4.14.303-rc1 review
Subsystems (6)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/338 fbdev: vermilion: decrease reference count in error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xiongfeng Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 001f2cdb952a9566c77fb4b5470cc361db5601bb ]
pci_get_device() will increase the reference count for the returned pci_dev. For the error path, we need to use pci_dev_put() to decrease the reference count.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/vermilion.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/vermilion/vermilion.c +3 -1
@@ -291,8 +291,10 @@ static int vmlfb_get_gpu(struct vml_par *par)mutex_unlock (&vml_mutex); -if (pci_enable_device (par->gpu) <0 ) +if (pci_enable_device (par->gpu) <0 ) { +pci_dev_put (par->gpu);return -ENODEV ; + }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/338 fbdev: uvesafb: Fixes an error handling path in uvesafb_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a94371040712031ba129c7e9d8ff04a06a2f8207 ]
If an error occurs after a successful uvesafb_init_mtrr() call, it must be undone by a corresponding arch_phys_wc_del() call, as already done in the remove function.
This has been added in the remove function in commit 63e28a7a5ffc ("uvesafb: Clean up MTRR code")
--- drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/video/fbdev/uvesafb.c +1 -0
@@ -1754,6 +1754,7 @@ static int uvesafb_probe(struct platform_device *dev) out_unmap:iounmap (info->screen_base); out_mem: +arch_phys_wc_del (par->mtrr_handle);release_mem_region (info->fix.smem_start, info->fix.smem_len); out_reg:release_region (0x3c0 ,32 );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/338 HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix unbalanced pm_runtime_disable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f5181c35ed7ba0ceb6e42872aad1334d994b0175 ]
In error label 'out1' path in ssi_probe(), the pm_runtime_enable() has not been called yet, so pm_runtime_disable() is not needed.
--- drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c +1 -1
@@ -572,9 +572,9 @@ static int ssi_probe(struct platform_device *pd)device_for_each_child (&pd->dev,NULL , ssi_remove_ports); out2:ssi_remove_controller (ssi); +pm_runtime_disable (&pd->dev); out1:platform_set_drvdata (pd,NULL ); -pm_runtime_disable (&pd->dev);return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/338 HSI: omap_ssi_core: fix possible memory leak in ssi_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1aff514e1d2bd47854dbbdf867970b9d463d4c57 ]
If ssi_add_controller() returns error, it should call hsi_put_controller() to give up the reference that was set in hsi_alloc_controller(), so that it can call hsi_controller_release() to free controller and ports that allocated in hsi_alloc_controller().
--- drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c +3 -1
@@ -538,8 +538,10 @@ static int ssi_probe(struct platform_device *pd)platform_set_drvdata (pd, ssi); err =ssi_add_controller (ssi, pd); -if (err <0 ) +if (err <0 ) { +hsi_put_controller (ssi); goto out1; + }pm_runtime_enable (&pd->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/338 power: supply: fix residue sysfs file in error handle route of __power_supply_register()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zeng Heng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5b79480ce1978864ac3f06f2134dfa3b6691fe74 ]
If device_add() succeeds, we should call device_del() when want to get rid of it, so move it into proper jump symbol.
Otherwise, when __power_supply_register() returns fail and goto wakeup_init_failed to exit, there is still residue device file in sysfs. When attempt to probe device again, sysfs would complain as below:
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/i2c/i2c-0/0-001c/power_supply/adp5061'
Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x85 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x1c/0x29 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x1b1/0x1d0 kobject_add_internal+0x143/0x390 kobject_add+0x108/0x170
--- drivers/power/supply/power_supply_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/power/supply/power_supply_core.c +1 -1
@@ -934,8 +934,8 @@ __power_supply_register(struct device *parent, register_cooler_failed:psy_unregister_thermal (psy); register_thermal_failed: -device_del (dev); wakeup_init_failed: +device_del (dev); device_add_failed: check_supplies_failed: dev_set_name_failed:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/338 HSI: omap_ssi_core: Fix error handling in ssi_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yuan Can <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3ffa9f713c39a213a08d9ff13ab983a8aa5d8b5d ]
The ssi_init() returns the platform_driver_register() directly without checking its return value, if platform_driver_register() failed, the ssi_pdriver is not unregistered.
Fix by unregister ssi_pdriver when the last platform_driver_register() failed.
--- drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hsi/controllers/omap_ssi_core.c +7 -1
@@ -667,7 +667,13 @@ static int __init ssi_init(void) {if (ret)return ret; -return platform_driver_register (&ssi_port_pdriver); + ret =platform_driver_register (&ssi_port_pdriver); +if (ret) { +platform_driver_unregister (&ssi_pdriver); +return ret; + } + +return 0 ; }module_init (ssi_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/338 include/uapi/linux/swab: Fix potentially missing __always_inline
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Matt Redfearn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit defbab270d45e32b068e7e73c3567232d745c60f ]
Commit bc27fb68aaad ("include/uapi/linux/byteorder, swab: force inlining of some byteswap operations") added __always_inline to swab functions and commit 283d75737837 ("uapi/linux/stddef.h: Provide __always_inline to userspace headers") added a definition of __always_inline for use in exported headers when the kernel's compiler.h is not available.
However, since swab.h does not include stddef.h, if the header soup does not indirectly include it, the definition of __always_inline is missing, resulting in a compilation failure, which was observed compiling the perf tool using exported headers containing this commit:
In file included from /usr/include/linux/byteorder/little_endian.h:12:0,
from /usr/include/asm/byteorder.h:14,
from tools/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h:20,
from perf.h:8,
from builtin-bench.c:18:/usr/include/linux/swab.h:160:8: error: unknown type name `__always_inline'
static __always_inline __u16 __swab16p(const __u16 *p)
Fix this by replacing the inclusion of linux/compiler.h with linux/stddef.h to ensure that we pick up that definition if required, without relying on it's indirect inclusion. compiler.h is then included indirectly, via stddef.h.
--- include/uapi/linux/swab.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/swab.h +1 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@#define _UAPI_LINUX_SWAB_H#include <linux/types.h> -#include <linux/compiler.h> +#include <linux/stddef.h> #include <asm/bitsperlong.h> #include <asm/swab.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/338 rtc: snvs: Allow a time difference on clock register read
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stefan Eichenberger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0462681e207ccc44778a77b3297af728b1cf5b9f ]
On an iMX6ULL the following message appears when a wakealarm is set:
echo 0 > /sys/class/rtc/rtc1/wakealarm
rtc rtc1: Timeout trying to get valid LPSRT Counter read
This does not always happen but is reproducible quite often (7 out of 10 times). The problem appears because the iMX6ULL is not able to read the registers within one 32kHz clock cycle which is the base clock of the RTC. Therefore, this patch allows a difference of up to 320 cycles (10ms). 10ms was chosen to be big enough even on systems with less cpu power (e.g. iMX6ULL). According to the reference manual a difference is fine:
- If the two consecutive reads are similar, the value is correct. The values have to be similar, not equal.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-snvs.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-snvs.c +14 -2
@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@#define SNVS_LPPGDR_INIT 0x41736166#define CNTR_TO_SECS_SH 15 +/* The maximum RTC clock cycles that are allowed to pass between two +* consecutive clock counter register reads. If the values are corrupted a +* bigger difference is expected. The RTC frequency is 32kHz. With 320 cycles +* we end at 10ms which should be enough for most cases. If it once takes +* longer than expected we do a retry. +*/ +#define MAX_RTC_READ_DIFF_CYCLES 320 +struct snvs_rtc_data {struct rtc_device *rtc;struct regmap *regmap;
@@ -63,6 +71,7 @@ static u64 rtc_read_lpsrt(struct snvs_rtc_data *data)static u32 rtc_read_lp_counter (struct snvs_rtc_data *data) {u64 read1, read2; +s64 diff;unsigned int timeout =100 ;/* As expected, the registers might update between the read of the LSB
@@ -73,7 +82,8 @@ static u32 rtc_read_lp_counter(struct snvs_rtc_data *data)do { read2 = read1; read1 =rtc_read_lpsrt (data); - }while (read1 != read2 && --timeout); + diff = read1 - read2; + }while (((diff <0 ) || (diff >MAX_RTC_READ_DIFF_CYCLES )) && --timeout);if (!timeout)dev_err (&data->rtc->dev,"Timeout trying to get valid LPSRT Counter read\n" );
@@ -85,13 +95,15 @@ static u32 rtc_read_lp_counter(struct snvs_rtc_data *data)static int rtc_read_lp_counter_lsb (struct snvs_rtc_data *data,u32 *lsb) {u32 count1, count2; +s32 diff;unsigned int timeout =100 ;regmap_read (data->regmap, data->offset +SNVS_LPSRTCLR , &count1);do { count2 = count1;regmap_read (data->regmap, data->offset +SNVS_LPSRTCLR , &count1); - }while (count1 != count2 && --timeout); + diff = count1 - count2; + }while (((diff <0 ) || (diff >MAX_RTC_READ_DIFF_CYCLES )) && --timeout);if (!timeout) {dev_err (&data->rtc->dev,"Timeout trying to get valid LPSRT Counter read\n" );return -ETIMEDOUT ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/338 iommu/amd: Fix pci device refcount leak in ppr_notifier()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6cf0981c2233f97d56938d9d61845383d6eb227c ]
As comment of pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot() says, it returns a pci device with refcount increment, when finish using it, the caller must decrement the reference count by calling pci_dev_put(). So call it before returning from ppr_notifier() to avoid refcount leak.
--- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c +1 -0
@@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ static int ppr_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long e, void *data)put_device_state (dev_state); out: +pci_dev_put (pdev);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/338 iommu/fsl_pamu: Fix resource leak in fsl_pamu_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yuan Can <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 73f5fc5f884ad0c5f7d57f66303af64f9f002526 ]
The fsl_pamu_probe() returns directly when create_csd() failed, leaving irq and memories unreleased.
Fix by jumping to error if create_csd() returns error.
--- drivers/iommu/fsl_pamu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/iommu/fsl_pamu.c +1 -1
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ static int fsl_pamu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) ret =create_csd (ppaact_phys, mem_size, csd_port_id);if (ret) {dev_err (dev,"could not create coherence subdomain\n" ); -return ret; + goto error; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/338 macintosh: fix possible memory leak in macio_add_one_device()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ca86eae55a2f006e6c1edd2029b2cacb6979515 ]
Afer commit 1fa5ae857bb1 ("driver core: get rid of struct device's bus_id string array"), the name of device is allocated dynamically. It needs to be freed when of_device_register() fails. Call put_device() to give up the reference that's taken in device_initialize(), so that it can be freed in kobject_cleanup() when the refcount hits 0.
macio device is freed in macio_release_dev(), so the kfree() can be removed.
--- drivers/macintosh/macio_asic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/macintosh/macio_asic.c +1 -1
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static struct macio_dev * macio_add_one_device(struct macio_chip *chip,if (of_device_register (&dev->ofdev) !=0 ) {printk (KERN_DEBUG "macio: device registration error for %s!\n" ,dev_name (&dev->ofdev.dev)); -kfree (dev); +put_device (&dev->ofdev.dev);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/338 macintosh/macio-adb: check the return value of ioremap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xie Shaowen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dbaa3105736d4d73063ea0a3b01cd7fafce924e6 ]
The function ioremap() in macio_init() can fail, so its return value should be checked.
--- drivers/macintosh/macio-adb.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/macintosh/macio-adb.c +4 -0
@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ int macio_init(void)return -ENXIO ; } adb =ioremap (r.start,sizeof (struct adb_regs )); +if (!adb) { +of_node_put (adbs); +return -ENOMEM ; + }out_8 (&adb->ctrl.r,0 );out_8 (&adb->intr.r,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/338 powerpc/52xx: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5836947613ef33d311b4eff6a32d019580a214f5 ]
The error handling path of mpc52xx_lpbfifo_probe() has a request_irq() that is not balanced by a corresponding free_irq().
Add the missing call, as already done in the remove function.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_lpbfifo.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_lpbfifo.c +1 -0
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static int mpc52xx_lpbfifo_probe(struct platform_device *op) err_bcom_rx_irq:bcom_gen_bd_rx_release (lpbfifo.bcom_rx_task); err_bcom_rx: +free_irq (lpbfifo.irq, &lpbfifo); err_irq:iounmap (lpbfifo.regs); lpbfifo.regs =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/338 cxl: Fix refcount leak in cxl_calc_capp_routing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1d09697ff22908ae487fc8c4fbde1811732be523 ]
of_get_next_parent() returns a node pointer with refcount incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore. This function only calls of_node_put() in normal path, missing it in the error path.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
--- drivers/misc/cxl/pci.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/misc/cxl/pci.c +1 -0
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ int cxl_calc_capp_routing(struct pci_dev *dev, u64 *chipid, rc =get_phb_index (np, phb_index);if (rc) {pr_err ("cxl: invalid phb index\n" ); +of_node_put (np);return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/338 powerpc/xive: add missing iounmap() in error path in xive_spapr_populate_irq_data()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8b49670f3bb3f10cd4d5a6dca17f5a31b173ecdc ]
If remapping 'data->trig_page' fails, the 'data->eoi_mmio' need be unmapped before returning from xive_spapr_populate_irq_data().
--- arch/powerpc/sysdev/xive/spapr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/sysdev/xive/spapr.c +1 -0
@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ static int xive_spapr_populate_irq_data(u32 hw_irq, struct xive_irq_data *data) data->trig_mmio =ioremap (data->trig_page,1u << data->esb_shift);if (!data->trig_mmio) { +iounmap (data->eoi_mmio);pr_err ("Failed to map trigger page for irq 0x%x\n" , hw_irq);return -ENOMEM ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/338 powerpc/perf: callchain validate kernel stack pointer bounds
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 32c5209214bd8d4f8c4e9d9b630ef4c671f58e79 ]
The interrupt frame detection and loads from the hypothetical pt_regs are not bounds-checked. The next-frame validation only bounds-checks STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD, which does not include the pt_regs. Add another test for this.
The user could set r1 to be equal to the address matching the first interrupt frame - STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE, which is in the previous page due to the kernel redzone, and induce the kernel to load the marker from there. Possibly this could cause a crash at least. If the user could induce the previous page to contain a valid marker, then it might be able to direct perf to read specific memory addresses in a way that could be transmitted back to the user in the perf data.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/perf/callchain.c +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ perf_callchain_kernel(struct perf_callchain_entry_ctx *entry, struct pt_regs *re next_sp = fp[0 ];if (next_sp == sp +STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE && +validate_sp (sp, current,STACK_INT_FRAME_SIZE ) && fp[STACK_FRAME_MARKER ] ==STACK_FRAME_REGS_MARKER ) {/* * This looks like an interrupt frame for an
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/338 powerpc/83xx/mpc832x_rdb: call platform_device_put() in error case in of_fsl_spi_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4d0eea415216fe3791da2f65eb41399e70c7bedf ]
If platform_device_add() is not called or failed, it can not call platform_device_del() to clean up memory, it should call platform_device_put() in error case.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/83xx/mpc832x_rdb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/83xx/mpc832x_rdb.c +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static int __init of_fsl_spi_probe(char *type, char *compatible, u32 sysclk, goto next; unreg: -platform_device_del (pdev); +platform_device_put (pdev); err:pr_err ("%pOF: registration failed\n" , np); next:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/338 powerpc/hv-gpci: Fix hv_gpci event list
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 03f7c1d2a49acd30e38789cd809d3300721e9b0e ]
Based on getPerfCountInfo v1.018 documentation, some of the hv_gpci events were deprecated for platform firmware that supports counter_info_version 0x8 or above.
Fix the hv_gpci event list by adding a new attribute group called "hv_gpci_event_attrs_v6" and a "ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6" macro to enable these events for platform firmware
that supports counter_info_version 0x6 or below. And assigning the hv_gpci event list based on output counter info version of underlying plaform.
--- arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci-requests.h | 4 ++++ arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/perf/req-gen/perf.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci-requests.h +4 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ REQUEST(__field(0, 8, partition_id) )#include I (REQUEST_END ) +#ifdef ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6 /* * Not available for counter_info_version >= 0x8, use * run_instruction_cycles_by_partition(0x100) instead.
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ REQUEST(__field(0, 8, partition_id) __count(0x10, 8, cycles) )#include I (REQUEST_END ) +#endif #define REQUEST_NAME system_performance_capabilities#define REQUEST_NUM 0x40
@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ REQUEST(__field(0, 1, perf_collect_privileged) )#include I (REQUEST_END ) +#ifdef ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6 #define REQUEST_NAME processor_bus_utilization_abc_links#define REQUEST_NUM 0x50#define REQUEST_IDX_KIND "hw_chip_id=?"
@@ -194,6 +197,7 @@ REQUEST(__field(0, 4, phys_processor_idx) __count(0x28, 8, instructions_completed) )#include I (REQUEST_END ) +#endif /* Processor_core_power_mode (0x95) skipped, no counters */ /* Affinity_domain_information_by_virtual_processor (0xA0) skipped,
arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.c +32 -1
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static struct attribute_group format_group = {static struct attribute_group event_group = { .name ="events" , - .attrs = hv_gpci_event_attrs, +/* .attrs is set in init */ };#define HV_CAPS_ATTR (_name, _format) \
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static int hv_gpci_init(void)int r;unsigned long hret;struct hv_perf_caps caps; +struct hv_gpci_request_buffer *arg;hv_gpci_assert_offsets_correct ();
@@ -310,6 +311,36 @@ static int hv_gpci_init(void)/* sampling not supported */ h_gpci_pmu.capabilities |=PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_INTERRUPT ; + arg = (void *)get_cpu_var (hv_gpci_reqb); +memset (arg,0 ,HGPCI_REQ_BUFFER_SIZE ); + +/* +* hcall H_GET_PERF_COUNTER_INFO populates the output +* counter_info_version value based on the system hypervisor. +* Pass the counter request 0x10 corresponds to request type +* 'Dispatch_timebase_by_processor', to get the supported +* counter_info_version. +*/ + arg->params.counter_request =cpu_to_be32 (0x10 ); + + r =plpar_hcall_norets (H_GET_PERF_COUNTER_INFO , +virt_to_phys (arg),HGPCI_REQ_BUFFER_SIZE ); +if (r) { +pr_devel ("hcall failed, can't get supported counter_info_version: 0x%x\n" , r); + arg->params.counter_info_version_out =0x8 ; + } + +/* +* Use counter_info_version_out value to assign +* required hv-gpci event list. +*/ +if (arg->params.counter_info_version_out >=0x8 ) + event_group.attrs = hv_gpci_event_attrs; +else + event_group.attrs = hv_gpci_event_attrs_v6; + +put_cpu_var (hv_gpci_reqb); + r =perf_pmu_register (&h_gpci_pmu, h_gpci_pmu.name,-1 );if (r)return r;
arch/powerpc/perf/hv-gpci.h +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ enum {#define REQUEST_FILE "../hv-gpci-requests.h"#define NAME_LOWER hv_gpci#define NAME_UPPER HV_GPCI +#define ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6 #include "req-gen/perf.h" #undef REQUEST_FILE#undef NAME_LOWER
arch/powerpc/perf/req-gen/perf.h +20 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,26 @@ PMU_EVENT_ATTR_STRING( \#define REQUEST_ (r_name, r_value, r_idx_1, r_fields) \ r_fields +/* Generate event list for platforms with counter_info_version 0x6 or below */ +static __maybe_unused struct attribute *hv_gpci_event_attrs_v6[] = { +#include REQUEST_FILE +NULL +}; + +/* +* Based on getPerfCountInfo v1.018 documentation, some of the hv-gpci +* events were deprecated for platform firmware that supports +* counter_info_version 0x8 or above. +* Those deprecated events are still part of platform firmware that +* support counter_info_version 0x6 and below. As per the getPerfCountInfo +* v1.018 documentation there is no counter_info_version 0x7. +* Undefining macro ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6, to disable the addition of +* deprecated events in "hv_gpci_event_attrs" attribute group, for platforms +* that supports counter_info_version 0x8 or above. +*/ +#undef ENABLE_EVENTS_COUNTERINFO_V6 + +/* Generate event list for platforms with counter_info_version 0x8 or above*/ static __maybe_unused struct attribute *hv_gpci_event_attrs[] = { #include REQUEST_FILE NULL
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/338 selftests/powerpc: Fix resource leaks
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8f4ab7da904ab7027ccd43ddb4f0094e932a5877 ]
In check_all_cpu_dscr_defaults, opendir() opens the directory stream. Add missing closedir() in the error path to release it.
In check_cpu_dscr_default, open() creates an open file descriptor. Add missing close() in the error path to release it.
--- tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/dscr/dscr_sysfs_test.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/dscr/dscr_sysfs_test.c +4 -1
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ static int check_cpu_dscr_default(char *file, unsigned long val) rc =read (fd, buf,sizeof (buf));if (rc ==-1 ) {perror ("read() failed" ); +close (fd);return 1 ; }close (fd);
@@ -64,8 +65,10 @@ static int check_all_cpu_dscr_defaults(unsigned long val)if (access (file,F_OK ))continue ; -if (check_cpu_dscr_default (file, val)) +if (check_cpu_dscr_default (file, val)) { +closedir (sysfs);return 1 ; + } }closedir (sysfs);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/338 rtc: st-lpc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in st_rtc_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5fb733d7bd6949e90028efdce8bd528c6ab7cf1e ]
The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of clk_get_rate(), fix it.
--- drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c +1 -0
@@ -246,6 +246,7 @@ static int st_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) rtc->clkrate =clk_get_rate (rtc->clk);if (!rtc->clkrate) { +clk_disable_unprepare (rtc->clk);dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Unable to fetch clock rate\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/338 nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dan Aloni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3bc8edc98bd43540dbe648e4ef91f443d6d20a24 ]
On error situation clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt should not be given a reference to the xprt otherwise both client cleanup and the error handling path of the caller call to put it. Better to delay handing over the reference to a later branch.
[ 72.530665] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 72.531933] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 173 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120 [ 72.533075] Modules linked in: nfsd(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfsv3(OE) nfs(OE) lockd(OE) compat_nfs_ssc(OE) nfs_acl(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(OE) auth_rpcgss(OE) rpcrdma(OE) dns_resolver fscache netfs grace rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm sunrpc(OE) mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf ib_uverbs ib_core xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nft_counter xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter bridge stp llc nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set overlay nf_tables nfnetlink crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xfs serio_raw virtio_net virtio_blk net_failover failover fuse [last unloaded: sunrpc] [ 72.540389] CPU: 0 PID: 173 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G OE 5.15.82-dan #1 [ 72.541511] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+1084+97b81f61 04/01/2014 [ 72.542717] Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_run_cb_work [nfsd] [ 72.543575] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120 [ 72.544299] Code: 55 00 0f 0b 5d e9 01 50 98 00 80 3d 75 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 e8 d1 60 8e c6 05 61 9e 39 08 01 e8 f6 51 55 00 <0f> 0b 5d e9 d9 4f 98 00 80 3d 4b 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 4c ff ff ff 48 [ 72.546666] RSP: 0018:ffffb3f841157cf0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 72.547393] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff89ac6231d478 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 72.548324] RDX: ffff89adb7c2c2c0 RSI: ffff89adb7c205c0 RDI: ffff89adb7c205c0 [ 72.549271] RBP: ffffb3f841157cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffefffff [ 72.550209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb3f841157ad0 R12: ffff89ac6231d180 [ 72.551142] R13: ffff89ac6231d478 R14: ffff89ac40c06180 R15: ffff89ac6231d4b0 [ 72.552089] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89adb7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 72.553175] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 72.553934] CR2: 0000563a310506a8 CR3: 0000000109a66000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 72.554874] Call Trace: [ 72.555278] <TASK> [ 72.555614] svc_xprt_put+0xaf/0xe0 [sunrpc] [ 72.556276] nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.11+0xb7/0x410 [nfsd] [ 72.557087] ? update_load_avg+0x82/0x610 [ 72.557652] ? cpuacct_charge+0x60/0x70 [ 72.558212] ? dequeue_entity+0xdb/0x3e0 [ 72.558765] ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x20 [ 72.559358] nfsd4_run_cb_work+0xfc/0x270 [nfsd] [ 72.560031] process_one_work+0x1df/0x390 [ 72.560600] worker_thread+0x37/0x3b0 [ 72.561644] ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390 [ 72.562247] kthread+0x12f/0x150 [ 72.562710] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [ 72.563309] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 72.563818] </TASK> [ 72.564189] ---[ end trace 031117b1c72ec616 ]--- [ 72.566019] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff89ac4977e538), but was ffff89ac4763e018. (next=ffff89ac4763e018). [ 72.567647] ------------[ cut here ]------------
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +3 -1
@@ -813,7 +813,6 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c }else {if (!conn->cb_xprt)return -EINVAL ; - clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt; clp->cl_cb_session = ses; args.bc_xprt = conn->cb_xprt; args.prognumber = clp->cl_cb_session->se_cb_prog;
@@ -833,6 +832,9 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *crpc_shutdown_client (client);return PTR_ERR (cred); } + +if (clp->cl_minorversion !=0 ) + clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt; clp->cl_cb_client = client; clp->cl_cb_cred = cred;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/338 mISDN: hfcsusb: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ddc9648db162eee556edd5222d2808fe33730203 ]
It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.
It should use dev_kfree_skb_irq() or dev_consume_skb_irq() instead. The difference between them is free reason, dev_kfree_skb_irq() means the SKB is dropped in error and dev_consume_skb_irq() means the SKB is consumed in normal.
skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcusb_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.
In tx_iso_complete(), dev_kfree_skb() is called to consume the transmitted SKB, so replace it with dev_consume_skb_irq().
--- drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c +8 -4
@@ -337,20 +337,24 @@ hfcusb_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)test_and_clear_bit (FLG_L2_ACTIVATED , &dch->Flags);if (hw->protocol ==ISDN_P_NT_S0 ) { +struct sk_buff_head free_queue; + +__skb_queue_head_init (&free_queue);hfcsusb_ph_command (hw,HFC_L1_DEACTIVATE_NT );spin_lock_irqsave (&hw->lock, flags); -skb_queue_purge (&dch->squeue); +skb_queue_splice_init (&dch->squeue, &free_queue);if (dch->tx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->tx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->tx_skb); dch->tx_skb =NULL ; } dch->tx_idx =0 ;if (dch->rx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->rx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->rx_skb); dch->rx_skb =NULL ; }test_and_clear_bit (FLG_TX_BUSY , &dch->Flags);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hw->lock, flags); +__skb_queue_purge (&free_queue);#ifdef FIXME if (test_and_clear_bit (FLG_L1_BUSY , &dch->Flags))dchannel_sched_event (&hc->dch,D_CLEARBUSY );
@@ -1340,7 +1344,7 @@ tx_iso_complete(struct urb *urb)printk ("\n" ); } -dev_kfree_skb (tx_skb); +dev_consume_skb_irq (tx_skb); tx_skb =NULL ;if (fifo->dch &&get_next_dframe (fifo->dch)) tx_skb = fifo->dch->tx_skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/338 mISDN: hfcpci: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f0f596bd75a9d573ca9b587abb39cee0b916bb82 ]
It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.
skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcpci_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.
--- drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c +9 -4
@@ -1631,16 +1631,19 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)test_and_clear_bit (FLG_L2_ACTIVATED , &dch->Flags);spin_lock_irqsave (&hc->lock, flags);if (hc->hw.protocol ==ISDN_P_NT_S0 ) { +struct sk_buff_head free_queue; + +__skb_queue_head_init (&free_queue);/* prepare deactivation */ Write_hfc (hc,HFCPCI_STATES ,0x40 ); -skb_queue_purge (&dch->squeue); +skb_queue_splice_init (&dch->squeue, &free_queue);if (dch->tx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->tx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->tx_skb); dch->tx_skb =NULL ; } dch->tx_idx =0 ;if (dch->rx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->rx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->rx_skb); dch->rx_skb =NULL ; }test_and_clear_bit (FLG_TX_BUSY , &dch->Flags);
@@ -1653,10 +1656,12 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb) hc->hw.mst_m &= ~HFCPCI_MASTER ;Write_hfc (hc,HFCPCI_MST_MODE , hc->hw.mst_m); ret =0 ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hc->lock, flags); +__skb_queue_purge (&free_queue); }else { ret =l1_event (dch->l1, hh->prim); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hc->lock, flags); } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hc->lock, flags);break ; }if (!ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/338 mISDN: hfcmulti: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1232946cf522b8de9e398828bde325d7c41f29dd ]
It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.
skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in handle_dmsg() and hfcm_l1callback(), kfree_skb() is called in them, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.
--- drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c +13 -6
@@ -3233,6 +3233,7 @@ static int hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd) {struct hfc_multi *hc = dch->hw; +struct sk_buff_head free_queue;u_long flags;switch (cmd) {
@@ -3261,6 +3262,7 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)l1_event (dch->l1,HW_POWERUP_IND );break ;case HW_DEACT_REQ : +__skb_queue_head_init (&free_queue);/* start deactivation */ spin_lock_irqsave (&hc->lock, flags);if (hc->ctype ==HFC_TYPE_E1 ) {
@@ -3280,20 +3282,21 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)plxsd_checksync (hc,0 ); } } -skb_queue_purge (&dch->squeue); +skb_queue_splice_init (&dch->squeue, &free_queue);if (dch->tx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->tx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->tx_skb); dch->tx_skb =NULL ; } dch->tx_idx =0 ;if (dch->rx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->rx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->rx_skb); dch->rx_skb =NULL ; }test_and_clear_bit (FLG_TX_BUSY , &dch->Flags);if (test_and_clear_bit (FLG_BUSY_TIMER , &dch->Flags))del_timer (&dch->timer);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hc->lock, flags); +__skb_queue_purge (&free_queue);break ;case HW_POWERUP_REQ :spin_lock_irqsave (&hc->lock, flags);
@@ -3400,6 +3403,9 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)case PH_DEACTIVATE_REQ :test_and_clear_bit (FLG_L2_ACTIVATED , &dch->Flags);if (dch->dev.D.protocol !=ISDN_P_TE_S0 ) { +struct sk_buff_head free_queue; + +__skb_queue_head_init (&free_queue);spin_lock_irqsave (&hc->lock, flags);if (debug &DEBUG_HFCMULTI_MSG ) printk(KERN_DEBUG
@@ -3421,14 +3427,14 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)/* deactivate */ dch->state =1 ; } -skb_queue_purge (&dch->squeue); +skb_queue_splice_init (&dch->squeue, &free_queue);if (dch->tx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->tx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->tx_skb); dch->tx_skb =NULL ; } dch->tx_idx =0 ;if (dch->rx_skb) { -dev_kfree_skb (dch->rx_skb); +__skb_queue_tail (&free_queue, dch->rx_skb); dch->rx_skb =NULL ; }test_and_clear_bit (FLG_TX_BUSY , &dch->Flags);
@@ -3440,6 +3446,7 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)#endif ret =0 ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hc->lock, flags); +__skb_queue_purge (&free_queue); }else ret =l1_event (dch->l1, hh->prim);break ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/338 nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9f28157778ede0d4f183f7ab3b46995bb400abbe ]
Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with memset() before they are used.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put Call Trace: memcpy nla_put nfc_genl_dump_targets genl_lock_dumpit netlink_dump __netlink_dump_start genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit genl_rcv_msg netlink_rcv_skb genl_rcv netlink_unicast netlink_sendmsg sock_sendmsg ____sys_sendmsg ___sys_sendmsg __sys_sendmsg do_syscall_64
--- drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c +4 -0
@@ -1305,6 +1305,8 @@ static int pn533_poll_dep_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,if (IS_ERR (resp))return PTR_ERR (resp); +memset (&nfc_target,0 ,sizeof (struct nfc_target )); + rsp = (struct pn533_cmd_jump_dep_response *)resp->data; rc = rsp->status &PN533_CMD_RET_MASK ;
@@ -1786,6 +1788,8 @@ static int pn533_in_dep_link_up_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,dev_dbg (dev->dev,"Creating new target\n" ); +memset (&nfc_target,0 ,sizeof (struct nfc_target )); + nfc_target.supported_protocols =NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP_MASK ; nfc_target.nfcid1_len =10 ;memcpy (nfc_target.nfcid1, rsp->nfcid3t, nfc_target.nfcid1_len);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/338 r6040: Fix kmemleak in probe and remove
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Li Zetao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7e43039a49c2da45edc1d9d7c9ede4003ab45a5f ]
There is a memory leaks reported by kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff888116111000 (size 2048):
comm "modprobe", pid 817, jiffies 4294759745 (age 76.502s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 c4 0a 04 81 88 ff ff 08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff ................
08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff815bcd82>] kmalloc_trace+0x22/0x60
[<ffffffff827e20ee>] phy_device_create+0x4e/0x90
[<ffffffff827e6072>] get_phy_device+0xd2/0x220
[<ffffffff827e7844>] mdiobus_scan+0xa4/0x2e0
[<ffffffff827e8be2>] __mdiobus_register+0x482/0x8b0
[<ffffffffa01f5d24>] r6040_init_one+0x714/0xd2c [r6040]
...The problem occurs in probe process as follows:
r6040_init_one:
mdiobus_register
mdiobus_scan <- alloc and register phy_device,
the reference count of phy_device is 3
r6040_mii_probe
phy_connect <- connect to the first phy_device,
so the reference count of the first phy_device is 4, others are 3
register_netdev <- fault inject succeeded, goto error handling path
// error handling path
err_out_mdio_unregister:
mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
err_out_mdio:
mdiobus_free(lp->mii_bus); <- the reference count of the first
phy_device is 1, it is not released and other phy_devices are released
// similarly, the remove process also has the same problem
The root cause is traced to the phy_device is not disconnected when removes one r6040 device in r6040_remove_one() or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully. In r6040_mii_probe(), a net ethernet device is connected to the first PHY device of mii_bus, in order to notify the connected driver when the link status changes, which is the default behavior of the PHY infrastructure to handle everything. Therefore the phy_device should be disconnected when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path.
Fix it by adding phy_disconnect() when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c +4 -1
@@ -1184,10 +1184,12 @@ static int r6040_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) err =register_netdev (dev);if (err) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to register net device\n" ); - goto err_out_mdio_unregister; + goto err_out_phy_disconnect; }return 0 ; +err_out_phy_disconnect: +phy_disconnect (dev->phydev); err_out_mdio_unregister:mdiobus_unregister (lp->mii_bus); err_out_mdio:
@@ -1211,6 +1213,7 @@ static void r6040_remove_one(struct pci_dev *pdev)struct r6040_private *lp =netdev_priv (dev);unregister_netdev (dev); +phy_disconnect (dev->phydev);mdiobus_unregister (lp->mii_bus);mdiobus_free (lp->mii_bus);netif_napi_del (&lp->napi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/338 openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 68bb10101e6b0a6bb44e9c908ef795fc4af99eae ]
The commit mentioned below causes the ovs_flow_tbl_lookup() function to be called with the masked key. However, it's supposed to be called with the unmasked key. This due to the fact that the datapath supports installing wider flows, and OVS relies on this behavior. For example if ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0, dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0) exists, a wider flow (smaller mask) of ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/128.0.0.0,dst=192.1.1.2/ 128.0.0.0) is allowed to be added.
However, if we try to add a wildcard rule, the installation fails:
$ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \ ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0,dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2 $ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \ ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/0.0.0.0,dst=49.1.1.2/0.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2 ovs-vswitchd: updating flow table (File exists)
The reason is that the key used to determine if the flow is already present in the system uses the original key ANDed with the mask. This results in the IP address not being part of the (miniflow) key, i.e., being substituted with an all-zero value. When doing the actual lookup, this results in the key wrongfully matching the first flow, and therefore the flow does not get installed.
This change reverses the commit below, but rather than having the key on the stack, it's allocated.
--- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/datapath.c +16 -9
@@ -930,6 +930,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)struct sw_flow_mask mask;struct sk_buff *reply;struct datapath *dp; +struct sw_flow_key *key;struct sw_flow_actions *acts;struct sw_flow_match match;u32 ufid_flags =ovs_nla_get_ufid_flags (a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID_FLAGS ]);
@@ -957,24 +958,26 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) }/* Extract key. */ -ovs_match_init (&match, &new_flow->key, false, &mask); + key =kzalloc (sizeof (*key),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!key) { + error = -ENOMEM ; + goto err_kfree_key; + } + +ovs_match_init (&match, key, false, &mask); error =ovs_nla_get_match (net, &match, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY ], a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MASK ], log);if (error) goto err_kfree_flow; +ovs_flow_mask_key (&new_flow->key, key, true, &mask); +/* Extract flow identifier. */ error =ovs_nla_get_identifier (&new_flow->id, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID ], - &new_flow->key, log); + key, log);if (error) goto err_kfree_flow; -/* unmasked key is needed to match when ufid is not used. */ -if (ovs_identifier_is_key (&new_flow->id)) - match.key = new_flow->id.unmasked_key; - -ovs_flow_mask_key (&new_flow->key, &new_flow->key, true, &mask); -/* Validate actions. */ error =ovs_nla_copy_actions (net, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_ACTIONS ], &new_flow->key, &acts, log);
@@ -1001,7 +1004,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (ovs_identifier_is_ufid (&new_flow->id)) flow =ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_ufid (&dp->table, &new_flow->id);if (!flow) - flow =ovs_flow_tbl_lookup (&dp->table, &new_flow->key); + flow =ovs_flow_tbl_lookup (&dp->table, key);if (likely (!flow)) {rcu_assign_pointer (new_flow->sf_acts, acts);
@@ -1071,6 +1074,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (reply)ovs_notify (&dp_flow_genl_family, reply, info); + +kfree (key);return 0 ; err_unlock_ovs:
@@ -1080,6 +1085,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)ovs_nla_free_flow_actions (acts); err_kfree_flow:ovs_flow_free (new_flow, false); +err_kfree_key: +kfree (key); error:return error; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/338 skbuff: Account for tail adjustment during pull operations
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2d7afdcbc9d32423f177ee12b7c93783aea338fb ]
Extending the tail can have some unexpected side effects if a program uses a helper like BPF_FUNC_skb_pull_data to read partial content beyond the head skb headlen when all the skbs in the gso frag_list are linear with no head_frag -
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4219!
pc : skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c lr : skb_segment+0x63c/0xd2c Call trace: skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c __udp_gso_segment+0xa4/0x544 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x184/0x1c0 inet_gso_segment+0x16c/0x3a4 skb_mac_gso_segment+0xd4/0x1b0 __skb_gso_segment+0xcc/0x12c udp_rcv_segment+0x54/0x16c udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x78/0x144 udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x8c/0xa4 __udp4_lib_rcv+0x490/0x68c udp_rcv+0x20/0x30 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1b0/0x33c ip_local_deliver+0xd8/0x1f0 ip_rcv+0x98/0x1a4 deliver_ptype_list_skb+0x98/0x1ec __netif_receive_skb_core+0x978/0xc60
Fix this by marking these skbs as GSO_DODGY so segmentation can handle the tail updates accordingly.
--- net/core/skbuff.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -0
@@ -1951,6 +1951,9 @@ void *__pskb_pull_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, int delta) insp = list; }else {/* Eaten partially. */ +if (skb_is_gso (skb) && !list->head_frag && +skb_headlen (list)) +skb_shinfo (skb)->gso_type |=SKB_GSO_DODGY ;if (skb_shared (list)) {/* Sucks! We need to fork list. :-( */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/338 net_sched: reject TCF_EM_SIMPLE case for complex ematch module
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9cd3fd2054c3b3055163accbf2f31a4426f10317 ]
When TCF_EM_SIMPLE was introduced, it is supposed to be convenient for ematch implementation:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
"You don't have to, providing a 32bit data chunk without TCF_EM_SIMPLE set will simply result in allocating & copy. It's an optimization, nothing more."
So if an ematch module provides ops->datalen that means it wants a complex data structure (saved in its em->data) instead of a simple u32 value. We should simply reject such a combination, otherwise this u32 could be misinterpreted as a pointer.
--- net/sched/ematch.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/sched/ematch.c +2 -0
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@ static int tcf_em_validate(struct tcf_proto *tp,* the value carried. */ if (em_hdr->flags &TCF_EM_SIMPLE ) { +if (em->ops->datalen >0 ) + goto errout;if (data_len <sizeof (u32)) goto errout; em->data = *(u32 *) data;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/338 myri10ge: Fix an error handling path in myri10ge_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d83b950d44d2982c0e62e3d81b0f35ab09431008 ]
Some memory allocated in myri10ge_probe_slices() is not released in the error handling path of myri10ge_probe().
Add the corresponding kfree(), as already done in the remove function.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c +1 -0
@@ -3961,6 +3961,7 @@ static int myri10ge_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)myri10ge_free_slices (mgp); abort_with_firmware: +kfree (mgp->msix_vectors);myri10ge_dummy_rdma (mgp,0 ); abort_with_ioremap:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/338 net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e0c8bccd40fc1c19e1d246c39bcf79e357e1ada3 ]
Changheon Lee reported TCP socket leaks, with a nice repro.
It seems we leak TCP sockets with the following sequence:
1) SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is enabled on the socket.
Each ACK will cook an skb put in error queue, from __skb_tstamp_tx(). __skb_tstamp_tx() is using skb_clone(), unless SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY was also requested.
2) If the application is also using MSG_ZEROCOPY, then we put in the error queue cloned skbs that had a struct ubuf_info attached to them.
Whenever an struct ubuf_info is allocated, sock_zerocopy_alloc() does a sock_hold().
As long as the cloned skbs are still in sk_error_queue, socket refcount is kept elevated.
3) Application closes the socket, while error queue is not empty.
Since tcp_close() no longer purges the socket error queue, we might end up with a TCP socket with at least one skb in error queue keeping the socket alive forever.
This bug can be (ab)used to consume all kernel memory and freeze the host.
We need to purge the error queue, with proper synchronization against concurrent writers.
--- net/core/stream.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/core/stream.c +6 -0
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ void sk_stream_kill_queues(struct sock *sk)/* First the read buffer. */ __skb_queue_purge (&sk->sk_receive_queue); +/* Next, the error queue. +* We need to use queue lock, because other threads might +* add packets to the queue without socket lock being held. +*/ +skb_queue_purge (&sk->sk_error_queue); +/* Next, the write queue. */ WARN_ON (!skb_queue_empty (&sk->sk_write_queue));
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/338 binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6a46bf558803dd2b959ca7435a5c143efe837217 ]
UBSAN reported a shift-out-of-bounds warning:
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:151 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x208 lib/ubsan.c:322 check_special_flags fs/binfmt_misc.c:241 [inline] create_entry fs/binfmt_misc.c:456 [inline] bm_register_write+0x9d3/0xa20 fs/binfmt_misc.c:654 vfs_write+0x11e/0x580 fs/read_write.c:582 ksys_write+0xcf/0x120 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x4194e1
Since the type of Node's flags is unsigned long, we should define these macros with same type too.
--- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/binfmt_misc.c +4 -4
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ static LIST_HEAD(entries);static int enabled =1 ;enum {Enabled, Magic}; -#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << 31) -#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1 << 30) -#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1 << 29) -#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1 << 28) +#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1UL << 31) +#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1UL << 30) +#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1UL << 29) +#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1UL << 28) typedef struct { struct list_head list;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/338 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 898f706695682b9954f280d95e49fa86ffa55d08 ]
Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.
Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp. Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount.
--- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +16 -6
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)struct bmap *bmp;struct dbmap_disk *dbmp_le;struct metapage *mp; -int i; +int i, err;/* * allocate/initialize the in-memory bmap descriptor
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)BMAPBLKNO <<JFS_SBI (ipbmap->i_sb)->l2nbperpage, PSIZE, 0);if (mp ==NULL ) { -kfree (bmp); -return -EIO ; + err = -EIO ; + goto err_kfree_bmp; }/* copy the on-disk bmap descriptor to its in-memory version. */
@@ -194,9 +194,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) bmp->db_l2nbperpage =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_l2nbperpage); bmp->db_numag =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_numag);if (!bmp->db_numag) { -release_metapage (mp); -kfree (bmp); -return -EINVAL ; + err = -EINVAL ; + goto err_release_metapage; } bmp->db_maxlevel =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_maxlevel);
@@ -207,6 +206,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) bmp->db_agwidth =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agwidth); bmp->db_agstart =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agstart); bmp->db_agl2size =le32_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agl2size); +if (bmp->db_agl2size >L2MAXL2SIZE -L2MAXAG ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto err_release_metapage; + } +for (i =0 ; i <MAXAG ; i++) bmp->db_agfree[i] =le64_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]); bmp->db_agsize =le64_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
@@ -227,6 +231,12 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)BMAP_LOCK_INIT (bmp);return (0 ); + +err_release_metapage: +release_metapage (mp); +err_kfree_bmp: +kfree (bmp); +return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/338 udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c791730f2554a9ebb8f18df9368dc27d4ebc38c2 ]
syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:
VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150 smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0 ? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 ? lock_release+0x587/0x810 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50 on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80 blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0 blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0 blkdev_put+0x222/0x760 deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160 deactivate_super+0xda/0x100 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0 task_work_run+0x149/0x240 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30 do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 ? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0 do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However, brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head becomes unbalanced.
This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename() when udf_find_entry() returns NULL.
--- fs/udf/namei.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/udf/namei.c +4 -4
@@ -1112,8 +1112,9 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,return -EINVAL ; ofi =udf_find_entry (old_dir, &old_dentry->d_name, &ofibh, &ocfi); -if (IS_ERR (ofi)) { - retval =PTR_ERR (ofi); +if (!ofi ||IS_ERR (ofi)) { +if (IS_ERR (ofi)) + retval =PTR_ERR (ofi); goto end_rename; }
@@ -1122,8 +1123,7 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,brelse (ofibh.sbh); tloc =lelb_to_cpu (ocfi.icb.extLocation); -if (!ofi ||udf_get_lb_pblock (old_dir->i_sb, &tloc,0 ) - != old_inode->i_ino) +if (udf_get_lb_pblock (old_dir->i_sb, &tloc,0 ) != old_inode->i_ino) goto end_rename; nfi =udf_find_entry (new_dir, &new_dentry->d_name, &nfibh, &ncfi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/338 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hoi Pok Wu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 25e70c6162f207828dd405b432d8f2a98dbf7082 ]
This should be applied to most URSAN bugs found recently by syzbot, by guarding the dbMount. As syzbot feeding rubbish into the bmap descriptor.
--- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +5 -0
@@ -211,6 +211,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap) goto err_release_metapage; } +if (((bmp->db_mapsize -1 ) >> bmp->db_agl2size) >MAXAG ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto err_release_metapage; + } +for (i =0 ; i <MAXAG ; i++) bmp->db_agfree[i] =le64_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]); bmp->db_agsize =le64_to_cpu (dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/338 ACPICA: Fix error code path in acpi_ds_call_control_method()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 404ec60438add1afadaffaed34bb5fe4ddcadd40 ]
A use-after-free in acpi_ps_parse_aml() after a failing invocaion of acpi_ds_call_control_method() is reported by KASAN [1] and code inspection reveals that next_walk_state pushed to the thread by acpi_ds_create_walk_state() is freed on errors, but it is not popped from the thread beforehand. Thus acpi_ds_get_current_walk_state() called by acpi_ps_parse_aml() subsequently returns it as the new walk state which is incorrect.
To address this, make acpi_ds_call_control_method() call acpi_ds_pop_walk_state() to pop next_walk_state from the thread before returning an error.
--- drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c +8 -2
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread, info =ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED (sizeof (struct acpi_evaluate_info ));if (!info) { status =AE_NO_MEMORY ; - goto cleanup; + goto pop_walk_state; } info->parameters = &this_walk_state->operands[0 ];
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,ACPI_FREE (info);if (ACPI_FAILURE (status)) { - goto cleanup; + goto pop_walk_state; }/*
@@ -595,6 +595,12 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,return_ACPI_STATUS (status); +pop_walk_state: + +/* On error, pop the walk state to be deleted from thread */ + +acpi_ds_pop_walk_state (thread); + cleanup:/* On error, we must terminate the method properly */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/338 nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds/overflow in nilfs_sb2_bad_offset()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 610a2a3d7d8be3537458a378ec69396a76c385b6 ]
Patch series "nilfs2: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warnings on mount time".
The first patch fixes a bug reported by syzbot, and the second one fixes the remaining bug of the same kind. Although they are triggered by the same super block data anomaly, I divided it into the above two because the details of the issues and how to fix it are different.
Both are required to eliminate the shift-out-of-bounds issues at mount time.
This patch (of 2):
If the block size exponent information written in an on-disk superblock is corrupted, nilfs_sb2_bad_offset helper function can trigger shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn is set):
shift exponent 38983 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long long'
Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x33d/0x3b0 lib/ubsan.c:322 nilfs_sb2_bad_offset fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:449 [inline] nilfs_load_super_block+0xdf5/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:523 init_nilfs+0xb7/0x7d0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:577 nilfs_fill_super+0xb1/0x5d0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1047 nilfs_mount+0x613/0x9b0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1317 ...
In addition, since nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() performs multiplication without considering the upper bound, the computation may overflow if the disk layout parameters are not normal.
This fixes these issues by inserting preliminary sanity checks for those parameters and by converting the comparison from one involving multiplication and left bit-shifting to one using division and right bit-shifting.
--- fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c +27 -4
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@#include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/backing-dev.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/log2.h> #include <linux/crc32.h> #include "nilfs.h" #include "segment.h"
@@ -457,11 +458,33 @@ static int nilfs_valid_sb(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp)return crc ==le32_to_cpu (sbp->s_sum); } -static int nilfs_sb2_bad_offset (struct nilfs_super_block *sbp,u64 offset) +/** +* nilfs_sb2_bad_offset - check the location of the second superblock +* @sbp: superblock raw data buffer +* @offset: byte offset of second superblock calculated from device size +* +* nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() checks if the position on the second +* superblock is valid or not based on the filesystem parameters +* stored in @sbp. If @offset points to a location within the segment +* area, or if the parameters themselves are not normal, it is +* determined to be invalid. +* +* Return Value: true if invalid, false if valid. +*/ +static bool nilfs_sb2_bad_offset (struct nilfs_super_block *sbp,u64 offset) { -return offset < ((le64_to_cpu (sbp->s_nsegments) * -le32_to_cpu (sbp->s_blocks_per_segment)) << - (le32_to_cpu (sbp->s_log_block_size) +10 )); +unsigned int shift_bits =le32_to_cpu (sbp->s_log_block_size); +u32 blocks_per_segment =le32_to_cpu (sbp->s_blocks_per_segment); +u64 nsegments =le64_to_cpu (sbp->s_nsegments); +u64 index; + +if (blocks_per_segment <NILFS_SEG_MIN_BLOCKS || + shift_bits >ilog2 (NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ) -BLOCK_SIZE_BITS ) +return true; + + index = offset >> (shift_bits +BLOCK_SIZE_BITS ); +do_div (index, blocks_per_segment); +return index < nsegments; }static void nilfs_release_super_block (struct the_nilfs *nilfs)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/338 acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5f31c655bcc01b6da53b836ac951c1556245305 ]
The integer overflow is descripted with following codes:
Quoted 3 lines
317 static
comp_tencode_comp_t(u64 value)
318 {
319 int exp, rnd;
......
Quoted 4 lines
341 exp <<= MANTSIZE; 342 exp += value; 343 return exp;344 }
Currently comp_t is defined as type of '__u16', but the variable 'exp' is type of 'int', so overflow would happen when variable 'exp' in line 343 is greater than 65535.
--- kernel/acct.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/acct.c +2 -0
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static comp_t encode_comp_t(unsigned long value) exp++; } +if (exp > (((comp_t ) ~0U ) >>MANTSIZE )) +return (comp_t ) ~0U ;/* * Clean it up and polish it off. */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/338 hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: ZhangPeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]
Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11 CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495 hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84 __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75 hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138 hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]
If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename
OOB read occurred:hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large
Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling hfs_brec_find().
--- fs/hfs/inode.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/hfs/inode.c +2 -0
@@ -453,6 +453,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)/* panic? */ return -EIO ; +if (HFS_I (main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len >HFS_NAMELEN ) +return -EIO ; fd.search_key->cat =HFS_I (main_inode)->cat_key;if (hfs_brec_find (&fd))/* panic? */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/338 wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 16ef02bad239f11f322df8425d302be62f0443ce ]
The bug arises when a USB device claims to be an ATH9K but doesn't have the expected endpoints. (In this case there was an interrupt endpoint where the driver expected a bulk endpoint.) The kernel needs to be able to handle such devices without getting an internal error.
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 500 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 500 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.10.135-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 Call Trace: ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:908 [inline] ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_urbs+0x75e/0x1010 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1019 ath9k_hif_usb_dev_init drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1109 [inline] ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb+0x142/0x530 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1242 request_firmware_work_func+0x12e/0x240 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:1097 process_one_work+0x9af/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2279 worker_thread+0x61d/0x12f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2425 kthread+0x3b4/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:299
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +14 -0
@@ -1326,10 +1326,24 @@ static int send_eject_command(struct usb_interface *interface)static int ath9k_hif_usb_probe (struct usb_interface *interface,const struct usb_device_id *id) { +struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *bulk_in, *bulk_out, *int_in, *int_out;struct usb_device *udev =interface_to_usbdev (interface); +struct usb_host_interface *alt;struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;int ret =0 ; +/* Verify the expected endpoints are present */ + alt = interface->cur_altsetting; +if (usb_find_common_endpoints (alt, &bulk_in, &bulk_out, &int_in, &int_out) <0 || +usb_endpoint_num (bulk_in) !=USB_WLAN_RX_PIPE || +usb_endpoint_num (bulk_out) !=USB_WLAN_TX_PIPE || +usb_endpoint_num (int_in) !=USB_REG_IN_PIPE || +usb_endpoint_num (int_out) !=USB_REG_OUT_PIPE ) { +dev_err (&udev->dev, +"ath9k_htc: Device endpoint numbers are not the expected ones\n" ); +return -ENODEV ; + } +if (id->driver_info ==STORAGE_DEVICE )return send_eject_command (interface);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/338 wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b6702a942a069c2a975478d719e98d83cdae1797 ]
syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]:
[ 38.960489][ C3] ================================================================== [ 38.963216][ C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.964950][ C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0 [ 38.966363][ C3] [ 38.967053][ C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18 [ 38.968464][ C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 38.969959][ C3] Call Trace: [ 38.970841][ C3] <IRQ> [ 38.971663][ C3] dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174 [ 38.972620][ C3] print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752 [ 38.973626][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.974644][ C3] kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0 [ 38.975720][ C3] ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.976831][ C3] ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240 [ 38.978412][ C3] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0 [ 38.979755][ C3] usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430 [ 38.981266][ C3] dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0 [ 38.982925][ C3] ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0 [ 38.984761][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.986242][ C3] ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790 [ 38.987323][ C3] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70 [ 38.988483][ C3] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130 [ 38.989621][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 38.990777][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.991919][ C3] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60 [ 38.993138][ C3] ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550 [ 38.994890][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.996266][ C3] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230 [ 38.997670][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 38.999116][ C3] call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0 [ 39.000668][ C3] ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.002137][ C3] ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0 [ 39.003809][ C3] ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0 [ 39.005509][ C3] __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0 [ 39.007025][ C3] ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860 [ 39.008716][ C3] ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 39.010254][ C3] ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10 [ 39.011795][ C3] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 39.013277][ C3] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0 [ 39.014724][ C3] run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0 [ 39.016196][ C3] __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be [ 39.017616][ C3] __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190 [ 39.019004][ C3] irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 [ 39.020361][ C3] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0 [ 39.021965][ C3] </IRQ> [ 39.023237][ C3] <TASK>
In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()):
ar5523_probe()
-> ar5523_host_available()
-> ar5523_cmd_read()
-> ar5523_cmd()
If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure.
This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static void ar5523_cmd_tx_cb(struct urb *urb) } } +static void ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd (struct ar5523 *ar) +{ +usb_kill_urb (ar->tx_cmd.urb_tx); +} +static int ar5523_cmd (struct ar5523 *ar,u32 code,const void *idata,int ilen,void *odata,int olen,int flags) {
@@ -280,6 +285,7 @@ static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata, }if (!wait_for_completion_timeout (&cmd->done,2 *HZ )) { +ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd (ar); cmd->odata =NULL ;ar5523_err (ar,"timeout waiting for command %02x reply\n" , code);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/338 ASoC: codecs: rt298: Add quirk for KBL-R RVP platform
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 953dbd1cef18ce9ac0d69c1bd735b929fe52a17e ]
KBL-R RVP platforms also use combojack, so we need to enable that configuration for them.
--- sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c +7 -0
@@ -1170,6 +1170,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id force_combo_jack_table[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Geminilake") } }, + { + .ident = "Intel Kabylake R RVP", + .matches = { +DMI_MATCH (DMI_SYS_VENDOR ,"Intel Corporation" ), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Kabylake Client platform") + } + }, { } };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/338 ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zhang Yuchen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 36992eb6b9b83f7f9cdc8e74fb5799d7b52e83e9 ]
After the IPMI disconnect problem, the memory kept rising and we tried to unload the driver to free the memory. However, only part of the free memory is recovered after the driver is uninstalled. Using ebpf to hook free functions, we find that neither ipmi_user nor ipmi_smi_msg is free, only ipmi_recv_msg is free.
We find that the deliver_smi_err_response call in clean_smi_msgs does the destroy processing on each message from the xmit_msg queue without checking the return value and free ipmi_smi_msg.
deliver_smi_err_response is called only at this location. Adding the free handling has no effect.
To verify, try using ebpf to trace the free function.
$ bpftrace -e 'kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_recv_msg {printf("alloc rcv
%p\n",retval);} kprobe:free_recv_msg {printf("free recv %p\n",
arg0)} kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_smi_msg {printf("alloc smi %p\n",
retval);} kprobe:free_smi_msg {printf("free smi %p\n",arg0)}'Message-Id: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +6 -2
@@ -2931,12 +2931,16 @@ static void deliver_smi_err_response(ipmi_smi_t intf,struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg, unsigned char err) { + int rv; msg->rsp[0 ] = msg->data[0 ] |4 ; msg->rsp[1 ] = msg->data[1 ]; msg->rsp[2 ] = err; msg->rsp_size =3 ; -/* It's an error, so it will never requeue, no need to check return. */ -handle_one_recv_msg (intf, msg); + +/* This will never requeue, but it may ask us to free the message. */ + rv =handle_one_recv_msg (intf, msg); +if (rv ==0 ) +ipmi_free_smi_msg (msg); }static void cleanup_smi_msgs (ipmi_smi_t intf)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/338 bpf: make sure skb->len != 0 when redirecting to a tunneling device
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 07ec7b502800ba9f7b8b15cb01dd6556bb41aaca ]
syzkaller managed to trigger another case where skb->len == 0 when we enter __dev_queue_xmit:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2069/0x35e0 net/core/dev.c:4295 Call Trace: dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4406 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2115 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2140 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x5fb/0xda0 net/core/filter.c:2163 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2447 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x247/0x390 net/core/filter.c:2419 bpf_prog_48159a89cb4a9a16+0x59/0x5e bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:897 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:596 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:603 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x46c/0x890 net/bpf/test_run.c:402 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xbdc/0x14c0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1170 bpf_prog_test_run+0x345/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3648 __sys_bpf+0x43a/0x6c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5005 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6
The reproducer doesn't really reproduce outside of syzkaller environment, so I'm taking a guess here. It looks like we do generate correct ETH_HLEN-sized packet, but we redirect the packet to the tunneling device. Before we do so, we __skb_pull l2 header and arrive again at skb->len == 0. Doesn't seem like we can do anything better than having an explicit check after __skb_pull?
--- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +4 -0
@@ -1725,6 +1725,10 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_no_mac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,if (mlen) {__skb_pull (skb, mlen); +if (unlikely (!skb->len)) { +kfree_skb (skb); +return -ERANGE ; + }/* At ingress, the mac header has already been pulled once. * At egress, skb_pospull_rcsum has to be done in case that
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/338 net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 63fe6ff674a96cfcfc0fa8df1051a27aa31c70b4 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c:1944:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netcp_ndo_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c +1 -1
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ static int netcp_tx_submit_skb(struct netcp_intf *netcp, }/* Submit the packet */ -static int netcp_ndo_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *ndev) +static netdev_tx_t netcp_ndo_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *ndev) {struct netcp_intf *netcp =netdev_priv (ndev);struct netcp_stats *tx_stats = &netcp->stats;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/338 hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5733e5b15d91ab679646ec3149e192996a27d5d ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c:1119:25: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = baycom_send_packet,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of baycom_send_packet() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.
--- drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c +1 -1
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static void epp_bh(struct work_struct *work)* ===================== network driver interface ========================= */ -static int baycom_send_packet (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t baycom_send_packet (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {struct baycom_state *bc =netdev_priv (dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/338 wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c ]
This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller, brcmf_usb_probe_cb() or brcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #132 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0 kthread+0x379/0x450 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,11 @@ int brcmf_fw_map_chip_to_name(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,u32 i;char end; +if (chiprev >=BITS_PER_TYPE (u32)) { +brcmf_err ("Invalid chip revision %u\n" , chiprev); +return NULL ; + } +for (i =0 ; i < table_size; i++) {if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip && mapping_table[i].revmask &BIT (chiprev))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH 4.14 230/338] wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()
Quoted 142 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c]This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than
BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller,brcmf_usb_probe_cb()orbrcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #132 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0 kthread+0x379/0x450 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30Reported-by Dokyung Song <[email protected]>Reported-by Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>Reported-by Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kalle Valo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5
-0@@ -572,6 +572,11 @@ int brcmf_fw_map_chip_to_name(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,u32 i;char end; +if (chiprev >=BITS_PER_TYPE (u32)) { +brcmf_err ("Invalid chip revision %u\n" , chiprev); +return NULL ; + } +for (i =0 ; i < table_size; i++) {if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip && mapping_table[i].revmask &BIT (chiprev))Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Clang points out that this backport is incorrect:
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c:577:10: error: incompatible pointer to integer conversion returning 'void *' from a function with result type 'int' [-Wint-conversion]
return NULL;
^~~~
include/linux/stddef.h:8:14: note: expanded from macro 'NULL'
#define NULL ((void *)0)
^~~~~~~~~~~1 error generated.
That should probably be something like -EINVAL for 4.14 but I am not sure, hence just the report. This code path was reworked in commit 2baa3aaee27f ("brcmfmac: introduce brcmf_fw_alloc_request() function"). Returning NULL would be treated as an error in the callers, which would require a negative return code here.
Cheers,
Nathan
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4.14 230/338] wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()
Quoted 152 lines · Nathan Chancellor
Quoted 142 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit
81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c]This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than
BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller,brcmf_usb_probe_cb()orbrcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G O 5.14.0+ #132 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120 __device_attach+0x207/0x330 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0 kthread+0x379/0x450 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30Reported-by Dokyung Song <[email protected]>Reported-by Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>Reported-by Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kalle Valo <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5
-0@@ -572,6 +572,11 @@ int brcmf_fw_map_chip_to_name(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,u32 i;char end; +if (chiprev >=BITS_PER_TYPE (u32)) { +brcmf_err ("Invalid chip revision %u\n" , chiprev); +return NULL ; + } +for (i =0 ; i < table_size; i++) {if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip && mapping_table[i].revmask &BIT (chiprev))Signature · 1 line
2.35.1Clang points out that this backport is incorrect:
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c:577:10: error: incompatible pointer to integer conversion returning 'void *' from a function with result type 'int' [-Wint-conversion]return NULL; ^~~~ include/linux/stddef.h:8:14: note: expanded from macro 'NULL' #define NULL ((void *)0) ^~~~~~~~~~~
Quoted 7 lines
1 error generated.
That should probably be something like
-EINVALfor 4.14 but I am not sure, hence just the report. This code path was reworked in commit2baa3aaee27f("brcmfmac: introducebrcmf_fw_alloc_request()function"). Returning NULL would be treated as an error in the callers, which would require a negative return code here.
Good catch, I'll fix this up on Monday, thanks for reporting it!
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/338 igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0668716506ca66f90d395f36ccdaebc3e0e84801 ]
Avoid potential use-after-free condition under memory pressure. If the kzalloc() fails, q_vector will be freed but left in the original adapter->q_vector[v_idx] array position.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +6 -2
@@ -1222,8 +1222,12 @@ static int igb_alloc_q_vector(struct igb_adapter *adapter,if (!q_vector) { q_vector =kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); }else if (size >ksize (q_vector)) { -kfree_rcu (q_vector, rcu); - q_vector =kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +struct igb_q_vector *new_q_vector; + + new_q_vector =kzalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (new_q_vector) +kfree_rcu (q_vector, rcu); + q_vector = new_q_vector; }else {memset (q_vector,0 , size); }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/338 s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aa5bf80c3c067b82b4362cd6e8e2194623bcaca6 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1064:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcm_tx,
^~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1072:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcmpc_tx,
^~~~~~~~~
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.
Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.
--- drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c +2 -9
@@ -866,16 +866,9 @@ static int ctcmpc_transmit_skb(struct channel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)/** * Start transmission of a packet. * Called from generic network device layer. -* -* skb Pointer to buffer containing the packet. -* dev Pointer to interface struct. -* -* returns 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected. -* Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by -* the generic network layer. */ /* first merge version - leaving both functions separated */ -static int ctcm_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t ctcm_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
@@ -918,7 +911,7 @@ static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) }/* unmerged MPC variant of ctcm_tx */ -static int ctcmpc_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t ctcmpc_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {int len =0 ;struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/338 s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 88d86d18d7cf7e9137c95f9d212bb9fff8a1b4be ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c:1854:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netiucv_tx,
^~~~~~~~~~
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netiucv_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.
Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.
--- drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c | 9 +-------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c +1 -8
@@ -1358,15 +1358,8 @@ static int netiucv_pm_restore_thaw(struct device *dev)/** * Start transmission of a packet. * Called from generic network device layer. -* -* @param skb Pointer to buffer containing the packet. -* @param dev Pointer to interface struct. -* -* @return 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected. -* Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by -* the generic network layer. */ -static int netiucv_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t netiucv_tx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {struct netiucv_priv *privptr =netdev_priv (dev);int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/338 s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit bb16db8393658e0978c3f0d30ae069e878264fa3 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2090:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2097:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of lcs_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.
--- drivers/s390/net/lcs.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c +3 -5
@@ -1540,9 +1540,8 @@ lcs_txbuffer_cb(struct lcs_channel *channel, struct lcs_buffer *buffer)/** * Packet transmit function called by network stack */ -static int -__lcs_start_xmit (struct lcs_card *card,struct sk_buff *skb, -struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t __lcs_start_xmit (struct lcs_card *card,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct net_device *dev) {struct lcs_header *header;int rc =NETDEV_TX_OK ;
@@ -1603,8 +1602,7 @@ __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,return rc; } -static int -lcs_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) +static netdev_tx_t lcs_start_xmit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct net_device *dev) {struct lcs_card *card;int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/338 drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 442cf8e22ba25a77cb9092d78733fdbac9844e50 ]
struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.
Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.
Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.
@is_mode_copy@
@@drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}
@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)
@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)
@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode
--- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +1 -1
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static void sti_dvo_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER ("\n" ); -memcpy (&dvo->mode, mode,sizeof (struct drm_display_mode )); +drm_mode_copy (&dvo->mode, mode);/* According to the path used (main or aux), the dvo clocks should * have a different parent clock. */
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +1 -1
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static void sti_hda_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER ("\n" ); -memcpy (&hda->mode, mode,sizeof (struct drm_display_mode )); +drm_mode_copy (&hda->mode, mode);if (!hda_get_mode_idx (hda->mode, &mode_idx)) {DRM_ERROR ("Undefined mode\n" );
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +1 -1
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static void sti_hdmi_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER ("\n" );/* Copy the drm display mode in the connector local structure */ -memcpy (&hdmi->mode, mode,sizeof (struct drm_display_mode )); +drm_mode_copy (&hdmi->mode, mode);/* Update clock framerate according to the selected mode */ ret =clk_set_rate (hdmi->clk_pix, mode->clock *1000 );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/338 md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jiang Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b611ad14006e5be2170d9e8e611bf49dff288911 ]
fail run raid1 array when we assemble array with the inactive disk only, but the mdx_raid1 thread were not stop, Even if the associated resources have been released. it will caused a NULL dereference when we do poweroff.
This causes the following Oops:
[ 287.587787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000070
[ 287.594762] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 287.599912] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 287.605061] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 287.607612] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 287.611287] CPU: 3 PID: 5265 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G U 5.10.146 #0
[ 287.619029] Hardware name: xxxxxxx/To be filled by O.E.M, BIOS 5.19 06/16/2022
[ 287.626775] RIP: 0010:md_check_recovery+0x57/0x500 [md_mod]
[ 287.632357] Code: fe 01 00 00 48 83 bb 10 03 00 00 00 74 08 48 89 ......
[ 287.651118] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000433d78 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 287.656347] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105986800 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 287.663491] RDX: ffffc90000433bb0 RSI: 00000000ffffefff RDI: ffff888105986800
[ 287.670634] RBP: ffffc90000433da0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffefff
[ 287.677771] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffc90000433ba8 R12: ffff888105986800
[ 287.684907] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffe00 R15: ffff888100b6b500
[ 287.692052] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888277f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 287.700149] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 287.705897] CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 000000000320a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 287.713033] Call Trace:
[ 287.715498] raid1d+0x6c/0xbbb [raid1]
[ 287.719256] ? __schedule+0x1ff/0x760
[ 287.722930] ? schedule+0x3b/0xb0
[ 287.726260] ? schedule_timeout+0x1ed/0x290
[ 287.730456] ? __switch_to+0x11f/0x400
[ 287.734219] md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
[ 287.738328] ? md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
[ 287.742601] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
[ 287.746097] ? md_register_thread+0xe0/0xe0 [md_mod]
[ 287.751064] kthread+0x11a/0x140
[ 287.754300] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
[ 287.757974] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30In fact, when raid1 array run fail, we need to domd_unregister_thread() before raid1_free().
--- drivers/md/raid1.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -0
@@ -3105,6 +3105,7 @@ static int raid1_run(struct mddev *mddev)* RAID1 needs at least one disk in active */ if (conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded <1 ) { +md_unregister_thread (&conf->thread); ret = -EINVAL ; goto abort; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/338 mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Schspa Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab0377803dafc58f1e22296708c1c28e309414d6 ]
The caller of del_timer_sync must prevent restarting of the timer, If we have no this synchronization, there is a small probability that the cancellation will not be successful.
And syzbot report the fellowing crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605
Write at addr f9ff000024df6058 by task syz-fuzzer/2256 Pointer tag: [f9], memory tag: [fe]
CPU: 1 PID: 2256 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00008- ge01d50cbd6ee #0 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156 dump_backtrace arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:162 [inline] show_stack+0x18/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x1a8/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0x94/0xb4 mm/kasan/report.c:495 __do_kernel_fault+0x164/0x1e0 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:320 do_bad_area arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:473 [inline] do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x8c arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:749 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:825 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xd8/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:427 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:576 hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline] enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605 mod_timer+0x14/0x20 kernel/time/timer.c:1161 mrp_periodic_timer_arm net/802/mrp.c:614 [inline] mrp_periodic_timer+0xa0/0xc0 net/802/mrp.c:627 call_timer_fn.constprop.0+0x24/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1474 expire_timers+0x98/0xc4 kernel/time/timer.c:1519
To fix it, we can introduce a new active flags to make sure the timer will not restart.
--- include/net/mrp.h | 1 + net/802/mrp.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/net/mrp.h +1 -0
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct mrp_applicant {struct sk_buff *pdu;struct rb_root mad;struct rcu_head rcu; +bool active; };struct mrp_port {
net/802/mrp.c +13 -5
@@ -609,7 +609,10 @@ static void mrp_join_timer(unsigned long data)spin_unlock (&app->lock);mrp_queue_xmit (app); -mrp_join_timer_arm (app); +spin_lock (&app->lock); +if (likely (app->active)) +mrp_join_timer_arm (app); +spin_unlock (&app->lock); }static void mrp_periodic_timer_arm (struct mrp_applicant *app)
@@ -623,11 +626,12 @@ static void mrp_periodic_timer(unsigned long data)struct mrp_applicant *app = (struct mrp_applicant *)data;spin_lock (&app->lock); -mrp_mad_event (app,MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC ); -mrp_pdu_queue (app); +if (likely (app->active)) { +mrp_mad_event (app,MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC ); +mrp_pdu_queue (app); +mrp_periodic_timer_arm (app); + }spin_unlock (&app->lock); - -mrp_periodic_timer_arm (app); }static int mrp_pdu_parse_end_mark (struct sk_buff *skb,int *offset)
@@ -875,6 +879,7 @@ int mrp_init_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl) app->dev = dev; app->app = appl; app->mad =RB_ROOT ; + app->active = true;spin_lock_init (&app->lock);skb_queue_head_init (&app->queue);rcu_assign_pointer (dev->mrp_port->applicants[appl->type], app);
@@ -904,6 +909,9 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)RCU_INIT_POINTER (port->applicants[appl->type],NULL ); +spin_lock_bh (&app->lock); + app->active = false; +spin_unlock_bh (&app->lock);/* Delete timer and generate a final TX event to flush out * all pending messages before the applicant is gone. */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/338 ppp: associate skb with a device at tx
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9f225444467b98579cf28d94f4ad053460dfdb84 ]
Syzkaller triggered flow dissector warning with the following:
r0 = openat$ppp(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0xc0802, 0x0)
ioctl$PPPIOCNEWUNIT(r0, 0xc004743e, &(0x7f00000000c0))
ioctl$PPPIOCSACTIVE(r0, 0x40107446, &(0x7f0000000240)={0x2, &(0x7f0000000180)=[{0x20, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff034}, {0x6}]}) pwritev(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)=[{&(0x7f0000000140)='\x00!', 0x2}], 0x1, 0x0, 0x0)
[ 9.485814] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 329 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1016 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1ee0/0x1fa0 [ 9.485929] skb_get_poff+0x53/0xa0 [ 9.485937] bpf_skb_get_pay_offset+0xe/0x20 [ 9.485944] ? ppp_send_frame+0xc2/0x5b0 [ 9.485949] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60 [ 9.485958] ? __ppp_xmit_process+0x7a/0xe0 [ 9.485968] ? ppp_xmit_process+0x5b/0xb0 [ 9.485974] ? ppp_write+0x12a/0x190 [ 9.485981] ? do_iter_write+0x18e/0x2d0 [ 9.485987] ? __import_iovec+0x30/0x130 [ 9.485997] ? do_pwritev+0x1b6/0x240 [ 9.486016] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x47/0x50 [ 9.486023] ? __x64_sys_pwritev+0x24/0x30 [ 9.486026] ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80 [ 9.486031] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
Flow dissector tries to find skb net namespace either via device or via socket. Neigher is set in ppp_send_frame, so let's manually use ppp->dev.
--- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +2 -0
@@ -1542,6 +1542,8 @@ ppp_send_frame(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb)int len;unsigned char *cp; + skb->dev = ppp->dev; +if (proto <0x8000 ) {#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER /* check if we should pass this packet */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/338 media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yan Lei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a15fe8d9f1bf460a804bcf18a890bfd2cf0d5caa ]
--- drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c +1 -0
@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ static int bcm3510_download_firmware(struct dvb_frontend* fe)deb_info ("firmware chunk, addr: 0x%04x, len: 0x%04x, total length: 0x%04zx\n" ,addr,len,fw->size);if ((ret =bcm3510_write_ram (st,addr,&b[i+4 ],len)) <0 ) {err ("firmware download failed: %d\n" ,ret); +release_firmware (fw);return ret; } i +=4 + len;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/338 media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0fc044b2b5e2d05a1fa1fb0d7f270367a7855d79 ]
dvb_unregister_device() is known that prone to use-after-free. That is, the cleanup from dvb_unregister_device() releases the dvb_device even if there are pointers stored in file->private_data still refer to it.
This patch adds a reference counter into struct dvb_device and delays its deallocation until no pointer refers to the object.
--- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c | 2 +- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c | 2 +- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.h | 31 +++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c +1 -1
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void dvb_ca_private_free(struct dvb_ca_private *ca) {unsigned int i; -dvb_free_device (ca->dvbdev); +dvb_device_put (ca->dvbdev);for (i =0 ; i < ca->slot_count; i++)vfree (ca->slot_info[i].rx_buffer.data);
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void __dvb_frontend_free(struct dvb_frontend *fe)struct dvb_frontend_private *fepriv = fe->frontend_priv;if (fepriv) -dvb_free_device (fepriv->dvbdev); +dvb_device_put (fepriv->dvbdev);dvb_frontend_invoke_release (fe, fe->ops.release);
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +25 -7
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int dvb_device_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) new_fops =fops_get (dvbdev->fops);if (!new_fops) goto fail; - file->private_data = dvbdev; + file->private_data =dvb_device_get (dvbdev);replace_fops (file, new_fops);if (file->f_op->open) err = file->f_op->open (inode, file);
@@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ int dvb_generic_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) } dvbdev->users++; + +dvb_device_put (dvbdev); +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (dvb_generic_release);
@@ -462,6 +465,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,return -ENOMEM ; } +kref_init (&dvbdev->ref);memcpy (dvbdev, template,sizeof (struct dvb_device )); dvbdev->type = type; dvbdev->id = id;
@@ -493,7 +497,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,#endif dvbdev->minor = minor; - dvb_minors[minor] = dvbdev; + dvb_minors[minor] =dvb_device_get (dvbdev);up_write (&minor_rwsem); ret =dvb_register_media_device (dvbdev, type, minor, demux_sink_pads);
@@ -534,6 +538,7 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)down_write (&minor_rwsem); dvb_minors[dvbdev->minor] =NULL ; +dvb_device_put (dvbdev);up_write (&minor_rwsem);dvb_media_device_free (dvbdev);
@@ -545,21 +550,34 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)EXPORT_SYMBOL (dvb_remove_device); -void dvb_free_device (struct dvb_device *dvbdev) +static void dvb_free_device (struct kref *ref) { -if (!dvbdev) -return ; + struct dvb_device *dvbdev = container_of(ref, struct dvb_device, ref);kfree (dvbdev->fops);kfree (dvbdev); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (dvb_free_device); + + +struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get (struct dvb_device *dvbdev) +{ +kref_get (&dvbdev->ref); +return dvbdev; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (dvb_device_get); + + +void dvb_device_put (struct dvb_device *dvbdev) +{ +if (dvbdev) +kref_put (&dvbdev->ref, dvb_free_device); +}void dvb_unregister_device (struct dvb_device *dvbdev) {dvb_remove_device (dvbdev); -dvb_free_device (dvbdev); +dvb_device_put (dvbdev); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (dvb_unregister_device);
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.h +17 -14
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ struct dvb_adapter {*/ struct dvb_device {struct list_head list_head; +struct kref ref;const struct file_operations *fops;struct dvb_adapter *adapter;int type;
@@ -164,6 +165,20 @@ struct dvb_device {void *priv; }; +/** +* dvb_device_get - Increase dvb_device reference +* +* @dvbdev: pointer to struct dvb_device +*/ +struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get (struct dvb_device *dvbdev); + +/** +* dvb_device_get - Decrease dvb_device reference +* +* @dvbdev: pointer to struct dvb_device +*/ +void dvb_device_put (struct dvb_device *dvbdev); +/** * dvb_register_adapter - Registers a new DVB adapter *
@@ -210,29 +225,17 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap,/** * dvb_remove_device - Remove a registered DVB device * -* This does not free memory. To do that, call dvb_free_device(). +* This does not free memory. dvb_free_device() will do that when +* reference counter is empty * * @dvbdev: pointer to struct dvb_device */ void dvb_remove_device (struct dvb_device *dvbdev); -/** -* dvb_free_device - Free memory occupied by a DVB device. -* -* Call dvb_unregister_device() before calling this function. -* -* @dvbdev: pointer to struct dvb_device -*/ -void dvb_free_device (struct dvb_device *dvbdev);/** * dvb_unregister_device - Unregisters a DVB device * -* This is a combination of dvb_remove_device() and dvb_free_device(). -* Using this function is usually a mistake, and is often an indicator -* for a use-after-free bug (when a userspace process keeps a file -* handle to a detached device). -* * @dvbdev: pointer to struct dvb_device */ void dvb_unregister_device (struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/338 media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mazin Al Haddad <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 94d90fb06b94a90c176270d38861bcba34ce377d ]
Syzbot reports a memory leak in "dvb_usb_adapter_init()". The leak is due to not accounting for and freeing current iteration's adapter->priv in case of an error. Currently if an error occurs, it will exit before incrementing "num_adapters_initalized", which is used as a reference counter to free all adap->priv in "dvb_usb_adapter_exit()". There are multiple error paths that can exit from before incrementing the counter. Including the error handling paths for "dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init()", "dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init()" and "dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init()" within "dvb_usb_adapter_init()".
This means that in case of an error in any of these functions the current iteration is not accounted for and the current iteration's adap->priv is not freed.
Fix this by freeing the current iteration's adap->priv in the "stream_init_err:" label in the error path. The rest of the (accounted for) adap->priv objects are freed in dvb_usb_adapter_exit() as expected using the num_adapters_initalized variable.
Syzbot report:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881172f1a00 (size 512):
comm "kworker/0:2", pid 139, jiffies 4294994873 (age 10.960s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:75 [inline]
[<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:184 [inline]
[<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_device_init.cold+0x4e5/0x79e drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:308
[<ffffffff830db21d>] dib0700_probe+0x8d/0x1b0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dib0700_core.c:883
[<ffffffff82d3fdc7>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
[<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
[<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
[<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
[<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
[<ffffffff8274af6a>] driver_probe_device+0x2a/0x120 drivers/base/dd.c:782
[<ffffffff8274b786>] __device_attach_driver+0xf6/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:899
[<ffffffff82747c87>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:427
[<ffffffff8274b352>] __device_attach+0x122/0x260 drivers/base/dd.c:970
[<ffffffff827498f6>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
[<ffffffff82745cdb>] device_add+0x5fb/0xdf0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
[<ffffffff82d3d202>] usb_set_configuration+0x8f2/0xb80 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
[<ffffffff82d4dbfc>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
[<ffffffff82d3f49c>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
[<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
[<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
[<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
[<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752--- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c +3 -1
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs) ret =dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init (adap);if (ret) -return ret; + goto stream_init_err; ret =dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init (adap, adapter_nrs);if (ret)
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_exit (adap); dvb_init_err:dvb_usb_adapter_stream_exit (adap); +stream_init_err: +kfree (adap->priv);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/338 blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register hctx failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4b7a21c57b14fbcd0e1729150189e5933f5088e9 ]
There's issue as follows when do fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888132a9f400 (size 512):
comm "insmod", pid 308021, jiffies 4324277909 (age 509.733s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff ...........2....
08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...2............
backtrace:
[<00000000e8952bb4>] kmalloc_node_trace+0x22/0xa0
[<00000000f9980e0f>] blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x3f1/0x7e0
[<000000002e719efa>] blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x1e6/0x230
[<000000004f1fda40>] blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x27e/0x910
[<00000000287123ec>] __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x67/0xf0
[<00000000a2a34657>] 0xffffffffa2ad310f
[<00000000b173f718>] 0xffffffffa2af824a
[<0000000095a1dabb>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
[<00000000f32fdf93>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
[<00000000cbe8541e>] load_module+0x3006/0x3390
[<0000000069ed1bdb>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
[<00000000a1a29ae8>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<000000009cd878b0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0Fault injection context as follows:
kobject_add
blk_mq_register_hctx
blk_mq_sysfs_register
blk_register_queue
device_add_disk
null_add_dev.part.0 [null_blk]
As 'blk_mq_register_hctx' may already add some objects when failed halfway, but there isn't do fallback, caller don't know which objects add failed. To solve above issue just do fallback when add objects failed halfway in 'blk_mq_register_hctx'.
--- block/blk-mq-sysfs.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
block/blk-mq-sysfs.c +9 -2
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx) {struct request_queue *q = hctx->queue;struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx; -int i, ret; +int i, j, ret;if (!hctx->nr_ctx)return 0 ;
@@ -247,9 +247,16 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)hctx_for_each_ctx (hctx, ctx, i) { ret =kobject_add (&ctx->kobj, &hctx->kobj,"cpu%u" , ctx->cpu);if (ret) -break ; + goto out; } +return 0 ; +out: +hctx_for_each_ctx (hctx, ctx, j) { +if (j < i) +kobject_del (&ctx->kobj); + } +kobject_del (&hctx->kobj);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/338 mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aae9d3a440736691b3c1cb09ae2c32c4f1ee2e67 ]
There is a case where the timeout clock is not supplied to the capability. Add a quirk for that.
--- drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c +3 -0
@@ -180,6 +180,9 @@ static int sdhci_f_sdh30_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (reg &SDHCI_CAN_DO_8BIT ) priv->vendor_hs200 =F_SDH30_EMMC_HS200 ; +if (!(reg &SDHCI_TIMEOUT_CLK_MASK )) + host->quirks |=SDHCI_QUIRK_DATA_TIMEOUT_USES_SDCLK ; + ret =sdhci_add_host (host);if (ret) goto err_add_host;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/338 media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d21e0b1b41b21d628bf2afce777727bd4479aa5 ]
syzbot reported use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback() [1]. This indicates that urb->context, which contains struct si470x_device object, is freed when si470x_int_in_callback() is called.
The cause of this issue is that si470x_int_in_callback() is called for freed urb.
si470x_usb_driver_probe() calls si470x_start_usb(), which then calls usb_submit_urb() and si470x_start(). If si470x_start_usb() fails, si470x_usb_driver_probe() doesn't kill urb, but it just frees struct si470x_device object, as depicted below:
si470x_usb_driver_probe()
...
si470x_start_usb()
...
usb_submit_urb()
retval = si470x_start()
return retval
if (retval < 0)
free struct si470x_device object, but don't kill urbThis patch fixes this issue by killing urb when si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is submitted. If si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is not submitted, i.e. submitting usb fails, it just frees struct si470x_device object.
--- drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c +3 -1
@@ -736,8 +736,10 @@ static int si470x_usb_driver_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,/* start radio */ retval =si470x_start_usb (radio); -if (retval <0 ) +if (retval <0 && !radio->int_in_running) goto err_buf; +else if (retval <0 )/* in case of radio->int_in_running == 1 */ + goto err_all;/* set initial frequency */ si470x_set_freq (radio,87.5 *FREQ_MUL );/* available in all regions */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/338 clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfd3ffb36f0d566846163118651d868e607300ba ]
If st_clk_register_quadfs_pll() fails, @lock should be freed before goto @err_exit, otherwise will cause meory leak issue, fix it.
--- drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c +3 -2
@@ -948,9 +948,10 @@ static void __init st_of_quadfs_setup(struct device_node *np, clk =st_clk_register_quadfs_pll (pll_name, clk_parent_name, data, reg, lock); -if (IS_ERR (clk)) +if (IS_ERR (clk)) { +kfree (lock); goto err_exit; -else + }else pr_debug("%s: parent %s rate %u\n", __clk_get_name(clk), __clk_get_name(clk_get_parent(clk)),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/338 drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 96d845a67b7e406cfed7880a724c8ca6121e022e ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c:74:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.
->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c +3 -2
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)return num_modes; } -static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, -struct drm_display_mode *mode) +static enum drm_mode_status +fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, +struct drm_display_mode *mode) {if (mode->hdisplay &0xf )return MODE_ERROR ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/338 drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0ad811cc08a937d875cbad0149c1bab17f84ba05 ]
With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c:637:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hda_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c:376:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c:1035:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c | 5 +++-- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c | 5 +++-- drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +3 -2
@@ -346,8 +346,9 @@ static int sti_dvo_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)#define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50 -static int sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, -struct drm_display_mode *mode) +static enum drm_mode_status +sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, +struct drm_display_mode *mode) {int target = mode->clock *1000 ;int target_min = target -CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +3 -2
@@ -596,8 +596,9 @@ static int sti_hda_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)#define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50 -static int sti_hda_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, -struct drm_display_mode *mode) +static enum drm_mode_status +sti_hda_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, +struct drm_display_mode *mode) {int target = mode->clock *1000 ;int target_min = target -CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +3 -2
@@ -988,8 +988,9 @@ static int sti_hdmi_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)#define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50 -static int sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, -struct drm_display_mode *mode) +static enum drm_mode_status +sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid (struct drm_connector *connector, +struct drm_display_mode *mode) {int target = mode->clock *1000 ;int target_min = target -CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/338 orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d23417a5bf3a3afc55de5442eb46e1e60458b0a1 ]
When insert and remove the orangefs module, then debug_help_string will be leaked:
unreferenced object 0xffff8881652ba000 (size 4096):
comm "insmod", pid 1701, jiffies 4294893639 (age 13218.530s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
43 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 44 65 62 75 67 20 4b 65 79 Client Debug Key
77 6f 72 64 73 20 61 72 65 20 75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77 words are unknow
backtrace:
[<0000000004e6f8e3>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
[<0000000006f75d85>] orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string+0x5e/0x480 [orangefs]
[<0000000091270a2a>] _sub_I_65535_1+0x57/0xf70 [crc_itu_t]
[<000000004b1ee1a3>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
[<000000001d0614ae>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
[<00000000efef068c>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
[<000000006533b44d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
[<00000000a0da6f99>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
[<000000007790b19b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0When remove the module, should always free debug_help_string. Should always free the allocated buffer when change the free_debug_help_string.
--- fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -0
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ static int orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)void orangefs_debugfs_cleanup (void ) {debugfs_remove_recursive (debug_dir); +kfree (debug_help_string); + debug_help_string =NULL ; }/* open ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_HELP_FILE */
@@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ int orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string(int at_boot)memset (debug_help_string,0 ,DEBUG_HELP_STRING_SIZE );strlcat (debug_help_string, new, string_size);mutex_unlock (&orangefs_help_file_lock); +kfree (new); } rc =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/338 ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3327d721114c109ba0575f86f8fda3b525404054 ]
The node returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented, of_node_put() needs be called when finish using it. So add it in the error path in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe().
--- sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c +5 -2
@@ -209,14 +209,16 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[0 ].of_node) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; } mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1 ].of_node =of_parse_phandle (pdev->dev.of_node,"mediatek,audio-codec" ,1 );if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1 ].of_node) {dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; } mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codec_conf[0 ].of_node = mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1 ].of_node;
@@ -228,6 +230,7 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)dev_err (&pdev->dev,"%s snd_soc_register_card fail %d\n" , __func__, ret); +out:of_node_put (platform_node);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/338 ASoC: rockchip: pdm: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ef0a098efb36660326c133af9b5a04a96a00e3ca ]
The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume().
--- sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c +1 -0
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ static int rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) ret =clk_prepare_enable (pdm->hclk);if (ret) { +clk_disable_unprepare (pdm->clk);dev_err (pdm->dev,"hclock enable failed %d\n" , ret);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/338 ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9529dc167ffcdfd201b9f0eda71015f174095f7e ]
Fix this by dropping wm8994->accdet_lock while calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work) in wm1811_jackdet_irq().
--- sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +5 -0
@@ -3704,7 +3704,12 @@ static irqreturn_t wm1811_jackdet_irq(int irq, void *data) }else {dev_dbg (codec->dev,"Jack not detected\n" ); +/* Release wm8994->accdet_lock to avoid deadlock: +* cancel_delayed_work_sync() takes wm8994->mic_work internal +* lock and wm1811_mic_work takes wm8994->accdet_lock */ +mutex_unlock (&wm8994->accdet_lock);cancel_delayed_work_sync (&wm8994->mic_work); +mutex_lock (&wm8994->accdet_lock);snd_soc_update_bits (codec,WM8958_MICBIAS2 ,WM8958_MICB2_DISCH ,WM8958_MICB2_DISCH );
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/338 ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6d94d0090527b1763872275a7ccd44df7219b31e ]
rk_spdif_runtime_resume() may have called clk_prepare_enable() before return from failed branches, add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in this case.
--- sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c +1 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused rk_spdif_runtime_resume(struct device *dev) ret =clk_prepare_enable (spdif->hclk);if (ret) { +clk_disable_unprepare (spdif->mclk);dev_err (spdif->dev,"hclk clock enable failed %d\n" , ret);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/338 ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c900dcc3f7331a67ed29739d74524e428d137fb ]
For some reason rt5670_i2c_probe() does a pm_runtime_put() at the end of a successful probe. But it has never done a pm_runtime_get() leading to the following error being logged into dmesg:
rt5670 i2c-10EC5640:00: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
Fix this by removing the unnecessary pm_runtime_put().
--- sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c +0 -2
@@ -3071,8 +3071,6 @@ static int rt5670_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c,if (ret <0 ) goto err; -pm_runtime_put (&i2c->dev); -return 0 ; err:pm_runtime_disable (&i2c->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/338 pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: John Stultz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 76d62f24db07f22ccf9bc18ca793c27d4ebef721 ]
Wei Wang reported seeing priority inversion caused latencies caused by contention on pmsg_lock, and suggested it be switched to a rt_mutex.
I was initially hesitant this would help, as the tasks in that trace all seemed to be SCHED_NORMAL, so the benefit would be limited to only nice boosting.
However, another similar issue was raised where the priority inversion was seen did involve a blocked RT task so it is clear this would be helpful in that case.
--- fs/pstore/pmsg.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/pstore/pmsg.c +4 -3
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/rtmutex.h> #include "internal.h" -static DEFINE_MUTEX (pmsg_lock); +static DEFINE_RT_MUTEX (pmsg_lock);static ssize_t write_pmsg (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos)
@@ -36,9 +37,9 @@ static ssize_t write_pmsg(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,if (!access_ok (VERIFY_READ , buf, count))return -EFAULT ; -mutex_lock (&pmsg_lock); +rt_mutex_lock (&pmsg_lock); ret = psinfo->write_user (&record, buf); -mutex_unlock (&pmsg_lock); +rt_mutex_unlock (&pmsg_lock);return ret ? ret : count; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/338 pstore: Make sure CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG selects CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: John Stultz <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f4fec5943407318b9523f01ce1f5d668c028332 ]
In commit 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion") I changed a lock to an rt_mutex.
However, its possible that CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES is not enabled, which then results in a build failure, as the 0day bot detected:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Thus this patch changes CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG to select CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES, which ensures the build will not fail.
--- fs/pstore/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/pstore/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config PSTORE_CONSOLE config PSTORE_PMSG bool "Log user space messages" depends on PSTORE + select RT_MUTEXES help When the option is enabled, pstore will export a character interface /dev/pmsg0 to log user space messages. On reboot
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/338 usb: dwc3: core: defer probe on ulpi_read_id timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ferry Toth <[email protected]>
commit 63130462c919ece0ad0d9bb5a1f795ef8d79687e upstream.
Since commit 0f0101719138 ("usb: dwc3: Don't switch OTG -> peripheral if extcon is present"), Dual Role support on Intel Merrifield platform broke due to rearranging the call to dwc3_get_extcon().
It appears to be caused by ulpi_read_id() masking the timeout on the first test write. In the past dwc3 probe continued by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() followed by dwc3_get_extcon() which happend to return -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() finally succeeded. Due to above mentioned rearranging -EPROBE_DEFER is not returned and probe completes without phy.
On Intel Merrifield the timeout on the first test write issue is reproducible but it is difficult to find the root cause. Using a mainline kernel and rootfs with buildroot ulpi_read_id() succeeds. As soon as adding ftrace / bootconfig to find out why, ulpi_read_id() fails and we can't analyze the flow. Using another rootfs ulpi_read_id() fails even without adding ftrace. We suspect the issue is some kind of timing / race, but merely retrying ulpi_read_id() does not resolve the issue.
As we now changed ulpi_read_id() to return -ETIMEDOUT in this case, we need to handle the error by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() and request -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() is retried and succeeds.
--- drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +6 -1
@@ -801,8 +801,13 @@ static int dwc3_core_init(struct dwc3 *dif (!dwc->ulpi_ready) { ret =dwc3_core_ulpi_init (dwc); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT ) { +dwc3_core_soft_reset (dwc); + ret = -EPROBE_DEFER ; + } goto err0; + } dwc->ulpi_ready = true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 257/338 HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason Gerecke <[email protected]>
commit 1db1f392591aff13fd643f0ec7c1d5e27391d700 upstream.
Some Wacom devices have a special "bootloader" mode that is used for firmware flashing. When operating in this mode, the device cannot be used for input, and the HID descriptor is not able to be processed by the driver. The driver generates an "Unknown device_type" warning and then returns an error code from wacom_probe(). This is a problem because userspace still needs to be able to interact with the device via hidraw to perform the firmware flash.
This commit adds a non-generic device definition for 056a:0094 which is used when devices are in "bootloader" mode. It marks the devices with a special BOOTLOADER type that is recognized by wacom_probe() and wacom_raw_event(). When we see this type we ensure a hidraw device is created and otherwise keep our hands off so that userspace is in full control.
--- drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c | 8 ++++++++ drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c | 4 ++++ drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +8 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ static int wacom_raw_event(struct hid_de {struct wacom *wacom =hid_get_drvdata (hdev); +if (wacom->wacom_wac.features.type ==BOOTLOADER ) +return 0 ; +if (size >WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX )return 1 ;
@@ -2616,6 +2619,11 @@ static int wacom_probe(struct hid_device goto fail; } +if (features->type ==BOOTLOADER ) { +hid_warn (hdev,"Using device in hidraw-only mode" ); +return hid_hw_start (hdev,HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW ); + } + error =wacom_parse_and_register (wacom, false);if (error) goto fail;
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c +4 -0
@@ -4477,6 +4477,9 @@ static const struct wacom_features wacomstatic const struct wacom_features wacom_features_HID_ANY_ID = {"Wacom HID" , .type =HID_GENERIC , .oVid =HID_ANY_ID , .oPid =HID_ANY_ID }; +static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_0x94 = + {"Wacom Bootloader" , .type =BOOTLOADER }; +#define USB_DEVICE_WACOM (prod) \ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_WACOM, USB_VENDOR_ID_WACOM, prod),\ .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&wacom_features_##prod
@@ -4550,6 +4553,7 @@ const struct hid_device_id wacom_ids[] = { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x84) }, { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x90) }, { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x93) }, + { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x94) }, { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x97) }, { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9A) }, { USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9F) },
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h +1 -0
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ enum {MTTPC ,MTTPC_B ,HID_GENERIC , +BOOTLOADER , MAX_TYPE };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 258/338 reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>
commit 572302af1258459e124437b8f3369357447afac7 upstream.
Commit 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation") defined reiserfs_security_free() to free the name and value of a security xattr allocated by the active LSM through security_old_inode_init_security(). However, this function is not called in the reiserfs code.
Thus, add a call to reiserfs_security_free() whenever reiserfs_security_init() is called, and initialize value to NULL, to avoid to call kfree() on an uninitialized pointer.
Finally, remove the kfree() for the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.
--- fs/reiserfs/namei.c | 4 ++++ fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/namei.c +4 -0
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static int reiserfs_create(struct inode out_failed:reiserfs_write_unlock (dir->i_sb); +reiserfs_security_free (&security);return retval; }
@@ -778,6 +779,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mknod(struct inode * out_failed:reiserfs_write_unlock (dir->i_sb); +reiserfs_security_free (&security);return retval; }
@@ -876,6 +878,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mkdir(struct inode * retval =journal_end (&th); out_failed:reiserfs_write_unlock (dir->i_sb); +reiserfs_security_free (&security);return retval; }
@@ -1191,6 +1194,7 @@ static int reiserfs_symlink(struct inode retval =journal_end (&th); out_failed:reiserfs_write_unlock (parent_dir->i_sb); +reiserfs_security_free (&security);return retval; }
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inodeint error; sec->name =NULL ; + sec->value =NULL ;/* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */ if (IS_PRIVATE (dir))
@@ -94,7 +95,6 @@ int reiserfs_security_write(struct reisevoid reiserfs_security_free (struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec) { -kfree (sec->name);kfree (sec->value); sec->name =NULL ; sec->value =NULL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 259/338 iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>
commit 20228a1d5a55e7db0c6720840f2c7d2b48c55f69 upstream.
Drop 'mlock' usage by making use of iio_device_claim_direct_mode(). This change actually makes sure we cannot do a single conversion while buffering is enable. Note there was a potential race in the previous code since we were only acquiring the lock after checking if the bus is enabled.
--- drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +4 -4
@@ -282,10 +282,10 @@ int ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(strunsigned int sample, raw_sample;int ret =0 ; -if (iio_buffer_enabled (indio_dev)) -return -EBUSY ; + ret =iio_device_claim_direct_mode (indio_dev); +if (ret) +return ret; -mutex_lock (&indio_dev->mlock);ad_sigma_delta_set_channel (sigma_delta, chan->address);spi_bus_lock (sigma_delta->spi->master);
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ out:ad_sigma_delta_set_mode (sigma_delta,AD_SD_MODE_IDLE ); sigma_delta->bus_locked = false;spi_bus_unlock (sigma_delta->spi->master); -mutex_unlock (&indio_dev->mlock); +iio_device_release_direct_mode (indio_dev);if (ret)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 260/338 gcov: add support for checksum field
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rickard x Andersson <[email protected]>
commit e96b95c2b7a63a454b6498e2df67aac14d046d13 upstream.
In GCC version 12.1 a checksum field was added.
This patch fixes a kernel crash occurring during boot when using gcov-kernel with GCC version 12.2. The crash occurred on a system running on i.MX6SX.
--- kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c +5 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct gcov_fn_info {* @version: gcov version magic indicating the gcc version used for compilation * @next: list head for a singly-linked list * @stamp: uniquifying time stamp +* @checksum: unique object checksum * @filename: name of the associated gcov data file * @merge: merge functions (null for unused counter type) * @n_functions: number of instrumented functions
@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ struct gcov_info {unsigned int version;struct gcov_info *next;unsigned int stamp; +/* Since GCC 12.1 a checksum field is added. */ +#if (__GNUC__ >=12 ) +unsigned int checksum; +#endif const char *filename;void (*merge[GCOV_COUNTERS ])(gcov_type *,unsigned int );unsigned int n_functions;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 261/338 media: dvbdev: fix refcnt bug
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
commit 3a664569b71b0a52be5ffb9fb87cc4f83d29bd71 upstream.
Previous commit initialize the dvbdev->ref before the template copy, which will overwrite the reference and cause refcnt bug.
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-next-20221128-syzkaller #0 ... RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25 RSP: 0000:ffffc900000678d0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88813ff58000 RSI: ffffffff81660e7c RDI: fffff5200000cf0c RBP: ffff888022a45010 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff88823ffff000 CR3: 000000000c48e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline] __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline] refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline] kref_get include/linux/kref.h:45 [inline] dvb_device_get drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:585 [inline] dvb_register_device+0xe83/0x16e0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:517
...
Just place the kref_init at correct position.
--- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -1
@@ -465,8 +465,8 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adaptreturn -ENOMEM ; } -kref_init (&dvbdev->ref);memcpy (dvbdev, template,sizeof (struct dvb_device )); +kref_init (&dvbdev->ref); dvbdev->type = type; dvbdev->id = id; dvbdev->adapter = adap;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 262/338 powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ]
rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could hang.
Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time, cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for "ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +10 -3
@@ -716,6 +716,7 @@ void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)/* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */ static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048 ]; +static s32 ibm_os_term_token =RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ;void rtas_os_term (char *str) {
@@ -727,14 +728,13 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)* this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid * since it interferes with panic_timeout. */ -if (RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ==rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ) || -RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE ==rtas_token ("ibm,extended-os-term" )) +if (ibm_os_term_token ==RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE )return ;snprintf (rtas_os_term_buf,2048 ,"OS panic: %s" , str);do { - status =rtas_call (rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ),1 ,1 ,NULL , + status =rtas_call (ibm_os_term_token,1 ,1 ,NULL ,__pa (rtas_os_term_buf)); }while (rtas_busy_delay (status));
@@ -1331,6 +1331,13 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void) no_entry =of_property_read_u32 (rtas.dev,"linux,rtas-entry" , &entry); rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry; +/* +* Discover these now to avoid device tree lookups in the +* panic path. +*/ +if (of_property_read_bool (rtas.dev,"ibm,extended-os-term" )) + ibm_os_term_token =rtas_token ("ibm,os-term" ); +/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for * the stop-self token if any */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 263/338 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]
It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 2, expected: 0 CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9 Call Trace: [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable) [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0 [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0 [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4 [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68 [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50 [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0 [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0 [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420 [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200
Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +6 -1
@@ -733,10 +733,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)snprintf (rtas_os_term_buf,2048 ,"OS panic: %s" , str); +/* +* Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status, +* but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially +* schedules. +*/ do { status =rtas_call (ibm_os_term_token,1 ,1 ,NULL ,__pa (rtas_os_term_buf)); - }while (rtas_busy_delay (status)); + }while (rtas_busy_delay_time (status));if (status !=0 )printk (KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n" , status);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 264/338 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Terry Junge <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]
I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.
Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)
Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.
The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms.
End quote
--- drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 3 +++ drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
@@ -859,7 +859,10 @@#define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_IHOME_IMAC_A210S 0x8003#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS 0x047f +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES 0xc055#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES 0xc056 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES 0xc057 +#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES 0xc058#define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC 0x04da#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780 0x1044
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c +9 -0
@@ -201,9 +201,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev, }static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = { + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS ,USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES ), .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, + {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS , +USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES ), + .driver_data =PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS }, {HID_USB_DEVICE (USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS ,HID_ANY_ID ) }, { } };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 265/338 hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>
commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.
Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.
--- fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h | 2 ++ fs/hfsplus/inode.c | 4 ++-- fs/hfsplus/options.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h +2 -0
@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {#define HFSPLUS_SB_HFSX 3#define HFSPLUS_SB_CASEFOLD 4#define HFSPLUS_SB_NOBARRIER 5 +#define HFSPLUS_SB_UID 6 +#define HFSPLUS_SB_GID 7static inline struct hfsplus_sb_info *HFSPLUS_SB (struct super_block *sb) {
fs/hfsplus/inode.c +2 -2
@@ -188,11 +188,11 @@ static void hfsplus_get_perms(struct ino mode =be16_to_cpu (perms->mode);i_uid_write (inode,be32_to_cpu (perms->owner)); -if (!i_uid_read (inode) && !mode) +if ((test_bit (HFSPLUS_SB_UID , &sbi->flags)) || (!i_uid_read (inode) && !mode)) inode->i_uid = sbi->uid;i_gid_write (inode,be32_to_cpu (perms->group)); -if (!i_gid_read (inode) && !mode) +if ((test_bit (HFSPLUS_SB_GID , &sbi->flags)) || (!i_gid_read (inode) && !mode)) inode->i_gid = sbi->gid;if (dir) {
fs/hfsplus/options.c +4 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, sif (!uid_valid (sbi->uid)) {pr_err ("invalid uid specified\n" );return 0 ; + }else { +set_bit (HFSPLUS_SB_UID , &sbi->flags); }break ;case opt_gid:
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, sif (!gid_valid (sbi->gid)) {pr_err ("invalid gid specified\n" );return 0 ; + }else { +set_bit (HFSPLUS_SB_GID , &sbi->flags); }break ;case opt_part:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 266/338 ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>
commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream.
A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0 status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.
This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt.
[ tiwai: fixed white spaces ]
--- sound/usb/line6/driver.c | 3 ++- sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 3 ++- sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++-------- sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h | 5 ++++- sound/usb/line6/pod.c | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
sound/usb/line6/driver.c +2 -1
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static void line6_data_received(struct ufor (;;) { done =line6_midibuf_read (mb, line6->buffer_message, -LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN ); +LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN , +LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX );if (done <=0 )break ;
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct sfor (;;) { done =line6_midibuf_read (mb, chunk, -LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE ); +LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE , +LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX );if (done ==0 )break ;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c +17 -8
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "midibuf.h" +static int midibuf_message_length (unsigned char code) {int message_length;
@@ -24,12 +25,7 @@ static int midibuf_message_length(unsign message_length = length[(code >>4 ) -8 ]; }else { -/* -Note that according to the MIDI specification 0xf2 is -the "Song Position Pointer", but this is used by Line 6 -to send sysex messages to the host. -*/ -static const int length[] = {-1 ,2 ,-1 ,2 ,-1 ,-1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 , +static const int length[] = {-1 ,2 ,2 ,2 ,-1 ,-1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,-1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,-1 ,1 ,1 }; message_length = length[code &0x0f ];
@@ -129,7 +125,7 @@ int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buff }int line6_midibuf_read (struct midi_buffer *this,unsigned char *data, -int length) +int length,int read_type) {int bytes_used;int length1, length2;
@@ -152,9 +148,22 @@ int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffe length1 = this->size - this->pos_read; -/* check MIDI command length */ command = this->buf[this->pos_read]; +/* +PODxt always has status byte lower nibble set to 0010, +when it means to send 0000, so we correct if here so +that control/program changes come on channel 1 and +sysex message status byte is correct +*/ +if (read_type ==LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX ) { +if (command ==0xb2 || command ==0xc2 || command ==0xf2 ) { +unsigned char fixed = command &0xf0 ; + this->buf[this->pos_read] = fixed; + command = fixed; + } + } +/* check MIDI command length */ if (command &0x80 ) { midi_length =midibuf_message_length (command); this->command_prev = command;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h +4 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ #ifndef MIDIBUF_H #define MIDIBUF_H +#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX 0 +#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX 1 + struct midi_buffer { unsigned char *buf; int size;
@@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ extern void line6_midibuf_destroy(structextern int line6_midibuf_ignore (struct midi_buffer *mb,int length);extern int line6_midibuf_init (struct midi_buffer *mb,int size,int split);extern int line6_midibuf_read (struct midi_buffer *mb,unsigned char *data, -int length); +int length,int read_type);extern void line6_midibuf_reset (struct midi_buffer *mb);extern int line6_midibuf_write (struct midi_buffer *mb,unsigned char *data,int length);
sound/usb/line6/pod.c +2 -1
@@ -169,8 +169,9 @@ static struct line6_pcm_properties pod_p .bytes_per_channel = 3 /* SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_S24_3LE */ }; +static const char pod_version_header[] = { -0xf2 ,0x7e ,0x7f ,0x06 ,0x02 +0xf0 ,0x7e ,0x7f ,0x06 ,0x02 };/* forward declarations: */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 267/338 ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>
commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream.
Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex messages are sent to a PODxt device.
--- sound/usb/line6/midi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct sint req, done;for (;;) { - req =min (line6_midibuf_bytes_free (mb), line6->max_packet_size); + req =min3 (line6_midibuf_bytes_free (mb), line6->max_packet_size, +LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE ); done =snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek (substream, chunk, req);if (done ==0 )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 268/338 pnode: terminate at peers of source
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.
The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt.
Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.
Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users.
While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some clarifications:
* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group.
* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.
* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.
* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term "master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group.
* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.
* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from.
* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group.
If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.
* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group.
* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree.
For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master.
* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount.
For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.
With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.
We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree.
The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn't concern us a lot here.
It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent.
For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.
propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source.
Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.
Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later.
The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.
After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree.
The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters.
It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.
Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves.
The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that in a previous call to propagate_one().
The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on.
For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.
But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m.
Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.
If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree.
We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m:
for (n = m; ; n = p) {
p = n->mnt_master;
if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
break;
}For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.
Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.
So the first iteration sets:
n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;
such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:
n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.
Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:
do {
struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
if (last_source == first_source)
break;
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().
Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick.
We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence:
done = parent->mnt_master == p;
is trivially true in the base condition.
We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to:
last_dest = dest_mnt;
at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that's important.):
if (done && peers(n, parent))
break;
So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.
At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.
By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again.
The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does.
If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.
IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.
Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.
So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.
The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group.
As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n
We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m.
We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m.
If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up.
This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from.
However, terminating the walk has corner cases.
If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.
We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.
So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.
One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master.
So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.
If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt():
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.
Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently come last in that peer loop.
So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.
But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.
IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below.
For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
\
(@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]: 609 609 shared:218(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216
\
(P1) mnt_master[218]: 624 607 shared:218(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216
\
(P2) mnt_master[218]: 625 576 shared:218(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216
\
(P3) mnt_master[218]: 626 545 shared:218After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:
===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218
\ /
\/
(P4) mnt_slave 627 483 master:218will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).
When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.
We can fix this in multiple ways:
(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt().
(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.
(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof.
The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in the near future.
This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues.
Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this.
Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held.
[ 115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 [ 115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3 [ 115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 [ 115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.856859] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.857531] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 115.860099] Call Trace: [ 115.860358] <TASK> [ 115.860535] propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190 [ 115.860848] attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0 [ 115.861212] path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60 [ 115.861503] __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140 [ 115.861819] do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80 [ 115.862117] ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250 [ 115.862435] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.862826] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863133] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40 [ 115.863527] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.863835] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864144] ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80 [ 115.864452] ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170 [ 115.864775] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe [ 115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe [ 115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620 [ 115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076 [ 115.870581] </TASK> [ 115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4
nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath
[ 115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010 [ 115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0 [ 115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01 00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37 02 4d [ 115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00 [ 115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780 [ 115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0 [ 115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8 [ 115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 115.881548] FS: 00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 115.882234] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0 [ 115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
---
If there are no big objections I'll get this to Linus rather sooner than later.
--- fs/pnode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pnode.c +1 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m } do { struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent; - if (last_source == first_source) + if (peers(last_source, first_source)) break; done = parent->mnt_master == p; if (done && peers(n, parent))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 269/338 md: fix a crash in mempool_free
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream.
There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.
The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free.
We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.
We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown.
The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay] RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] __submit_bio+0x76/0x120 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0 flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300 worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0xc2/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd] CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- drivers/md/md.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -418,13 +418,14 @@ static void md_end_flush(struct bio *biostruct md_rdev *rdev = bio->bi_private;struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev; +bio_put (bio); +rdev_dec_pending (rdev, mddev);if (atomic_dec_and_test (&mddev->flush_pending)) {/* The pre-request flush has finished */ queue_work (md_wq, &mddev->flush_work); } -bio_put (bio); }static void md_submit_flush_data (struct work_struct *ws);
@@ -805,10 +806,12 @@ static void super_written(struct bio *bi }else clear_bit (LastDev, &rdev->flags); +bio_put (bio); + +rdev_dec_pending (rdev, mddev); +if (atomic_dec_and_test (&mddev->pending_writes))wake_up (&mddev->sb_wait); -rdev_dec_pending (rdev, mddev); -bio_put (bio); } void md_super_write(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 270/338 mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Deren Wu <[email protected]>
commit 4a44cd249604e29e7b90ae796d7692f5773dd348 upstream.
vub300_enable_sdio_irq() works with mutex and need TASK_RUNNING here. Ensure that we mark current as TASK_RUNNING for sleepable context.
[ 77.554641] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff92a72c1d>] sdio_irq_thread+0x17d/0x5b0 [ 77.554652] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1983 at kernel/sched/core.c:9813 __might_sleep+0x116/0x160 [ 77.554905] CPU: 2 PID: 1983 Comm: ksdioirqd/mmc1 Tainted: G OE 6.1.0-rc5 #1 [ 77.554910] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0081.2020.0504.1834 05/04/2020 [ 77.554912] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x116/0x160 [ 77.554920] RSP: 0018:ffff888107b7fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 77.554923] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888118c1b740 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 77.554926] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed1020f6ffa9 [ 77.554928] RBP: ffff888107b7fde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1043ea60ba [ 77.554930] R10: ffff88821f5305cb R11: ffffed1043ea60b9 R12: ffffffff93aa3a60 [ 77.554932] R13: 000000000000011b R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: ffffffffc0558660 [ 77.554934] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88821f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 77.554937] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 77.554939] CR2: 00007f8a44010d68 CR3: 000000024421a003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [ 77.554942] Call Trace: [ 77.554944] <TASK> [ 77.554952] mutex_lock+0x78/0xf0 [ 77.554973] vub300_enable_sdio_irq+0x103/0x3c0 [vub300] [ 77.554981] sdio_irq_thread+0x25c/0x5b0 [ 77.555006] kthread+0x2b8/0x370 [ 77.555017] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 77.555023] </TASK> [ 77.555025] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c +2 -0
@@ -2052,6 +2052,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(strucreturn ;kref_get (&vub300->kref);if (enable) { +set_current_state (TASK_RUNNING );mutex_lock (&vub300->irq_mutex);if (vub300->irqs_queued) { vub300->irqs_queued -=1 ;
@@ -2067,6 +2068,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(strucvub300_queue_poll_work (vub300,0 ); }mutex_unlock (&vub300->irq_mutex); +set_current_state (TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE ); }else { vub300->irq_enabled =0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 271/338 tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]>
commit 37e90c374dd11cf4919c51e847c6d6ced0abc555 upstream.
In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak.
--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +20 -9
@@ -613,12 +613,16 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi/* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */ sm = buf->start_method; -if (sm ==ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED ) -return -ENODEV ; +if (sm ==ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED ) { + rc = -ENODEV ; + goto out; + } priv =devm_kzalloc (dev,sizeof (struct crb_priv ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!priv) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!priv) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + }/* The reason for the extra quirk is that the PTT in 4th Gen Core CPUs * report only ACPI start but in practice seems to require both
@@ -638,7 +642,8 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_deviFW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table has wrong size %u for start method type %d\n" , buf->header.length, ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC); -return -EINVAL ; + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out; } crb_smc = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct tpm2_crb_smc, buf, sizeof(*buf)); priv->smc_func_id = crb_smc->smc_func_id;
@@ -647,17 +652,23 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi rc =crb_map_io (device, priv, buf);if (rc) -return rc; + goto out; chip =tpmm_chip_alloc (dev, &tpm_crb); -if (IS_ERR (chip)) -return PTR_ERR (chip); +if (IS_ERR (chip)) { + rc =PTR_ERR (chip); + goto out; + }dev_set_drvdata (&chip->dev, priv); chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle; chip->flags =TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 ; -return tpm_chip_register (chip); + rc =tpm_chip_register (chip); + +out: +acpi_put_table ((struct acpi_table_header *)buf); +return rc; }static int crb_acpi_remove (struct acpi_device *device)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 272/338 tpm: tpm_tis: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]>
commit db9622f762104459ff87ecdf885cc42c18053fd9 upstream.
In check_acpi_tpm2(), we get the TPM2 table just to make sure the table is there, not used after the init, so the acpi_put_table() should be added to release the ACPI memory.
--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +5 -4
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct deviceconst struct acpi_device_id *aid =acpi_match_device (tpm_acpi_tbl, dev);struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl;acpi_status st; +int ret =0 ;if (!aid || aid->driver_data !=DEVICE_IS_TPM2 )return 0 ;
@@ -112,8 +113,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device/* If the ACPI TPM2 signature is matched then a global ACPI_SIG_TPM2 * table is mandatory */ - st = -acpi_get_table (ACPI_SIG_TPM2 ,1 , (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl); + st =acpi_get_table (ACPI_SIG_TPM2 ,1 , (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl);if (ACPI_FAILURE (st) || tbl->header.length <sizeof (*tbl)) {dev_err (dev,FW_BUG "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n" );return -EINVAL ;
@@ -121,9 +121,10 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device/* The tpm2_crb driver handles this device */ if (tbl->start_method !=ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED ) -return -ENODEV ; + ret = -ENODEV ; - return 0; +acpi_put_table ((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl); + return ret; }#else static int check_acpi_tpm2 (struct device *dev)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 273/338 media: stv0288: use explicitly signed char
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
commit 7392134428c92a4cb541bd5c8f4f5c8d2e88364d upstream.
With char becoming unsigned by default, and with char alone being ambiguous and based on architecture, signed chars need to be marked explicitly as such. Use s8 and u8 types here, since that's what surrounding code does. This fixes:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: assigning (-9) to unsigned variable 'tm' drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: we never enter this loop
--- drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c +2 -3
@@ -458,9 +458,8 @@ static int stv0288_set_frontend(struct dstruct stv0288_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache; -char tm; -unsigned char tda[3 ]; -u8 reg, time_out =0 ; +u8 tda[3 ], reg, time_out =0 ; +s8 tm;dprintk ("%s : FE_SET_FRONTEND\n" , __func__);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 274/338 ktest.pl minconfig: Unset configs instead of just removing them
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
commit ef784eebb56425eed6e9b16e7d47e5c00dcf9c38 upstream.
After a full run of a make_min_config test, I noticed there were a lot of CONFIGs still enabled that really should not be. Looking at them, I noticed they were all defined as "default y". The issue is that the test simple removes the config and re-runs make oldconfig, which enables it again because it is set to default 'y'. Instead, explicitly disable the config with writing "# CONFIG_FOO is not set" to the file to keep it from being set again.
With this change, one of my box's minconfigs went from 768 configs set, down to 521 configs set.
--- tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl +2 -1
@@ -3797,9 +3797,10 @@ sub test_this_config { # .config to make sure it is missing the config that # we had before my %configs = %min_configs; - delete $configs{$config}; + $configs{$config} = "# $config is not set"; make_new_config ((values %configs), (values %keep_configs)); make_oldconfig; + delete $configs{$config}; undef %configs; assign_configs \%configs, $output_config;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 275/338 ARM: ux500: do not directly dereference __iomem
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
commit 65b0e307a1a9193571db12910f382f84195a3d29 upstream.
Sparse reports that calling add_device_randomness() on uid is a violation of address spaces. And indeed the next usage uses readl() properly, but that was left out when passing it toadd_device_ randomness(). So instead copy the whole thing to the stack first.
--- drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c +4 -6
@@ -159,20 +159,18 @@ static ssize_t ux500_get_process(structstatic const char *db8500_read_soc_id (struct device_node *backupram) {void __iomem *base; -void __iomem *uid;const char *retstr; +u32 uid[5 ]; base =of_iomap (backupram,0 );if (!base)return NULL ; - uid = base +0x1fc0 ; +memcpy_fromio (uid, base +0x1fc0 ,sizeof (uid));/* Throw these device-specific numbers into the entropy pool */ -add_device_randomness (uid,0x14 ); +add_device_randomness (uid,sizeof (uid)); retstr =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x" , -readl ((u32 *)uid+0 ), -readl ((u32 *)uid+1 ),readl ((u32 *)uid+2 ), -readl ((u32 *)uid+3 ),readl ((u32 *)uid+4 )); + uid[0 ], uid[1 ], uid[2 ], uid[3 ], uid[4 ]);iounmap (base);return retstr; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 276/338 selftests: Use optional USERCFLAGS and USERLDFLAGS
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
commit de3ee3f63400a23954e7c1ad1cb8c20f29ab6fe3 upstream.
This change enables to extend CFLAGS and LDFLAGS from command line, e.g. to extend compiler checks: make USERCFLAGS=-Werror USERLDFLAGS=-static
USERCFLAGS and USERLDFLAGS are documented in Documentation/kbuild/makefiles.rst and Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.rst
This should be backported (down to 5.10) to improve previous kernel versions testing as well.
--- tools/testing/selftests/lib.mk | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/lib.mk +5 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ endef clean: $(CLEAN) +# Enables to extend CFLAGS and LDFLAGS from command line, e.g. +# make USERCFLAGS=-Werror USERLDFLAGS=-static +CFLAGS += $(USERCFLAGS) +LDFLAGS += $(USERLDFLAGS) + # When make O= with kselftest target from main level # the following aren't defined. #
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 277/338 dm cache: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_cache_metadata_abort
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
commit 352b837a5541690d4f843819028cf2b8be83d424 upstream.
Same ABBA deadlock pattern fixed in commit 4b60f452ec51 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata") to DM-cache's metadata.
--- drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c +47 -7
@@ -550,11 +550,13 @@ static int __create_persistent_data_objereturn r; } -static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects (struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd) +static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects (struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd, +bool destroy_bm) {dm_sm_destroy (cmd->metadata_sm);dm_tm_destroy (cmd->tm); -dm_block_manager_destroy (cmd->bm); +if (destroy_bm) +dm_block_manager_destroy (cmd->bm); }typedef unsigned long (*flags_mutator )(unsigned long );
@@ -825,7 +827,7 @@ static struct dm_cache_metadata *lookup_ cmd2 =lookup (bdev);if (cmd2) {mutex_unlock (&table_lock); -__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd); +__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd, true);kfree (cmd);return cmd2; }
@@ -873,7 +875,7 @@ void dm_cache_metadata_close(struct dm_cmutex_unlock (&table_lock);if (!cmd->fail_io) -__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd); +__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd, true);kfree (cmd); } }
@@ -1807,14 +1809,52 @@ int dm_cache_metadata_needs_check(structint dm_cache_metadata_abort (struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd) { -int r; +int r = -EINVAL ; +struct dm_block_manager *old_bm =NULL , *new_bm =NULL ; + +/* fail_io is double-checked with cmd->root_lock held below */ +if (unlikely (cmd->fail_io)) +return r; + +/* +* Replacement block manager (new_bm) is created and old_bm destroyed outside of +* cmd root_lock to avoid ABBA deadlock that would result (due to life-cycle of +* shrinker associated with the block manager's bufio client vs cmd root_lock). +* - must take shrinker_rwsem without holding cmd->root_lock +*/ + new_bm =dm_block_manager_create (cmd->bdev,DM_CACHE_METADATA_BLOCK_SIZE <<SECTOR_SHIFT , +CACHE_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS );WRITE_LOCK (cmd); -__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd); - r =__create_persistent_data_objects (cmd, false); +if (cmd->fail_io) { +WRITE_UNLOCK (cmd); + goto out; + } + +__destroy_persistent_data_objects (cmd, false); + old_bm = cmd->bm; +if (IS_ERR (new_bm)) { +DMERR ("could not create block manager during abort" ); + cmd->bm =NULL ; + r =PTR_ERR (new_bm); + goto out_unlock; + } + + cmd->bm = new_bm; + r =__open_or_format_metadata (cmd, false); +if (r) { + cmd->bm =NULL ; + goto out_unlock; + } + new_bm =NULL ; +out_unlock:if (r) cmd->fail_io = true;WRITE_UNLOCK (cmd); +dm_block_manager_destroy (old_bm); +out: +if (new_bm && !IS_ERR (new_bm)) +dm_block_manager_destroy (new_bm);return r; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 278/338 dm thin: Use last transactions pmd->root when commit failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>
commit 7991dbff6849f67e823b7cc0c15e5a90b0549b9f upstream.
Recently we found a softlock up problem in dm thin pool btree lookup code due to corrupted metadata:
Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks CPU: 7 PID: 2669225 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [dm_thin_pool] Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x9c/0xd3 panic+0x35d/0x6b9 watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x16/0x25 __run_hrtimer+0xa2/0x2d0 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:__relink_lru+0x102/0x220 [dm_bufio] __bufio_new+0x11f/0x4f0 [dm_bufio] new_read+0xa3/0x1e0 [dm_bufio] dm_bm_read_lock+0x33/0xd0 [dm_persistent_data] ro_step+0x63/0x100 [dm_persistent_data] btree_lookup_raw.constprop.0+0x44/0x220 [dm_persistent_data] dm_btree_lookup+0x16f/0x210 [dm_persistent_data] dm_thin_find_block+0x12c/0x210 [dm_thin_pool] __process_bio_read_only+0xc5/0x400 [dm_thin_pool] process_thin_deferred_bios+0x1a4/0x4a0 [dm_thin_pool] process_one_work+0x3c5/0x730
Following process may generate a broken btree mixed with fresh and stale btree nodes, which could get dm thin trapped in an infinite loop while looking up data block:
Transaction 1: pmd->root = A, A->B->C // One path in btree
pmd->root = X, X->Y->Z // Copy-up
Transaction 2: X,Z is updated on disk, Y write failed.
// Commit failed, dm thin becomes read-only.
process_bio_read_only
dm_thin_find_block
__find_block
dm_btree_lookup(pmd->root)The pmd->root points to a broken btree, Y may contain stale node pointing to any block, for example X, which gets dm thin trapped into a dead loop while looking up Z.
Fix this by setting pmd->root in __open_metadata(), so that dm thin will use the last transaction's pmd->root if commit failed.
Fetch a reproducer in [Link].
Linke: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216790
--- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +9 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,15 @@ static int __open_metadata(struct dm_poo goto bad_cleanup_data_sm; } +/* +* For pool metadata opening process, root setting is redundant +* because it will be set again in __begin_transaction(). But dm +* pool aborting process really needs to get last transaction's +* root to avoid accessing broken btree. +*/ + pmd->root =le64_to_cpu (disk_super->data_mapping_root); + pmd->details_root =le64_to_cpu (disk_super->device_details_root); +__setup_btree_details (pmd);dm_bm_unlock (sblock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 279/338 dm thin: Fix UAF in run_timer_softirq()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luo Meng <[email protected]>
commit 88430ebcbc0ec637b710b947738839848c20feff upstream.
When dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent, it will lead to UAF, as follows:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __run_timers+0x173/0x710 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88816d9490f0 by task swapper/0/0 <snip> Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f print_report.cold+0x132/0xaa2 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xcd/0x160 __run_timers+0x173/0x710 kasan_report+0xad/0x110 __run_timers+0x173/0x710 __asan_store8+0x9c/0x140 __run_timers+0x173/0x710 call_timer_fn+0x310/0x310 pvclock_clocksource_read+0xfa/0x250 kvm_clock_read+0x2c/0x70 kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x20 ktime_get+0x5c/0x110 lapic_next_event+0x38/0x50 clockevents_program_event+0xf1/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x49/0x90 __do_softirq+0x16e/0x62c __irq_exit_rcu+0x1fa/0x270 irq_exit_rcu+0x12/0x20 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0
One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:
use free
do_resume |
__find_device_hash_cell |
dm_get |
atomic_inc(&md->holders) |
| dm_destroy
| __dm_destroy
| if (!dm_suspended_md(md))
| atomic_read(&md->holders)
| msleep(1)
dm_resume |
__dm_resume |
dm_table_resume_targets |
pool_resume |
do_waker #add delay work |
dm_put |
atomic_dec(&md->holders) |
| dm_table_destroy
| pool_dtr
| __pool_dec
| __pool_destroy
| destroy_workqueue
| kfree(pool) # free pool time out__do_softirq
run_timer_softirq # pool has already been freed
This can be easily reproduced using:
1. create thin-pool
2. dmsetup suspend pool
3. dmsetup resume pool
4. dmsetup remove_all # Concurrent with 3
The root cause of this UAF bug is that dm_resume() adds timer after dm_destroy() skips cancelling the timer because of suspend status. After timeout, it will call run_timer_softirq(), however pool has already been freed. The concurrency UAF bug will happen.
Therefore, cancelling timer again in __pool_destroy().
--- drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2 -0
@@ -2932,6 +2932,8 @@ static void __pool_destroy(struct pool *dm_bio_prison_destroy (pool->prison);dm_kcopyd_client_destroy (pool->copier); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&pool->waker); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&pool->no_space_timeout);if (pool->wq)destroy_workqueue (pool->wq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 280/338 dm cache: Fix UAF in destroy()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luo Meng <[email protected]>
commit 6a459d8edbdbe7b24db42a5a9f21e6aa9e00c2aa upstream.
Dm_cache also has the same UAF problem when dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent.
Therefore, cancelling timer again in destroy().
--- drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +1 -0
@@ -2034,6 +2034,7 @@ static void destroy(struct cache *cache)if (cache->prison)dm_bio_prison_destroy_v2 (cache->prison); +cancel_delayed_work_sync (&cache->waker);if (cache->wq)destroy_workqueue (cache->wq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 281/338 dm cache: set needs_check flag after aborting metadata
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>
commit 6b9973861cb2e96dcd0bb0f1baddc5c034207c5c upstream.
Otherwise the commit that will be aborted will be associated with the metadata objects that will be torn down. Must write needs_check flag to metadata with a reset block manager.
Found through code-inspection (and compared against dm-thin.c).
--- drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +5 -5
@@ -1019,16 +1019,16 @@ static void abort_transaction(struct cacif (get_cache_mode (cache) >=CM_READ_ONLY )return ; -if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check (cache->cmd)) { -DMERR ("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata" , dev_name); -set_cache_mode (cache,CM_FAIL ); - } -DMERR_LIMIT ("%s: aborting current metadata transaction" , dev_name);if (dm_cache_metadata_abort (cache->cmd)) {DMERR ("%s: failed to abort metadata transaction" , dev_name);set_cache_mode (cache,CM_FAIL ); } + +if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check (cache->cmd)) { +DMERR ("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata" , dev_name); +set_cache_mode (cache,CM_FAIL ); + } }static void metadata_operation_failed (struct cache *cache,const char *op,int r)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 282/338 x86/microcode/intel: Do not retry microcode reloading on the APs
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
commit be1b670f61443aa5d0d01782e9b8ea0ee825d018 upstream.
The retries in load_ucode_intel_ap() were in place to support systems with mixed steppings. Mixed steppings are no longer supported and there is only one microcode image at a time. Any retries will simply reattempt to apply the same image over and over without making progress.
[ bp: Zap the circumstantial reasoning from the commit message. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +1 -7
@@ -662,7 +662,6 @@ void load_ucode_intel_ap(void)else iup = &intel_ucode_patch; -reget:if (!*iup) { patch =__load_ucode_intel (&uci);if (!patch)
@@ -673,12 +672,7 @@ reget: uci.mc = *iup; -if (apply_microcode_early (&uci, true)) { -/* Mixed-silicon system? Try to refetch the proper patch: */ - *iup =NULL ; - - goto reget; - } +apply_microcode_early (&uci, true); }static struct microcode_intel *find_patch (struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 283/338 tracing: Fix infinite loop in tracing_read_pipe on overflowed print_trace_line
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>
commit c1ac03af6ed45d05786c219d102f37eb44880f28 upstream.
print_trace_line may overflow seq_file buffer. If the event is not consumed, the while loop keeps peeking this event, causing a infinite loop.
--- kernel/trace/trace.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +14 -1
@@ -5798,7 +5798,20 @@ waitagain: ret =print_trace_line (iter);if (ret ==TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE ) { -/* don't print partial lines */ +/* +* If one print_trace_line() fills entire trace_seq in one shot, +* trace_seq_to_user() will returns -EBUSY because save_len == 0, +* In this case, we need to consume it, otherwise, loop will peek +* this event next time, resulting in an infinite loop. +*/ +if (save_len ==0 ) { + iter->seq.full =0 ; +trace_seq_puts (&iter->seq,"[LINE TOO BIG]\n" ); +trace_consume (iter); +break ; + } + +/* In other cases, don't print partial lines */ iter->seq.seq.len = save_len;break ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 284/338 ARM: 9256/1: NWFPE: avoid compiler-generated __aeabi_uldivmod
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>
commit 3220022038b9a3845eea762af85f1c5694b9f861 upstream.
clang-15's ability to elide loops completely became more aggressive when it can deduce how a variable is being updated in a loop. Counting down one variable by an increment of another can be replaced by a modulo operation.
For 64b variables on 32b ARM EABI targets, this can result in the compiler generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod, which it does for a do while loop in float64_rem().
For the kernel, we'd generally prefer that developers not open code 64b division via binary / operators and instead use the more explicit helpers from div64.h. On arm-linux-gnuabi targets, failure to do so can result in linkage failures due to undefined references to __aeabi_uldivmod().
While developers can avoid open coding divisions on 64b variables, the compiler doesn't know that the Linux kernel has a partial implementation of a compiler runtime (--rtlib) to enforce this convention.
It's also undecidable for the compiler whether the code in question would be faster to execute the loop vs elide it and do the 64b division.
While I actively avoid using the internal -mllvm command line flags, I think we get better code than using barrier() here, which will force reloads+spills in the loop for all toolchains.
--- arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -11,3 +11,9 @@ nwfpe-y += fpa11.o fpa11_cpdo.o fpa11 entry.o nwfpe-$(CONFIG_FPE_NWFPE_XP) += extended_cpdo.o + +# Try really hard to avoid generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod() from +# float64_rem() due to loop elision. +ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG +CFLAGS_softfloat.o += -mllvm -replexitval=never +endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 285/338 media: dvb-core: Fix double free in dvb_register_device()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>
commit 6b0d0477fce747d4137aa65856318b55fba72198 upstream.
In function dvb_register_device() -> dvb_register_media_device() -> dvb_create_media_entity(), dvb->entity is allocated and initialized. If the initialization fails, it frees the dvb->entity, and return an error code. The caller takes the error code and handles the error by calling dvb_media_device_free(), which unregisters the entity and frees the field again if it is not NULL. As dvb->entity may not NULLed in dvb_create_media_entity() when the allocation of dvbdev->pad fails, a double free may occur. This may also cause an Use After free in media_device_unregister_entity().
Fix this by storing NULL to dvb->entity when it is freed.
--- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -0
@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ static int dvb_create_media_entity(struc GFP_KERNEL);if (!dvbdev->pads) {kfree (dvbdev->entity); + dvbdev->entity =NULL ;return -ENOMEM ; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 286/338 media: dvb-core: Fix UAF due to refcount races at releasing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit fd3d91ab1c6ab0628fe642dd570b56302c30a792 upstream.
The dvb-core tries to sync the releases of opened files at dvb_dmxdev_release() with two refcounts: dvbdev->users and dvr_dvbdev->users. A problem is present in those two syncs: when yet another dvb_demux_open() is called during those sync waits, dvb_demux_open() continues to process even if the device is being closed. This includes the increment of the former refcount, resulting in the leftover refcount after the sync of the latter refcount at dvb_dmxdev_release(). It ends up with use-after-free, since the function believes that all usages were gone and releases the resources.
This patch addresses the problem by adding the check of dmxdev->exit flag at dvb_demux_open(), just like dvb_dvr_open() already does. With the exit flag check, the second call of dvb_demux_open() fails, hence the further corruption can be avoided.
Also for avoiding the races of the dmxdev->exit flag reference, this patch serializes the dmxdev->exit set up and the sync waits with the dmxdev->mutex lock at dvb_dmxdev_release(). Without the mutex lock, dvb_demux_open() (or dvb_dvr_open()) may run concurrently with dvb_dmxdev_release(), which allows to skip the exit flag check and continue the open process that is being closed.
CVE-2022-41218 is assigned to those bugs above.
--- drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c +8 -0
@@ -738,6 +738,11 @@ static int dvb_demux_open(struct inode *if (mutex_lock_interruptible (&dmxdev->mutex))return -ERESTARTSYS ; +if (dmxdev->exit) { +mutex_unlock (&dmxdev->mutex); +return -ENODEV ; + } +for (i =0 ; i < dmxdev->filternum; i++)if (dmxdev->filter[i].state ==DMXDEV_STATE_FREE )break ;
@@ -1253,7 +1258,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_dmxdev_init);void dvb_dmxdev_release (struct dmxdev *dmxdev) { +mutex_lock (&dmxdev->mutex); dmxdev->exit =1 ; +mutex_unlock (&dmxdev->mutex); +if (dmxdev->dvbdev->users >1 ) {wait_event (dmxdev->dvbdev->wait_queue, dmxdev->dvbdev->users ==1 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 287/338 cifs: fix confusing debug message
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>
commit a85ceafd41927e41a4103d228a993df7edd8823b upstream.
Since rc was initialised to -ENOMEM in cifs_get_smb_ses(), when an existing smb session was found, free_xid() would be called and then print
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 44 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 44) rc = -12
Fix this by initialising rc to 0 and then let free_xid() print this instead
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 14 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 14) rc = 0
--- fs/cifs/connect.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/connect.c +3 -1
@@ -2693,7 +2693,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol _static struct cifs_ses *cifs_get_smb_ses (struct TCP_Server_Info *server,struct smb_vol *volume_info) { -int rc = -ENOMEM ; +int rc =0 ;unsigned int xid;struct cifs_ses *ses;struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr;
@@ -2735,6 +2735,8 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Inforeturn ses; } + rc = -ENOMEM ; +cifs_dbg (FYI ,"Existing smb sess not found\n" ); ses =sesInfoAlloc ();if (ses ==NULL )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 288/338 ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Huaxin Lu <[email protected]>
commit 11220db412edae8dba58853238f53258268bdb88 upstream.
In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +4 -1
@@ -266,8 +266,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore template_desc->name ="" ; template_desc->fmt =kstrdup (template_name,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!template_desc->fmt) +if (!template_desc->fmt) { +kfree (template_desc); + template_desc =NULL ; goto out; + }spin_lock (&template_list);list_add_tail_rcu (&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 289/338 PCI: Fix pci_device_is_present() for VFs by checking PF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
commit 98b04dd0b4577894520493d96bc4623387767445 upstream.
pci_device_is_present() previously didn't work for VFs because it reads the Vendor and Device ID, which are 0xffff for VFs, which looks like they aren't present. Check the PF instead.
Wei Gong reported that if virtio I/O is in progress when the driver is unbound or "0" is written to /sys/.../sriov_numvfs, the virtio I/O operation hangs, which may result in output like this:
task:bash state:D stack: 0 pid: 1773 ppid: 1241 flags:0x00004002
Call Trace: schedule+0x4f/0xc0 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x69/0xa0 blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x1b/0x20 blk_cleanup_queue+0x3d/0xd0 virtblk_remove+0x3c/0xb0 [virtio_blk] virtio_dev_remove+0x4b/0x80 ... device_unregister+0x1b/0x60 unregister_virtio_device+0x18/0x30 virtio_pci_remove+0x41/0x80 pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0
This happened because pci_device_is_present(VF) returned "false" in virtio_pci_remove(), so it called virtio_break_device(). The broken vq meant that vring_interrupt() skipped the vq.callback() that would have completed the virtio I/O operation via virtblk_done().
--- drivers/pci/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/pci.c +2 -0
@@ -5166,6 +5166,8 @@ bool pci_device_is_present(struct pci_de {u32 v; +/* Check PF if pdev is a VF, since VF Vendor/Device IDs are 0xffff */ + pdev =pci_physfn (pdev);if (pci_dev_is_disconnected (pdev))return false;return pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id (pdev->bus, pdev->devfn, &v,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 290/338 PCI/sysfs: Fix double free in error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
commit aa382ffa705bea9931ec92b6f3c70e1fdb372195 upstream.
When pci_create_attr() fails, pci_remove_resource_files() is called which will iterate over the res_attr[_wc] arrays and frees every non NULL entry. To avoid a double free here set the array entry only after it's clear we successfully initialized it.
--- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +9 -4
@@ -1313,11 +1313,9 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_desysfs_bin_attr_init (res_attr);if (write_combine) { - pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr;sprintf (res_attr_name,"resource%d_wc" , num); res_attr->mmap = pci_mmap_resource_wc; }else { - pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr;sprintf (res_attr_name,"resource%d" , num);if (pci_resource_flags (pdev, num) &IORESOURCE_IO ) { res_attr->read = pci_read_resource_io;
@@ -1333,10 +1331,17 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_de res_attr->size =pci_resource_len (pdev, num); res_attr->private = (void *)(unsigned long )num; retval =sysfs_create_bin_file (&pdev->dev.kobj, res_attr); -if (retval) +if (retval) {kfree (res_attr); +return retval; + } + +if (write_combine) + pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr; +else + pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr; -return retval; +return 0 ; }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 291/338 crypto: n2 - add missing hash statesize
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin Labbe <[email protected]>
commit 76a4e874593543a2dff91d249c95bac728df2774 upstream.
Add missing statesize to hash templates.
This is mandatory otherwise no algorithms can be registered as the core requires statesize to be set.
--- drivers/crypto/n2_core.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/n2_core.c +6 -0
@@ -1276,6 +1276,7 @@ struct n2_hash_tmpl {const u32 *hash_init;u8 hw_op_hashsz;u8 digest_size; +u8 statesize;u8 block_size;u8 auth_type;u8 hmac_type;
@@ -1307,6 +1308,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm .hmac_type = AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_MD5, .hw_op_hashsz = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, .digest_size = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, + .statesize = sizeof(struct md5_state), .block_size = MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE }, { .name = "sha1", .hash_zero = sha1_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1315,6 +1317,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm .hmac_type = AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1, .hw_op_hashsz = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, .digest_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha1_state), .block_size = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE }, { .name = "sha256", .hash_zero = sha256_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1323,6 +1326,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm .hmac_type = AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256, .hw_op_hashsz = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, .digest_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state), .block_size = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE }, { .name = "sha224", .hash_zero = sha224_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1331,6 +1335,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm .hmac_type = AUTH_TYPE_RESERVED, .hw_op_hashsz = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, .digest_size = SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE, + .statesize = sizeof(struct sha256_state), .block_size = SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE }, };#define NUM_HASH_TMPLS ARRAY_SIZE(hash_tmpls)
@@ -1470,6 +1475,7 @@ static int __n2_register_one_ahash(const halg = &ahash->halg; halg->digestsize = tmpl->digest_size; + halg->statesize = tmpl->statesize; base = &halg->base;snprintf (base->cra_name,CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ,"%s" , tmpl->name);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 292/338 iommu/amd: Fix ivrs_acpihid cmdline parsing code
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
commit 5f18e9f8868c6d4eae71678e7ebd4977b7d8c8cf upstream.
The second (UID) strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match considers "0" and "00" different, which can prevent device registration.
Have the AMD IOMMU driver's ivrs_acpihid parsing code remove any leading zeroes to make the UID strcmp succeed. Now users can safely specify "AMDxxxxx:00" or "AMDxxxxx:0" and expect the same behaviour.
--- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +7 -0
@@ -2919,6 +2919,13 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(chareturn 1 ; } +/* +* Ignore leading zeroes after ':', so e.g., AMDI0095:00 +* will match AMDI0095:0 in the second strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match +*/ +while (*uid =='0' && *(uid +1 )) + uid++; + i = early_acpihid_map_size++;memcpy (early_acpihid_map[i].hid, hid,strlen (hid));memcpy (early_acpihid_map[i].uid, uid,strlen (uid));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 293/338 parisc: led: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in start_task()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Shang XiaoJing <[email protected]>
commit 41f563ab3c33698bdfc3403c7c2e6c94e73681e4 upstream.
start_task() calls create_singlethread_workqueue() and not checked the ret value, which may return NULL. And a null-ptr-deref may happen:
start_task()
create_singlethread_workqueue() # failed, led_wq is NULL queue_delayed_work()
queue_delayed_work_on()
__queue_delayed_work() # warning here, but continue
__queue_work() # access wq->flags, null-ptr-deref
Check the ret value and return -ENOMEM if it is NULL.
--- drivers/parisc/led.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/parisc/led.c +3 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ static int start_task(void)/* Create the work queue and queue the LED task */ led_wq =create_singlethread_workqueue ("led_wq" ); +if (!led_wq) +return -ENOMEM ; +queue_delayed_work (led_wq, &led_task,0 );return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 294/338 device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Wang Weiyang <[email protected]>
commit e68bfbd3b3c3a0ec3cf8c230996ad8cabe90322f upstream.
When add the 'a *:* rwm' entry to devcgroup A's whitelist, at first A's exceptions will be cleaned and A's behavior is changed to DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW. Then parent's exceptions will be copyed to A's whitelist. If copy failure occurs, just return leaving A to grant permissions to all devices. And A may grant more permissions than parent.
Backup A's whitelist and recover original exceptions after copy failure.
--- security/device_cgroup.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +29 -4
@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ free_and_exit:return -ENOMEM ; } +static void dev_exceptions_move (struct list_head *dest,struct list_head *orig) +{ +struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp; + +lockdep_assert_held (&devcgroup_mutex); + +list_for_each_entry_safe (ex, tmp, orig, list) { +list_move_tail (&ex->list, dest); + } +} +/* * called under devcgroup_mutex */
@@ -609,11 +620,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(strucint count, rc =0 ;struct dev_exception_item ex;struct dev_cgroup *parent =css_to_devcgroup (devcgroup->css.parent); +struct dev_cgroup tmp_devcgrp;if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;memset (&ex,0 ,sizeof (ex)); +memset (&tmp_devcgrp,0 ,sizeof (tmp_devcgrp)); b = buffer;switch (*b) {
@@ -625,15 +638,27 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(strucif (!may_allow_all (parent))return -EPERM ; -dev_exception_clean (devcgroup); - devcgroup->behavior =DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW ; -if (!parent) +if (!parent) { + devcgroup->behavior =DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW ; +dev_exception_clean (devcgroup);break ; + } +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions); + rc =dev_exceptions_copy (&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions, + &devcgroup->exceptions); +if (rc) +return rc; +dev_exception_clean (devcgroup); rc =dev_exceptions_copy (&devcgroup->exceptions, &parent->exceptions); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +dev_exceptions_move (&devcgroup->exceptions, + &tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);return rc; + } + devcgroup->behavior =DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW ; +dev_exception_clean (&tmp_devcgrp);break ;case DEVCG_DENY :if (css_has_online_children (&devcgroup->css))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 295/338 drm/connector: send hotplug uevent on connector cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Simon Ser <[email protected]>
commit 6fdc2d490ea1369d17afd7e6eb66fecc5b7209bc upstream.
A typical DP-MST unplug removes a KMS connector. However care must be taken to properly synchronize with user-space. The expected sequence of events is the following:
1. The kernel notices that the DP-MST port is gone.
2. The kernel marks the connector as disconnected, then sends a uevent to make user-space re-scan the connector list.
3. User-space notices the connector goes from connected to disconnected, disables it.
4. Kernel handles the IOCTL disabling the connector. On success, the very last reference to the struct drm_connector is dropped and drm_connector_cleanup() is called.
5. The connector is removed from the list, and a uevent is sent to tell user-space that the connector disappeared.
The very last step was missing. As a result, user-space thought the connector still existed and could try to disable it again. Since the kernel no longer knows about the connector, that would end up with EINVAL and confused user-space.
Fix this by sending a hotplug uevent from drm_connector_cleanup().
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c +3 -0
@@ -352,6 +352,9 @@ void drm_connector_cleanup(struct drm_comutex_destroy (&connector->mutex);memset (connector,0 ,sizeof (*connector)); + +if (dev->registered) +drm_sysfs_hotplug_event (dev); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (drm_connector_cleanup);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 296/338 drm/vmwgfx: Validate the box size for the snooped cursor
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zack Rusin <[email protected]>
commit 4cf949c7fafe21e085a4ee386bb2dade9067316e upstream.
Invalid userspace dma surface copies could potentially overflow the memcpy from the surface to the snooped image leading to crashes. To fix it the dimensions of the copybox have to be validated against the expected size of the snooped cursor.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +2 -1
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ void vmw_kms_cursor_snoop(struct vmw_surif (cmd->dma.guest.ptr.offset %PAGE_SIZE || box->x !=0 || box->y !=0 || box->z !=0 || box->srcx !=0 || box->srcy !=0 || box->srcz !=0 || - box->d !=1 || box_count !=1 ) { + box->d !=1 || box_count !=1 || + box->w >64 || box->h >64 ) {/* TODO handle none page aligned offsets */ /* TODO handle more dst & src != 0 */ /* TODO handle more then one copy */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 297/338 ext4: add inode table check in __ext4_get_inode_loc to aovid possible infinite loop
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
commit eee22187b53611e173161e38f61de1c7ecbeb876 upstream.
In do_writepages, if the value returned by ext4_writepages is "-ENOMEM" and "wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL", retry until the condition is not met.
In __ext4_get_inode_loc, if the bh returned by sb_getblk is NULL, the function returns -ENOMEM.
In __getblk_slow, if the return value of grow_buffers is less than 0, the function returns NULL.
When the three processes are connected in series like the following stack, an infinite loop may occur:
do_writepages <--- keep retrying
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent
ext4_map_blocks
ext4_ext_map_blocks
ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized
ext4_split_extent
ext4_split_extent_at
__ext4_ext_dirty
__ext4_mark_inode_dirty
ext4_reserve_inode_write
ext4_get_inode_loc
__ext4_get_inode_loc <--- return -ENOMEM
sb_getblk
__getblk_gfp
__getblk_slow <--- return NULL
grow_buffers
grow_dev_page <--- return -ENXIO
ret = (block < end_block) ? 1 : -ENXIO;In this issue, bg_inode_table_hi is overwritten as an incorrect value. As a result, block < end_block cannot be met in grow_dev_page. Therefore, __ext4_get_inode_loc always returns '-ENOMEM' and do_writepages keeps retrying. As a result, the writeback process is in the D state due to an infinite loop.
Add a check on inode table block in the __ext4_get_inode_loc function by referring to ext4_read_inode_bitmap to avoid this infinite loop.
--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +9 -1
@@ -4570,9 +4570,17 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct i inodes_per_block =EXT4_SB (sb)->s_inodes_per_block; inode_offset = ((inode->i_ino -1 ) %EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP (sb)); - block =ext4_inode_table (sb, gdp) + (inode_offset / inodes_per_block); iloc->offset = (inode_offset % inodes_per_block) *EXT4_INODE_SIZE (sb); + block =ext4_inode_table (sb, gdp); +if ((block <=le32_to_cpu (EXT4_SB (sb)->s_es->s_first_data_block)) || + (block >=ext4_blocks_count (EXT4_SB (sb)->s_es))) { +ext4_error (sb,"Invalid inode table block %llu in " +"block_group %u" , block, iloc->block_group); +return -EFSCORRUPTED ; + } + block += (inode_offset / inodes_per_block); + bh =sb_getblk (sb, block);if (unlikely (!bh))return -ENOMEM ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 298/338 ext4: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for ext4_check_flag_values
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
commit 3bf678a0f9c017c9ba7c581541dbc8453452a7ae upstream.
Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ext4/ext4.h:591:2 left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c ext4_init_fs+0x5a/0x277 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK>
--- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +1 -1
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ enum {* * It's not paranoia if the Murphy's Law really *is* out to get you. :-) */ -#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE (FLAG ) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1 << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG)) +#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE (FLAG ) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1U << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG))#define CHECK_FLAG_VALUE (FLAG ) BUILD_BUG_ON(!TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG))static inline void ext4_check_flag_values (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 299/338 ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search caused by bad boot loader inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
commit 991ed014de0840c5dc405b679168924afb2952ac upstream.
We got a issue as fllows:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:203!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 945 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.0.0-next-20221007-dirty #349 RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end.isra.0+0x34/0x42 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000143b768 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881769cd0b8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fc27cf7 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff8881769cd0bc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000143b5f8 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881769cd0a0 R13: ffff8881768e5668 R14: 00000000768e52f0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f359f7f05c0(0000)GS:ffff88842fd00000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f359f5a2000 CR3: 000000017130c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __es_tree_search.isra.0+0x6d/0xf5 ext4_es_cache_extent+0xfa/0x230 ext4_cache_extents+0xd2/0x110 ext4_find_extent+0x5d5/0x8c0 ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x9c/0x1d30 ext4_map_blocks+0x431/0xa50 ext4_mpage_readpages+0x48e/0xe40 ext4_readahead+0x47/0x50 read_pages+0x82/0x530 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x199/0x2a0 do_page_cache_ra+0x47/0x70 page_cache_ra_order+0x242/0x400 ondemand_readahead+0x1e8/0x4b0 page_cache_sync_ra+0xf4/0x110 filemap_get_pages+0x131/0xb20 filemap_read+0xda/0x4b0 generic_file_read_iter+0x13a/0x250 ext4_file_read_iter+0x59/0x1d0 vfs_read+0x28f/0x460 ksys_read+0x73/0x160 __x64_sys_read+0x1e/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd </TASK> ==================================================================
In the above issue, ioctl invokes the swap_inode_boot_loader function to swap inode<5> and inode<12>. However, inode<5> contain incorrect imode and disordered extents, and i_nlink is set to 1. The extents check for inode in the ext4_iget function can be bypassed bacause 5 is EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO. While links_count is set to 1, the extents are not initialized in swap_inode_boot_loader. After the ioctl command is executed successfully, the extents are swapped to inode<12>, in this case, run the cat command to view inode<12>. And Bug_ON is triggered due to the incorrect extents.
When the boot loader inode is not initialized, its imode can be one of the following:
1) the imode is a bad type, which is marked as bad_inode in ext4_iget and set to S_IFREG.
2) the imode is good type but not S_IFREG.
3) the imode is S_IFREG.
The BUG_ON may be triggered by bypassing the check in cases 1 and 2. Therefore, when the boot loader inode is bad_inode or its imode is not S_IFREG, initialize the inode to avoid triggering the BUG.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc/* Protect extent tree against block allocations via delalloc */ ext4_double_down_write_data_sem (inode, inode_bl); -if (inode_bl->i_nlink ==0 ) { +if (is_bad_inode (inode_bl) || !S_ISREG (inode_bl->i_mode)) {/* this inode has never been used as a BOOT_LOADER */ set_nlink (inode_bl,1 );i_uid_write (inode_bl,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 300/338 ext4: init quota for old.inode in ext4_rename
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
commit fae381a3d79bb94aa2eb752170d47458d778b797 upstream.
Syzbot found the following issue:ext4_parse_param: s_want_extra_isize=128ext4_inode_info_init: s_want_extra_isize=32ext4_rename: old.inode=ffff88823869a2c8 old.dir=ffff888238699828 new.inode=ffff88823869d7e8 new.dir=ffff888238699828 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff888238699828 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff88823869a2c8 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128ext4_xattr_block_set: inode=ffff88823869a2c8
------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2234 at fs/ext4/xattr.c:2070 ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980 Modules linked in: RIP: 0010:ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980 RSP: 0018:ffff888227d3f3b0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88823007a000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000a03 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff888230078178 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000002c R09: ffffed1075c7df8e R10: ffff8883ae3efc6b R11: ffffed1075c7df8d R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88823869a2c8 R14: ffff8881012e0460 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f350ac1f740(0000) GS:ffff8883ae200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f350a6ed6a0 CR3: 0000000237456000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x3b7/0x2320 ? ext4_xattr_block_set+0x0/0x2020 ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x0/0x2320 ? ext4_xattr_check_entries+0x77/0x310 ? ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x23b/0x340 ext4_xattr_move_to_block+0x594/0x720 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x59a/0x10f0 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x278/0x3f0 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty.cold+0x347/0x410 ext4_rename+0xed3/0x174f vfs_rename+0x13a7/0x2510 do_renameat2+0x55d/0x920 __x64_sys_rename+0x7d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
As 'ext4_rename' will modify 'old.inode' ctime and mark inode dirty, which may trigger expand 'extra_isize' and allocate block. If inode didn't init quota will lead to warning. To solve above issue, init 'old.inode' firstly in 'ext4_rename'.
--- fs/ext4/namei.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -3901,6 +3901,9 @@ static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inod retval =dquot_initialize (old.dir);if (retval)return retval; + retval =dquot_initialize (old.inode); +if (retval) +return retval; retval =dquot_initialize (new.dir);if (retval)return retval;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 301/338 ext4: fix error code return to user-space in ext4_get_branch()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Luís Henriques <[email protected]>
commit 26d75a16af285a70863ba6a81f85d81e7e65da50 upstream.
If a block is out of range in ext4_get_branch(), -ENOMEM will be returned to user-space. Obviously, this error code isn't really useful. This patch fixes it by making sure the right error code (-EFSCORRUPTED) is propagated to user-space. EUCLEAN is more informative than ENOMEM.
--- fs/ext4/indirect.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/indirect.c +8 -1
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(structstruct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;Indirect *p = chain;struct buffer_head *bh; +unsigned int key;int ret = -EIO ; *err =0 ;
@@ -156,7 +157,13 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(structif (!p->key) goto no_block;while (--depth) { - bh =sb_getblk (sb,le32_to_cpu (p->key)); + key =le32_to_cpu (p->key); +if (key >ext4_blocks_count (EXT4_SB (sb)->s_es)) { +/* the block was out of range */ + ret = -EFSCORRUPTED ; + goto failure; + } + bh =sb_getblk (sb, key);if (unlikely (!bh)) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto failure;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 302/338 ext4: avoid BUG_ON when creating xattrs
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit b40ebaf63851b3a401b0dc9263843538f64f5ce6 upstream.
Commit fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32") added code to try to allocate xattr block with 32-bit block number for indirect block based files on the grounds that these files cannot use larger block numbers. It also added BUG_ON when allocated block could not fit into 32 bits. This is however bogus reasoning because xattr block is stored in inode->i_file_acl and inode->i_file_acl_hi and as such even indirect block based files can happily use full 48 bits for xattr block number. The proper handling seems to be there basically since 64-bit block number support was added. So remove the bogus limitation and BUG_ON.
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +0 -8
@@ -2069,19 +2069,11 @@ inserted: goal =ext4_group_first_block_no (sb,EXT4_I (inode)->i_block_group); - -/* non-extent files can't have physical blocks past 2^32 */ -if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag (inode,EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS ))) - goal = goal &EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS ; - block =ext4_new_meta_blocks (handle, inode, goal,0 ,NULL , &error);if (error) goto cleanup; -if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag (inode,EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS ))) -BUG_ON (block >EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS ); -ea_idebug (inode,"creating block %llu" , (unsigned long long )block);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 303/338 ext4: fix inode leak in ext4_xattr_inode_create() on an error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
commit e4db04f7d3dbbe16680e0ded27ea2a65b10f766a upstream.
There is issue as follows when do setxattr with inject fault:
[localhost]# fsck.ext4 -fn /dev/sda
e2fsck 1.46.6-rc1 (12-Sep-2022)
Pass 1: Checking inodes, blocks, and sizes
Pass 2: Checking directory structure
Pass 3: Checking directory connectivity
Pass 4: Checking reference counts
Unattached zero-length inode 15. Clear? no
Unattached inode 15
Connect to /lost+found? no
Pass 5: Checking group summary information
/dev/sda: ********** WARNING: Filesystem still has errors **********
/dev/sda: 15/655360 files (0.0% non-contiguous), 66755/2621440 blocks
This occurs in 'ext4_xattr_inode_create()'. If 'ext4_mark_inode_dirty()' fails, dropping i_nlink of the inode is needed. Or will lead to inode leak.
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +3 -0
@@ -1445,6 +1445,9 @@ static struct inode *ext4_xattr_inode_crif (!err) err =ext4_inode_attach_jinode (ea_inode);if (err) { +if (ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref (handle, ea_inode)) +ext4_warning_inode (ea_inode, +"cleanup dec ref error %d" , err);iput (ea_inode);return ERR_PTR (err); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 304/338 ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 1485f726c6dec1a1f85438f2962feaa3d585526f upstream.
Make sure we initialize quotas before possibly expanding inode space (and thus maybe needing to allocate external xattr block) in ext4_ioctl_setproject(). This prevents not accounting the necessary block allocation.
--- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +4 -4
@@ -390,6 +390,10 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(structif (ext4_is_quota_file (inode))return err; + err =dquot_initialize (inode); +if (err) +return err; + err =ext4_get_inode_loc (inode, &iloc);if (err)return err;
@@ -405,10 +409,6 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(structbrelse (iloc.bh); } - err =dquot_initialize (inode); -if (err) -return err; - handle =ext4_journal_start (inode,EXT4_HT_QUOTA ,EXT4_QUOTA_INIT_BLOCKS (sb) +EXT4_QUOTA_DEL_BLOCKS (sb) +3 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 305/338 ext4: avoid unaccounted block allocation when expanding inode
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
commit 8994d11395f8165b3deca1971946f549f0822630 upstream.
When expanding inode space in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() we may need to allocate external xattr block. If quota is not initialized for the inode, the block allocation will not be accounted into quota usage. Make sure the quota is initialized before we try to expand inode space.
--- fs/ext4/inode.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/inode.c +8 -0
@@ -5905,6 +5905,14 @@ static int __ext4_expand_extra_isize(strreturn 0 ; } +/* +* We may need to allocate external xattr block so we need quotas +* initialized. Here we can be called with various locks held so we +* cannot affort to initialize quotas ourselves. So just bail. +*/ +if (dquot_initialize_needed (inode)) +return -EAGAIN ; +/* try to expand with EAs present */ error =ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea (inode, new_extra_isize, raw_inode, handle);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 306/338 ext4: allocate extended attribute value in vmalloc area
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
commit cc12a6f25e07ed05d5825a1664b67a970842b2ca upstream.
Now, extended attribute value maximum length is 64K. The memory requested here does not need continuous physical addresses, so it is appropriate to use kvmalloc to request memory. At the same time, it can also cope with the situation that the extended attribute will become longer in the future.
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -2569,7 +2569,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_move_to_block(hand is =kzalloc (sizeof (struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find ),GFP_NOFS ); bs =kzalloc (sizeof (struct ext4_xattr_block_find ),GFP_NOFS ); - buffer =kmalloc (value_size,GFP_NOFS ); + buffer =kvmalloc (value_size,GFP_NOFS ); b_entry_name =kmalloc (entry->e_name_len +1 ,GFP_NOFS );if (!is || !bs || !buffer || !b_entry_name) { error = -ENOMEM ;
@@ -2621,7 +2621,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_move_to_block(hand error =0 ; out:kfree (b_entry_name); -kfree (buffer); +kvfree (buffer);if (is)brelse (is->iloc.bh);if (bs)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 307/338 SUNRPC: ensure the matching upcall is in-flight upon downcall
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: minoura makoto <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ]
Commit 9130b8dbc6ac ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced auth argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined.
When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet.
We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7.
PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
#0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f
#1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9
#2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc
[sunrpc]
#4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc]
The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe.
When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up.
Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that.
This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall.
--- include/linux/sunrpc/rpc_pipe_fs.h | 5 +++++ net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/sunrpc/rpc_pipe_fs.h +5 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ extern ssize_t rpc_pipe_generic_upcall(struct file *, struct rpc_pipe_msg *, char __user *, size_t);extern int rpc_queue_upcall (struct rpc_pipe *,struct rpc_pipe_msg *); +/* returns true if the msg is in-flight, i.e., already eaten by the peer */ +static inline bool rpc_msg_is_inflight (const struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg) { +return (msg->copied !=0 &&list_empty (&msg->list)); +} +struct rpc_clnt ;extern struct dentry *rpc_create_client_dir (struct dentry *,const char *,struct rpc_clnt *);extern int rpc_remove_client_dir (struct rpc_clnt *);
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +17 -2
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ __gss_find_upcall(struct rpc_pipe *pipe, kuid_t uid, const struct gss_auth *authlist_for_each_entry (pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) {if (!uid_eq (pos->uid, uid))continue ; -if (auth && pos->auth->service != auth->service) +if (pos->auth->service != auth->service)continue ;refcount_inc (&pos->count);dprintk ("RPC: %s found msg %p\n" , __func__, pos);
@@ -646,6 +646,21 @@ gss_create_upcall(struct gss_auth *gss_auth, struct gss_cred *gss_cred)return err; } +static struct gss_upcall_msg * +gss_find_downcall (struct rpc_pipe *pipe,kuid_t uid) +{ +struct gss_upcall_msg *pos; +list_for_each_entry (pos, &pipe->in_downcall, list) { +if (!uid_eq (pos->uid, uid)) +continue ; +if (!rpc_msg_is_inflight (&pos->msg)) +continue ; +refcount_inc (&pos->count); +return pos; + } +return NULL ; +} +#define MSG_BUF_MAXSIZE 1024 static ssize_t
@@ -692,7 +707,7 @@ gss_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen) err = -ENOENT ;/* Find a matching upcall */ spin_lock (&pipe->lock); - gss_msg =__gss_find_upcall (pipe, uid,NULL ); + gss_msg =gss_find_downcall (pipe, uid);if (gss_msg ==NULL ) {spin_unlock (&pipe->lock); goto err_put_ctx;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 308/338 bpf: pull before calling skb_postpull_rcsum()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 54c3f1a81421f85e60ae2eaae7be3727a09916ee ]
Anand hit a BUG() when pulling off headers on egress to a SW tunnel. We get to skb_checksum_help() with an invalid checksum offset (commit d7ea0d9df2a6 ("net: remove two BUG() from skb_checksum_help()") converted those BUGs to WARN_ONs()).
He points out oddness in how skb_postpull_rcsum() gets used. Indeed looks like we should pull before "postpull", otherwise the CHECKSUM_PARTIAL fixup from skb_postpull_rcsum() will not be able to do its job:
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb_checksum_start_offset(skb) < 0) skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
--- net/core/filter.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/filter.c +5 -2
@@ -2035,15 +2035,18 @@ static int bpf_skb_generic_push(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off, u32 len)static int bpf_skb_generic_pop (struct sk_buff *skb,u32 off,u32 len) { +void *old_data; +/* skb_ensure_writable() is not needed here, as we're * already working on an uncloned skb. */ if (unlikely (!pskb_may_pull (skb, off + len)))return -ENOMEM ; -skb_postpull_rcsum (skb, skb->data + off, len); -memmove (skb->data + len, skb->data, off); + old_data = skb->data;__skb_pull (skb, len); +skb_postpull_rcsum (skb, old_data + off, len); +memmove (skb->data, old_data, off);return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 309/338 qlcnic: prevent ->dcb use-after-free on qlcnic_dcb_enable() failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Daniil Tatianin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 13a7c8964afcd8ca43c0b6001ebb0127baa95362 ]
adapter->dcb would get silently freed inside qlcnic_dcb_enable() in case qlcnic_dcb_attach() would return an error, which always happens under OOM conditions. This would lead to use-after-free because both of the existing callers invoke qlcnic_dcb_get_info() on the obtained pointer, which is potentially freed at that point.
Propagate errors from qlcnic_dcb_enable(), and instead free the dcb pointer at callsite using qlcnic_dcb_free(). This also removes the now unused qlcnic_clear_dcb_ops() helper, which was a simple wrapper around kfree() also causing memory leaks for partially initialized dcb.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the SVACE static analysis tool.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_init.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_dcb.h | 10 ++-------- drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_main.c | 8 +++++++- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_init.c +7 -1
@@ -2525,7 +2525,13 @@ int qlcnic_83xx_init(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter, int pci_using_dac) goto disable_mbx_intr;qlcnic_83xx_clear_function_resources (adapter); -qlcnic_dcb_enable (adapter->dcb); + + err =qlcnic_dcb_enable (adapter->dcb); +if (err) { +qlcnic_dcb_free (adapter->dcb); + goto disable_mbx_intr; + } +qlcnic_83xx_initialize_nic (adapter,1 );qlcnic_dcb_get_info (adapter->dcb);
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_dcb.h +2 -8
@@ -42,11 +42,6 @@ struct qlcnic_dcb {unsigned long state; }; -static inline void qlcnic_clear_dcb_ops (struct qlcnic_dcb *dcb) -{ -kfree (dcb); -} -static inline int qlcnic_dcb_get_hw_capability (struct qlcnic_dcb *dcb) {if (dcb && dcb->ops->get_hw_capability)
@@ -113,9 +108,8 @@ static inline void qlcnic_dcb_init_dcbnl_ops(struct qlcnic_dcb *dcb) dcb->ops->init_dcbnl_ops(dcb); } -static inline void qlcnic_dcb_enable (struct qlcnic_dcb *dcb) +static inline int qlcnic_dcb_enable (struct qlcnic_dcb *dcb) { -if (dcb &&qlcnic_dcb_attach (dcb)) -qlcnic_clear_dcb_ops (dcb); +return dcb ?qlcnic_dcb_attach (dcb) :0 ; }#endif
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_main.c +7 -1
@@ -2641,7 +2641,13 @@ qlcnic_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) "Device does not support MSI interrupts\n");if (qlcnic_82xx_check (adapter)) { -qlcnic_dcb_enable (adapter->dcb); + err =qlcnic_dcb_enable (adapter->dcb); +if (err) { +qlcnic_dcb_free (adapter->dcb); +dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Failed to enable DCB\n" ); + goto err_out_free_hw; + } +qlcnic_dcb_get_info (adapter->dcb); err =qlcnic_setup_intr (adapter);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 310/338 nfc: Fix potential resource leaks
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit df49908f3c52d211aea5e2a14a93bbe67a2cb3af ]
nfc_get_device() take reference for the device, add missing nfc_put_device() to release it when not need anymore. Also fix the style warnning by use error EOPNOTSUPP instead of ENOTSUPP.
--- net/nfc/netlink.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/nfc/netlink.c +38 -14
@@ -1506,6 +1506,7 @@ static int nfc_genl_se_io(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)u32 dev_idx, se_idx;u8 *apdu;size_t apdu_len; +int rc; if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] || !info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_SE_INDEX] ||
@@ -1519,25 +1520,37 @@ static int nfc_genl_se_io(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)if (!dev)return -ENODEV ; -if (!dev->ops || !dev->ops->se_io) -return -ENOTSUPP ; +if (!dev->ops || !dev->ops->se_io) { + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + goto put_dev; + } apdu_len =nla_len (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU ]); -if (apdu_len ==0 ) -return -EINVAL ; +if (apdu_len ==0 ) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto put_dev; + } apdu =nla_data (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_SE_APDU ]); -if (!apdu) -return -EINVAL ; +if (!apdu) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto put_dev; + } ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (struct se_io_ctx ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; +if (!ctx) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; + goto put_dev; + } ctx->dev_idx = dev_idx; ctx->se_idx = se_idx; -return nfc_se_io (dev, se_idx, apdu, apdu_len, se_io_cb, ctx); + rc =nfc_se_io (dev, se_idx, apdu, apdu_len, se_io_cb, ctx); + +put_dev: +nfc_put_device (dev); +return rc; } static int nfc_genl_vendor_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -1560,14 +1573,21 @@ static int nfc_genl_vendor_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, subcmd =nla_get_u32 (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_SUBCMD ]); dev =nfc_get_device (dev_idx); -if (!dev || !dev->vendor_cmds || !dev->n_vendor_cmds) +if (!dev)return -ENODEV ; +if (!dev->vendor_cmds || !dev->n_vendor_cmds) { + err = -ENODEV ; + goto put_dev; + } +if (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA ]) { data =nla_data (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA ]); data_len =nla_len (info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_VENDOR_DATA ]); -if (data_len ==0 ) -return -EINVAL ; +if (data_len ==0 ) { + err = -EINVAL ; + goto put_dev; + } }else { data =NULL ; data_len =0 ;
@@ -1582,10 +1602,14 @@ static int nfc_genl_vendor_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, dev->cur_cmd_info = info; err = cmd->doit (dev, data, data_len); dev->cur_cmd_info =NULL ; -return err; + goto put_dev; } -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +put_dev: +nfc_put_device (dev); +return err; }/* message building helper */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 311/338 net: amd-xgbe: add missed tasklet_kill
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jiguang Xiao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d530ece70f16f912e1d1bfeea694246ab78b0a4b ]
The driver does not call tasklet_kill in several places. Add the calls to fix it.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c | 3 +++ drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-i2c.c | 4 +++- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c +3 -0
@@ -1142,6 +1142,9 @@ static void xgbe_free_irqs(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)devm_free_irq (pdata->dev, pdata->dev_irq, pdata); +tasklet_kill (&pdata->tasklet_dev); +tasklet_kill (&pdata->tasklet_ecc); +if (pdata->vdata->ecc_support && (pdata->dev_irq != pdata->ecc_irq))devm_free_irq (pdata->dev, pdata->ecc_irq, pdata);
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-i2c.c +3 -1
@@ -447,8 +447,10 @@ static void xgbe_i2c_stop(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)xgbe_i2c_disable (pdata);xgbe_i2c_clear_all_interrupts (pdata); -if (pdata->dev_irq != pdata->i2c_irq) +if (pdata->dev_irq != pdata->i2c_irq) {devm_free_irq (pdata->dev, pdata->i2c_irq, pdata); +tasklet_kill (&pdata->tasklet_i2c); + } }static int xgbe_i2c_start (struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c +3 -1
@@ -1400,8 +1400,10 @@ static void xgbe_phy_stop(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)/* Disable auto-negotiation */ xgbe_an_disable_all (pdata); -if (pdata->dev_irq != pdata->an_irq) +if (pdata->dev_irq != pdata->an_irq) {devm_free_irq (pdata->dev, pdata->an_irq, pdata); +tasklet_kill (&pdata->tasklet_an); + } pdata->phy_if.phy_impl.stop (pdata);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 312/338 net: phy: xgmiitorgmii: Fix refcount leak in xgmiitorgmii_probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d039535850ee47079d59527e96be18d8e0daa84b ]
of_phy_find_device() return device node with refcount incremented. Call put_device() to relese it when not needed anymore.
--- drivers/net/phy/xilinx_gmii2rgmii.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/phy/xilinx_gmii2rgmii.c +1 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static int xgmiitorgmii_probe(struct mdio_device *mdiodev)if (!priv->phy_dev->drv) {dev_info (dev,"Attached phy not ready\n" ); +put_device (&priv->phy_dev->mdio.dev);return -EPROBE_DEFER ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 313/338 net: sched: atm: dont intepret cls results when asked to drop
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a2965c7be0522eaa18808684b7b82b248515511b ]
If asked to drop a packet via TC_ACT_SHOT it is unsafe to assume res.class contains a valid pointer
--- net/sched/sch_atm.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sched/sch_atm.c +4 -1
@@ -389,10 +389,13 @@ static int atm_tc_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, result =tcf_classify (skb, fl, &res, true);if (result <0 )continue ; +if (result ==TC_ACT_SHOT ) + goto done; + flow = (struct atm_flow_data *)res.class;if (!flow) flow =lookup_flow (sch, res.classid); - goto done; + goto drop; } } flow =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 314/338 usb: rndis_host: Secure rndis_query check against int overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c7dd13805f8b8fc1ce3b6d40f6aff47e66b72ad2 ]
Variables off and len typed as uint32 in rndis_query function are controlled by incoming RNDIS response message thus their value may be manipulated. Setting off to a unexpectetly large value will cause the sum with len and 8 to overflow and pass the implemented validation step. Consequently the response pointer will be referring to a location past the expected buffer boundaries allowing information leakage e.g. via RNDIS_OID_802_3_PERMANENT_ADDRESS OID.
--- drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/usb/rndis_host.c +2 -1
@@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ static int rndis_query(struct usbnet *dev, struct usb_interface *intf, off =le32_to_cpu (u.get_c->offset); len =le32_to_cpu (u.get_c->len); -if (unlikely ((8 + off + len) >CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE )) +if (unlikely ((off >CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE -8 ) || + (len >CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE -8 - off))) goto response_error;if (*reply_len !=-1 && len != *reply_len)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 315/338 caif: fix memory leak in cfctrl_linkup_request()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fe69230f05897b3de758427b574fc98025dfc907 ]
When linktype is unknown or kzalloc failed in cfctrl_linkup_request(), pkt is not released. Add release process to error path.
--- net/caif/cfctrl.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/caif/cfctrl.c +5 -1
@@ -269,11 +269,15 @@ int cfctrl_linkup_request(struct cflayer *layer,default :pr_warn ("Request setup of bad link type = %d\n" , param->linktype); +cfpkt_destroy (pkt);return -EINVAL ; } req =kzalloc (sizeof (*req),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!req) +if (!req) { +cfpkt_destroy (pkt);return -ENOMEM ; + } + req->client_layer = user_layer; req->cmd =CFCTRL_CMD_LINK_SETUP ; req->param = *param;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 316/338 udf: Fix extension of the last extent in the file
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 83c7423d1eb6806d13c521d1002cc1a012111719 ]
When extending the last extent in the file within the last block, we wrongly computed the length of the last extent. This is mostly a cosmetical problem since the extent does not contain any data and the length will be fixed up by following operations but still.
--- fs/udf/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/udf/inode.c +1 -1
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static void udf_do_extend_final_block(struct inode *inode,*/ if (new_elen <= (last_ext->extLength &UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK ))return ; - added_bytes = (last_ext->extLength &UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK ) - new_elen; + added_bytes = new_elen - (last_ext->extLength &UDF_EXTENT_LENGTH_MASK ); last_ext->extLength += added_bytes;UDF_I (inode)->i_lenExtents += added_bytes;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 317/338 x86/bugs: Flush IBP in ib_prctl_set()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rodrigo Branco <[email protected]>
commit a664ec9158eeddd75121d39c9a0758016097fa96 upstream.
We missed the window between the TIF flag update and the next reschedule.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -0
@@ -1776,6 +1776,8 @@ static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struif (ctrl ==PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE )task_set_spec_ib_force_disable (task);task_update_spec_tif (task); +if (task == current) +indirect_branch_prediction_barrier ();break ;default :return -ERANGE ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 318/338 nfsd: fix handling of readdir in v4root vs. mount upcall timeout
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
commit cad853374d85fe678d721512cecfabd7636e51f3 upstream.
If v4 READDIR operation hits a mountpoint and gets back an error, then it will include that entry in the reply and set RDATTR_ERROR for it to the error.
That's fine for "normal" exported filesystems, but on the v4root, we need to be more careful to only expose the existence of dentries that lead to exports.
If the mountd upcall times out while checking to see whether a mountpoint on the v4root is exported, then we have no recourse other than to fail the whole operation.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +11 -0
@@ -3060,6 +3060,17 @@ nfsd4_encode_dirent(void *ccdv, const chcase nfserr_noent:xdr_truncate_encode (xdr, start_offset); goto skip_entry; +case nfserr_jukebox: +/* +* The pseudoroot should only display dentries that lead to +* exports. If we get EJUKEBOX here, then we can't tell whether +* this entry should be included. Just fail the whole READDIR +* with NFS4ERR_DELAY in that case, and hope that the situation +* will resolve itself by the client's next attempt. +*/ +if (cd->rd_fhp->fh_export->ex_flags &NFSEXP_V4ROOT ) + goto fail; +/* fallthrough */ default :/* * If the client requested the RDATTR_ERROR attribute,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 319/338 hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
commit 55d1cbbbb29e6656c662ee8f73ba1fc4777532eb upstream.
gcc warns about a couple of instances in which a sanity check exists but the author wasn't sure how to react to it failing, which makes it look like a possible bug:
fs/hfsplus/inode.c: In function 'hfsplus_cat_read_inode':
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:503:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
503 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:524:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
524 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c: In function 'hfsplus_cat_write_inode':
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:582:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
582 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:608:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
608 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfs/inode.c: In function 'hfs_write_inode':
fs/hfs/inode.c:464:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
464 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfs/inode.c:485:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
485 | /* panic? */;
| ^panic() is probably not the correct choice here, but a WARN_ON seems appropriate and avoids the compile-time warning.
--- fs/hfs/inode.c | 6 ++---- fs/hfsplus/inode.c | 12 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/hfs/inode.c +2 -4
@@ -461,8 +461,7 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, goto out;if (S_ISDIR (main_inode->i_mode)) { -if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir ));hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )); if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_DIR ||
@@ -482,8 +481,7 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,hfs_bnode_write (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); }else { -if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file ));hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_FIL ||
fs/hfsplus/inode.c +4 -8
@@ -488,8 +488,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_read_inode(struct inodeif (type ==HFSPLUS_FOLDER ) {struct hfsplus_cat_folder *folder = &entry.folder; -if (fd->entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd->entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder ));hfs_bnode_read (fd->bnode, &entry, fd->entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder ));hfsplus_get_perms (inode, &folder->permissions,1 );
@@ -509,8 +508,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_read_inode(struct inode }else if (type ==HFSPLUS_FILE ) {struct hfsplus_cat_file *file = &entry.file; -if (fd->entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd->entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file ));hfs_bnode_read (fd->bnode, &entry, fd->entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file ));
@@ -567,8 +565,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_write_inode(struct inodeif (S_ISDIR (main_inode->i_mode)) {struct hfsplus_cat_folder *folder = &entry.folder; -if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder ));hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_folder ));/* simple node checks? */
@@ -593,8 +590,7 @@ int hfsplus_cat_write_inode(struct inode }else {struct hfsplus_cat_file *file = &entry.file; -if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file )) -/* panic? */ ; +WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file ));hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &entry, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfsplus_cat_file ));hfsplus_inode_write_fork (inode, &file->data_fork);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 320/338 hfs/hfsplus: avoid WARN_ON() for sanity check, use proper error handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit cb7a95af78d29442b8294683eca4897544b8ef46 upstream.
Commit 55d1cbbbb29e ("hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check") fixed a build warning by turning a comment into a WARN_ON(), but it turns out that syzbot then complains because it can trigger said warning with a corrupted hfs image.
The warning actually does warn about a bad situation, but we are much better off just handling it as the error it is. So rather than warn about us doing bad things, stop doing the bad things and return -EIO.
While at it, also fix a memory leak that was introduced by an earlier fix for a similar syzbot warning situation, and add a check for one case that historically wasn't handled at all (ie neither comment nor subsequent WARN_ON).
--- fs/hfs/inode.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/hfs/inode.c +10 -5
@@ -453,15 +453,16 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,/* panic? */ return -EIO ; + res = -EIO ;if (HFS_I (main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len >HFS_NAMELEN ) -return -EIO ; + goto out; fd.search_key->cat =HFS_I (main_inode)->cat_key;if (hfs_brec_find (&fd)) -/* panic? */ goto out;if (S_ISDIR (main_inode->i_mode)) { -WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )); +if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )) + goto out;hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )); if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_DIR ||
@@ -474,6 +475,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,hfs_bnode_write (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_dir )); }else if (HFS_IS_RSRC (inode)) { +if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )) + goto out;hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); hfs_inode_write_fork(inode, rec.file.RExtRec,
@@ -481,7 +484,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,hfs_bnode_write (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); }else { -WARN_ON (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); +if (fd.entrylength <sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )) + goto out;hfs_bnode_read (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); if (rec.type != HFS_CDR_FIL ||
@@ -498,9 +502,10 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode,hfs_bnode_write (fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset,sizeof (struct hfs_cat_file )); } + res =0 ; out:hfs_find_exit (&fd); -return 0 ; +return res; } static struct dentry *hfs_file_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 321/338 parisc: Align parisc MADV_XXX constants with all other architectures
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 71bdea6f798b425bc0003780b13e3fdecb16a010 upstream.
Adjust some MADV_XXX constants to be in sync what their values are on all other platforms. There is currently no reason to have an own numbering on parisc, but it requires workarounds in many userspace sources (e.g. glibc, qemu, ...) - which are often forgotten and thus introduce bugs and different behaviour on parisc.
A wrapper avoids an ABI breakage for existing userspace applications by translating any old values to the new ones, so this change allows us to move over all programs to the new ABI over time.
--- arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 17 ++++++++--------- arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S | 2 +- tools/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 12 ++++++------ tools/perf/bench/bench.h | 12 ------------ 5 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +8 -9
@@ -48,25 +48,24 @@#define MADV_DONTFORK 10/* don't inherit across fork */ #define MADV_DOFORK 11/* do inherit across fork */ -#define MADV_MERGEABLE 65/* KSM may merge identical pages */ -#define MADV_UNMERGEABLE 66/* KSM may not merge identical pages */ +#define MADV_MERGEABLE 12/* KSM may merge identical pages */ +#define MADV_UNMERGEABLE 13/* KSM may not merge identical pages */ -#define MADV_HUGEPAGE 67/* Worth backing with hugepages */ -#define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 68/* Not worth backing with hugepages */ +#define MADV_HUGEPAGE 14/* Worth backing with hugepages */ +#define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 15/* Not worth backing with hugepages */ -#define MADV_DONTDUMP 69/* Explicity exclude from the core dump, +#define MADV_DONTDUMP 16/* Explicity exclude from the core dump, overrides the coredump filter bits */ -#define MADV_DODUMP 70/* Clear the MADV_NODUMP flag */ +#define MADV_DODUMP 17/* Clear the MADV_NODUMP flag */ -#define MADV_WIPEONFORK 71/* Zero memory on fork, child only */ -#define MADV_KEEPONFORK 72/* Undo MADV_WIPEONFORK */ +#define MADV_WIPEONFORK 18/* Zero memory on fork, child only */ +#define MADV_KEEPONFORK 19/* Undo MADV_WIPEONFORK */ #define MADV_HWPOISON 100/* poison a page for testing */ #define MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE 101/* soft offline page for testing */ /* compatibility flags */ #define MAP_FILE 0 -#define MAP_VARIABLE 0#define PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS 0x1#define PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE 0x2
arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c +27 -0
@@ -385,3 +385,30 @@ long parisc_personality(unsigned long pereturn err; } + +/* +* madvise() wrapper +* +* Up to kernel v6.1 parisc has different values than all other +* platforms for the MADV_xxx flags listed below. +* To keep binary compatibility with existing userspace programs +* translate the former values to the new values. +* +* XXX: Remove this wrapper in year 2025 (or later) +*/ + +asmlinkage notrace long parisc_madvise(unsigned long start, size_t len_in, int behavior) +{ +switch (behavior) { +case 65 : behavior =MADV_MERGEABLE ;break ; +case 66 : behavior =MADV_UNMERGEABLE ;break ; +case 67 : behavior =MADV_HUGEPAGE ;break ; +case 68 : behavior =MADV_NOHUGEPAGE ;break ; +case 69 : behavior =MADV_DONTDUMP ;break ; +case 70 : behavior =MADV_DODUMP ;break ; +case 71 : behavior =MADV_WIPEONFORK ;break ; +case 72 : behavior =MADV_KEEPONFORK ;break ; + } + +return sys_madvise (start, len_in, behavior); +}
arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S +1 -1
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ ENTRY_COMP(sysinfo) ENTRY_SAME(shutdown) ENTRY_SAME(fsync) - ENTRY_SAME(madvise) + ENTRY_OURS(madvise) ENTRY_SAME(clone_wrapper) /* 120 */ ENTRY_SAME(setdomainname) ENTRY_COMP(sendfile)
tools/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +6 -6
@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ #ifndef TOOLS_ARCH_PARISC_UAPI_ASM_MMAN_FIX_H #define TOOLS_ARCH_PARISC_UAPI_ASM_MMAN_FIX_H -#define MADV_DODUMP 70 +#define MADV_DODUMP 17#define MADV_DOFORK 11 -#define MADV_DONTDUMP 69 +#define MADV_DONTDUMP 16#define MADV_DONTFORK 10#define MADV_DONTNEED 4#define MADV_FREE 8 -#define MADV_HUGEPAGE 67 -#define MADV_MERGEABLE 65 -#define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 68 +#define MADV_HUGEPAGE 14 +#define MADV_MERGEABLE 12 +#define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 15#define MADV_NORMAL 0#define MADV_RANDOM 1#define MADV_REMOVE 9#define MADV_SEQUENTIAL 2 -#define MADV_UNMERGEABLE 66 +#define MADV_UNMERGEABLE 13#define MADV_WILLNEED 3#define MAP_ANONYMOUS 0x10#define MAP_DENYWRITE 0x0800
tools/perf/bench/bench.h +0 -12
@@ -6,25 +6,13 @@* The madvise transparent hugepage constants were added in glibc * 2.13. For compatibility with older versions of glibc, define these * tokens if they are not already defined. -* -* PA-RISC uses different madvise values from other architectures and -* needs to be special-cased. */ -#ifdef __hppa__ -# ifndef MADV_HUGEPAGE -# define MADV_HUGEPAGE 67 -# endif -# ifndef MADV_NOHUGEPAGE -# define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 68 -# endif -#else # ifndef MADV_HUGEPAGE # define MADV_HUGEPAGE 14# endif # ifndef MADV_NOHUGEPAGE # define MADV_NOHUGEPAGE 15# endif -#endif int bench_numa (int argc,const char **argv);int bench_sched_messaging (int argc,const char **argv);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 322/338 driver core: Fix bus_type.match() error handling in __driver_attach()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Isaac J. Manjarres <[email protected]>
commit 27c0d217340e47ec995557f61423ef415afba987 upstream.
When a driver registers with a bus, it will attempt to match with every device on the bus through the __driver_attach() function. Currently, if the bus_type.match() function encounters an error that is not -EPROBE_DEFER, __driver_attach() will return a negative error code, which causes the driver registration logic to stop trying to match with the remaining devices on the bus.
This behavior is not correct; a failure while matching a driver to a device does not mean that the driver won't be able to match and bind with other devices on the bus. Update the logic in __driver_attach() to reflect this.
--- drivers/base/dd.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/base/dd.c +6 -2
@@ -785,8 +785,12 @@ static int __driver_attach(struct device*/ return 0 ; }else if (ret <0 ) { -dev_dbg (dev,"Bus failed to match device: %d" , ret); -return ret; +dev_dbg (dev,"Bus failed to match device: %d\n" , ret); +/* +* Driver could not match with device, but may match with +* another device on the bus. +*/ +return 0 ; }/* ret > 0 means positive match */ if (dev->parent)/* Needed for USB */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 323/338 ravb: Fix "failed to switch device to config mode" message during unbind
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Biju Das <[email protected]>
commit c72a7e42592b2e18d862cf120876070947000d7a upstream.
This patch fixes the error "ravb 11c20000.ethernet eth0: failed to switch device to config mode" during unbind.
We are doing register access after pm_runtime_put_sync().
We usually do cleanup in reverse order of init. Currently in remove(), the "pm_runtime_put_sync" is not in reverse order.
Probe
reset_control_deassert(rstc); pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev); pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
remove
pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev); unregister_netdev(ndev); .. ravb_mdio_release(priv); pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
Consider the call to unregister_netdev() unregister_netdev->unregister_netdevice_queue->rollback_registered_many that calls the below functions which access the registers after pm_runtime_put_sync()
1) ravb_get_stats
2) ravb_close
--- drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c +1 -1
@@ -2195,11 +2195,11 @@ static int ravb_remove(struct platform_d priv->desc_bat_dma);/* Set reset mode */ ravb_write (ndev,CCC_OPC_RESET ,CCC ); -pm_runtime_put_sync (&pdev->dev);unregister_netdev (ndev);netif_napi_del (&priv->napi[RAVB_NC ]);netif_napi_del (&priv->napi[RAVB_BE ]);ravb_mdio_release (priv); +pm_runtime_put_sync (&pdev->dev);pm_runtime_disable (&pdev->dev);free_netdev (ndev);platform_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 324/338 net: sched: disallow noqueue for qdisc classes
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Frederick Lawler <[email protected]>
commit 96398560f26aa07e8f2969d73c8197e6a6d10407 upstream.
While experimenting with applying noqueue to a classful queue discipline, we discovered a NULL pointer dereference in the __dev_queue_xmit() path that generates a kernel OOPS:
# dev=enp0s5
# tc qdisc replace dev $dev root handle 1: htb default 1 # tc class add dev $dev parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate 10mbit # tc qdisc add dev $dev parent 1:1 handle 10: noqueue # ping -I $dev -w 1 -c 1 1.1.1.1
[ 2.172856] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 2.173217] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode ... [ 2.178451] Call Trace: [ 2.178577] <TASK> [ 2.178686] htb_enqueue+0x1c8/0x370 [ 2.178880] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x15/0x90 [ 2.179093] __dev_queue_xmit+0x798/0xd00 [ 2.179305] ? _raw_write_lock_bh+0xe/0x30 [ 2.179522] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x32/0x70 [ 2.179759] ? ___neigh_create+0x610/0x840 [ 2.179968] ? eth_header+0x21/0xc0 [ 2.180144] ip_finish_output2+0x15e/0x4f0 [ 2.180348] ? dst_output+0x30/0x30 [ 2.180525] ip_push_pending_frames+0x9d/0xb0 [ 2.180739] raw_sendmsg+0x601/0xcb0 [ 2.180916] ? _raw_spin_trylock+0xe/0x50 [ 2.181112] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30 [ 2.181354] ? get_page_from_freelist+0xcd6/0xdf0 [ 2.181594] ? sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x60 [ 2.181781] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x60 [ 2.181958] __sys_sendto+0xf7/0x160 [ 2.182139] ? handle_mm_fault+0x6e/0x1d0 [ 2.182366] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1e1/0x660 [ 2.182627] __x64_sys_sendto+0x1b/0x30 [ 2.182881] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 [ 2.183085] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd ... [ 2.187402] </TASK>
Previously in commit d66d6c3152e8 ("net: sched: register noqueue qdisc"), NULL was set for the noqueue discipline on noqueue init so that __dev_queue_xmit() falls through for the noqueue case. This also sets a bypass of the enqueue NULL check in the register_qdisc() function for the struct noqueue_disc_ops.
Classful queue disciplines make it past the NULL check in __dev_queue_xmit() because the discipline is set to htb (in this case), and then in the call to __dev_xmit_skb(), it calls into htb_enqueue() which grabs a leaf node for a class and then calls qdisc_enqueue() by passing in a queue discipline which assumes ->enqueue() is not set to NULL.
Fix this by not allowing classes to be assigned to the noqueue discipline. Linux TC Notes states that classes cannot be set to the noqueue discipline. [1] Let's enforce that here.
Links:
1. https://linux-tc-notes.sourceforge.net/tc/doc/sch_noqueue.txt
--- net/sched/sch_api.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sched/sch_api.c +7 -3
@@ -959,10 +959,14 @@ skip:if (cops && cops->graft) {unsigned long cl = cops->find (parent, classid); -if (cl) - err = cops->graft (parent, cl, new, &old); -else +if (cl) { +if (new && new->ops == &noqueue_qdisc_ops) + err = -EINVAL ; +else + err = cops->graft (parent, cl, new, &old); + }else { err = -ENOENT ; + } }if (!err)notify_and_destroy (net, skb, n, classid, old, new);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 325/338 docs: Fix the docs build with Sphinx 6.0
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
commit 0283189e8f3d0917e2ac399688df85211f48447b upstream.
Sphinx 6.0 removed the execfile_() function, which we use as part of the configuration process. They *did* warn us... Just open-code the functionality as is done in Sphinx itself.
Tested (using SPHINX_CONF, since this code is only executed with an alternative config file) on various Sphinx versions from 2.5 through 6.0.
--- Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/sphinx/load_config.py +4 -2
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import os import sys -from sphinx.util.pycompat import execfile_ +from sphinx.util.osutil import fs_encoding # ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ def loadConfig(namespace):
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ def loadConfig(namespace): sys.stdout.write("load additional sphinx-config: %s\n" % config_file) config = namespace.copy() config['__file__'] = config_file - execfile_(config_file, config) + with open(config_file, 'rb') as f: + code = compile(f.read(), fs_encoding, 'exec') + exec(code, config) del config['__file__'] namespace.update(config) else:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 326/338 perf auxtrace: Fix address filter duplicate symbol selection
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
commit cf129830ee820f7fc90b98df193cd49d49344d09 upstream.
When a match has been made to the nth duplicate symbol, return success not error.
Example:
Before:
$ cat file.c
cat: file.c: No such file or directory
$ cat file1.c
#include <stdio.h> static void func(void)
{
printf("First func\n");
}
void other(void);
int main()
{
func();
other();
return 0;
}
$ cat file2.c
#include <stdio.h>
static void func(void)
{
printf("Second func\n");
}
void other(void)
{
func();
}
$ gcc -Wall -Wextra -o test file1.c file2.c
$ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func @ ./test' -- ./test
Multiple symbols with name 'func'
#1 0x1149 l func
which is near main
#2 0x1179 l func
which is near other
Disambiguate symbol name by inserting #n after the name e.g. func #2
Or select a global symbol by inserting #0 or #g or #G
Failed to parse address filter: 'filter func @ ./test'
Filter format is: filter|start|stop|tracestop <start symbol or address> [/ <end symbol or size>] [@<file name>]
Where multiple filters are separated by space or comma.
$ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func #2 @ ./test' -- ./test
Failed to parse address filter: 'filter func #2 @ ./test'
Filter format is: filter|start|stop|tracestop <start symbol or address> [/ <end symbol or size>] [@<file name>]
Where multiple filters are separated by space or comma.After:
$ perf record -e intel_pt//u --filter 'filter func #2 @ ./test' -- ./test
First func
Second func
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.016 MB perf.data ]
$ perf script --itrace=b -Ftime,flags,ip,sym,addr --ns
1231062.526977619: tr strt 0 [unknown] => 558495708179 func
1231062.526977619: tr end call 558495708188 func => 558495708050 _init
1231062.526979286: tr strt 0 [unknown] => 55849570818d func
1231062.526979286: tr end return 55849570818f func => 55849570819d other--- tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c +1 -1
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ static int find_dso_sym(struct dso *dso, *size = sym->start - *start;if (idx >0 ) {if (*size) -return 1 ; +return 0 ; }else if (dso_sym_match (sym, sym_name, &cnt, idx)) {print_duplicate_syms (dso, sym_name);return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 327/338 s390/percpu: add READ_ONCE() to arch_this_cpu_to_op_simple()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
commit e3f360db08d55a14112bd27454e616a24296a8b0 upstream.
Make sure that *ptr__ within arch_this_cpu_to_op_simple() is only dereferenced once by using READ_ONCE(). Otherwise the compiler could generate incorrect code.
--- arch/s390/include/asm/percpu.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/percpu.h +1 -1
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@pcp_op_T__ *ptr__; \preempt_disable_notrace (); \ ptr__ =raw_cpu_ptr (&(pcp)); \ - prev__ = *ptr__; \ + prev__ =READ_ONCE (*ptr__); \ do { \ old__ = prev__; \ new__ = old__ op (val); \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 328/338 net/ulp: prevent ULP without clone op from entering the LISTEN status
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
commit 2c02d41d71f90a5168391b6a5f2954112ba2307c upstream.
When an ULP-enabled socket enters the LISTEN status, the listener ULP data pointer is copied inside the child/accepted sockets by sk_clone_lock().
The relevant ULP can take care of de-duplicating the context pointer via the clone() operation, but only MPTCP and SMC implement such op.
Other ULPs may end-up with a double-free at socket disposal time.
We can't simply clear the ULP data at clone time, as TLS replaces the socket ops with custom ones assuming a valid TLS ULP context is available.
Instead completely prevent clone-less ULP sockets from entering the LISTEN status.
--- net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c +15 -1
@@ -894,11 +894,25 @@ void inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(struc }EXPORT_SYMBOL (inet_csk_prepare_forced_close); +static int inet_ulp_can_listen (const struct sock *sk) +{ +const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk); + +if (icsk->icsk_ulp_ops) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +int inet_csk_listen_start (struct sock *sk,int backlog) {struct inet_connection_sock *icsk =inet_csk (sk);struct inet_sock *inet =inet_sk (sk); -int err = -EADDRINUSE ; +int err; + + err =inet_ulp_can_listen (sk); +if (unlikely (err)) +return err;reqsk_queue_alloc (&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 329/338 ALSA: pcm: Move rwsem lock inside snd_ctl_elem_read to prevent UAF
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Clement Lecigne <[email protected]>
[ Note: this is a fix that works around the bug equivalently as the
two upstream commits:
1fa4445f9adf ("ALSA: control - introduce snd_ctl_notify_one() helper") 56b88b50565c ("ALSA: pcm: Move rwsem lock inside snd_ctl_elem_read to prevent UAF")
but in a simpler way to fit with older stable trees -- tiwai ]
Add missing locking in ctl_elem_read_user/ctl_elem_write_user which can be easily triggered and turned into an use-after-free.
Example code paths with SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_READ:
64-bits:snd_ctl_ioctl
snd_ctl_elem_read_user
[takes controls_rwsem]
snd_ctl_elem_read [lock properly held, all good] [drops controls_rwsem]
32-bits (compat):snd_ctl_ioctl_compat
snd_ctl_elem_write_read_compat
ctl_elem_write_read
snd_ctl_elem_read [missing lock, not good]
CVE-2023-0266 was assigned for this issue.
--- sound/core/control_compat.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
sound/core/control_compat.c +4 -0
@@ -319,7 +319,9 @@ static int ctl_elem_read_user(struct snd err =snd_power_wait (card,SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0 );if (err <0 ) goto error; +down_read (&card->controls_rwsem); err =snd_ctl_elem_read (card, data); +up_read (&card->controls_rwsem);if (err <0 ) goto error; err =copy_ctl_value_to_user (userdata, valuep, data, type, count);
@@ -347,7 +349,9 @@ static int ctl_elem_write_user(struct sn err =snd_power_wait (card,SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0 );if (err <0 ) goto error; +down_write (&card->controls_rwsem); err =snd_ctl_elem_write (card, file, data); +up_write (&card->controls_rwsem);if (err <0 ) goto error; err =copy_ctl_value_to_user (userdata, valuep, data, type, count);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 330/338 platform/x86: sony-laptop: Dont turn off 0x153 keyboard backlight during probe
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
commit ad75bd85b1db69c97eefea07b375567821f6ef58 upstream.
The 0x153 version of the kbd backlight control SNC handle has no separate address to probe if the backlight is there.
This turns the probe call into a set keyboard backlight call with a value of 0 turning off the keyboard backlight.
Skip probing when there is no separate probe address to avoid this.
--- drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c +14 -7
@@ -1911,14 +1911,21 @@ static int sony_nc_kbd_backlight_setup(sbreak ; } - ret =sony_call_snc_handle (handle, probe_base, &result); -if (ret) -return ret; +/* +* Only probe if there is a separate probe_base, otherwise the probe call +* is equivalent to __sony_nc_kbd_backlight_mode_set(0), resulting in +* the keyboard backlight being turned off. +*/ +if (probe_base) { + ret =sony_call_snc_handle (handle, probe_base, &result); +if (ret) +return ret; -if ((handle ==0x0137 && !(result &0x02 )) || - !(result &0x01 )) { -dprintk ("no backlight keyboard found\n" ); -return 0 ; +if ((handle ==0x0137 && !(result &0x02 )) || + !(result &0x01 )) { +dprintk ("no backlight keyboard found\n" ); +return 0 ; + } } kbdbl_ctl =kzalloc (sizeof (*kbdbl_ctl),GFP_KERNEL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 331/338 ipv6: raw: Deduct extension header length in rawv6_push_pending_frames
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit cb3e9864cdbe35ff6378966660edbcbac955fe17 upstream.
The total cork length created by ip6_append_data includes extension headers, so we must exclude them when comparing them against the IPV6_CHECKSUM offset which does not include extension headers.
--- net/ipv6/raw.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/raw.c +4 -0
@@ -544,6 +544,7 @@ csum_copy_err:static int rawv6_push_pending_frames (struct sock *sk,struct flowi6 *fl6,struct raw6_sock *rp) { +struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;struct sk_buff *skb;int err =0 ;int offset;
@@ -561,6 +562,9 @@ static int rawv6_push_pending_frames(str offset = rp->offset; total_len =inet_sk (sk)->cork.base.length; + opt =inet6_sk (sk)->cork.opt; + total_len -= opt ? opt->opt_flen :0 ; +if (offset >= total_len -1 ) { err = -EINVAL ;ip6_flush_pending_frames (sk);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 332/338 netfilter: ipset: Fix overflow before widen in the bitmap_ip_create() function.
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Gavrilov Ilia <[email protected]>
commit 9ea4b476cea1b7d461d16dda25ca3c7e616e2d15 upstream.
When first_ip is 0, last_ip is 0xFFFFFFFF, and netmask is 31, the value of an arithmetic expression 2 << (netmask - mask_bits - 1) is subject to overflow due to a failure casting operands to a larger data type before performing the arithmetic.
Note that it's harmless since the value will be checked at the next step.
Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
--- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c +2 -2
@@ -301,8 +301,8 @@ bitmap_ip_create(struct net *net, structreturn -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE ;pr_debug ("mask_bits %u, netmask %u\n" , mask_bits, netmask); - hosts =2 << (32 - netmask -1 ); - elements =2 << (netmask - mask_bits -1 ); + hosts =2U << (32 - netmask -1 ); + elements =2UL << (netmask - mask_bits -1 ); }if (elements >IPSET_BITMAP_MAX_RANGE +1 )return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE_SIZE ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 333/338 x86/boot: Avoid using Intel mnemonics in AT&T syntax asm
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
commit 7c6dd961d0c8e7e8f9fdc65071fb09ece702e18d upstream.
With 'GNU assembler (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.39.90.20221231' the build now reports:
arch/x86/realmode/rm/../../boot/bioscall.S: Assembler messages:
arch/x86/realmode/rm/../../boot/bioscall.S:35: Warning: found movsd'; assuming movsl' was meant arch/x86/realmode/rm/../../boot/bioscall.S:70: Warning: found movsd'; assuming movsl' was meant
arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S: Assembler messages:
arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S:35: Warning: found movsd'; assuming movsl' was meant arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S:70: Warning: found movsd'; assuming movsl' was meant
Which is due to:
PR gas/29525
Note that with the dropped CMPSD and MOVSD Intel Syntax string insn templates taking operands, mixed IsString/non-IsString template groups (with memory operands) cannot occur anymore. With that maybe_adjust_templates() becomes unnecessary (and is hence being removed).
More details: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=29525
Borislav Petkov further explains:
" the particular problem here is is that the 'd' suffix is
"conflicting" in the sense that you can have SSE mnemonics like movsD %xmm... and the same thing also for string ops (which is the case here) so apparently the agreement in binutils land is to use the always accepted suffixes 'l' or 'q' and phase out 'd' slowly... "
--- arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/bioscall.S +2 -2
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ intcall: movw %dx, %si movw %sp, %di movw $11, %cx - rep; movsd + rep; movsl /* Pop full state from the stack */ popal
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ intcall: jz 4f movw %sp, %si movw $11, %cx - rep; movsd + rep; movsl 4: addw $44, %sp /* Restore state and return */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 334/338 EDAC/device: Fix period calculation in edac_device_reset_delay_period()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eliav Farber <[email protected]>
commit e84077437902ec99eba0a6b516df772653f142c7 upstream.
Fix period calculation in case user sets a value of 1000. The input of round_jiffies_relative() should be in jiffies and not in milli-seconds.
[ bp: Use the same code pattern as in edac_device_workq_setup() for
clarity. ]
--- drivers/edac/edac_device.c | 17 ++++++++--------- drivers/edac/edac_module.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/edac_device.c +8 -9
@@ -424,17 +424,16 @@ static void edac_device_workq_teardown(s* Then restart the workq on the new delay */ void edac_device_reset_delay_period (struct edac_device_ctl_info *edac_dev, -unsigned long value) +unsigned long msec) { -unsigned long jiffs =msecs_to_jiffies (value); + edac_dev->poll_msec = msec; + edac_dev->delay =msecs_to_jiffies (msec); -if (value ==1000 ) - jiffs =round_jiffies_relative (value); - - edac_dev->poll_msec = value; - edac_dev->delay = jiffs; - -edac_mod_work (&edac_dev->work, jiffs); +/* See comment in edac_device_workq_setup() above */ +if (edac_dev->poll_msec ==1000 ) +edac_mod_work (&edac_dev->work,round_jiffies_relative (edac_dev->delay)); +else +edac_mod_work (&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay); }int edac_device_alloc_index (void )
drivers/edac/edac_module.h +1 -1
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ bool edac_stop_work(struct delayed_workbool edac_mod_work (struct delayed_work *work,unsigned long delay);extern void edac_device_reset_delay_period (struct edac_device_ctl_info - *edac_dev,unsigned long value); + *edac_dev,unsigned long msec);extern void edac_mc_reset_delay_period (unsigned long value);extern void *edac_align_ptr (void **p,unsigned size,int n_elems);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 335/338 regulator: da9211: Use irq handler when ready
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ricardo Ribalda <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 02228f6aa6a64d588bc31e3267d05ff184d772eb ]
If the system does not come from reset (like when it is kexec()), the regulator might have an IRQ waiting for us.
If we enable the IRQ handler before its structures are ready, we crash.
This patch fixes:
[ 1.141839] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000078 [ 1.316096] Call trace: [ 1.316101] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x20/0xa8 [ 1.322757] cpu cpu0: dummy supplies not allowed for exclusive requests [ 1.327823] regulator_notifier_call_chain+0x1c/0x2c [ 1.327825] da9211_irq_handler+0x68/0xf8 [ 1.327829] irq_thread+0x11c/0x234 [ 1.327833] kthread+0x13c/0x154
--- drivers/regulator/da9211-regulator.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/da9211-regulator.c +6 -5
@@ -470,6 +470,12 @@ static int da9211_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c, chip->chip_irq = i2c->irq; + ret =da9211_regulator_init (chip); +if (ret <0 ) { +dev_err (chip->dev,"Failed to initialize regulator: %d\n" , ret); +return ret; + } +if (chip->chip_irq !=0 ) { ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(chip->dev, chip->chip_irq, NULL, da9211_irq_handler,
@@ -484,11 +490,6 @@ static int da9211_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c,dev_warn (chip->dev,"No IRQ configured\n" ); } - ret =da9211_regulator_init (chip); - -if (ret <0 ) -dev_err (chip->dev,"Failed to initialize regulator: %d\n" , ret); -return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 336/338 hvc/xen: lock console list traversal
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Roger Pau Monne <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c0dccad87cf68fc6012aec7567e354353097ec1a ]
The currently lockless access to the xen console list in vtermno_to_xencons() is incorrect, as additions and removals from the list can happen anytime, and as such the traversal of the list to get the private console data for a given termno needs to happen with the lock held. Note users that modify the list already do so with the lock taken.
Adjust current lock takers to use the _irq{save,restore} helpers, since the context in which vtermno_to_xencons() is called can have interrupts disabled. Use the _irq{save,restore} set of helpers to switch the current callers to disable interrupts in the locked region. I haven't checked if existing users could instead use the _irq variant, as I think it's safer to use _irq{save,restore} upfront.
While there switch from using list_for_each_entry_safe tolist_for_each_entry: the current entry cursor won't be removed as part of the code in the loop body, so using the _safe variant is pointless.
--- drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c +29 -17
@@ -65,17 +65,22 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(xencons_lock);static struct xencons_info *vtermno_to_xencons (int vtermno) { -struct xencons_info *entry, *n, *ret =NULL ; +struct xencons_info *entry, *ret =NULL ; +unsigned long flags; -if (list_empty (&xenconsoles)) -return NULL ; +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags); +if (list_empty (&xenconsoles)) { +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags); +return NULL ; + } -list_for_each_entry_safe (entry, n, &xenconsoles, list) { +list_for_each_entry (entry, &xenconsoles, list) {if (entry->vtermno == vtermno) { ret = entry;break ; } } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);return ret; }
@@ -236,7 +241,7 @@ static int xen_hvm_console_init(void) {int r;uint64_t v =0 ; -unsigned long gfn; +unsigned long gfn, flags;struct xencons_info *info;if (!xen_hvm_domain ())
@@ -271,9 +276,9 @@ static int xen_hvm_console_init(void) goto err; info->vtermno =HVC_COOKIE ; -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&info->list, &xenconsoles); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);return 0 ; err:
@@ -296,6 +301,7 @@ static int xencons_info_pv_init(struct xencons_info *info, int vtermno)static int xen_pv_console_init (void ) {struct xencons_info *info; +unsigned long flags;if (!xen_pv_domain ())return -ENODEV ;
@@ -312,9 +318,9 @@ static int xen_pv_console_init(void)/* already configured */ return 0 ; } -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);xencons_info_pv_init (info,HVC_COOKIE ); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);return 0 ; }
@@ -322,6 +328,7 @@ static int xen_pv_console_init(void)static int xen_initial_domain_console_init (void ) {struct xencons_info *info; +unsigned long flags;if (!xen_initial_domain ())return -ENODEV ;
@@ -336,9 +343,9 @@ static int xen_initial_domain_console_init(void) info->irq =bind_virq_to_irq (VIRQ_CONSOLE ,0 , false); info->vtermno =HVC_COOKIE ; -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&info->list, &xenconsoles); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);return 0 ; }
@@ -393,10 +400,12 @@ static void xencons_free(struct xencons_info *info)static int xen_console_remove (struct xencons_info *info) { +unsigned long flags; +xencons_disconnect_backend (info); -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);list_del (&info->list); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);if (info->xbdev !=NULL )xencons_free (info);else {
@@ -477,6 +486,7 @@ static int xencons_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, {int ret, devid;struct xencons_info *info; +unsigned long flags; devid = dev->nodename[strlen (dev->nodename) -1 ] -'0' ;if (devid ==0 )
@@ -495,9 +505,9 @@ static int xencons_probe(struct xenbus_device *dev, ret =xencons_connect_backend (dev, info);if (ret <0 ) goto error; -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);list_add_tail (&info->list, &xenconsoles); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);return 0 ;
@@ -596,10 +606,12 @@ static int __init xen_hvc_init(void) info->hvc =hvc_alloc (HVC_COOKIE , info->irq, ops,256 );if (IS_ERR (info->hvc)) { +unsigned long flags; + r =PTR_ERR (info->hvc); -spin_lock (&xencons_lock); +spin_lock_irqsave (&xencons_lock, flags);list_del (&info->list); -spin_unlock (&xencons_lock); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&xencons_lock, flags);if (info->irq)unbind_from_irqhandler (info->irq,NULL );kfree (info);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 337/338 nfc: pn533: Wait for out_urbs completion in pn533_usb_send_frame()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9dab880d675b9d0dd56c6428e4e8352a3339371d ]
Fix a use-after-free that occurs in hcd when in_urb sent from pn533_usb_send_frame() is completed earlier than out_urb. Its callback frees the skb data in pn533_send_async_complete() that is used as a transfer buffer of out_urb. Wait before sending in_urb until the callback of out_urb is called. To modify the callback of out_urb alone, separate the complete function of out_urb and ack_urb.
Found by a modified version of syzkaller.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dummy_timer Call Trace: memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:65) dummy_perform_transfer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1352) transfer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1453) dummy_timer (drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:1972) arch_static_branch (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27) static_key_false (include/linux/jump_label.h:207) timer_expire_exit (include/trace/events/timer.h:127) call_timer_fn (kernel/time/timer.c:1475) expire_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1519) __run_timers (kernel/time/timer.c:1790) run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:1803)
--- drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c +41 -3
@@ -165,10 +165,17 @@ static int pn533_usb_send_ack(struct pn5return usb_submit_urb (phy->ack_urb, flags); } +struct pn533_out_arg { +struct pn533_usb_phy *phy; +struct completion done; +}; +static int pn533_usb_send_frame (struct pn533 *dev,struct sk_buff *out) {struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = dev->phy; +struct pn533_out_arg arg; +void *cntx;int rc;if (phy->priv ==NULL )
@@ -180,10 +187,17 @@ static int pn533_usb_send_frame(struct pprint_hex_dump_debug ("PN533 TX: " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , out->data, out->len, false); +init_completion (&arg.done); + cntx = phy->out_urb->context; + phy->out_urb->context = &arg; + rc =usb_submit_urb (phy->out_urb,GFP_KERNEL );if (rc)return rc; +wait_for_completion (&arg.done); + phy->out_urb->context = cntx; +if (dev->protocol_type ==PN533_PROTO_REQ_RESP ) {/* request for response for sent packet directly */ rc =pn533_submit_urb_for_response (phy,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -424,7 +438,31 @@ static int pn533_acr122_poweron_rdr(strureturn arg.rc; } -static void pn533_send_complete (struct urb *urb) +static void pn533_out_complete (struct urb *urb) +{ +struct pn533_out_arg *arg = urb->context; +struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = arg->phy; + +switch (urb->status) { +case 0 : +break ;/* success */ +case -ECONNRESET : +case -ENOENT : +dev_dbg (&phy->udev->dev, +"The urb has been stopped (status %d)\n" , + urb->status); +break ; +case -ESHUTDOWN : +default : +nfc_err (&phy->udev->dev, +"Urb failure (status %d)\n" , + urb->status); + } + +complete (&arg->done); +} + +static void pn533_ack_complete (struct urb *urb) {struct pn533_usb_phy *phy = urb->context;
@@ -512,10 +550,10 @@ static int pn533_usb_probe(struct usb_inusb_fill_bulk_urb (phy->out_urb, phy->udev,usb_sndbulkpipe (phy->udev, out_endpoint), -NULL ,0 , pn533_send_complete, phy); +NULL ,0 , pn533_out_complete, phy);usb_fill_bulk_urb (phy->ack_urb, phy->udev,usb_sndbulkpipe (phy->udev, out_endpoint), -NULL ,0 , pn533_send_complete, phy); +NULL ,0 , pn533_ack_complete, phy);switch (id->driver_info) {case PN533_DEVICE_STD :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 338/338 Revert "usb: ulpi: defer ulpi_register on ulpi_read_id timeout"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ferry Toth <[email protected]>
commit b659b613cea2ae39746ca8bd2b69d1985dd9d770 upstream.
This reverts commit 8a7b31d545d3a15f0e6f5984ae16f0ca4fd76aac.
This patch results in some qemu test failures, specifically xilinx-zynq-a9 machine and zynq-zc702 as well as zynq-zed devicetree files, when trying to boot from USB drive.
--- drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/common/ulpi.c +1 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int ulpi_read_id(struct ulpi *ulp ret =ulpi_read (ulpi,ULPI_SCRATCH );if (ret <0 ) -return ret; + goto err;if (ret !=0xaa ) goto err;
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.303 release. There are 338 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 18 Jan 2023 15:47:28 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.303-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.14:
8 builds: 8 pass, 0 fail
16 boots: 16 pass, 0 fail
32 tests: 32 pass, 0 failLinux version: 4.14.303-rc1-g4e9c6da20b2b
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04
Jon
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.303 release. There are 338 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 18 Jan 2023 15:47:28 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.303-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
NOTE:
clang-nightly x86_64 build failed, arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c:180:2: error: 'struct (unnamed at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/init.c:180:2)' cannot be defined in '__builtin_offsetof'
CHECK_MEMBER_AT_END_OF(struct fpu, state);
## Build
* kernel: 4.14.303-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-4.14.y
* git commit: 4e9c6da20b2bb77a60e70689d2f196e534548f08
* git describe: v4.14.302-339-g4e9c6da20b2b
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14.302-339-g4e9c6da20b2b
## Test Regressions (compared to v4.14.302)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v4.14.302)
## Test Fixes (compared to v4.14.302)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v4.14.302)
## Test result summary
total: 61609, pass: 54639, fail: 1816, skip: 4854, xfail: 300
## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 313 total, 304 passed, 9 failed
* arm64: 53 total, 48 passed, 5 failed
* i386: 29 total, 28 passed, 1 failed
* mips: 41 total, 41 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 20 total, 19 passed, 1 failed
* s390: 15 total, 11 passed, 4 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 51 total, 46 passed, 5 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* fwts
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* libhugetlbfs
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* rcutorture
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.303 release. There are 338 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 18 Jan 2023 15:47:28 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 168 pass: 168 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 424 pass: 424 fail: 0
Guenter