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mm-memfd-add-f_seal_exec.patch removed from -mm tree

merged mm-stable Andrew Morton 1 participant 1 message Jan 19, 2023

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The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mm-memfd-add-f_seal_exec.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

------------------------------------------------------
From: Daniel Verkamp <[email protected]>
Subject: mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXEC
Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2022 00:12:01 +0000

Patch series "mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC", v8.

Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it differently.

However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind.

On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3].

To address those above, this set of patches add following:
1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time.
2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit.
3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of
X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected.
4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new
LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy.

This patch (of 5):

The new F_SEAL_EXEC flag will prevent modification of the exec bits:
written as traditional octal mask, 0111, or as named flags, S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH. Any chmod(2) or similar call that attempts to modify any of these bits after the seal is applied will fail with errno EPERM.

This will preserve the execute bits as they are at the time of sealing, so the memfd will become either permanently executable or permanently un-executable.

---

 include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h |    1 +
 mm/memfd.c                 |    2 ++
 mm/shmem.c                 |    6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h renamed from include/uapi/linux/fcntl.h~mm-memfd-add-f_seal_exec +1 -0
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #define F_SEAL_GROW	0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
 #define F_SEAL_WRITE	0x0008	/* prevent writes */
 #define F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE	0x0010  /* prevent future writes while mapped */
+#define F_SEAL_EXEC	0x0020  /* prevent chmod modifying exec bits */
 /* (1U << 31) is reserved for signed error codes */
 
 /*
mm/memfd.c renamed from mm/memfd.c~mm-memfd-add-f_seal_exec +2 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static unsigned int *memfd_file_seals_pt
 }
 
 #define F_ALL_SEALS (F_SEAL_SEAL | \
+		     F_SEAL_EXEC | \
 		     F_SEAL_SHRINK | \
 		     F_SEAL_GROW | \
 		     F_SEAL_WRITE | \
@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *
 	 *   SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
 	 *   SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
 	 *   SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
+	 *   SEAL_EXEC: Prevent modification of the exec bits in the file mode
 	 *
 	 * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
 	 * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
mm/shmem.c renamed from mm/shmem.c~mm-memfd-add-f_seal_exec +6 -0
@@ -1093,6 +1093,12 @@ static int shmem_setattr(struct user_nam
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
+	if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_EXEC) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
+		if ((inode->i_mode ^ attr->ia_mode) & 0111) {
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) {
 		loff_t oldsize = inode->i_size;
 		loff_t newsize = attr->ia_size;

_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are