Skip to contentSkip to conversation

Backport oops_limit to 5.10

PATCH New Eric Biggers 1 participant 21 messages Jan 24, 2023

Subsystems (3)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

cover Backport oops_limit to 5.10

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

This series backports the patchset
"exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops"
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/T/#u)
to 5.10, as recommended at
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2023/01/exploiting-null-dereferences-in-linux.html

This required backporting various prerequisite patches.

I've tested that oops_limit and warn_limit work correctly on x86_64.

Eric W. Biederman (2):
exit: Add and use make_task_dead.
objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation

Jann Horn (1):
exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

Kees Cook (8):
panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP
exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs
exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled
panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks
panic: Introduce warn_limit
panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs
docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count
exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

Nathan Chancellor (3):
hexagon: Fix function name in die()
h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition
csky: Fix function name in csky_alignment() and die()

Randy Dunlap (1):
ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate

Tiezhu Yang (3):
panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()
ubsan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in ubsan_epilogue()
kasan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in end_report()

Xiaoming Ni (1):
sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface

tangmeng (1):
kernel/panic: move panic sysctls to its own file

 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count       |  6 ++
 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count       |  6 ++
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst   | 19 ++++
 arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c                     |  6 +-
 arch/alpha/mm/fault.c                         |  2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c                       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                           |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                     |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                         |  2 +-
 arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c                   |  2 +-
 arch/csky/kernel/traps.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c                     |  3 +-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c                         |  2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c                   |  2 +-
 arch/ia64/Kconfig                             |  2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c                    |  2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/ia64/mm/fault.c                          |  2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/m68k/mm/fault.c                          |  2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c           |  4 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/traps.c                      |  2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c                       |  2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c                     |  8 +-
 arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c                     |  4 +-
 arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c                  |  2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c                    |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c                   |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c                     |  2 +-
 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c                         |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c                  |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c                        |  2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/traps.c                        |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c                  |  4 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c                  |  4 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                     |  6 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                     |  6 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                   |  4 +-
 arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c                    |  2 +-
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c                         | 33 +++++++
 include/linux/kernel.h                        |  7 +-
 include/linux/sched/task.h                    |  1 +
 include/linux/sysctl.h                        |  3 +
 kernel/exit.c                                 | 72 +++++++++++++++
 kernel/kcsan/report.c                         |  4 +-
 kernel/panic.c                                | 90 ++++++++++++++++---
 kernel/sched/core.c                           |  3 +-
 kernel/sysctl.c                               | 11 ---
 lib/ubsan.c                                   | 11 +--
 mm/kasan/report.c                             | 12 +--
 tools/objtool/check.c                         |  3 +-
 51 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 105 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count

base-commit: 179624a57b78c02de833370b7bdf0b0f4a27ca31

Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/20 sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface

From: Xiaoming Ni <[email protected]>

commit 3ddd9a808cee7284931312f2f3e854c9617f44b2 upstream.

Patch series "sysctl: first set of kernel/sysctl cleanups", v2.

Finally had time to respin the series of the work we had started last year on cleaning up the kernel/sysct.c kitchen sink. People keeps stuffing their sysctls in that file and this creates a maintenance burden. So this effort is aimed at placing sysctls where they actually belong.

I'm going to split patches up into series as there is quite a bit of work.

This first set adds register_sysctl_init() for uses of registerting a sysctl on the init path, adds const where missing to a few places, generalizes common values so to be more easy to share, and starts the move of a few kernel/sysctl.c out where they belong.

The majority of rework on v2 in this first patch set is 0-day fixes. Eric Biederman's feedback is later addressed in subsequent patch sets.

I'll only post the first two patch sets for now. We can address the rest once the first two patch sets get completely reviewed / Acked.

This patch (of 9):

The kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.

To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we just care about the core logic.

Today though folks heavily rely on tables on kernel/sysctl.c so they can easily just extend this table with their needed sysctls. In order to help users move their sysctls out we need to provide a helper which can be used during code initialization.

We special-case the initialization use of register_sysctl() since it *is* safe to fail, given all that sysctls do is provide a dynamic interface to query or modify at runtime an existing variable. So the use case of register_sysctl() on init should *not* stop if the sysctls don't end up getting registered. It would be counter productive to stop boot if a simple sysctl registration failed.

Provide a helper for init then, and document the recommended init levels to use for callers of this routine. We will later use this in subsequent patches to start slimming down kernel/sysctl.c tables and moving sysctl registration to the code which actually needs these sysctls.

[[email protected]: major commit log and documentation rephrasing also moved to fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c ]

Cc Iurii Zaikin <[email protected]>
Cc "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Turner <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Reichel <[email protected]>
Cc Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc Qing Wang <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin LaHaise <[email protected]>
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
Cc Stephen Kitt <[email protected]>
Cc Antti Palosaari <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Benjamin Herrenschmidt <[email protected]>
Cc Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Cc David Airlie <[email protected]>
Cc Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Cc Joel Becker <[email protected]>
Cc Joonas Lahtinen <[email protected]>
Cc Joseph Qi <[email protected]>
Cc Julia Lawall <[email protected]>
Cc Lukas Middendorf <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Cc Phillip Potter <[email protected]>
Cc Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
Cc Douglas Gilbert <[email protected]>
Cc James E.J. Bottomley <[email protected]>
Cc Jani Nikula <[email protected]>
Cc John Ogness <[email protected]>
Cc Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
Cc "Rafael J. Wysocki" <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
Cc Suren Baghdasaryan <[email protected]>
Cc "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
---
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c  | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/sysctl.h |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +33 -0
index 070d2df8ab9cf..cd7c6c4af83ad 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/bpf-cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 static const struct dentry_operations proc_sys_dentry_operations;
@@ -1380,6 +1381,38 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl(const char *path, struct ctl_table *tab
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_sysctl);
 
+/**
+ * __register_sysctl_init() - register sysctl table to path
+ * @path: path name for sysctl base
+ * @table: This is the sysctl table that needs to be registered to the path
+ * @table_name: The name of sysctl table, only used for log printing when
+ *              registration fails
+ *
+ * The sysctl interface is used by userspace to query or modify at runtime
+ * a predefined value set on a variable. These variables however have default
+ * values pre-set. Code which depends on these variables will always work even
+ * if register_sysctl() fails. If register_sysctl() fails you'd just loose the
+ * ability to query or modify the sysctls dynamically at run time. Chances of
+ * register_sysctl() failing on init are extremely low, and so for both reasons
+ * this function does not return any error as it is used by initialization code.
+ *
+ * Context: Can only be called after your respective sysctl base path has been
+ * registered. So for instance, most base directories are registered early on
+ * init before init levels are processed through proc_sys_init() and
+ * sysctl_init().
+ */
+void __init __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
+				 const char *table_name)
+{
+	struct ctl_table_header *hdr = register_sysctl(path, table);
+
+	if (unlikely(!hdr)) {
+		pr_err("failed when register_sysctl %s to %s\n", table_name, path);
+		return;
+	}
+	kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
+}
+
 static char *append_path(const char *path, char *pos, const char *name)
 {
 	int namelen;
include/linux/sysctl.h +3 -0
index 51298a4f46235..161eba9fd9122 100644
@@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_paths(const struct ctl_path *path,
 void unregister_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header * table);
 
 extern int sysctl_init(void);
+extern void __register_sysctl_init(const char *path, struct ctl_table *table,
+				 const char *table_name);
+#define register_sysctl_init(path, table) __register_sysctl_init(path, table, #table)
 void do_sysctl_args(void);
 
 extern int pwrsw_enabled;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/20 kernel/panic: move panic sysctls to its own file

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: tangmeng <[email protected]>

commit 9df918698408fd914493aba0b7858fef50eba63a upstream.

kernel/sysctl.c is a kitchen sink where everyone leaves their dirty dishes, this makes it very difficult to maintain.

To help with this maintenance let's start by moving sysctls to places where they actually belong. The proc sysctl maintainers do not want to know what sysctl knobs you wish to add for your own piece of code, we just care about the core logic.

All filesystem syctls now get reviewed by fs folks. This commit follows the commit of fs, move the oops_all_cpu_backtrace sysctl to its own file, kernel/panic.c.

---
 include/linux/kernel.h |  6 ------
 kernel/panic.c         | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/sysctl.c        | 11 -----------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/linux/kernel.h +0 -6
index f5392d96d6886..084d97070ed99 100644
@@ -520,12 +520,6 @@ static inline u32 int_sqrt64(u64 x)
 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-extern unsigned int sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
-#else
-#define sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace 0
-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
-
 extern void bust_spinlocks(int yes);
 extern int panic_timeout;
 extern unsigned long panic_print;
kernel/panic.c +25 -1
index 332736a72a58e..f567195d45d9d 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,9 @@
  * Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event?
  * Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl.
  */
-unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
+static unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
+#else
+#define sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace 0
 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 
 int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
@@ -70,6 +72,28 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
+static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname       = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace",
+		.data           = &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
+	},
+	{ }
+};
+
+static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
+{
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_panic_table);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
+#endif
+
 static long no_blink(int state)
 {
 	return 0;
kernel/sysctl.c +0 -11
index 3eb527f8a269c..d8b7b28463135 100644
@@ -2199,17 +2199,6 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-	{
-		.procname	= "oops_all_cpu_backtrace",
-		.data		= &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace,
-		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
-		.mode		= 0644,
-		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
-		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
-		.extra2		= SYSCTL_ONE,
-	},
-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 	{
 		.procname	= "pid_max",
 		.data		= &pid_max,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/20 panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

commit 1a2383e8b84c0451fd9b1eec3b9aab16f30b597c upstream.

In the current code, the following three places need to unset panic_on_warn before calling panic() to avoid recursive panics:

kernel/kcsan/report.c: print_report()
kernel/sched/core.c: __schedule_bug()
mm/kfence/report.c: kfence_report_error()

In order to avoid copy-pasting "panic_on_warn = 0" all over the places, it is better to move it inside panic() and then remove it from the other places.

---
 kernel/panic.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/panic.c +11 -9
index f567195d45d9d..960c2be2759cb 100644
@@ -207,6 +207,16 @@ void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
 	int old_cpu, this_cpu;
 	bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
 
+	if (panic_on_warn) {
+		/*
+		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
+		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
+		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
+		 * panic_mutex in panic().
+		 */
+		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
 	 * from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
@@ -618,16 +628,8 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
 	if (regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 
-	if (panic_on_warn) {
-		/*
-		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
-		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
-		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
-		 * panic_mutex in panic().
-		 */
-		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
-	}
 
 	if (!regs)
 		dump_stack();
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/20 ubsan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in ubsan_epilogue()

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

commit d83ce027a54068fabb70d2c252e1ce2da86784a4 upstream.

panic_on_warn is unset inside panic(), so no need to unset it before calling panic() in ubsan_epilogue().

---
 lib/ubsan.c | 10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
lib/ubsan.c +1 -9
index adf8dcf3c84e6..d81d107f64f41 100644
@@ -151,16 +151,8 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
 
 	current->in_ubsan--;
 
-	if (panic_on_warn) {
-		/*
-		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
-		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
-		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
-		 * panic_mutex in panic().
-		 */
-		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
-	}
 }
 
 static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/20 kasan: no need to unset panic_on_warn in end_report()

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>

commit e7ce7500375a63348e1d3a703c8d5003cbe3fea6 upstream.

panic_on_warn is unset inside panic(), so no need to unset it before calling panic() in end_report().

---
 mm/kasan/report.c | 10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/report.c +1 -9
index 00a53f1355aec..91714acea0d61 100644
@@ -95,16 +95,8 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
-	if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags)) {
-		/*
-		 * This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
-		 * Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
-		 * system on this thread.  Other threads are blocked by the
-		 * panic_mutex in panic().
-		 */
-		panic_on_warn = 0;
+	if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
 		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
-	}
 	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/20 exit: Add and use make_task_dead.

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 0e25498f8cd43c1b5aa327f373dd094e9a006da7 upstream.

There are two big uses of do_exit. The first is it's design use to be the guts of the exit(2) system call. The second use is to terminate a task after something catastrophic has happened like a NULL pointer in kernel code.

Add a function make_task_dead that is initialy exactly the same as do_exit to cover the cases where do_exit is called to handle catastrophic failure. In time this can probably be reduced to just a light wrapper around do_task_dead. For now keep it exactly the same so that there will be no behavioral differences introducing this new concept.

Replace all of the uses of do_exit that use it for catastraphic task cleanup with make_task_dead to make it clear what the code is doing.

As part of this rename rewind_stack_do_exit
rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

---
 arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c           | 6 +++---
 arch/alpha/mm/fault.c               | 2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c             | 2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                 | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c           | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c               | 2 +-
 arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c         | 2 +-
 arch/csky/kernel/traps.c            | 2 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c           | 2 +-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c               | 2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c         | 2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c          | 2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c            | 2 +-
 arch/ia64/mm/fault.c                | 2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c            | 2 +-
 arch/m68k/mm/fault.c                | 2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c | 4 ++--
 arch/mips/kernel/traps.c            | 2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c             | 2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c           | 8 ++++----
 arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c           | 4 ++--
 arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c        | 2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c          | 2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c         | 2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c           | 2 +-
 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c               | 2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c        | 2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c              | 2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/traps.c              | 2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c        | 4 +---
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c        | 4 +---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S           | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S           | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c         | 4 ++--
 arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c          | 2 +-
 include/linux/sched/task.h          | 1 +
 kernel/exit.c                       | 9 +++++++++
 tools/objtool/check.c               | 3 ++-
 38 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c +3 -3
index 921d4b6e4d956..8b0f81a58b948 100644
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
 		local_irq_enable();
 		while (1);
 	}
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_MATHEMU
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcode, unsigned long reg,
 
 	printk("Bad unaligned kernel access at %016lx: %p %lx %lu\n",
 		pc, va, opcode, reg);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 
 got_exception:
 	/* Ok, we caught the exception, but we don't want it.  Is there
@@ -632,7 +632,7 @@ do_entUna(void * va, unsigned long opcode, unsigned long reg,
 		local_irq_enable();
 		while (1);
 	}
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /*
arch/alpha/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 09172f017efc0..5d42f94887daf 100644
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ do_page_fault(unsigned long address, unsigned long mmcsr,
 	printk(KERN_ALERT "Unable to handle kernel paging request at "
 	       "virtual address %016lx\n", address);
 	die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, cause, (unsigned long*)regs - 16);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 
 	/* We ran out of memory, or some other thing happened to us that
 	   made us unable to handle the page fault gracefully.  */
arch/arm/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index a531afad87fdb..7878c33e188d7 100644
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (signr)
-		do_exit(signr);
+		make_task_dead(signr);
 }
 
 /*
arch/arm/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index efa4020250315..af5177801fb10 100644
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ __do_kernel_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
 	show_pte(KERN_ALERT, mm, addr);
 	die("Oops", regs, fsr);
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 /*
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 2059d8f43f55f..2cdd53425509d 100644
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&die_lock, flags);
 
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static void arm64_show_signal(int signo, const char *str)
arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 795d224f184ff..2be856731e817 100644
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void die_kernel_fault(const char *msg, unsigned long addr,
 	show_pte(addr);
 	die("Oops", regs, esr);
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 static void __do_kernel_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c +1 -1
index cb2a0d94a144d..5e2fb45d605cf 100644
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ void csky_alignment(struct pt_regs *regs)
 				__func__, opcode, rz, rx, imm, addr);
 		show_regs(regs);
 		bust_spinlocks(0);
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
 	}
 
 	force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)addr);
arch/csky/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 22721468a04b2..3c648305f2c30 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 5d8b969cd8f34..2b1366c958e3f 100644
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, unsigned long err)
 	dump(fp);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index d4bc9c16f2df9..0223528565dd3 100644
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 	printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
 		die("Oops", regs, error_code);
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
 
 	return 1;
 }
arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 904134b37232f..25e8bdbfd6853 100644
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_dead_task(err);
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c +1 -1
index 2a40268c3d494..d9ee3b186249d 100644
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ mca_handler_bh(unsigned long paddr, void *iip, unsigned long ipsr)
 	spin_unlock(&mca_bh_lock);
 
 	/* This process is about to be killed itself */
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 /**
arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index e13cb905930fb..753642366e12e 100644
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-  	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 	return 0;
 }
 
arch/ia64/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index cd9766d2b6e0e..829198180ca6f 100644
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ ia64_do_page_fault (unsigned long address, unsigned long isr, struct pt_regs *re
 		regs = NULL;
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
 	if (regs)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	return;
 
   out_of_memory:
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 9e1261462bcc5..b2a31afb998c2 100644
@@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr)
 	pr_crit("%s: %08x\n", str, nr);
 	show_registers(fp);
 	add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 asmlinkage void set_esp0(unsigned long ssp)
arch/m68k/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index ef46e77e97a5b..fcb3a0d8421c5 100644
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int send_fault_sig(struct pt_regs *regs)
 			pr_alert("Unable to handle kernel access");
 		pr_cont(" at virtual address %p\n", addr);
 		die_if_kernel("Oops", regs, 0 /*error_code*/);
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c +2 -2
index cf99c411503e3..6d3a6a6442205 100644
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, long err)
 	pr_warn("Oops: %s, sig: %ld\n", str, err);
 	show_regs(fp);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	/* do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+	/* make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
 	 * context so we don't handle it here
 	 */
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
 
 /* for user application debugging */
arch/mips/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index b1fe4518bd221..ebd0101f0958d 100644
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (regs && kexec_should_crash(current))
 		crash_kexec(regs);
 
-	do_exit(sig);
+	make_task_dead(sig);
 }
 
 extern struct exception_table_entry __start___dbe_table[];
arch/nds32/kernel/fpu.c +1 -1
index 9edd7ed7d7bf8..701c09a668de4 100644
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ inline void handle_fpu_exception(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		}
 	} else if (fpcsr & FPCSR_mskRIT) {
 		if (!user_mode(regs))
-			do_exit(SIGILL);
+			make_task_dead(SIGILL);
 		si_signo = SIGILL;
 	}
 
arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c +4 -4
index 6a9772ba73927..12cdd6549360c 100644
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
 
 	bust_spinlocks(0);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(die);
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void unhandled_interruption(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	pr_emerg("unhandled_interruption\n");
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
 }
 
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void unhandled_exceptions(unsigned long entry, unsigned long addr,
 		 addr, type);
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	force_sig(SIGKILL);
 }
 
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ void do_revinsn(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	pr_emerg("Reserved Instruction\n");
 	show_regs(regs);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
-		do_exit(SIGILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGILL);
 	force_sig(SIGILL);
 }
 
arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c +2 -2
index b172da4eb1a95..86208178024f6 100644
@@ -37,10 +37,10 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	show_regs(regs);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
 	/*
-	 * do_exit() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
+	 * make_task_dead() should take care of panic'ing from an interrupt
 	 * context so we don't handle it here
 	 */
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
 
 void _exception(int signo, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 206e5325e61bc..fca5317f3ce17 100644
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	__asm__ __volatile__("l.nop   1");
 	do {} while (1);
 #endif
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /* This is normally the 'Oops' routine */
arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index bce47e0fb692c..2fad7867af100 100644
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 /* gdb uses break 4,8 */
arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 069d451240fa4..5e5a2448ae79a 100644
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
-	do_exit(signr);
+	make_task_dead(signr);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
 
arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index c1a13011fb8e5..23fe03ca7ec7b 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
arch/riscv/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 8f84bbe0ac33e..54b12943cc7b0 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr)
 		(addr < PAGE_SIZE) ? "NULL pointer dereference" :
 		"paging request", addr);
 	die(regs, "Oops");
-	do_exit(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 }
 
 static inline void mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr, vm_fault_t fault)
arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c +1 -1
index 0dc4b258b98d5..763e726025b3d 100644
@@ -214,5 +214,5 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception: panic_on_oops");
 	oops_exit();
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c +1 -1
index 86c8d5370e7f4..0102376eca3db 100644
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ void s390_handle_mcck(void)
 		       "malfunction (code 0x%016lx).\n", mcck.mcck_code);
 		printk(KERN_EMERG "mcck: task: %s, pid: %d.\n",
 		       current->comm, current->pid);
-		do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 	}
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(s390_handle_mcck);
arch/sh/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 9c3d32b80038a..4efffc18c8512 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void die_if_kernel(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c +1 -3
index 247a0d9683b2b..5d47f4a342261 100644
@@ -86,9 +86,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 	printk("Instruction DUMP:");
 	instruction_dump ((unsigned long *) regs->pc);
-	if(regs->psr & PSR_PS)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead((regs->psr & PSR_PS) ? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_hw_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long type)
arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c +1 -3
index a850dccd78ea1..814277d0e3e8f 100644
@@ -2564,9 +2564,7 @@ void __noreturn die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
-	if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)
-		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-	do_exit(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead((regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV)? SIGKILL : SIGSEGV);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(die_if_kernel);
 
arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +3 -3
index 8fcd6a42b3a18..70bd81b6c612e 100644
@@ -1333,14 +1333,14 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
 SYM_CODE_END(asm_exc_nmi)
 
 .pushsection .text, "ax"
-SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
 	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
 
 	movl	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %esi
 	leal	-TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING-PTREGS_SIZE(%esi), %esp
 
-	call	do_exit
+	call	make_task_dead
 1:	jmp 1b
-SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 .popsection
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +3 -3
index 559c82b834757..23212c53cef7f 100644
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ignore_sysret)
 #endif
 
 .pushsection .text, "ax"
-SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 	/* Prevent any naive code from trying to unwind to our caller. */
 	xorl	%ebp, %ebp
@@ -1518,6 +1518,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(rewind_stack_do_exit)
 	leaq	-PTREGS_SIZE(%rax), %rsp
 	UNWIND_HINT_REGS
 
-	call	do_exit
-SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_do_exit)
+	call	make_task_dead
+SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
 .popsection
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +2 -2
index 97aa900386cbb..b4964300153a1 100644
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ unsigned long oops_begin(void)
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_begin);
 
-void __noreturn rewind_stack_do_exit(int signr);
+void __noreturn rewind_stack_and_make_dead(int signr);
 
 void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 {
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
 	 * reuse the task stack and that existing poisons are invalid.
 	 */
 	kasan_unpoison_task_stack(current);
-	rewind_stack_do_exit(signr);
+	rewind_stack_and_make_dead(signr);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(oops_end);
 
arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index efc3a29cde803..129f23c0ab553 100644
@@ -545,5 +545,5 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
-	do_exit(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 }
include/linux/sched/task.h +1 -0
index 4ce511437a8aa..2832cc6be062b 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ extern void sched_post_fork(struct task_struct *p,
 extern void sched_dead(struct task_struct *p);
 
 void __noreturn do_task_dead(void);
+void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr);
 
 extern void proc_caches_init(void);
 
kernel/exit.c +9 -0
index 8989e1d1f79b7..8d7577940077a 100644
@@ -863,6 +863,15 @@ void __noreturn do_exit(long code)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
 
+void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
+	 * happened.
+	 */
+	do_exit(signr);
+}
+
 void complete_and_exit(struct completion *comp, long code)
 {
 	if (comp)
tools/objtool/check.c +2 -1
index 700984e7f5ba1..3c2baeb86c578 100644
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"panic",
 		"do_exit",
 		"do_task_dead",
+		"make_task_dead",
 		"__module_put_and_exit",
 		"complete_and_exit",
 		"__reiserfs_panic",
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"fortify_panic",
 		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
-		"rewind_stack_do_exit",
+		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
 		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
 		"xen_start_kernel",
 		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/20 objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>

commit 1fb466dff904e4a72282af336f2c355f011eec61 upstream.

Recently the kbuild robot reported two new errors:

Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

lib/kunit/kunit-example-test.o: warning: objtool: .text.unlikely: unexpected end of section arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.o: warning: objtool: oops_end() falls through to next function show_opcodes()

I don't know why they did not occur in my test setup but after digging it I realized I had accidentally dropped a comma in tools/objtool/check.c when I renamed rewind_stack_do_exit to rewind_stack_and_make_dead.

Add that comma back to fix objtool errors.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/objtool/check.c +1 -1
index 3c2baeb86c578..985bcc5cea8a4 100644
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 		"fortify_panic",
 		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
-		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead"
+		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead",
 		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
 		"xen_start_kernel",
 		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/20 hexagon: Fix function name in die()

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit 4f0712ccec09c071e221242a2db9a6779a55a949 upstream.

When building ARCH=hexagon defconfig:

arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c:217:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror,-Wimplicit-function-declaration]

        make_dead_task(err);
        ^

The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more build error.

---
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 25e8bdbfd6853..b334e80717099 100644
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 
 	oops_exit();
-	make_dead_task(err);
+	make_task_dead(err);
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/20 h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit ab4ababdf77ccc56c7301c751dff49c79709c51c upstream.

When building ARCH=h8300 defconfig:

arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c:109:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

  109 |  make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

arch/h8300/mm/fault.c: In function 'do_page_fault':
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c:54:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

   54 |  make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
      |  ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more build error.

Additionally, include linux/sched/task.h in arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c to avoid the same error because do_exit()'s declaration is in kernel.h but make_task_dead()'s is in task.h, which is not included in traps.c.

---
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c | 3 ++-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c     | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c +2 -1
index 2b1366c958e3f..cf23ccb50c17e 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/sched/debug.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
 #include <linux/mm_types.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, unsigned long err)
 	dump(fp);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
-	make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+	make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 static int kstack_depth_to_print = 24;
arch/h8300/mm/fault.c +1 -1
index 0223528565dd3..b465441f490df 100644
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
 	printk(" at virtual address %08lx\n", address);
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
 		die("Oops", regs, error_code);
-	make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+	make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 
 	return 1;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/20 csky: Fix function name in csky_alignment() and die()

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit 751971af2e3615dc5bd12674080bc795505fefeb upstream.

When building ARCH=csky defconfig:

arch/csky/kernel/traps.c: In function 'die':
arch/csky/kernel/traps.c:112:17: error: implicit declaration of function 'make_dead_task' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]

  112 |                 make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
      |                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The function's name is make_task_dead(), change it so there is no more build error.

---
 arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c | 2 +-
 arch/csky/kernel/traps.c    | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/csky/abiv1/alignment.c +1 -1
index 5e2fb45d605cf..2df115d0e2105 100644
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ void csky_alignment(struct pt_regs *regs)
 				__func__, opcode, rz, rx, imm, addr);
 		show_regs(regs);
 		bust_spinlocks(0);
-		make_dead_task(SIGKILL);
+		make_task_dead(SIGKILL);
 	}
 
 	force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)addr);
arch/csky/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index 3c648305f2c30..15711efa14a4e 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
 	if (panic_on_oops)
 		panic("Fatal exception");
 	if (ret != NOTIFY_STOP)
-		make_dead_task(SIGSEGV);
+		make_task_dead(SIGSEGV);
 }
 
 void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/20 ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>

commit dbecf9b8b8ce580f4e11afed9d61e8aa294cddd2 upstream.

In linux-next, IA64_MCA_RECOVERY uses the (new) function make_task_dead(), which is not exported for use by modules. Instead of exporting it for one user, convert IA64_MCA_RECOVERY to be a bool Kconfig symbol.

In a config file from "kernel test robot <[email protected]>" for a different problem, this linker error was exposed when CONFIG_IA64_MCA_RECOVERY=m.

Fixes this build error:

ERROR: modpost: "make_task_dead" [arch/ia64/kernel/mca_recovery.ko] undefined!

---
 arch/ia64/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/ia64/Kconfig +1 -1
index 39b25a5a591b3..1d0579bc9d655 100644
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
 	depends on PROC_KCORE
 
 config IA64_MCA_RECOVERY
-	tristate "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
+	bool "MCA recovery from errors other than TLB."
 
 config IA64_PALINFO
 	tristate "/proc/pal support"
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/20 panic: Separate sysctl logic from CONFIG_SMP

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 9360d035a579d95d1e76c471061b9065b18a0eb1 upstream.

In preparation for adding more sysctls directly in kernel/panic.c, split CONFIG_SMP from the logic that adds sysctls.

---
 kernel/panic.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/panic.c +3 -1
index 960c2be2759cb..09f0802212c38 100644
@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	{
 		.procname       = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace",
 		.data           = &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace,
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 		.extra1         = SYSCTL_ZERO,
 		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
 	},
+#endif
 	{ }
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/20 exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit d4ccd54d28d3c8598e2354acc13e28c060961dbb upstream.

Many Linux systems are configured to not panic on oops; but allowing an attacker to oops the system **really** often can make even bugs that look completely unexploitable exploitable (like NULL dereferences and such) if each crash elevates a refcount by one or a lock is taken in read mode, and this causes a counter to eventually overflow.

The most interesting counters for this are 32 bits wide (like open-coded refcounts that don't use refcount_t). (The ldsem reader count on 32-bit platforms is just 16 bits, but probably nobody cares about 32-bit platforms that much nowadays.)

So let's panic the system if the kernel is constantly oopsing.

The speed of oopsing 2^32 times probably depends on several factors, like how long the stack trace is and which unwinder you're using; an empirically important one is whether your console is showing a graphical environment or a text console that oopses will be printed to.
In a quick single-threaded benchmark, it looks like oopsing in a vfork() child with a very short stack trace only takes ~510 microseconds per run when a graphical console is active; but switching to a text console that oopses are printed to slows it down around 87x, to ~45 milliseconds per run.
(Adding more threads makes this faster, but the actual oops printing happens under &die_lock on x86, so you can maybe speed this up by a factor of around 2 and then any further improvement gets eaten up by lock contention.)

It looks like it would take around 8-12 days to overflow a 32-bit counter with repeated oopsing on a multi-core X86 system running a graphical environment; both me (in an X86 VM) and Seth (with a distro kernel on normal hardware in a standard configuration) got numbers in that ballpark.

12 days aren't *that* short on a desktop system, and you'd likely need much longer on a typical server system (assuming that people don't run graphical desktop environments on their servers), and this is a *very* noisy and violent approach to exploiting the kernel; and it also seems to take orders of magnitude longer on some machines, probably because stuff like EFI pstore will slow it down a ton if that's active.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst |  8 ++++
 kernel/exit.c                               | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +8 -0
index a4b1ebc2e70b0..cd9247b48fc73 100644
@@ -663,6 +663,14 @@ This is the default behavior.
 an oops event is detected.
 
 
+oops_limit
+==========
+
+Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
+as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
+
+
 osrelease, ostype & version
 ===========================
 
kernel/exit.c +43 -0

59 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/20 exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 9db89b41117024f80b38b15954017fb293133364 upstream.

Since Oops count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add the entry /sys/kernel/oops_count to expose it to userspace.

---
 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count       |  6 +++++
 kernel/exit.c                                 | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count new file +6 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..156cca9dbc960
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Oopsed since last boot.
kernel/exit.c +20 -2
index db832cff6b7b2..b519abee2c541 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcuwait.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -96,6 +97,25 @@ static __init int kernel_exit_sysctls_init(void)
 late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysctls_init);
 #endif
 
+static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t oops_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&oops_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute oops_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(oops_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_exit_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &oops_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_exit_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p, bool group_dead)
 {
 	nr_threads--;
@@ -892,8 +912,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_exit);
 
 void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 {
-	static atomic_t oops_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
 	/*
 	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
 	 * happened.
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/20 exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit de92f65719cd672f4b48397540b9f9eff67eca40 upstream.

In preparation for keeping oops_limit logic in sync with warn_limit, have oops_limit == 0 disable checking the Oops counter.

Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
Cc "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Cc "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 5 +++--
 kernel/exit.c                               | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +3 -2
index cd9247b48fc73..470262c088589 100644
@@ -667,8 +667,9 @@ oops_limit
 ==========
 
 Number of kernel oopses after which the kernel should panic when
-``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 or 1 has the same effect
-as setting ``panic_on_oops=1``.
+``panic_on_oops`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the count. Setting this to  1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_oops=1``. The default value is 10000.
 
 
 osrelease, ostype & version
kernel/exit.c +1 -1
index b519abee2c541..8c820aa7b9c5d 100644
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
 	 * kernel may oops without panic().
 	 */
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit))
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
 		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
 
 	do_exit(signr);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/20 panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 79cc1ba7badf9e7a12af99695a557e9ce27ee967 upstream.

Several run-time checkers (KASAN, UBSAN, KFENCE, KCSAN, sched) roll their own warnings, and each check "panic_on_warn". Consolidate this into a single function so that future instrumentation can be added in a single location.

Cc Marco Elver <[email protected]>
Cc Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc Dietmar Eggemann <[email protected]>
Cc Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc Ben Segall <[email protected]>
Cc Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <[email protected]>
Cc Valentin Schneider <[email protected]>
Cc Andrey Ryabinin <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
Cc Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc Vincenzo Frascino <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc David Gow <[email protected]>
Cc tangmeng <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Shuah Khan <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <[email protected]>
Cc Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
---
 include/linux/kernel.h | 1 +
 kernel/kcsan/report.c  | 4 ++--
 kernel/panic.c         | 9 +++++++--
 kernel/sched/core.c    | 3 +--
 lib/ubsan.c            | 3 +--
 mm/kasan/report.c      | 4 ++--
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
include/linux/kernel.h +1 -0
index 084d97070ed99..394f10fc29aad 100644
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ extern long (*panic_blink)(int state);
 __printf(1, 2)
 void panic(const char *fmt, ...) __noreturn __cold;
 void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *msg);
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin);
 extern void oops_enter(void);
 extern void oops_exit(void);
 extern bool oops_may_print(void);
kernel/kcsan/report.c +2 -2
index d3bf87e6007ca..069830f5a5d24 100644
@@ -630,8 +630,8 @@ void kcsan_report(const volatile void *ptr, size_t size, int access_type,
 		bool reported = value_change != KCSAN_VALUE_CHANGE_FALSE &&
 				print_report(value_change, type, &ai, other_info);
 
-		if (reported && panic_on_warn)
-			panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+		if (reported)
+			check_panic_on_warn("KCSAN");
 
 		release_report(&flags, other_info);
 	}
kernel/panic.c +7 -2
index 09f0802212c38..0da47888f72e8 100644
@@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
 		ftrace_dump(DUMP_ALL);
 }
 
+void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
+{
+	if (panic_on_warn)
+		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+}
+
 /**
  *	panic - halt the system
  *	@fmt: The text string to print
@@ -630,8 +636,7 @@ void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
 	if (regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
 
 	if (!regs)
 		dump_stack();
kernel/sched/core.c +1 -2
index a875bc59804eb..1303a2607f1f8 100644
@@ -4280,8 +4280,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
 		pr_err("Preemption disabled at:");
 		print_ip_sym(KERN_ERR, preempt_disable_ip);
 	}
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("scheduling while atomic\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("scheduling while atomic");
 
 	dump_stack();
 	add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
lib/ubsan.c +1 -2
index d81d107f64f41..ee14c46cac897 100644
@@ -151,8 +151,7 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(void)
 
 	current->in_ubsan--;
 
-	if (panic_on_warn)
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	check_panic_on_warn("UBSAN");
 }
 
 static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
mm/kasan/report.c +2 -2
index 91714acea0d61..2f5e96ac4d008 100644
@@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ static void end_report(unsigned long *flags)
 	pr_err("==================================================================\n");
 	add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&report_lock, *flags);
-	if (panic_on_warn && !test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
-		panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
+	if (!test_bit(KASAN_BIT_MULTI_SHOT, &kasan_flags))
+		check_panic_on_warn("KASAN");
 	kasan_enable_current();
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/20 panic: Introduce warn_limit

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 9fc9e278a5c0b708eeffaf47d6eb0c82aa74ed78 upstream.

Like oops_limit, add warn_limit for limiting the number of warnings when panic_on_warn is not set.

Cc Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
Cc "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc Huang Ying <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc tangmeng <[email protected]>
Cc "Guilherme G. Piccoli" <[email protected]>
Cc Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 10 ++++++++++
 kernel/panic.c                              | 14 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +10 -0
index 470262c088589..6b0c7b650deaa 100644
@@ -1478,6 +1478,16 @@ entry will default to 2 instead of 0.
 2 Unprivileged calls to ``bpf()`` are disabled
 = =============================================================
 
+
+warn_limit
+==========
+
+Number of kernel warnings after which the kernel should panic when
+``panic_on_warn`` is not set. Setting this to 0 disables checking
+the warning count. Setting this to 1 has the same effect as setting
+``panic_on_warn=1``. The default value is 0.
+
+
 watchdog
 ========
 
kernel/panic.c +14 -0
index 0da47888f72e8..e341366bd3e8b 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
 int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
 unsigned long panic_on_taint;
 bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false;
+static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly;
 
 int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
@@ -85,6 +86,13 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
 		.extra2         = SYSCTL_ONE,
 	},
 #endif
+	{
+		.procname       = "warn_limit",
+		.data           = &warn_limit,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(warn_limit),
+		.mode           = 0644,
+		.proc_handler   = proc_douintvec,
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
@@ -194,8 +202,14 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
+	static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
+
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
+		panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
+		      origin, warn_limit);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/20 panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 8b05aa26336113c4cea25f1c333ee8cd4fc212a6 upstream.

Since Warn count is now tracked and is a fairly interesting signal, add the entry /sys/kernel/warn_count to expose it to userspace.

---
 .../ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count       |  6 +++++
 kernel/panic.c                                | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count new file +6 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..08f083d2fd51b
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+Date:		November 2022
+KernelVersion:	6.2.0
+Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <[email protected]>
+Description:
+		Shows how many times the system has Warned since last boot.
kernel/panic.c +20 -2
index e341366bd3e8b..6e30455eb2e7c 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 
 #define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
@@ -104,6 +105,25 @@ static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
 late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
 #endif
 
+static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+static ssize_t warn_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
+			       char *page)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&warn_count));
+}
+
+static struct kobj_attribute warn_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(warn_count);
+
+static __init int kernel_panic_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+	sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &warn_count_attr.attr, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysfs_init);
+#endif
+
 static long no_blink(int state)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -202,8 +222,6 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
-	static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
-
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/20 docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 00dd027f721e0458418f7750d8a5a664ed3e5994 upstream.

Running "make htmldocs" shows that "/sys/kernel/oops_count" was duplicated. This should have been "warn_count":

Warning: /sys/kernel/oops_count is defined 2 times:
./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count:0 ./Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count:0

Fix the typo.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count +1 -1
index 08f083d2fd51b..90a029813717d 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-What:		/sys/kernel/oops_count
+What:		/sys/kernel/warn_count
 Date:		November 2022
 KernelVersion:	6.2.0
 Contact:	Linux Kernel Hardening List <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/20 exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 7535b832c6399b5ebfc5b53af5c51dd915ee2538 upstream.

Use a temporary variable to take full advantage of READ_ONCE() behavior. Without this, the report (and even the test) might be out of sync with the initial test.

Fixes 9fc9e278a5c0 ("panic: Introduce warn_limit")
Fixes d4ccd54d28d3 ("exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops")
Cc "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
Cc Marco Elver <[email protected]>
Cc tangmeng <[email protected]>
Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
Cc Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/exit.c  | 6 ++++--
 kernel/panic.c | 7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/exit.c +4 -2
index 8c820aa7b9c5d..bacdaf980933b 100644
@@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 	 * Take the task off the cpu after something catastrophic has
 	 * happened.
 	 */
+	unsigned int limit;
 
 	/*
 	 * Every time the system oopses, if the oops happens while a reference
@@ -927,8 +928,9 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
 	 * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the
 	 * kernel may oops without panic().
 	 */
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit)
-		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit);
+	limit = READ_ONCE(oops_limit);
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= limit && limit)
+		panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", limit);
 
 	do_exit(signr);
 }
kernel/panic.c +5 -2
index 6e30455eb2e7c..bc39e2b27d315 100644
@@ -222,12 +222,15 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(void)
 
 void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
 {
+	unsigned int limit;
+
 	if (panic_on_warn)
 		panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
 
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit)
+	limit = READ_ONCE(warn_limit);
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= limit && limit)
 		panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
-		      origin, warn_limit);
+		      origin, limit);
 }
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1