is usually a mistake, and is often an indicator
- * for a use-after-free bug (when a userspace process keeps a file
- * handle to a detached device).
- *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
 void dvb_unregister_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#527 lore raw

PATCH 527/783 media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mazin Al Haddad <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 94d90fb06b94a90c176270d38861bcba34ce377d ]

Syzbot reports a memory leak in "dvb_usb_adapter_init()". The leak is due to not accounting for and freeing current iteration's adapter->priv in case of an error. Currently if an error occurs, it will exit before incrementing "num_adapters_initalized", which is used as a reference counter to free all adap->priv in "dvb_usb_adapter_exit()". There are multiple error paths that can exit from before incrementing the counter. Including the error handling paths for "dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init()", "dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init()" and "dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init()" within "dvb_usb_adapter_init()".

This means that in case of an error in any of these functions the current iteration is not accounted for and the current iteration's adap->priv is not freed.

Fix this by freeing the current iteration's adap->priv in the "stream_init_err:" label in the error path. The rest of the (accounted for) adap->priv objects are freed in dvb_usb_adapter_exit() as expected using the num_adapters_initalized variable.

Syzbot report:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881172f1a00 (size 512):
  comm "kworker/0:2", pid 139, jiffies 4294994873 (age 10.960s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
backtrace:
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:75 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:184 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_device_init.cold+0x4e5/0x79e drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:308
    [<ffffffff830db21d>] dib0700_probe+0x8d/0x1b0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dib0700_core.c:883
    [<ffffffff82d3fdc7>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
    [<ffffffff8274af6a>] driver_probe_device+0x2a/0x120 drivers/base/dd.c:782
    [<ffffffff8274b786>] __device_attach_driver+0xf6/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:899
    [<ffffffff82747c87>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:427
    [<ffffffff8274b352>] __device_attach+0x122/0x260 drivers/base/dd.c:970
    [<ffffffff827498f6>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
    [<ffffffff82745cdb>] device_add+0x5fb/0xdf0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
    [<ffffffff82d3d202>] usb_set_configuration+0x8f2/0xb80 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
    [<ffffffff82d4dbfc>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
    [<ffffffff82d3f49c>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c +3 -1
index 61439c8f33ca..58eea8ab5477 100644
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init(adap);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			goto stream_init_err;
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init(adap, adapter_nrs);
 		if (ret)
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 	dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_exit(adap);
 dvb_init_err:
 	dvb_usb_adapter_stream_exit(adap);
+stream_init_err:
+	kfree(adap->priv);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#528 lore raw

PATCH 528/783 blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register hctx failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b7a21c57b14fbcd0e1729150189e5933f5088e9 ]

There's issue as follows when do fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888132a9f400 (size 512):
comm "insmod", pid 308021, jiffies 4324277909 (age 509.733s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff  ...........2....
    08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...2............
  backtrace:
    [<00000000e8952bb4>] kmalloc_node_trace+0x22/0xa0
    [<00000000f9980e0f>] blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x3f1/0x7e0
    [<000000002e719efa>] blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x1e6/0x230
    [<000000004f1fda40>] blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x27e/0x910
    [<00000000287123ec>] __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x67/0xf0
    [<00000000a2a34657>] 0xffffffffa2ad310f
    [<00000000b173f718>] 0xffffffffa2af824a
    [<0000000095a1dabb>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
    [<00000000f32fdf93>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
    [<00000000cbe8541e>] load_module+0x3006/0x3390
    [<0000000069ed1bdb>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
    [<00000000a1a29ae8>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
    [<000000009cd878b0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Fault injection context as follows:
kobject_add
blk_mq_register_hctx
blk_mq_sysfs_register
blk_register_queue
device_add_disk
null_add_dev.part.0 [null_blk]

As 'blk_mq_register_hctx' may already add some objects when failed halfway, but there isn't do fallback, caller don't know which objects add failed. To solve above issue just do fallback when add objects failed halfway in 'blk_mq_register_hctx'.

---
 block/blk-mq-sysfs.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
block/blk-mq-sysfs.c +9 -2
index 7b52e7657b2d..f0bc3398f3ed 100644
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 {
 	struct request_queue *q = hctx->queue;
 	struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
-	int i, ret;
+	int i, j, ret;
 
 	if (!hctx->nr_ctx)
 		return 0;
@@ -254,9 +254,16 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, i) {
 		ret = kobject_add(&ctx->kobj, &hctx->kobj, "cpu%u", ctx->cpu);
 		if (ret)
-			break;
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	return 0;
+out:
+	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, j) {
+		if (j < i)
+			kobject_del(&ctx->kobj);
+	}
+	kobject_del(&hctx->kobj);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#529 lore raw

PATCH 529/783 libbpf: Avoid enum forward-declarations in public API in C++ mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b42693415b86f608049cf1b4870adc1dc65e58b0 ]

C++ enum forward declarations are fundamentally not compatible with pure C enum definitions, and so libbpf's use of enum bpf_stats_type; forward declaration in libbpf/bpf.h public API header is causing C++ compilation issues.

More details can be found in [0], but it comes down to C++ supporting enum forward declaration only with explicitly specified backing type:

enum bpf_stats_type: int;

In C (and I believe it's a GCC extension also), such forward declaration is simply:

enum bpf_stats_type;

Further, in Linux UAPI this enum is defined in pure C way:

enum bpf_stats_type { BPF_STATS_RUN_TIME = 0; }

And even though in both cases backing type is int, which can be confirmed by looking at DWARF information, for C++ compiler actual enum definition and forward declaration are incompatible.

To eliminate this problem, for C++ mode define input argument as int, which makes enum unnecessary in libbpf public header. This solves the issue and as demonstrated by next patch doesn't cause any unwanted compiler warnings, at least with default warnings setting.

[0] https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42766839/c11-enum-forward-causes-underlying-type-mismatch
[1] Closes: https://github.com/libbpf/libbpf/issues/249

---
 tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h +7 -0
index 875dde20d56e..92a3eaa154dd 100644
@@ -241,8 +241,15 @@ LIBBPF_API int bpf_task_fd_query(int pid, int fd, __u32 flags, char *buf,
 				 __u32 *buf_len, __u32 *prog_id, __u32 *fd_type,
 				 __u64 *probe_offset, __u64 *probe_addr);
 
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+/* forward-declaring enums in C++ isn't compatible with pure C enums, so
+ * instead define bpf_enable_stats() as accepting int as an input
+ */
+LIBBPF_API int bpf_enable_stats(int type);
+#else
 enum bpf_stats_type; /* defined in up-to-date linux/bpf.h */
 LIBBPF_API int bpf_enable_stats(enum bpf_stats_type type);
+#endif
 
 struct bpf_prog_bind_opts {
 	size_t sz; /* size of this struct for forward/backward compatibility */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#530 lore raw

PATCH 530/783 regulator: core: fix use_count leakage when handling boot-on

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rui Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0591b14ce0398125439c759f889647369aa616a0 ]

I found a use_count leakage towards supply regulator of rdev with boot-on option.

┌───────────────────┐           ┌───────────────────┐
│  regulator_dev A  │           │  regulator_dev B  │
│     (boot-on)     │           │     (boot-on)     │
│    use_count=0    │◀──supply──│    use_count=1    │
│                   │           │                   │
└───────────────────┘           └───────────────────┘

In case of rdev(A) configured with `regulator-boot-on', the use_count of supplying regulator(B) will increment inside regulator_enable(rdev->supply).

Thus, B will acts like always-on, and further balanced regulator_enable/disable cannot actually disable it anymore.

However, B was also configured with `regulator-boot-on', we wish it could be disabled afterwards.

---
 drivers/regulator/core.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/core.c +7 -1
index 4472c31b9b00..df746ba5c1bc 100644
@@ -1428,7 +1428,13 @@ static int set_machine_constraints(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
 		if (rdev->supply_name && !rdev->supply)
 			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 
-		if (rdev->supply) {
+		/* If supplying regulator has already been enabled,
+		 * it's not intended to have use_count increment
+		 * when rdev is only boot-on.
+		 */
+		if (rdev->supply &&
+		    (rdev->constraints->always_on ||
+		     !regulator_is_enabled(rdev->supply))) {
 			ret = regulator_enable(rdev->supply);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				_regulator_put(rdev->supply);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#531 lore raw

PATCH 531/783 mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aae9d3a440736691b3c1cb09ae2c32c4f1ee2e67 ]

There is a case where the timeout clock is not supplied to the capability. Add a quirk for that.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c +3 -0
index 3f5977979cf2..6c4f43e11282 100644
@@ -168,6 +168,9 @@ static int sdhci_f_sdh30_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (reg & SDHCI_CAN_DO_8BIT)
 		priv->vendor_hs200 = F_SDH30_EMMC_HS200;
 
+	if (!(reg & SDHCI_TIMEOUT_CLK_MASK))
+		host->quirks |= SDHCI_QUIRK_DATA_TIMEOUT_USES_SDCLK;
+
 	ret = sdhci_add_host(host);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_add_host;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#532 lore raw

PATCH 532/783 mmc: renesas_sdhi: better reset from HS400 mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0da69dd2155019ed4c444ede0e79ce7a4a6af627 ]

Up to now, HS400 adjustment mode was only disabled on soft reset when a calibration table was in use. It is safer, though, to disable it as soon as the instance has an adjustment related quirk set, i.e. bad taps or a calibration table.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c +1 -1
index ac01fb518386..a49b8fe2a098 100644
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static void renesas_sdhi_reset_hs400_mode(struct tmio_mmc_host *host,
 			 SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_TMPPORT2_HS400OSEL) &
 			sd_scc_read32(host, priv, SH_MOBILE_SDHI_SCC_TMPPORT2));
 
-	if (priv->adjust_hs400_calib_table)
+	if (priv->quirks && (priv->quirks->hs400_calib_table || priv->quirks->hs400_bad_taps))
 		renesas_sdhi_adjust_hs400_mode_disable(host);
 
 	sd_ctrl_write16(host, CTL_SD_CARD_CLK_CTL, CLK_CTL_SCLKEN |
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#533 lore raw

PATCH 533/783 media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d21e0b1b41b21d628bf2afce777727bd4479aa5 ]

syzbot reported use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback() [1]. This indicates that urb->context, which contains struct si470x_device object, is freed when si470x_int_in_callback() is called.

The cause of this issue is that si470x_int_in_callback() is called for freed urb.

si470x_usb_driver_probe() calls si470x_start_usb(), which then calls usb_submit_urb() and si470x_start(). If si470x_start_usb() fails, si470x_usb_driver_probe() doesn't kill urb, but it just frees struct si470x_device object, as depicted below:

si470x_usb_driver_probe()
...
si470x_start_usb()

    ...
    usb_submit_urb()
    retval = si470x_start()
    return retval
  if (retval < 0)
    free struct si470x_device object, but don't kill urb

This patch fixes this issue by killing urb when si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is submitted. If si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is not submitted, i.e. submitting usb fails, it just frees struct si470x_device object.

---
 drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c +3 -1
index 3f8634a46573..1365ae732b79 100644
@@ -733,8 +733,10 @@ static int si470x_usb_driver_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 
 	/* start radio */
 	retval = si470x_start_usb(radio);
-	if (retval < 0)
+	if (retval < 0 && !radio->int_in_running)
 		goto err_buf;
+	else if (retval < 0)	/* in case of radio->int_in_running == 1 */
+		goto err_all;
 
 	/* set initial frequency */
 	si470x_set_freq(radio, 87.5 * FREQ_MUL); /* available in all regions */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#534 lore raw

PATCH 534/783 clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cfd3ffb36f0d566846163118651d868e607300ba ]

If st_clk_register_quadfs_pll() fails, @lock should be freed before goto @err_exit, otherwise will cause meory leak issue, fix it.

---
 drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c +3 -2
index f1adc858b590..0e58a7cda427 100644
@@ -942,9 +942,10 @@ static void __init st_of_quadfs_setup(struct device_node *np,
 
 	clk = st_clk_register_quadfs_pll(pll_name, clk_parent_name, data,
 			reg, lock);
-	if (IS_ERR(clk))
+	if (IS_ERR(clk)) {
+		kfree(lock);
 		goto err_exit;
-	else
+	} else
 		pr_debug("%s: parent %s rate %u\n",
 			__clk_get_name(clk),
 			__clk_get_name(clk_get_parent(clk)),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#535 lore raw

PATCH 535/783 hugetlbfs: fix null-ptr-deref in hugetlbfs_parse_param()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hawkins Jiawei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 26215b7ee923b9251f7bb12c4e5f09dc465d35f2 ]

Syzkaller reports a null-ptr-deref bug as follows:
======================================================

KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:hugetlbfs_parse_param+0x1dd/0x8e0 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:1380
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 vfs_parse_fs_param fs/fs_context.c:148 [inline]
 vfs_parse_fs_param+0x1f9/0x3c0 fs/fs_context.c:129
 vfs_parse_fs_string+0xdb/0x170 fs/fs_context.c:191
 generic_parse_monolithic+0x16f/0x1f0 fs/fs_context.c:231
 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3036 [inline]
 path_mount+0x12de/0x1e20 fs/namespace.c:3370
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
 __x64_sys_mount+0x27f/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 [...]
 </TASK>
======================================================

According to commit "vfs: parse: deal with zero length string value", kernel will set the param->string to null pointer in vfs_parse_fs_string() if fs string has zero length.

Yet the problem is that, hugetlbfs_parse_param() will dereference the param->string, without checking whether it is a null pointer. To be more specific, if hugetlbfs_parse_param() parses an illegal mount parameter, such as "size=,", kernel will constructs struct fs_parameter with null pointer in vfs_parse_fs_string(), then passes this struct fs_parameter to hugetlbfs_parse_param(), which triggers the above null-ptr-deref bug.

This patch solves it by adding sanity check on param->string in hugetlbfs_parse_param().

---
 fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +3 -3
index a2f43f1a85f8..5181e6d4e18c 100644
@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *par
 
 	case Opt_size:
 		/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
-		if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+		if (!param->string || !isdigit(param->string[0]))
 			goto bad_val;
 		ctx->max_size_opt = memparse(param->string, &rest);
 		ctx->max_val_type = SIZE_STD;
@@ -1271,7 +1271,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *par
 
 	case Opt_nr_inodes:
 		/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
-		if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+		if (!param->string || !isdigit(param->string[0]))
 			goto bad_val;
 		ctx->nr_inodes = memparse(param->string, &rest);
 		return 0;
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static int hugetlbfs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *par
 
 	case Opt_min_size:
 		/* memparse() will accept a K/M/G without a digit */
-		if (!isdigit(param->string[0]))
+		if (!param->string || !isdigit(param->string[0]))
 			goto bad_val;
 		ctx->min_size_opt = memparse(param->string, &rest);
 		ctx->min_val_type = SIZE_STD;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#536 lore raw

PATCH 536/783 drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96d845a67b7e406cfed7880a724c8ca6121e022e ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c:74:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c +3 -2
index 4d4a715b429d..2c2b92324a2e 100644
@@ -60,8 +60,9 @@ static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	return drm_panel_get_modes(fsl_connector->panel, connector);
 }
 
-static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					    struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+				 struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	if (mode->hdisplay & 0xf)
 		return MODE_ERROR;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#537 lore raw

PATCH 537/783 drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0ad811cc08a937d875cbad0149c1bab17f84ba05 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c:637:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hda_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c:376:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c:1035:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +3 -2
index b0676a73a1d7..11225ac213e1 100644
@@ -346,8 +346,9 @@ static int sti_dvo_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +3 -2
index 84109800143a..418dfccc2faf 100644
@@ -600,8 +600,9 @@ static int sti_hda_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +3 -2
index 412664dfb0b0..1bcee73f5114 100644
@@ -997,8 +997,9 @@ static int sti_hdmi_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			      struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#538 lore raw

PATCH 538/783 orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d23417a5bf3a3afc55de5442eb46e1e60458b0a1 ]

When insert and remove the orangefs module, then debug_help_string will be leaked:

unreferenced object 0xffff8881652ba000 (size 4096):

    comm "insmod", pid 1701, jiffies 4294893639 (age 13218.530s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      43 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 44 65 62 75 67 20 4b 65 79  Client Debug Key
      77 6f 72 64 73 20 61 72 65 20 75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77  words are unknow
    backtrace:
      [<0000000004e6f8e3>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
      [<0000000006f75d85>] orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string+0x5e/0x480 [orangefs]
      [<0000000091270a2a>] _sub_I_65535_1+0x57/0xf70 [crc_itu_t]
      [<000000004b1ee1a3>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
      [<000000001d0614ae>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
      [<00000000efef068c>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
      [<000000006533b44d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
      [<00000000a0da6f99>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
      [<000000007790b19b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

When remove the module, should always free debug_help_string. Should always free the allocated buffer when change the free_debug_help_string.

---
 fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -0
index 29eaa4544372..a848b6ef9599 100644
@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ static void orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)
 void orangefs_debugfs_cleanup(void)
 {
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(debug_dir);
+	kfree(debug_help_string);
+	debug_help_string = NULL;
 }
 
 /* open ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_HELP_FILE */
@@ -671,6 +673,7 @@ int orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string(int at_boot)
 		memset(debug_help_string, 0, DEBUG_HELP_STRING_SIZE);
 		strlcat(debug_help_string, new, string_size);
 		mutex_unlock(&orangefs_help_file_lock);
+		kfree(new);
 	}
 
 	rc = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#539 lore raw

PATCH 539/783 orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_{kernel,client}_debug_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 31720a2b109b3080eb77e97b8f6f50a27b4ae599 ]

When insert and remove the orangefs module, there are memory leaked as below:

unreferenced object 0xffff88816b0cc000 (size 2048):
comm "insmod", pid 783, jiffies 4294813439 (age 65.512s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    6e 6f 6e 65 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  none............
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<0000000031ab7788>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
    [<000000005b405fee>] orangefs_debugfs_init.cold+0xaf/0x17f
    [<00000000e5a0085b>] 0xffffffffa02780f9
    [<000000004232d9f7>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
    [<0000000054f22384>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
    [<000000003263bdea>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
    [<0000000052cd4153>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
    [<00000000250ae02b>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
    [<00000000f11c03c7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Use the golbal variable as the buffer rather than dynamic allocate to slove the problem.

---
 fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 26 +++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -23
index a848b6ef9599..1b508f543384 100644
@@ -194,15 +194,10 @@ void orangefs_debugfs_init(int debug_mask)
  */
 static void orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)
 {
-	int rc = -ENOMEM;
-	char *k_buffer = NULL;
+	static char k_buffer[ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN] = { };
 
 	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DEBUGFS_DEBUG, "%s: start\n", __func__);
 
-	k_buffer = kzalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!k_buffer)
-		goto out;
-
 	if (strlen(kernel_debug_string) + 1 < ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN) {
 		strcpy(k_buffer, kernel_debug_string);
 		strcat(k_buffer, "\n");
@@ -213,9 +208,6 @@ static void orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)
 
 	debugfs_create_file(ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_FILE, 0444, debug_dir, k_buffer,
 			    &kernel_debug_fops);
-
-out:
-	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DEBUGFS_DEBUG, "%s: rc:%d:\n", __func__, rc);
 }
 
 
@@ -299,18 +291,13 @@ static int help_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 /*
  * initialize the client-debug file.
  */
-static int orangefs_client_debug_init(void)
+static void orangefs_client_debug_init(void)
 {
 
-	int rc = -ENOMEM;
-	char *c_buffer = NULL;
+	static char c_buffer[ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN] = { };
 
 	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DEBUGFS_DEBUG, "%s: start\n", __func__);
 
-	c_buffer = kzalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!c_buffer)
-		goto out;
-
 	if (strlen(client_debug_string) + 1 < ORANGEFS_MAX_DEBUG_STRING_LEN) {
 		strcpy(c_buffer, client_debug_string);
 		strcat(c_buffer, "\n");
@@ -324,13 +311,6 @@ static int orangefs_client_debug_init(void)
 						  debug_dir,
 						  c_buffer,
 						  &kernel_debug_fops);
-
-	rc = 0;
-
-out:
-
-	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DEBUGFS_DEBUG, "%s: rc:%d:\n", __func__, rc);
-	return rc;
 }
 
 /* open ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_FILE or ORANGEFS_CLIENT_DEBUG_FILE.*/
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#540 lore raw

PATCH 540/783 hwmon: (jc42) Fix missing unlock on error in jc42_write()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b744db17abf6a2efc2bfa80870cc88e9799a8ccc ]

Add the missing unlock before return from function jc42_write() in the error handling case.

---
 drivers/hwmon/jc42.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hwmon/jc42.c +1 -1
index 5240bfdfcf2e..52f341d46029 100644
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static int jc42_write(struct device *dev, enum hwmon_sensor_types type,
 		ret = regmap_read(data->regmap, JC42_REG_TEMP_CRITICAL,
 				  &regval);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			break;
 
 		/*
 		 * JC42.4 compliant chips only support four hysteresis values.
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#541 lore raw

PATCH 541/783 ALSA/ASoC: hda: move/rename snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams to hdac_stream.c

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 12054f0ce8be7d2003ec068ab27c9eb608397b98 ]

snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams() has really nothing to do with the extension, it just loops over the bus streams.

Move it to the hdac_stream layer and rename to remove the 'ext' prefix and add the precision that the chip will also be stopped.

Stable-dep-of: 171107237246 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix driver hang during shutdown")

---
 include/sound/hdaudio.h         |  1 +
 include/sound/hdaudio_ext.h     |  1 -
 sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_stream.c | 17 -----------------
 sound/hda/hdac_stream.c         | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl.c   |  4 ++--
 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
include/sound/hdaudio.h +1 -0
index 6eed61e6cf8a..63edae565573 100644
@@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ int snd_hdac_stream_set_params(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev,
 void snd_hdac_stream_start(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev, bool fresh_start);
 void snd_hdac_stream_clear(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
 void snd_hdac_stream_stop(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
+void snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(struct hdac_bus *bus);
 void snd_hdac_stream_reset(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
 void snd_hdac_stream_sync_trigger(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev, bool set,
 				  unsigned int streams, unsigned int reg);
include/sound/hdaudio_ext.h +0 -1
index 75048ea178f6..ddcb5b2f0a8e 100644
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ void snd_hdac_ext_stream_decouple_locked(struct hdac_bus *bus,
 				  struct hdac_ext_stream *azx_dev, bool decouple);
 void snd_hdac_ext_stream_decouple(struct hdac_bus *bus,
 				struct hdac_ext_stream *azx_dev, bool decouple);
-void snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams(struct hdac_bus *bus);
 
 int snd_hdac_ext_stream_set_spib(struct hdac_bus *bus,
 				 struct hdac_ext_stream *stream, u32 value);
sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_stream.c +0 -17
index 1e6e4cf428cd..4276dae2e00a 100644
@@ -475,23 +475,6 @@ int snd_hdac_ext_stream_get_spbmaxfifo(struct hdac_bus *bus,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_ext_stream_get_spbmaxfifo);
 
-
-/**
- * snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams - stop all stream if running
- * @bus: HD-audio core bus
- */
-void snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams(struct hdac_bus *bus)
-{
-	struct hdac_stream *stream;
-
-	if (bus->chip_init) {
-		list_for_each_entry(stream, &bus->stream_list, list)
-			snd_hdac_stream_stop(stream);
-		snd_hdac_bus_stop_chip(bus);
-	}
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams);
-
 /**
  * snd_hdac_ext_stream_drsm_enable - enable DMA resume for a stream
  * @bus: HD-audio core bus
sound/hda/hdac_stream.c +16 -0
index ce77a5320163..f9f0ed3042a2 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,22 @@ void snd_hdac_stream_stop(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_stream_stop);
 
+/**
+ * snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip - stop all streams and chip if running
+ * @bus: HD-audio core bus
+ */
+void snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(struct hdac_bus *bus)
+{
+	struct hdac_stream *stream;
+
+	if (bus->chip_init) {
+		list_for_each_entry(stream, &bus->stream_list, list)
+			snd_hdac_stream_stop(stream);
+		snd_hdac_bus_stop_chip(bus);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip);
+
 /**
  * snd_hdac_stream_reset - reset a stream
  * @azx_dev: HD-audio core stream to reset
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl.c +2 -2
index 8b993722f74e..83b1eb70b40a 100644
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int skl_free(struct hdac_bus *bus)
 
 	skl->init_done = 0; /* to be sure */
 
-	snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams(bus);
+	snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(bus);
 
 	if (bus->irq >= 0)
 		free_irq(bus->irq, (void *)bus);
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ static void skl_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pci)
 	if (!skl->init_done)
 		return;
 
-	snd_hdac_ext_stop_streams(bus);
+	snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(bus);
 	list_for_each_entry(s, &bus->stream_list, list) {
 		stream = stream_to_hdac_ext_stream(s);
 		snd_hdac_ext_stream_decouple(bus, stream, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#542 lore raw

PATCH 542/783 ALSA: hda: add snd_hdac_stop_streams() helper

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Pierre-Louis Bossart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 24ad3835a6db4f8857975effa6bf47730371a5ff ]

Minor code reuse, no functionality change.

Stable-dep-of: 171107237246 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix driver hang during shutdown")

---
 include/sound/hdaudio.h        |  1 +
 sound/hda/hdac_stream.c        | 17 ++++++++++++++---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_controller.c |  4 +---
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/sound/hdaudio.h +1 -0
index 63edae565573..496decb63f80 100644
@@ -562,6 +562,7 @@ int snd_hdac_stream_set_params(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev,
 void snd_hdac_stream_start(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev, bool fresh_start);
 void snd_hdac_stream_clear(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
 void snd_hdac_stream_stop(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
+void snd_hdac_stop_streams(struct hdac_bus *bus);
 void snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(struct hdac_bus *bus);
 void snd_hdac_stream_reset(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev);
 void snd_hdac_stream_sync_trigger(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev, bool set,
sound/hda/hdac_stream.c +14 -3
index f9f0ed3042a2..1e0f61affd97 100644
@@ -142,17 +142,28 @@ void snd_hdac_stream_stop(struct hdac_stream *azx_dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_stream_stop);
 
+/**
+ * snd_hdac_stop_streams - stop all streams
+ * @bus: HD-audio core bus
+ */
+void snd_hdac_stop_streams(struct hdac_bus *bus)
+{
+	struct hdac_stream *stream;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(stream, &bus->stream_list, list)
+		snd_hdac_stream_stop(stream);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_hdac_stop_streams);
+
 /**
  * snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip - stop all streams and chip if running
  * @bus: HD-audio core bus
  */
 void snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(struct hdac_bus *bus)
 {
-	struct hdac_stream *stream;
 
 	if (bus->chip_init) {
-		list_for_each_entry(stream, &bus->stream_list, list)
-			snd_hdac_stream_stop(stream);
+		snd_hdac_stop_streams(bus);
 		snd_hdac_bus_stop_chip(bus);
 	}
 }
sound/pci/hda/hda_controller.c +1 -3
index 3de7dc34def2..ea76395d71d3 100644
@@ -1045,10 +1045,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(azx_init_chip);
 void azx_stop_all_streams(struct azx *chip)
 {
 	struct hdac_bus *bus = azx_bus(chip);
-	struct hdac_stream *s;
 
-	list_for_each_entry(s, &bus->stream_list, list)
-		snd_hdac_stream_stop(s);
+	snd_hdac_stop_streams(bus);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(azx_stop_all_streams);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#543 lore raw

PATCH 543/783 ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Fix driver hang during shutdown

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cezary Rojewski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 171107237246d66bce04f3769d33648f896b4ce3 ]

AudioDSP cores and HDAudio links need to be turned off on shutdown to ensure no communication or data transfer occurs during the procedure.

---
 sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/intel/skylake/skl.c +4 -1
index 83b1eb70b40a..2085e12dc611 100644
@@ -1100,7 +1100,10 @@ static void skl_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pci)
 	if (!skl->init_done)
 		return;
 
-	snd_hdac_stop_streams_and_chip(bus);
+	snd_hdac_stop_streams(bus);
+	snd_hdac_ext_bus_link_power_down_all(bus);
+	skl_dsp_sleep(skl->dsp);
+
 	list_for_each_entry(s, &bus->stream_list, list) {
 		stream = stream_to_hdac_ext_stream(s);
 		snd_hdac_ext_stream_decouple(bus, stream, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#544 lore raw

PATCH 544/783 ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3327d721114c109ba0575f86f8fda3b525404054 ]

The node returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented, of_node_put() needs be called when finish using it. So add it in the error path in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe().

Fixes 0d1d7a664288 ("ASoC: mediatek: Refine mt8173 driver and change config option")
---
 sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c +5 -2
index 390da5bf727e..9421b919d462 100644
@@ -200,14 +200,16 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dais[DAI_LINK_CODEC_I2S].codecs[0].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dais[DAI_LINK_CODEC_I2S].codecs[1].of_node =
 		of_parse_phandle(pdev->dev.of_node, "mediatek,audio-codec", 1);
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dais[DAI_LINK_CODEC_I2S].codecs[1].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codec_conf[0].dlc.of_node =
 		mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dais[DAI_LINK_CODEC_I2S].codecs[1].of_node;
@@ -219,6 +221,7 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s snd_soc_register_card fail %d\n",
 			__func__, ret);
 
+out:
 	of_node_put(platform_node);
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#545 lore raw

PATCH 545/783 ASoC: audio-graph-card: fix refcount leak of cpu_ep in __graph_for_each_link()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ab2d12c726f0fde0692fa5d81d8019b3dcd62d0 ]

The of_get_next_child() returns a node with refcount incremented, and decrements the refcount of prev. So in the error path of the while loop, of_node_put() needs be called for cpu_ep.

Fixes fce9b90c1ab7 ("ASoC: audio-graph-card: cleanup DAI link loop method - step2")
---
 sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/generic/audio-graph-card.c +3 -1
index bfbee2d716f3..84510ca0b8fd 100644
@@ -466,8 +466,10 @@ static int graph_for_each_link(struct asoc_simple_priv *priv,
 			of_node_put(codec_ep);
 			of_node_put(codec_port);
 
-			if (ret < 0)
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				of_node_put(cpu_ep);
 				return ret;
+			}
 
 			codec_port_old = codec_port;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#546 lore raw

PATCH 546/783 ASoC: rockchip: pdm: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef0a098efb36660326c133af9b5a04a96a00e3ca ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume().

Fixes fc05a5b22253 ("ASoC: rockchip: add support for pdm controller")
---
 sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c +1 -0
index 5adb293d0435..94cfbc90390b 100644
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ static int rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(pdm->hclk);
 	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(pdm->clk);
 		dev_err(pdm->dev, "hclock enable failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#547 lore raw

PATCH 547/783 ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9529dc167ffcdfd201b9f0eda71015f174095f7e ]

Fix this by dropping wm8994->accdet_lock while calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work) in wm1811_jackdet_irq().

Fixes c0cc3f166525 ("ASoC: wm8994: Allow a delay between jack insertion and microphone detect")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +5 -0
index f57884113406..d3a7480fda43 100644
@@ -3853,7 +3853,12 @@ static irqreturn_t wm1811_jackdet_irq(int irq, void *data)
 	} else {
 		dev_dbg(component->dev, "Jack not detected\n");
 
+		/* Release wm8994->accdet_lock to avoid deadlock:
+		 * cancel_delayed_work_sync() takes wm8994->mic_work internal
+		 * lock and wm1811_mic_work takes wm8994->accdet_lock */
+		mutex_unlock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work);
+		mutex_lock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 
 		snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, WM8958_MICBIAS2,
 				    WM8958_MICB2_DISCH, WM8958_MICB2_DISCH);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#548 lore raw

PATCH 548/783 ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d94d0090527b1763872275a7ccd44df7219b31e ]

rk_spdif_runtime_resume() may have called clk_prepare_enable() before return from failed branches, add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in this case.

Fixes f874b80e1571 ("ASoC: rockchip: Add rockchip SPDIF transceiver driver")
---
 sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c +1 -0
index 674810851fbc..ccddcd9926af 100644
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused rk_spdif_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(spdif->hclk);
 	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(spdif->mclk);
 		dev_err(spdif->dev, "hclk clock enable failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#549 lore raw

PATCH 549/783 ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c900dcc3f7331a67ed29739d74524e428d137fb ]

For some reason rt5670_i2c_probe() does a pm_runtime_put() at the end of a successful probe. But it has never done a pm_runtime_get() leading to the following error being logged into dmesg:

rt5670 i2c-10EC5640:00: Runtime PM usage count underflow!

Fix this by removing the unnecessary pm_runtime_put().

Fixes 64e89e5f5548 ("ASoC: rt5670: Add runtime PM support")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c +0 -2
index 47ce074289ca..58227602053f 100644
@@ -3192,8 +3192,6 @@ static int rt5670_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err;
 
-	pm_runtime_put(&i2c->dev);
-
 	return 0;
 err:
 	pm_runtime_disable(&i2c->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#550 lore raw

PATCH 550/783 LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1a17e5b513ceebf21100027745b8731b4728edf7 ]

LoadPin only enforces the read-only origin of kernel file reads. Whether or not it was a partial read isn't important. Remove the overly conservative checks so that things like partial firmware reads will succeed (i.e. reading a firmware header).

Fixes 2039bda1fa8d ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Cc Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc James Morris <[email protected]>
Cc "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]>
---
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
security/loadpin/loadpin.c +18 -12
index b12f7d986b1e..5fce105a372d 100644
@@ -118,21 +118,11 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
 	}
 }
 
-static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
-			     bool contents)
+static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
 {
 	struct super_block *load_root;
 	const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
 
-	/*
-	 * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents
-	 * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged
-	 * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were
-	 * no associated file struct.
-	 */
-	if (!contents)
-		file = NULL;
-
 	/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
 	if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
 	    ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
@@ -187,9 +177,25 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+			     bool contents)
+{
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available"
+	 * argument here.
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(file, id);
+}
+
 static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
 {
-	return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
+	/*
+	 * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its
+	 * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the
+	 * state of "contents".
+	 */
+	return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
 }
 
 static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#551 lore raw

PATCH 551/783 pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76d62f24db07f22ccf9bc18ca793c27d4ebef721 ]

Wei Wang reported seeing priority inversion caused latencies caused by contention on pmsg_lock, and suggested it be switched to a rt_mutex.

I was initially hesitant this would help, as the tasks in that trace all seemed to be SCHED_NORMAL, so the benefit would be limited to only nice boosting.

However, another similar issue was raised where the priority inversion was seen did involve a blocked RT task so it is clear this would be helpful in that case.

Cc Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Midas Chien<[email protected]>
Cc Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>
Cc Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Fixes 9d5438f462ab ("pstore: Add pmsg - user-space accessible pstore object")
---
 fs/pstore/pmsg.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/pstore/pmsg.c +4 -3
index d8542ec2f38c..18cf94b597e0 100644
@@ -7,9 +7,10 @@
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/rtmutex.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(pmsg_lock);
+static DEFINE_RT_MUTEX(pmsg_lock);
 
 static ssize_t write_pmsg(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -28,9 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t write_pmsg(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!access_ok(buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	mutex_lock(&pmsg_lock);
+	rt_mutex_lock(&pmsg_lock);
 	ret = psinfo->write_user(&record, buf);
-	mutex_unlock(&pmsg_lock);
+	rt_mutex_unlock(&pmsg_lock);
 	return ret ? ret : count;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#552 lore raw

PATCH 552/783 perf debug: Set debug_peo_args and redirect_to_stderr variable to correct values in perf_quiet_option()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 188ac720d364035008a54d249cf47b4cc100f819 ]

When perf uses quiet mode, perf_quiet_option() sets the 'debug_peo_args' variable to -1, and display_attr() incorrectly determines the value of 'debug_peo_args'. As a result, unexpected information is displayed.

Before:

  # perf record --quiet -- ls > /dev/null
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  perf_event_attr:
    size                             128
    { sample_period, sample_freq }   4000
    sample_type                      IP|TID|TIME|PERIOD
    read_format                      ID|LOST
    disabled                         1
    inherit                          1
    mmap                             1
    comm                             1
    freq                             1
    enable_on_exec                   1
    task                             1
    precise_ip                       3
    sample_id_all                    1
    exclude_guest                    1
    mmap2                            1
    comm_exec                        1
    ksymbol                          1
    bpf_event                        1
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  ...

After:

  # perf record --quiet -- ls > /dev/null
  #

redirect_to_stderr is a similar problem.

Fixes f78eaef0e0493f60 ("perf tools: Allow to force redirect pr_debug to stderr.")
Fixes ccd26741f5e6bdf2 ("perf tool: Provide an option to print perf_event_open args and return value")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Carsten Haitzler <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/debug.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/debug.c +4 -0
index 0af163abaa62..854dd3d2d8de 100644
@@ -207,6 +207,10 @@ int perf_quiet_option(void)
 		opt++;
 	}
 
+	/* For debug variables that are used as bool types, set to 0. */
+	redirect_to_stderr = 0;
+	debug_peo_args = 0;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#553 lore raw

PATCH 553/783 afs: Fix lost servers_outstanding count

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36f82c93ee0bd88f1c95a52537906b8178b537f1 ]

The afs_fs_probe_dispatcher() work function is passed a count on net->servers_outstanding when it is scheduled (which may come via its timer). This is passed back to the work_item, passed to the timer or dropped at the end of the dispatcher function.

But, at the top of the dispatcher function, there are two checks which skip the rest of the function: if the network namespace is being destroyed or if there are no fileservers to probe. These two return paths, however, do not drop the count passed to the dispatcher, and so, sometimes, the destruction of a network namespace, such as induced by rmmod of the kafs module, may get stuck in afs_purge_servers(), waiting for net->servers_outstanding to become zero.

Fix this by adding the missing decrements in afs_fs_probe_dispatcher().

---
 fs/afs/fs_probe.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/afs/fs_probe.c +4 -1
index 04d42e49fc59..def80365fe79 100644
@@ -360,12 +360,15 @@ void afs_fs_probe_dispatcher(struct work_struct *work)
 	unsigned long nowj, timer_at, poll_at;
 	bool first_pass = true, set_timer = false;
 
-	if (!net->live)
+	if (!net->live) {
+		afs_dec_servers_outstanding(net);
 		return;
+	}
 
 	_enter("");
 
 	if (list_empty(&net->fs_probe_fast) && list_empty(&net->fs_probe_slow)) {
+		afs_dec_servers_outstanding(net);
 		_leave(" [none]");
 		return;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#554 lore raw

PATCH 554/783 pstore: Make sure CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG selects CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f4fec5943407318b9523f01ce1f5d668c028332 ]

In commit 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion") I changed a lock to an rt_mutex.

However, its possible that CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES is not enabled, which then results in a build failure, as the 0day bot detected:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/

Thus this patch changes CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG to select CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES, which ensures the build will not fail.

Cc Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Midas Chien<[email protected]>
Cc Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>
Cc Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Fixes 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion")
---
 fs/pstore/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/pstore/Kconfig +1 -0
index 8efe60487b48..71dbe9a2533f 100644
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ config PSTORE_CONSOLE
 config PSTORE_PMSG
 	bool "Log user space messages"
 	depends on PSTORE
+	select RT_MUTEXES
 	help
 	  When the option is enabled, pstore will export a character
 	  interface /dev/pmsg0 to log user space messages. On reboot
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#555 lore raw

PATCH 555/783 ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d57378d3aa4d864d9e590482602068af1b20c0c5 ]

Currently ima_lsm_copy_rule() set the arg_p field of the source rule to NULL, so that the source rule could be freed afterward. It does not make sense for this behavior to be inside a "copy" function. So move it outside and let the caller handle this field.

ima_lsm_copy_rule() now produce a shallow copy of the original entry including args_p field. Meaning only the lsm.rule and the rule itself should be freed for the original rule. Thus, instead of calling ima_lsm_free_rule() which frees lsm.rule as well as args_p field, free the lsm.rule directly.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 10 +++-------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3 -7
index a83ce111cf50..96ecb7d25403 100644
@@ -370,12 +370,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
 		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
-		/*
-		 * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated
-		 * memory will not be freed during a later call to
-		 * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry).
-		 */
-		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
 
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
@@ -389,6 +383,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
+	int i;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 
 	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
@@ -403,7 +398,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * references and the entry itself. All other memory refrences will now
 	 * be owned by nentry.
 	 */
-	ima_lsm_free_rule(entry);
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
 	kfree(entry);
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#556 lore raw

PATCH 556/783 ALSA: usb-audio: add the quirk for KT0206 device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: wangdicheng <[email protected]>

commit 696b66ac26ef953aed5783ef26a252ec8f207013 upstream.

Add relevant information to the quirks-table.h file. The test passes and the sound source file plays normally.

---
 sound/usb/quirks-table.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/usb/quirks-table.h +2 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
 { USB_DEVICE_VENDOR_SPEC(0x041e, 0x3f0a) },
 /* E-Mu 0204 USB */
 { USB_DEVICE_VENDOR_SPEC(0x041e, 0x3f19) },
+/* Ktmicro Usb_audio device */
+{ USB_DEVICE_VENDOR_SPEC(0x31b2, 0x0011) },
 
 /*
  * Creative Technology, Ltd Live! Cam Sync HD [VF0770]
author maintainer
#557 lore raw

PATCH 557/783 ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Lenovo TianYi510Pro-14IOB

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Edward Pacman <[email protected]>

commit 4bf5bf54476dffe60e6b6d8d539f67309ff599e2 upstream.

Lenovo TianYi510Pro-14IOB (17aa:3742)
require quirk for enabling headset-mic

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +27 -0
@@ -10514,6 +10514,17 @@ static void alc897_fixup_lenovo_headset_
 	}
 }
 
+static void alc897_fixup_lenovo_headset_mode(struct hda_codec *codec,
+				     const struct hda_fixup *fix, int action)
+{
+	struct alc_spec *spec = codec->spec;
+
+	if (action == HDA_FIXUP_ACT_PRE_PROBE) {
+		spec->parse_flags |= HDA_PINCFG_HEADSET_MIC;
+		spec->gen.hp_automute_hook = alc897_hp_automute_hook;
+	}
+}
+
 static const struct coef_fw alc668_coefs[] = {
 	WRITE_COEF(0x01, 0xbebe), WRITE_COEF(0x02, 0xaaaa), WRITE_COEF(0x03,    0x0),
 	WRITE_COEF(0x04, 0x0180), WRITE_COEF(0x06,    0x0), WRITE_COEF(0x07, 0x0f80),
@@ -10597,6 +10608,8 @@ enum {
 	ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MIC,
 	ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN,
 	ALC897_FIXUP_HP_HSMIC_VERB,
+	ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MODE,
+	ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN2,
 };
 
 static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fixups[] = {
@@ -11023,6 +11036,19 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fix
 			{ }
 		},
 	},
+	[ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MODE] = {
+		.type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC,
+		.v.func = alc897_fixup_lenovo_headset_mode,
+	},
+	[ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN2] = {
+		.type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS,
+		.v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) {
+			{ 0x1a, 0x01a11140 }, /* use as headset mic, without its own jack detect */
+			{ }
+		},
+		.chained = true,
+		.chain_id = ALC897_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADSET_MODE
+	},
 };
 
 static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = {
@@ -11075,6 +11101,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc662
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x32cb, "Lenovo ThinkCentre M70", ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x32cf, "Lenovo ThinkCentre M950", ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x32f7, "Lenovo ThinkCentre M90", ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3742, "Lenovo TianYi510Pro-14IOB", ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN2),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x38af, "Lenovo Ideapad Y550P", ALC662_FIXUP_IDEAPAD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x3a0d, "Lenovo Ideapad Y550", ALC662_FIXUP_IDEAPAD),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x5892, "ASRock B150M", ALC892_FIXUP_ASROCK_MOBO),
author maintainer
#558 lore raw

PATCH 558/783 ALSA: hda/hdmi: Add HP Device 0x8711 to force connect list

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiao Zhou <[email protected]>

commit 31b573946ea55e1ea0e08ae8e83bcf879b30f83a upstream.

HDMI audio is not working on the HP EliteDesk 800 G6 because the pin is unconnected. This issue can be resolved by using the 'hdajackretask' tool to override the unconnected pin to force it to connect.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_hdmi.c +1 -0
@@ -1965,6 +1965,7 @@ static int hdmi_add_cvt(struct hda_codec
 static const struct snd_pci_quirk force_connect_list[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x870f, "HP", 1),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x871a, "HP", 1),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x103c, 0x8711, "HP", 1),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xec94, "MS-7C94", 1),
 	{}
 };
author maintainer
#559 lore raw

PATCH 559/783 usb: dwc3: Fix race between dwc3_set_mode and __dwc3_set_mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sven Peter <[email protected]>

commit 62c73bfea048e66168df09da6d3e4510ecda40bb upstream.

dwc->desired_dr_role is changed by dwc3_set_mode inside a spinlock but then read by __dwc3_set_mode outside of that lock. This can lead to a race condition when very quick successive role switch events happen:

CPU A

	dwc3_set_mode(DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST) // first role switch event
		spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
		dwc->desired_dr_role = mode; // DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
		queue_work(system_freezable_wq, &dwc->drd_work);

CPU B

	__dwc3_set_mode
		// ....
		spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
		// desired_dr_role is DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST
		dwc3_set_prtcap(dwc, dwc->desired_dr_role);
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);

CPU A

	dwc3_set_mode(DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE) // second event
		spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
		dwc->desired_dr_role = mode; // DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);

CPU B (continues running __dwc3_set_mode)

	switch (dwc->desired_dr_role) { // DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE
	// ....
	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE:
		// ....
		ret = dwc3_gadget_init(dwc);

We then have DWC3_GCTL.DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAPDIR = DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST and dwc->current_dr_role = DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST but initialized the controller in device mode. It's also possible to get into a state where both host and device are intialized at the same time. Fix this race by creating a local copy of desired_dr_role inside __dwc3_set_mode while holding dwc->lock.

Fixes 41ce1456e1db ("usb: dwc3: core: make dwc3_set_mode() work properly")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c |   16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +10 -6
@@ -120,21 +120,25 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
 	u32 reg;
+	u32 desired_dr_role;
 
 	mutex_lock(&dwc->mutex);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
+	desired_dr_role = dwc->desired_dr_role;
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
 
 	pm_runtime_get_sync(dwc->dev);
 
 	if (dwc->current_dr_role == DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_OTG)
 		dwc3_otg_update(dwc, 0);
 
-	if (!dwc->desired_dr_role)
+	if (!desired_dr_role)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (dwc->desired_dr_role == dwc->current_dr_role)
+	if (desired_dr_role == dwc->current_dr_role)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (dwc->desired_dr_role == DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_OTG && dwc->edev)
+	if (desired_dr_role == DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_OTG && dwc->edev)
 		goto out;
 
 	switch (dwc->current_dr_role) {
@@ -162,7 +166,7 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_
 	 */
 	if (dwc->current_dr_role && ((DWC3_IP_IS(DWC3) ||
 			DWC3_VER_IS_PRIOR(DWC31, 190A)) &&
-			dwc->desired_dr_role != DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_OTG)) {
+			desired_dr_role != DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_OTG)) {
 		reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GCTL);
 		reg |= DWC3_GCTL_CORESOFTRESET;
 		dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GCTL, reg);
@@ -182,11 +186,11 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
 
-	dwc3_set_prtcap(dwc, dwc->desired_dr_role);
+	dwc3_set_prtcap(dwc, desired_dr_role);
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
 
-	switch (dwc->desired_dr_role) {
+	switch (desired_dr_role) {
 	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST:
 		ret = dwc3_host_init(dwc);
 		if (ret) {
author maintainer
#560 lore raw

PATCH 560/783 usb: dwc3: core: defer probe on ulpi_read_id timeout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ferry Toth <[email protected]>

commit 63130462c919ece0ad0d9bb5a1f795ef8d79687e upstream.

Since commit 0f0101719138 ("usb: dwc3: Don't switch OTG -> peripheral if extcon is present"), Dual Role support on Intel Merrifield platform broke due to rearranging the call to dwc3_get_extcon().

It appears to be caused by ulpi_read_id() masking the timeout on the first test write. In the past dwc3 probe continued by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() followed by dwc3_get_extcon() which happend to return -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() finally succeeded. Due to above mentioned rearranging -EPROBE_DEFER is not returned and probe completes without phy.

On Intel Merrifield the timeout on the first test write issue is reproducible but it is difficult to find the root cause. Using a mainline kernel and rootfs with buildroot ulpi_read_id() succeeds. As soon as adding ftrace / bootconfig to find out why, ulpi_read_id() fails and we can't analyze the flow. Using another rootfs ulpi_read_id() fails even without adding ftrace. We suspect the issue is some kind of timing / race, but merely retrying ulpi_read_id() does not resolve the issue.

As we now changed ulpi_read_id() to return -ETIMEDOUT in this case, we need to handle the error by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() and request -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() is retried and succeeds.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +6 -1
@@ -960,8 +960,13 @@ static int dwc3_core_init(struct dwc3 *d
 
 	if (!dwc->ulpi_ready) {
 		ret = dwc3_core_ulpi_init(dwc);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT) {
+				dwc3_core_soft_reset(dwc);
+				ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+			}
 			goto err0;
+		}
 		dwc->ulpi_ready = true;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#561 lore raw

PATCH 561/783 HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason Gerecke <[email protected]>

commit 1db1f392591aff13fd643f0ec7c1d5e27391d700 upstream.

Some Wacom devices have a special "bootloader" mode that is used for firmware flashing. When operating in this mode, the device cannot be used for input, and the HID descriptor is not able to be processed by the driver. The driver generates an "Unknown device_type" warning and then returns an error code from wacom_probe(). This is a problem because userspace still needs to be able to interact with the device via hidraw to perform the firmware flash.

This commit adds a non-generic device definition for 056a:0094 which is used when devices are in "bootloader" mode. It marks the devices with a special BOOTLOADER type that is recognized by wacom_probe() and wacom_raw_event(). When we see this type we ensure a hidraw device is created and otherwise keep our hands off so that userspace is in full control.

---
 drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c |    4 ++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +8 -0
@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static int wacom_raw_event(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct wacom *wacom = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 
+	if (wacom->wacom_wac.features.type == BOOTLOADER)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (size > WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX)
 		return 1;
 
@@ -2786,6 +2789,11 @@ static int wacom_probe(struct hid_device
 		return error;
 	}
 
+	if (features->type == BOOTLOADER) {
+		hid_warn(hdev, "Using device in hidraw-only mode");
+		return hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW);
+	}
+
 	error = wacom_parse_and_register(wacom, false);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c +4 -0
@@ -4782,6 +4782,9 @@ static const struct wacom_features wacom
 static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_HID_ANY_ID =
 	{ "Wacom HID", .type = HID_GENERIC, .oVid = HID_ANY_ID, .oPid = HID_ANY_ID };
 
+static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_0x94 =
+	{ "Wacom Bootloader", .type = BOOTLOADER };
+
 #define USB_DEVICE_WACOM(prod)						\
 	HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_WACOM, USB_VENDOR_ID_WACOM, prod),\
 	.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&wacom_features_##prod
@@ -4855,6 +4858,7 @@ const struct hid_device_id wacom_ids[] =
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x84) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x90) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x93) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x94) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x97) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9A) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9F) },
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h +1 -0
@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ enum {
 	MTTPC,
 	MTTPC_B,
 	HID_GENERIC,
+	BOOTLOADER,
 	MAX_TYPE
 };
 
author maintainer
#562 lore raw

PATCH 562/783 HID: mcp2221: dont connect hidraw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Enrik Berkhan <[email protected]>

commit 67c90d14018775556d5420382ace86521421f9ff upstream.

The MCP2221 driver should not connect to the hidraw userspace interface, as it needs exclusive access to the chip.

If you want to use /dev/hidrawX with the MCP2221, you need to avoid binding this driver to the device and use the hid generic driver instead (e.g. using udev rules).

---
 drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c +9 -3
@@ -840,12 +840,19 @@ static int mcp2221_probe(struct hid_devi
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW);
+	/*
+	 * This driver uses the .raw_event callback and therefore does not need any
+	 * HID_CONNECT_xxx flags.
+	 */
+	ret = hid_hw_start(hdev, 0);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "can't start hardware\n");
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	hid_info(hdev, "USB HID v%x.%02x Device [%s] on %s\n", hdev->version >> 8,
+			hdev->version & 0xff, hdev->name, hdev->phys);
+
 	ret = hid_hw_open(hdev);
 	if (ret) {
 		hid_err(hdev, "can't open device\n");
@@ -870,8 +877,7 @@ static int mcp2221_probe(struct hid_devi
 	mcp->adapter.retries = 1;
 	mcp->adapter.dev.parent = &hdev->dev;
 	snprintf(mcp->adapter.name, sizeof(mcp->adapter.name),
-			"MCP2221 usb-i2c bridge on hidraw%d",
-			((struct hidraw *)hdev->hidraw)->minor);
+			"MCP2221 usb-i2c bridge");
 
 	ret = i2c_add_adapter(&mcp->adapter);
 	if (ret) {
author maintainer
#563 lore raw

PATCH 563/783 reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>

commit 572302af1258459e124437b8f3369357447afac7 upstream.

Commit 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation") defined reiserfs_security_free() to free the name and value of a security xattr allocated by the active LSM through security_old_inode_init_security(). However, this function is not called in the reiserfs code.

Thus, add a call to reiserfs_security_free() whenever reiserfs_security_init() is called, and initialize value to NULL, to avoid to call kfree() on an uninitialized pointer.

Finally, remove the kfree() for the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.

Fixes 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Cc Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Cc Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
---
 fs/reiserfs/namei.c          |    4 ++++
 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/namei.c +4 -0
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static int reiserfs_create(struct inode
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -778,6 +779,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mknod(struct inode *
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -876,6 +878,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mkdir(struct inode *
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -1191,6 +1194,7 @@ static int reiserfs_symlink(struct inode
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(parent_dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode
 	int error;
 
 	sec->name = NULL;
+	sec->value = NULL;
 
 	/* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */
 	if (IS_PRIVATE(dir))
@@ -94,7 +95,6 @@ int reiserfs_security_write(struct reise
 
 void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
 {
-	kfree(sec->name);
 	kfree(sec->value);
 	sec->name = NULL;
 	sec->value = NULL;
author maintainer
#564 lore raw

PATCH 564/783 iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>

commit 20228a1d5a55e7db0c6720840f2c7d2b48c55f69 upstream.

Drop 'mlock' usage by making use of iio_device_claim_direct_mode(). This change actually makes sure we cannot do a single conversion while buffering is enable. Note there was a potential race in the previous code since we were only acquiring the lock after checking if the bus is enabled.

Fixes af3008485ea0 ("iio:adc: Add common code for ADI Sigma Delta devices")
Cc <[email protected]> #No rush as race is very old.
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +4 -4
@@ -280,10 +280,10 @@ int ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(str
 	unsigned int data_reg;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (iio_buffer_enabled(indio_dev))
-		return -EBUSY;
+	ret = iio_device_claim_direct_mode(indio_dev);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
-	mutex_lock(&indio_dev->mlock);
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_channel(sigma_delta, chan->address);
 
 	spi_bus_lock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ out:
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE);
 	sigma_delta->bus_locked = false;
 	spi_bus_unlock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
-	mutex_unlock(&indio_dev->mlock);
+	iio_device_release_direct_mode(indio_dev);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
author maintainer
#565 lore raw

PATCH 565/783 iio: adc128s052: add proper .data members in adc128_of_match table

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>

commit e2af60f5900c6ade53477b494ffb54690eee11f5 upstream.

Prior to commit bd5d54e4d49d ("iio: adc128s052: add ACPI _HID AANT1280"), the driver unconditionally used spi_get_device_id() to get the index into the adc128_config array.

However, with that commit, OF-based boards now incorrectly treat all supported sensors as if they are an adc128s052, because all the .data members of the adc128_of_match table are implicitly 0. Our board, which has an adc122s021, thus exposes 8 channels whereas it really only has two.

---
 drivers/iio/adc/ti-adc128s052.c |   14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ti-adc128s052.c +7 -7
@@ -193,13 +193,13 @@ static int adc128_remove(struct spi_devi
 }
 
 static const struct of_device_id adc128_of_match[] = {
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc128s052", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s021", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s051", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s101", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s021", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s051", },
-	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s101", },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc128s052", .data = (void*)0L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s021", .data = (void*)1L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s051", .data = (void*)1L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc122s101", .data = (void*)1L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s021", .data = (void*)2L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s051", .data = (void*)2L, },
+	{ .compatible = "ti,adc124s101", .data = (void*)2L, },
 	{ /* sentinel */ },
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, adc128_of_match);
author maintainer
#566 lore raw

PATCH 566/783 regulator: core: fix deadlock on regulator enable

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit cb3543cff90a4448ed560ac86c98033ad5fecda9 upstream.

When updating the operating mode as part of regulator enable, the caller has already locked the regulator tree and drms_uA_update() must not try to do the same in order not to trigger a deadlock.

The lock inversion is reported by lockdep as:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.1.0-next-20221215 #142 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
udevd/154 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffc11f123d7e50 (regulator_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regulator_lock_dependent+0x54/0x280

but task is already holding lock:
ffff80000e4c36e8 (regulator_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: regulator_enable+0x34/0x80

which lock already depends on the new lock.

...

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(regulator_ww_class_acquire);
                                 lock(regulator_list_mutex);
                                 lock(regulator_ww_class_acquire);
    lock(regulator_list_mutex);

*** DEADLOCK ***

just before probe of a Qualcomm UFS controller (occasionally) deadlocks when enabling one of its regulators.

Fixes 9243a195be7a ("regulator: core: Change voltage setting path")
Fixes f8702f9e4aa7 ("regulator: core: Use ww_mutex for regulators locking")
---
 drivers/regulator/core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/core.c +1 -1
@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ static int drms_uA_update(struct regulat
 		/* get input voltage */
 		input_uV = 0;
 		if (rdev->supply)
-			input_uV = regulator_get_voltage(rdev->supply);
+			input_uV = regulator_get_voltage_rdev(rdev->supply->rdev);
 		if (input_uV <= 0)
 			input_uV = rdev->constraints->input_uV;
 		if (input_uV <= 0) {
author maintainer
#567 lore raw

PATCH 567/783 gcov: add support for checksum field

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rickard x Andersson <[email protected]>

commit e96b95c2b7a63a454b6498e2df67aac14d046d13 upstream.

In GCC version 12.1 a checksum field was added.

This patch fixes a kernel crash occurring during boot when using gcov-kernel with GCC version 12.2. The crash occurred on a system running on i.MX6SX.

---
 kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c +5 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct gcov_fn_info {
  * @version: gcov version magic indicating the gcc version used for compilation
  * @next: list head for a singly-linked list
  * @stamp: uniquifying time stamp
+ * @checksum: unique object checksum
  * @filename: name of the associated gcov data file
  * @merge: merge functions (null for unused counter type)
  * @n_functions: number of instrumented functions
@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ struct gcov_info {
 	unsigned int version;
 	struct gcov_info *next;
 	unsigned int stamp;
+ /* Since GCC 12.1 a checksum field is added. */
+#if (__GNUC__ >= 12)
+	unsigned int checksum;
+#endif
 	const char *filename;
 	void (*merge[GCOV_COUNTERS])(gcov_type *, unsigned int);
 	unsigned int n_functions;
author maintainer
#568 lore raw

PATCH 568/783 ovl: fix use inode directly in rcu-walk mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chen Zhongjin <[email protected]>

commit 672e4268b2863d7e4978dfed29552b31c2f9bd4e upstream.

ovl_dentry_revalidate_common() can be called in rcu-walk mode. As document said, "in rcu-walk mode, d_parent and d_inode should not be used without care".

Check inode here to protect access under rcu-walk mode.

Fixes bccece1ead36 ("ovl: allow remote upper")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.7
---
 fs/overlayfs/super.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/overlayfs/super.c +6 -1
@@ -138,11 +138,16 @@ static int ovl_dentry_revalidate_common(
 					unsigned int flags, bool weak)
 {
 	struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode_rcu(dentry);
 	struct dentry *upper;
 	unsigned int i;
 	int ret = 1;
 
-	upper = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
+	/* Careful in RCU mode */
+	if (!inode)
+		return -ECHILD;
+
+	upper = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode);
 	if (upper)
 		ret = ovl_revalidate_real(upper, flags, weak);
 
author maintainer
#569 lore raw

PATCH 569/783 media: dvbdev: fix build warning due to comments

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

commit 3edfd14bb50fa6f94ed1a37bbb17d9f1c2793b57 upstream.

Previous commit that introduces reference counter does not add proper comments, which will lead to warning when building htmldocs. Fix them.

Fixes 0fc044b2b5e2 ("media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF")
---
 include/media/dvbdev.h |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/media/dvbdev.h +2 -1
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ struct dvb_adapter {
  * struct dvb_device - represents a DVB device node
  *
  * @list_head:	List head with all DVB devices
+ * @ref:	reference counter
  * @fops:	pointer to struct file_operations
  * @adapter:	pointer to the adapter that holds this device node
  * @type:	type of the device, as defined by &enum dvb_device_type.
@@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ struct dvb_device {
 struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
 /**
- * dvb_device_get - Decrease dvb_device reference
+ * dvb_device_put - Decrease dvb_device reference
  *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
author maintainer
#570 lore raw

PATCH 570/783 media: dvbdev: fix refcnt bug

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

commit 3a664569b71b0a52be5ffb9fb87cc4f83d29bd71 upstream.

Previous commit initialize the dvbdev->ref before the template copy, which will overwrite the reference and cause refcnt bug.

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-next-20221128-syzkaller #0
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
RSP: 0000:ffffc900000678d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88813ff58000 RSI: ffffffff81660e7c RDI: fffff5200000cf0c
RBP: ffff888022a45010 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff88823ffff000 CR3: 000000000c48e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline]
 __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline]
 refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline]
 kref_get include/linux/kref.h:45 [inline]
 dvb_device_get drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:585 [inline]
 dvb_register_device+0xe83/0x16e0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:517

...

Just place the kref_init at correct position.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 0fc044b2b5e2 ("media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF")
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -1
@@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapt
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	memcpy(dvbdev, template, sizeof(struct dvb_device));
+	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	dvbdev->type = type;
 	dvbdev->id = id;
 	dvbdev->adapter = adap;
author maintainer
#571 lore raw

PATCH 571/783 pwm: tegra: Fix 32 bit build

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steven Price <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd1f1da4ada5d8ac774c2ebe97230637820b3323 ]

The value of NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH doesn't fix within a 32 bit integer causing a build warning/error (and the value truncated):

drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c: In function ‘tegra_pwm_config’:
drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c:148:53: error: result of ‘1000000000 << 8’ requires 39 bits to represent, but ‘long int’ only has 32 bits [-Werror=shift-overflow=]
148 | required_clk_rate = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH,
| ^~

Explicitly cast to a u64 to ensure the correct result.

Fixes cfcb68817fb3 ("pwm: tegra: Improve required rate calculation")
---
 drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pwm/pwm-tegra.c +1 -1
index 36cc1452cb7a..f3528c56e894 100644
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ static int tegra_pwm_config(struct pwm_chip *chip, struct pwm_device *pwm,
 		 * source clock rate as required_clk_rate, PWM controller will
 		 * be able to configure the requested period.
 		 */
-		required_clk_rate = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH,
+		required_clk_rate = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL((u64)NSEC_PER_SEC << PWM_DUTY_WIDTH,
 						     period_ns);
 
 		err = clk_set_rate(pc->clk, required_clk_rate);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#572 lore raw

PATCH 572/783 usb: dwc3: qcom: Fix memory leak in dwc3_qcom_interconnect_init

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97a48da1619ba6bd42a0e5da0a03aa490a9496b1 ]

of_icc_get() alloc resources for path handle, we should release it when not need anymore. Like the release in dwc3_qcom_interconnect_exit() function. Add icc_put() in error handling to fix this.

Fixes bea46b981515 ("usb: dwc3: qcom: Add interconnect support in dwc3 driver")
Cc stable <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-qcom.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-qcom.c +10 -3
index ca3a35fd8f74..528e36cc58ea 100644
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ static int dwc3_qcom_interconnect_init(struct dwc3_qcom *qcom)
 	if (IS_ERR(qcom->icc_path_apps)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to get apps-usb path: %ld\n",
 				PTR_ERR(qcom->icc_path_apps));
-		return PTR_ERR(qcom->icc_path_apps);
+		ret = PTR_ERR(qcom->icc_path_apps);
+		goto put_path_ddr;
 	}
 
 	if (usb_get_maximum_speed(&qcom->dwc3->dev) >= USB_SPEED_SUPER ||
@@ -271,17 +272,23 @@ static int dwc3_qcom_interconnect_init(struct dwc3_qcom *qcom)
 
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to set bandwidth for usb-ddr path: %d\n", ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto put_path_apps;
 	}
 
 	ret = icc_set_bw(qcom->icc_path_apps,
 		APPS_USB_AVG_BW, APPS_USB_PEAK_BW);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to set bandwidth for apps-usb path: %d\n", ret);
-		return ret;
+		goto put_path_apps;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
+
+put_path_apps:
+	icc_put(qcom->icc_path_apps);
+put_path_ddr:
+	icc_put(qcom->icc_path_ddr);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#573 lore raw

PATCH 573/783 cifs: fix oops during encryption

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f7f291e14dde32a07b1f0aa06921d28f875a7b54 ]

When running xfstests against Azure the following oops occurred on an arm64 system

  Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address
  ffff0001221cf000
  Mem abort info:
    ESR = 0x9600004f
    EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
    SET = 0, FnV = 0
    EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
    FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
  Data abort info:
    ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
    CM = 0, WnR = 1
  swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000294f3000
  [ffff0001221cf000] pgd=18000001ffff8003, p4d=18000001ffff8003,
  pud=18000001ff82e003, pmd=18000001ff71d003, pte=00600001221cf787
  Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  ...
  pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
  pc : __memcpy+0x40/0x230
  lr : scatterwalk_copychunks+0xe0/0x200
  sp : ffff800014e92de0
  x29: ffff800014e92de0 x28: ffff000114f9de80 x27: 0000000000000008
  x26: 0000000000000008 x25: ffff800014e92e78 x24: 0000000000000008
  x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000040000000000 x21: ffff000000000000
  x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0001037c4488 x18: 0000000000000014
  x17: 235e1c0d6efa9661 x16: a435f9576b6edd6c x15: 0000000000000058
  x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000008 x12: ffff000114f2e590
  x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: 0000040000000000 x9 : ffff8000105c3580
  x8 : 2e9413b10000001a x7 : 534b4410fb86b005 x6 : 534b4410fb86b005
  x5 : ffff0001221cf008 x4 : ffff0001037c4490 x3 : 0000000000000001
  x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff0001037c4488 x0 : ffff0001221cf000
  Call trace:
   __memcpy+0x40/0x230
   scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x98/0x100
   crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x150/0x180
   crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
   crypt_message+0x750/0x880
   smb3_init_transform_rq+0x298/0x340
   smb_send_rqst.part.11+0xd8/0x180
   smb_send_rqst+0x3c/0x100
   compound_send_recv+0x534/0xbc0
   smb2_query_info_compound+0x32c/0x440
   smb2_set_ea+0x438/0x4c0
   cifs_xattr_set+0x5d4/0x7c0

This is because in scatterwalk_copychunks(), we attempted to write to a buffer (@sign) that was allocated in the stack (vmalloc area) by crypt_message() and thus accessing its remaining 8 (x2) bytes ended up crossing a page boundary.

To simply fix it, we could just pass @sign kmalloc'd from crypt_message() and then we're done. Luckily, we don't seem to pass any other vmalloc'd buffers in smb_rqst::rq_iov...

Instead, let's map the correct pages and offsets from vmalloc buffers as well in cifs_sg_set_buf() and then avoiding such oopses.

---
 fs/cifs/cifsglob.h  |  69 +++++++++++++++++++++
 fs/cifs/cifsproto.h |   4 +-
 fs/cifs/misc.c      |   4 +-
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c   | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 4 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsglob.h +69 -0
index 196285b0fe46..92a7628560cc 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
 #include <linux/in.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/mempool.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include "cifs_fs_sb.h"
@@ -30,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/cifs/cifs_mount.h>
 #include "smb2pdu.h"
+#include "smb2glob.h"
 
 #define CIFS_MAGIC_NUMBER 0xFF534D42      /* the first four bytes of SMB PDUs */
 
@@ -2046,4 +2049,70 @@ static inline bool is_tcon_dfs(struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
 		tcon->share_flags & (SHI1005_FLAGS_DFS | SHI1005_FLAGS_DFS_ROOT);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int cifs_get_num_sgs(const struct smb_rqst *rqst,
+					    int num_rqst,
+					    const u8 *sig)
+{
+	unsigned int len, skip;
+	unsigned int nents = 0;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	int i, j;
+
+	/* Assumes the first rqst has a transform header as the first iov.
+	 * I.e.
+	 * rqst[0].rq_iov[0]  is transform header
+	 * rqst[0].rq_iov[1+] data to be encrypted/decrypted
+	 * rqst[1+].rq_iov[0+] data to be encrypted/decrypted
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_rqst; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * The first rqst has a transform header where the
+		 * first 20 bytes are not part of the encrypted blob.
+		 */
+		for (j = 0; j < rqst[i].rq_nvec; j++) {
+			struct kvec *iov = &rqst[i].rq_iov[j];
+
+			skip = (i == 0) && (j == 0) ? 20 : 0;
+			addr = (unsigned long)iov->iov_base + skip;
+			if (unlikely(is_vmalloc_addr((void *)addr))) {
+				len = iov->iov_len - skip;
+				nents += DIV_ROUND_UP(offset_in_page(addr) + len,
+						      PAGE_SIZE);
+			} else {
+				nents++;
+			}
+		}
+		nents += rqst[i].rq_npages;
+	}
+	nents += DIV_ROUND_UP(offset_in_page(sig) + SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	return nents;
+}
+
+/* We can not use the normal sg_set_buf() as we will sometimes pass a
+ * stack object as buf.
+ */
+static inline struct scatterlist *cifs_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg,
+						  const void *buf,
+						  unsigned int buflen)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)buf;
+	unsigned int off = offset_in_page(addr);
+
+	addr &= PAGE_MASK;
+	if (unlikely(is_vmalloc_addr((void *)addr))) {
+		do {
+			unsigned int len = min_t(unsigned int, buflen, PAGE_SIZE - off);
+
+			sg_set_page(sg++, vmalloc_to_page((void *)addr), len, off);
+
+			off = 0;
+			addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+			buflen -= len;
+		} while (buflen);
+	} else {
+		sg_set_page(sg++, virt_to_page(addr), buflen, off);
+	}
+	return sg;
+}
+
 #endif	/* _CIFS_GLOB_H */
fs/cifs/cifsproto.h +2 -2
index a6ca4eda9a5a..ca34cc1e1931 100644
@@ -602,8 +602,8 @@ int cifs_alloc_hash(const char *name, struct crypto_shash **shash,
 		    struct sdesc **sdesc);
 void cifs_free_hash(struct crypto_shash **shash, struct sdesc **sdesc);
 
-extern void rqst_page_get_length(struct smb_rqst *rqst, unsigned int page,
-				unsigned int *len, unsigned int *offset);
+void rqst_page_get_length(const struct smb_rqst *rqst, unsigned int page,
+			  unsigned int *len, unsigned int *offset);
 struct cifs_chan *
 cifs_ses_find_chan(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 int cifs_try_adding_channels(struct cifs_ses *ses);
fs/cifs/misc.c +2 -2
index 9d740916a8ee..9044b0fca9a3 100644
@@ -974,8 +974,8 @@ cifs_free_hash(struct crypto_shash **shash, struct sdesc **sdesc)
  * Input: rqst - a smb_rqst, page - a page index for rqst
  * Output: *len - the length for this page, *offset - the offset for this page
  */
-void rqst_page_get_length(struct smb_rqst *rqst, unsigned int page,
-				unsigned int *len, unsigned int *offset)
+void rqst_page_get_length(const struct smb_rqst *rqst, unsigned int page,
+			  unsigned int *len, unsigned int *offset)
 {
 	*len = rqst->rq_pagesz;
 	*offset = (page == 0) ? rqst->rq_offset : 0;
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +68 -75

197 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#574 lore raw

PATCH 574/783 nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Klaus Jensen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b5f96cb719d8ba220b565ddd3ba4ac0d8bcfb130 ]

When using shadow doorbells, the event index and the doorbell values are written to host memory. Prior to this patch, the values written would erroneously be written in host endianness. This causes trouble on big-endian platforms. Fix this by adding missing endian conversions.

This issue was noticed by Guenter while testing various big-endian platforms under QEMU[1]. A similar fix required for hw/nvme in QEMU is up for review as well[2].

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/[email protected]/

Fixes f9f38e33389c ("nvme: improve performance for virtual NVMe devices")
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +13 -12
index c222d7bf6ce1..948b027a75d3 100644
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ struct nvme_dev {
 	mempool_t *iod_mempool;
 
 	/* shadow doorbell buffer support: */
-	u32 *dbbuf_dbs;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_dbs;
 	dma_addr_t dbbuf_dbs_dma_addr;
-	u32 *dbbuf_eis;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_eis;
 	dma_addr_t dbbuf_eis_dma_addr;
 
 	/* host memory buffer support: */
@@ -209,10 +209,10 @@ struct nvme_queue {
 #define NVMEQ_SQ_CMB		1
 #define NVMEQ_DELETE_ERROR	2
 #define NVMEQ_POLLED		3
-	u32 *dbbuf_sq_db;
-	u32 *dbbuf_cq_db;
-	u32 *dbbuf_sq_ei;
-	u32 *dbbuf_cq_ei;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_sq_db;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_cq_db;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_sq_ei;
+	__le32 *dbbuf_cq_ei;
 	struct completion delete_done;
 };
 
@@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ static inline int nvme_dbbuf_need_event(u16 event_idx, u16 new_idx, u16 old)
 }
 
 /* Update dbbuf and return true if an MMIO is required */
-static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
-					      volatile u32 *dbbuf_ei)
+static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db,
+					      volatile __le32 *dbbuf_ei)
 {
 	if (dbbuf_db) {
-		u16 old_value;
+		u16 old_value, event_idx;
 
 		/*
 		 * Ensure that the queue is written before updating
@@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
 		 */
 		wmb();
 
-		old_value = *dbbuf_db;
-		*dbbuf_db = value;
+		old_value = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_db);
+		*dbbuf_db = cpu_to_le32(value);
 
 		/*
 		 * Ensure that the doorbell is updated before reading the event
@@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db,
 		 */
 		mb();
 
-		if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(*dbbuf_ei, value, old_value))
+		event_idx = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_ei);
+		if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(event_idx, value, old_value))
 			return false;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#575 lore raw

PATCH 575/783 nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keith Busch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c89a529e823d51dd23c7ec0c047c7a454a428541 ]

Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries.

The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the size provided by the mempool.

While unlikely to occur (you'd need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments on a queue that doesn't support SGLs), this memory corruption has been observed by kfence.

Cc Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Fixes 943e942e6266f ("nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations")
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +2 -2
index 948b027a75d3..0452fb96df69 100644
@@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db,
  */
 static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
 {
-	unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_KB_SZ + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE,
-				      NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
+	unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE;
+	unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
 	return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#576 lore raw

PATCH 576/783 nvme-pci: fix page size checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keith Busch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 841734234a28fd5cd0889b84bd4d93a0988fa11e ]

The size allocated out of the dma pool is at most NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE, which may be smaller than the PAGE_SIZE.

Fixes c61b82c7b7134 ("nvme-pci: fix PRP pool size")
---
 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +4 -4
index 0452fb96df69..67dd68462b81 100644
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 #define SQ_SIZE(q)	((q)->q_depth << (q)->sqes)
 #define CQ_SIZE(q)	((q)->q_depth * sizeof(struct nvme_completion))
 
-#define SGES_PER_PAGE	(PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc))
+#define SGES_PER_PAGE	(NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc))
 
 /*
  * These can be higher, but we need to ensure that any command doesn't
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
 {
 	unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE;
 	unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
-	return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8);
+	return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE - 8);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void)
 static int nvme_pci_npages_sgl(void)
 {
 	return DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_SEGS * sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc),
-			PAGE_SIZE);
+			NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
 }
 
 static size_t nvme_pci_iod_alloc_size(void)
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static void nvme_pci_sgl_set_seg(struct nvme_sgl_desc *sge,
 		sge->length = cpu_to_le32(entries * sizeof(*sge));
 		sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_LAST_SEG_DESC << 4;
 	} else {
-		sge->length = cpu_to_le32(PAGE_SIZE);
+		sge->length = cpu_to_le32(NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE);
 		sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_SEG_DESC << 4;
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#577 lore raw

PATCH 577/783 ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Adam Vodopjan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 37e14e4f3715428b809e4df9a9958baa64c77d51 ]

Since kernel 5.3.4 my laptop (ICH8M controller) does not see Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD disk connected into a SATA connector on wake from suspend. The problem was introduced in c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond"): the quirk is not applied on wake from suspend as it originally was.

It is worth to mention the commit contained another bug: the quirk is not applied at all to controllers which require it. The fix commit 09d6ac8dc51a ("libata/ahci: Fix PCS quirk application") landed in 5.3.8. So testing my patch anywhere between commits c312ef176399 and 09d6ac8dc51a is pointless.

Not all disks trigger the problem. For example nothing bad happens with Western Digital WD5000LPCX HDD.

Test hardware:
- Acer 5920G with ICH8M SATA controller
- sda: some SATA HDD connnected into the DVD drive IDE port with a SATA-IDE caddy. It is a boot disk
- sdb: Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD connected into the only SATA port

Sample "dmesg --notime | grep -E '^(sd |ata)'" output on wake:

sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Starting disk
ata4: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:0c:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:42:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1: FORCE: cable set to 80c
ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3.00: disabled
sd 2:0:0:0: rejecting I/O to offline device
ata3.00: detaching (SCSI 2:0:0:0)
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_NO_CONNECT
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronize Cache(10) failed: Result:
hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Stopping disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK

Commit c312ef176399 dropped ahci_pci_reset_controller() which internally calls ahci_reset_controller() and applies the PCS quirk if needed after that. It was called each time a reset was required instead of just ahci_reset_controller(). This patch puts the function back in place.

Fixes c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond")
---
 drivers/ata/ahci.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +23 -9
index ff2add0101fe..7ca9fa9a75e2 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum board_ids {
 static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
 static void ahci_remove_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
 static void ahci_shutdown_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
+static void ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv);
 static int ahci_vt8251_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
 				 unsigned long deadline);
 static int ahci_avn_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
@@ -664,6 +665,25 @@ static void ahci_pci_save_initial_config(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	ahci_save_initial_config(&pdev->dev, hpriv);
 }
 
+static int ahci_pci_reset_controller(struct ata_host *host)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(host->dev);
+	struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
+	 * them here.
+	 */
+	ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void ahci_pci_init_controller(struct ata_host *host)
 {
 	struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
@@ -865,7 +885,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 	struct ata_host *host = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	ahci_pci_init_controller(host);
@@ -900,7 +920,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_resume(struct device *dev)
 		ahci_mcp89_apple_enable(pdev);
 
 	if (pdev->dev.power.power_state.event == PM_EVENT_SUSPEND) {
-		rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+		rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
@@ -1785,12 +1805,6 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	/* save initial config */
 	ahci_pci_save_initial_config(pdev, hpriv);
 
-	/*
-	 * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
-	 * them here.
-	 */
-	ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
-
 	/* prepare host */
 	if (hpriv->cap & HOST_CAP_NCQ) {
 		pi.flags |= ATA_FLAG_NCQ;
@@ -1900,7 +1914,7 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#578 lore raw

PATCH 578/783 nvme: fix the NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK definition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 685e6311637e46f3212439ce2789f8a300e5050f ]

3 << 16 does not generate the correct mask for bits 16, 17 and 18. Use the GENMASK macro to generate the correct mask instead.

Fixes 84fef62d135b ("nvme: check admin passthru command effects")
---
 include/linux/nvme.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/nvme.h +2 -1
index bfed36e342cc..fe39ed9e9303 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_NVME_H
 #define _LINUX_NVME_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/uuid.h>
 
@@ -528,7 +529,7 @@ enum {
 	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_NCC		= 1 << 2,
 	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_NIC		= 1 << 3,
 	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CCC		= 1 << 4,
-	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK	= 3 << 16,
+	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSE_MASK	= GENMASK(18, 16),
 	NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_UUID_SEL	= 1 << 19,
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#579 lore raw

PATCH 579/783 nvmet: dont defer passthrough commands with trivial effects to the workqueue

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a459f6933e1c459bffb7cc73fd6c900edc714bd ]

Mask out the "Command Supported" and "Logical Block Content Change" bits and only defer execution of commands that have non-trivial effects to the workqueue for synchronous execution. This allows to execute admin commands asynchronously on controllers that provide a Command Supported and Effects log page, and will keep allowing to execute Write commands asynchronously once command effects on I/O commands are taken into account.

Fixes c1fef73f793b ("nvmet: add passthru code to process commands")
---
 drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/target/passthru.c +5 -6
index d24251ece502..f76d01028df0 100644
@@ -259,14 +259,13 @@ static void nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd(struct nvmet_req *req)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If there are effects for the command we are about to execute, or
-	 * an end_req function we need to use nvme_execute_passthru_rq()
-	 * synchronously in a work item seeing the end_req function and
-	 * nvme_passthru_end() can't be called in the request done callback
-	 * which is typically in interrupt context.
+	 * If a command needs post-execution fixups, or there are any
+	 * non-trivial effects, make sure to execute the command synchronously
+	 * in a workqueue so that nvme_passthru_end gets called.
 	 */
 	effects = nvme_command_effects(ctrl, ns, req->cmd->common.opcode);
-	if (req->p.use_workqueue || effects) {
+	if (req->p.use_workqueue ||
+	    (effects & ~(NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_CSUPP | NVME_CMD_EFFECTS_LBCC))) {
 		INIT_WORK(&req->p.work, nvmet_passthru_execute_cmd_work);
 		req->p.rq = rq;
 		schedule_work(&req->p.work);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#580 lore raw

PATCH 580/783 objtool: Fix SEGFAULT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit efb11fdb3e1a9f694fa12b70b21e69e55ec59c36 ]

find_insn() will return NULL in case of failure. Check insn in order to avoid a kernel Oops for NULL pointer dereference.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +1 -1
index 5d64b673da2d..700984e7f5ba 100644
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		return false;
 
 	insn = find_insn(file, func->sec, func->offset);
-	if (!insn->func)
+	if (!insn || !insn->func)
 		return false;
 
 	func_for_each_insn(file, func, insn) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#581 lore raw

PATCH 581/783 powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ]

rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could hang.

Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time, cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for "ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +10 -3
index bf962051af0a..aa66317a9a49 100644
@@ -715,6 +715,7 @@ void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)
 
 /* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */
 static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048];
+static s32 ibm_os_term_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
 
 void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 {
@@ -726,14 +727,13 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 	 * this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid
 	 * since it interferes with panic_timeout.
 	 */
-	if (RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,os-term") ||
-	    RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,extended-os-term"))
+	if (ibm_os_term_token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
 		return;
 
 	snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
 
 	do {
-		status = rtas_call(rtas_token("ibm,os-term"), 1, 1, NULL,
+		status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
 				   __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
 	} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
 
@@ -1267,6 +1267,13 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void)
 	no_entry = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "linux,rtas-entry", &entry);
 	rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry;
 
+	/*
+	 * Discover these now to avoid device tree lookups in the
+	 * panic path.
+	 */
+	if (of_property_read_bool(rtas.dev, "ibm,extended-os-term"))
+		ibm_os_term_token = rtas_token("ibm,os-term");
+
 	/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for
 	 * the stop-self token if any
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#582 lore raw

PATCH 582/783 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]

It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():

Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G      D            6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9
Call Trace:
[c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)
[c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0
[c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0
[c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4
[c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68
[c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50
[c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0
[c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420
[c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200

Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +6 -1
index aa66317a9a49..014229c40435 100644
@@ -732,10 +732,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 
 	snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
 
+	/*
+	 * Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status,
+	 * but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially
+	 * schedules.
+	 */
 	do {
 		status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
 				   __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
-	} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
+	} while (rtas_busy_delay_time(status));
 
 	if (status != 0)
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n", status);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#583 lore raw

PATCH 583/783 HID: multitouch: fix Asus ExpertBook P2 P2451FA trackpoint

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: José Expósito <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4eab1c2fe06c98a4dff258dd64800b6986c101e9 ]

The HID descriptor of this device contains two mouse collections, one for mouse emulation and the other for the trackpoint.

Both collections get merged and, because the first one defines X and Y, the movemenent events reported by the trackpoint collection are ignored.

Set the MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT class for this device to be able to receive its reports.

This fix is similar to/based on commit 40d5bb87377a ("HID: multitouch:
enable multi-input as a quirk for some devices").

---
 drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +4 -0
index a78ce16d4782..ea8c52f0aa78 100644
@@ -1912,6 +1912,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
 		HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
 			USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x313a) },
 
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
+			USB_VENDOR_ID_ELAN, 0x3148) },
+
 	/* Elitegroup panel */
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_SERIAL,
 		MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ELITEGROUP,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#584 lore raw

PATCH 584/783 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Terry Junge <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]

I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.

Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)

Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.

The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms.
End quote

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h         | 3 +++
 drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
index 2001566be3f5..09c3f30f10d3 100644
@@ -948,7 +948,10 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_IHOME_IMAC_A210S	0x8003
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS	0x047f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES	0xc055
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES	0xc056
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES	0xc057
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES	0xc058
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC		0x04da
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780	0x1044
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c +9 -0
index e81b7cec2d12..3d414ae194ac 100644
@@ -198,9 +198,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
 }
 
 static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = {
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
 					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES),
 		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS, HID_ANY_ID) },
 	{ }
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#585 lore raw

PATCH 585/783 pstore/zone: Use GFP_ATOMIC to allocate zone buffer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Qiujun Huang <[email protected]>

commit 99b3b837855b987563bcfb397cf9ddd88262814b upstream.

There is a case found when triggering a panic_on_oom, pstore fails to dump kmsg. Because psz_kmsg_write_record can't get the new buffer.

Handle this by using GFP_ATOMIC to allocate a buffer at lower watermark.

---
 fs/pstore/zone.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pstore/zone.c +1 -1
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static inline int notrace psz_kmsg_write
 		/* avoid destroying old data, allocate a new one */
 		len = zone->buffer_size + sizeof(*zone->buffer);
 		zone->oldbuf = zone->buffer;
-		zone->buffer = kzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		zone->buffer = kzalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!zone->buffer) {
 			zone->buffer = zone->oldbuf;
 			return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#586 lore raw

PATCH 586/783 hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>

commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.

Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.

---
 fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h |    2 ++
 fs/hfsplus/inode.c      |    4 ++--
 fs/hfsplus/options.c    |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h +2 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_HFSX		3
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_CASEFOLD	4
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_NOBARRIER	5
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_UID		6
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_GID		7
 
 static inline struct hfsplus_sb_info *HFSPLUS_SB(struct super_block *sb)
 {
fs/hfsplus/inode.c +2 -2
@@ -187,11 +187,11 @@ static void hfsplus_get_perms(struct ino
 	mode = be16_to_cpu(perms->mode);
 
 	i_uid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->owner));
-	if (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_uid = sbi->uid;
 
 	i_gid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->group));
-	if (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_gid = sbi->gid;
 
 	if (dir) {
fs/hfsplus/options.c +4 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!uid_valid(sbi->uid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid uid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_gid:
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!gid_valid(sbi->gid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid gid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_part:
author maintainer
#587 lore raw

PATCH 587/783 binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

commit e7f703ff2507f4e9f496da96cd4b78fd3026120c upstream.

Fix to return a negative error code from create_elf_fdpic_tables() instead of 0.

---
 fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +3 -2
@@ -434,8 +434,9 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct
 	current->mm->start_stack = current->mm->start_brk + stack_size;
 #endif
 
-	if (create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm,
-				    &exec_params, &interp_params) < 0)
+	retval = create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm, &exec_params,
+					 &interp_params);
+	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
 	kdebug("- start_code  %lx", current->mm->start_code);
author maintainer
#588 lore raw

PATCH 588/783 ovl: Use ovl mounters fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Tianci <[email protected]>

commit 5b0db51215e895a361bc63132caa7cca36a53d6a upstream.

There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:

  $ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
  $ mount -t fuse /fuse
  $ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
  $ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
    workdir=work
  $ touch /merge/file
  $ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
  $ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile

Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s caller is "bin", it denied this request.

In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:

The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable to use the caller's fsuid.

The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link") which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's mounter! So this is incorrect.

Fix this bug by using ovl mounter's fsuid/fsgid to do underlying fs's link().

---
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +30 -16
@@ -586,28 +586,42 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct den
 			goto out_revert_creds;
 	}
 
-	err = -ENOMEM;
-	override_cred = prepare_creds();
-	if (override_cred) {
+	if (!attr->hardlink) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		override_cred = prepare_creds();
+		if (!override_cred)
+			goto out_revert_creds;
+		/*
+		 * In the creation cases(create, mkdir, mknod, symlink),
+		 * ovl should transfer current's fs{u,g}id to underlying
+		 * fs. Because underlying fs want to initialize its new
+		 * inode owner using current's fs{u,g}id. And in this
+		 * case, the @inode is a new inode that is initialized
+		 * in inode_init_owner() to current's fs{u,g}id. So use
+		 * the inode's i_{u,g}id to override the cred's fs{u,g}id.
+		 *
+		 * But in the other hardlink case, ovl_link() does not
+		 * create a new inode, so just use the ovl mounter's
+		 * fs{u,g}id.
+		 */
 		override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
 		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
-		if (!attr->hardlink) {
-			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
-					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
-					override_cred);
-			if (err) {
-				put_cred(override_cred);
-				goto out_revert_creds;
-			}
+		err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
+				attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+				override_cred);
+		if (err) {
+			put_cred(override_cred);
+			goto out_revert_creds;
 		}
 		put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
 		put_cred(override_cred);
-
-		if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
-			err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
-		else
-			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
 	}
+
+	if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
+		err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
+	else
+		err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
+
 out_revert_creds:
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return err;
author maintainer
#589 lore raw

PATCH 589/783 ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream.

A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0 status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.

This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt.

[ tiwai: fixed white spaces ]

---
 sound/usb/line6/driver.c  |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c    |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h |    5 ++++-
 sound/usb/line6/pod.c     |    3 ++-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
sound/usb/line6/driver.c +2 -1
@@ -304,7 +304,8 @@ static void line6_data_received(struct u
 		for (;;) {
 			done =
 				line6_midibuf_read(mb, line6->buffer_message,
-						LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN);
+						   LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN,
+						   LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX);
 
 			if (done <= 0)
 				break;
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 
 	for (;;) {
 		done = line6_midibuf_read(mb, chunk,
-					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
+					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE,
+					  LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX);
 
 		if (done == 0)
 			break;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c +17 -8
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 
 #include "midibuf.h"
 
+
 static int midibuf_message_length(unsigned char code)
 {
 	int message_length;
@@ -20,12 +21,7 @@ static int midibuf_message_length(unsign
 
 		message_length = length[(code >> 4) - 8];
 	} else {
-		/*
-		   Note that according to the MIDI specification 0xf2 is
-		   the "Song Position Pointer", but this is used by Line 6
-		   to send sysex messages to the host.
-		 */
-		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
+		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, 2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1,
 			1, 1, 1, -1, 1, 1
 		};
 		message_length = length[code & 0x0f];
@@ -125,7 +121,7 @@ int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buff
 }
 
 int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *this, unsigned char *data,
-		       int length)
+		       int length, int read_type)
 {
 	int bytes_used;
 	int length1, length2;
@@ -148,9 +144,22 @@ int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffe
 
 	length1 = this->size - this->pos_read;
 
-	/* check MIDI command length */
 	command = this->buf[this->pos_read];
+	/*
+	   PODxt always has status byte lower nibble set to 0010,
+	   when it means to send 0000, so we correct if here so
+	   that control/program changes come on channel 1 and
+	   sysex message status byte is correct
+	 */
+	if (read_type == LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX) {
+		if (command == 0xb2 || command == 0xc2 || command == 0xf2) {
+			unsigned char fixed = command & 0xf0;
+			this->buf[this->pos_read] = fixed;
+			command = fixed;
+		}
+	}
 
+	/* check MIDI command length */
 	if (command & 0x80) {
 		midi_length = midibuf_message_length(command);
 		this->command_prev = command;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h +4 -1
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
 #ifndef MIDIBUF_H
 #define MIDIBUF_H
 
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX 0
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX 1
+
 struct midi_buffer {
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	int size;
@@ -23,7 +26,7 @@ extern void line6_midibuf_destroy(struct
 extern int line6_midibuf_ignore(struct midi_buffer *mb, int length);
 extern int line6_midibuf_init(struct midi_buffer *mb, int size, int split);
 extern int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
-			      int length);
+			      int length, int read_type);
 extern void line6_midibuf_reset(struct midi_buffer *mb);
 extern int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
 			       int length);
sound/usb/line6/pod.c +2 -1
@@ -159,8 +159,9 @@ static struct line6_pcm_properties pod_p
 	.bytes_per_channel = 3 /* SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_S24_3LE */
 };
 
+
 static const char pod_version_header[] = {
-	0xf2, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
+	0xf0, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
 };
 
 static char *pod_alloc_sysex_buffer(struct usb_line6_pod *pod, int code,
author maintainer
#590 lore raw

PATCH 590/783 ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream.

Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex messages are sent to a PODxt device.

---
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 	int req, done;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		req = min(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size);
+		req = min3(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size,
+			   LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
 		done = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, chunk, req);
 
 		if (done == 0)
author maintainer
#591 lore raw

PATCH 591/783 pnode: terminate at peers of source

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.

The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt.

Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.

Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users.

While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some clarifications:

* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group.

* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.

* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.

* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term "master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group.

* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.

* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from.

* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group.

If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.

* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group.

* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.

The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree.

For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master.

* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount.

For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.

With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.

We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
               goto out;
}

Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree.

The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn't concern us a lot here.

It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent.

For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.

propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source.

Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.

Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later.

The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.

After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:

for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
                m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
        /* everything in that slave group */
        n = m;
        do {
                ret = propagate_one(n);
                if (ret)
                        goto out;
                n = next_peer(n);
        } while (n != m);
}

The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree.

The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters.

It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.

Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves.

The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that in a previous call to propagate_one().

The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on.

For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.

But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m.

Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.

If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree.

We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m:

for (n = m; ; n = p) {
        p = n->mnt_master;
        if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
                break;
}

For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.

Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.

So the first iteration sets:

n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;

such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:

n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;

If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.

Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

do {
        struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
        if (last_source == first_source)
                break;
        done = parent->mnt_master == p;
        if (done && peers(n, parent))
                break;
        last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick.

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence:

done = parent->mnt_master == p;

is trivially true in the base condition.

We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to:

last_dest = dest_mnt;

at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that's important.):

if (done && peers(n, parent))

        break;

So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.

At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.

By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again.

The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does.

If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.

IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.

Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.

So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.

The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group.

As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n

We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m.

We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m.

If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up.

This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from.

However, terminating the walk has corner cases.

If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.

We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.

So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master.

So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.

If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt():

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
                goto out;
}

will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.

Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently come last in that peer loop.

So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.

But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.

IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below.

For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216

    \
     (@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]:      609        609               shared:218

(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216

    \
     (P1) mnt_master[218]:               624        607               shared:218

(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216

    \
     (P2) mnt_master[218]:               625        576               shared:218

(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216

    \
     (P3) mnt_master[218]:               626        545               shared:218

After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218

    \  /
     \/
    (P4) mnt_slave                       627        483               master:218

will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).

When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.

We can fix this in multiple ways:

(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.

(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof.

The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in the near future.

This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues.

Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this.

Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held.

[  115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[  115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[  115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3
[  115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.856859] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.857531] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  115.860099] Call Trace:
[  115.860358]  <TASK>
[  115.860535]  propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190
[  115.860848]  attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0
[  115.861212]  path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60
[  115.861503]  __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140
[  115.861819]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[  115.862117]  ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250
[  115.862435]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.862826]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863133]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.863527]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863835]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864144]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864452]  ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[  115.864775]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[  115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe
[  115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff
c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[  115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000a5
[  115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe
[  115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620
[  115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620
[  115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076
[  115.870581]  </TASK>
[  115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4

nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath

[  115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010
[  115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.881548] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.882234] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes f2ebb3a921c1 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Fixes 5ec0811d3037 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave")

---
If there are no big objections I'll get this to Linus rather sooner than later.

---
 fs/pnode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pnode.c +1 -1
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m
 		}
 		do {
 			struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
-			if (last_source == first_source)
+			if (peers(last_source, first_source))
 				break;
 			done = parent->mnt_master == p;
 			if (done && peers(n, parent))
author maintainer
#592 lore raw

PATCH 592/783 md: fix a crash in mempool_free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream.

There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.

The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free.

We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.

We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown.

The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay]
 RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80
 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8
 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000
 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  __submit_bio+0x76/0x120
  submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0
  flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay]
  process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300
  worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
  kthread+0xc2/0x100
  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd]
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
---
 drivers/md/md.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -555,13 +555,14 @@ static void md_end_flush(struct bio *bio
 	struct md_rdev *rdev = bio->bi_private;
 	struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev;
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
 	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
 
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending)) {
 		/* The pre-request flush has finished */
 		queue_work(md_wq, &mddev->flush_work);
 	}
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 static void md_submit_flush_data(struct work_struct *ws);
@@ -966,10 +967,12 @@ static void super_written(struct bio *bi
 	} else
 		clear_bit(LastDev, &rdev->flags);
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
+	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
+
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes))
 		wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
-	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 void md_super_write(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
author maintainer
#593 lore raw

PATCH 593/783 mm, compaction: fix fast_isolate_around() to stay within boundaries

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: NARIBAYASHI Akira <[email protected]>

commit be21b32afe470c5ae98e27e49201158a47032942 upstream.

Depending on the memory configuration, isolate_freepages_block() may scan pages out of the target range and causes panic.

Panic can occur on systems with multiple zones in a single pageblock.

The reason it is rare is that it only happens in special configurations. Depending on how many similar systems there are, it may be a good idea to fix this problem for older kernels as well.

The problem is that pfn as argument of fast_isolate_around() could be out of the target range. Therefore we should consider the case where pfn < start_pfn, and also the case where end_pfn < pfn.

This problem should have been addressd by the commit 6e2b7044c199 ("mm,
compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone") but there was an oversight.

Case1: pfn < start_pfn

<at memory compaction for node Y>

  |  node X's zone  | node Y's zone
  +-----------------+------------------------------...
   pageblock    ^   ^     ^
  +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
                ^   ^     ^
                ^   ^      end_pfn
                ^    start_pfn = cc->zone->zone_start_pfn
                 pfn
                <---------> scanned range by "Scan After"

Case2: end_pfn < pfn

<at memory compaction for node X>

  |  node X's zone  | node Y's zone
  +-----------------+------------------------------...
   pageblock  ^     ^   ^
  +-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+...
              ^     ^   ^
              ^     ^    pfn
              ^      end_pfn
               start_pfn
              <---------> scanned range by "Scan Before"

It seems that there is no good reason to skip nr_isolated pages just after given pfn. So let perform simple scan from start to end instead of dividing the scan into "Before" and "After".

Fixes 6e2b7044c199 ("mm, compaction: make fast_isolate_freepages() stay within zone").
Cc David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
---
 mm/compaction.c |   18 +++++-------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
mm/compaction.c +5 -13
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ move_freelist_tail(struct list_head *fre
 }
 
 static void
-fast_isolate_around(struct compact_control *cc, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_isolated)
+fast_isolate_around(struct compact_control *cc, unsigned long pfn)
 {
 	unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn;
 	struct page *page;
@@ -1266,21 +1266,13 @@ fast_isolate_around(struct compact_contr
 	if (!page)
 		return;
 
-	/* Scan before */
-	if (start_pfn != pfn) {
-		isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
-		if (cc->nr_freepages >= cc->nr_migratepages)
-			return;
-	}
-
-	/* Scan after */
-	start_pfn = pfn + nr_isolated;
-	if (start_pfn < end_pfn)
-		isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, end_pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
+	isolate_freepages_block(cc, &start_pfn, end_pfn, &cc->freepages, 1, false);
 
 	/* Skip this pageblock in the future as it's full or nearly full */
 	if (cc->nr_freepages < cc->nr_migratepages)
 		set_pageblock_skip(page);
+
+	return;
 }
 
 /* Search orders in round-robin fashion */
@@ -1456,7 +1448,7 @@ fast_isolate_freepages(struct compact_co
 		return cc->free_pfn;
 
 	low_pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
-	fast_isolate_around(cc, low_pfn, nr_isolated);
+	fast_isolate_around(cc, low_pfn);
 	return low_pfn;
 }
 
author maintainer
#594 lore raw

PATCH 594/783 f2fs: should put a page when checking the summary info

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>

commit c3db3c2fd9992c08f49aa93752d3c103c3a4f6aa upstream.

The commit introduces another bug.

Fixes c6ad7fd16657e ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on summary info")
---
 fs/f2fs/gc.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/f2fs/gc.c +1 -0
@@ -1008,6 +1008,7 @@ static bool is_alive(struct f2fs_sb_info
 	if (ofs_in_node >= max_addrs) {
 		f2fs_err(sbi, "Inconsistent ofs_in_node:%u in summary, ino:%u, nid:%u, max:%u",
 			ofs_in_node, dni->ino, dni->nid, max_addrs);
+		f2fs_put_page(node_page, 1);
 		return false;
 	}