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4.19.270-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 6 participants 528 messages Jan 16, 2023 – Jan 22, 2023 Page 3 of 4

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#292 lore raw

PATCH 292/521 powerpc/pseries: PCIE PHB reset

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wen Xiong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5a090f7c363fdc09b99222eae679506a58e7cc68 ]

Several device drivers hit EEH(Extended Error handling) when triggering kdump on Pseries PowerVM. This patch implemented a reset of the PHBs in pci general code when triggering kdump. PHB reset stop all PCI transactions from normal kernel. We have tested the patch in several enviroments:
- direct slot adapters
- adapters under the switch
- a VF adapter in PowerVM
- a VF adapter/adapter in KVM guest.

[mpe: Fix broken whitespace, subject & SOB formatting]

Stable-dep-of: 9aafbfa5f57a ("powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size")

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 232 ++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 169 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +169 -63
index 0fc93f7e167d..560d7401496c 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 
 #include <asm/eeh.h>
 #include <asm/eeh_event.h>
@@ -94,6 +95,152 @@ void pseries_pcibios_bus_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	eeh_sysfs_add_device(pdev);
 }
 
+
+/**
+ * pseries_eeh_get_config_addr - Retrieve config address
+ *
+ * Retrieve the assocated config address. Actually, there're 2 RTAS
+ * function calls dedicated for the purpose. We need implement
+ * it through the new function and then the old one. Besides,
+ * you should make sure the config address is figured out from
+ * FDT node before calling the function.
+ *
+ * It's notable that zero'ed return value means invalid PE config
+ * address.
+ */
+static int pseries_eeh_get_config_addr(struct pci_controller *phb, int config_addr)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	int rets[3];
+
+	if (ibm_get_config_addr_info2 != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+		/*
+		 * First of all, we need to make sure there has one PE
+		 * associated with the device. Otherwise, PE address is
+		 * meaningless.
+		 */
+		ret = rtas_call(ibm_get_config_addr_info2, 4, 2, rets,
+				config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+				BUID_LO(phb->buid), 1);
+		if (ret || (rets[0] == 0))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Retrieve the associated PE config address */
+		ret = rtas_call(ibm_get_config_addr_info2, 4, 2, rets,
+				config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+				BUID_LO(phb->buid), 0);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_warn("%s: Failed to get address for PHB#%x-PE#%x\n",
+				__func__, phb->global_number, config_addr);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return rets[0];
+	}
+
+	if (ibm_get_config_addr_info != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+		ret = rtas_call(ibm_get_config_addr_info, 4, 2, rets,
+				config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+				BUID_LO(phb->buid), 0);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_warn("%s: Failed to get address for PHB#%x-PE#%x\n",
+				__func__, phb->global_number, config_addr);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		return rets[0];
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseries_eeh_phb_reset - Reset the specified PHB
+ * @phb: PCI controller
+ * @config_adddr: the associated config address
+ * @option: reset option
+ *
+ * Reset the specified PHB/PE
+ */
+static int pseries_eeh_phb_reset(struct pci_controller *phb, int config_addr, int option)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* Reset PE through RTAS call */
+	ret = rtas_call(ibm_set_slot_reset, 4, 1, NULL,
+			config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+			BUID_LO(phb->buid), option);
+
+	/* If fundamental-reset not supported, try hot-reset */
+	if (option == EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL &&
+	    ret == -8) {
+		option = EEH_RESET_HOT;
+		ret = rtas_call(ibm_set_slot_reset, 4, 1, NULL,
+				config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+				BUID_LO(phb->buid), option);
+	}
+
+	/* We need reset hold or settlement delay */
+	if (option == EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL ||
+	    option == EEH_RESET_HOT)
+		msleep(EEH_PE_RST_HOLD_TIME);
+	else
+		msleep(EEH_PE_RST_SETTLE_TIME);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge - Configure PCI bridges in the indicated PE
+ * @phb: PCI controller
+ * @config_adddr: the associated config address
+ *
+ * The function will be called to reconfigure the bridges included
+ * in the specified PE so that the mulfunctional PE would be recovered
+ * again.
+ */
+static int pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge(struct pci_controller *phb, int config_addr)
+{
+	int ret;
+	/* Waiting 0.2s maximum before skipping configuration */
+	int max_wait = 200;
+
+	while (max_wait > 0) {
+		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
+				config_addr, BUID_HI(phb->buid),
+				BUID_LO(phb->buid));
+
+		if (!ret)
+			return ret;
+		if (ret < 0)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * If RTAS returns a delay value that's above 100ms, cut it
+		 * down to 100ms in case firmware made a mistake.  For more
+		 * on how these delay values work see rtas_busy_delay_time
+		 */
+		if (ret > RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2 &&
+		    ret <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX)
+			ret = RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2;
+
+		max_wait -= rtas_busy_delay_time(ret);
+
+		if (max_wait < 0)
+			break;
+
+		rtas_busy_delay(ret);
+	}
+
+	pr_warn("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%x-PE#%x (%d)\n",
+		__func__, phb->global_number, config_addr, ret);
+	/* PAPR defines -3 as "Parameter Error" for this function: */
+	if (ret == -3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	else
+		return -EIO;
+}
+
 /*
  * Buffer for reporting slot-error-detail rtas calls. Its here
  * in BSS, and not dynamically alloced, so that it ends up in
@@ -110,6 +257,10 @@ static int eeh_error_buf_size;
  */
 static int pseries_eeh_init(void)
 {
+	struct pci_controller *phb;
+	struct pci_dn *pdn;
+	int addr, config_addr;
+
 	/* figure out EEH RTAS function call tokens */
 	ibm_set_eeh_option		= rtas_token("ibm,set-eeh-option");
 	ibm_set_slot_reset		= rtas_token("ibm,set-slot-reset");
@@ -162,6 +313,22 @@ static int pseries_eeh_init(void)
 	/* Set EEH machine dependent code */
 	ppc_md.pcibios_bus_add_device = pseries_pcibios_bus_add_device;
 
+	if (is_kdump_kernel() || reset_devices) {
+		pr_info("Issue PHB reset ...\n");
+		list_for_each_entry(phb, &hose_list, list_node) {
+			pdn = list_first_entry(&PCI_DN(phb->dn)->child_list, struct pci_dn, list);
+			addr = (pdn->busno << 16) | (pdn->devfn << 8);
+			config_addr = pseries_eeh_get_config_addr(phb, addr);
+			/* invalid PE config addr */
+			if (config_addr == 0)
+				continue;
+
+			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL);
+			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_DEACTIVATE);
+			pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge(phb, config_addr);
+		}
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -531,35 +698,13 @@ static int pseries_eeh_get_state(struct eeh_pe *pe, int *state)
 static int pseries_eeh_reset(struct eeh_pe *pe, int option)
 {
 	int config_addr;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Figure out PE address */
 	config_addr = pe->config_addr;
 	if (pe->addr)
 		config_addr = pe->addr;
 
-	/* Reset PE through RTAS call */
-	ret = rtas_call(ibm_set_slot_reset, 4, 1, NULL,
-			config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
-			BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid), option);
-
-	/* If fundamental-reset not supported, try hot-reset */
-	if (option == EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL &&
-	    ret == -8) {
-		option = EEH_RESET_HOT;
-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_set_slot_reset, 4, 1, NULL,
-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid), option);
-	}
-
-	/* We need reset hold or settlement delay */
-	if (option == EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL ||
-	    option == EEH_RESET_HOT)
-		msleep(EEH_PE_RST_HOLD_TIME);
-	else
-		msleep(EEH_PE_RST_SETTLE_TIME);
-
-	return ret;
+	return pseries_eeh_phb_reset(pe->phb, config_addr, option);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -661,56 +806,17 @@ static int pseries_eeh_get_log(struct eeh_pe *pe, int severity, char *drv_log, u
  * pseries_eeh_configure_bridge - Configure PCI bridges in the indicated PE
  * @pe: EEH PE
  *
- * The function will be called to reconfigure the bridges included
- * in the specified PE so that the mulfunctional PE would be recovered
- * again.
  */
 static int pseries_eeh_configure_bridge(struct eeh_pe *pe)
 {
 	int config_addr;
-	int ret;
-	/* Waiting 0.2s maximum before skipping configuration */
-	int max_wait = 200;
 
 	/* Figure out the PE address */
 	config_addr = pe->config_addr;
 	if (pe->addr)
 		config_addr = pe->addr;
 
-	while (max_wait > 0) {
-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
-
-		if (!ret)
-			return ret;
-		if (ret < 0)
-			break;
-
-		/*
-		 * If RTAS returns a delay value that's above 100ms, cut it
-		 * down to 100ms in case firmware made a mistake.  For more
-		 * on how these delay values work see rtas_busy_delay_time
-		 */
-		if (ret > RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2 &&
-		    ret <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX)
-			ret = RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2;
-
-		max_wait -= rtas_busy_delay_time(ret);
-
-		if (max_wait < 0)
-			break;
-
-		rtas_busy_delay(ret);
-	}
-
-	pr_warn("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%x-PE#%x (%d)\n",
-		__func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr, ret);
-	/* PAPR defines -3 as "Parameter Error" for this function: */
-	if (ret == -3)
-		return -EINVAL;
-	else
-		return -EIO;
+	return pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge(pe->phb, config_addr);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#293 lore raw

PATCH 293/521 powerpc/pseries: Stop using eeh_ops->init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver O'Halloran <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1f8fa0cd6a848ff072bffe0ee776554387128f60 ]

Fold pseries_eeh_init() into eeh_pseries_init() rather than having eeh_init() call it via eeh_ops->init(). It's simpler and it'll let us delete eeh_ops.init.

Stable-dep-of: 9aafbfa5f57a ("powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size")

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 155 +++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +71 -84
index 560d7401496c..7a0b9aa09d10 100644
@@ -250,88 +250,6 @@ static unsigned char slot_errbuf[RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX];
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(slot_errbuf_lock);
 static int eeh_error_buf_size;
 
-/**
- * pseries_eeh_init - EEH platform dependent initialization
- *
- * EEH platform dependent initialization on pseries.
- */
-static int pseries_eeh_init(void)
-{
-	struct pci_controller *phb;
-	struct pci_dn *pdn;
-	int addr, config_addr;
-
-	/* figure out EEH RTAS function call tokens */
-	ibm_set_eeh_option		= rtas_token("ibm,set-eeh-option");
-	ibm_set_slot_reset		= rtas_token("ibm,set-slot-reset");
-	ibm_read_slot_reset_state2	= rtas_token("ibm,read-slot-reset-state2");
-	ibm_read_slot_reset_state	= rtas_token("ibm,read-slot-reset-state");
-	ibm_slot_error_detail		= rtas_token("ibm,slot-error-detail");
-	ibm_get_config_addr_info2	= rtas_token("ibm,get-config-addr-info2");
-	ibm_get_config_addr_info	= rtas_token("ibm,get-config-addr-info");
-	ibm_configure_pe		= rtas_token("ibm,configure-pe");
-
-	/*
-	 * ibm,configure-pe and ibm,configure-bridge have the same semantics,
-	 * however ibm,configure-pe can be faster.  If we can't find
-	 * ibm,configure-pe then fall back to using ibm,configure-bridge.
-	 */
-	if (ibm_configure_pe == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
-		ibm_configure_pe 	= rtas_token("ibm,configure-bridge");
-
-	/*
-	 * Necessary sanity check. We needn't check "get-config-addr-info"
-	 * and its variant since the old firmware probably support address
-	 * of domain/bus/slot/function for EEH RTAS operations.
-	 */
-	if (ibm_set_eeh_option == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE		||
-	    ibm_set_slot_reset == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE		||
-	    (ibm_read_slot_reset_state2 == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE &&
-	     ibm_read_slot_reset_state == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)	||
-	    ibm_slot_error_detail == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE	||
-	    ibm_configure_pe == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		pr_info("EEH functionality not supported\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	/* Initialize error log lock and size */
-	spin_lock_init(&slot_errbuf_lock);
-	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
-	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
-			__func__);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = 1024;
-	} else if (eeh_error_buf_size > RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX) {
-		pr_info("%s: EEH error log size %d exceeds the maximal %d\n",
-			__func__, eeh_error_buf_size, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
-	}
-
-	/* Set EEH probe mode */
-	eeh_add_flag(EEH_PROBE_MODE_DEVTREE | EEH_ENABLE_IO_FOR_LOG);
-
-	/* Set EEH machine dependent code */
-	ppc_md.pcibios_bus_add_device = pseries_pcibios_bus_add_device;
-
-	if (is_kdump_kernel() || reset_devices) {
-		pr_info("Issue PHB reset ...\n");
-		list_for_each_entry(phb, &hose_list, list_node) {
-			pdn = list_first_entry(&PCI_DN(phb->dn)->child_list, struct pci_dn, list);
-			addr = (pdn->busno << 16) | (pdn->devfn << 8);
-			config_addr = pseries_eeh_get_config_addr(phb, addr);
-			/* invalid PE config addr */
-			if (config_addr == 0)
-				continue;
-
-			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL);
-			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_DEACTIVATE);
-			pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge(phb, config_addr);
-		}
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int pseries_eeh_cap_start(struct pci_dn *pdn)
 {
 	u32 status;
@@ -964,7 +882,6 @@ static int pseries_notify_resume(struct pci_dn *pdn)
 
 static struct eeh_ops pseries_eeh_ops = {
 	.name			= "pseries",
-	.init			= pseries_eeh_init,
 	.probe			= pseries_eeh_probe,
 	.set_option		= pseries_eeh_set_option,
 	.get_pe_addr		= pseries_eeh_get_pe_addr,
@@ -991,7 +908,77 @@ static struct eeh_ops pseries_eeh_ops = {
  */
 static int __init eeh_pseries_init(void)
 {
-	int ret;
+	struct pci_controller *phb;
+	struct pci_dn *pdn;
+	int ret, addr, config_addr;
+
+	/* figure out EEH RTAS function call tokens */
+	ibm_set_eeh_option		= rtas_token("ibm,set-eeh-option");
+	ibm_set_slot_reset		= rtas_token("ibm,set-slot-reset");
+	ibm_read_slot_reset_state2	= rtas_token("ibm,read-slot-reset-state2");
+	ibm_read_slot_reset_state	= rtas_token("ibm,read-slot-reset-state");
+	ibm_slot_error_detail		= rtas_token("ibm,slot-error-detail");
+	ibm_get_config_addr_info2	= rtas_token("ibm,get-config-addr-info2");
+	ibm_get_config_addr_info	= rtas_token("ibm,get-config-addr-info");
+	ibm_configure_pe		= rtas_token("ibm,configure-pe");
+
+	/*
+	 * ibm,configure-pe and ibm,configure-bridge have the same semantics,
+	 * however ibm,configure-pe can be faster.  If we can't find
+	 * ibm,configure-pe then fall back to using ibm,configure-bridge.
+	 */
+	if (ibm_configure_pe == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
+		ibm_configure_pe	= rtas_token("ibm,configure-bridge");
+
+	/*
+	 * Necessary sanity check. We needn't check "get-config-addr-info"
+	 * and its variant since the old firmware probably support address
+	 * of domain/bus/slot/function for EEH RTAS operations.
+	 */
+	if (ibm_set_eeh_option == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE		||
+	    ibm_set_slot_reset == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE		||
+	    (ibm_read_slot_reset_state2 == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE &&
+	     ibm_read_slot_reset_state == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)	||
+	    ibm_slot_error_detail == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE	||
+	    ibm_configure_pe == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+		pr_info("EEH functionality not supported\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize error log lock and size */
+	spin_lock_init(&slot_errbuf_lock);
+	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
+	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
+			__func__);
+		eeh_error_buf_size = 1024;
+	} else if (eeh_error_buf_size > RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX) {
+		pr_info("%s: EEH error log size %d exceeds the maximal %d\n",
+			__func__, eeh_error_buf_size, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
+		eeh_error_buf_size = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
+	}
+
+	/* Set EEH probe mode */
+	eeh_add_flag(EEH_PROBE_MODE_DEVTREE | EEH_ENABLE_IO_FOR_LOG);
+
+	/* Set EEH machine dependent code */
+	ppc_md.pcibios_bus_add_device = pseries_pcibios_bus_add_device;
+
+	if (is_kdump_kernel() || reset_devices) {
+		pr_info("Issue PHB reset ...\n");
+		list_for_each_entry(phb, &hose_list, list_node) {
+			pdn = list_first_entry(&PCI_DN(phb->dn)->child_list, struct pci_dn, list);
+			addr = (pdn->busno << 16) | (pdn->devfn << 8);
+			config_addr = pseries_eeh_get_config_addr(phb, addr);
+			/* invalid PE config addr */
+			if (config_addr == 0)
+				continue;
+
+			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_FUNDAMENTAL);
+			pseries_eeh_phb_reset(phb, config_addr, EEH_RESET_DEACTIVATE);
+			pseries_eeh_phb_configure_bridge(phb, config_addr);
+		}
+	}
 
 	ret = eeh_ops_register(&pseries_eeh_ops);
 	if (!ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#294 lore raw

PATCH 294/521 powerpc/eeh: Drop redundant spinlock initialization

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Haowen Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3def164a5cedad9117859dd4610cae2cc59cb6d2 ]

slot_errbuf_lock has declared and initialized by DEFINE_SPINLOCK, so we don't need to spin_lock_init again, drop it.

Stable-dep-of: 9aafbfa5f57a ("powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size")

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +1 -2
index 7a0b9aa09d10..f56248f19ef3 100644
@@ -945,8 +945,7 @@ static int __init eeh_pseries_init(void)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* Initialize error log lock and size */
-	spin_lock_init(&slot_errbuf_lock);
+	/* Initialize error log size */
 	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
 	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
 		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#295 lore raw

PATCH 295/521 powerpc/pseries/eeh: use correct API for error log size

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9aafbfa5f57a4b75bafd3bed0191e8429c5fa618 ]

rtas-error-log-max is not the name of an RTAS function, so rtas_token() is not the appropriate API for retrieving its value. We already have rtas_get_error_log_max() which returns a sensible value if the property is absent for any reason, so use that instead.

Fixes 8d633291b4fc ("powerpc/eeh: pseries platform EEH error log retrieval")
[mpe: Drop no-longer possible error handling as noticed by ajd]
---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c | 11 +----------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c +1 -10
index f56248f19ef3..b7160120c0bb 100644
@@ -946,16 +946,7 @@ static int __init eeh_pseries_init(void)
 	}
 
 	/* Initialize error log size */
-	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_token("rtas-error-log-max");
-	if (eeh_error_buf_size == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		pr_info("%s: unknown EEH error log size\n",
-			__func__);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = 1024;
-	} else if (eeh_error_buf_size > RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX) {
-		pr_info("%s: EEH error log size %d exceeds the maximal %d\n",
-			__func__, eeh_error_buf_size, RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX);
-		eeh_error_buf_size = RTAS_ERROR_LOG_MAX;
-	}
+	eeh_error_buf_size = rtas_get_error_log_max();
 
 	/* Set EEH probe mode */
 	eeh_add_flag(EEH_PROBE_MODE_DEVTREE | EEH_ENABLE_IO_FOR_LOG);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#296 lore raw

PATCH 296/521 rtc: st-lpc: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare in st_rtc_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5fb733d7bd6949e90028efdce8bd528c6ab7cf1e ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of clk_get_rate(), fix it.

Fixes b5b2bdfc2893 ("rtc: st: Add new driver for ST's LPC RTC")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/rtc/rtc-st-lpc.c +1 -0
index bee75ca7ff79..e66439b6247a 100644
@@ -249,6 +249,7 @@ static int st_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	rtc->clkrate = clk_get_rate(rtc->clk);
 	if (!rtc->clkrate) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(rtc->clk);
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Unable to fetch clock rate\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#297 lore raw

PATCH 297/521 nfsd: under NFSv4.1, fix double svc_xprt_put on rpc_create failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Aloni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bc8edc98bd43540dbe648e4ef91f443d6d20a24 ]

On error situation clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt should not be given a reference to the xprt otherwise both client cleanup and the error handling path of the caller call to put it. Better to delay handing over the reference to a later branch.

[   72.530665] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[   72.531933] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 173 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[   72.533075] Modules linked in: nfsd(OE) nfsv4(OE) nfsv3(OE) nfs(OE) lockd(OE) compat_nfs_ssc(OE) nfs_acl(OE) rpcsec_gss_krb5(OE) auth_rpcgss(OE) rpcrdma(OE) dns_resolver fscache netfs grace rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm sunrpc(OE) mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf ib_uverbs ib_core xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nft_counter xt_addrtype nft_compat br_netfilter bridge stp llc nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set overlay nf_tables nfnetlink crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xfs serio_raw virtio_net virtio_blk net_failover failover fuse [last unloaded: sunrpc]
[   72.540389] CPU: 0 PID: 173 Comm: kworker/u16:5 Tainted: G           OE     5.15.82-dan #1
[   72.541511] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+1084+97b81f61 04/01/2014
[   72.542717] Workqueue: nfsd4_callbacks nfsd4_run_cb_work [nfsd]
[   72.543575] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xcf/0x120
[   72.544299] Code: 55 00 0f 0b 5d e9 01 50 98 00 80 3d 75 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff 48 c7 c7 e8 d1 60 8e c6 05 61 9e 39 08 01 e8 f6 51 55 00 <0f> 0b 5d e9 d9 4f 98 00 80 3d 4b 9e 39 08 00 0f 85 4c ff ff ff 48
[   72.546666] RSP: 0018:ffffb3f841157cf0 EFLAGS: 00010286
[   72.547393] RAX: 0000000000000026 RBX: ffff89ac6231d478 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   72.548324] RDX: ffff89adb7c2c2c0 RSI: ffff89adb7c205c0 RDI: ffff89adb7c205c0
[   72.549271] RBP: ffffb3f841157cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffefffff
[   72.550209] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb3f841157ad0 R12: ffff89ac6231d180
[   72.551142] R13: ffff89ac6231d478 R14: ffff89ac40c06180 R15: ffff89ac6231d4b0
[   72.552089] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89adb7c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   72.553175] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   72.553934] CR2: 0000563a310506a8 CR3: 0000000109a66000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[   72.554874] Call Trace:
[   72.555278]  <TASK>
[   72.555614]  svc_xprt_put+0xaf/0xe0 [sunrpc]
[   72.556276]  nfsd4_process_cb_update.isra.11+0xb7/0x410 [nfsd]
[   72.557087]  ? update_load_avg+0x82/0x610
[   72.557652]  ? cpuacct_charge+0x60/0x70
[   72.558212]  ? dequeue_entity+0xdb/0x3e0
[   72.558765]  ? queued_spin_unlock+0x9/0x20
[   72.559358]  nfsd4_run_cb_work+0xfc/0x270 [nfsd]
[   72.560031]  process_one_work+0x1df/0x390
[   72.560600]  worker_thread+0x37/0x3b0
[   72.561644]  ? process_one_work+0x390/0x390
[   72.562247]  kthread+0x12f/0x150
[   72.562710]  ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
[   72.563309]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   72.563818]  </TASK>
[   72.564189] ---[ end trace 031117b1c72ec616 ]---
[   72.566019] list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (ffff89ac4977e538), but was ffff89ac4763e018. (next=ffff89ac4763e018).
[   72.567647] ------------[ cut here ]------------
Fixes a4abc6b12eb1 ("nfsd: Fix svc_xprt refcnt leak when setup callback client failed")
Cc Xiyu Yang <[email protected]>
Cc J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c +3 -1
index 7ee417b685e9..519d994c0c4c 100644
@@ -800,7 +800,6 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
 	} else {
 		if (!conn->cb_xprt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 		clp->cl_cb_session = ses;
 		args.bc_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 		args.prognumber = clp->cl_cb_session->se_cb_prog;
@@ -820,6 +819,9 @@ static int setup_callback_client(struct nfs4_client *clp, struct nfs4_cb_conn *c
 		rpc_shutdown_client(client);
 		return PTR_ERR(cred);
 	}
+
+	if (clp->cl_minorversion != 0)
+		clp->cl_cb_conn.cb_xprt = conn->cb_xprt;
 	clp->cl_cb_client = client;
 	clp->cl_cb_cred = cred;
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#298 lore raw

PATCH 298/521 mISDN: hfcsusb: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ddc9648db162eee556edd5222d2808fe33730203 ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

It should use dev_kfree_skb_irq() or dev_consume_skb_irq() instead. The difference between them is free reason, dev_kfree_skb_irq() means the SKB is dropped in error and dev_consume_skb_irq() means the SKB is consumed in normal.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcusb_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

In tx_iso_complete(), dev_kfree_skb() is called to consume the transmitted SKB, so replace it with dev_consume_skb_irq().

Fixes 69f52adb2d53 ("mISDN: Add HFC USB driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcsusb.c +8 -4
index c952002c6301..c49081ed5734 100644
@@ -337,20 +337,24 @@ hfcusb_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 
 		if (hw->protocol == ISDN_P_NT_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			hfcsusb_ph_command(hw, HFC_L1_DEACTIVATE_NT);
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&hw->lock, flags);
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hw->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 #ifdef FIXME
 			if (test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L1_BUSY, &dch->Flags))
 				dchannel_sched_event(&hc->dch, D_CLEARBUSY);
@@ -1344,7 +1348,7 @@ tx_iso_complete(struct urb *urb)
 					printk("\n");
 				}
 
-				dev_kfree_skb(tx_skb);
+				dev_consume_skb_irq(tx_skb);
 				tx_skb = NULL;
 				if (fifo->dch && get_next_dframe(fifo->dch))
 					tx_skb = fifo->dch->tx_skb;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#299 lore raw

PATCH 299/521 mISDN: hfcpci: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0f596bd75a9d573ca9b587abb39cee0b916bb82 ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in hfcpci_l2l1D(), kfree_skb() is called in it, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

Fixes 1700fe1a10dc ("Add mISDN HFC PCI driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcpci.c +9 -4
index 53349850f866..de98e94711d2 100644
@@ -1633,16 +1633,19 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 		if (hc->hw.protocol == ISDN_P_NT_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			/* prepare deactivation */
 			Write_hfc(hc, HFCPCI_STATES, 0x40);
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
@@ -1655,10 +1658,12 @@ hfcpci_l2l1D(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			hc->hw.mst_m &= ~HFCPCI_MASTER;
 			Write_hfc(hc, HFCPCI_MST_MODE, hc->hw.mst_m);
 			ret = 0;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		} else {
 			ret = l1_event(dch->l1, hh->prim);
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
 		}
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
 		break;
 	}
 	if (!ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#300 lore raw

PATCH 300/521 mISDN: hfcmulti: dont call dev_kfree_skb/kfree_skb() under spin_lock_irqsave()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1232946cf522b8de9e398828bde325d7c41f29dd ]

It is not allowed to call kfree_skb() or consume_skb() from hardware interrupt context or with hardware interrupts being disabled.

skb_queue_purge() is called under spin_lock_irqsave() in handle_dmsg() and hfcm_l1callback(), kfree_skb() is called in them, to fix this, use skb_queue_splice_init() to move the dch->squeue to a free queue, also enqueue the tx_skb and rx_skb, at last calling __skb_queue_purge() to free the SKBs afer unlock.

Fixes af69fb3a8ffa ("Add mISDN HFC multiport driver")
---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/isdn/hardware/mISDN/hfcmulti.c +13 -6
index 0928fd1f0e0c..60b3a4aabe6b 100644
@@ -3233,6 +3233,7 @@ static int
 hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 {
 	struct hfc_multi	*hc = dch->hw;
+	struct sk_buff_head	free_queue;
 	u_long	flags;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
@@ -3261,6 +3262,7 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 		l1_event(dch->l1, HW_POWERUP_IND);
 		break;
 	case HW_DEACT_REQ:
+		__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 		/* start deactivation */
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 		if (hc->ctype == HFC_TYPE_E1) {
@@ -3280,20 +3282,21 @@ hfcm_l1callback(struct dchannel *dch, u_int cmd)
 				plxsd_checksync(hc, 0);
 			}
 		}
-		skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+		skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 		if (dch->tx_skb) {
-			dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+			__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 			dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 		}
 		dch->tx_idx = 0;
 		if (dch->rx_skb) {
-			dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+			__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 			dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 		}
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
 		if (test_and_clear_bit(FLG_BUSY_TIMER, &dch->Flags))
 			del_timer(&dch->timer);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+		__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		break;
 	case HW_POWERUP_REQ:
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
@@ -3400,6 +3403,9 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	case PH_DEACTIVATE_REQ:
 		test_and_clear_bit(FLG_L2_ACTIVATED, &dch->Flags);
 		if (dch->dev.D.protocol != ISDN_P_TE_S0) {
+			struct sk_buff_head free_queue;
+
+			__skb_queue_head_init(&free_queue);
 			spin_lock_irqsave(&hc->lock, flags);
 			if (debug & DEBUG_HFCMULTI_MSG)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG
@@ -3421,14 +3427,14 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 				/* deactivate */
 				dch->state = 1;
 			}
-			skb_queue_purge(&dch->squeue);
+			skb_queue_splice_init(&dch->squeue, &free_queue);
 			if (dch->tx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->tx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->tx_skb);
 				dch->tx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			dch->tx_idx = 0;
 			if (dch->rx_skb) {
-				dev_kfree_skb(dch->rx_skb);
+				__skb_queue_tail(&free_queue, dch->rx_skb);
 				dch->rx_skb = NULL;
 			}
 			test_and_clear_bit(FLG_TX_BUSY, &dch->Flags);
@@ -3440,6 +3446,7 @@ handle_dmsg(struct mISDNchannel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 #endif
 			ret = 0;
 			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hc->lock, flags);
+			__skb_queue_purge(&free_queue);
 		} else
 			ret = l1_event(dch->l1, hh->prim);
 		break;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#301 lore raw

PATCH 301/521 nfc: pn533: Clear nfc_target before being used

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f28157778ede0d4f183f7ab3b46995bb400abbe ]

Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read that occurs in nla_put() called from nfc_genl_send_target() when target->sensb_res_len, which is duplicated from an nfc_target in pn533, is too large as the nfc_target is not properly initialized and retains garbage values. Clear nfc_targets with memset() before they are used.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nla_put
Call Trace:
 memcpy
 nla_put
 nfc_genl_dump_targets
 genl_lock_dumpit
 netlink_dump
 __netlink_dump_start
 genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit
 genl_rcv_msg
 netlink_rcv_skb
 genl_rcv
 netlink_unicast
 netlink_sendmsg
 sock_sendmsg
 ____sys_sendmsg
 ___sys_sendmsg
 __sys_sendmsg
 do_syscall_64
Fixes 673088fb42d0 ("NFC: pn533: Send ATR_REQ directly for active device detection")
Fixes 361f3cb7f9cf ("NFC: DEP link hook implementation for pn533")
---
 drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c +4 -0
index 79bf8e1bd39c..b7f5db3a6aa0 100644
@@ -1305,6 +1305,8 @@ static int pn533_poll_dep_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,
 	if (IS_ERR(resp))
 		return PTR_ERR(resp);
 
+	memset(&nfc_target, 0, sizeof(struct nfc_target));
+
 	rsp = (struct pn533_cmd_jump_dep_response *)resp->data;
 
 	rc = rsp->status & PN533_CMD_RET_MASK;
@@ -1786,6 +1788,8 @@ static int pn533_in_dep_link_up_complete(struct pn533 *dev, void *arg,
 
 		dev_dbg(dev->dev, "Creating new target\n");
 
+		memset(&nfc_target, 0, sizeof(struct nfc_target));
+
 		nfc_target.supported_protocols = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP_MASK;
 		nfc_target.nfcid1_len = 10;
 		memcpy(nfc_target.nfcid1, rsp->nfcid3t, nfc_target.nfcid1_len);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#302 lore raw

PATCH 302/521 r6040: Fix kmemleak in probe and remove

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Li Zetao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e43039a49c2da45edc1d9d7c9ede4003ab45a5f ]

There is a memory leaks reported by kmemleak:

unreferenced object 0xffff888116111000 (size 2048):

    comm "modprobe", pid 817, jiffies 4294759745 (age 76.502s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      00 c4 0a 04 81 88 ff ff 08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff  ................
      08 10 11 16 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    backtrace:
      [<ffffffff815bcd82>] kmalloc_trace+0x22/0x60
      [<ffffffff827e20ee>] phy_device_create+0x4e/0x90
      [<ffffffff827e6072>] get_phy_device+0xd2/0x220
      [<ffffffff827e7844>] mdiobus_scan+0xa4/0x2e0
      [<ffffffff827e8be2>] __mdiobus_register+0x482/0x8b0
      [<ffffffffa01f5d24>] r6040_init_one+0x714/0xd2c [r6040]
      ...

The problem occurs in probe process as follows:
r6040_init_one:
mdiobus_register
mdiobus_scan <- alloc and register phy_device,
the reference count of phy_device is 3
r6040_mii_probe
phy_connect <- connect to the first phy_device,
so the reference count of the first phy_device is 4, others are 3
register_netdev <- fault inject succeeded, goto error handling path

// error handling path
err_out_mdio_unregister:
mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
err_out_mdio:
mdiobus_free(lp->mii_bus); <- the reference count of the first
phy_device is 1, it is not released and other phy_devices are released
// similarly, the remove process also has the same problem

The root cause is traced to the phy_device is not disconnected when removes one r6040 device in r6040_remove_one() or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully. In r6040_mii_probe(), a net ethernet device is connected to the first PHY device of mii_bus, in order to notify the connected driver when the link status changes, which is the default behavior of the PHY infrastructure to handle everything. Therefore the phy_device should be disconnected when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path.

Fix it by adding phy_disconnect() when removes one r6040 device or on error handling path after r6040_mii probed successfully.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/rdc/r6040.c +4 -1
index 2199bd08f4d6..e377c1f68777 100644
@@ -1184,10 +1184,12 @@ static int r6040_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	err = register_netdev(dev);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register net device\n");
-		goto err_out_mdio_unregister;
+		goto err_out_phy_disconnect;
 	}
 	return 0;
 
+err_out_phy_disconnect:
+	phy_disconnect(dev->phydev);
 err_out_mdio_unregister:
 	mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
 err_out_mdio:
@@ -1211,6 +1213,7 @@ static void r6040_remove_one(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	struct r6040_private *lp = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	unregister_netdev(dev);
+	phy_disconnect(dev->phydev);
 	mdiobus_unregister(lp->mii_bus);
 	mdiobus_free(lp->mii_bus);
 	netif_napi_del(&lp->napi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#303 lore raw

PATCH 303/521 rtc: mxc_v2: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: GUO Zihua <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 55d5a86618d3b1a768bce01882b74cbbd2651975 ]

The call to clk_disable_unprepare() is left out in the error handling of devm_rtc_allocate_device. Add it back.

Fixes 5490a1e018a4 ("rtc: mxc_v2: fix possible race condition")
---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-mxc_v2.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/rtc/rtc-mxc_v2.c +3 -1
index 45c7366b7286..c16aa4a389e9 100644
@@ -335,8 +335,10 @@ static int mxc_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	pdata->rtc = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev);
-	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc))
+	if (IS_ERR(pdata->rtc)) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(pdata->clk);
 		return PTR_ERR(pdata->rtc);
+	}
 
 	pdata->rtc->ops = &mxc_rtc_ops;
 	pdata->rtc->range_max = U32_MAX;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#304 lore raw

PATCH 304/521 openvswitch: Fix flow lookup to use unmasked key

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eelco Chaudron <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 68bb10101e6b0a6bb44e9c908ef795fc4af99eae ]

The commit mentioned below causes the ovs_flow_tbl_lookup() function to be called with the masked key. However, it's supposed to be called with the unmasked key. This due to the fact that the datapath supports installing wider flows, and OVS relies on this behavior. For example if ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0, dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0) exists, a wider flow (smaller mask) of ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/128.0.0.0,dst=192.1.1.2/ 128.0.0.0) is allowed to be added.

However, if we try to add a wildcard rule, the installation fails:

$ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \
  ipv4(src=1.1.1.1/192.0.0.0,dst=1.1.1.2/192.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2
$ ovs-appctl dpctl/add-flow system@myDP "in_port(1),eth_type(0x0800), \
  ipv4(src=192.1.1.1/0.0.0.0,dst=49.1.1.2/0.0.0.0,frag=no)" 2
ovs-vswitchd: updating flow table (File exists)

The reason is that the key used to determine if the flow is already present in the system uses the original key ANDed with the mask. This results in the IP address not being part of the (miniflow) key, i.e., being substituted with an all-zero value. When doing the actual lookup, this results in the key wrongfully matching the first flow, and therefore the flow does not get installed.

This change reverses the commit below, but rather than having the key on the stack, it's allocated.

Fixes 190aa3e77880 ("openvswitch: Fix Frame-size larger than 1024 bytes warning.")
---
 net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/openvswitch/datapath.c +16 -9
index e9a10a66b4ca..fbc575247268 100644
@@ -903,6 +903,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	struct sw_flow_mask mask;
 	struct sk_buff *reply;
 	struct datapath *dp;
+	struct sw_flow_key *key;
 	struct sw_flow_actions *acts;
 	struct sw_flow_match match;
 	u32 ufid_flags = ovs_nla_get_ufid_flags(a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID_FLAGS]);
@@ -930,24 +931,26 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	}
 
 	/* Extract key. */
-	ovs_match_init(&match, &new_flow->key, false, &mask);
+	key = kzalloc(sizeof(*key), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key) {
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_kfree_key;
+	}
+
+	ovs_match_init(&match, key, false, &mask);
 	error = ovs_nla_get_match(net, &match, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_KEY],
 				  a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_MASK], log);
 	if (error)
 		goto err_kfree_flow;
 
+	ovs_flow_mask_key(&new_flow->key, key, true, &mask);
+
 	/* Extract flow identifier. */
 	error = ovs_nla_get_identifier(&new_flow->id, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_UFID],
-				       &new_flow->key, log);
+				       key, log);
 	if (error)
 		goto err_kfree_flow;
 
-	/* unmasked key is needed to match when ufid is not used. */
-	if (ovs_identifier_is_key(&new_flow->id))
-		match.key = new_flow->id.unmasked_key;
-
-	ovs_flow_mask_key(&new_flow->key, &new_flow->key, true, &mask);
-
 	/* Validate actions. */
 	error = ovs_nla_copy_actions(net, a[OVS_FLOW_ATTR_ACTIONS],
 				     &new_flow->key, &acts, log);
@@ -974,7 +977,7 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	if (ovs_identifier_is_ufid(&new_flow->id))
 		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup_ufid(&dp->table, &new_flow->id);
 	if (!flow)
-		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup(&dp->table, &new_flow->key);
+		flow = ovs_flow_tbl_lookup(&dp->table, key);
 	if (likely(!flow)) {
 		rcu_assign_pointer(new_flow->sf_acts, acts);
 
@@ -1044,6 +1047,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 
 	if (reply)
 		ovs_notify(&dp_flow_genl_family, reply, info);
+
+	kfree(key);
 	return 0;
 
 err_unlock_ovs:
@@ -1053,6 +1058,8 @@ static int ovs_flow_cmd_new(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 	ovs_nla_free_flow_actions(acts);
 err_kfree_flow:
 	ovs_flow_free(new_flow, false);
+err_kfree_key:
+	kfree(key);
 error:
 	return error;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#305 lore raw

PATCH 305/521 skbuff: Account for tail adjustment during pull operations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2d7afdcbc9d32423f177ee12b7c93783aea338fb ]

Extending the tail can have some unexpected side effects if a program uses a helper like BPF_FUNC_skb_pull_data to read partial content beyond the head skb headlen when all the skbs in the gso frag_list are linear with no head_frag -

kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4219!

  pc : skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c
  lr : skb_segment+0x63c/0xd2c
  Call trace:
   skb_segment+0xcf4/0xd2c
   __udp_gso_segment+0xa4/0x544
   udp4_ufo_fragment+0x184/0x1c0
   inet_gso_segment+0x16c/0x3a4
   skb_mac_gso_segment+0xd4/0x1b0
   __skb_gso_segment+0xcc/0x12c
   udp_rcv_segment+0x54/0x16c
   udp_queue_rcv_skb+0x78/0x144
   udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x8c/0xa4
   __udp4_lib_rcv+0x490/0x68c
   udp_rcv+0x20/0x30
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1b0/0x33c
   ip_local_deliver+0xd8/0x1f0
   ip_rcv+0x98/0x1a4
   deliver_ptype_list_skb+0x98/0x1ec
   __netif_receive_skb_core+0x978/0xc60

Fix this by marking these skbs as GSO_DODGY so segmentation can handle the tail updates accordingly.

Fixes 3dcbdb134f32 ("net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list")
---
 net/core/skbuff.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -0
index 4178fc28c277..7f501dff4501 100644
@@ -1953,6 +1953,9 @@ void *__pskb_pull_tail(struct sk_buff *skb, int delta)
 				insp = list;
 			} else {
 				/* Eaten partially. */
+				if (skb_is_gso(skb) && !list->head_frag &&
+				    skb_headlen(list))
+					skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_DODGY;
 
 				if (skb_shared(list)) {
 					/* Sucks! We need to fork list. :-( */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#306 lore raw

PATCH 306/521 net_sched: reject TCF_EM_SIMPLE case for complex ematch module

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9cd3fd2054c3b3055163accbf2f31a4426f10317 ]

When TCF_EM_SIMPLE was introduced, it is supposed to be convenient for ematch implementation:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

"You don't have to, providing a 32bit data chunk without TCF_EM_SIMPLE set will simply result in allocating & copy. It's an optimization, nothing more."

So if an ematch module provides ops->datalen that means it wants a complex data structure (saved in its em->data) instead of a simple u32 value. We should simply reject such a combination, otherwise this u32 could be misinterpreted as a pointer.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Cc Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
---
 net/sched/ematch.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/sched/ematch.c +2 -0
index 113a133ee544..5ba3548d2eb7 100644
@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@ static int tcf_em_validate(struct tcf_proto *tp,
 			 * the value carried.
 			 */
 			if (em_hdr->flags & TCF_EM_SIMPLE) {
+				if (em->ops->datalen > 0)
+					goto errout;
 				if (data_len < sizeof(u32))
 					goto errout;
 				em->data = *(u32 *) data;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#307 lore raw

PATCH 307/521 rxrpc: Fix missing unlock in rxrpc_do_sendmsg()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4feb2c44629e6f9b459b41a5a60491069d346a95 ]

One of the error paths in rxrpc_do_sendmsg() doesn't unlock the call mutex before returning. Fix it to do this.

Note that this still doesn't get rid of the checker warning:

../net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c:617:5: warning: context imbalance in 'rxrpc_do_sendmsg' - wrong count at exit

I think the interplay between the socket lock and the call's user_mutex may be too complicated for checker to analyse, especially as rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), which it calls, returns with the call's user_mutex if successful but unconditionally drops the socket lock.

Fixes e754eba685aa ("rxrpc: Provide a cmsg to specify the amount of Tx data for a call")
cc Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
---
 net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +1 -1
index 0220a2935002..a7a09eb04d93 100644
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 			if (call->tx_total_len != -1 ||
 			    call->tx_pending ||
 			    call->tx_top != 0)
-				goto error_put;
+				goto out_put_unlock;
 			call->tx_total_len = p.call.tx_total_len;
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#308 lore raw

PATCH 308/521 myri10ge: Fix an error handling path in myri10ge_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d83b950d44d2982c0e62e3d81b0f35ab09431008 ]

Some memory allocated in myri10ge_probe_slices() is not released in the error handling path of myri10ge_probe().

Add the corresponding kfree(), as already done in the remove function.

Fixes 0dcffac1a329 ("myri10ge: add multislices support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/myricom/myri10ge/myri10ge.c +1 -0
index 3bc570c46f81..8296b0aa42a9 100644
@@ -3960,6 +3960,7 @@ static int myri10ge_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	myri10ge_free_slices(mgp);
 
 abort_with_firmware:
+	kfree(mgp->msix_vectors);
 	myri10ge_dummy_rdma(mgp, 0);
 
 abort_with_ioremap:
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#309 lore raw

PATCH 309/521 net: stream: purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0c8bccd40fc1c19e1d246c39bcf79e357e1ada3 ]

Changheon Lee reported TCP socket leaks, with a nice repro.

It seems we leak TCP sockets with the following sequence:

1) SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_ACK is enabled on the socket.

Each ACK will cook an skb put in error queue, from __skb_tstamp_tx(). __skb_tstamp_tx() is using skb_clone(), unless SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_TSONLY was also requested.

2) If the application is also using MSG_ZEROCOPY, then we put in the error queue cloned skbs that had a struct ubuf_info attached to them.

Whenever an struct ubuf_info is allocated, sock_zerocopy_alloc() does a sock_hold().

As long as the cloned skbs are still in sk_error_queue, socket refcount is kept elevated.

3) Application closes the socket, while error queue is not empty.

Since tcp_close() no longer purges the socket error queue, we might end up with a TCP socket with at least one skb in error queue keeping the socket alive forever.

This bug can be (ab)used to consume all kernel memory and freeze the host.

We need to purge the error queue, with proper synchronization against concurrent writers.

Fixes 24bcbe1cc69f ("net: stream: don't purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()")
---
 net/core/stream.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/core/stream.c +6 -0
index 7b411a91a81c..58755528d39e 100644
@@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ void sk_stream_kill_queues(struct sock *sk)
 	/* First the read buffer. */
 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
 
+	/* Next, the error queue.
+	 * We need to use queue lock, because other threads might
+	 * add packets to the queue without socket lock being held.
+	 */
+	skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_error_queue);
+
 	/* Next, the write queue. */
 	WARN_ON(!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#310 lore raw

PATCH 310/521 binfmt_misc: fix shift-out-of-bounds in check_special_flags

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a46bf558803dd2b959ca7435a5c143efe837217 ]

UBSAN reported a shift-out-of-bounds warning:

left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'

 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x8d/0xcf lib/dump_stack.c:106
  ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0x44 lib/ubsan.c:151
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x208 lib/ubsan.c:322
  check_special_flags fs/binfmt_misc.c:241 [inline]
  create_entry fs/binfmt_misc.c:456 [inline]
  bm_register_write+0x9d3/0xa20 fs/binfmt_misc.c:654
  vfs_write+0x11e/0x580 fs/read_write.c:582
  ksys_write+0xcf/0x120 fs/read_write.c:637
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
 RIP: 0033:0x4194e1

Since the type of Node's flags is unsigned long, we should define these macros with same type too.

---
 fs/binfmt_misc.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/binfmt_misc.c +4 -4
index 27a04f492541..8fe7edd2b001 100644
@@ -42,10 +42,10 @@ static LIST_HEAD(entries);
 static int enabled = 1;
 
 enum {Enabled, Magic};
-#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << 31)
-#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1 << 30)
-#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1 << 29)
-#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1 << 28)
+#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1UL << 31)
+#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1UL << 30)
+#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1UL << 29)
+#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1UL << 28)
 
 typedef struct {
 	struct list_head list;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#311 lore raw

PATCH 311/521 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 898f706695682b9954f280d95e49fa86ffa55d08 ]

Syzbot found a crash : UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in dbAllocAG. The underlying bug is the missing check of bmp->db_agl2size. The field can be greater than 64 and trigger the shift-out-of-bounds.

Fix this bug by adding a check of bmp->db_agl2size in dbMount since this field is used in many following functions. The upper bound for this field is L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG, thanks for the help of Dave Kleikamp. Note that, for maintenance, I reorganized error handling code of dbMount.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +16 -6
index 1014f2a24697..4f72f7dee78b 100644
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	struct bmap *bmp;
 	struct dbmap_disk *dbmp_le;
 	struct metapage *mp;
-	int i;
+	int i, err;
 
 	/*
 	 * allocate/initialize the in-memory bmap descriptor
@@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 			   BMAPBLKNO << JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->l2nbperpage,
 			   PSIZE, 0);
 	if (mp == NULL) {
-		kfree(bmp);
-		return -EIO;
+		err = -EIO;
+		goto err_kfree_bmp;
 	}
 
 	/* copy the on-disk bmap descriptor to its in-memory version. */
@@ -194,9 +194,8 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	bmp->db_l2nbperpage = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_l2nbperpage);
 	bmp->db_numag = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_numag);
 	if (!bmp->db_numag) {
-		release_metapage(mp);
-		kfree(bmp);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
 	}
 
 	bmp->db_maxlevel = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_maxlevel);
@@ -207,6 +206,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	bmp->db_agwidth = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agwidth);
 	bmp->db_agstart = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agstart);
 	bmp->db_agl2size = le32_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agl2size);
+	if (bmp->db_agl2size > L2MAXL2SIZE - L2MAXAG) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++)
 		bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]);
 	bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
@@ -227,6 +231,12 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 	BMAP_LOCK_INIT(bmp);
 
 	return (0);
+
+err_release_metapage:
+	release_metapage(mp);
+err_kfree_bmp:
+	kfree(bmp);
+	return err;
 }
 
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#312 lore raw

PATCH 312/521 udf: Avoid double brelse() in udf_rename()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c791730f2554a9ebb8f18df9368dc27d4ebc38c2 ]

syzbot reported a warning like below [1]:

VFS: brelse: Trying to free free buffer

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 7301 at fs/buffer.c:1145 __brelse+0x67/0xa0
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 invalidate_bh_lru+0x99/0x150
 smp_call_function_many_cond+0xe2a/0x10c0
 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
 ? __mutex_lock+0x21c/0x12d0
 ? smp_call_on_cpu+0x250/0x250
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
 ? lock_release+0x587/0x810
 ? __brelse+0xa0/0xa0
 ? generic_remap_file_range_prep+0x50/0x50
 on_each_cpu_cond_mask+0x3c/0x80
 blkdev_flush_mapping+0x13a/0x2f0
 blkdev_put_whole+0xd3/0xf0
 blkdev_put+0x222/0x760
 deactivate_locked_super+0x96/0x160
 deactivate_super+0xda/0x100
 cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x3d0
 task_work_run+0x149/0x240
 ? task_work_cancel+0x30/0x30
 do_exit+0xb29/0x2a40
 ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12a/0x2b0
 ? mm_update_next_owner+0x7c0/0x7c0
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 ? zap_other_threads+0x234/0x2d0
 do_group_exit+0xd0/0x2a0
 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The cause of the issue is that brelse() is called on both ofibh.sbh and ofibh.ebh by udf_find_entry() when it returns NULL. However, brelse() is called by udf_rename(), too. So, b_count on buffer_head becomes unbalanced.

This patch fixes the issue by not calling brelse() by udf_rename() when udf_find_entry() returns NULL.

---
 fs/udf/namei.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/udf/namei.c +4 -4
index d13ded8e2c30..ef251622da13 100644
@@ -1106,8 +1106,9 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ofi = udf_find_entry(old_dir, &old_dentry->d_name, &ofibh, &ocfi);
-	if (IS_ERR(ofi)) {
-		retval = PTR_ERR(ofi);
+	if (!ofi || IS_ERR(ofi)) {
+		if (IS_ERR(ofi))
+			retval = PTR_ERR(ofi);
 		goto end_rename;
 	}
 
@@ -1116,8 +1117,7 @@ static int udf_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 
 	brelse(ofibh.sbh);
 	tloc = lelb_to_cpu(ocfi.icb.extLocation);
-	if (!ofi || udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0)
-	    != old_inode->i_ino)
+	if (udf_get_lb_pblock(old_dir->i_sb, &tloc, 0) != old_inode->i_ino)
 		goto end_rename;
 
 	nfi = udf_find_entry(new_dir, &new_dentry->d_name, &nfibh, &ncfi);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#313 lore raw

PATCH 313/521 fs: jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbDiscardAG

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hoi Pok Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25e70c6162f207828dd405b432d8f2a98dbf7082 ]

This should be applied to most URSAN bugs found recently by syzbot, by guarding the dbMount. As syzbot feeding rubbish into the bmap descriptor.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +5 -0
index 4f72f7dee78b..f06796cad9aa 100644
@@ -211,6 +211,11 @@ int dbMount(struct inode *ipbmap)
 		goto err_release_metapage;
 	}
 
+	if (((bmp->db_mapsize - 1) >> bmp->db_agl2size) > MAXAG) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto err_release_metapage;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < MAXAG; i++)
 		bmp->db_agfree[i] = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agfree[i]);
 	bmp->db_agsize = le64_to_cpu(dbmp_le->dn_agsize);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#314 lore raw

PATCH 314/521 ACPICA: Fix error code path in acpi_ds_call_control_method()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 404ec60438add1afadaffaed34bb5fe4ddcadd40 ]

A use-after-free in acpi_ps_parse_aml() after a failing invocaion of acpi_ds_call_control_method() is reported by KASAN [1] and code inspection reveals that next_walk_state pushed to the thread by acpi_ds_create_walk_state() is freed on errors, but it is not popped from the thread beforehand. Thus acpi_ds_get_current_walk_state() called by acpi_ps_parse_aml() subsequently returns it as the new walk state which is incorrect.

To address this, make acpi_ds_call_control_method() call acpi_ds_pop_walk_state() to pop next_walk_state from the thread before returning an error.

---
 drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/acpica/dsmethod.c +8 -2
index dd4deb678d13..a00516d9538c 100644
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 	info = ACPI_ALLOCATE_ZEROED(sizeof(struct acpi_evaluate_info));
 	if (!info) {
 		status = AE_NO_MEMORY;
-		goto cleanup;
+		goto pop_walk_state;
 	}
 
 	info->parameters = &this_walk_state->operands[0];
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 
 	ACPI_FREE(info);
 	if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
-		goto cleanup;
+		goto pop_walk_state;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -561,6 +561,12 @@ acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state *thread,
 
 	return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
 
+pop_walk_state:
+
+	/* On error, pop the walk state to be deleted from thread */
+
+	acpi_ds_pop_walk_state(thread);
+
 cleanup:
 
 	/* On error, we must terminate the method properly */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#315 lore raw

PATCH 315/521 nilfs2: fix shift-out-of-bounds/overflow in nilfs_sb2_bad_offset()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 610a2a3d7d8be3537458a378ec69396a76c385b6 ]

Patch series "nilfs2: fix UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds warnings on mount time".

The first patch fixes a bug reported by syzbot, and the second one fixes the remaining bug of the same kind. Although they are triggered by the same super block data anomaly, I divided it into the above two because the details of the issues and how to fix it are different.

Both are required to eliminate the shift-out-of-bounds issues at mount time.

This patch (of 2):

If the block size exponent information written in an on-disk superblock is corrupted, nilfs_sb2_bad_offset helper function can trigger shift-out-of-bounds warning followed by a kernel panic (if panic_on_warn is set):

shift exponent 38983 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long long'

 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
  ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:151 [inline]
  __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x33d/0x3b0 lib/ubsan.c:322
  nilfs_sb2_bad_offset fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:449 [inline]
  nilfs_load_super_block+0xdf5/0xe00 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:523
  init_nilfs+0xb7/0x7d0 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c:577
  nilfs_fill_super+0xb1/0x5d0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1047
  nilfs_mount+0x613/0x9b0 fs/nilfs2/super.c:1317
  ...

In addition, since nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() performs multiplication without considering the upper bound, the computation may overflow if the disk layout parameters are not normal.

This fixes these issues by inserting preliminary sanity checks for those parameters and by converting the comparison from one involving multiplication and left bit-shifting to one using division and right bit-shifting.

---
 fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/the_nilfs.c +27 -4
index fb61c33c6004..74ef3d313686 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
 #include <linux/crc32.h>
 #include "nilfs.h"
 #include "segment.h"
@@ -448,11 +449,33 @@ static int nilfs_valid_sb(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp)
 	return crc == le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_sum);
 }
 
-static int nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset)
+/**
+ * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset - check the location of the second superblock
+ * @sbp: superblock raw data buffer
+ * @offset: byte offset of second superblock calculated from device size
+ *
+ * nilfs_sb2_bad_offset() checks if the position on the second
+ * superblock is valid or not based on the filesystem parameters
+ * stored in @sbp.  If @offset points to a location within the segment
+ * area, or if the parameters themselves are not normal, it is
+ * determined to be invalid.
+ *
+ * Return Value: true if invalid, false if valid.
+ */
+static bool nilfs_sb2_bad_offset(struct nilfs_super_block *sbp, u64 offset)
 {
-	return offset < ((le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments) *
-			  le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment)) <<
-			 (le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size) + 10));
+	unsigned int shift_bits = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_log_block_size);
+	u32 blocks_per_segment = le32_to_cpu(sbp->s_blocks_per_segment);
+	u64 nsegments = le64_to_cpu(sbp->s_nsegments);
+	u64 index;
+
+	if (blocks_per_segment < NILFS_SEG_MIN_BLOCKS ||
+	    shift_bits > ilog2(NILFS_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) - BLOCK_SIZE_BITS)
+		return true;
+
+	index = offset >> (shift_bits + BLOCK_SIZE_BITS);
+	do_div(index, blocks_per_segment);
+	return index < nsegments;
 }
 
 static void nilfs_release_super_block(struct the_nilfs *nilfs)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#316 lore raw

PATCH 316/521 acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5f31c655bcc01b6da53b836ac951c1556245305 ]

The integer overflow is descripted with following codes:

Quoted 3 lines

317 static comp_t encode_comp_t(u64 value)
318 {
319 int exp, rnd;

    ......
Quoted 4 lines
341         exp <<= MANTSIZE;
342         exp += value;
343         return exp;

344 }

Currently comp_t is defined as type of '__u16', but the variable 'exp' is type of 'int', so overflow would happen when variable 'exp' in line 343 is greater than 65535.

---
 kernel/acct.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
kernel/acct.c +2 -0
index 81f9831a7859..6d98aed403ba 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,8 @@ static comp_t encode_comp_t(unsigned long value)
 		exp++;
 	}
 
+	if (exp > (((comp_t) ~0U) >> MANTSIZE))
+		return (comp_t) ~0U;
 	/*
 	 * Clean it up and polish it off.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#317 lore raw

PATCH 317/521 hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: ZhangPeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d824e69d9f3fa3121b2dda25053bae71e2460d2 ]

Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190
fs/hfs/string.c:84
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11
CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84
 __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75
 hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138
 hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462
 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]

If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:
struct inode
struct hfs_inode_info
struct hfs_cat_key
struct hfs_name
u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the
maximum length of an HFS filename

OOB read occurred:
hfs_write_inode()
hfs_brec_find()
__hfs_brec_find()
hfs_cat_keycmp()
hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large

Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling hfs_brec_find().

---
 fs/hfs/inode.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/hfs/inode.c +2 -0
index da243c84e93b..9c5badc9db00 100644
@@ -453,6 +453,8 @@ int hfs_write_inode(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)
 		/* panic? */
 		return -EIO;
 
+	if (HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key.CName.len > HFS_NAMELEN)
+		return -EIO;
 	fd.search_key->cat = HFS_I(main_inode)->cat_key;
 	if (hfs_brec_find(&fd))
 		/* panic? */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#318 lore raw

PATCH 318/521 wifi: ath9k: verify the expected usb_endpoints are present

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16ef02bad239f11f322df8425d302be62f0443ce ]

The bug arises when a USB device claims to be an ATH9K but doesn't have the expected endpoints. (In this case there was an interrupt endpoint where the driver expected a bulk endpoint.) The kernel needs to be able to handle such devices without getting an internal error.

usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 3 != type 1

WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 500 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493 usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 500 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.10.135-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xce2/0x1430 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:493
Call Trace:
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_rx_urbs drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:908 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_alloc_urbs+0x75e/0x1010 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1019
 ath9k_hif_usb_dev_init drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1109 [inline]
 ath9k_hif_usb_firmware_cb+0x142/0x530 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c:1242
 request_firmware_work_func+0x12e/0x240 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:1097
 process_one_work+0x9af/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 worker_thread+0x61d/0x12f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2425
 kthread+0x3b4/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313
 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:299

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +14 -0
index d872459c51cc..8a18a33b5b59 100644
@@ -1328,10 +1328,24 @@ static int send_eject_command(struct usb_interface *interface)
 static int ath9k_hif_usb_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 			       const struct usb_device_id *id)
 {
+	struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *bulk_in, *bulk_out, *int_in, *int_out;
 	struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(interface);
+	struct usb_host_interface *alt;
 	struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	/* Verify the expected endpoints are present */
+	alt = interface->cur_altsetting;
+	if (usb_find_common_endpoints(alt, &bulk_in, &bulk_out, &int_in, &int_out) < 0 ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_in) != USB_WLAN_RX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(bulk_out) != USB_WLAN_TX_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_in) != USB_REG_IN_PIPE ||
+	    usb_endpoint_num(int_out) != USB_REG_OUT_PIPE) {
+		dev_err(&udev->dev,
+			"ath9k_htc: Device endpoint numbers are not the expected ones\n");
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
 	if (id->driver_info == STORAGE_DEVICE)
 		return send_eject_command(interface);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#319 lore raw

PATCH 319/521 wifi: ar5523: Fix use-after-free on ar5523_cmd() timed out

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b6702a942a069c2a975478d719e98d83cdae1797 ]

syzkaller reported use-after-free with the stack trace like below [1]:

[   38.960489][    C3] ==================================================================
[   38.963216][    C3] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.964950][    C3] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888048e03450 by task swapper/3/0
[   38.966363][    C3]
[   38.967053][    C3] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.0.0-09039-ga6afa4199d3d-dirty #18
[   38.968464][    C3] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014
[   38.969959][    C3] Call Trace:
[   38.970841][    C3]  <IRQ>
[   38.971663][    C3]  dump_stack_lvl+0xfc/0x174
[   38.972620][    C3]  print_report.cold+0x2c3/0x752
[   38.973626][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.974644][    C3]  kasan_report+0xb1/0x1d0
[   38.975720][    C3]  ? ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.976831][    C3]  ar5523_cmd_tx_cb+0x220/0x240
[   38.978412][    C3]  __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x353/0x5b0
[   38.979755][    C3]  usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x385/0x430
[   38.981266][    C3]  dummy_timer+0x140c/0x34e0
[   38.982925][    C3]  ? notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x1e0
[   38.984761][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.986242][    C3]  ? lock_release+0x51c/0x790
[   38.987323][    C3]  ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x37/0x70
[   38.988483][    C3]  ? __wake_up_common_lock+0xde/0x130
[   38.989621][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   38.990777][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.991919][    C3]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xb/0x60
[   38.993138][    C3]  ? lock_acquire+0x472/0x550
[   38.994890][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.996266][    C3]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x16f/0x230
[   38.997670][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   38.999116][    C3]  call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x6a0
[   39.000668][    C3]  ? add_timer_on+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.002137][    C3]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x4a0/0x4a0
[   39.003809][    C3]  ? __next_timer_interrupt+0x226/0x2a0
[   39.005509][    C3]  __run_timers.part.0+0x69a/0xac0
[   39.007025][    C3]  ? dummy_urb_enqueue+0x860/0x860
[   39.008716][    C3]  ? call_timer_fn+0x6a0/0x6a0
[   39.010254][    C3]  ? cpuacct_percpu_seq_show+0x10/0x10
[   39.011795][    C3]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40
[   39.013277][    C3]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x69/0x2b0
[   39.014724][    C3]  run_timer_softirq+0xb6/0x1d0
[   39.016196][    C3]  __do_softirq+0x1d2/0x9be
[   39.017616][    C3]  __irq_exit_rcu+0xeb/0x190
[   39.019004][    C3]  irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20
[   39.020361][    C3]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8f/0xb0
[   39.021965][    C3]  </IRQ>
[   39.023237][    C3]  <TASK>

In ar5523_probe(), ar5523_host_available() calls ar5523_cmd() as below (there are other functions which finally call ar5523_cmd()):

ar5523_probe()
-> ar5523_host_available()
-> ar5523_cmd_read()

      -> ar5523_cmd()

If ar5523_cmd() timed out, then ar5523_host_available() failed and ar5523_probe() freed the device structure. So, ar5523_cmd_tx_cb() might touch the freed structure.

This patch fixes this issue by canceling in-flight tx cmd if submitted urb timed out.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ar5523/ar5523.c +6 -0
index 58e189ec672f..5d3cf354f6cb 100644
@@ -241,6 +241,11 @@ static void ar5523_cmd_tx_cb(struct urb *urb)
 	}
 }
 
+static void ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar)
+{
+	usb_kill_urb(ar->tx_cmd.urb_tx);
+}
+
 static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 		      int ilen, void *odata, int olen, int flags)
 {
@@ -280,6 +285,7 @@ static int ar5523_cmd(struct ar5523 *ar, u32 code, const void *idata,
 	}
 
 	if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&cmd->done, 2 * HZ)) {
+		ar5523_cancel_tx_cmd(ar);
 		cmd->odata = NULL;
 		ar5523_err(ar, "timeout waiting for command %02x reply\n",
 			   code);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#320 lore raw

PATCH 320/521 ASoC: codecs: rt298: Add quirk for KBL-R RVP platform

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Amadeusz Sławiński <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 953dbd1cef18ce9ac0d69c1bd735b929fe52a17e ]

KBL-R RVP platforms also use combojack, so we need to enable that configuration for them.

---
 sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/rt298.c +7 -0
index 06cdba4edfe2..3181b91a025b 100644
@@ -1169,6 +1169,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id force_combo_jack_table[] = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Geminilake")
 		}
 	},
+	{
+		.ident = "Intel Kabylake R RVP",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Kabylake Client platform")
+		}
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#321 lore raw

PATCH 321/521 ipmi: fix memleak when unload ipmi driver

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Yuchen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36992eb6b9b83f7f9cdc8e74fb5799d7b52e83e9 ]

After the IPMI disconnect problem, the memory kept rising and we tried to unload the driver to free the memory. However, only part of the free memory is recovered after the driver is uninstalled. Using ebpf to hook free functions, we find that neither ipmi_user nor ipmi_smi_msg is free, only ipmi_recv_msg is free.

We find that the deliver_smi_err_response call in clean_smi_msgs does the destroy processing on each message from the xmit_msg queue without checking the return value and free ipmi_smi_msg.

deliver_smi_err_response is called only at this location. Adding the free handling has no effect.

To verify, try using ebpf to trace the free function.

  $ bpftrace -e 'kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_recv_msg {printf("alloc rcv
      %p\n",retval);} kprobe:free_recv_msg {printf("free recv %p\n",
      arg0)} kretprobe:ipmi_alloc_smi_msg {printf("alloc smi %p\n",
        retval);} kprobe:free_smi_msg {printf("free smi  %p\n",arg0)}'

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

[Fixed the comment above handle_one_recv_msg().]
---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +6 -2
index 4cf3ef4ddec3..8cfc7e6ab645 100644
@@ -3461,12 +3461,16 @@ static void deliver_smi_err_response(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
 				     struct ipmi_smi_msg *msg,
 				     unsigned char err)
 {
+	int rv;
 	msg->rsp[0] = msg->data[0] | 4;
 	msg->rsp[1] = msg->data[1];
 	msg->rsp[2] = err;
 	msg->rsp_size = 3;
-	/* It's an error, so it will never requeue, no need to check return. */
-	handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+
+	/* This will never requeue, but it may ask us to free the message. */
+	rv = handle_one_recv_msg(intf, msg);
+	if (rv == 0)
+		ipmi_free_smi_msg(msg);
 }
 
 static void cleanup_smi_msgs(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#322 lore raw

PATCH 322/521 bpf: make sure skb->len != 0 when redirecting to a tunneling device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 07ec7b502800ba9f7b8b15cb01dd6556bb41aaca ]

syzkaller managed to trigger another case where skb->len == 0 when we enter __dev_queue_xmit:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 skb_assert_len include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2470 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2576 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2069/0x35e0 net/core/dev.c:4295

Call Trace:
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:4406
 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2115 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2140 [inline]
 __bpf_redirect+0x5fb/0xda0 net/core/filter.c:2163
 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2447 [inline]
 bpf_clone_redirect+0x247/0x390 net/core/filter.c:2419
 bpf_prog_48159a89cb4a9a16+0x59/0x5e
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:897 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:596 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:603 [inline]
 bpf_test_run+0x46c/0x890 net/bpf/test_run.c:402
 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xbdc/0x14c0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1170
 bpf_prog_test_run+0x345/0x3c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3648
 __sys_bpf+0x43a/0x6c0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5005
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5091 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5089
 do_syscall_64+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6

The reproducer doesn't really reproduce outside of syzkaller environment, so I'm taking a guess here. It looks like we do generate correct ETH_HLEN-sized packet, but we redirect the packet to the tunneling device. Before we do so, we __skb_pull l2 header and arrive again at skb->len == 0. Doesn't seem like we can do anything better than having an explicit check after __skb_pull?

---
 net/core/filter.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +4 -0
index 5129e89f52bb..aa2e7baa13c4 100644
@@ -2025,6 +2025,10 @@ static int __bpf_redirect_no_mac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 
 	if (mlen) {
 		__skb_pull(skb, mlen);
+		if (unlikely(!skb->len)) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			return -ERANGE;
+		}
 
 		/* At ingress, the mac header has already been pulled once.
 		 * At egress, skb_pospull_rcsum has to be done in case that
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#323 lore raw

PATCH 323/521 net: ethernet: ti: Fix return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 63fe6ff674a96cfcfc0fa8df1051a27aa31c70b4 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c:1944:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netcp_ndo_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netcp_ndo_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c +1 -1
index 6099865217f2..7fdbd2ff5573 100644
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ static int netcp_tx_submit_skb(struct netcp_intf *netcp,
 }
 
 /* Submit the packet */
-static int netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
+static netdev_tx_t netcp_ndo_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 {
 	struct netcp_intf *netcp = netdev_priv(ndev);
 	struct netcp_stats *tx_stats = &netcp->stats;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#324 lore raw

PATCH 324/521 hamradio: baycom_epp: Fix return type of baycom_send_packet()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5733e5b15d91ab679646ec3149e192996a27d5d ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c:1119:25: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = baycom_send_packet,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of baycom_send_packet() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/hamradio/baycom_epp.c +1 -1
index 1e62d00732f2..787eaf3f4f13 100644
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ static void epp_bh(struct work_struct *work)
  * ===================== network driver interface =========================
  */
 
-static int baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t baycom_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct baycom_state *bc = netdev_priv(dev);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#325 lore raw

PATCH 325/521 wifi: brcmfmac: Fix potential shift-out-of-bounds in brcmf_fw_alloc_request()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Minsuk Kang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 81d17f6f3331f03c8eafdacea68ab773426c1e3c ]

This patch fixes a shift-out-of-bounds in brcmfmac that occurs in BIT(chiprev) when a 'chiprev' provided by the device is too large. It should also not be equal to or greater than BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) as we do bitwise AND with a u32 variable and BIT(chiprev). The patch adds a check that makes the function return NULL if that is the case. Note that the NULL case is later handled by the bus-specific caller, brcmf_usb_probe_cb() or brcmf_usb_reset_resume(), for example.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c
shift exponent 151055786 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 0 PID: 1885 Comm: kworker/0:2 Tainted: G           O      5.14.0+ #132
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x40
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x53/0xdb
 ? lock_chain_count+0x20/0x20
 brcmf_fw_alloc_request.cold+0x19/0x3ea
 ? brcmf_fw_get_firmwares+0x250/0x250
 ? brcmf_usb_ioctl_resp_wait+0x1a7/0x1f0
 brcmf_usb_get_fwname+0x114/0x1a0
 ? brcmf_usb_reset_resume+0x120/0x120
 ? number+0x6c4/0x9a0
 brcmf_c_process_clm_blob+0x168/0x590
 ? put_dec+0x90/0x90
 ? enable_ptr_key_workfn+0x20/0x20
 ? brcmf_common_pd_remove+0x50/0x50
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 brcmf_c_preinit_dcmds+0x673/0xc40
 ? brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default+0x100/0x100
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lock_acquire+0x19d/0x4e0
 ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1cc/0x260
 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 ? brcmf_usb_deq+0x1a7/0x260
 ? brcmf_usb_rx_fill_all+0x5a/0xf0
 brcmf_attach+0x246/0xd40
 ? wiphy_new_nm+0x1476/0x1d50
 ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
 brcmf_usb_probe+0x12de/0x1690
 ? brcmf_usbdev_qinit.constprop.0+0x470/0x470
 usb_probe_interface+0x25f/0x710
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 ? usb_match_id.part.0+0x88/0xc0
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x660
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_set_configuration+0x984/0x1770
 ? kernfs_create_link+0x175/0x230
 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x69/0x90
 usb_probe_device+0x9c/0x220
 really_probe+0x1be/0xa90
 __driver_probe_device+0x2ab/0x460
 driver_probe_device+0x49/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0x18a/0x250
 ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x120/0x120
 bus_for_each_drv+0x123/0x1a0
 ? bus_rescan_devices+0x20/0x20
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0x120
 __device_attach+0x207/0x330
 ? device_bind_driver+0xb0/0xb0
 ? kobject_uevent_env+0x230/0x12c0
 bus_probe_device+0x1a2/0x260
 device_add+0xa61/0x1ce0
 ? __fw_devlink_link_to_suppliers+0x550/0x550
 usb_new_device.cold+0x463/0xf66
 ? hub_disconnect+0x400/0x400
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 hub_event+0x10d5/0x3330
 ? hub_port_debounce+0x280/0x280
 ? __lock_acquire+0x1671/0x5790
 ? wq_calc_node_cpumask+0x170/0x2a0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3e0
 process_one_work+0x873/0x13e0
 ? lock_release+0x640/0x640
 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x320/0x320
 ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
 worker_thread+0x8b/0xd10
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xd9/0x1d0
 ? process_one_work+0x13e0/0x13e0
 kthread+0x379/0x450
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x100/0x100
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/firmware.c +5 -0
index 4e5a6c311d1a..d8460835ff00 100644
@@ -648,6 +648,11 @@ brcmf_fw_alloc_request(u32 chip, u32 chiprev,
 	char end = '\0';
 	size_t reqsz;
 
+	if (chiprev >= BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)) {
+		brcmf_err("Invalid chip revision %u\n", chiprev);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < table_size; i++) {
 		if (mapping_table[i].chipid == chip &&
 		    mapping_table[i].revmask & BIT(chiprev))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#326 lore raw

PATCH 326/521 igb: Do not free q_vector unless new one was allocated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0668716506ca66f90d395f36ccdaebc3e0e84801 ]

Avoid potential use-after-free condition under memory pressure. If the kzalloc() fails, q_vector will be freed but left in the original adapter->q_vector[v_idx] array position.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +6 -2
index 3d2dd15859cb..87f98170ac93 100644
@@ -1211,8 +1211,12 @@ static int igb_alloc_q_vector(struct igb_adapter *adapter,
 	if (!q_vector) {
 		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	} else if (size > ksize(q_vector)) {
-		kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
-		q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		struct igb_q_vector *new_q_vector;
+
+		new_q_vector = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (new_q_vector)
+			kfree_rcu(q_vector, rcu);
+		q_vector = new_q_vector;
 	} else {
 		memset(q_vector, 0, size);
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#327 lore raw

PATCH 327/521 drm/amdgpu: Fix type of second parameter in trans_msg() callback

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f0d0f1087333714ee683cc134a95afe331d7ddd9 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mxgpu_ai.c:412:15: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, u32, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') with an expression of type 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.trans_msg = xgpu_ai_mailbox_trans_msg,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/mxgpu_nv.c:435:15: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, u32, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (*)(struct amdgpu_device *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') with an expression of type 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, u32, u32, u32)' (aka 'void (struct amdgpu_device *, enum idh_request, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int)') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.trans_msg = xgpu_nv_mailbox_trans_msg,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

The type of the second parameter in the prototype should be 'enum idh_request' instead of 'u32'. Update it to clear up the warnings.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_virt.h | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_virt.h +4 -1
index 880ac113a3a9..d26b6e36be02 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ struct amdgpu_vf_error_buffer {
 	uint64_t data[AMDGPU_VF_ERROR_ENTRY_SIZE];
 };
 
+enum idh_request;
+
 /**
  * struct amdgpu_virt_ops - amdgpu device virt operations
  */
@@ -56,7 +58,8 @@ struct amdgpu_virt_ops {
 	int (*rel_full_gpu)(struct amdgpu_device *adev, bool init);
 	int (*reset_gpu)(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
 	int (*wait_reset)(struct amdgpu_device *adev);
-	void (*trans_msg)(struct amdgpu_device *adev, u32 req, u32 data1, u32 data2, u32 data3);
+	void (*trans_msg)(struct amdgpu_device *adev, enum idh_request req,
+			  u32 data1, u32 data2, u32 data3);
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#328 lore raw

PATCH 328/521 s390/ctcm: Fix return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa5bf80c3c067b82b4362cd6e8e2194623bcaca6 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1064:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcm_tx,
^~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c:1072:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = ctcmpc_tx,
^~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of ctc{mp,}m_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c | 11 ++---------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/ctcm_main.c +2 -9
index f63c5c871d3d..d9fdcdd6760b 100644
@@ -867,16 +867,9 @@ static int ctcmpc_transmit_skb(struct channel *ch, struct sk_buff *skb)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- *  skb		Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- *  dev		Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * returns 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
 /* first merge version - leaving both functions separated */
-static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
 
@@ -919,7 +912,7 @@ static int ctcm_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 }
 
 /* unmerged MPC variant of ctcm_tx */
-static int ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t ctcmpc_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	int len = 0;
 	struct ctcm_priv *priv = dev->ml_priv;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#329 lore raw

PATCH 329/521 s390/netiucv: Fix return type of netiucv_tx()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 88d86d18d7cf7e9137c95f9d212bb9fff8a1b4be ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c:1854:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = netiucv_tx,
^~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of netiucv_tx() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

Additionally, while in the area, remove a comment block that is no longer relevant.

---
 drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/netiucv.c +1 -8
index 5ce2424ca729..e2984b54447b 100644
@@ -1344,15 +1344,8 @@ static int netiucv_pm_restore_thaw(struct device *dev)
 /**
  * Start transmission of a packet.
  * Called from generic network device layer.
- *
- * @param skb Pointer to buffer containing the packet.
- * @param dev Pointer to interface struct.
- *
- * @return 0 if packet consumed, !0 if packet rejected.
- *         Note: If we return !0, then the packet is free'd by
- *               the generic network layer.
  */
-static int netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t netiucv_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct netiucv_priv *privptr = netdev_priv(dev);
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#330 lore raw

PATCH 330/521 s390/lcs: Fix return type of lcs_start_xmit()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bb16db8393658e0978c3f0d30ae069e878264fa3 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2090:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c:2097:21: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'netdev_tx_t (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' (aka 'enum netdev_tx (*)(struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)') with an expression of type 'int (struct sk_buff *, struct net_device *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.ndo_start_xmit = lcs_start_xmit,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->ndo_start_xmit() in 'struct net_device_ops' expects a return type of 'netdev_tx_t', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of lcs_start_xmit() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and potential CFI failure, should s390 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG in the future.

---
 drivers/s390/net/lcs.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/lcs.c +3 -5
index d8f99ff53a94..09e019d76bdd 100644
@@ -1518,9 +1518,8 @@ lcs_txbuffer_cb(struct lcs_channel *channel, struct lcs_buffer *buffer)
 /**
  * Packet transmit function called by network stack
  */
-static int
-__lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
-		 struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_header *header;
 	int rc = NETDEV_TX_OK;
@@ -1581,8 +1580,7 @@ __lcs_start_xmit(struct lcs_card *card, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int
-lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+static netdev_tx_t lcs_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct lcs_card *card;
 	int rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#331 lore raw

PATCH 331/521 drm/sti: Use drm_mode_copy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 442cf8e22ba25a77cb9092d78733fdbac9844e50 ]

struct drm_display_mode embeds a list head, so overwriting the full struct with another one will corrupt the list (if the destination mode is on a list). Use drm_mode_copy() instead which explicitly preserves the list head of the destination mode.

Even if we know the destination mode is not on any list using drm_mode_copy() seems decent as it sets a good example. Bad examples of not using it might eventually get copied into code where preserving the list head actually matters.

Obviously one case not covered here is when the mode itself is embedded in a larger structure and the whole structure is copied. But if we are careful when copying into modes embedded in structures I think we can be a little more reassured that bogus list heads haven't been propagated in.

@is_mode_copy@
@@
drm_mode_copy(...)
{
...
}

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
expression E, S;
@@
(
- *mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(mode, E)
)

@depends on !is_mode_copy@
struct drm_display_mode mode;
expression E;
@@
(
- mode = E
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, &E)
|
- memcpy(&mode, E, S)
+ drm_mode_copy(&mode, E)
)

@@
struct drm_display_mode *mode;
@@
- &*mode
+ mode

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +1 -1
index b08376b7611b..a3f01721c552 100644
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static void sti_dvo_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&dvo->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&dvo->mode, mode);
 
 	/* According to the path used (main or aux), the dvo clocks should
 	 * have a different parent clock. */
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +1 -1
index 19b9b5ed1297..33c9efa06f68 100644
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ static void sti_hda_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
-	memcpy(&hda->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hda->mode, mode);
 
 	if (!hda_get_mode_idx(hda->mode, &mode_idx)) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Undefined mode\n");
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +1 -1
index ccf718404a1c..3acf044ba366 100644
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static void sti_hdmi_set_mode(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 	DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("\n");
 
 	/* Copy the drm display mode in the connector local structure */
-	memcpy(&hdmi->mode, mode, sizeof(struct drm_display_mode));
+	drm_mode_copy(&hdmi->mode, mode);
 
 	/* Update clock framerate according to the selected mode */
 	ret = clk_set_rate(hdmi->clk_pix, mode->clock * 1000);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#332 lore raw

PATCH 332/521 drivers/md/md-bitmap: check the return value of md_bitmap_get_counter()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Li Zhong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3bd548e5b819b8c0f2c9085de775c5c7bff9052f ]

Check the return value of md_bitmap_get_counter() in case it returns NULL pointer, which will result in a null pointer dereference.

v2: update the check to include other dereference

---
 drivers/md/md-bitmap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md-bitmap.c +15 -12
index 7cf9d34ce20e..157a1735d7b7 100644
@@ -2191,20 +2191,23 @@ int md_bitmap_resize(struct bitmap *bitmap, sector_t blocks,
 
 		if (set) {
 			bmc_new = md_bitmap_get_counter(&bitmap->counts, block, &new_blocks, 1);
-			if (*bmc_new == 0) {
-				/* need to set on-disk bits too. */
-				sector_t end = block + new_blocks;
-				sector_t start = block >> chunkshift;
-				start <<= chunkshift;
-				while (start < end) {
-					md_bitmap_file_set_bit(bitmap, block);
-					start += 1 << chunkshift;
+			if (bmc_new) {
+				if (*bmc_new == 0) {
+					/* need to set on-disk bits too. */
+					sector_t end = block + new_blocks;
+					sector_t start = block >> chunkshift;
+
+					start <<= chunkshift;
+					while (start < end) {
+						md_bitmap_file_set_bit(bitmap, block);
+						start += 1 << chunkshift;
+					}
+					*bmc_new = 2;
+					md_bitmap_count_page(&bitmap->counts, block, 1);
+					md_bitmap_set_pending(&bitmap->counts, block);
 				}
-				*bmc_new = 2;
-				md_bitmap_count_page(&bitmap->counts, block, 1);
-				md_bitmap_set_pending(&bitmap->counts, block);
+				*bmc_new |= NEEDED_MASK;
 			}
-			*bmc_new |= NEEDED_MASK;
 			if (new_blocks < old_blocks)
 				old_blocks = new_blocks;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#333 lore raw

PATCH 333/521 md/raid1: stop mdx_raid1 thread when raid1 array run failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jiang Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b611ad14006e5be2170d9e8e611bf49dff288911 ]

fail run raid1 array when we assemble array with the inactive disk only, but the mdx_raid1 thread were not stop, Even if the associated resources have been released. it will caused a NULL dereference when we do poweroff.

This causes the following Oops:

    [  287.587787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000070
    [  287.594762] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
    [  287.599912] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
    [  287.605061] PGD 0 P4D 0
    [  287.607612] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
    [  287.611287] CPU: 3 PID: 5265 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G     U            5.10.146 #0
    [  287.619029] Hardware name: xxxxxxx/To be filled by O.E.M, BIOS 5.19 06/16/2022
    [  287.626775] RIP: 0010:md_check_recovery+0x57/0x500 [md_mod]
    [  287.632357] Code: fe 01 00 00 48 83 bb 10 03 00 00 00 74 08 48 89 ......
    [  287.651118] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000433d78 EFLAGS: 00010202
    [  287.656347] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888105986800 RCX: 0000000000000000
    [  287.663491] RDX: ffffc90000433bb0 RSI: 00000000ffffefff RDI: ffff888105986800
    [  287.670634] RBP: ffffc90000433da0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffefff
    [  287.677771] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffc90000433ba8 R12: ffff888105986800
    [  287.684907] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffe00 R15: ffff888100b6b500
    [  287.692052] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888277f80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    [  287.700149] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    [  287.705897] CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 000000000320a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
    [  287.713033] Call Trace:
    [  287.715498]  raid1d+0x6c/0xbbb [raid1]
    [  287.719256]  ? __schedule+0x1ff/0x760
    [  287.722930]  ? schedule+0x3b/0xb0
    [  287.726260]  ? schedule_timeout+0x1ed/0x290
    [  287.730456]  ? __switch_to+0x11f/0x400
    [  287.734219]  md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.738328]  ? md_thread+0xe9/0x140 [md_mod]
    [  287.742601]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
    [  287.746097]  ? md_register_thread+0xe0/0xe0 [md_mod]
    [  287.751064]  kthread+0x11a/0x140
    [  287.754300]  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
    [  287.757974]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

In fact, when raid1 array run fail, we need to do
md_unregister_thread() before raid1_free().

---
 drivers/md/raid1.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -0
index 876d3e1339d1..0f8b1fb3d051 100644
@@ -3110,6 +3110,7 @@ static int raid1_run(struct mddev *mddev)
 	 * RAID1 needs at least one disk in active
 	 */
 	if (conf->raid_disks - mddev->degraded < 1) {
+		md_unregister_thread(&conf->thread);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto abort;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#334 lore raw

PATCH 334/521 mrp: introduce active flags to prevent UAF when applicant uninit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Schspa Shi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ab0377803dafc58f1e22296708c1c28e309414d6 ]

The caller of del_timer_sync must prevent restarting of the timer, If we have no this synchronization, there is a small probability that the cancellation will not be successful.

And syzbot report the fellowing crash:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605

Write at addr f9ff000024df6058 by task syz-fuzzer/2256 Pointer tag: [f9], memory tag: [fe]

CPU: 1 PID: 2256 Comm: syz-fuzzer Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-syzkaller-00008-
ge01d50cbd6ee #0
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe0/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 dump_backtrace arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:162 [inline]
 show_stack+0x18/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline]
 print_report+0x1a8/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
 kasan_report+0x94/0xb4 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 __do_kernel_fault+0x164/0x1e0 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:320
 do_bad_area arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:473 [inline]
 do_tag_check_fault+0x78/0x8c arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:749
 do_mem_abort+0x44/0x94 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c:825
 el1_abort+0x40/0x60 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:367
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0xd8/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:427
 el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:576
 hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:929 [inline]
 enqueue_timer+0x18/0xa4 kernel/time/timer.c:605
 mod_timer+0x14/0x20 kernel/time/timer.c:1161
 mrp_periodic_timer_arm net/802/mrp.c:614 [inline]
 mrp_periodic_timer+0xa0/0xc0 net/802/mrp.c:627
 call_timer_fn.constprop.0+0x24/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1474
 expire_timers+0x98/0xc4 kernel/time/timer.c:1519

To fix it, we can introduce a new active flags to make sure the timer will not restart.

Reported-by [email protected]
---
 include/net/mrp.h |  1 +
 net/802/mrp.c     | 18 +++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/net/mrp.h +1 -0
index ef58b4a07190..c6c53370e390 100644
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ struct mrp_applicant {
 	struct sk_buff		*pdu;
 	struct rb_root		mad;
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	bool			active;
 };
 
 struct mrp_port {
net/802/mrp.c +13 -5
index 32f87d458f05..ce6e4774d333 100644
@@ -609,7 +609,10 @@ static void mrp_join_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 
 	mrp_queue_xmit(app);
-	mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_lock(&app->lock);
+	if (likely(app->active))
+		mrp_join_timer_arm(app);
+	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
 }
 
 static void mrp_periodic_timer_arm(struct mrp_applicant *app)
@@ -623,11 +626,12 @@ static void mrp_periodic_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	struct mrp_applicant *app = from_timer(app, t, periodic_timer);
 
 	spin_lock(&app->lock);
-	mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
-	mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+	if (likely(app->active)) {
+		mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_PERIODIC);
+		mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+		mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&app->lock);
-
-	mrp_periodic_timer_arm(app);
 }
 
 static int mrp_pdu_parse_end_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, int *offset)
@@ -875,6 +879,7 @@ int mrp_init_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 	app->dev = dev;
 	app->app = appl;
 	app->mad = RB_ROOT;
+	app->active = true;
 	spin_lock_init(&app->lock);
 	skb_queue_head_init(&app->queue);
 	rcu_assign_pointer(dev->mrp_port->applicants[appl->type], app);
@@ -903,6 +908,9 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 
 	RCU_INIT_POINTER(port->applicants[appl->type], NULL);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
+	app->active = false;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 	/* Delete timer and generate a final TX event to flush out
 	 * all pending messages before the applicant is gone.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#335 lore raw

PATCH 335/521 ppp: associate skb with a device at tx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9f225444467b98579cf28d94f4ad053460dfdb84 ]

Syzkaller triggered flow dissector warning with the following:

r0 = openat$ppp(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000000), 0xc0802, 0x0)
ioctl$PPPIOCNEWUNIT(r0, 0xc004743e, &(0x7f00000000c0))
ioctl$PPPIOCSACTIVE(r0, 0x40107446, &(0x7f0000000240)={0x2, &(0x7f0000000180)=[{0x20, 0x0, 0x0, 0xfffff034}, {0x6}]}) pwritev(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)=[{&(0x7f0000000140)='\x00!', 0x2}], 0x1, 0x0, 0x0)

[    9.485814] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 329 at net/core/flow_dissector.c:1016 __skb_flow_dissect+0x1ee0/0x1fa0
[    9.485929]  skb_get_poff+0x53/0xa0
[    9.485937]  bpf_skb_get_pay_offset+0xe/0x20
[    9.485944]  ? ppp_send_frame+0xc2/0x5b0
[    9.485949]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[    9.485958]  ? __ppp_xmit_process+0x7a/0xe0
[    9.485968]  ? ppp_xmit_process+0x5b/0xb0
[    9.485974]  ? ppp_write+0x12a/0x190
[    9.485981]  ? do_iter_write+0x18e/0x2d0
[    9.485987]  ? __import_iovec+0x30/0x130
[    9.485997]  ? do_pwritev+0x1b6/0x240
[    9.486016]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x47/0x50
[    9.486023]  ? __x64_sys_pwritev+0x24/0x30
[    9.486026]  ? do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
[    9.486031]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Flow dissector tries to find skb net namespace either via device or via socket. Neigher is set in ppp_send_frame, so let's manually use ppp->dev.

---
 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +2 -0
index 3f335b57d5cd..220b28711f98 100644
@@ -1528,6 +1528,8 @@ ppp_send_frame(struct ppp *ppp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	int len;
 	unsigned char *cp;
 
+	skb->dev = ppp->dev;
+
 	if (proto < 0x8000) {
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER
 		/* check if we should pass this packet */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#336 lore raw

PATCH 336/521 media: dvb-frontends: fix leak of memory fw

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a15fe8d9f1bf460a804bcf18a890bfd2cf0d5caa ]

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/bcm3510.c +1 -0
index e92542b92d34..6457b0912d14 100644
@@ -649,6 +649,7 @@ static int bcm3510_download_firmware(struct dvb_frontend* fe)
 		deb_info("firmware chunk, addr: 0x%04x, len: 0x%04x, total length: 0x%04zx\n",addr,len,fw->size);
 		if ((ret = bcm3510_write_ram(st,addr,&b[i+4],len)) < 0) {
 			err("firmware download failed: %d\n",ret);
+			release_firmware(fw);
 			return ret;
 		}
 		i += 4 + len;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#337 lore raw

PATCH 337/521 media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0fc044b2b5e2d05a1fa1fb0d7f270367a7855d79 ]

dvb_unregister_device() is known that prone to use-after-free. That is, the cleanup from dvb_unregister_device() releases the dvb_device even if there are pointers stored in file->private_data still refer to it.

This patch adds a reference counter into struct dvb_device and delays its deallocation until no pointer refers to the object.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c |  2 +-
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c   |  2 +-
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c         | 32 +++++++++++++++++++------
 include/media/dvbdev.h                  | 31 +++++++++++++-----------
 4 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_ca_en50221.c +1 -1
index 4d371cea0d5d..36afcea709a7 100644
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static void dvb_ca_private_free(struct dvb_ca_private *ca)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	dvb_free_device(ca->dvbdev);
+	dvb_device_put(ca->dvbdev);
 	for (i = 0; i < ca->slot_count; i++)
 		vfree(ca->slot_info[i].rx_buffer.data);
 
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_frontend.c +1 -1
index 1768c1b515b3..e0650bc2df61 100644
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ static void __dvb_frontend_free(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 	struct dvb_frontend_private *fepriv = fe->frontend_priv;
 
 	if (fepriv)
-		dvb_free_device(fepriv->dvbdev);
+		dvb_device_put(fepriv->dvbdev);
 
 	dvb_frontend_invoke_release(fe, fe->ops.release);
 
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +25 -7
index d8f19a4d214a..bf527eda6f05 100644
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static int dvb_device_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 		new_fops = fops_get(dvbdev->fops);
 		if (!new_fops)
 			goto fail;
-		file->private_data = dvbdev;
+		file->private_data = dvb_device_get(dvbdev);
 		replace_fops(file, new_fops);
 		if (file->f_op->open)
 			err = file->f_op->open(inode, file);
@@ -171,6 +171,9 @@ int dvb_generic_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	}
 
 	dvbdev->users++;
+
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_generic_release);
@@ -487,6 +490,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
+	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	memcpy(dvbdev, template, sizeof(struct dvb_device));
 	dvbdev->type = type;
 	dvbdev->id = id;
@@ -518,7 +522,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 #endif
 
 	dvbdev->minor = minor;
-	dvb_minors[minor] = dvbdev;
+	dvb_minors[minor] = dvb_device_get(dvbdev);
 	up_write(&minor_rwsem);
 
 	ret = dvb_register_media_device(dvbdev, type, minor, demux_sink_pads);
@@ -559,6 +563,7 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 
 	down_write(&minor_rwsem);
 	dvb_minors[dvbdev->minor] = NULL;
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
 	up_write(&minor_rwsem);
 
 	dvb_media_device_free(dvbdev);
@@ -570,21 +575,34 @@ void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_remove_device);
 
 
-void dvb_free_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+static void dvb_free_device(struct kref *ref)
 {
-	if (!dvbdev)
-		return;
+	struct dvb_device *dvbdev = container_of(ref, struct dvb_device, ref);
 
 	kfree (dvbdev->fops);
 	kfree (dvbdev);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_free_device);
+
+
+struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+{
+	kref_get(&dvbdev->ref);
+	return dvbdev;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_device_get);
+
+
+void dvb_device_put(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
+{
+	if (dvbdev)
+		kref_put(&dvbdev->ref, dvb_free_device);
+}
 
 
 void dvb_unregister_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev)
 {
 	dvb_remove_device(dvbdev);
-	dvb_free_device(dvbdev);
+	dvb_device_put(dvbdev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_unregister_device);
 
include/media/dvbdev.h +17 -14
index 881ca461b7bb..6a0d22c4c3d8 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ struct dvb_adapter {
  */
 struct dvb_device {
 	struct list_head list_head;
+	struct kref ref;
 	const struct file_operations *fops;
 	struct dvb_adapter *adapter;
 	enum dvb_device_type type;
@@ -187,6 +188,20 @@ struct dvb_device {
 	void *priv;
 };
 
+/**
+ * dvb_device_get - Increase dvb_device reference
+ *
+ * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
+ */
+struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
+
+/**
+ * dvb_device_get - Decrease dvb_device reference
+ *
+ * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
+ */
+void dvb_device_put(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
+
 /**
  * dvb_register_adapter - Registers a new DVB adapter
  *
@@ -231,29 +246,17 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap,
 /**
  * dvb_remove_device - Remove a registered DVB device
  *
- * This does not free memory.  To do that, call dvb_free_device().
+ * This does not free memory. dvb_free_device() will do that when
+ * reference counter is empty
  *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
 void dvb_remove_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
-/**
- * dvb_free_device - Free memory occupied by a DVB device.
- *
- * Call dvb_unregister_device() before calling this function.
- *
- * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
- */
-void dvb_free_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
 /**
  * dvb_unregister_device - Unregisters a DVB device
  *
- * This is a combination of dvb_remove_device() and dvb_free_device().
- * Using this function is usually a mistake, and is often an indicator
- * for a use-after-free bug (when a userspace process keeps a file
- * handle to a detached device).
- *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
 void dvb_unregister_device(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#338 lore raw

PATCH 338/521 media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mazin Al Haddad <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 94d90fb06b94a90c176270d38861bcba34ce377d ]

Syzbot reports a memory leak in "dvb_usb_adapter_init()". The leak is due to not accounting for and freeing current iteration's adapter->priv in case of an error. Currently if an error occurs, it will exit before incrementing "num_adapters_initalized", which is used as a reference counter to free all adap->priv in "dvb_usb_adapter_exit()". There are multiple error paths that can exit from before incrementing the counter. Including the error handling paths for "dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init()", "dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init()" and "dvb_usb_adapter_frontend_init()" within "dvb_usb_adapter_init()".

This means that in case of an error in any of these functions the current iteration is not accounted for and the current iteration's adap->priv is not freed.

Fix this by freeing the current iteration's adap->priv in the "stream_init_err:" label in the error path. The rest of the (accounted for) adap->priv objects are freed in dvb_usb_adapter_exit() as expected using the num_adapters_initalized variable.

Syzbot report:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881172f1a00 (size 512):
  comm "kworker/0:2", pid 139, jiffies 4294994873 (age 10.960s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
backtrace:
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_adapter_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:75 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_init drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:184 [inline]
    [<ffffffff844af012>] dvb_usb_device_init.cold+0x4e5/0x79e drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c:308
    [<ffffffff830db21d>] dib0700_probe+0x8d/0x1b0 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dib0700_core.c:883
    [<ffffffff82d3fdc7>] usb_probe_interface+0x177/0x370 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
    [<ffffffff8274af6a>] driver_probe_device+0x2a/0x120 drivers/base/dd.c:782
    [<ffffffff8274b786>] __device_attach_driver+0xf6/0x140 drivers/base/dd.c:899
    [<ffffffff82747c87>] bus_for_each_drv+0xb7/0x100 drivers/base/bus.c:427
    [<ffffffff8274b352>] __device_attach+0x122/0x260 drivers/base/dd.c:970
    [<ffffffff827498f6>] bus_probe_device+0xc6/0xe0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
    [<ffffffff82745cdb>] device_add+0x5fb/0xdf0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
    [<ffffffff82d3d202>] usb_set_configuration+0x8f2/0xb80 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
    [<ffffffff82d4dbfc>] usb_generic_driver_probe+0x8c/0xc0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
    [<ffffffff82d3f49c>] usb_probe_device+0x5c/0x140 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:542 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ab37>] really_probe.part.0+0xe7/0x310 drivers/base/dd.c:621
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline]
    [<ffffffff8274ae6c>] __driver_probe_device+0x10c/0x1e0 drivers/base/dd.c:752
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dvb-usb-init.c +3 -1
index 4b1445d806e5..16be32b19ca1 100644
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_stream_init(adap);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			goto stream_init_err;
 
 		ret = dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_init(adap, adapter_nrs);
 		if (ret)
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ static int dvb_usb_adapter_init(struct dvb_usb_device *d, short *adapter_nrs)
 	dvb_usb_adapter_dvb_exit(adap);
 dvb_init_err:
 	dvb_usb_adapter_stream_exit(adap);
+stream_init_err:
+	kfree(adap->priv);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#339 lore raw

PATCH 339/521 blk-mq: fix possible memleak when register hctx failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4b7a21c57b14fbcd0e1729150189e5933f5088e9 ]

There's issue as follows when do fault injection test:
unreferenced object 0xffff888132a9f400 (size 512):
comm "insmod", pid 308021, jiffies 4324277909 (age 509.733s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff  ...........2....
    08 f4 a9 32 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...2............
  backtrace:
    [<00000000e8952bb4>] kmalloc_node_trace+0x22/0xa0
    [<00000000f9980e0f>] blk_mq_alloc_and_init_hctx+0x3f1/0x7e0
    [<000000002e719efa>] blk_mq_realloc_hw_ctxs+0x1e6/0x230
    [<000000004f1fda40>] blk_mq_init_allocated_queue+0x27e/0x910
    [<00000000287123ec>] __blk_mq_alloc_disk+0x67/0xf0
    [<00000000a2a34657>] 0xffffffffa2ad310f
    [<00000000b173f718>] 0xffffffffa2af824a
    [<0000000095a1dabb>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
    [<00000000f32fdf93>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
    [<00000000cbe8541e>] load_module+0x3006/0x3390
    [<0000000069ed1bdb>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
    [<00000000a1a29ae8>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
    [<000000009cd878b0>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

Fault injection context as follows:
kobject_add
blk_mq_register_hctx
blk_mq_sysfs_register
blk_register_queue
device_add_disk
null_add_dev.part.0 [null_blk]

As 'blk_mq_register_hctx' may already add some objects when failed halfway, but there isn't do fallback, caller don't know which objects add failed. To solve above issue just do fallback when add objects failed halfway in 'blk_mq_register_hctx'.

---
 block/blk-mq-sysfs.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
block/blk-mq-sysfs.c +9 -2
index 5e4b7ed1e897..ae03e63ffbfd 100644
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 {
 	struct request_queue *q = hctx->queue;
 	struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
-	int i, ret;
+	int i, j, ret;
 
 	if (!hctx->nr_ctx)
 		return 0;
@@ -253,9 +253,16 @@ static int blk_mq_register_hctx(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
 	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, i) {
 		ret = kobject_add(&ctx->kobj, &hctx->kobj, "cpu%u", ctx->cpu);
 		if (ret)
-			break;
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	return 0;
+out:
+	hctx_for_each_ctx(hctx, ctx, j) {
+		if (j < i)
+			kobject_del(&ctx->kobj);
+	}
+	kobject_del(&hctx->kobj);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#340 lore raw

PATCH 340/521 regulator: core: fix use_count leakage when handling boot-on

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rui Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0591b14ce0398125439c759f889647369aa616a0 ]

I found a use_count leakage towards supply regulator of rdev with boot-on option.

┌───────────────────┐           ┌───────────────────┐
│  regulator_dev A  │           │  regulator_dev B  │
│     (boot-on)     │           │     (boot-on)     │
│    use_count=0    │◀──supply──│    use_count=1    │
│                   │           │                   │
└───────────────────┘           └───────────────────┘

In case of rdev(A) configured with `regulator-boot-on', the use_count of supplying regulator(B) will increment inside regulator_enable(rdev->supply).

Thus, B will acts like always-on, and further balanced regulator_enable/disable cannot actually disable it anymore.

However, B was also configured with `regulator-boot-on', we wish it could be disabled afterwards.

---
 drivers/regulator/core.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/core.c +7 -1
index 9cf438a37eeb..11656b383674 100644
@@ -1197,7 +1197,13 @@ static int set_machine_constraints(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
 		if (rdev->supply_name && !rdev->supply)
 			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 
-		if (rdev->supply) {
+		/* If supplying regulator has already been enabled,
+		 * it's not intended to have use_count increment
+		 * when rdev is only boot-on.
+		 */
+		if (rdev->supply &&
+		    (rdev->constraints->always_on ||
+		     !regulator_is_enabled(rdev->supply))) {
 			ret = regulator_enable(rdev->supply);
 			if (ret < 0) {
 				_regulator_put(rdev->supply);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#341 lore raw

PATCH 341/521 mmc: f-sdh30: Add quirks for broken timeout clock capability

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kunihiko Hayashi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aae9d3a440736691b3c1cb09ae2c32c4f1ee2e67 ]

There is a case where the timeout clock is not supplied to the capability. Add a quirk for that.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci_f_sdh30.c +3 -0
index 485f7591fae4..ca9e05440da1 100644
@@ -199,6 +199,9 @@ static int sdhci_f_sdh30_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (reg & SDHCI_CAN_DO_8BIT)
 		priv->vendor_hs200 = F_SDH30_EMMC_HS200;
 
+	if (!(reg & SDHCI_TIMEOUT_CLK_MASK))
+		host->quirks |= SDHCI_QUIRK_DATA_TIMEOUT_USES_SDCLK;
+
 	ret = sdhci_add_host(host);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_add_host;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#342 lore raw

PATCH 342/521 media: si470x: Fix use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7d21e0b1b41b21d628bf2afce777727bd4479aa5 ]

syzbot reported use-after-free in si470x_int_in_callback() [1]. This indicates that urb->context, which contains struct si470x_device object, is freed when si470x_int_in_callback() is called.

The cause of this issue is that si470x_int_in_callback() is called for freed urb.

si470x_usb_driver_probe() calls si470x_start_usb(), which then calls usb_submit_urb() and si470x_start(). If si470x_start_usb() fails, si470x_usb_driver_probe() doesn't kill urb, but it just frees struct si470x_device object, as depicted below:

si470x_usb_driver_probe()
...
si470x_start_usb()

    ...
    usb_submit_urb()
    retval = si470x_start()
    return retval
  if (retval < 0)
    free struct si470x_device object, but don't kill urb

This patch fixes this issue by killing urb when si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is submitted. If si470x_start_usb() fails and urb is not submitted, i.e. submitting usb fails, it just frees struct si470x_device object.

---
 drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/radio/si470x/radio-si470x-usb.c +3 -1
index ba43a727c0b9..51b961cfba7c 100644
@@ -742,8 +742,10 @@ static int si470x_usb_driver_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 
 	/* start radio */
 	retval = si470x_start_usb(radio);
-	if (retval < 0)
+	if (retval < 0 && !radio->int_in_running)
 		goto err_buf;
+	else if (retval < 0)	/* in case of radio->int_in_running == 1 */
+		goto err_all;
 
 	/* set initial frequency */
 	si470x_set_freq(radio, 87.5 * FREQ_MUL); /* available in all regions */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#343 lore raw

PATCH 343/521 clk: st: Fix memory leak in st_of_quadfs_setup()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xiu Jianfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cfd3ffb36f0d566846163118651d868e607300ba ]

If st_clk_register_quadfs_pll() fails, @lock should be freed before goto @err_exit, otherwise will cause meory leak issue, fix it.

---
 drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/st/clkgen-fsyn.c +3 -2
index a79d81985c4e..bbe113159bc6 100644
@@ -948,9 +948,10 @@ static void __init st_of_quadfs_setup(struct device_node *np,
 
 	clk = st_clk_register_quadfs_pll(pll_name, clk_parent_name, data,
 			reg, lock);
-	if (IS_ERR(clk))
+	if (IS_ERR(clk)) {
+		kfree(lock);
 		goto err_exit;
-	else
+	} else
 		pr_debug("%s: parent %s rate %u\n",
 			__clk_get_name(clk),
 			__clk_get_name(clk_get_parent(clk)),
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#344 lore raw

PATCH 344/521 drm/fsl-dcu: Fix return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96d845a67b7e406cfed7880a724c8ca6121e022e ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c:74:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 error generated.

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/fsl-dcu/fsl_dcu_drm_rgb.c +3 -2
index 2298ed2a9e1c..3c8c4a820e95 100644
@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	return num_modes;
 }
 
-static int fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					    struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+fsl_dcu_drm_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+				 struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	if (mode->hdisplay & 0xf)
 		return MODE_ERROR;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#345 lore raw

PATCH 345/521 drm/sti: Fix return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0ad811cc08a937d875cbad0149c1bab17f84ba05 ]

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed. A proposed warning in clang aims to catch these at compile time, which reveals:

drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c:637:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hda_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c:376:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c:1035:16: error: incompatible function pointer types initializing 'enum drm_mode_status (*)(struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' with an expression of type 'int (struct drm_connector *, struct drm_display_mode *)' [-Werror,-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types-strict]
.mode_valid = sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

->mode_valid() in 'struct drm_connector_helper_funcs' expects a return type of 'enum drm_mode_status', not 'int'. Adjust the return type of sti_{dvo,hda,hdmi}_connector_mode_valid() to match the prototype's to resolve the warning and CFI failure.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c  | 5 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c | 5 +++--
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_dvo.c +3 -2
index a3f01721c552..794ac057a55c 100644
@@ -346,8 +346,9 @@ static int sti_dvo_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_dvo_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hda.c +3 -2
index 33c9efa06f68..cf5b6dbe86b0 100644
@@ -596,8 +596,9 @@ static int sti_hda_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hda_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			     struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
drivers/gpu/drm/sti/sti_hdmi.c +3 -2
index 3acf044ba366..c4bc09c9d0b5 100644
@@ -989,8 +989,9 @@ static int sti_hdmi_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 
 #define CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ 50
 
-static int sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
-					struct drm_display_mode *mode)
+static enum drm_mode_status
+sti_hdmi_connector_mode_valid(struct drm_connector *connector,
+			      struct drm_display_mode *mode)
 {
 	int target = mode->clock * 1000;
 	int target_min = target - CLK_TOLERANCE_HZ;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#346 lore raw

PATCH 346/521 orangefs: Fix kmemleak in orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Xiaoxu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d23417a5bf3a3afc55de5442eb46e1e60458b0a1 ]

When insert and remove the orangefs module, then debug_help_string will be leaked:

unreferenced object 0xffff8881652ba000 (size 4096):

    comm "insmod", pid 1701, jiffies 4294893639 (age 13218.530s)
    hex dump (first 32 bytes):
      43 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 44 65 62 75 67 20 4b 65 79  Client Debug Key
      77 6f 72 64 73 20 61 72 65 20 75 6e 6b 6e 6f 77  words are unknow
    backtrace:
      [<0000000004e6f8e3>] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0
      [<0000000006f75d85>] orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string+0x5e/0x480 [orangefs]
      [<0000000091270a2a>] _sub_I_65535_1+0x57/0xf70 [crc_itu_t]
      [<000000004b1ee1a3>] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0
      [<000000001d0614ae>] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320
      [<00000000efef068c>] load_module+0x2f98/0x3330
      [<000000006533b44d>] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0
      [<00000000a0da6f99>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
      [<000000007790b19b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

When remove the module, should always free debug_help_string. Should always free the allocated buffer when change the free_debug_help_string.

---
 fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/orangefs/orangefs-debugfs.c +3 -0
index e24738c691f6..f79c015fa7cb 100644
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ static int orangefs_kernel_debug_init(void)
 void orangefs_debugfs_cleanup(void)
 {
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(debug_dir);
+	kfree(debug_help_string);
+	debug_help_string = NULL;
 }
 
 /* open ORANGEFS_KMOD_DEBUG_HELP_FILE */
@@ -709,6 +711,7 @@ int orangefs_prepare_debugfs_help_string(int at_boot)
 		memset(debug_help_string, 0, DEBUG_HELP_STRING_SIZE);
 		strlcat(debug_help_string, new, string_size);
 		mutex_unlock(&orangefs_help_file_lock);
+		kfree(new);
 	}
 
 	rc = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#347 lore raw

PATCH 347/521 ASoC: mediatek: mt8173-rt5650-rt5514: fix refcount leak in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3327d721114c109ba0575f86f8fda3b525404054 ]

The node returned by of_parse_phandle() with refcount incremented, of_node_put() needs be called when finish using it. So add it in the error path in mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe().

Fixes 0d1d7a664288 ("ASoC: mediatek: Refine mt8173 driver and change config option")
---
 sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/mediatek/mt8173/mt8173-rt5650-rt5514.c +5 -2
index cdb394071037..9f8d2a00a1cd 100644
@@ -199,14 +199,16 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[0].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node =
 		of_parse_phandle(pdev->dev.of_node, "mediatek,audio-codec", 1);
 	if (!mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"Property 'audio-codec' missing or invalid\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codec_conf[0].of_node =
 		mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_codecs[1].of_node;
@@ -218,6 +220,7 @@ static int mt8173_rt5650_rt5514_dev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s snd_soc_register_card fail %d\n",
 			__func__, ret);
 
+out:
 	of_node_put(platform_node);
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#348 lore raw

PATCH 348/521 ASoC: rockchip: pdm: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ef0a098efb36660326c133af9b5a04a96a00e3ca ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume().

Fixes fc05a5b22253 ("ASoC: rockchip: add support for pdm controller")
---
 sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_pdm.c +1 -0
index ad16c8310dd3..7dfd1e6b2c25 100644
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ static int rockchip_pdm_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(pdm->hclk);
 	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(pdm->clk);
 		dev_err(pdm->dev, "hclock enable failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#349 lore raw

PATCH 349/521 ASoC: wm8994: Fix potential deadlock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9529dc167ffcdfd201b9f0eda71015f174095f7e ]

Fix this by dropping wm8994->accdet_lock while calling cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work) in wm1811_jackdet_irq().

Fixes c0cc3f166525 ("ASoC: wm8994: Allow a delay between jack insertion and microphone detect")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
sound/soc/codecs/wm8994.c +5 -0
index e3e069277a3f..13ef2bebf6da 100644
@@ -3715,7 +3715,12 @@ static irqreturn_t wm1811_jackdet_irq(int irq, void *data)
 	} else {
 		dev_dbg(component->dev, "Jack not detected\n");
 
+		/* Release wm8994->accdet_lock to avoid deadlock:
+		 * cancel_delayed_work_sync() takes wm8994->mic_work internal
+		 * lock and wm1811_mic_work takes wm8994->accdet_lock */
+		mutex_unlock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&wm8994->mic_work);
+		mutex_lock(&wm8994->accdet_lock);
 
 		snd_soc_component_update_bits(component, WM8958_MICBIAS2,
 				    WM8958_MICB2_DISCH, WM8958_MICB2_DISCH);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#350 lore raw

PATCH 350/521 ASoC: rockchip: spdif: Add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rk_spdif_runtime_resume()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Jingjin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d94d0090527b1763872275a7ccd44df7219b31e ]

rk_spdif_runtime_resume() may have called clk_prepare_enable() before return from failed branches, add missing clk_disable_unprepare() in this case.

Fixes f874b80e1571 ("ASoC: rockchip: Add rockchip SPDIF transceiver driver")
---
 sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/rockchip/rockchip_spdif.c +1 -0
index a89fe9b6463b..5ac726da6015 100644
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static int __maybe_unused rk_spdif_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	ret = clk_prepare_enable(spdif->hclk);
 	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(spdif->mclk);
 		dev_err(spdif->dev, "hclk clock enable failed %d\n", ret);
 		return ret;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#351 lore raw

PATCH 351/521 ASoC: rt5670: Remove unbalanced pm_runtime_put()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c900dcc3f7331a67ed29739d74524e428d137fb ]

For some reason rt5670_i2c_probe() does a pm_runtime_put() at the end of a successful probe. But it has never done a pm_runtime_get() leading to the following error being logged into dmesg:

rt5670 i2c-10EC5640:00: Runtime PM usage count underflow!

Fix this by removing the unnecessary pm_runtime_put().

Fixes 64e89e5f5548 ("ASoC: rt5670: Add runtime PM support")
---
 sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/codecs/rt5670.c +0 -2
index 6a2a58e107e3..9dd99d123e44 100644
@@ -3217,8 +3217,6 @@ static int rt5670_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err;
 
-	pm_runtime_put(&i2c->dev);
-
 	return 0;
 err:
 	pm_runtime_disable(&i2c->dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#352 lore raw

PATCH 352/521 pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76d62f24db07f22ccf9bc18ca793c27d4ebef721 ]

Wei Wang reported seeing priority inversion caused latencies caused by contention on pmsg_lock, and suggested it be switched to a rt_mutex.

I was initially hesitant this would help, as the tasks in that trace all seemed to be SCHED_NORMAL, so the benefit would be limited to only nice boosting.

However, another similar issue was raised where the priority inversion was seen did involve a blocked RT task so it is clear this would be helpful in that case.

Cc Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Midas Chien<[email protected]>
Cc Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>
Cc Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Fixes 9d5438f462ab ("pstore: Add pmsg - user-space accessible pstore object")
---
 fs/pstore/pmsg.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/pstore/pmsg.c +4 -3
index 24db02de1787..ffc13ea196d2 100644
@@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/rtmutex.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(pmsg_lock);
+static DEFINE_RT_MUTEX(pmsg_lock);
 
 static ssize_t write_pmsg(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -36,9 +37,9 @@ static ssize_t write_pmsg(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	mutex_lock(&pmsg_lock);
+	rt_mutex_lock(&pmsg_lock);
 	ret = psinfo->write_user(&record, buf);
-	mutex_unlock(&pmsg_lock);
+	rt_mutex_unlock(&pmsg_lock);
 	return ret ? ret : count;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#353 lore raw

PATCH 353/521 perf debug: Set debug_peo_args and redirect_to_stderr variable to correct values in perf_quiet_option()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 188ac720d364035008a54d249cf47b4cc100f819 ]

When perf uses quiet mode, perf_quiet_option() sets the 'debug_peo_args' variable to -1, and display_attr() incorrectly determines the value of 'debug_peo_args'. As a result, unexpected information is displayed.

Before:

  # perf record --quiet -- ls > /dev/null
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  perf_event_attr:
    size                             128
    { sample_period, sample_freq }   4000
    sample_type                      IP|TID|TIME|PERIOD
    read_format                      ID|LOST
    disabled                         1
    inherit                          1
    mmap                             1
    comm                             1
    freq                             1
    enable_on_exec                   1
    task                             1
    precise_ip                       3
    sample_id_all                    1
    exclude_guest                    1
    mmap2                            1
    comm_exec                        1
    ksymbol                          1
    bpf_event                        1
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  ...

After:

  # perf record --quiet -- ls > /dev/null
  #

redirect_to_stderr is a similar problem.

Fixes f78eaef0e0493f60 ("perf tools: Allow to force redirect pr_debug to stderr.")
Fixes ccd26741f5e6bdf2 ("perf tool: Provide an option to print perf_event_open args and return value")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Carsten Haitzler <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Leo Yan <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/debug.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/debug.c +4 -0
index 3d6459626c2a..9f9875ba2edf 100644
@@ -232,6 +232,10 @@ int perf_quiet_option(void)
 		var++;
 	}
 
+	/* For debug variables that are used as bool types, set to 0. */
+	redirect_to_stderr = 0;
+	debug_peo_args = 0;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#354 lore raw

PATCH 354/521 pstore: Make sure CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG selects CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f4fec5943407318b9523f01ce1f5d668c028332 ]

In commit 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion") I changed a lock to an rt_mutex.

However, its possible that CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES is not enabled, which then results in a build failure, as the 0day bot detected:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/

Thus this patch changes CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG to select CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES, which ensures the build will not fail.

Cc Wei Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Midas Chien<[email protected]>
Cc Connor O'Brien <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Anton Vorontsov <[email protected]>
Cc Colin Cross <[email protected]>
Cc Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc kernel test robot <[email protected]>
Fixes 76d62f24db07 ("pstore: Switch pmsg_lock to an rt_mutex to avoid priority inversion")
---
 fs/pstore/Kconfig | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/pstore/Kconfig +1 -0
index 503086f7f7c1..d5fb6d95d4d4 100644
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ config PSTORE_CONSOLE
 config PSTORE_PMSG
 	bool "Log user space messages"
 	depends on PSTORE
+	select RT_MUTEXES
 	help
 	  When the option is enabled, pstore will export a character
 	  interface /dev/pmsg0 to log user space messages. On reboot
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#355 lore raw

PATCH 355/521 usb: dwc3: core: defer probe on ulpi_read_id timeout

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ferry Toth <[email protected]>

commit 63130462c919ece0ad0d9bb5a1f795ef8d79687e upstream.

Since commit 0f0101719138 ("usb: dwc3: Don't switch OTG -> peripheral if extcon is present"), Dual Role support on Intel Merrifield platform broke due to rearranging the call to dwc3_get_extcon().

It appears to be caused by ulpi_read_id() masking the timeout on the first test write. In the past dwc3 probe continued by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() followed by dwc3_get_extcon() which happend to return -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() finally succeeded. Due to above mentioned rearranging -EPROBE_DEFER is not returned and probe completes without phy.

On Intel Merrifield the timeout on the first test write issue is reproducible but it is difficult to find the root cause. Using a mainline kernel and rootfs with buildroot ulpi_read_id() succeeds. As soon as adding ftrace / bootconfig to find out why, ulpi_read_id() fails and we can't analyze the flow. Using another rootfs ulpi_read_id() fails even without adding ftrace. We suspect the issue is some kind of timing / race, but merely retrying ulpi_read_id() does not resolve the issue.

As we now changed ulpi_read_id() to return -ETIMEDOUT in this case, we need to handle the error by calling dwc3_core_soft_reset() and request -EPROBE_DEFER. On deferred probe ulpi_read_id() is retried and succeeds.

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +6 -1
@@ -914,8 +914,13 @@ static int dwc3_core_init(struct dwc3 *d
 
 	if (!dwc->ulpi_ready) {
 		ret = dwc3_core_ulpi_init(dwc);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret == -ETIMEDOUT) {
+				dwc3_core_soft_reset(dwc);
+				ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+			}
 			goto err0;
+		}
 		dwc->ulpi_ready = true;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#356 lore raw

PATCH 356/521 HID: wacom: Ensure bootloader PID is usable in hidraw mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason Gerecke <[email protected]>

commit 1db1f392591aff13fd643f0ec7c1d5e27391d700 upstream.

Some Wacom devices have a special "bootloader" mode that is used for firmware flashing. When operating in this mode, the device cannot be used for input, and the HID descriptor is not able to be processed by the driver. The driver generates an "Unknown device_type" warning and then returns an error code from wacom_probe(). This is a problem because userspace still needs to be able to interact with the device via hidraw to perform the firmware flash.

This commit adds a non-generic device definition for 056a:0094 which is used when devices are in "bootloader" mode. It marks the devices with a special BOOTLOADER type that is recognized by wacom_probe() and wacom_raw_event(). When we see this type we ensure a hidraw device is created and otherwise keep our hands off so that userspace is in full control.

---
 drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c |    8 ++++++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c |    4 ++++
 drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/wacom_sys.c +8 -0
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static int wacom_raw_event(struct hid_de
 {
 	struct wacom *wacom = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
 
+	if (wacom->wacom_wac.features.type == BOOTLOADER)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (size > WACOM_PKGLEN_MAX)
 		return 1;
 
@@ -2759,6 +2762,11 @@ static int wacom_probe(struct hid_device
 		goto fail;
 	}
 
+	if (features->type == BOOTLOADER) {
+		hid_warn(hdev, "Using device in hidraw-only mode");
+		return hid_hw_start(hdev, HID_CONNECT_HIDRAW);
+	}
+
 	error = wacom_parse_and_register(wacom, false);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail;
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c +4 -0
@@ -4680,6 +4680,9 @@ static const struct wacom_features wacom
 static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_HID_ANY_ID =
 	{ "Wacom HID", .type = HID_GENERIC, .oVid = HID_ANY_ID, .oPid = HID_ANY_ID };
 
+static const struct wacom_features wacom_features_0x94 =
+	{ "Wacom Bootloader", .type = BOOTLOADER };
+
 #define USB_DEVICE_WACOM(prod)						\
 	HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_WACOM, USB_VENDOR_ID_WACOM, prod),\
 	.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&wacom_features_##prod
@@ -4753,6 +4756,7 @@ const struct hid_device_id wacom_ids[] =
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x84) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x90) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x93) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x94) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x97) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9A) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_WACOM(0x9F) },
drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h +1 -0
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ enum {
 	MTTPC,
 	MTTPC_B,
 	HID_GENERIC,
+	BOOTLOADER,
 	MAX_TYPE
 };
 
author maintainer
#357 lore raw

PATCH 357/521 reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]>

commit 572302af1258459e124437b8f3369357447afac7 upstream.

Commit 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation") defined reiserfs_security_free() to free the name and value of a security xattr allocated by the active LSM through security_old_inode_init_security(). However, this function is not called in the reiserfs code.

Thus, add a call to reiserfs_security_free() whenever reiserfs_security_init() is called, and initialize value to NULL, to avoid to call kfree() on an uninitialized pointer.

Finally, remove the kfree() for the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore.

Fixes 57fe60df6241 ("reiserfs: add atomic addition of selinux attributes during inode creation")
Cc Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
Cc Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
---
 fs/reiserfs/namei.c          |    4 ++++
 fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/namei.c +4 -0
@@ -695,6 +695,7 @@ static int reiserfs_create(struct inode
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -778,6 +779,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mknod(struct inode *
 
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -876,6 +878,7 @@ static int reiserfs_mkdir(struct inode *
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -1191,6 +1194,7 @@ static int reiserfs_symlink(struct inode
 	retval = journal_end(&th);
 out_failed:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(parent_dir->i_sb);
+	reiserfs_security_free(&security);
 	return retval;
 }
 
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ int reiserfs_security_init(struct inode
 	int error;
 
 	sec->name = NULL;
+	sec->value = NULL;
 
 	/* Don't add selinux attributes on xattrs - they'll never get used */
 	if (IS_PRIVATE(dir))
@@ -94,7 +95,6 @@ int reiserfs_security_write(struct reise
 
 void reiserfs_security_free(struct reiserfs_security_handle *sec)
 {
-	kfree(sec->name);
 	kfree(sec->value);
 	sec->name = NULL;
 	sec->value = NULL;
author maintainer
#358 lore raw

PATCH 358/521 iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: do not use internal iio_dev lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nuno Sá <[email protected]>

commit 20228a1d5a55e7db0c6720840f2c7d2b48c55f69 upstream.

Drop 'mlock' usage by making use of iio_device_claim_direct_mode(). This change actually makes sure we cannot do a single conversion while buffering is enable. Note there was a potential race in the previous code since we were only acquiring the lock after checking if the bus is enabled.

Fixes af3008485ea0 ("iio:adc: Add common code for ADI Sigma Delta devices")
Cc <[email protected]> #No rush as race is very old.
---
 drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/iio/adc/ad_sigma_delta.c +4 -4
@@ -283,10 +283,10 @@ int ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(str
 	unsigned int sample, raw_sample;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (iio_buffer_enabled(indio_dev))
-		return -EBUSY;
+	ret = iio_device_claim_direct_mode(indio_dev);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
-	mutex_lock(&indio_dev->mlock);
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_channel(sigma_delta, chan->address);
 
 	spi_bus_lock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ out:
 	ad_sigma_delta_set_mode(sigma_delta, AD_SD_MODE_IDLE);
 	sigma_delta->bus_locked = false;
 	spi_bus_unlock(sigma_delta->spi->master);
-	mutex_unlock(&indio_dev->mlock);
+	iio_device_release_direct_mode(indio_dev);
 
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
author maintainer
#359 lore raw

PATCH 359/521 gcov: add support for checksum field

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rickard x Andersson <[email protected]>

commit e96b95c2b7a63a454b6498e2df67aac14d046d13 upstream.

In GCC version 12.1 a checksum field was added.

This patch fixes a kernel crash occurring during boot when using gcov-kernel with GCC version 12.2. The crash occurred on a system running on i.MX6SX.

---
 kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/gcov/gcc_4_7.c +5 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct gcov_fn_info {
  * @version: gcov version magic indicating the gcc version used for compilation
  * @next: list head for a singly-linked list
  * @stamp: uniquifying time stamp
+ * @checksum: unique object checksum
  * @filename: name of the associated gcov data file
  * @merge: merge functions (null for unused counter type)
  * @n_functions: number of instrumented functions
@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ struct gcov_info {
 	unsigned int version;
 	struct gcov_info *next;
 	unsigned int stamp;
+ /* Since GCC 12.1 a checksum field is added. */
+#if (__GNUC__ >= 12)
+	unsigned int checksum;
+#endif
 	const char *filename;
 	void (*merge[GCOV_COUNTERS])(gcov_type *, unsigned int);
 	unsigned int n_functions;
author maintainer
#360 lore raw

PATCH 360/521 media: dvbdev: fix build warning due to comments

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

commit 3edfd14bb50fa6f94ed1a37bbb17d9f1c2793b57 upstream.

Previous commit that introduces reference counter does not add proper comments, which will lead to warning when building htmldocs. Fix them.

Fixes 0fc044b2b5e2 ("media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF")
---
 include/media/dvbdev.h |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/media/dvbdev.h +2 -1
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ struct dvb_adapter {
  * struct dvb_device - represents a DVB device node
  *
  * @list_head:	List head with all DVB devices
+ * @ref:	reference counter
  * @fops:	pointer to struct file_operations
  * @adapter:	pointer to the adapter that holds this device node
  * @type:	type of the device, as defined by &enum dvb_device_type.
@@ -196,7 +197,7 @@ struct dvb_device {
 struct dvb_device *dvb_device_get(struct dvb_device *dvbdev);
 
 /**
- * dvb_device_get - Decrease dvb_device reference
+ * dvb_device_put - Decrease dvb_device reference
  *
  * @dvbdev:	pointer to struct dvb_device
  */
author maintainer
#361 lore raw

PATCH 361/521 media: dvbdev: fix refcnt bug

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>

commit 3a664569b71b0a52be5ffb9fb87cc4f83d29bd71 upstream.

Previous commit initialize the dvbdev->ref before the template copy, which will overwrite the reference and cause refcnt bug.

refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6-next-20221128-syzkaller #0
...
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x17c/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:25
RSP: 0000:ffffc900000678d0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff88813ff58000 RSI: ffffffff81660e7c RDI: fffff5200000cf0c
RBP: ffff888022a45010 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff88823ffff000 CR3: 000000000c48e000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:199 [inline]
 __refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:250 [inline]
 refcount_inc include/linux/refcount.h:267 [inline]
 kref_get include/linux/kref.h:45 [inline]
 dvb_device_get drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:585 [inline]
 dvb_register_device+0xe83/0x16e0 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c:517

...

Just place the kref_init at correct position.

Reported-by [email protected]
Fixes 0fc044b2b5e2 ("media: dvbdev: adopts refcnt to avoid UAF")
---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -1
@@ -490,8 +490,8 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapt
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
-	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	memcpy(dvbdev, template, sizeof(struct dvb_device));
+	kref_init(&dvbdev->ref);
 	dvbdev->type = type;
 	dvbdev->id = id;
 	dvbdev->adapter = adap;
author maintainer
#362 lore raw

PATCH 362/521 ata: ahci: Fix PCS quirk application for suspend

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Adam Vodopjan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 37e14e4f3715428b809e4df9a9958baa64c77d51 ]

Since kernel 5.3.4 my laptop (ICH8M controller) does not see Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD disk connected into a SATA connector on wake from suspend. The problem was introduced in c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond"): the quirk is not applied on wake from suspend as it originally was.

It is worth to mention the commit contained another bug: the quirk is not applied at all to controllers which require it. The fix commit 09d6ac8dc51a ("libata/ahci: Fix PCS quirk application") landed in 5.3.8. So testing my patch anywhere between commits c312ef176399 and 09d6ac8dc51a is pointless.

Not all disks trigger the problem. For example nothing bad happens with Western Digital WD5000LPCX HDD.

Test hardware:
- Acer 5920G with ICH8M SATA controller
- sda: some SATA HDD connnected into the DVD drive IDE port with a SATA-IDE caddy. It is a boot disk
- sdb: Kingston SV300S37A60G SSD connected into the only SATA port

Sample "dmesg --notime | grep -E '^(sd |ata)'" output on wake:

sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Starting disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Starting disk
ata4: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:0c:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out ata1.00: ACPI cmd ef/03:42:00:00:00:a0 (SET FEATURES) filtered out
ata1: FORCE: cable set to 80c
ata5: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3: SATA link down (SStatus 4 SControl 300)
ata3.00: disabled
sd 2:0:0:0: rejecting I/O to offline device
ata3.00: detaching (SCSI 2:0:0:0)
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_NO_CONNECT
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronizing SCSI cache
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Synchronize Cache(10) failed: Result:
hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET driverbyte=DRIVER_OK
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Stopping disk
sd 2:0:0:0: [sdb] Start/Stop Unit failed: Result: hostbyte=DID_BAD_TARGET
driverbyte=DRIVER_OK

Commit c312ef176399 dropped ahci_pci_reset_controller() which internally calls ahci_reset_controller() and applies the PCS quirk if needed after that. It was called each time a reset was required instead of just ahci_reset_controller(). This patch puts the function back in place.

Fixes c312ef176399 ("libata/ahci: Drop PCS quirk for Denverton and beyond")
---
 drivers/ata/ahci.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/ahci.c +23 -9
index 505920d4530f..13fb983b3413 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ enum board_ids {
 static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent);
 static void ahci_remove_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
 static void ahci_shutdown_one(struct pci_dev *dev);
+static void ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv);
 static int ahci_vt8251_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
 				 unsigned long deadline);
 static int ahci_avn_hardreset(struct ata_link *link, unsigned int *class,
@@ -655,6 +656,25 @@ static void ahci_pci_save_initial_config(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 	ahci_save_initial_config(&pdev->dev, hpriv);
 }
 
+static int ahci_pci_reset_controller(struct ata_host *host)
+{
+	struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(host->dev);
+	struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
+	 * them here.
+	 */
+	ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void ahci_pci_init_controller(struct ata_host *host)
 {
 	struct ahci_host_priv *hpriv = host->private_data;
@@ -857,7 +877,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_runtime_resume(struct device *dev)
 	struct ata_host *host = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	ahci_pci_init_controller(host);
@@ -892,7 +912,7 @@ static int ahci_pci_device_resume(struct device *dev)
 		ahci_mcp89_apple_enable(pdev);
 
 	if (pdev->dev.power.power_state.event == PM_EVENT_SUSPEND) {
-		rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+		rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
@@ -1769,12 +1789,6 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	/* save initial config */
 	ahci_pci_save_initial_config(pdev, hpriv);
 
-	/*
-	 * If platform firmware failed to enable ports, try to enable
-	 * them here.
-	 */
-	ahci_intel_pcs_quirk(pdev, hpriv);
-
 	/* prepare host */
 	if (hpriv->cap & HOST_CAP_NCQ) {
 		pi.flags |= ATA_FLAG_NCQ;
@@ -1884,7 +1898,7 @@ static int ahci_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = ahci_reset_controller(host);
+	rc = ahci_pci_reset_controller(host);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#363 lore raw

PATCH 363/521 powerpc/rtas: avoid device tree lookups in rtas_os_term()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed2213bfb192ab51f09f12e9b49b5d482c6493f3 ]

rtas_os_term() is called during panic. Its behavior depends on a couple of conditions in the /rtas node of the device tree, the traversal of which entails locking and local IRQ state changes. If the kernel panics while devtree_lock is held, rtas_os_term() as currently written could hang.

Instead of discovering the relevant characteristics at panic time, cache them in file-static variables at boot. Note the lookup for "ibm,extended-os-term" is converted to of_property_read_bool() since it is a boolean property, not an RTAS function token.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +10 -3
index b492cb1c36fd..4c9ed28465b3 100644
@@ -717,6 +717,7 @@ void __noreturn rtas_halt(void)
 
 /* Must be in the RMO region, so we place it here */
 static char rtas_os_term_buf[2048];
+static s32 ibm_os_term_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE;
 
 void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 {
@@ -728,14 +729,13 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 	 * this property may terminate the partition which we want to avoid
 	 * since it interferes with panic_timeout.
 	 */
-	if (RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,os-term") ||
-	    RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE == rtas_token("ibm,extended-os-term"))
+	if (ibm_os_term_token == RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE)
 		return;
 
 	snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
 
 	do {
-		status = rtas_call(rtas_token("ibm,os-term"), 1, 1, NULL,
+		status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
 				   __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
 	} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
 
@@ -1332,6 +1332,13 @@ void __init rtas_initialize(void)
 	no_entry = of_property_read_u32(rtas.dev, "linux,rtas-entry", &entry);
 	rtas.entry = no_entry ? rtas.base : entry;
 
+	/*
+	 * Discover these now to avoid device tree lookups in the
+	 * panic path.
+	 */
+	if (of_property_read_bool(rtas.dev, "ibm,extended-os-term"))
+		ibm_os_term_token = rtas_token("ibm,os-term");
+
 	/* If RTAS was found, allocate the RMO buffer for it and look for
 	 * the stop-self token if any
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#364 lore raw

PATCH 364/521 powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nathan Lynch <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c606e57eecc37d6b36d732b1ff7e55b7dc32dd4 ]

It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():

Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G      D            6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9
Call Trace:
[c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)
[c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0
[c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0
[c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4
[c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68
[c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50
[c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0
[c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420
[c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200

Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c +6 -1
index 4c9ed28465b3..a3f08a380c99 100644
@@ -734,10 +734,15 @@ void rtas_os_term(char *str)
 
 	snprintf(rtas_os_term_buf, 2048, "OS panic: %s", str);
 
+	/*
+	 * Keep calling as long as RTAS returns a "try again" status,
+	 * but don't use rtas_busy_delay(), which potentially
+	 * schedules.
+	 */
 	do {
 		status = rtas_call(ibm_os_term_token, 1, 1, NULL,
 				   __pa(rtas_os_term_buf));
-	} while (rtas_busy_delay(status));
+	} while (rtas_busy_delay_time(status));
 
 	if (status != 0)
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "ibm,os-term call failed %d\n", status);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#365 lore raw

PATCH 365/521 HID: plantronics: Additional PIDs for double volume key presses quirk

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Terry Junge <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d57f36c89d8ba32b2c312f397a37fd1a2dc7cfc ]

I no longer work for Plantronics (aka Poly, aka HP) and do not have access to the headsets in order to test. However, as noted by Maxim, the other 32xx models that share the same base code set as the 3220 would need the same quirk. This patch adds the PIDs for the rest of the Blackwire 32XX product family that require the quirk.

Plantronics Blackwire 3210 Series (047f:c055)
Plantronics Blackwire 3215 Series (047f:c057)
Plantronics Blackwire 3225 Series (047f:c058)

Quote from previous patch by Maxim Mikityanskiy Plantronics Blackwire 3220 Series (047f:c056) sends HID reports twice for each volume key press. This patch adds a quirk to hid-plantronics for this product ID, which will ignore the second volume key press if it happens within 5 ms from the last one that was handled.

The patch was tested on the mentioned model only, it shouldn't affect other models, however, this quirk might be needed for them too. Auto-repeat (when a key is held pressed) is not affected, because the rate is about 3 times per second, which is far less frequent than once in 5 ms.
End quote

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h         | 3 +++
 drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +3 -0
index 00943ddbe417..2c9597c8ac92 100644
@@ -908,7 +908,10 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_ORTEK_IHOME_IMAC_A210S	0x8003
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS	0x047f
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES	0xc055
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES	0xc056
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES	0xc057
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES	0xc058
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_PANASONIC		0x04da
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_PANABOARD_UBT780	0x1044
drivers/hid/hid-plantronics.c +9 -0
index 460711c1124a..3b75cadd543f 100644
@@ -201,9 +201,18 @@ static int plantronics_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
 }
 
 static const struct hid_device_id plantronics_devices[] = {
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3210_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
 					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3220_SERIES),
 		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3215_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
+	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS,
+					 USB_DEVICE_ID_PLANTRONICS_BLACKWIRE_3225_SERIES),
+		.driver_data = PLT_QUIRK_DOUBLE_VOLUME_KEYS },
 	{ HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_PLANTRONICS, HID_ANY_ID) },
 	{ }
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#366 lore raw

PATCH 366/521 hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Aditya Garg <[email protected]>

commit 9f2b5debc07073e6dfdd774e3594d0224b991927 upstream.

Despite specifying UID and GID in mount command, the specified UID and GID were not being assigned. This patch fixes this issue.

---
 fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h |    2 ++
 fs/hfsplus/inode.c      |    4 ++--
 fs/hfsplus/options.c    |    4 ++++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/hfsplus/hfsplus_fs.h +2 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ struct hfsplus_sb_info {
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_HFSX		3
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_CASEFOLD	4
 #define HFSPLUS_SB_NOBARRIER	5
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_UID		6
+#define HFSPLUS_SB_GID		7
 
 static inline struct hfsplus_sb_info *HFSPLUS_SB(struct super_block *sb)
 {
fs/hfsplus/inode.c +2 -2
@@ -187,11 +187,11 @@ static void hfsplus_get_perms(struct ino
 	mode = be16_to_cpu(perms->mode);
 
 	i_uid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->owner));
-	if (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_uid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_uid = sbi->uid;
 
 	i_gid_write(inode, be32_to_cpu(perms->group));
-	if (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode)
+	if ((test_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags)) || (!i_gid_read(inode) && !mode))
 		inode->i_gid = sbi->gid;
 
 	if (dir) {
fs/hfsplus/options.c +4 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!uid_valid(sbi->uid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid uid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_UID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_gid:
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ int hfsplus_parse_options(char *input, s
 			if (!gid_valid(sbi->gid)) {
 				pr_err("invalid gid specified\n");
 				return 0;
+			} else {
+				set_bit(HFSPLUS_SB_GID, &sbi->flags);
 			}
 			break;
 		case opt_part:
author maintainer
#367 lore raw

PATCH 367/521 ovl: Use ovl mounters fsuid and fsgid in ovl_link()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Tianci <[email protected]>

commit 5b0db51215e895a361bc63132caa7cca36a53d6a upstream.

There is a wrong case of link() on overlay:

  $ mkdir /lower /fuse /merge
  $ mount -t fuse /fuse
  $ mkdir /fuse/upper /fuse/work
  $ mount -t overlay /merge -o lowerdir=/lower,upperdir=/fuse/upper,\
    workdir=work
  $ touch /merge/file
  $ chown bin.bin /merge/file // the file's caller becomes "bin"
  $ ln /merge/file /merge/lnkfile

Then we will get an error(EACCES) because fuse daemon checks the link()'s caller is "bin", it denied this request.

In the changing history of ovl_link(), there are two key commits:

The first is commit bb0d2b8ad296 ("ovl: fix sgid on directory") which overrides the cred's fsuid/fsgid using the new inode. The new inode's owner is initialized by inode_init_owner(), and inode->fsuid is assigned to the current user. So the override fsuid becomes the current user. We know link() is actually modifying the directory, so the caller must have the MAY_WRITE permission on the directory. The current caller may should have this permission. This is acceptable to use the caller's fsuid.

The second is commit 51f7e52dc943 ("ovl: share inode for hard link") which removed the inode creation in ovl_link(). This commit move inode_init_owner() into ovl_create_object(), so the ovl_link() just give the old inode to ovl_create_or_link(). Then the override fsuid becomes the old inode's fsuid, neither the caller nor the overlay's mounter! So this is incorrect.

Fix this bug by using ovl mounter's fsuid/fsgid to do underlying fs's link().

---
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +30 -16
@@ -561,28 +561,42 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct den
 			goto out_revert_creds;
 	}
 
-	err = -ENOMEM;
-	override_cred = prepare_creds();
-	if (override_cred) {
+	if (!attr->hardlink) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		override_cred = prepare_creds();
+		if (!override_cred)
+			goto out_revert_creds;
+		/*
+		 * In the creation cases(create, mkdir, mknod, symlink),
+		 * ovl should transfer current's fs{u,g}id to underlying
+		 * fs. Because underlying fs want to initialize its new
+		 * inode owner using current's fs{u,g}id. And in this
+		 * case, the @inode is a new inode that is initialized
+		 * in inode_init_owner() to current's fs{u,g}id. So use
+		 * the inode's i_{u,g}id to override the cred's fs{u,g}id.
+		 *
+		 * But in the other hardlink case, ovl_link() does not
+		 * create a new inode, so just use the ovl mounter's
+		 * fs{u,g}id.
+		 */
 		override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
 		override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
-		if (!attr->hardlink) {
-			err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
-					attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
-					override_cred);
-			if (err) {
-				put_cred(override_cred);
-				goto out_revert_creds;
-			}
+		err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
+				attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+				override_cred);
+		if (err) {
+			put_cred(override_cred);
+			goto out_revert_creds;
 		}
 		put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
 		put_cred(override_cred);
-
-		if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
-			err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
-		else
-			err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
 	}
+
+	if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout(dentry))
+		err = ovl_create_upper(dentry, inode, attr);
+	else
+		err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
+
 out_revert_creds:
 	revert_creds(old_cred);
 	return err;
author maintainer
#368 lore raw

PATCH 368/521 ALSA: line6: correct midi status byte when receiving data from podxt

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit 8508fa2e7472f673edbeedf1b1d2b7a6bb898ecc upstream.

A PODxt device sends 0xb2, 0xc2 or 0xf2 as a status byte for MIDI messages over USB that should otherwise have a 0xb0, 0xc0 or 0xf0 status byte. This is usually corrected by the driver on other OSes.

This fixes MIDI sysex messages sent by PODxt.

[ tiwai: fixed white spaces ]

---
 sound/usb/line6/driver.c  |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c    |    3 ++-
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h |    5 ++++-
 sound/usb/line6/pod.c     |    3 ++-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
sound/usb/line6/driver.c +2 -1
@@ -318,7 +318,8 @@ static void line6_data_received(struct u
 		for (;;) {
 			done =
 				line6_midibuf_read(mb, line6->buffer_message,
-						LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN);
+						   LINE6_MIDI_MESSAGE_MAXLEN,
+						   LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX);
 
 			if (done <= 0)
 				break;
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 
 	for (;;) {
 		done = line6_midibuf_read(mb, chunk,
-					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
+					  LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE,
+					  LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX);
 
 		if (done == 0)
 			break;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.c +17 -8
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 
 #include "midibuf.h"
 
+
 static int midibuf_message_length(unsigned char code)
 {
 	int message_length;
@@ -24,12 +25,7 @@ static int midibuf_message_length(unsign
 
 		message_length = length[(code >> 4) - 8];
 	} else {
-		/*
-		   Note that according to the MIDI specification 0xf2 is
-		   the "Song Position Pointer", but this is used by Line 6
-		   to send sysex messages to the host.
-		 */
-		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, -1, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
+		static const int length[] = { -1, 2, 2, 2, -1, -1, 1, 1, 1, -1,
 			1, 1, 1, -1, 1, 1
 		};
 		message_length = length[code & 0x0f];
@@ -129,7 +125,7 @@ int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buff
 }
 
 int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *this, unsigned char *data,
-		       int length)
+		       int length, int read_type)
 {
 	int bytes_used;
 	int length1, length2;
@@ -152,9 +148,22 @@ int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffe
 
 	length1 = this->size - this->pos_read;
 
-	/* check MIDI command length */
 	command = this->buf[this->pos_read];
+	/*
+	   PODxt always has status byte lower nibble set to 0010,
+	   when it means to send 0000, so we correct if here so
+	   that control/program changes come on channel 1 and
+	   sysex message status byte is correct
+	 */
+	if (read_type == LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX) {
+		if (command == 0xb2 || command == 0xc2 || command == 0xf2) {
+			unsigned char fixed = command & 0xf0;
+			this->buf[this->pos_read] = fixed;
+			command = fixed;
+		}
+	}
 
+	/* check MIDI command length */
 	if (command & 0x80) {
 		midi_length = midibuf_message_length(command);
 		this->command_prev = command;
sound/usb/line6/midibuf.h +4 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
 #ifndef MIDIBUF_H
 #define MIDIBUF_H
 
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_TX 0
+#define LINE6_MIDIBUF_READ_RX 1
+
 struct midi_buffer {
 	unsigned char *buf;
 	int size;
@@ -27,7 +30,7 @@ extern void line6_midibuf_destroy(struct
 extern int line6_midibuf_ignore(struct midi_buffer *mb, int length);
 extern int line6_midibuf_init(struct midi_buffer *mb, int size, int split);
 extern int line6_midibuf_read(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
-			      int length);
+			      int length, int read_type);
 extern void line6_midibuf_reset(struct midi_buffer *mb);
 extern int line6_midibuf_write(struct midi_buffer *mb, unsigned char *data,
 			       int length);
sound/usb/line6/pod.c +2 -1
@@ -169,8 +169,9 @@ static struct line6_pcm_properties pod_p
 	.bytes_per_channel = 3 /* SNDRV_PCM_FMTBIT_S24_3LE */
 };
 
+
 static const char pod_version_header[] = {
-	0xf2, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
+	0xf0, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x06, 0x02
 };
 
 /* forward declarations: */
author maintainer
#369 lore raw

PATCH 369/521 ALSA: line6: fix stack overflow in line6_midi_transmit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Artem Egorkine <[email protected]>

commit b8800d324abb50160560c636bfafe2c81001b66c upstream.

Correctly calculate available space including the size of the chunk buffer. This fixes a buffer overflow when multiple MIDI sysex messages are sent to a PODxt device.

---
 sound/usb/line6/midi.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/usb/line6/midi.c +2 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ static void line6_midi_transmit(struct s
 	int req, done;
 
 	for (;;) {
-		req = min(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size);
+		req = min3(line6_midibuf_bytes_free(mb), line6->max_packet_size,
+			   LINE6_FALLBACK_MAXPACKETSIZE);
 		done = snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, chunk, req);
 
 		if (done == 0)
author maintainer
#370 lore raw

PATCH 370/521 pnode: terminate at peers of source

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 11933cf1d91d57da9e5c53822a540bbdc2656c16 upstream.

The propagate_mnt() function handles mount propagation when creating mounts and propagates the source mount tree @source_mnt to all applicable nodes of the destination propagation mount tree headed by @dest_mnt.

Unfortunately it contains a bug where it fails to terminate at peers of @source_mnt when looking up copies of the source mount that become masters for copies of the source mount tree mounted on top of slaves in the destination propagation tree causing a NULL dereference.

Once the mechanics of the bug are understood it's easy to trigger. Because of unprivileged user namespaces it is available to unprivileged users.

While fixing this bug we've gotten confused multiple times due to unclear terminology or missing concepts. So let's start this with some clarifications:

* The terms "master" or "peer" denote a shared mount. A shared mount belongs to a peer group.

* A peer group is a set of shared mounts that propagate to each other. They are identified by a peer group id. The peer group id is available in @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.
Shared mounts within the same peer group have the same peer group id. The peers in a peer group can be reached via @shared_mnt->mnt_share.

* The terms "slave mount" or "dependent mount" denote a mount that receives propagation from a peer in a peer group. IOW, shared mounts may have slave mounts and slave mounts have shared mounts as their master. Slave mounts of a given peer in a peer group are listed on that peers slave list available at @shared_mnt->mnt_slave_list.

* The term "master mount" denotes a mount in a peer group. IOW, it denotes a shared mount or a peer mount in a peer group. The term "master mount" - or "master" for short - is mostly used when talking in the context of slave mounts that receive propagation from a master mount. A master mount of a slave identifies the closest peer group a slave mount receives propagation from. The master mount of a slave can be identified via @slave_mount->mnt_master. Different slaves may point to different masters in the same peer group.

* Multiple peers in a peer group can have non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists. Non-empty ->mnt_slave_lists of peers don't intersect. Consequently, to ensure all slave mounts of a peer group are visited the ->mnt_slave_lists of all peers in a peer group have to be walked.

* Slave mounts point to a peer in the closest peer group they receive propagation from via @slave_mnt->mnt_master (see above). Together with these peers they form a propagation group (see below). The closest peer group can thus be identified through the peer group id @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id of the peer/master that a slave mount receives propagation from.

* A shared-slave mount is a slave mount to a peer group pg1 while also a peer in another peer group pg2. IOW, a peer group may receive propagation from another peer group.

If a peer group pg1 is a slave to another peer group pg2 then all peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via ->mnt_master. IOW, all peers in peer group pg1 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, they cannot be slaves to different peer groups.

* A pure slave mount is a slave mount that is a slave to a peer group but is not a peer in another peer group.

* A propagation group denotes the set of mounts consisting of a single peer group pg1 and all slave mounts and shared-slave mounts that point to a peer in that peer group via ->mnt_master. IOW, all slave mounts such that @slave_mnt->mnt_master->mnt_group_id is equal to @shared_mnt->mnt_group_id.

The concept of a propagation group makes it easier to talk about a single propagation level in a propagation tree.

For example, in propagate_mnt() the immediate peers of @dest_mnt and all slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group form a propagation group propg1. So a shared-slave mount that is a slave in propg1 and that is a peer in another peer group pg2 forms another propagation group propg2 together with all slaves that point to that shared-slave mount in their ->mnt_master.

* A propagation tree refers to all mounts that receive propagation starting from a specific shared mount.

For example, for propagate_mnt() @dest_mnt is the start of a propagation tree. The propagation tree ecompasses all mounts that receive propagation from @dest_mnt's peer group down to the leafs.

With that out of the way let's get to the actual algorithm.

We know that @dest_mnt is guaranteed to be a pure shared mount or a shared-slave mount. This is guaranteed by a check in attach_recursive_mnt(). So propagate_mnt() will first propagate the source mount tree to all peers in @dest_mnt's peer group:

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
               goto out;
}

Notice, that the peer propagation loop of propagate_mnt() doesn't propagate @dest_mnt itself. @dest_mnt is mounted directly in attach_recursive_mnt() after we propagated to the destination propagation tree.

The mount that will be mounted on top of @dest_mnt is @source_mnt. This copy was created earlier even before we entered attach_recursive_mnt() and doesn't concern us a lot here.

It's just important to notice that when propagate_mnt() is called @source_mnt will not yet have been mounted on top of @dest_mnt. Thus, @source_mnt->mnt_parent will either still point to @source_mnt or - in the case @source_mnt is moved and thus already attached - still to its former parent.

For each peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_one() will create a new copy of the source mount tree and mount that copy @child on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m after propagate_one() returns.

propagate_one() will stash the last destination propagation node @m in @last_dest and the last copy it created for the source mount tree in @last_source.

Hence, if we call into propagate_one() again for the next destination propagation node @m, @last_dest will point to the previous destination propagation node and @last_source will point to the previous copy of the source mount tree and mounted on @last_dest.

Each new copy of the source mount tree is created from the previous copy of the source mount tree. This will become important later.

The peer loop in propagate_mnt() is straightforward. We iterate through the peers copying and updating @last_source and @last_dest as we go through them and mount each copy of the source mount tree @child on a peer @m in @dest_mnt's peer group.

After propagate_mnt() handled the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group propagate_mnt() will propagate the source mount tree down the propagation tree that @dest_mnt's peer group propagates to:

for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
                m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
        /* everything in that slave group */
        n = m;
        do {
                ret = propagate_one(n);
                if (ret)
                        goto out;
                n = next_peer(n);
        } while (n != m);
}

The next_group() helper will recursively walk the destination propagation tree, descending into each propagation group of the propagation tree.

The important part is that it takes care to propagate the source mount tree to all peers in the peer group of a propagation group before it propagates to the slaves to those peers in the propagation group. IOW, it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become masters before it creates and mounts copies of the source mount tree that become slaves to these masters.

It is important to remember that propagating the source mount tree to each mount @m in the destination propagation tree simply means that we create and mount new copies @child of the source mount tree on @m such that @child->mnt_parent points to @m.

Since we know that each node @m in the destination propagation tree headed by @dest_mnt's peer group will be overmounted with a copy of the source mount tree and since we know that the propagation properties of each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at @m will mostly mirror the propagation properties of @m. We can use that information to create and mount the copies of the source mount tree that become masters before their slaves.

The easy case is always when @m and @last_dest are peers in a peer group of a given propagation group. In that case we know that we can simply copy @last_source without having to figure out what the master for the new copy @child of the source mount tree needs to be as we've done that in a previous call to propagate_one().

The hard case is when we're dealing with a slave mount or a shared-slave mount @m in a destination propagation group that we need to create and mount a copy of the source mount tree on.

For each propagation group in the destination propagation tree we propagate the source mount tree to we want to make sure that the copies @child of the source mount tree we create and mount on slaves @m pick an ealier copy of the source mount tree that we mounted on a master @m of the destination propagation group as their master. This is a mouthful but as far as we can tell that's the core of it all.

But, if we keep track of the masters in the destination propagation tree @m we can use the information to find the correct master for each copy of the source mount tree we create and mount at the slaves in the destination propagation tree @m.

Let's walk through the base case as that's still fairly easy to grasp.

If we're dealing with the first slave in the propagation group that @dest_mnt is in then we don't yet have marked any masters in the destination propagation tree.

We know the master for the first slave to @dest_mnt's peer group is simple @dest_mnt. So we expect this algorithm to yield a copy of the source mount tree that was mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as the master for the copy of the source mount tree we want to mount at the first slave @m:

for (n = m; ; n = p) {
        p = n->mnt_master;
        if (p == dest_master || IS_MNT_MARKED(p))
                break;
}

For the first slave we walk the destination propagation tree all the way up to a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. IOW, the propagation hierarchy can be walked by walking up the @mnt->mnt_master hierarchy of the destination propagation tree @m. We will ultimately find a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group and thus ultimately @dest_mnt->mnt_master.

Btw, here the assumption we listed at the beginning becomes important. Namely, that peers in a peer group pg1 that are slaves in another peer group pg2 appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list. IOW, all slaves who are peers in peer group pg1 point to the same peer in peer group pg2 via their ->mnt_master. Otherwise the termination condition in the code above would be wrong and next_group() would be broken too.

So the first iteration sets:

n = m;
p = n->mnt_master;

such that @p now points to a peer or @dest_mnt itself. We walk up one more level since we don't have any marked mounts. So we end up with:

n = dest_mnt;
p = dest_mnt->mnt_master;

If @dest_mnt's peer group is not slave to another peer group then @p is now NULL. If @dest_mnt's peer group is a slave to another peer group then @p now points to @dest_mnt->mnt_master points which is a master outside the propagation tree we're dealing with.

Now we need to figure out the master for the copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

do {
        struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
        if (last_source == first_source)
                break;
        done = parent->mnt_master == p;
        if (done && peers(n, parent))
                break;
        last_source = last_source->mnt_master;
} while (!done);

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest and @last_dest is the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we propagated to in the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

Consequently, @last_source is the last copy we created and mount on that last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So @last_source is the master we want to pick.

We know that @last_source->mnt_parent->mnt_master points to @last_dest->mnt_master. We also know that @last_dest->mnt_master is either NULL or points to a master outside of the destination propagation tree and so does @p. Hence:

done = parent->mnt_master == p;

is trivially true in the base condition.

We also know that for the first slave mount of @dest_mnt's peer group that @last_dest either points @dest_mnt itself because it was initialized to:

last_dest = dest_mnt;

at the beginning of propagate_mnt() or it will point to a peer of @dest_mnt in its peer group. In both cases it is guaranteed that on the first iteration @n and @parent are peers (Please note the check for peers here as that's important.):

if (done && peers(n, parent))

        break;

So, as we expected, we select @last_source, which referes to the last copy of the source mount tree we mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group, as the master of the first slave in @dest_mnt's peer group. The rest is taken care of by clone_mnt(last_source, ...). We'll skip over that part otherwise this becomes a blogpost.

At the end of propagate_mnt() we now mark @m->mnt_master as the first master in the destination propagation tree that is distinct from @dest_mnt->mnt_master. IOW, we mark @dest_mnt itself as a master.

By marking @dest_mnt or one of it's peers we are able to easily find it again when we later lookup masters for other copies of the source mount tree we mount copies of the source mount tree on slaves @m to @dest_mnt's peer group. This, in turn allows us to find the master we selected for the copies of the source mount tree we mounted on master in the destination propagation tree again.

The important part is to realize that the code makes use of the fact that the last copy of the source mount tree stashed in @last_source was mounted on top of the previous destination propagation node @last_dest. What this means is that @last_source allows us to walk the destination propagation hierarchy the same way each destination propagation node @m does.

If we take @last_source, which is the copy of @source_mnt we have mounted on @last_dest in the previous iteration of propagate_one(), then we know @last_source->mnt_parent points to @last_dest but we also know that as we walk through the destination propagation tree that @last_source->mnt_master will point to an earlier copy of the source mount tree we mounted one an earlier destination propagation node @m.

IOW, @last_source->mnt_parent will be our hook into the destination propagation tree and each consecutive @last_source->mnt_master will lead us to an earlier propagation node @m via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent.

Hence, by walking up @last_source->mnt_master, each of which is mounted on a node that is a master @m in the destination propagation tree we can also walk up the destination propagation hierarchy.

So, for each new destination propagation node @m we use the previous copy of @last_source and the fact it's mounted on the previous propagation node @last_dest via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent to determine what the master of the new copy of @last_source needs to be.

The goal is to find the _closest_ master that the new copy of the source mount tree we are about to create and mount on a slave @m in the destination propagation tree needs to pick. IOW, we want to find a suitable master in the propagation group.

As the propagation structure of the source mount propagation tree we create mirrors the propagation structure of the destination propagation tree we can find @m's closest master - i.e., a marked master - which is a peer in the closest peer group that @m receives propagation from. We store that closest master of @m in @p as before and record the slave to that master in @n

We then search for this master @p via @last_source by walking up the master hierarchy starting from the last copy of the source mount tree stored in @last_source that we created and mounted on the previous destination propagation node @m.

We will try to find the master by walking @last_source->mnt_master and by comparing @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master to @p. If we find @p then we can figure out what earlier copy of the source mount tree needs to be the master for the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create and mount at the current destination propagation node @m.

If @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent and @n are peers then we know that the closest master they receive propagation from is @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent->mnt_master. If not then the closest immediate peer group that they receive propagation from must be one level higher up.

This builds on the earlier clarification at the beginning that all peers in a peer group which are slaves of other peer groups all point to the same ->mnt_master, i.e., appear on the same ->mnt_slave_list, of the closest peer group that they receive propagation from.

However, terminating the walk has corner cases.

If the closest marked master for a given destination node @m cannot be found by walking up the master hierarchy via @last_source->mnt_master then we need to terminate the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

This isn't an arbitrary termination. It simply means that the new copy of the source mount tree we're about to create has a copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. IOW, @source_mnt is the peer in the closest peer group that the new copy of the source mount tree receives propagation from.

We absolutely have to stop @source_mnt because @last_source->mnt_master either points outside the propagation hierarchy we're dealing with or it is NULL because @source_mnt isn't a shared-slave.

So continuing the walk past @source_mnt would cause a NULL dereference via @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. And so we have to stop the walk when we encounter @source_mnt again.

One scenario where this can happen is when we first handled a series of slaves of @dest_mnt's peer group and then encounter peers in a new peer group that is a slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. We handle them and then we encounter another slave mount to @dest_mnt that is a pure slave to @dest_mnt's peer group. That pure slave will have a peer in @dest_mnt's peer group as its master. Consequently, the new copy of the source mount tree will need to have @source_mnt as it's master. So we walk the propagation hierarchy all the way up to @source_mnt based on @last_source->mnt_master.

So terminate on @source_mnt, easy peasy. Except, that the check misses something that the rest of the algorithm already handles.

If @dest_mnt has peers in it's peer group the peer loop in propagate_mnt():

for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
        ret = propagate_one(n);
        if (ret)
                goto out;
}

will consecutively update @last_source with each previous copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted at the previous peer in @dest_mnt's peer group. So after that loop terminates @last_source will point to whatever copy of the source mount tree was created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group.

Furthermore, if there is even a single additional peer in @dest_mnt's peer group then @last_source will __not__ point to @source_mnt anymore. Because, as we mentioned above, @dest_mnt isn't even handled in this loop but directly in attach_recursive_mnt(). So it can't even accidently come last in that peer loop.

So the first time we handle a slave mount @m of @dest_mnt's peer group the copy of the source mount tree we create will make the __last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted on the last peer in @dest_mnt's peer group the master of the new copy of the source mount tree we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group__.

But this means that the termination condition that checks for @source_mnt is wrong. The @source_mnt cannot be found anymore by propagate_one(). Instead it will find the last copy of the source mount tree we created and mounted for the last peer of @dest_mnt's peer group again. And that is a peer of @source_mnt not @source_mnt itself.

IOW, we fail to terminate the loop correctly and ultimately dereference @last_source->mnt_master->mnt_parent. When @source_mnt's peer group isn't slave to another peer group then @last_source->mnt_master is NULL causing the splat below.

For example, assume @dest_mnt is a pure shared mount and has three peers in its peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
(@dest_mnt) mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216

    \
     (@source_mnt) mnt_master[218]:      609        609               shared:218

(1) mnt_master[216]: 607 605 shared:216

    \
     (P1) mnt_master[218]:               624        607               shared:218

(2) mnt_master[216]: 576 574 shared:216

    \
     (P2) mnt_master[218]:               625        576               shared:218

(3) mnt_master[216]: 545 543 shared:216

    \
     (P3) mnt_master[218]:               626        545               shared:218

After this sequence has been processed @last_source will point to (P3), the copy generated for the third peer in @dest_mnt's peer group we handled. So the copy of the source mount tree (P4) we create and mount on the first slave of @dest_mnt's peer group:

===================================================================================
mount-id mount-parent-id peer-group-id
===================================================================================
mnt_master[216] 309 297 shared:216
/
/
(S0) mnt_slave 483 481 master:216
\
\ (P3) mnt_master[218] 626 545 shared:218

    \  /
     \/
    (P4) mnt_slave                       627        483               master:218

will pick the last copy of the source mount tree (P3) as master, not (S0).

When walking the propagation hierarchy via @last_source's master hierarchy we encounter (P3) but not (S0), i.e., @source_mnt.

We can fix this in multiple ways:

(1) By setting @last_source to @source_mnt after we processed the peers in @dest_mnt's peer group right after the peer loop in propagate_mnt().

(2) By changing the termination condition that relies on finding exactly @source_mnt to finding a peer of @source_mnt.

(3) By only moving @last_source when we actually venture into a new peer group or some clever variant thereof.

The first two options are minimally invasive and what we want as a fix. The third option is more intrusive but something we'd like to explore in the near future.

This passes all LTP tests and specifically the mount propagation testsuite part of it. It also holds up against all known reproducers of this issues.

Final words.
First, this is a clever but __worringly__ underdocumented algorithm. There isn't a single detailed comment to be found in next_group(), propagate_one() or anywhere else in that file for that matter. This has been a giant pain to understand and work through and a bug like this is insanely difficult to fix without a detailed understanding of what's happening. Let's not talk about the amount of time that was sunk into fixing this.

Second, all the cool kids with access to
unshare --mount --user --map-root --propagation=unchanged are going to have a lot of fun. IOW, triggerable by unprivileged users while namespace_lock() lock is held.

[  115.848393] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
[  115.848967] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  115.849386] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  115.849803] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  115.850012] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[  115.850354] CPU: 0 PID: 15591 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #3
[  115.850851] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
[  115.851510] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.851924] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.853441] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.853865] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.854458] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.855044] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.855693] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.856304] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.856859] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.857531] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.858006] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.858598] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.859393] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  115.860099] Call Trace:
[  115.860358]  <TASK>
[  115.860535]  propagate_mnt+0x14d/0x190
[  115.860848]  attach_recursive_mnt+0x274/0x3e0
[  115.861212]  path_mount+0x8c8/0xa60
[  115.861503]  __x64_sys_mount+0xf6/0x140
[  115.861819]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x80
[  115.862117]  ? do_faccessat+0x123/0x250
[  115.862435]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.862826]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863133]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x17/0x40
[  115.863527]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.863835]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864144]  ? do_syscall_64+0x67/0x80
[  115.864452]  ? exc_page_fault+0x70/0x170
[  115.864775]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[  115.865187] RIP: 0033:0x7f92c92b0ebe
[  115.865480] Code: 48 8b 0d 75 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff
c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 42 4f 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[  115.866984] RSP: 002b:00007fff000aa728 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000a5
[  115.867607] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055a77888d6b0 RCX: 00007f92c92b0ebe
[  115.868240] RDX: 000055a77888d8e0 RSI: 000055a77888e6e0 RDI: 000055a77888e620
[  115.868823] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[  115.869403] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055a77888e620
[  115.869994] R13: 000055a77888d8e0 R14: 00000000ffffffff R15: 00007f92c93e4076
[  115.870581]  </TASK>
[  115.870763] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4

nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf_tables nfnetlink qrtr snd_intel8x0 sunrpc snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm snd_timer intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common snd vboxguest intel_powerclamp video rapl joydev soundcore i2c_piix4 wmi fuse zram xfs vmwgfx crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel polyval_clmulni polyval_generic drm_ttm_helper ttm e1000 ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua dm_multipath

[  115.875288] CR2: 0000000000000010
[  115.875641] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[  115.876135] RIP: 0010:propagate_one.part.0+0x7f/0x1a0
[  115.876551] Code: 75 eb 4c 8b 05 c2 25 37 02 4c 89 ca 48 8b 4a 10
49 39 d0 74 1e 48 3b 81 e0 00 00 00 74 26 48 8b 92 e0 00 00 00 be 01
00 00 00 <48> 8b 4a 10 49 39 d0 75 e2 40 84 f6 74 38 4c 89 05 84 25 37
02 4d
[  115.878086] RSP: 0018:ffffb8d5443d7d50 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  115.878511] RAX: ffff8e4d87c41c80 RBX: ffff8e4d88ded780 RCX: ffff8e4da4333a00
[  115.879128] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8e4d88ded780
[  115.879715] RBP: ffff8e4d88ded780 R08: ffff8e4da4338000 R09: ffff8e4da43388c0
[  115.880359] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffffb8d540158000 R12: ffffb8d5443d7da8
[  115.880962] R13: ffff8e4d88ded780 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  115.881548] FS:  00007f92c90c9800(0000) GS:ffff8e4dfdc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  115.882234] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  115.882713] CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000022f4c002 CR4: 00000000000706f0
[  115.883314] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  115.883966] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes f2ebb3a921c1 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Fixes 5ec0811d3037 ("propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave")

---
If there are no big objections I'll get this to Linus rather sooner than later.

---
 fs/pnode.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/pnode.c +1 -1
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m
 		}
 		do {
 			struct mount *parent = last_source->mnt_parent;
-			if (last_source == first_source)
+			if (peers(last_source, first_source))
 				break;
 			done = parent->mnt_master == p;
 			if (done && peers(n, parent))
author maintainer
#371 lore raw

PATCH 371/521 md: fix a crash in mempool_free

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream.

There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh.

The reason for the crash is this:
* super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio).
* so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio).
* if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed.
* bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free.

We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test.

We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown.

The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios.

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0
 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay]
 RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80
 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00
 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8
 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900
 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000
 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05
 FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod]
  __submit_bio+0x76/0x120
  submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0
  flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay]
  process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300
  worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0
  ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380
  kthread+0xc2/0x100
  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
  </TASK>
 Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd]
 CR2: 0000000000000000
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
---
 drivers/md/md.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md.c +6 -3
@@ -417,13 +417,14 @@ static void md_end_flush(struct bio *bio
 	struct md_rdev *rdev = bio->bi_private;
 	struct mddev *mddev = rdev->mddev;
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
 	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
 
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->flush_pending)) {
 		/* The pre-request flush has finished */
 		queue_work(md_wq, &mddev->flush_work);
 	}
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 static void md_submit_flush_data(struct work_struct *ws);
@@ -821,10 +822,12 @@ static void super_written(struct bio *bi
 	} else
 		clear_bit(LastDev, &rdev->flags);
 
+	bio_put(bio);
+
+	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
+
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes))
 		wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait);
-	rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev);
-	bio_put(bio);
 }
 
 void md_super_write(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
author maintainer
#372 lore raw

PATCH 372/521 mmc: vub300: fix warning - do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Deren Wu <[email protected]>

commit 4a44cd249604e29e7b90ae796d7692f5773dd348 upstream.

vub300_enable_sdio_irq() works with mutex and need TASK_RUNNING here. Ensure that we mark current as TASK_RUNNING for sleepable context.

[   77.554641] do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffff92a72c1d>] sdio_irq_thread+0x17d/0x5b0
[   77.554652] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1983 at kernel/sched/core.c:9813 __might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[   77.554905] CPU: 2 PID: 1983 Comm: ksdioirqd/mmc1 Tainted: G           OE      6.1.0-rc5 #1
[   77.554910] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7BEH/NUC8BEB, BIOS BECFL357.86A.0081.2020.0504.1834 05/04/2020
[   77.554912] RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x116/0x160
[   77.554920] RSP: 0018:ffff888107b7fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[   77.554923] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888118c1b740 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   77.554926] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffed1020f6ffa9
[   77.554928] RBP: ffff888107b7fde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1043ea60ba
[   77.554930] R10: ffff88821f5305cb R11: ffffed1043ea60b9 R12: ffffffff93aa3a60
[   77.554932] R13: 000000000000011b R14: 7fffffffffffffff R15: ffffffffc0558660
[   77.554934] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88821f500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   77.554937] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   77.554939] CR2: 00007f8a44010d68 CR3: 000000024421a003 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[   77.554942] Call Trace:
[   77.554944]  <TASK>
[   77.554952]  mutex_lock+0x78/0xf0
[   77.554973]  vub300_enable_sdio_irq+0x103/0x3c0 [vub300]
[   77.554981]  sdio_irq_thread+0x25c/0x5b0
[   77.555006]  kthread+0x2b8/0x370
[   77.555017]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[   77.555023]  </TASK>
[   77.555025] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
---
 drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c +2 -0
@@ -2052,6 +2052,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
 		return;
 	kref_get(&vub300->kref);
 	if (enable) {
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 		mutex_lock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
 		if (vub300->irqs_queued) {
 			vub300->irqs_queued -= 1;
@@ -2067,6 +2068,7 @@ static void vub300_enable_sdio_irq(struc
 			vub300_queue_poll_work(vub300, 0);
 		}
 		mutex_unlock(&vub300->irq_mutex);
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 	} else {
 		vub300->irq_enabled = 0;
 	}
author maintainer
#373 lore raw

PATCH 373/521 tpm: tpm_crb: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]>

commit 37e90c374dd11cf4919c51e847c6d6ced0abc555 upstream.

In crb_acpi_add(), we get the TPM2 table to retrieve information like start method, and then assign them to the priv data, so the TPM2 table is not used after the init, should be freed, call acpi_put_table() to fix the memory leak.

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c +20 -9
@@ -680,12 +680,16 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
 
 	/* Should the FIFO driver handle this? */
 	sm = buf->start_method;
-	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
-		return -ENODEV;
+	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED) {
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	priv = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(struct crb_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!priv)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!priv) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (sm == ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC) {
 		if (buf->header.length < (sizeof(*buf) + sizeof(*crb_smc))) {
@@ -693,7 +697,8 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
 				FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table has wrong size %u for start method type %d\n",
 				buf->header.length,
 				ACPI_TPM2_COMMAND_BUFFER_WITH_ARM_SMC);
-			return -EINVAL;
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
 		}
 		crb_smc = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct tpm2_crb_smc, buf, sizeof(*buf));
 		priv->smc_func_id = crb_smc->smc_func_id;
@@ -704,17 +709,23 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_devi
 
 	rc = crb_map_io(device, priv, buf);
 	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+		goto out;
 
 	chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_crb);
-	if (IS_ERR(chip))
-		return PTR_ERR(chip);
+	if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
+		rc = PTR_ERR(chip);
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
 	chip->acpi_dev_handle = device->handle;
 	chip->flags = TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
 
-	return tpm_chip_register(chip);
+	rc = tpm_chip_register(chip);
+
+out:
+	acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)buf);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int crb_acpi_remove(struct acpi_device *device)
author maintainer
#374 lore raw

PATCH 374/521 tpm: tpm_tis: Add the missed acpi_put_table() to fix memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hanjun Guo <[email protected]>

commit db9622f762104459ff87ecdf885cc42c18053fd9 upstream.

In check_acpi_tpm2(), we get the TPM2 table just to make sure the table is there, not used after the init, so the acpi_put_table() should be added to release the ACPI memory.

Fixes 4cb586a188d4 ("tpm_tis: Consolidate the platform and acpi probe flow")
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis.c +5 -4
@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
 	const struct acpi_device_id *aid = acpi_match_device(tpm_acpi_tbl, dev);
 	struct acpi_table_tpm2 *tbl;
 	acpi_status st;
+	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (!aid || aid->driver_data != DEVICE_IS_TPM2)
 		return 0;
@@ -136,8 +137,7 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
 	/* If the ACPI TPM2 signature is matched then a global ACPI_SIG_TPM2
 	 * table is mandatory
 	 */
-	st =
-	    acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl);
+	st = acpi_get_table(ACPI_SIG_TPM2, 1, (struct acpi_table_header **)&tbl);
 	if (ACPI_FAILURE(st) || tbl->header.length < sizeof(*tbl)) {
 		dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "failed to get TPM2 ACPI table\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -145,9 +145,10 @@ static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device
 
 	/* The tpm2_crb driver handles this device */
 	if (tbl->start_method != ACPI_TPM2_MEMORY_MAPPED)
-		return -ENODEV;
+		ret = -ENODEV;
 
-	return 0;
+	acpi_put_table((struct acpi_table_header *)tbl);
+	return ret;
 }
 #else
 static int check_acpi_tpm2(struct device *dev)
author maintainer
#375 lore raw

PATCH 375/521 SUNRPC: Dont leak netobj memory when gss_read_proxy_verf() fails

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

commit da522b5fe1a5f8b7c20a0023e87b52a150e53bf5 upstream.

Fixes 030d794bf498 ("SUNRPC: Use gssproxy upcall for server RPCGSS authentication.")
---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +7 -2
@@ -1088,18 +1088,23 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct sv
 		return res;
 
 	inlen = svc_getnl(argv);
-	if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len))
+	if (inlen > (argv->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len)) {
+		kfree(in_handle->data);
 		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
 
 	pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
 	in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!in_token->pages)
+	if (!in_token->pages) {
+		kfree(in_handle->data);
 		return SVC_DENIED;
+	}
 	in_token->page_base = 0;
 	in_token->page_len = inlen;
 	for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
 		in_token->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!in_token->pages[i]) {
+			kfree(in_handle->data);
 			gss_free_in_token_pages(in_token);
 			return SVC_DENIED;
 		}
author maintainer
#376 lore raw

PATCH 376/521 media: stv0288: use explicitly signed char

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 7392134428c92a4cb541bd5c8f4f5c8d2e88364d upstream.

With char becoming unsigned by default, and with char alone being ambiguous and based on architecture, signed chars need to be marked explicitly as such. Use s8 and u8 types here, since that's what surrounding code does. This fixes:

drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: assigning (-9) to unsigned variable 'tm' drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c:471 stv0288_set_frontend() warn: we never enter this loop

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/stv0288.c +2 -3
@@ -452,9 +452,8 @@ static int stv0288_set_frontend(struct d
 	struct stv0288_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
 	struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
 
-	char tm;
-	unsigned char tda[3];
-	u8 reg, time_out = 0;
+	u8 tda[3], reg, time_out = 0;
+	s8 tm;
 
 	dprintk("%s : FE_SET_FRONTEND\n", __func__);
 
author maintainer
#377 lore raw

PATCH 377/521 soc: qcom: Select REMAP_MMIO for LLCC driver

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit 5d2fe2d7b616b8baa18348ead857b504fc2de336 upstream.

LLCC driver uses REGMAP_MMIO for accessing the hardware registers. So select the dependency in Kconfig. Without this, there will be errors while building the driver with COMPILE_TEST only:

ERROR: modpost: "__devm_regmap_init_mmio_clk" [drivers/soc/qcom/llcc-qcom.ko] undefined! make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.modpost:126: Module.symvers] Error 1
make: *** [Makefile:1944: modpost] Error 2

---
 drivers/soc/qcom/Kconfig |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/soc/qcom/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ config QCOM_COMMAND_DB
 config QCOM_GENI_SE
 	tristate "QCOM GENI Serial Engine Driver"
 	depends on ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST
+	select REGMAP_MMIO
 	help
 	  This driver is used to manage Generic Interface (GENI) firmware based
 	  Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Universal Peripheral (QUP) Wrapper. This
author maintainer
#378 lore raw

PATCH 378/521 ktest.pl minconfig: Unset configs instead of just removing them

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>

commit ef784eebb56425eed6e9b16e7d47e5c00dcf9c38 upstream.

After a full run of a make_min_config test, I noticed there were a lot of CONFIGs still enabled that really should not be. Looking at them, I noticed they were all defined as "default y". The issue is that the test simple removes the config and re-runs make oldconfig, which enables it again because it is set to default 'y'. Instead, explicitly disable the config with writing "# CONFIG_FOO is not set" to the file to keep it from being set again.

With this change, one of my box's minconfigs went from 768 configs set, down to 521 configs set.

Fixes 0a05c769a9de5 ("ktest: Added config_bisect test type")
---
 tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/ktest/ktest.pl +2 -1
@@ -3706,9 +3706,10 @@ sub test_this_config {
     # .config to make sure it is missing the config that
     # we had before
     my %configs = %min_configs;
-    delete $configs{$config};
+    $configs{$config} = "# $config is not set";
     make_new_config ((values %configs), (values %keep_configs));
     make_oldconfig;
+    delete $configs{$config};
     undef %configs;
     assign_configs \%configs, $output_config;
 
author maintainer
#379 lore raw

PATCH 379/521 ARM: ux500: do not directly dereference __iomem

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 65b0e307a1a9193571db12910f382f84195a3d29 upstream.

Sparse reports that calling add_device_randomness() on uid is a violation of address spaces. And indeed the next usage uses readl() properly, but that was left out when passing it toadd_device_ randomness(). So instead copy the whole thing to the stack first.

---
 drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c |   10 ++++------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/soc/ux500/ux500-soc-id.c +4 -6
@@ -159,20 +159,18 @@ static ssize_t ux500_get_process(struct
 static const char *db8500_read_soc_id(struct device_node *backupram)
 {
 	void __iomem *base;
-	void __iomem *uid;
 	const char *retstr;
+	u32 uid[5];
 
 	base = of_iomap(backupram, 0);
 	if (!base)
 		return NULL;
-	uid = base + 0x1fc0;
+	memcpy_fromio(uid, base + 0x1fc0, sizeof(uid));
 
 	/* Throw these device-specific numbers into the entropy pool */
-	add_device_randomness(uid, 0x14);
+	add_device_randomness(uid, sizeof(uid));
 	retstr = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%08x%08x%08x%08x%08x",
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+0),
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+1), readl((u32 *)uid+2),
-			 readl((u32 *)uid+3), readl((u32 *)uid+4));
+			   uid[0], uid[1], uid[2], uid[3], uid[4]);
 	iounmap(base);
 	return retstr;
 }
author maintainer
#380 lore raw

PATCH 380/521 selftests: Use optional USERCFLAGS and USERLDFLAGS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

commit de3ee3f63400a23954e7c1ad1cb8c20f29ab6fe3 upstream.

This change enables to extend CFLAGS and LDFLAGS from command line, e.g. to extend compiler checks: make USERCFLAGS=-Werror USERLDFLAGS=-static

USERCFLAGS and USERLDFLAGS are documented in Documentation/kbuild/makefiles.rst and Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.rst

This should be backported (down to 5.10) to improve previous kernel versions testing as well.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/lib.mk |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/lib.mk +5 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,11 @@ endef
 clean:
 	$(CLEAN)
 
+# Enables to extend CFLAGS and LDFLAGS from command line, e.g.
+# make USERCFLAGS=-Werror USERLDFLAGS=-static
+CFLAGS += $(USERCFLAGS)
+LDFLAGS += $(USERLDFLAGS)
+
 # When make O= with kselftest target from main level
 # the following aren't defined.
 #
author maintainer
#381 lore raw

PATCH 381/521 binfmt: Move install_exec_creds after setup_new_exec to match binfmt_elf

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e7f7785449a1f459a4a3ca92f82f56fb054dd2b9 ]

In 2016 Linus moved install_exec_creds immediately after setup_new_exec, in binfmt_elf as a cleanup and as part of closing a potential information leak.

Perform the same cleanup for the other binary formats.

Different binary formats doing the same things the same way makes exec easier to reason about and easier to maintain.

Greg Ungerer reports:

Quoted 3 lines

I tested the the whole series on non-MMU m68k and non-MMU arm (exercising binfmt_flat) and it all tested out with no problems, so for the binfmt_flat changes:

Ref: 9f834ec18def ("binfmt_elf: switch to new creds when switching to new mm")

Stable-dep-of: e7f703ff2507 ("binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary()")

---
 arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c | 3 +--
 fs/binfmt_aout.c          | 2 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c     | 2 +-
 fs/binfmt_flat.c          | 3 +--
 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_aout.c +1 -2
index 3ebd77770f98..4cfda3cfae7f 100644
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	set_personality_ia32(false);
 
 	setup_new_exec(bprm);
+	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	regs->cs = __USER32_CS;
 	regs->r8 = regs->r9 = regs->r10 = regs->r11 = regs->r12 =
@@ -314,8 +315,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		return retval;
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
-
 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
 		unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
 
fs/binfmt_aout.c +1 -1
index c3deb2e35f20..e7a9e8b56e71 100644
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	set_personality(PER_LINUX);
 #endif
 	setup_new_exec(bprm);
+	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	current->mm->end_code = ex.a_text +
 		(current->mm->start_code = N_TXTADDR(ex));
@@ -256,7 +257,6 @@ static int load_aout_binary(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
 	if (retval < 0)
 		return retval;
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	if (N_MAGIC(ex) == OMAGIC) {
 		unsigned long text_addr, map_size;
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +1 -1
index b53bb3729ac1..60896c16f103 100644
@@ -357,6 +357,7 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		current->personality |= READ_IMPLIES_EXEC;
 
 	setup_new_exec(bprm);
+	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 
 	set_binfmt(&elf_fdpic_format);
 
@@ -438,7 +439,6 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	current->mm->start_stack = current->mm->start_brk + stack_size;
 #endif
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
 	if (create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm,
 				    &exec_params, &interp_params) < 0)
 		goto error;
fs/binfmt_flat.c +1 -2
index a6f97d86fb80..a909743b1a0e 100644
@@ -541,6 +541,7 @@ static int load_flat_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 		/* OK, This is the point of no return */
 		set_personality(PER_LINUX_32BIT);
 		setup_new_exec(bprm);
+		install_exec_creds(bprm);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -965,8 +966,6 @@ static int load_flat_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		}
 	}
 
-	install_exec_creds(bprm);
-
 	set_binfmt(&flat_format);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#382 lore raw

PATCH 382/521 binfmt: Fix error return code in load_elf_fdpic_binary()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e7f703ff2507f4e9f496da96cd4b78fd3026120c ]

Fix to return a negative error code from create_elf_fdpic_tables() instead of 0.

---
 fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +3 -2
index 60896c16f103..64d0b838085d 100644
@@ -439,8 +439,9 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	current->mm->start_stack = current->mm->start_brk + stack_size;
 #endif
 
-	if (create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm,
-				    &exec_params, &interp_params) < 0)
+	retval = create_elf_fdpic_tables(bprm, current->mm, &exec_params,
+					 &interp_params);
+	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
 	kdebug("- start_code  %lx", current->mm->start_code);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#383 lore raw

PATCH 383/521 dm cache: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_cache_metadata_abort

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

commit 352b837a5541690d4f843819028cf2b8be83d424 upstream.

Same ABBA deadlock pattern fixed in commit 4b60f452ec51 ("dm thin: Fix ABBA deadlock between shrink_slab and dm_pool_abort_metadata") to DM-cache's metadata.

Fixes 028ae9f76f29 ("dm cache: add fail io mode and needs_check flag")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-metadata.c +47 -7
@@ -551,11 +551,13 @@ static int __create_persistent_data_obje
 	return r;
 }
 
-static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd)
+static void __destroy_persistent_data_objects(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd,
+					      bool destroy_bm)
 {
 	dm_sm_destroy(cmd->metadata_sm);
 	dm_tm_destroy(cmd->tm);
-	dm_block_manager_destroy(cmd->bm);
+	if (destroy_bm)
+		dm_block_manager_destroy(cmd->bm);
 }
 
 typedef unsigned long (*flags_mutator)(unsigned long);
@@ -826,7 +828,7 @@ static struct dm_cache_metadata *lookup_
 		cmd2 = lookup(bdev);
 		if (cmd2) {
 			mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
-			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
+			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, true);
 			kfree(cmd);
 			return cmd2;
 		}
@@ -874,7 +876,7 @@ void dm_cache_metadata_close(struct dm_c
 		mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
 
 		if (!cmd->fail_io)
-			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
+			__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, true);
 		kfree(cmd);
 	}
 }
@@ -1808,14 +1810,52 @@ int dm_cache_metadata_needs_check(struct
 
 int dm_cache_metadata_abort(struct dm_cache_metadata *cmd)
 {
-	int r;
+	int r = -EINVAL;
+	struct dm_block_manager *old_bm = NULL, *new_bm = NULL;
+
+	/* fail_io is double-checked with cmd->root_lock held below */
+	if (unlikely(cmd->fail_io))
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Replacement block manager (new_bm) is created and old_bm destroyed outside of
+	 * cmd root_lock to avoid ABBA deadlock that would result (due to life-cycle of
+	 * shrinker associated with the block manager's bufio client vs cmd root_lock).
+	 * - must take shrinker_rwsem without holding cmd->root_lock
+	 */
+	new_bm = dm_block_manager_create(cmd->bdev, DM_CACHE_METADATA_BLOCK_SIZE << SECTOR_SHIFT,
+					 CACHE_MAX_CONCURRENT_LOCKS);
 
 	WRITE_LOCK(cmd);
-	__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd);
-	r = __create_persistent_data_objects(cmd, false);
+	if (cmd->fail_io) {
+		WRITE_UNLOCK(cmd);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	__destroy_persistent_data_objects(cmd, false);
+	old_bm = cmd->bm;
+	if (IS_ERR(new_bm)) {
+		DMERR("could not create block manager during abort");
+		cmd->bm = NULL;
+		r = PTR_ERR(new_bm);
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	cmd->bm = new_bm;
+	r = __open_or_format_metadata(cmd, false);
+	if (r) {
+		cmd->bm = NULL;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+	new_bm = NULL;
+out_unlock:
 	if (r)
 		cmd->fail_io = true;
 	WRITE_UNLOCK(cmd);
+	dm_block_manager_destroy(old_bm);
+out:
+	if (new_bm && !IS_ERR(new_bm))
+		dm_block_manager_destroy(new_bm);
 
 	return r;
 }
author maintainer
#384 lore raw

PATCH 384/521 dm thin: Use last transactions pmd->root when commit failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>

commit 7991dbff6849f67e823b7cc0c15e5a90b0549b9f upstream.

Recently we found a softlock up problem in dm thin pool btree lookup code due to corrupted metadata:

 Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks
 CPU: 7 PID: 2669225 Comm: kworker/u16:3
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
 Workqueue: dm-thin do_worker [dm_thin_pool]
 Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack+0x9c/0xd3
   panic+0x35d/0x6b9
   watchdog_timer_fn.cold+0x16/0x25
   __run_hrtimer+0xa2/0x2d0
   </IRQ>
   RIP: 0010:__relink_lru+0x102/0x220 [dm_bufio]
   __bufio_new+0x11f/0x4f0 [dm_bufio]
   new_read+0xa3/0x1e0 [dm_bufio]
   dm_bm_read_lock+0x33/0xd0 [dm_persistent_data]
   ro_step+0x63/0x100 [dm_persistent_data]
   btree_lookup_raw.constprop.0+0x44/0x220 [dm_persistent_data]
   dm_btree_lookup+0x16f/0x210 [dm_persistent_data]
   dm_thin_find_block+0x12c/0x210 [dm_thin_pool]
   __process_bio_read_only+0xc5/0x400 [dm_thin_pool]
   process_thin_deferred_bios+0x1a4/0x4a0 [dm_thin_pool]
   process_one_work+0x3c5/0x730

Following process may generate a broken btree mixed with fresh and stale btree nodes, which could get dm thin trapped in an infinite loop while looking up data block:
Transaction 1: pmd->root = A, A->B->C // One path in btree

                pmd->root = X, X->Y->Z   // Copy-up
 Transaction 2: X,Z is updated on disk, Y write failed.
                // Commit failed, dm thin becomes read-only.
                process_bio_read_only
		 dm_thin_find_block
		  __find_block
		   dm_btree_lookup(pmd->root)

The pmd->root points to a broken btree, Y may contain stale node pointing to any block, for example X, which gets dm thin trapped into a dead loop while looking up Z.

Fix this by setting pmd->root in __open_metadata(), so that dm thin will use the last transaction's pmd->root if commit failed.

Fetch a reproducer in [Link].

Linke: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216790

Fixes 991d9fa02da0 ("dm: add thin provisioning target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +9 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,15 @@ static int __open_metadata(struct dm_poo
 		goto bad_cleanup_data_sm;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * For pool metadata opening process, root setting is redundant
+	 * because it will be set again in __begin_transaction(). But dm
+	 * pool aborting process really needs to get last transaction's
+	 * root to avoid accessing broken btree.
+	 */
+	pmd->root = le64_to_cpu(disk_super->data_mapping_root);
+	pmd->details_root = le64_to_cpu(disk_super->device_details_root);
+
 	__setup_btree_details(pmd);
 	dm_bm_unlock(sblock);
 
author maintainer
#385 lore raw

PATCH 385/521 dm thin: Fix UAF in run_timer_softirq()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luo Meng <[email protected]>

commit 88430ebcbc0ec637b710b947738839848c20feff upstream.

When dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent, it will lead to UAF, as follows:

 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __run_timers+0x173/0x710
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88816d9490f0 by task swapper/0/0
<snip>
 Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0x9f
  print_report.cold+0x132/0xaa2
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xcd/0x160
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  kasan_report+0xad/0x110
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  __asan_store8+0x9c/0x140
  __run_timers+0x173/0x710
  call_timer_fn+0x310/0x310
  pvclock_clocksource_read+0xfa/0x250
  kvm_clock_read+0x2c/0x70
  kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x20
  ktime_get+0x5c/0x110
  lapic_next_event+0x38/0x50
  clockevents_program_event+0xf1/0x1e0
  run_timer_softirq+0x49/0x90
  __do_softirq+0x16e/0x62c
  __irq_exit_rcu+0x1fa/0x270
  irq_exit_rcu+0x12/0x20
  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8e/0xc0

One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:

use free

do_resume                           |
  __find_device_hash_cell           |
    dm_get                          |
      atomic_inc(&md->holders)      |
                                    | dm_destroy
                                    |   __dm_destroy
                                    |     if (!dm_suspended_md(md))
                                    |     atomic_read(&md->holders)
                                    |     msleep(1)
  dm_resume                         |
    __dm_resume                     |
      dm_table_resume_targets       |
        pool_resume                 |
          do_waker  #add delay work |
  dm_put                            |
    atomic_dec(&md->holders)        |
                                    |     dm_table_destroy
                                    |       pool_dtr
                                    |         __pool_dec
                                    |           __pool_destroy
                                    |             destroy_workqueue
                                    |             kfree(pool) # free pool

time out
__do_softirq
run_timer_softirq # pool has already been freed

This can be easily reproduced using:
1. create thin-pool
2. dmsetup suspend pool
3. dmsetup resume pool
4. dmsetup remove_all # Concurrent with 3

The root cause of this UAF bug is that dm_resume() adds timer after dm_destroy() skips cancelling the timer because of suspend status. After timeout, it will call run_timer_softirq(), however pool has already been freed. The concurrency UAF bug will happen.

Therefore, cancelling timer again in __pool_destroy().

Fixes 991d9fa02da0d ("dm: add thin provisioning target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +2 -0
@@ -2921,6 +2921,8 @@ static void __pool_destroy(struct pool *
 	dm_bio_prison_destroy(pool->prison);
 	dm_kcopyd_client_destroy(pool->copier);
 
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pool->waker);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&pool->no_space_timeout);
 	if (pool->wq)
 		destroy_workqueue(pool->wq);
 
author maintainer
#386 lore raw

PATCH 386/521 dm cache: Fix UAF in destroy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luo Meng <[email protected]>

commit 6a459d8edbdbe7b24db42a5a9f21e6aa9e00c2aa upstream.

Dm_cache also has the same UAF problem when dm_resume() and dm_destroy() are concurrent.

Therefore, cancelling timer again in destroy().

Fixes c6b4fcbad044e ("dm: add cache target")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +1 -0
@@ -1987,6 +1987,7 @@ static void destroy(struct cache *cache)
 	if (cache->prison)
 		dm_bio_prison_destroy_v2(cache->prison);
 
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&cache->waker);
 	if (cache->wq)
 		destroy_workqueue(cache->wq);
 
author maintainer
#387 lore raw

PATCH 387/521 dm cache: set needs_check flag after aborting metadata

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mike Snitzer <[email protected]>

commit 6b9973861cb2e96dcd0bb0f1baddc5c034207c5c upstream.

Otherwise the commit that will be aborted will be associated with the metadata objects that will be torn down. Must write needs_check flag to metadata with a reset block manager.

Found through code-inspection (and compared against dm-thin.c).

Fixes 028ae9f76f29 ("dm cache: add fail io mode and needs_check flag")
---
 drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-cache-target.c +5 -5
@@ -1010,16 +1010,16 @@ static void abort_transaction(struct cac
 	if (get_cache_mode(cache) >= CM_READ_ONLY)
 		return;
 
-	if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check(cache->cmd)) {
-		DMERR("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata", dev_name);
-		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
-	}
-
 	DMERR_LIMIT("%s: aborting current metadata transaction", dev_name);
 	if (dm_cache_metadata_abort(cache->cmd)) {
 		DMERR("%s: failed to abort metadata transaction", dev_name);
 		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
 	}
+
+	if (dm_cache_metadata_set_needs_check(cache->cmd)) {
+		DMERR("%s: failed to set 'needs_check' flag in metadata", dev_name);
+		set_cache_mode(cache, CM_FAIL);
+	}
 }
 
 static void metadata_operation_failed(struct cache *cache, const char *op, int r)
author maintainer
#388 lore raw

PATCH 388/521 x86/microcode/intel: Do not retry microcode reloading on the APs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ashok Raj <[email protected]>

commit be1b670f61443aa5d0d01782e9b8ea0ee825d018 upstream.

The retries in load_ucode_intel_ap() were in place to support systems with mixed steppings. Mixed steppings are no longer supported and there is only one microcode image at a time. Any retries will simply reattempt to apply the same image over and over without making progress.

[ bp: Zap the circumstantial reasoning from the commit message. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c |    8 +-------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c +1 -7
@@ -662,7 +662,6 @@ void load_ucode_intel_ap(void)
 	else
 		iup = &intel_ucode_patch;
 
-reget:
 	if (!*iup) {
 		patch = __load_ucode_intel(&uci);
 		if (!patch)
@@ -673,12 +672,7 @@ reget:
 
 	uci.mc = *iup;
 
-	if (apply_microcode_early(&uci, true)) {
-		/* Mixed-silicon system? Try to refetch the proper patch: */
-		*iup = NULL;
-
-		goto reget;
-	}
+	apply_microcode_early(&uci, true);
 }
 
 static struct microcode_intel *find_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
author maintainer
#389 lore raw

PATCH 389/521 tracing: Fix infinite loop in tracing_read_pipe on overflowed print_trace_line

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yang Jihong <[email protected]>

commit c1ac03af6ed45d05786c219d102f37eb44880f28 upstream.

print_trace_line may overflow seq_file buffer. If the event is not consumed, the while loop keeps peeking this event, causing a infinite loop.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Fixes 088b1e427dbba ("ftrace: pipe fixes")
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +14 -1
@@ -5803,7 +5803,20 @@ waitagain:
 
 		ret = print_trace_line(iter);
 		if (ret == TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE) {
-			/* don't print partial lines */
+			/*
+			 * If one print_trace_line() fills entire trace_seq in one shot,
+			 * trace_seq_to_user() will returns -EBUSY because save_len == 0,
+			 * In this case, we need to consume it, otherwise, loop will peek
+			 * this event next time, resulting in an infinite loop.
+			 */
+			if (save_len == 0) {
+				iter->seq.full = 0;
+				trace_seq_puts(&iter->seq, "[LINE TOO BIG]\n");
+				trace_consume(iter);
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* In other cases, don't print partial lines */
 			iter->seq.seq.len = save_len;
 			break;
 		}
author maintainer
#390 lore raw

PATCH 390/521 ARM: 9256/1: NWFPE: avoid compiler-generated __aeabi_uldivmod

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>

commit 3220022038b9a3845eea762af85f1c5694b9f861 upstream.

clang-15's ability to elide loops completely became more aggressive when it can deduce how a variable is being updated in a loop. Counting down one variable by an increment of another can be replaced by a modulo operation.

For 64b variables on 32b ARM EABI targets, this can result in the compiler generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod, which it does for a do while loop in float64_rem().

For the kernel, we'd generally prefer that developers not open code 64b division via binary / operators and instead use the more explicit helpers from div64.h. On arm-linux-gnuabi targets, failure to do so can result in linkage failures due to undefined references to __aeabi_uldivmod().

While developers can avoid open coding divisions on 64b variables, the compiler doesn't know that the Linux kernel has a partial implementation of a compiler runtime (--rtlib) to enforce this convention.

It's also undecidable for the compiler whether the code in question would be faster to execute the loop vs elide it and do the 64b division.

While I actively avoid using the internal -mllvm command line flags, I think we get better code than using barrier() here, which will force reloads+spills in the loop for all toolchains.

---
 arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm/nwfpe/Makefile +6 -0
@@ -11,3 +11,9 @@ nwfpe-y				+= fpa11.o fpa11_cpdo.o fpa11
 				   entry.o
 
 nwfpe-$(CONFIG_FPE_NWFPE_XP)	+= extended_cpdo.o
+
+# Try really hard to avoid generating calls to __aeabi_uldivmod() from
+# float64_rem() due to loop elision.
+ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_CLANG
+CFLAGS_softfloat.o	+= -mllvm -replexitval=never
+endif
author maintainer
#391 lore raw

PATCH 391/521 media: dvb-core: Fix double free in dvb_register_device()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

commit 6b0d0477fce747d4137aa65856318b55fba72198 upstream.

In function dvb_register_device() -> dvb_register_media_device() -> dvb_create_media_entity(), dvb->entity is allocated and initialized. If the initialization fails, it frees the dvb->entity, and return an error code. The caller takes the error code and handles the error by calling dvb_media_device_free(), which unregisters the entity and frees the field again if it is not NULL. As dvb->entity may not NULLed in dvb_create_media_entity() when the allocation of dvbdev->pad fails, a double free may occur. This may also cause an Use After free in media_device_unregister_entity().

Fix this by storing NULL to dvb->entity when it is freed.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c +1 -0
@@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ static int dvb_create_media_entity(struc
 				       GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!dvbdev->pads) {
 			kfree(dvbdev->entity);
+			dvbdev->entity = NULL;
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 	}
author maintainer
#392 lore raw

PATCH 392/521 media: dvb-core: Fix UAF due to refcount races at releasing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit fd3d91ab1c6ab0628fe642dd570b56302c30a792 upstream.

The dvb-core tries to sync the releases of opened files at dvb_dmxdev_release() with two refcounts: dvbdev->users and dvr_dvbdev->users. A problem is present in those two syncs: when yet another dvb_demux_open() is called during those sync waits, dvb_demux_open() continues to process even if the device is being closed. This includes the increment of the former refcount, resulting in the leftover refcount after the sync of the latter refcount at dvb_dmxdev_release(). It ends up with use-after-free, since the function believes that all usages were gone and releases the resources.

This patch addresses the problem by adding the check of dmxdev->exit flag at dvb_demux_open(), just like dvb_dvr_open() already does. With the exit flag check, the second call of dvb_demux_open() fails, hence the further corruption can be avoided.

Also for avoiding the races of the dmxdev->exit flag reference, this patch serializes the dmxdev->exit set up and the sync waits with the dmxdev->mutex lock at dvb_dmxdev_release(). Without the mutex lock, dvb_demux_open() (or dvb_dvr_open()) may run concurrently with dvb_dmxdev_release(), which allows to skip the exit flag check and continue the open process that is being closed.

CVE-2022-41218 is assigned to those bugs above.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/media/dvb-core/dmxdev.c +8 -0
@@ -800,6 +800,11 @@ static int dvb_demux_open(struct inode *
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&dmxdev->mutex))
 		return -ERESTARTSYS;
 
+	if (dmxdev->exit) {
+		mutex_unlock(&dmxdev->mutex);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < dmxdev->filternum; i++)
 		if (dmxdev->filter[i].state == DMXDEV_STATE_FREE)
 			break;
@@ -1457,7 +1462,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dvb_dmxdev_init);
 
 void dvb_dmxdev_release(struct dmxdev *dmxdev)
 {
+	mutex_lock(&dmxdev->mutex);
 	dmxdev->exit = 1;
+	mutex_unlock(&dmxdev->mutex);
+
 	if (dmxdev->dvbdev->users > 1) {
 		wait_event(dmxdev->dvbdev->wait_queue,
 				dmxdev->dvbdev->users == 1);
author maintainer
#393 lore raw

PATCH 393/521 cifs: fix confusing debug message

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>

commit a85ceafd41927e41a4103d228a993df7edd8823b upstream.

Since rc was initialised to -ENOMEM in cifs_get_smb_ses(), when an existing smb session was found, free_xid() would be called and then print

CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 44 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 44) rc = -12

Fix this by initialising rc to 0 and then let free_xid() print this instead

CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing tcp session with server found
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: in cifs_get_smb_ses as Xid: 14 with uid: 0
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: Existing smb sess found (status=1)
CIFS: fs/cifs/connect.c: VFS: leaving cifs_get_smb_ses (xid = 14) rc = 0

---
 fs/cifs/connect.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/cifs/connect.c +3 -1
@@ -2940,7 +2940,7 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol _
 static struct cifs_ses *
 cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
 {
-	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	int rc = 0;
 	unsigned int xid;
 	struct cifs_ses *ses;
 	struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *)&server->dstaddr;
@@ -2982,6 +2982,8 @@ cifs_get_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info
 		return ses;
 	}
 
+	rc = -ENOMEM;
+
 	cifs_dbg(FYI, "Existing smb sess not found\n");
 	ses = sesInfoAlloc();
 	if (ses == NULL)
author maintainer
#394 lore raw

PATCH 394/521 md/bitmap: Fix bitmap chunk size overflow issues

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Florian-Ewald Mueller <[email protected]>

commit 4555211190798b6b6fa2c37667d175bf67945c78 upstream.

- limit bitmap chunk size internal u64 variable to values not overflowing the u32 bitmap superblock structure variable stored on persistent media
- assign bitmap chunk size internal u64 variable from unsigned values to avoid possible sign extension artifacts when assigning from a s32 value

The bug has been there since at least kernel 4.0.
Steps to reproduce it:
1: mdadm -C /dev/mdx -l 1 --bitmap=internal --bitmap-chunk=256M -e 1.2 -n2 /dev/rnbd1 /dev/rnbd2
2 resize member device rnbd1 and rnbd2 to 8 TB
3 mdadm --grow /dev/mdx --size=max

The bitmap_chunksize will overflow without patch.

---
 drivers/md/md-bitmap.c |   20 ++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/md/md-bitmap.c +12 -8
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ void md_bitmap_print_sb(struct bitmap *b
 	sb = kmap_atomic(bitmap->storage.sb_page);
 	pr_debug("%s: bitmap file superblock:\n", bmname(bitmap));
 	pr_debug("         magic: %08x\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->magic));
-	pr_debug("       version: %d\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->version));
+	pr_debug("       version: %u\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->version));
 	pr_debug("          uuid: %08x.%08x.%08x.%08x\n",
 		 le32_to_cpu(*(__u32 *)(sb->uuid+0)),
 		 le32_to_cpu(*(__u32 *)(sb->uuid+4)),
@@ -499,11 +499,11 @@ void md_bitmap_print_sb(struct bitmap *b
 	pr_debug("events cleared: %llu\n",
 		 (unsigned long long) le64_to_cpu(sb->events_cleared));
 	pr_debug("         state: %08x\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->state));
-	pr_debug("     chunksize: %d B\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->chunksize));
-	pr_debug("  daemon sleep: %ds\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->daemon_sleep));
+	pr_debug("     chunksize: %u B\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->chunksize));
+	pr_debug("  daemon sleep: %us\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->daemon_sleep));
 	pr_debug("     sync size: %llu KB\n",
 		 (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(sb->sync_size)/2);
-	pr_debug("max write behind: %d\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->write_behind));
+	pr_debug("max write behind: %u\n", le32_to_cpu(sb->write_behind));
 	kunmap_atomic(sb);
 }
 
@@ -2101,7 +2101,8 @@ int md_bitmap_resize(struct bitmap *bitm
 			bytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(chunks, 8);
 			if (!bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.external)
 				bytes += sizeof(bitmap_super_t);
-		} while (bytes > (space << 9));
+		} while (bytes > (space << 9) && (chunkshift + BITMAP_BLOCK_SHIFT) <
+			(BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(((bitmap_super_t *)0)->chunksize) - 1));
 	} else
 		chunkshift = ffz(~chunksize) - BITMAP_BLOCK_SHIFT;
 
@@ -2146,7 +2147,7 @@ int md_bitmap_resize(struct bitmap *bitm
 	bitmap->counts.missing_pages = pages;
 	bitmap->counts.chunkshift = chunkshift;
 	bitmap->counts.chunks = chunks;
-	bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = 1 << (chunkshift +
+	bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = 1UL << (chunkshift +
 						     BITMAP_BLOCK_SHIFT);
 
 	blocks = min(old_counts.chunks << old_counts.chunkshift,
@@ -2172,8 +2173,8 @@ int md_bitmap_resize(struct bitmap *bitm
 				bitmap->counts.missing_pages = old_counts.pages;
 				bitmap->counts.chunkshift = old_counts.chunkshift;
 				bitmap->counts.chunks = old_counts.chunks;
-				bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = 1 << (old_counts.chunkshift +
-									     BITMAP_BLOCK_SHIFT);
+				bitmap->mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize =
+					1UL << (old_counts.chunkshift + BITMAP_BLOCK_SHIFT);
 				blocks = old_counts.chunks << old_counts.chunkshift;
 				pr_warn("Could not pre-allocate in-memory bitmap for cluster raid\n");
 				break;
@@ -2499,6 +2500,9 @@ chunksize_store(struct mddev *mddev, con
 	if (csize < 512 ||
 	    !is_power_of_2(csize))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (BITS_PER_LONG > 32 && csize >= (1ULL << (BITS_PER_BYTE *
+		sizeof(((bitmap_super_t *)0)->chunksize))))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
 	mddev->bitmap_info.chunksize = csize;
 	return len;
 }
author maintainer
#395 lore raw

PATCH 395/521 ipmi: fix long wait in unload when IPMI disconnect

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zhang Yuchen <[email protected]>

commit f6f1234d98cce69578bfac79df147a1f6660596c upstream.

When fixing the problem mentioned in PATCH1, we also found the following problem:

If the IPMI is disconnected and in the sending process, the uninstallation driver will be stuck for a long time.

The main problem is that uninstalling the driver waits for curr_msg to be sent or HOSED. After stopping tasklet, the only place to trigger the timeout mechanism is the circular poll in shutdown_smi.

The poll function delays 10us and calls smi_event_handler(smi_info,10). Smi_event_handler deducts 10us from kcs->ibf_timeout.

But the poll func is followed by schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1). The time consumed here is not counted in kcs->ibf_timeout.

So when 10us is deducted from kcs->ibf_timeout, at least 1 jiffies has actually passed. The waiting time has increased by more than a hundredfold.

Now instead of calling poll(). call smi_event_handler() directly and calculate the elapsed time.

For verification, you can directly use ebpf to check the kcs-> ibf_timeout for each call to kcs_event() when IPMI is disconnected. Decrement at normal rate before unloading. The decrement rate becomes very slow after unloading.

  $ bpftrace -e 'kprobe:kcs_event {printf("kcs->ibftimeout : %d\n",
      *(arg0+584));}'

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c |   27 +++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_si_intf.c +19 -8
@@ -2187,6 +2187,20 @@ skip_fallback_noirq:
 }
 module_init(init_ipmi_si);
 
+static void wait_msg_processed(struct smi_info *smi_info)
+{
+	unsigned long jiffies_now;
+	long time_diff;
+
+	while (smi_info->curr_msg || (smi_info->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) {
+		jiffies_now = jiffies;
+		time_diff = (((long)jiffies_now - (long)smi_info->last_timeout_jiffies)
+		     * SI_USEC_PER_JIFFY);
+		smi_event_handler(smi_info, time_diff);
+		schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
+	}
+}
+
 static void shutdown_smi(void *send_info)
 {
 	struct smi_info *smi_info = send_info;
@@ -2221,16 +2235,13 @@ static void shutdown_smi(void *send_info
 	 * in the BMC.  Note that timers and CPU interrupts are off,
 	 * so no need for locks.
 	 */
-	while (smi_info->curr_msg || (smi_info->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) {
-		poll(smi_info);
-		schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
-	}
+	wait_msg_processed(smi_info);
+
 	if (smi_info->handlers)
 		disable_si_irq(smi_info);
-	while (smi_info->curr_msg || (smi_info->si_state != SI_NORMAL)) {
-		poll(smi_info);
-		schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
-	}
+
+	wait_msg_processed(smi_info);
+
 	if (smi_info->handlers)
 		smi_info->handlers->cleanup(smi_info->si_sm);
 
author maintainer
#396 lore raw

PATCH 396/521 ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Huaxin Lu <[email protected]>

commit 11220db412edae8dba58853238f53258268bdb88 upstream.

In restore_template_fmt, when kstrdup fails, a non-NULL value will still be returned, which causes a NULL pointer access in template_desc_init_fields.

Fixes c7d09367702e ("ima: support restoring multiple template formats")
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +4 -1
@@ -266,8 +266,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore
 
 	template_desc->name = "";
 	template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!template_desc->fmt)
+	if (!template_desc->fmt) {
+		kfree(template_desc);
+		template_desc = NULL;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(&template_list);
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates);
author maintainer
#397 lore raw

PATCH 397/521 ipmi: fix use after free in _ipmi_destroy_user()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit a92ce570c81dc0feaeb12a429b4bc65686d17967 upstream.

The intf_free() function frees the "intf" pointer so we cannot dereference it again on the next line.

Fixes cbb79863fc31 ("ipmi: Don't allow device module unload when in use")

Message-Id: <Y3M8xa1drZv4CToE@kili>

---
 drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_msghandler.c +3 -1
@@ -1219,6 +1219,7 @@ static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ip
 	unsigned long    flags;
 	struct cmd_rcvr  *rcvr;
 	struct cmd_rcvr  *rcvrs = NULL;
+	struct module    *owner;
 
 	if (!acquire_ipmi_user(user, &i)) {
 		/*
@@ -1278,8 +1279,9 @@ static void _ipmi_destroy_user(struct ip
 		kfree(rcvr);
 	}
 
+	owner = intf->owner;
 	kref_put(&intf->refcount, intf_free);
-	module_put(intf->owner);
+	module_put(owner);
 }
 
 int ipmi_destroy_user(struct ipmi_user *user)
author maintainer
#398 lore raw

PATCH 398/521 PCI: Fix pci_device_is_present() for VFs by checking PF

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>

commit 98b04dd0b4577894520493d96bc4623387767445 upstream.

pci_device_is_present() previously didn't work for VFs because it reads the Vendor and Device ID, which are 0xffff for VFs, which looks like they aren't present. Check the PF instead.

Wei Gong reported that if virtio I/O is in progress when the driver is unbound or "0" is written to /sys/.../sriov_numvfs, the virtio I/O operation hangs, which may result in output like this:

task:bash state:D stack: 0 pid: 1773 ppid: 1241 flags:0x00004002

  Call Trace:
   schedule+0x4f/0xc0
   blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x69/0xa0
   blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x1b/0x20
   blk_cleanup_queue+0x3d/0xd0
   virtblk_remove+0x3c/0xb0 [virtio_blk]
   virtio_dev_remove+0x4b/0x80
   ...
   device_unregister+0x1b/0x60
   unregister_virtio_device+0x18/0x30
   virtio_pci_remove+0x41/0x80
   pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0

This happened because pci_device_is_present(VF) returned "false" in virtio_pci_remove(), so it called virtio_break_device(). The broken vq meant that vring_interrupt() skipped the vq.callback() that would have completed the virtio I/O operation via virtblk_done().

---
 drivers/pci/pci.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/pci/pci.c +2 -0
@@ -5815,6 +5815,8 @@ bool pci_device_is_present(struct pci_de
 {
 	u32 v;
 
+	/* Check PF if pdev is a VF, since VF Vendor/Device IDs are 0xffff */
+	pdev = pci_physfn(pdev);
 	if (pci_dev_is_disconnected(pdev))
 		return false;
 	return pci_bus_read_dev_vendor_id(pdev->bus, pdev->devfn, &v, 0);
author maintainer
#399 lore raw

PATCH 399/521 PCI/sysfs: Fix double free in error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>

commit aa382ffa705bea9931ec92b6f3c70e1fdb372195 upstream.

When pci_create_attr() fails, pci_remove_resource_files() is called which will iterate over the res_attr[_wc] arrays and frees every non NULL entry. To avoid a double free here set the array entry only after it's clear we successfully initialized it.

Fixes b562ec8f74e4 ("PCI: Don't leak memory if sysfs_create_bin_file() fails")
---
 drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +9 -4
@@ -1289,11 +1289,9 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_de
 
 	sysfs_bin_attr_init(res_attr);
 	if (write_combine) {
-		pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr;
 		sprintf(res_attr_name, "resource%d_wc", num);
 		res_attr->mmap = pci_mmap_resource_wc;
 	} else {
-		pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr;
 		sprintf(res_attr_name, "resource%d", num);
 		if (pci_resource_flags(pdev, num) & IORESOURCE_IO) {
 			res_attr->read = pci_read_resource_io;
@@ -1309,10 +1307,17 @@ static int pci_create_attr(struct pci_de
 	res_attr->size = pci_resource_len(pdev, num);
 	res_attr->private = (void *)(unsigned long)num;
 	retval = sysfs_create_bin_file(&pdev->dev.kobj, res_attr);
-	if (retval)
+	if (retval) {
 		kfree(res_attr);
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	if (write_combine)
+		pdev->res_attr_wc[num] = res_attr;
+	else
+		pdev->res_attr[num] = res_attr;
 
-	return retval;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
author maintainer
#400 lore raw

PATCH 400/521 crypto: n2 - add missing hash statesize

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Corentin Labbe <[email protected]>

commit 76a4e874593543a2dff91d249c95bac728df2774 upstream.

Add missing statesize to hash templates.
This is mandatory otherwise no algorithms can be registered as the core requires statesize to be set.

Fixes 0a625fd2abaa ("crypto: n2 - Add Niagara2 crypto driver")
---
 drivers/crypto/n2_core.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/crypto/n2_core.c +6 -0
@@ -1286,6 +1286,7 @@ struct n2_hash_tmpl {
 	const u32	*hash_init;
 	u8		hw_op_hashsz;
 	u8		digest_size;
+	u8		statesize;
 	u8		block_size;
 	u8		auth_type;
 	u8		hmac_type;
@@ -1317,6 +1318,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_MD5,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct md5_state),
 	  .block_size	= MD5_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha1",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha1_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1325,6 +1327,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha1_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha256",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha256_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1333,6 +1336,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha256_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE },
 	{ .name		= "sha224",
 	  .hash_zero	= sha224_zero_message_hash,
@@ -1341,6 +1345,7 @@ static const struct n2_hash_tmpl hash_tm
 	  .hmac_type	= AUTH_TYPE_RESERVED,
 	  .hw_op_hashsz	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	  .digest_size	= SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	  .statesize	= sizeof(struct sha256_state),
 	  .block_size	= SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE },
 };
 #define NUM_HASH_TMPLS ARRAY_SIZE(hash_tmpls)
@@ -1482,6 +1487,7 @@ static int __n2_register_one_ahash(const
 
 	halg = &ahash->halg;
 	halg->digestsize = tmpl->digest_size;
+	halg->statesize = tmpl->statesize;
 
 	base = &halg->base;
 	snprintf(base->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s", tmpl->name);
author maintainer
#401 lore raw

PATCH 401/521 iommu/amd: Fix ivrs_acpihid cmdline parsing code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>

commit 5f18e9f8868c6d4eae71678e7ebd4977b7d8c8cf upstream.

The second (UID) strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match considers "0" and "00" different, which can prevent device registration.

Have the AMD IOMMU driver's ivrs_acpihid parsing code remove any leading zeroes to make the UID strcmp succeed. Now users can safely specify "AMDxxxxx:00" or "AMDxxxxx:0" and expect the same behaviour.

Fixes ca3bf5d47cec ("iommu/amd: Introduces ivrs_acpihid kernel parameter")
Cc Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>
Cc Joerg Roedel <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c +7 -0
@@ -2946,6 +2946,13 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(cha
 		return 1;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Ignore leading zeroes after ':', so e.g., AMDI0095:00
+	 * will match AMDI0095:0 in the second strcmp in acpi_dev_hid_uid_match
+	 */
+	while (*uid == '0' && *(uid + 1))
+		uid++;
+
 	i = early_acpihid_map_size++;
 	memcpy(early_acpihid_map[i].hid, hid, strlen(hid));
 	memcpy(early_acpihid_map[i].uid, uid, strlen(uid));
author maintainer
#402 lore raw

PATCH 402/521 parisc: led: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in start_task()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shang XiaoJing <[email protected]>

commit 41f563ab3c33698bdfc3403c7c2e6c94e73681e4 upstream.

start_task() calls create_singlethread_workqueue() and not checked the ret value, which may return NULL. And a null-ptr-deref may happen:

start_task()
create_singlethread_workqueue() # failed, led_wq is NULL queue_delayed_work()
queue_delayed_work_on()
__queue_delayed_work() # warning here, but continue
__queue_work() # access wq->flags, null-ptr-deref

Check the ret value and return -ENOMEM if it is NULL.

Fixes 3499495205a6 ("[PARISC] Use work queue in LED/LCD driver instead of tasklet.")
---
 drivers/parisc/led.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/parisc/led.c +3 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ static int start_task(void)
 
 	/* Create the work queue and queue the LED task */
 	led_wq = create_singlethread_workqueue("led_wq");	
+	if (!led_wq)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	queue_delayed_work(led_wq, &led_task, 0);
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#403 lore raw

PATCH 403/521 device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wang Weiyang <[email protected]>

commit e68bfbd3b3c3a0ec3cf8c230996ad8cabe90322f upstream.

When add the 'a *:* rwm' entry to devcgroup A's whitelist, at first A's exceptions will be cleaned and A's behavior is changed to DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW. Then parent's exceptions will be copyed to A's whitelist. If copy failure occurs, just return leaving A to grant permissions to all devices. And A may grant more permissions than parent.

Backup A's whitelist and recover original exceptions after copy failure.

Fixes 4cef7299b478 ("device_cgroup: add proper checking when changing default behavior")
---
 security/device_cgroup.c |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +29 -4
@@ -79,6 +79,17 @@ free_and_exit:
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
+static void dev_exceptions_move(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
+{
+	struct dev_exception_item *ex, *tmp;
+
+	lockdep_assert_held(&devcgroup_mutex);
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(ex, tmp, orig, list) {
+		list_move_tail(&ex->list, dest);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * called under devcgroup_mutex
  */
@@ -600,11 +611,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struc
 	int count, rc = 0;
 	struct dev_exception_item ex;
 	struct dev_cgroup *parent = css_to_devcgroup(devcgroup->css.parent);
+	struct dev_cgroup tmp_devcgrp;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	memset(&ex, 0, sizeof(ex));
+	memset(&tmp_devcgrp, 0, sizeof(tmp_devcgrp));
 	b = buffer;
 
 	switch (*b) {
@@ -616,15 +629,27 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struc
 
 			if (!may_allow_all(parent))
 				return -EPERM;
-			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
-			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
-			if (!parent)
+			if (!parent) {
+				devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+				dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 				break;
+			}
 
+			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
+			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&tmp_devcgrp.exceptions,
+						 &devcgroup->exceptions);
+			if (rc)
+				return rc;
+			dev_exception_clean(devcgroup);
 			rc = dev_exceptions_copy(&devcgroup->exceptions,
 						 &parent->exceptions);
-			if (rc)
+			if (rc) {
+				dev_exceptions_move(&devcgroup->exceptions,
+						    &tmp_devcgrp.exceptions);
 				return rc;
+			}
+			devcgroup->behavior = DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW;
+			dev_exception_clean(&tmp_devcgrp);
 			break;
 		case DEVCG_DENY:
 			if (css_has_online_children(&devcgroup->css))
author maintainer
#404 lore raw

PATCH 404/521 drm/connector: send hotplug uevent on connector cleanup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Simon Ser <[email protected]>

commit 6fdc2d490ea1369d17afd7e6eb66fecc5b7209bc upstream.

A typical DP-MST unplug removes a KMS connector. However care must be taken to properly synchronize with user-space. The expected sequence of events is the following:

1. The kernel notices that the DP-MST port is gone.
2. The kernel marks the connector as disconnected, then sends a uevent to make user-space re-scan the connector list.
3. User-space notices the connector goes from connected to disconnected, disables it.
4. Kernel handles the IOCTL disabling the connector. On success, the very last reference to the struct drm_connector is dropped and drm_connector_cleanup() is called.
5. The connector is removed from the list, and a uevent is sent to tell user-space that the connector disappeared.

The very last step was missing. As a result, user-space thought the connector still existed and could try to disable it again. Since the kernel no longer knows about the connector, that would end up with EINVAL and confused user-space.

Fix this by sending a hotplug uevent from drm_connector_cleanup().

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c +3 -0
@@ -413,6 +413,9 @@ void drm_connector_cleanup(struct drm_co
 	mutex_destroy(&connector->mutex);
 
 	memset(connector, 0, sizeof(*connector));
+
+	if (dev->registered)
+		drm_sysfs_hotplug_event(dev);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_cleanup);
 
author maintainer
#405 lore raw

PATCH 405/521 drm/vmwgfx: Validate the box size for the snooped cursor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Zack Rusin <[email protected]>

commit 4cf949c7fafe21e085a4ee386bb2dade9067316e upstream.

Invalid userspace dma surface copies could potentially overflow the memcpy from the surface to the snooped image leading to crashes. To fix it the dimensions of the copybox have to be validated against the expected size of the snooped cursor.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_kms.c +2 -1
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ void vmw_kms_cursor_snoop(struct vmw_sur
 	if (cmd->dma.guest.ptr.offset % PAGE_SIZE ||
 	    box->x != 0    || box->y != 0    || box->z != 0    ||
 	    box->srcx != 0 || box->srcy != 0 || box->srcz != 0 ||
-	    box->d != 1    || box_count != 1) {
+	    box->d != 1    || box_count != 1 ||
+	    box->w > 64 || box->h > 64) {
 		/* TODO handle none page aligned offsets */
 		/* TODO handle more dst & src != 0 */
 		/* TODO handle more then one copy */
author maintainer
#406 lore raw

PATCH 406/521 ext4: add inode table check in __ext4_get_inode_loc to aovid possible infinite loop

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit eee22187b53611e173161e38f61de1c7ecbeb876 upstream.

In do_writepages, if the value returned by ext4_writepages is "-ENOMEM" and "wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL", retry until the condition is not met.

In __ext4_get_inode_loc, if the bh returned by sb_getblk is NULL, the function returns -ENOMEM.

In __getblk_slow, if the return value of grow_buffers is less than 0, the function returns NULL.

When the three processes are connected in series like the following stack, an infinite loop may occur:

do_writepages <--- keep retrying
ext4_writepages
mpage_map_and_submit_extent
mpage_map_one_extent

    ext4_map_blocks
     ext4_ext_map_blocks
      ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents
       ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized
        ext4_split_extent
         ext4_split_extent_at
          __ext4_ext_dirty
           __ext4_mark_inode_dirty
            ext4_reserve_inode_write
             ext4_get_inode_loc
              __ext4_get_inode_loc		<--- return -ENOMEM
               sb_getblk
                __getblk_gfp
                 __getblk_slow			<--- return NULL
                  grow_buffers
                   grow_dev_page		<--- return -ENXIO
                    ret = (block < end_block) ? 1 : -ENXIO;

In this issue, bg_inode_table_hi is overwritten as an incorrect value. As a result, block < end_block cannot be met in grow_dev_page. Therefore, __ext4_get_inode_loc always returns '-ENOMEM' and do_writepages keeps retrying. As a result, the writeback process is in the D state due to an infinite loop.

Add a check on inode table block in the __ext4_get_inode_loc function by referring to ext4_read_inode_bitmap to avoid this infinite loop.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +9 -1
@@ -4663,9 +4663,17 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct i
 	inodes_per_block = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_inodes_per_block;
 	inode_offset = ((inode->i_ino - 1) %
 			EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb));
-	block = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp) + (inode_offset / inodes_per_block);
 	iloc->offset = (inode_offset % inodes_per_block) * EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb);
 
+	block = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
+	if ((block <= le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_first_data_block)) ||
+	    (block >= ext4_blocks_count(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es))) {
+		ext4_error(sb, "Invalid inode table block %llu in "
+			   "block_group %u", block, iloc->block_group);
+		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+	}
+	block += (inode_offset / inodes_per_block);
+
 	bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
 	if (unlikely(!bh))
 		return -ENOMEM;
author maintainer
#407 lore raw

PATCH 407/521 ext4: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for ext4_check_flag_values

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

commit 3bf678a0f9c017c9ba7c581541dbc8453452a7ae upstream.

Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ext4/ext4.h:591:2
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5
 dump_stack+0x15/0x1b
 ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c
 ext4_init_fs+0x5a/0x277
 do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430
 kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422
 kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
 </TASK>
Fixes 9a4c80194713 ("ext4: ensure Inode flags consistency are checked at build time")
---
 fs/ext4/ext4.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ext4.h +1 -1
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ enum {
  *
  * It's not paranoia if the Murphy's Law really *is* out to get you.  :-)
  */
-#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1 << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG))
+#define TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) (EXT4_##FLAG##_FL == (1U << EXT4_INODE_##FLAG))
 #define CHECK_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG) BUILD_BUG_ON(!TEST_FLAG_VALUE(FLAG))
 
 static inline void ext4_check_flag_values(void)
author maintainer
#408 lore raw

PATCH 408/521 ext4: add helper to check quota inums

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 07342ec259df2a35d6a34aebce010567a80a0e15 upstream.

Before quota is enabled, a check on the preset quota inums in ext4_super_block is added to prevent wrong quota inodes from being loaded. In addition, when the quota fails to be enabled, the quota type and quota inum are printed to facilitate fault locating.

---
 fs/ext4/super.c |   28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +25 -3
@@ -5839,6 +5839,20 @@ static int ext4_quota_on(struct super_bl
 	return err;
 }
 
+static inline bool ext4_check_quota_inum(int type, unsigned long qf_inum)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case USRQUOTA:
+		return qf_inum == EXT4_USR_QUOTA_INO;
+	case GRPQUOTA:
+		return qf_inum == EXT4_GRP_QUOTA_INO;
+	case PRJQUOTA:
+		return qf_inum >= EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO;
+	default:
+		BUG();
+	}
+}
+
 static int ext4_quota_enable(struct super_block *sb, int type, int format_id,
 			     unsigned int flags)
 {
@@ -5855,9 +5869,16 @@ static int ext4_quota_enable(struct supe
 	if (!qf_inums[type])
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (!ext4_check_quota_inum(type, qf_inums[type])) {
+		ext4_error(sb, "Bad quota inum: %lu, type: %d",
+				qf_inums[type], type);
+		return -EUCLEAN;
+	}
+
 	qf_inode = ext4_iget(sb, qf_inums[type], EXT4_IGET_SPECIAL);
 	if (IS_ERR(qf_inode)) {
-		ext4_error(sb, "Bad quota inode # %lu", qf_inums[type]);
+		ext4_error(sb, "Bad quota inode: %lu, type: %d",
+				qf_inums[type], type);
 		return PTR_ERR(qf_inode);
 	}
 
@@ -5896,8 +5917,9 @@ static int ext4_enable_quotas(struct sup
 			if (err) {
 				ext4_warning(sb,
 					"Failed to enable quota tracking "
-					"(type=%d, err=%d). Please run "
-					"e2fsck to fix.", type, err);
+					"(type=%d, err=%d, ino=%lu). "
+					"Please run e2fsck to fix.", type,
+					err, qf_inums[type]);
 				for (type--; type >= 0; type--) {
 					struct inode *inode;
 
author maintainer
#409 lore raw

PATCH 409/521 ext4: fix bug_on in __es_tree_search caused by bad boot loader inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 991ed014de0840c5dc405b679168924afb2952ac upstream.

We got a issue as fllows:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:203!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP

 CPU: 1 PID: 945 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.0.0-next-20221007-dirty #349
 RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end.isra.0+0x34/0x42
 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000143b768 EFLAGS: 00010203
 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881769cd0b8 RCX: 0000000000000000
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fc27cf7 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
 RBP: ffff8881769cd0bc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000143b5f8
 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881769cd0a0
 R13: ffff8881768e5668 R14: 00000000768e52f0 R15: 0000000000000000
 FS: 00007f359f7f05c0(0000)GS:ffff88842fd00000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 00007f359f5a2000 CR3: 000000017130c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __es_tree_search.isra.0+0x6d/0xf5
  ext4_es_cache_extent+0xfa/0x230
  ext4_cache_extents+0xd2/0x110
  ext4_find_extent+0x5d5/0x8c0
  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x9c/0x1d30
  ext4_map_blocks+0x431/0xa50
  ext4_mpage_readpages+0x48e/0xe40
  ext4_readahead+0x47/0x50
  read_pages+0x82/0x530
  page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x199/0x2a0
  do_page_cache_ra+0x47/0x70
  page_cache_ra_order+0x242/0x400
  ondemand_readahead+0x1e8/0x4b0
  page_cache_sync_ra+0xf4/0x110
  filemap_get_pages+0x131/0xb20
  filemap_read+0xda/0x4b0
  generic_file_read_iter+0x13a/0x250
  ext4_file_read_iter+0x59/0x1d0
  vfs_read+0x28f/0x460
  ksys_read+0x73/0x160
  __x64_sys_read+0x1e/0x30
  do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  </TASK>
==================================================================

In the above issue, ioctl invokes the swap_inode_boot_loader function to swap inode<5> and inode<12>. However, inode<5> contain incorrect imode and disordered extents, and i_nlink is set to 1. The extents check for inode in the ext4_iget function can be bypassed bacause 5 is EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO. While links_count is set to 1, the extents are not initialized in swap_inode_boot_loader. After the ioctl command is executed successfully, the extents are swapped to inode<12>, in this case, run the cat command to view inode<12>. And Bug_ON is triggered due to the incorrect extents.

When the boot loader inode is not initialized, its imode can be one of the following:
1) the imode is a bad type, which is marked as bad_inode in ext4_iget and set to S_IFREG.
2) the imode is good type but not S_IFREG.
3) the imode is S_IFREG.

The BUG_ON may be triggered by bypassing the check in cases 1 and 2. Therefore, when the boot loader inode is bad_inode or its imode is not S_IFREG, initialize the inode to avoid triggering the BUG.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static long swap_inode_boot_loader(struc
 	/* Protect extent tree against block allocations via delalloc */
 	ext4_double_down_write_data_sem(inode, inode_bl);
 
-	if (inode_bl->i_nlink == 0) {
+	if (is_bad_inode(inode_bl) || !S_ISREG(inode_bl->i_mode)) {
 		/* this inode has never been used as a BOOT_LOADER */
 		set_nlink(inode_bl, 1);
 		i_uid_write(inode_bl, 0);
author maintainer
#410 lore raw

PATCH 410/521 ext4: init quota for old.inode in ext4_rename

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

commit fae381a3d79bb94aa2eb752170d47458d778b797 upstream.

Syzbot found the following issue:
ext4_parse_param: s_want_extra_isize=128
ext4_inode_info_init: s_want_extra_isize=32
ext4_rename: old.inode=ffff88823869a2c8 old.dir=ffff888238699828 new.inode=ffff88823869d7e8 new.dir=ffff888238699828 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff888238699828 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty: inode=ffff88823869a2c8 ea_isize=32 want_ea_size=128
ext4_xattr_block_set: inode=ffff88823869a2c8

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2234 at fs/ext4/xattr.c:2070 ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980
Modules linked in:
RIP: 0010:ext4_xattr_block_set.cold+0x22/0x980
RSP: 0018:ffff888227d3f3b0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff88823007a000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000a03 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff888230078178
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000000000000002c R09: ffffed1075c7df8e
R10: ffff8883ae3efc6b R11: ffffed1075c7df8d R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88823869a2c8 R14: ffff8881012e0460 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f350ac1f740(0000) GS:ffff8883ae200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f350a6ed6a0 CR3: 0000000237456000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x3b7/0x2320
 ? ext4_xattr_block_set+0x0/0x2020
 ? ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x0/0x2320
 ? ext4_xattr_check_entries+0x77/0x310
 ? ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x23b/0x340
 ext4_xattr_move_to_block+0x594/0x720
 ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x59a/0x10f0
 __ext4_expand_extra_isize+0x278/0x3f0
 __ext4_mark_inode_dirty.cold+0x347/0x410
 ext4_rename+0xed3/0x174f
 vfs_rename+0x13a7/0x2510
 do_renameat2+0x55d/0x920
 __x64_sys_rename+0x7d/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xa0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc

As 'ext4_rename' will modify 'old.inode' ctime and mark inode dirty, which may trigger expand 'extra_isize' and allocate block. If inode didn't init quota will lead to warning. To solve above issue, init 'old.inode' firstly in 'ext4_rename'.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/namei.c +3 -0
@@ -3870,6 +3870,9 @@ static int ext4_cross_rename(struct inod
 	retval = dquot_initialize(old.dir);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
+	retval = dquot_initialize(old.inode);
+	if (retval)
+		return retval;
 	retval = dquot_initialize(new.dir);
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
author maintainer
#411 lore raw

PATCH 411/521 ext4: fix corruption when online resizing a 1K bigalloc fs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 0aeaa2559d6d53358fca3e3fce73807367adca74 upstream.

When a backup superblock is updated in update_backups(), the primary superblock's offset in the group (that is, sbi->s_sbh->b_blocknr) is used as the backup superblock's offset in its group. However, when the block size is 1K and bigalloc is enabled, the two offsets are not equal. This causes the backup group descriptors to be overwritten by the superblock in update_backups(). Moreover, if meta_bg is enabled, the file system will be corrupted because this feature uses backup group descriptors.

To solve this issue, we use a more accurate ext4_group_first_block_no() as the offset of the backup superblock in its group.

Fixes d77147ff443b ("ext4: add support for online resizing with bigalloc")
---
 fs/ext4/resize.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/resize.c +3 -3
@@ -1567,8 +1567,8 @@ exit_journal:
 		int meta_bg = ext4_has_feature_meta_bg(sb);
 		sector_t old_gdb = 0;
 
-		update_backups(sb, sbi->s_sbh->b_blocknr, (char *)es,
-			       sizeof(struct ext4_super_block), 0);
+		update_backups(sb, ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, 0),
+			       (char *)es, sizeof(struct ext4_super_block), 0);
 		for (; gdb_num <= gdb_num_end; gdb_num++) {
 			struct buffer_head *gdb_bh;
 
@@ -1775,7 +1775,7 @@ errout:
 		if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
 			printk(KERN_DEBUG "EXT4-fs: extended group to %llu "
 			       "blocks\n", ext4_blocks_count(es));
-		update_backups(sb, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh->b_blocknr,
+		update_backups(sb, ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, 0),
 			       (char *)es, sizeof(struct ext4_super_block), 0);
 	}
 	return err;
author maintainer
#412 lore raw

PATCH 412/521 ext4: fix error code return to user-space in ext4_get_branch()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luís Henriques <[email protected]>

commit 26d75a16af285a70863ba6a81f85d81e7e65da50 upstream.

If a block is out of range in ext4_get_branch(), -ENOMEM will be returned to user-space. Obviously, this error code isn't really useful. This patch fixes it by making sure the right error code (-EFSCORRUPTED) is propagated to user-space. EUCLEAN is more informative than ENOMEM.

---
 fs/ext4/indirect.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/indirect.c +8 -1
@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(struct
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	Indirect *p = chain;
 	struct buffer_head *bh;
+	unsigned int key;
 	int ret = -EIO;
 
 	*err = 0;
@@ -156,7 +157,13 @@ static Indirect *ext4_get_branch(struct
 	if (!p->key)
 		goto no_block;
 	while (--depth) {
-		bh = sb_getblk(sb, le32_to_cpu(p->key));
+		key = le32_to_cpu(p->key);
+		if (key > ext4_blocks_count(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es)) {
+			/* the block was out of range */
+			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+			goto failure;
+		}
+		bh = sb_getblk(sb, key);
 		if (unlikely(!bh)) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto failure;
author maintainer
#413 lore raw

PATCH 413/521 ext4: avoid BUG_ON when creating xattrs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit b40ebaf63851b3a401b0dc9263843538f64f5ce6 upstream.

Commit fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32") added code to try to allocate xattr block with 32-bit block number for indirect block based files on the grounds that these files cannot use larger block numbers. It also added BUG_ON when allocated block could not fit into 32 bits. This is however bogus reasoning because xattr block is stored in inode->i_file_acl and inode->i_file_acl_hi and as such even indirect block based files can happily use full 48 bits for xattr block number. The proper handling seems to be there basically since 64-bit block number support was added. So remove the bogus limitation and BUG_ON.

Cc Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Fixes fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32")
---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    8 --------
 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +0 -8
@@ -2070,19 +2070,11 @@ inserted:
 
 			goal = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb,
 						EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_group);
-
-			/* non-extent files can't have physical blocks past 2^32 */
-			if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
-				goal = goal & EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS;
-
 			block = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, 0,
 						     NULL, &error);
 			if (error)
 				goto cleanup;
 
-			if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
-				BUG_ON(block > EXT4_MAX_BLOCK_FILE_PHYS);
-
 			ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %llu",
 				  (unsigned long long)block);
 
author maintainer
#414 lore raw

PATCH 414/521 ext4: fix inode leak in ext4_xattr_inode_create() on an error path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

commit e4db04f7d3dbbe16680e0ded27ea2a65b10f766a upstream.

There is issue as follows when do setxattr with inject fault:

[localhost]# fsck.ext4 -fn /dev/sda
e2fsck 1.46.6-rc1 (12-Sep-2022)
Pass 1: Checking inodes, blocks, and sizes
Pass 2: Checking directory structure
Pass 3: Checking directory connectivity
Pass 4: Checking reference counts
Unattached zero-length inode 15. Clear? no

Unattached inode 15
Connect to /lost+found? no

Pass 5: Checking group summary information

/dev/sda: ********** WARNING: Filesystem still has errors **********

/dev/sda: 15/655360 files (0.0% non-contiguous), 66755/2621440 blocks

This occurs in 'ext4_xattr_inode_create()'. If 'ext4_mark_inode_dirty()' fails, dropping i_nlink of the inode is needed. Or will lead to inode leak.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +3 -0
@@ -1446,6 +1446,9 @@ static struct inode *ext4_xattr_inode_cr
 		if (!err)
 			err = ext4_inode_attach_jinode(ea_inode);
 		if (err) {
+			if (ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref(handle, ea_inode))
+				ext4_warning_inode(ea_inode,
+					"cleanup dec ref error %d", err);
 			iput(ea_inode);
 			return ERR_PTR(err);
 		}
author maintainer
#415 lore raw

PATCH 415/521 ext4: initialize quota before expanding inode in setproject ioctl

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 1485f726c6dec1a1f85438f2962feaa3d585526f upstream.

Make sure we initialize quotas before possibly expanding inode space (and thus maybe needing to allocate external xattr block) in ext4_ioctl_setproject(). This prevents not accounting the necessary block allocation.

---
 fs/ext4/ioctl.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +4 -4
@@ -449,6 +449,10 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(struct
 	if (ext4_is_quota_file(inode))
 		return err;
 
+	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	err = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -464,10 +468,6 @@ static int ext4_ioctl_setproject(struct
 		brelse(iloc.bh);
 	}
 
-	err = dquot_initialize(inode);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_QUOTA,
 		EXT4_QUOTA_INIT_BLOCKS(sb) +
 		EXT4_QUOTA_DEL_BLOCKS(sb) + 3);
author maintainer
#416 lore raw

PATCH 416/521 ext4: avoid unaccounted block allocation when expanding inode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 8994d11395f8165b3deca1971946f549f0822630 upstream.

When expanding inode space in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() we may need to allocate external xattr block. If quota is not initialized for the inode, the block allocation will not be accounted into quota usage. Make sure the quota is initialized before we try to expand inode space.

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
fs/ext4/inode.c +8 -0
@@ -6041,6 +6041,14 @@ static int __ext4_expand_extra_isize(str
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * We may need to allocate external xattr block so we need quotas
+	 * initialized. Here we can be called with various locks held so we
+	 * cannot affort to initialize quotas ourselves. So just bail.
+	 */
+	if (dquot_initialize_needed(inode))
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
 	/* try to expand with EAs present */
 	error = ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(inode, new_extra_isize,
 					   raw_inode, handle);
author maintainer
#417 lore raw

PATCH 417/521 ext4: allocate extended attribute value in vmalloc area

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ye Bin <[email protected]>

commit cc12a6f25e07ed05d5825a1664b67a970842b2ca upstream.

Now, extended attribute value maximum length is 64K. The memory requested here does not need continuous physical addresses, so it is appropriate to use kvmalloc to request memory. At the same time, it can also cope with the situation that the extended attribute will become longer in the future.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -2570,7 +2570,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_move_to_block(hand
 
 	is = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_ibody_find), GFP_NOFS);
 	bs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ext4_xattr_block_find), GFP_NOFS);
-	buffer = kmalloc(value_size, GFP_NOFS);
+	buffer = kvmalloc(value_size, GFP_NOFS);
 	b_entry_name = kmalloc(entry->e_name_len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
 	if (!is || !bs || !buffer || !b_entry_name) {
 		error = -ENOMEM;
@@ -2622,7 +2622,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_move_to_block(hand
 	error = 0;
 out:
 	kfree(b_entry_name);
-	kfree(buffer);
+	kvfree(buffer);
 	if (is)
 		brelse(is->iloc.bh);
 	if (bs)
author maintainer
#418 lore raw

PATCH 418/521 drm/amdgpu: make display pinning more flexible (v2)

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>

commit 81d0bcf9900932633d270d5bc4a54ff599c6ebdb upstream.

Only apply the static threshold for Stoney and Carrizo. This hardware has certain requirements that don't allow mixing of GTT and VRAM. Newer asics do not have these requirements so we should be able to be more flexible with where buffers end up.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_object.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_object.c +2 -1
@@ -1387,7 +1387,8 @@ u64 amdgpu_bo_gpu_offset(struct amdgpu_b
 uint32_t amdgpu_bo_get_preferred_pin_domain(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
 					    uint32_t domain)
 {
-	if (domain == (AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_VRAM | AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_GTT)) {
+	if ((domain == (AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_VRAM | AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_GTT)) &&
+	    ((adev->asic_type == CHIP_CARRIZO) || (adev->asic_type == CHIP_STONEY))) {
 		domain = AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_VRAM;
 		if (adev->gmc.real_vram_size <= AMDGPU_SG_THRESHOLD)
 			domain = AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_GTT;
author maintainer
#419 lore raw

PATCH 419/521 btrfs: send: avoid unnecessary backref lookups when finding clone source

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 22a3c0ac8ed0043af209a15928ae4c4855b0a4c4 ]

At find_extent_clone(), unless we are given an inline extent, a file extent item that represents hole or an extent that starts beyond the i_size, we always do backref walking to look for clone sources, unless if we have more than SEND_MAX_EXTENT_REFS (64) known references on the extent.

However if we know we only have one reference in the extent item and only one clone source (the send root), then it's pointless to do the backref walking to search for clone sources, as we can't clone from any other root. So skip the backref walking in that case.

The following test was run on a non-debug kernel (Debian's default kernel config):

   $ cat test.sh
   #!/bin/bash

DEV=/dev/sdi
MNT=/mnt/sdi

mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
mount $DEV $MNT

# Create an extent tree that's not too small and none of the

   # extents is shared.
   for ((i = 1; i <= 50000; i++)); do
      xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 4K" $MNT/file_$i > /dev/null
      echo -ne "\r$i files created..."
   done
   echo

btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT $MNT/snap

   start=$(date +%s%N)
   btrfs send $MNT/snap > /dev/null
   end=$(date +%s%N)

   dur=$(( (end - start) / 1000000 ))
   echo -e "\nsend took $dur milliseconds"

umount $MNT

Before this change:

send took 5389 milliseconds

After this change:

send took 4519 milliseconds (-16.1%)

Stable-dep-of: 63d5429f68a3 ("btrfs: replace strncpy() with strscpy()")

---
 fs/btrfs/send.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/send.c +10 -1
index eb2f8e84ffc9..80d248e88761 100644
@@ -1306,6 +1306,7 @@ static int find_extent_clone(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 	u64 disk_byte;
 	u64 num_bytes;
 	u64 extent_item_pos;
+	u64 extent_refs;
 	u64 flags = 0;
 	struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
 	struct extent_buffer *eb = path->nodes[0];
@@ -1373,14 +1374,22 @@ static int find_extent_clone(struct send_ctx *sctx,
 
 	ei = btrfs_item_ptr(tmp_path->nodes[0], tmp_path->slots[0],
 			    struct btrfs_extent_item);
+	extent_refs = btrfs_extent_refs(tmp_path->nodes[0], ei);
 	/*
 	 * Backreference walking (iterate_extent_inodes() below) is currently
 	 * too expensive when an extent has a large number of references, both
 	 * in time spent and used memory. So for now just fallback to write
 	 * operations instead of clone operations when an extent has more than
 	 * a certain amount of references.
+	 *
+	 * Also, if we have only one reference and only the send root as a clone
+	 * source - meaning no clone roots were given in the struct
+	 * btrfs_ioctl_send_args passed to the send ioctl - then it's our
+	 * reference and there's no point in doing backref walking which is
+	 * expensive, so exit early.
 	 */
-	if (btrfs_extent_refs(tmp_path->nodes[0], ei) > SEND_MAX_EXTENT_REFS) {
+	if ((extent_refs == 1 && sctx->clone_roots_cnt == 1) ||
+	    extent_refs > SEND_MAX_EXTENT_REFS) {
 		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#420 lore raw

PATCH 420/521 btrfs: replace strncpy() with strscpy()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

[ Upstream commit 63d5429f68a3d4c4aa27e65a05196c17f86c41d6 ]

Using strncpy() on NUL-terminated strings are deprecated. To avoid possible forming of non-terminated string strscpy() should be used.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c      | 9 +++------
 fs/btrfs/rcu-string.h | 6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +3 -6
index 752b5d265284..4f2513388567 100644
@@ -3234,13 +3234,10 @@ static long btrfs_ioctl_dev_info(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 	di_args->bytes_used = btrfs_device_get_bytes_used(dev);
 	di_args->total_bytes = btrfs_device_get_total_bytes(dev);
 	memcpy(di_args->uuid, dev->uuid, sizeof(di_args->uuid));
-	if (dev->name) {
-		strncpy(di_args->path, rcu_str_deref(dev->name),
-				sizeof(di_args->path) - 1);
-		di_args->path[sizeof(di_args->path) - 1] = 0;
-	} else {
+	if (dev->name)
+		strscpy(di_args->path, rcu_str_deref(dev->name), sizeof(di_args->path));
+	else
 		di_args->path[0] = '\0';
-	}
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
fs/btrfs/rcu-string.h +5 -1
index a97dc74a4d3d..02f15321cecc 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ static inline struct rcu_string *rcu_string_strdup(const char *src, gfp_t mask)
 					 (len * sizeof(char)), mask);
 	if (!ret)
 		return ret;
-	strncpy(ret->str, src, len);
+	/* Warn if the source got unexpectedly truncated. */
+	if (WARN_ON(strscpy(ret->str, src, len) < 0)) {
+		kfree(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#421 lore raw

PATCH 421/521 media: s5p-mfc: Fix to handle reference queue during finishing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Smitha T Murthy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d8a46bc4e1e0446459daa77c4ce14218d32dacf9 ]

On receiving last buffer driver puts MFC to MFCINST_FINISHING state which in turn skips transferring of frame from SRC to REF queue. This causes driver to stop MFC encoding and last frame is lost.

This patch guarantees safe handling of frames during MFCINST_FINISHING and correct clearing of workbit to avoid early stopping of encoding.

Fixes af9357467810 ("[media] MFC: Add MFC 5.1 V4L2 driver")
---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_enc.c | 12 ++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_enc.c +10 -2
index 3ad4f5073002..cc8d101eb2b0 100644
@@ -1224,6 +1224,7 @@ static int enc_post_frame_start(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 	unsigned long mb_y_addr, mb_c_addr;
 	int slice_type;
 	unsigned int strm_size;
+	bool src_ready;
 
 	slice_type = s5p_mfc_hw_call(dev->mfc_ops, get_enc_slice_type, dev);
 	strm_size = s5p_mfc_hw_call(dev->mfc_ops, get_enc_strm_size, dev);
@@ -1263,7 +1264,8 @@ static int enc_post_frame_start(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-	if ((ctx->src_queue_cnt > 0) && (ctx->state == MFCINST_RUNNING)) {
+	if (ctx->src_queue_cnt > 0 && (ctx->state == MFCINST_RUNNING ||
+				       ctx->state == MFCINST_FINISHING)) {
 		mb_entry = list_entry(ctx->src_queue.next, struct s5p_mfc_buf,
 									list);
 		if (mb_entry->flags & MFC_BUF_FLAG_USED) {
@@ -1294,7 +1296,13 @@ static int enc_post_frame_start(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 		vb2_set_plane_payload(&mb_entry->b->vb2_buf, 0, strm_size);
 		vb2_buffer_done(&mb_entry->b->vb2_buf, VB2_BUF_STATE_DONE);
 	}
-	if ((ctx->src_queue_cnt == 0) || (ctx->dst_queue_cnt == 0))
+
+	src_ready = true;
+	if (ctx->state == MFCINST_RUNNING && ctx->src_queue_cnt == 0)
+		src_ready = false;
+	if (ctx->state == MFCINST_FINISHING && ctx->ref_queue_cnt == 0)
+		src_ready = false;
+	if (!src_ready || ctx->dst_queue_cnt == 0)
 		clear_work_bit(ctx);
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#422 lore raw

PATCH 422/521 media: s5p-mfc: Clear workbit to handle error condition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Smitha T Murthy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d3f3c2fe54e30b0636496d842ffbb5ad3a547f9b ]

During error on CLOSE_INSTANCE command, ctx_work_bits was not getting cleared. During consequent mfc execution NULL pointer dereferencing of this context led to kernel panic. This patch fixes this issue by making sure to clear ctx_work_bits always.

Fixes 818cd91ab8c6 ("[media] s5p-mfc: Extract open/close MFC instance commands")
---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_ctrl.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_ctrl.c +3 -1
index ee7b15b335e0..31bbf1cc5388 100644
@@ -472,8 +472,10 @@ void s5p_mfc_close_mfc_inst(struct s5p_mfc_dev *dev, struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 	s5p_mfc_hw_call(dev->mfc_ops, try_run, dev);
 	/* Wait until instance is returned or timeout occurred */
 	if (s5p_mfc_wait_for_done_ctx(ctx,
-				S5P_MFC_R2H_CMD_CLOSE_INSTANCE_RET, 0))
+				S5P_MFC_R2H_CMD_CLOSE_INSTANCE_RET, 0)){
+		clear_work_bit_irqsave(ctx);
 		mfc_err("Err returning instance\n");
+	}
 
 	/* Free resources */
 	s5p_mfc_hw_call(dev->mfc_ops, release_codec_buffers, ctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#423 lore raw

PATCH 423/521 media: s5p-mfc: Fix in register read and write for H264

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Smitha T Murthy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 06710cd5d2436135046898d7e4b9408c8bb99446 ]

Few of the H264 encoder registers written were not getting reflected since the read values were not stored and getting overwritten.

Fixes 6a9c6f681257 ("[media] s5p-mfc: Add variants to access mfc registers")
---
 drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_opr_v6.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s5p-mfc/s5p_mfc_opr_v6.c +7 -7
index 7c629be43205..1171b76df036 100644
@@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ static int s5p_mfc_set_enc_params_h264(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 	}
 
 	/* aspect ratio VUI */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 5);
 	reg |= ((p_h264->vui_sar & 0x1) << 5);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static int s5p_mfc_set_enc_params_h264(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 
 	/* intra picture period for H.264 open GOP */
 	/* control */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 4);
 	reg |= ((p_h264->open_gop & 0x1) << 4);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
@@ -1100,23 +1100,23 @@ static int s5p_mfc_set_enc_params_h264(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 	}
 
 	/* 'WEIGHTED_BI_PREDICTION' for B is disable */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x3 << 9);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 
 	/* 'CONSTRAINED_INTRA_PRED_ENABLE' is disable */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 14);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 
 	/* ASO */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 6);
 	reg |= ((p_h264->aso & 0x1) << 6);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 
 	/* hier qp enable */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 8);
 	reg |= ((p_h264->open_gop & 0x1) << 8);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ static int s5p_mfc_set_enc_params_h264(struct s5p_mfc_ctx *ctx)
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_num_t_layer);
 
 	/* frame packing SEI generation */
-	readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
+	reg = readl(mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
 	reg &= ~(0x1 << 25);
 	reg |= ((p_h264->sei_frame_packing & 0x1) << 25);
 	writel(reg, mfc_regs->e_h264_options);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#424 lore raw

PATCH 424/521 dm thin: resume even if in FAIL mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luo Meng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 19eb1650afeb1aa86151f61900e9e5f1de5d8d02 ]

If a thinpool set fail_io while suspending, resume will fail with:
device-mapper: resume ioctl on vg-thinpool failed: Invalid argument

The thin-pool also can't be removed if an in-flight bio is in the deferred list.

This can be easily reproduced using:

echo "offline" > /sys/block/sda/device/state dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/thin bs=4K count=1 dmsetup suspend /dev/mapper/pool mkfs.ext4 /dev/mapper/thin
dmsetup resume /dev/mapper/pool

The root cause is maybe_resize_data_dev() will check fail_io and return error before called dm_resume.

Fix this by adding FAIL mode check at the end of pool_preresume().

Fixes da105ed5fd7e ("dm thin metadata: introduce dm_pool_abort_metadata")
---
 drivers/md/dm-thin.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/md/dm-thin.c +12 -4
index 1916becc20e0..386cb3395378 100644
@@ -3549,20 +3549,28 @@ static int pool_preresume(struct dm_target *ti)
 	 */
 	r = bind_control_target(pool, ti);
 	if (r)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
 	r = maybe_resize_data_dev(ti, &need_commit1);
 	if (r)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
 	r = maybe_resize_metadata_dev(ti, &need_commit2);
 	if (r)
-		return r;
+		goto out;
 
 	if (need_commit1 || need_commit2)
 		(void) commit(pool);
+out:
+	/*
+	 * When a thin-pool is PM_FAIL, it cannot be rebuilt if
+	 * bio is in deferred list. Therefore need to return 0
+	 * to allow pool_resume() to flush IO.
+	 */
+	if (r && get_pool_mode(pool) == PM_FAIL)
+		r = 0;
 
-	return 0;
+	return r;
 }
 
 static void pool_suspend_active_thins(struct pool *pool)
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#425 lore raw

PATCH 425/521 perf probe: Use dwarf_attr_integrate as generic DWARF attr accessor

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f828929ab7f0dc3353e4a617f94f297fa8f3dec3 ]

Use dwarf_attr_integrate() instead of dwarf_attr() for generic attribute acccessor functions, so that it can find the specified attribute from abstact origin DIE etc.

Stable-dep-of: a9dfc46c67b5 ("perf probe: Fix to get the DW_AT_decl_file and DW_AT_call_file as unsinged data")

---
 tools/perf/util/dwarf-aux.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dwarf-aux.c +2 -2
index 230e94bf7775..3b7386527794 100644
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int die_get_attr_udata(Dwarf_Die *tp_die, unsigned int attr_name,
 {
 	Dwarf_Attribute attr;
 
-	if (dwarf_attr(tp_die, attr_name, &attr) == NULL ||
+	if (dwarf_attr_integrate(tp_die, attr_name, &attr) == NULL ||
 	    dwarf_formudata(&attr, result) != 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static int die_get_attr_sdata(Dwarf_Die *tp_die, unsigned int attr_name,
 {
 	Dwarf_Attribute attr;
 
-	if (dwarf_attr(tp_die, attr_name, &attr) == NULL ||
+	if (dwarf_attr_integrate(tp_die, attr_name, &attr) == NULL ||
 	    dwarf_formsdata(&attr, result) != 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#426 lore raw

PATCH 426/521 perf probe: Fix to get the DW_AT_decl_file and DW_AT_call_file as unsinged data

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9dfc46c67b52ad43b8e335e28f4cf8002c67793 ]

DWARF version 5 standard Sec 2.14 says that

Any debugging information entry representing the declaration of an object, module, subprogram or type may have DW_AT_decl_file, DW_AT_decl_line and DW_AT_decl_column attributes, each of whose value is an unsigned integer constant.

So it should be an unsigned integer data. Also, even though the standard doesn't clearly say the DW_AT_call_file is signed or unsigned, the elfutils (eu-readelf) interprets it as unsigned integer data and it is natural to handle it as unsigned integer data as same as DW_AT_decl_file. This changes the DW_AT_call_file as unsigned integer data too.

Fixes 3f4460a28fb2f73d ("perf probe: Filter out redundant inline-instances")
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
---
 tools/perf/util/dwarf-aux.c | 21 ++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dwarf-aux.c +4 -17
index 3b7386527794..6de57d9ee7cc 100644
@@ -274,19 +274,6 @@ static int die_get_attr_udata(Dwarf_Die *tp_die, unsigned int attr_name,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Get attribute and translate it as a sdata */
-static int die_get_attr_sdata(Dwarf_Die *tp_die, unsigned int attr_name,
-			      Dwarf_Sword *result)
-{
-	Dwarf_Attribute attr;
-
-	if (dwarf_attr_integrate(tp_die, attr_name, &attr) == NULL ||
-	    dwarf_formsdata(&attr, result) != 0)
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * die_is_signed_type - Check whether a type DIE is signed or not
  * @tp_die: a DIE of a type
@@ -410,9 +397,9 @@ int die_get_data_member_location(Dwarf_Die *mb_die, Dwarf_Word *offs)
 /* Get the call file index number in CU DIE */
 static int die_get_call_fileno(Dwarf_Die *in_die)
 {
-	Dwarf_Sword idx;
+	Dwarf_Word idx;
 
-	if (die_get_attr_sdata(in_die, DW_AT_call_file, &idx) == 0)
+	if (die_get_attr_udata(in_die, DW_AT_call_file, &idx) == 0)
 		return (int)idx;
 	else
 		return -ENOENT;
@@ -421,9 +408,9 @@ static int die_get_call_fileno(Dwarf_Die *in_die)
 /* Get the declared file index number in CU DIE */
 static int die_get_decl_fileno(Dwarf_Die *pdie)
 {
-	Dwarf_Sword idx;
+	Dwarf_Word idx;
 
-	if (die_get_attr_sdata(pdie, DW_AT_decl_file, &idx) == 0)
+	if (die_get_attr_udata(pdie, DW_AT_decl_file, &idx) == 0)
 		return (int)idx;
 	else
 		return -ENOENT;
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#427 lore raw

PATCH 427/521 ravb: Fix "failed to switch device to config mode" message during unbind

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Biju Das <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c72a7e42592b2e18d862cf120876070947000d7a ]

This patch fixes the error "ravb 11c20000.ethernet eth0: failed to switch device to config mode" during unbind.

We are doing register access after pm_runtime_put_sync().

We usually do cleanup in reverse order of init. Currently in remove(), the "pm_runtime_put_sync" is not in reverse order.

Probe

	reset_control_deassert(rstc);
	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
	pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);

remove

	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
	unregister_netdev(ndev);
	..
	ravb_mdio_release(priv);
	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);

Consider the call to unregister_netdev() unregister_netdev->unregister_netdevice_queue->rollback_registered_many that calls the below functions which access the registers after pm_runtime_put_sync()
1) ravb_get_stats
2) ravb_close

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c +1 -1
index 9077014f6f40..ff374d0d80a7 100644
@@ -2199,11 +2199,11 @@ static int ravb_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 			  priv->desc_bat_dma);
 	/* Set reset mode */
 	ravb_write(ndev, CCC_OPC_RESET, CCC);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
 	unregister_netdev(ndev);
 	netif_napi_del(&priv->napi[RAVB_NC]);
 	netif_napi_del(&priv->napi[RAVB_BE]);
 	ravb_mdio_release(priv);
+	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev);
 	free_netdev(ndev);
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#428 lore raw

PATCH 428/521 riscv: remove unreachable !HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 877425424d6c853b804e6b6a6045a5b4ea97c510 ]

HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR is always defined for RISC-V.

Stable-dep-of: 5c3022e4a616 ("riscv: stacktrace: Fixup ftrace_graph_ret_addr retp argument")

---
 arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c +0 -4
index 74b2168d7298..39cd3cf9f06b 100644
@@ -64,12 +64,8 @@ static void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *task,
 		frame = (struct stackframe *)fp - 1;
 		sp = fp;
 		fp = frame->fp;
-#ifdef HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR
 		pc = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(current, NULL, frame->ra,
 					   (unsigned long *)(fp - 8));
-#else
-		pc = frame->ra - 0x4;
-#endif
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#429 lore raw

PATCH 429/521 riscv/stacktrace: Fix stack output without ra on the stack top

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chen Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f766f77a74f5784d8d4d3c36b1900731f97d08d0 ]

When a function doesn't have a callee, then it will not push ra into the stack, such as lkdtm_BUG() function,

addi sp,sp,-16
sd s0,8(sp)
addi s0,sp,16
ebreak

The struct stackframe use {fp,ra} to get information from stack, if walk_stackframe() with pr_regs, we will obtain wrong value and bad stacktrace,

[<ffffffe00066c56c>] lkdtm_BUG+0x6/0x8
---[ end trace 18da3fbdf08e25d5 ]---

Correct the next fp and pc, after that, full stacktrace shown as expects,

[<ffffffe00066c56c>] lkdtm_BUG+0x6/0x8
[<ffffffe0008b24a4>] lkdtm_do_action+0x14/0x1c
[<ffffffe00066c372>] direct_entry+0xc0/0x10a
[<ffffffe000439f86>] full_proxy_write+0x42/0x6a
[<ffffffe000309626>] vfs_write+0x7e/0x214
[<ffffffe00030992a>] ksys_write+0x98/0xc0
[<ffffffe000309960>] sys_write+0xe/0x16
[<ffffffe0002014bc>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2
---[ end trace 61917f3d9a9fadcd ]---

Stable-dep-of: 5c3022e4a616 ("riscv: stacktrace: Fixup ftrace_graph_ret_addr retp argument")

---
 arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c +9 -3
index 39cd3cf9f06b..3d1e184e39e9 100644
@@ -63,9 +63,15 @@ static void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *task,
 		/* Unwind stack frame */
 		frame = (struct stackframe *)fp - 1;
 		sp = fp;
-		fp = frame->fp;
-		pc = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(current, NULL, frame->ra,
-					   (unsigned long *)(fp - 8));
+		if (regs && (regs->epc == pc) && (frame->fp & 0x7)) {
+			fp = frame->ra;
+			pc = regs->ra;
+		} else {
+			fp = frame->fp;
+			pc = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(current, NULL, frame->ra,
+						   (unsigned long *)(fp - 8));
+		}
+
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#430 lore raw

PATCH 430/521 riscv: stacktrace: Fixup ftrace_graph_ret_addr retp argument

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Guo Ren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c3022e4a616d800cf5f4c3a981d7992179e44a1 ]

The 'retp' is a pointer to the return address on the stack, so we must pass the current return address pointer as the 'retp' argument to ftrace_push_return_trace(). Not parent function's return address on the stack.

Fixes b785ec129bd9 ("riscv/ftrace: Add HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR support")
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c +1 -1
index 3d1e184e39e9..75ed5b5b1f9b 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void notrace walk_stackframe(struct task_struct *task,
 		} else {
 			fp = frame->fp;
 			pc = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(current, NULL, frame->ra,
-						   (unsigned long *)(fp - 8));
+						   &frame->ra);
 		}
 
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#431 lore raw

PATCH 431/521 driver core: Set deferred_probe_timeout to a longer default if CONFIG_MODULES is set

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: John Stultz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e2cec7d6853712295cef5377762165a489b2957f ]

When using modules, its common for the modules not to be loaded until quite late by userland. With the current code, driver_deferred_probe_check_state() will stop returning EPROBE_DEFER after late_initcall, which can cause module dependency resolution to fail after that.

So allow a longer window of 30 seconds (picked somewhat arbitrarily, but influenced by the similar regulator core timeout value) in the case where modules are enabled.

Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Walleij <[email protected]>
Cc Thierry Reding <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Brown <[email protected]>
Cc Liam Girdwood <[email protected]>
Cc Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
Cc Saravana Kannan <[email protected]>
Cc Todd Kjos <[email protected]>
Cc Len Brown <[email protected]>
Cc Pavel Machek <[email protected]>
Cc Ulf Hansson <[email protected]>
Cc Kevin Hilman <[email protected]>
Cc "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
Cc Rob Herring <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/base/dd.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/base/dd.c +9 -0
index 63390a416b44..529d324a0f20 100644
@@ -220,7 +220,16 @@ static int deferred_devs_show(struct seq_file *s, void *data)
 }
 DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(deferred_devs);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
+/*
+ * In the case of modules, set the default probe timeout to
+ * 30 seconds to give userland some time to load needed modules
+ */
+static int deferred_probe_timeout = 30;
+#else
+/* In the case of !modules, no probe timeout needed */
 static int deferred_probe_timeout = -1;
+#endif
 static int __init deferred_probe_timeout_setup(char *str)
 {
 	deferred_probe_timeout = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 10);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#432 lore raw

PATCH 432/521 ext4: goto right label failed_mount3a

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jason Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43bd6f1b49b61f43de4d4e33661b8dbe8c911f14 ]

Before these two branches neither loaded the journal nor created the xattr cache. So the right label to goto is 'failed_mount3a'. Although this did not cause any issues because the error handler validated if the pointer is null. However this still made me confused when reading the code. So it's still worth to modify to goto the right label.

Stable-dep-of: 89481b5fa8c0 ("ext4: correct inconsistent error msg in nojournal mode")

---
 fs/ext4/super.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +5 -5
index 796588dc531b..3198c276b434 100644
@@ -4302,30 +4302,30 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		   ext4_has_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb)) {
 		ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "required journal recovery "
 		       "suppressed and not mounted read-only");
-		goto failed_mount_wq;
+		goto failed_mount3a;
 	} else {
 		/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
 		if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
 				 "journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
-			goto failed_mount_wq;
+			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
 		if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
 				 "journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
-			goto failed_mount_wq;
+			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
 		if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
 				 "commit=%lu, fs mounted w/o journal",
 				 sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ);
-			goto failed_mount_wq;
+			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
 		if (EXT4_MOUNT_DATA_FLAGS &
 		    (sbi->s_mount_opt ^ sbi->s_def_mount_opt)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
 				 "data=, fs mounted w/o journal");
-			goto failed_mount_wq;
+			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
 		sbi->s_def_mount_opt &= ~EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM;
 		clear_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#433 lore raw

PATCH 433/521 ext4: correct inconsistent error msg in nojournal mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 89481b5fa8c0640e62ba84c6020cee895f7ac643 ]

When we used the journal_async_commit mounting option in nojournal mode, the kernel told me that "can't mount with journal_checksum", was very confusing. I find that when we mount with journal_async_commit, both the JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT and EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM flags are set. However, in the error branch, CHECKSUM is checked before ASYNC_COMMIT. As a result, the above inconsistency occurs, and the ASYNC_COMMIT branch becomes dead code that cannot be executed. Therefore, we exchange the positions of the two judgments to make the error msg more accurate.

---
 fs/ext4/super.c | 9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/super.c +5 -4
index 3198c276b434..e0d597719133 100644
@@ -4305,14 +4305,15 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 		goto failed_mount3a;
 	} else {
 		/* Nojournal mode, all journal mount options are illegal */
-		if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
+		if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
-				 "journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
+				 "journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
 			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
-		if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT)) {
+
+		if (test_opt2(sb, EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) {
 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "can't mount with "
-				 "journal_async_commit, fs mounted w/o journal");
+				 "journal_checksum, fs mounted w/o journal");
 			goto failed_mount3a;
 		}
 		if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#434 lore raw

PATCH 434/521 ext4: use kmemdup() to replace kmalloc + memcpy

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shuqi Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4efd9f0d120c55b08852ee5605dbb02a77089a5d ]

Replace kmalloc + memcpy with kmemdup()

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +1 -2
index 7195a7ff65a6..959fc3328c3a 100644
@@ -1911,11 +1911,10 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 
 			unlock_buffer(bs->bh);
 			ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "cloning");
-			s->base = kmalloc(bs->bh->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
+			s->base = kmemdup(BHDR(bs->bh), bs->bh->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
 			error = -ENOMEM;
 			if (s->base == NULL)
 				goto cleanup;
-			memcpy(s->base, BHDR(bs->bh), bs->bh->b_size);
 			s->first = ENTRY(header(s->base)+1);
 			header(s->base)->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
 			s->here = ENTRY(s->base + offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#435 lore raw

PATCH 435/521 mbcache: dont reclaim used entries

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 58318914186c157477b978b1739dfe2f1b9dc0fe ]

Do not reclaim entries that are currently used by somebody from a shrinker. Firstly, these entries are likely useful. Secondly, we will need to keep such entries to protect pending increment of xattr block refcount.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/mbcache.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/mbcache.c +9 -1
index 081ccf0caee3..12203e5a91e7 100644
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static unsigned long mb_cache_shrink(struct mb_cache *cache,
 	while (nr_to_scan-- && !list_empty(&cache->c_list)) {
 		entry = list_first_entry(&cache->c_list,
 					 struct mb_cache_entry, e_list);
-		if (entry->e_referenced) {
+		if (entry->e_referenced || atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
 			entry->e_referenced = 0;
 			list_move_tail(&entry->e_list, &cache->c_list);
 			continue;
@@ -301,6 +301,14 @@ static unsigned long mb_cache_shrink(struct mb_cache *cache,
 		spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
 		head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, entry->e_key);
 		hlist_bl_lock(head);
+		/* Now a reliable check if the entry didn't get used... */
+		if (atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
+			hlist_bl_unlock(head);
+			spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+			list_add_tail(&entry->e_list, &cache->c_list);
+			cache->c_entry_count++;
+			continue;
+		}
 		if (!hlist_bl_unhashed(&entry->e_hash_list)) {
 			hlist_bl_del_init(&entry->e_hash_list);
 			atomic_dec(&entry->e_refcnt);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#436 lore raw

PATCH 436/521 mbcache: add functions to delete entry if unused

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3dc96bba65f53daa217f0a8f43edad145286a8f5 ]

Add function mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get() to delete mbcache entry if it is unused and also add a function to wait for entry to become unused
- mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(). We do not share code between the two deleting function as one of them will go away soon.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/mbcache.c            | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 include/linux/mbcache.h | 10 ++++++-
 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/mbcache.c +64 -2
index 12203e5a91e7..c76030e20d92 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 /*
  * Mbcache is a simple key-value store. Keys need not be unique, however
  * key-value pairs are expected to be unique (we use this fact in
- * mb_cache_entry_delete()).
+ * mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get()).
  *
  * Ext2 and ext4 use this cache for deduplication of extended attribute blocks.
  * Ext4 also uses it for deduplication of xattr values stored in inodes.
@@ -124,6 +124,19 @@ void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__mb_cache_entry_free);
 
+/*
+ * mb_cache_entry_wait_unused - wait to be the last user of the entry
+ *
+ * @entry - entry to work on
+ *
+ * Wait to be the last user of the entry.
+ */
+void mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
+{
+	wait_var_event(&entry->e_refcnt, atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) <= 3);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_wait_unused);
+
 static struct mb_cache_entry *__entry_find(struct mb_cache *cache,
 					   struct mb_cache_entry *entry,
 					   u32 key)
@@ -216,7 +229,7 @@ struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_get(struct mb_cache *cache, u32 key,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_get);
 
-/* mb_cache_entry_delete - remove a cache entry
+/* mb_cache_entry_delete - try to remove a cache entry
  * @cache - cache we work with
  * @key - key
  * @value - value
@@ -253,6 +266,55 @@ void mb_cache_entry_delete(struct mb_cache *cache, u32 key, u64 value)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_delete);
 
+/* mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get - remove a cache entry if it has no users
+ * @cache - cache we work with
+ * @key - key
+ * @value - value
+ *
+ * Remove entry from cache @cache with key @key and value @value. The removal
+ * happens only if the entry is unused. The function returns NULL in case the
+ * entry was successfully removed or there's no entry in cache. Otherwise the
+ * function grabs reference of the entry that we failed to delete because it
+ * still has users and return it.
+ */
+struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(struct mb_cache *cache,
+						    u32 key, u64 value)
+{
+	struct hlist_bl_node *node;
+	struct hlist_bl_head *head;
+	struct mb_cache_entry *entry;
+
+	head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, key);
+	hlist_bl_lock(head);
+	hlist_bl_for_each_entry(entry, node, head, e_hash_list) {
+		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_value == value) {
+			if (atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
+				atomic_inc(&entry->e_refcnt);
+				hlist_bl_unlock(head);
+				return entry;
+			}
+			/* We keep hash list reference to keep entry alive */
+			hlist_bl_del_init(&entry->e_hash_list);
+			hlist_bl_unlock(head);
+			spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+			if (!list_empty(&entry->e_list)) {
+				list_del_init(&entry->e_list);
+				if (!WARN_ONCE(cache->c_entry_count == 0,
+		"mbcache: attempt to decrement c_entry_count past zero"))
+					cache->c_entry_count--;
+				atomic_dec(&entry->e_refcnt);
+			}
+			spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+			mb_cache_entry_put(cache, entry);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	hlist_bl_unlock(head);
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get);
+
 /* mb_cache_entry_touch - cache entry got used
  * @cache - cache the entry belongs to
  * @entry - entry that got used
include/linux/mbcache.h +9 -1
index 20f1e3ff6013..8eca7f25c432 100644
@@ -30,15 +30,23 @@ void mb_cache_destroy(struct mb_cache *cache);
 int mb_cache_entry_create(struct mb_cache *cache, gfp_t mask, u32 key,
 			  u64 value, bool reusable);
 void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache_entry *entry);
+void mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(struct mb_cache_entry *entry);
 static inline int mb_cache_entry_put(struct mb_cache *cache,
 				     struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
 {
-	if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&entry->e_refcnt))
+	unsigned int cnt = atomic_dec_return(&entry->e_refcnt);
+
+	if (cnt > 0) {
+		if (cnt <= 3)
+			wake_up_var(&entry->e_refcnt);
 		return 0;
+	}
 	__mb_cache_entry_free(entry);
 	return 1;
 }
 
+struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(struct mb_cache *cache,
+						    u32 key, u64 value);
 void mb_cache_entry_delete(struct mb_cache *cache, u32 key, u64 value);
 struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_get(struct mb_cache *cache, u32 key,
 					  u64 value);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#437 lore raw

PATCH 437/521 ext4: remove EA inode entry from mbcache on inode eviction

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6bc0d63dad7f9f54d381925ee855b402f652fa39 ]

Currently we remove EA inode from mbcache as soon as its xattr refcount drops to zero. However there can be pending attempts to reuse the inode and thus refcount handling code has to handle the situation when refcount increases from zero anyway. So save some work and just keep EA inode in mbcache until it is getting evicted. At that moment we are sure following iget() of EA inode will fail anyway (or wait for eviction to finish and load things from the disk again) and so removing mbcache entry at that moment is fine and simplifies the code a bit.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/ext4/inode.c |  2 ++
 fs/ext4/xattr.c | 24 ++++++++----------------
 fs/ext4/xattr.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/inode.c +2 -0
index 2ad0a9540481..b322658ceff1 100644
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ void ext4_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 
 	trace_ext4_evict_inode(inode);
 
+	if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)
+		ext4_evict_ea_inode(inode);
 	if (inode->i_nlink) {
 		/*
 		 * When journalling data dirty buffers are tracked only in the
fs/ext4/xattr.c +8 -16
index 959fc3328c3a..648368b02c79 100644
@@ -434,6 +434,14 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_iget(struct inode *parent, unsigned long ea_ino,
 	return err;
 }
 
+/* Remove entry from mbcache when EA inode is getting evicted */
+void ext4_evict_ea_inode(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (EA_INODE_CACHE(inode))
+		mb_cache_entry_delete(EA_INODE_CACHE(inode),
+			ext4_xattr_inode_get_hash(inode), inode->i_ino);
+}
+
 static int
 ext4_xattr_inode_verify_hashes(struct inode *ea_inode,
 			       struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry, void *buffer,
@@ -1019,10 +1027,8 @@ static int ext4_xattr_ensure_credits(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
 				       int ref_change)
 {
-	struct mb_cache *ea_inode_cache = EA_INODE_CACHE(ea_inode);
 	struct ext4_iloc iloc;
 	s64 ref_count;
-	u32 hash;
 	int ret;
 
 	inode_lock(ea_inode);
@@ -1047,14 +1053,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
 
 			set_nlink(ea_inode, 1);
 			ext4_orphan_del(handle, ea_inode);
-
-			if (ea_inode_cache) {
-				hash = ext4_xattr_inode_get_hash(ea_inode);
-				mb_cache_entry_create(ea_inode_cache,
-						      GFP_NOFS, hash,
-						      ea_inode->i_ino,
-						      true /* reusable */);
-			}
 		}
 	} else {
 		WARN_ONCE(ref_count < 0, "EA inode %lu ref_count=%lld",
@@ -1067,12 +1065,6 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_update_ref(handle_t *handle, struct inode *ea_inode,
 
 			clear_nlink(ea_inode);
 			ext4_orphan_add(handle, ea_inode);
-
-			if (ea_inode_cache) {
-				hash = ext4_xattr_inode_get_hash(ea_inode);
-				mb_cache_entry_delete(ea_inode_cache, hash,
-						      ea_inode->i_ino);
-			}
 		}
 	}
 
fs/ext4/xattr.h +1 -0
index 990084e00374..231ef308d10c 100644
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ extern void ext4_xattr_inode_array_free(struct ext4_xattr_inode_array *array);
 
 extern int ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(struct inode *inode, int new_extra_isize,
 			    struct ext4_inode *raw_inode, handle_t *handle);
+extern void ext4_evict_ea_inode(struct inode *inode);
 
 extern const struct xattr_handler *ext4_xattr_handlers[];
 
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#438 lore raw

PATCH 438/521 ext4: unindent codeblock in ext4_xattr_block_set()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fd48e9acdf26d0cbd80051de07d4a735d05d29b2 ]

Remove unnecessary else (and thus indentation level) from a code block in ext4_xattr_block_set(). It will also make following code changes easier. No functional changes.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +38 -39
index 648368b02c79..c23d7d68d7a1 100644
@@ -1867,6 +1867,8 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 #define header(x) ((struct ext4_xattr_header *)(x))
 
 	if (s->base) {
+		int offset = (char *)s->here - bs->bh->b_data;
+
 		BUFFER_TRACE(bs->bh, "get_write_access");
 		error = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bs->bh);
 		if (error)
@@ -1898,49 +1900,46 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 			if (error)
 				goto cleanup;
 			goto inserted;
-		} else {
-			int offset = (char *)s->here - bs->bh->b_data;
+		}
+		unlock_buffer(bs->bh);
+		ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "cloning");
+		s->base = kmemdup(BHDR(bs->bh), bs->bh->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
+		error = -ENOMEM;
+		if (s->base == NULL)
+			goto cleanup;
+		s->first = ENTRY(header(s->base)+1);
+		header(s->base)->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
+		s->here = ENTRY(s->base + offset);
+		s->end = s->base + bs->bh->b_size;
 
-			unlock_buffer(bs->bh);
-			ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "cloning");
-			s->base = kmemdup(BHDR(bs->bh), bs->bh->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
-			error = -ENOMEM;
-			if (s->base == NULL)
+		/*
+		 * If existing entry points to an xattr inode, we need
+		 * to prevent ext4_xattr_set_entry() from decrementing
+		 * ref count on it because the reference belongs to the
+		 * original block. In this case, make the entry look
+		 * like it has an empty value.
+		 */
+		if (!s->not_found && s->here->e_value_inum) {
+			ea_ino = le32_to_cpu(s->here->e_value_inum);
+			error = ext4_xattr_inode_iget(inode, ea_ino,
+				      le32_to_cpu(s->here->e_hash),
+				      &tmp_inode);
+			if (error)
 				goto cleanup;
-			s->first = ENTRY(header(s->base)+1);
-			header(s->base)->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
-			s->here = ENTRY(s->base + offset);
-			s->end = s->base + bs->bh->b_size;
 
-			/*
-			 * If existing entry points to an xattr inode, we need
-			 * to prevent ext4_xattr_set_entry() from decrementing
-			 * ref count on it because the reference belongs to the
-			 * original block. In this case, make the entry look
-			 * like it has an empty value.
-			 */
-			if (!s->not_found && s->here->e_value_inum) {
-				ea_ino = le32_to_cpu(s->here->e_value_inum);
-				error = ext4_xattr_inode_iget(inode, ea_ino,
-					      le32_to_cpu(s->here->e_hash),
-					      &tmp_inode);
-				if (error)
-					goto cleanup;
-
-				if (!ext4_test_inode_state(tmp_inode,
-						EXT4_STATE_LUSTRE_EA_INODE)) {
-					/*
-					 * Defer quota free call for previous
-					 * inode until success is guaranteed.
-					 */
-					old_ea_inode_quota = le32_to_cpu(
-							s->here->e_value_size);
-				}
-				iput(tmp_inode);
-
-				s->here->e_value_inum = 0;
-				s->here->e_value_size = 0;
+			if (!ext4_test_inode_state(tmp_inode,
+					EXT4_STATE_LUSTRE_EA_INODE)) {
+				/*
+				 * Defer quota free call for previous
+				 * inode until success is guaranteed.
+				 */
+				old_ea_inode_quota = le32_to_cpu(
+						s->here->e_value_size);
 			}
+			iput(tmp_inode);
+
+			s->here->e_value_inum = 0;
+			s->here->e_value_size = 0;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Allocate a buffer where we construct the new block. */
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#439 lore raw

PATCH 439/521 ext4: fix race when reusing xattr blocks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 65f8b80053a1b2fd602daa6814e62d6fa90e5e9b ]

When ext4_xattr_block_set() decides to remove xattr block the following race can happen:

CPU1 CPU2
ext4_xattr_block_set() ext4_xattr_release_block()
new_bh = ext4_xattr_block_cache_find()

                                          lock_buffer(bh);
                                          ref = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount);
                                          if (ref == 1) {
                                            ...
                                            mb_cache_entry_delete();
                                            unlock_buffer(bh);
                                            ext4_free_blocks();
                                              ...
                                              ext4_forget(..., bh, ...);
                                                jbd2_journal_revoke(..., bh);
  ext4_journal_get_write_access(..., new_bh, ...)
    do_get_write_access()
      jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(..., new_bh);

Later the code in ext4_xattr_block_set() finds out the block got freed and cancels reusal of the block but the revoke stays canceled and so in case of block reuse and journal replay the filesystem can get corrupted. If the race works out slightly differently, we can also hit assertions in the jbd2 code.

Fix the problem by making sure that once matching mbcache entry is found, code dropping the last xattr block reference (or trying to modify xattr block in place) waits until the mbcache entry reference is dropped. This way code trying to reuse xattr block is protected from someone trying to drop the last reference to xattr block.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +45 -22
index c23d7d68d7a1..f759ab8c1a68 100644
@@ -437,9 +437,16 @@ static int ext4_xattr_inode_iget(struct inode *parent, unsigned long ea_ino,
 /* Remove entry from mbcache when EA inode is getting evicted */
 void ext4_evict_ea_inode(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	if (EA_INODE_CACHE(inode))
-		mb_cache_entry_delete(EA_INODE_CACHE(inode),
-			ext4_xattr_inode_get_hash(inode), inode->i_ino);
+	struct mb_cache_entry *oe;
+
+	if (!EA_INODE_CACHE(inode))
+		return;
+	/* Wait for entry to get unused so that we can remove it */
+	while ((oe = mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(EA_INODE_CACHE(inode),
+			ext4_xattr_inode_get_hash(inode), inode->i_ino))) {
+		mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe);
+		mb_cache_entry_put(EA_INODE_CACHE(inode), oe);
+	}
 }
 
 static int
@@ -1245,6 +1252,7 @@ ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
+retry_ref:
 	lock_buffer(bh);
 	hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
 	ref = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount);
@@ -1254,9 +1262,18 @@ ext4_xattr_release_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 		 * This must happen under buffer lock for
 		 * ext4_xattr_block_set() to reliably detect freed block
 		 */
-		if (ea_block_cache)
-			mb_cache_entry_delete(ea_block_cache, hash,
-					      bh->b_blocknr);
+		if (ea_block_cache) {
+			struct mb_cache_entry *oe;
+
+			oe = mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(ea_block_cache, hash,
+							  bh->b_blocknr);
+			if (oe) {
+				unlock_buffer(bh);
+				mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe);
+				mb_cache_entry_put(ea_block_cache, oe);
+				goto retry_ref;
+			}
+		}
 		get_bh(bh);
 		unlock_buffer(bh);
 
@@ -1883,9 +1900,20 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 			 * ext4_xattr_block_set() to reliably detect modified
 			 * block
 			 */
-			if (ea_block_cache)
-				mb_cache_entry_delete(ea_block_cache, hash,
-						      bs->bh->b_blocknr);
+			if (ea_block_cache) {
+				struct mb_cache_entry *oe;
+
+				oe = mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(ea_block_cache,
+					hash, bs->bh->b_blocknr);
+				if (oe) {
+					/*
+					 * Xattr block is getting reused. Leave
+					 * it alone.
+					 */
+					mb_cache_entry_put(ea_block_cache, oe);
+					goto clone_block;
+				}
+			}
 			ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "modifying in-place");
 			error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode,
 						     true /* is_block */);
@@ -1901,6 +1929,7 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 				goto cleanup;
 			goto inserted;
 		}
+clone_block:
 		unlock_buffer(bs->bh);
 		ea_bdebug(bs->bh, "cloning");
 		s->base = kmemdup(BHDR(bs->bh), bs->bh->b_size, GFP_NOFS);
@@ -2006,18 +2035,13 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 				lock_buffer(new_bh);
 				/*
 				 * We have to be careful about races with
-				 * freeing, rehashing or adding references to
-				 * xattr block. Once we hold buffer lock xattr
-				 * block's state is stable so we can check
-				 * whether the block got freed / rehashed or
-				 * not.  Since we unhash mbcache entry under
-				 * buffer lock when freeing / rehashing xattr
-				 * block, checking whether entry is still
-				 * hashed is reliable. Same rules hold for
-				 * e_reusable handling.
+				 * adding references to xattr block. Once we
+				 * hold buffer lock xattr block's state is
+				 * stable so we can check the additional
+				 * reference fits.
 				 */
-				if (hlist_bl_unhashed(&ce->e_hash_list) ||
-				    !ce->e_reusable) {
+				ref = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(new_bh)->h_refcount) + 1;
+				if (ref > EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX) {
 					/*
 					 * Undo everything and check mbcache
 					 * again.
@@ -2032,9 +2056,8 @@ ext4_xattr_block_set(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
 					new_bh = NULL;
 					goto inserted;
 				}
-				ref = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(new_bh)->h_refcount) + 1;
 				BHDR(new_bh)->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(ref);
-				if (ref >= EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX)
+				if (ref == EXT4_XATTR_REFCOUNT_MAX)
 					ce->e_reusable = 0;
 				ea_bdebug(new_bh, "reusing; refcount now=%d",
 					  ref);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
author maintainer
#440 lore raw

PATCH 440/521 mbcache: automatically delete entries from cache on freeing

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 307af6c879377c1c63e71cbdd978201f9c7ee8df ]

Use the fact that entries with elevated refcount are not removed from the hash and just move removal of the entry from the hash to the entry freeing time. When doing this we also change the generic code to hold one reference to the cache entry, not two of them, which makes code somewhat more obvious.

Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")

---
 fs/mbcache.c            | 108 +++++++++++++++-------------------------
 include/linux/mbcache.h |  24 ++++++---
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
fs/mbcache.c +39 -69
index c76030e20d92..aa564e79891d 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int mb_cache_entry_create(struct mb_cache *cache, gfp_t mask, u32 key,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->e_list);
-	/* One ref for hash, one ref returned */
+	/* Initial hash reference */
 	atomic_set(&entry->e_refcnt, 1);
 	entry->e_key = key;
 	entry->e_value = value;
@@ -105,21 +105,28 @@ int mb_cache_entry_create(struct mb_cache *cache, gfp_t mask, u32 key,
 		}
 	}
 	hlist_bl_add_head(&entry->e_hash_list, head);
-	hlist_bl_unlock(head);
-
+	/*
+	 * Add entry to LRU list before it can be found by
+	 * mb_cache_entry_delete() to avoid races
+	 */
 	spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&entry->e_list, &cache->c_list);
-	/* Grab ref for LRU list */
-	atomic_inc(&entry->e_refcnt);
 	cache->c_entry_count++;
 	spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+	hlist_bl_unlock(head);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_create);
 
-void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
+void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache *cache, struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
 {
+	struct hlist_bl_head *head;
+
+	head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, entry->e_key);
+	hlist_bl_lock(head);
+	hlist_bl_del(&entry->e_hash_list);
+	hlist_bl_unlock(head);
 	kmem_cache_free(mb_entry_cache, entry);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__mb_cache_entry_free);
@@ -133,7 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__mb_cache_entry_free);
  */
 void mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
 {
-	wait_var_event(&entry->e_refcnt, atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) <= 3);
+	wait_var_event(&entry->e_refcnt, atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) <= 2);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_wait_unused);
 
@@ -154,10 +161,9 @@ static struct mb_cache_entry *__entry_find(struct mb_cache *cache,
 	while (node) {
 		entry = hlist_bl_entry(node, struct mb_cache_entry,
 				       e_hash_list);
-		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_reusable) {
-			atomic_inc(&entry->e_refcnt);
+		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_reusable &&
+		    atomic_inc_not_zero(&entry->e_refcnt))
 			goto out;
-		}
 		node = node->next;
 	}
 	entry = NULL;
@@ -217,10 +223,9 @@ struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_get(struct mb_cache *cache, u32 key,
 	head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, key);
 	hlist_bl_lock(head);
 	hlist_bl_for_each_entry(entry, node, head, e_hash_list) {
-		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_value == value) {
-			atomic_inc(&entry->e_refcnt);
+		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_value == value &&
+		    atomic_inc_not_zero(&entry->e_refcnt))
 			goto out;
-		}
 	}
 	entry = NULL;
 out:
@@ -280,37 +285,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_delete);
 struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(struct mb_cache *cache,
 						    u32 key, u64 value)
 {
-	struct hlist_bl_node *node;
-	struct hlist_bl_head *head;
 	struct mb_cache_entry *entry;
 
-	head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, key);
-	hlist_bl_lock(head);
-	hlist_bl_for_each_entry(entry, node, head, e_hash_list) {
-		if (entry->e_key == key && entry->e_value == value) {
-			if (atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
-				atomic_inc(&entry->e_refcnt);
-				hlist_bl_unlock(head);
-				return entry;
-			}
-			/* We keep hash list reference to keep entry alive */
-			hlist_bl_del_init(&entry->e_hash_list);
-			hlist_bl_unlock(head);
-			spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
-			if (!list_empty(&entry->e_list)) {
-				list_del_init(&entry->e_list);
-				if (!WARN_ONCE(cache->c_entry_count == 0,
-		"mbcache: attempt to decrement c_entry_count past zero"))
-					cache->c_entry_count--;
-				atomic_dec(&entry->e_refcnt);
-			}
-			spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
-			mb_cache_entry_put(cache, entry);
-			return NULL;
-		}
-	}
-	hlist_bl_unlock(head);
+	entry = mb_cache_entry_get(cache, key, value);
+	if (!entry)
+		return NULL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Drop the ref we got from mb_cache_entry_get() and the initial hash
+	 * ref if we are the last user
+	 */
+	if (atomic_cmpxchg(&entry->e_refcnt, 2, 0) != 2)
+		return entry;
+
+	spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+	if (!list_empty(&entry->e_list))
+		list_del_init(&entry->e_list);
+	cache->c_entry_count--;
+	spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
+	__mb_cache_entry_free(cache, entry);
 	return NULL;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get);
@@ -342,42 +335,24 @@ static unsigned long mb_cache_shrink(struct mb_cache *cache,
 				     unsigned long nr_to_scan)
 {
 	struct mb_cache_entry *entry;
-	struct hlist_bl_head *head;
 	unsigned long shrunk = 0;
 
 	spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
 	while (nr_to_scan-- && !list_empty(&cache->c_list)) {
 		entry = list_first_entry(&cache->c_list,
 					 struct mb_cache_entry, e_list);
-		if (entry->e_referenced || atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
+		/* Drop initial hash reference if there is no user */
+		if (entry->e_referenced ||
+		    atomic_cmpxchg(&entry->e_refcnt, 1, 0) != 1) {
 			entry->e_referenced = 0;
 			list_move_tail(&entry->e_list, &cache->c_list);
 			continue;
 		}
 		list_del_init(&entry->e_list);
 		cache->c_entry_count--;
-		/*
-		 * We keep LRU list reference so that entry doesn't go away
-		 * from under us.
-		 */
 		spin_unlock(&cache->c_list_lock);
-		head = mb_cache_entry_head(cache, entry->e_key);
-		hlist_bl_lock(head);
-		/* Now a reliable check if the entry didn't get used... */
-		if (atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) > 2) {
-			hlist_bl_unlock(head);
-			spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
-			list_add_tail(&entry->e_list, &cache->c_list);
-			cache->c_entry_count++;
-			continue;
-		}
-		if (!hlist_bl_unhashed(&entry->e_hash_list)) {
-			hlist_bl_del_init(&entry->e_hash_list);
-			atomic_dec(&entry->e_refcnt);
-		}
-		hlist_bl_unlock(head);
-		if (mb_cache_entry_put(cache, entry))
-			shrunk++;
+		__mb_cache_entry_free(cache, entry);
+		shrunk++;
 		cond_resched();
 		spin_lock(&cache->c_list_lock);
 	}
@@ -469,11 +444,6 @@ void mb_cache_destroy(struct mb_cache *cache)
 	 * point.
 	 */
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, next, &cache->c_list, e_list) {
-		if (!hlist_bl_unhashed(&entry->e_hash_list)) {
-			hlist_bl_del_init(&entry->e_hash_list);
-			atomic_dec(&entry->e_refcnt);
-		} else
-			WARN_ON(1);
 		list_del(&entry->e_list);
 		WARN_ON(atomic_read(&entry->e_refcnt) != 1);
 		mb_cache_entry_put(cache, entry);
include/linux/mbcache.h +16 -8
index 8eca7f25c432..e9d5ece87794 100644
@@ -13,8 +13,16 @@ struct mb_cache;
 struct mb_cache_entry {
 	/* List of entries in cache - protected by cache->c_list_lock */
 	struct list_head	e_list;
-	/* Hash table list - protected by hash chain bitlock */
+	/*
+	 * Hash table list - protected by hash chain bitlock. The entry is
+	 * guaranteed to be hashed while e_refcnt > 0.
+	 */
 	struct hlist_bl_node	e_hash_list;
+	/*
+	 * Entry refcount. Once it reaches zero, entry is unhashed and freed.
+	 * While refcount > 0, the entry is guaranteed to stay in the hash and
+	 * e.g. mb_cache_entry_try_delete() will fail.
+	 */
 	atomic_t		e_refcnt;
 	/* Key in hash - stable during lifetime of the entry */
 	u32			e_key;
@@ -29,20 +37,20 @@ void mb_cache_destroy(struct mb_cache *cache);
 
 int mb_cache_entry_create(struct mb_cache *cache, gfp_t mask, u32 key,
 			  u64 value, bool reusable);
-void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache_entry *entry);
+void __mb_cache_entry_free(struct mb_cache *cache,
+			   struct mb_cache_entry *entry);
 void mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(struct mb_cache_entry *entry);
-static inline int mb_cache_entry_put(struct mb_cache *cache,
-				     struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
+static inline void mb_cache_entry_put(struct mb_cache *cache,
+				      struct mb_cache_entry *entry)
 {
 	unsigned int cnt = atomic_dec_return(&entry->e_refcnt);
 
 	if (cnt > 0) {
-		if (cnt <= 3)
+		if (cnt <= 2)
 			wake_up_var(&entry->e_refcnt);
-		return 0;
+		return;
 	}
-	__mb_cache_entry_free(entry);
-	return 1;
+	__mb_cache_entry_free(cache, entry);
 }
 
 struct mb_cache_entry *mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get(struct mb_cache *cache,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1