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Netfilter fixes for net

PATCH Applied Pablo Neira Ayuso 2 participants 4 messages Jan 31, 2023 – Feb 1, 2023

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Pablo Neira Ayuso

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover Netfilter fixes for net

Hi,

The following patchset contains two Netfilter fixes for net:

1) Release bridge info once packet escapes the br_netfilter path, from Florian Westphal.

2) Revert incorrect fix for the SCTP connection tracking chunk iterator, also from Florian.

First path fixes a long standing issue, the second path addresses a mistake in the previous pull request for net.

Please, pull these changes from:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git

Thanks.

----------------------------------------------------------------

The following changes since commit 9b3fc325c2a7e9e17e22b008357cb0ceb810d9b2:

Merge tag 'ieee802154-for-net-2023-01-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sschmidt/wpan (2023-01-30 21:11:11 -0800)

are available in the Git repository at:

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git HEAD

for you to fetch changes up to bd0e06f0def75ba26572a94e5350324474a55562:

Revert "netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk" (2023-01-31 14:02:48 +0100)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Florian Westphal (2):
netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression Revert "netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk"

 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c         | 1 +
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

When using a xfrm interface in a bridged setup (the outgoing device is bridged), the incoming packets in the xfrm interface are only tracked in the outgoing direction.

$ brctl show
bridge name     interfaces
br_eth1         eth1
$ conntrack -L
tcp 115 SYN_SENT src=192... dst=192... [UNREPLIED] ...

If br_netfilter is enabled, the first (encrypted) packet is received onR eth1, conntrack hooks are called from br_netfilter emulation which allocates nf_bridge info for this skb.

If the packet is for local machine, skb gets passed up the ip stack. The skb passes through ip prerouting a second time. br_netfilter ip_sabotage_in supresses the re-invocation of the hooks.

After this, skb gets decrypted in xfrm layer and appears in network stack a second time (after decryption).

Then, ip_sabotage_in is called again and suppresses netfilter hook invocation, even though the bridge layer never called them for the plaintext incarnation of the packet.

Free the bridge info after the first suppression to avoid this.

I was unable to figure out where the regression comes from, as far as i can see br_netfilter always had this problem; i did not expect that skb is looped again with different headers.

Fixes c4b0e771f906 ("netfilter: avoid using skb->nf_bridge directly")
---
 net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c +1 -0
index f20f4373ff40..9554abcfd5b4 100644
@@ -871,6 +871,7 @@ static unsigned int ip_sabotage_in(void *priv,
 	if (nf_bridge && !nf_bridge->in_prerouting &&
 	    !netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev) &&
 	    !netif_is_l3_slave(skb->dev)) {
+		nf_bridge_info_free(skb);
 		state->okfn(state->net, state->sk, skb);
 		return NF_STOLEN;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net 1/2] netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>:

Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 31 Jan 2023 14:31:57 +0100 you wrote:

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

When using a xfrm interface in a bridged setup (the outgoing device is bridged), the incoming packets in the xfrm interface are only tracked in the outgoing direction.

$ brctl show
bridge name     interfaces
br_eth1         eth1

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [net,1/2] netfilter: br_netfilter: disable sabotage_in hook after first suppression

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/2b272bb558f1
  - [net,2/2] Revert "netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk"
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/bd0e06f0def7

You are awesome, thank you!

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author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 Revert "netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk"

In reply to Pablo Neira Ayuso

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

There is no bug. If sch->length == 0, this would result in an infinite loop, but first caller, do_basic_checks(), errors out in this case.

After this change, packets with bogus zero-length chunks are no longer detected as invalid, so revert & add comment wrt. 0 length check.

Fixes 98ee00774525 ("netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk")
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c +3 -2
index 945dd40e7077..011d414038ea 100644
@@ -142,10 +142,11 @@ static void sctp_print_conntrack(struct seq_file *s, struct nf_conn *ct)
 }
 #endif
 
+/* do_basic_checks ensures sch->length > 0, do not use before */
 #define for_each_sctp_chunk(skb, sch, _sch, offset, dataoff, count)	\
 for ((offset) = (dataoff) + sizeof(struct sctphdr), (count) = 0;	\
-	((sch) = skb_header_pointer((skb), (offset), sizeof(_sch), &(_sch))) &&	\
-	(sch)->length;	\
+	(offset) < (skb)->len &&					\
+	((sch) = skb_header_pointer((skb), (offset), sizeof(_sch), &(_sch)));	\
 	(offset) += (ntohs((sch)->length) + 3) & ~3, (count)++)
 
 /* Some validity checks to make sure the chunks are fine */
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2.30.2