arm64/mm: Intercept pfn changes in set_pte_at()
PATCH v2 1/1 arm64/mm: Intercept pfn changes in set_pte_at()
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates set_pte_at() to intercept such changes, via an updated pgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via __check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as __check_safe_pte_update().
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Changes in V1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -2
@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) }extern void __sync_icache_dcache (pte_t pteval); +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new);/* * PTE bits configuration in the presence of hardware Dirty Bit Management
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);* PTE_DIRTY || (PTE_WRITE && !PTE_RDONLY) */ -static inline void __check_racy_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep, +static inline void __check_safe_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep,pte_t pte) {pte_t old_pte;
@@ -318,6 +319,9 @@ static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,VM_WARN_ONCE (pte_write (old_pte) && !pte_dirty (pte),"%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); +VM_WARN_ONCE (!pgattr_change_is_safe (pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)), +"%s: unsafe attribute change: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , + __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); } static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,mte_sync_tags (old_pte, pte); } -__check_racy_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte); +__check_safe_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte);set_pte (ptep, pte); }
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +7 -1
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)return phys; } -static bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) {/* * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live
@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)if (old ==0 || new ==0 )return true; +/* If old and new ptes are valid, pfn should not change */ +if (pte_valid (__pte (old)) &&pte_valid (__pte (new))) { +if (pte_pfn (__pte (old)) !=pte_pfn (__pte (new))) +return false; + } +/* live contiguous mappings may not be manipulated at all */ if ((old | new) &PTE_CONT )return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
Quoted 75 lines
Changes in V1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6
-2@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) }extern void __sync_icache_dcache (pte_t pteval); +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new);/* * PTE bits configuration in the presence of hardware Dirty Bit Management @@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);* PTE_DIRTY || (PTE_WRITE && !PTE_RDONLY) */ -static inline void __check_racy_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep, +static inline void __check_safe_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep,pte_t pte) {pte_t old_pte;@@ -318,6 +319,9 @@ static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,VM_WARN_ONCE (pte_write (old_pte) && !pte_dirty (pte),"%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); +VM_WARN_ONCE (!pgattr_change_is_safe (pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)), +"%s: unsafe attribute change: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , + __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); } static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,mte_sync_tags (old_pte, pte); } -__check_racy_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte); +__check_safe_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte);set_pte (ptep, pte); }arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +7
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)return phys; } -static bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) {/* * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live @@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)if (old ==0 || new ==0 )return true; +/* If old and new ptes are valid, pfn should not change */ +if (pte_valid (__pte (old)) &&pte_valid (__pte (new))) { +if (pte_pfn (__pte (old)) !=pte_pfn (__pte (new))) +return false; + } +/* live contiguous mappings may not be manipulated at all */ if ((old | new) &PTE_CONT )return false;
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
So I think we should confirm/fix the vmap issue before we enable this check and also try to get some testing coverage to address Mark's worries. I think he has a syzkaller instance set up, so that sound like a good place to start.
Will
Quoted 19 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 16 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Doesn't ring a bell, so either it wasn't me, or it was many years ago and about 5 levels deep into trying to fix something else :/
Quoted 4 lines
So I think we should confirm/fix the vmap issue before we enable this check and also try to get some testing coverage to address Mark's worries. I think he has a syzkaller instance set up, so that sound like a good place to start.
I think we're also missing a subtlety here in that this restriction doesn't *always* apply. For instance if someone wants to move a page by making the mapping read-only, copying the contents to a new page, then pointing the RO mapping at that new page, that should technically not require BBM.
Thanks,
Robin.
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 22 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 21 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 19 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Doesn't ring a bell, so either it wasn't me, or it was many years ago and about 5 levels deep into trying to fix something else :/
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap. Catalin -- any clues?
Will
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 27 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 25 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Doesn't ring a bell, so either it wasn't me, or it was many years ago and about 5 levels deep into trying to fix something else :/
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software PTE_DIRTY on the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).
Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit 47010c040dec ("mm: hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE if ARM64_4K_PAGES || (ARM64_16K_PAGES && !ARM64_VA_BITS_36) - select ARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN select ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP if ARM64_4K_PAGES
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 56 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 28 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 27 lines · Robin Murphy
Quoted 25 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Doesn't ring a bell, so either it wasn't me, or it was many years ago and about 5 levels deep into trying to fix something else :/
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64 · line 103
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-1@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE if ARM64_4K_PAGES || (ARM64_16K_PAGES && !ARM64_VA_BITS_36) - select ARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP
Maybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in set_pte_at(). What do you think of?
Muchun,
Thanks.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN select ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP if ARM64_4K_PAGESSignature · 2 lines
-- Catalin
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Catalin Marinas
maintainerQuoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:
Quoted 16 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig config ARM64 · line 103
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-1@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE if ARM64_4K_PAGES || (ARM64_16K_PAGES && !ARM64_VA_BITS_36) - select ARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?
IIUC, vmemmap_remap_pte() not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.
Signature · 1 line
Catalin
Quoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64select
ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
selectARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
selectARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHAREifARM64_4K_PAGES|| (ARM64_16K_PAGES&& !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
- selectARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?
Quoted 6 lines
IIUC,
vmemmap_remap_pte()not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.
Right. I think using BBM is to avoid possibly creating multiple TLB entries for the same address for a extremely short period. But accessing either the old page or the new page is fine in this case. Is it acceptable for this special case without using BBM?
Thanks,
Muchun.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 45 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64select
ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
selectARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
selectARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHAREifARM64_4K_PAGES|| (ARM64_16K_PAGES&& !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
- selectARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?Quoted 6 lines
IIUC,
vmemmap_remap_pte()not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.
Quoted 4 lines
Right. I think using BBM is to avoid possibly creating multiple TLB entries for the same address for a extremely short period. But accessing either the old page or the new page is fine in this case. Is it acceptable for this special case without using BBM?
Sadly, the architecture allows the CPU to conjure up a mapping based on a combination of the old and the new descriptor (a process known as "amalgamation") so we _really_ need the BBM sequence.
I'm in favour of disabling the optimisation now and bringing it back once we've got this fixed.
Will
Quoted 50 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 45 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 44 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64select
ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
selectARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
selectARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHAREifARM64_4K_PAGES|| (ARM64_16K_PAGES&& !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
- selectARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?IIUC,
vmemmap_remap_pte()not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Right. I think using BBM is to avoid possibly creating multiple TLB entries for the same address for a extremely short period. But accessing either the old page or the new page is fine in this case. Is it acceptable for this special case without using BBM?
Sadly, the architecture allows the CPU to conjure up a mapping based on a combination of the old and the new descriptor (a process known as "amalgamation") so we _really_ need the BBM sequence.
I am not familiar with ARM64, what's the user-visible effect if this "amalgamation" occurs?
Muchun,
Thanks.
Quoted 5 lines
I'm in favour of disabling the optimisation now and bringing it back once we've got this fixed.
Will
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 55 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 55 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 49 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64select
ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
selectARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
selectARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHAREifARM64_4K_PAGES|| (ARM64_16K_PAGES&& !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
- selectARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?Quoted 6 lines
IIUC,
vmemmap_remap_pte()not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.Right. I think using BBM is to avoid possibly creating multiple TLB entries for the same address for a extremely short period. But accessing either the old page or the new page is fine in this case. Is it acceptable for this special case without using BBM?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Sadly, the architecture allows the CPU to conjure up a mapping based on a combination of the old and the new descriptor (a process known as "amalgamation") so we _really_ need the BBM sequence.
I am not familiar with ARM64, what's the user-visible effect if this "amalgamation" occurs?
The user-visible effects would probably be data corruption and instability, since the amalgamated TLB entry could result in a bogus physical address and bogus permissions.
Will
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Quoted 64 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 59 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 58 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 45 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 38 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 16 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 16 lines · Catalin Marinas
Quoted 1 line
Bah, sorry! Catalin reckons it may have been him talking about the vmemmap.
Indeed. The discussion with Anshuman started from this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
We already trip over the existing checks even without Anshuman's patch, though only by chance. We are not setting the software
PTE_DIRTYon the new pte (we don't bother with this bit for kernel mappings).Given that the vmemmap ptes are still live when such change happens and no-one came with a solution to the break-before-make problem, I propose we revert the arm64 part of commit
47010c040dec("mm:hugetlb_vmemmap:
cleanup CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP*"). We just need this hunk:Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/arm64/Kconfig +0
-0@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ config ARM64select
ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
selectARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
selectARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHAREifARM64_4K_PAGES|| (ARM64_16K_PAGES&& !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
- selectARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAPMaybe it is a little overkill for HVO as it can significantly minimize the overhead of vmemmap on ARM64 servers for some workloads (like qemu, DPDK). So I don't think disabling it is a good approach. Indeed, HVO broke BBM, but the waring does not affect anything since the tail vmemmap pages are supposed to be read-only. So, I suggest skipping warnings if it is the vmemmap address in
set_pte_at(). What do you think of?Quoted 6 lines
IIUC,
vmemmap_remap_pte()not only makes the pte read-only but also changes the output address. Architecturally, this needs a BBM sequence. We can avoid going through an invalid pte if we first make the pte read-only, TLBI but keeping the same pfn, followed by a change of the pfn while keeping the pte readonly. This also assumes that the content of the page pointed at by the pte is the same at both old and new pfn.Quoted 4 lines
Right. I think using BBM is to avoid possibly creating multiple TLB entries for the same address for a extremely short period. But accessing either the old page or the new page is fine in this case. Is it acceptable for this special case without using BBM?
Sadly, the architecture allows the CPU to conjure up a mapping based on a combination of the old and the new descriptor (a process known as "amalgamation") so we _really_ need the BBM sequence.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I am not familiar with ARM64, what's the user-visible effect if this "amalgamation" occurs?
The user-visible effects would probably be data corruption and instability, since the amalgamated TLB entry could result in a bogus physical address and bogus permissions.
You mean the output address of amalgamated TLB entry is neither the old address (before updated) nor the new address (after updated)? So it is a bogus physical address? Is there any specifications to describe the rules of how to create a amalgamated TLB entry? Thanks.
Muchun
Quoted 2 lines
Will
Mark Rutland
reviewerQuoted 11 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 8 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 2 lines · Muchun Song
I am not familiar with ARM64, what's the user-visible effect if this "amalgamation" occurs?
The user-visible effects would probably be data corruption and instability, since the amalgamated TLB entry could result in a bogus physical address and bogus permissions.
You mean the output address of amalgamated TLB entry is neither the old address (before updated) nor the new address (after updated)?
Yes, that is one possible result.
Quoted 1 line
So it is a bogus physical address?
Yes, that is one possible result.
Quoted 2 lines
Is there any specifications to describe the rules of how to create a amalgamated TLB entry? Thanks.
Unfortunately, this is not clearly specified in the ARM ARM, and we have to take a pessimistic reading here. We assume that amalgamation is some arbitrary function of the TLB entries which are hit (e.g. they might be OR'd together). This is something that I'd like to have clarified further by Arm's architects.
The important thing to note is that amalgamation applies to *TLB entries*, not the translation table entries that they were derived from. Since the TLB format is micro-architecture dependent, and since the manner in which they might be combined is arbitrary, the results of combining could be arbitrary (and consequently, this is difficult to specify).
The architecture *does* provide a few restrictions (e.g. Stage-1 entries within a VM can't escape Stage-2, NS entries can't create a secure physical address), but beyond that we cannot make any assumptions.
So e.g. if you have 2 read-only entries for addresses A and B, amalgamation could result in read-write-execute for a distinct address C.
It's not clear to me whether that could also affect hits for unrelated VAs.
So the short answer is that we have to treat this as CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, and must avoid potential amalgamation by using Break-Before-Make.
Thanks,
Mark.
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Quoted 41 lines · Mark Rutland
Quoted 11 lines · Muchun Song
Quoted 8 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 2 lines · Muchun Song
I am not familiar with ARM64, what's the user-visible effect if this "amalgamation" occurs?
The user-visible effects would probably be data corruption and instability, since the amalgamated TLB entry could result in a bogus physical address and bogus permissions.
You mean the output address of amalgamated TLB entry is neither the old address (before updated) nor the new address (after updated)?
Yes, that is one possible result.
Quoted 1 line
So it is a bogus physical address?
Yes, that is one possible result.
Quoted 2 lines
Is there any specifications to describe the rules of how to create a amalgamated TLB entry? Thanks.
Unfortunately, this is not clearly specified in the ARM ARM, and we have to take a pessimistic reading here. We assume that amalgamation is some arbitrary function of the TLB entries which are hit (e.g. they might be OR'd together). This is something that I'd like to have clarified further by Arm's architects.
The important thing to note is that amalgamation applies to *TLB entries*, not the translation table entries that they were derived from. Since the TLB format is micro-architecture dependent, and since the manner in which they might be combined is arbitrary, the results of combining could be arbitrary (and consequently, this is difficult to specify).
The architecture *does* provide a few restrictions (e.g. Stage-1 entries within a VM can't escape Stage-2, NS entries can't create a secure physical address), but beyond that we cannot make any assumptions.
Quoted 7 lines
So e.g. if you have 2 read-only entries for addresses A and B, amalgamation could result in read-write-execute for a distinct address C.
It's not clear to me whether that could also affect hits for unrelated VAs.
So the short answer is that we have to treat this as CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, and must avoid potential amalgamation by using Break-Before-Make.
Thanks for your clear description. It's really helpful.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Mark.
Mark Rutland
reviewerQuoted 26 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Quoted 4 lines
So I think we should confirm/fix the vmap issue before we enable this check and also try to get some testing coverage to address Mark's worries. I think he has a syzkaller instance set up, so that sound like a good place to start.
I've thrown my Syzkaller instance at this patch; if it doesn't find anything by Monday I reckon we should pick this up.
That said, I had some minor nits on the patch; I'm not sure if you'd be happy to apply the suggested changes when applying or if you'd prefer that Anshuman applies those locally and sense a v3.
Thanks,
Mark.
Quoted 32 lines · Mark Rutland
Quoted 26 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Quoted 4 lines
So I think we should confirm/fix the vmap issue before we enable this check and also try to get some testing coverage to address Mark's worries. I think he has a syzkaller instance set up, so that sound like a good place to start.
Quoted 6 lines
I've thrown my Syzkaller instance at this patch; if it doesn't find anything by Monday I reckon we should pick this up.
That said, I had some minor nits on the patch; I'm not sure if you'd be happy to apply the suggested changes when applying or if you'd prefer that Anshuman applies those locally and sense a v3.
I could send out a V3, running some stress-ng based memory tests with the suggested changes applied on the patch.
Mark Rutland
reviewerQuoted 27 lines · Mark Rutland
Quoted 26 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 18 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.Quoted 1 line
Gentle ping, any updates on this patch ? Still any concerns ?
I don't think we really got to the bottom of Mark's concerns with unreachable ptes on the stack, did we? I also have vague recollections of somebody (Robin?) running into issues with the vmap code not honouring BBM.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
So I think we should confirm/fix the vmap issue before we enable this check and also try to get some testing coverage to address Mark's worries. I think he has a syzkaller instance set up, so that sound like a good place to start.
I've thrown my Syzkaller instance at this patch; if it doesn't find anything by Monday I reckon we should pick this up.
FWIW, that hasn't hit anything so far.
It would be good if we could explicitly nots which mm test suite and/or stress tests are happy with this, but otherwise this looks good to me.
Thanks,
Mark.
Quoted 6 lines
That said, I had some minor nits on the patch; I'm not sure if you'd be happy to apply the suggested changes when applying or if you'd prefer that Anshuman applies those locally and sense a v3.
Thanks,
Mark.
Hi Annshuman,
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Can you elaborate on this a little bit? It's not entirely clear what that internal CI system has tested. It would be helpful if you could indicate:
* What sort of testing has been done by the CI system? e.g. is this just booting, running LTP, something else?
* Has this tried a bunch of configurations and/or machines?
* If any targetted stress tests have been used? e.g. stress-ng's memory system tests?
I'm assuming that's hitting LTP on a few machines/configs, which'd be reasonable. It'd just be nice to confirm exactly what has been tested.
I've added this to my lcoal syzkaller instance's test branch, and I'll shout if that hits anything over the weekend.
Quoted 3 lines
Changes in V1:
Did you mean to list some cahnges here?
Quoted 59 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6
-2@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) }extern void __sync_icache_dcache (pte_t pteval); +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new);/* * PTE bits configuration in the presence of hardware Dirty Bit Management @@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);* PTE_DIRTY || (PTE_WRITE && !PTE_RDONLY) */ -static inline void __check_racy_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep, +static inline void __check_safe_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep,pte_t pte) {pte_t old_pte;@@ -318,6 +319,9 @@ static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,VM_WARN_ONCE (pte_write (old_pte) && !pte_dirty (pte),"%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); +VM_WARN_ONCE (!pgattr_change_is_safe (pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)), +"%s: unsafe attribute change: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , + __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); } static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,mte_sync_tags (old_pte, pte); } -__check_racy_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte); +__check_safe_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte);set_pte (ptep, pte); }arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)return phys; } -static bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) {/* * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) · line 146
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)if (old ==0 || new ==0 )return true;
These checks above should really use pte_valid(); we were just being lazy when this was originally written since for the init_*() cases the memory should be zero initially.
So could you make that:
if (!pte_valid(__pte(old)) || !pte_valid(__pte(new))) return true;
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) · line 152
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +5
-0+/* If old and new ptes are valid, pfn should not change */ +if (pte_valid (__pte (old)) &&pte_valid (__pte (new))) { +if (pte_pfn (__pte (old)) !=pte_pfn (__pte (new))) +return false; + }
With the above change, it's clear that both must be valid to get this far, and this check can be reduced to:
/* A live entry's pfn should not change */ if (pte_pfn(__pte(old)) != pte_pfn(__pte(new))) return false;
With those changes:
Thanks,
Mark.
Quoted 20 lines · Mark Rutland
Hi Annshuman,
Quoted 13 lines · Anshuman Khandual
Changing pfn on a user page table mapped entry, without first going through break-before-make (BBM) procedure is unsafe. This just updates
set_pte_at()to intercept such changes, via an updatedpgattr_change_is_safe(). This new check happens via__check_racy_pte_update(), which has now been renamed as__check_safe_pte_update().Cc Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>Quoted 3 lines
---
This applies on v6.2-rc3. This patch had some test time on an internal CI system without any issues being reported.
Quoted 2 lines
Can you elaborate on this a little bit? It's not entirely clear what that internal CI system has tested. It would be helpful if you could indicate:
Please find the details here, as learned from internal CI folks,
Quoted 3 lines
* What sort of testing has been done by the CI system? e.g. is this just booting, running LTP, something else?
Tested on both host and guest, with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled
- Booting
- LTP
Quoted 2 lines
* Has this tried a bunch of configurations and/or machines?
Tested on the following platforms
- LTP test on JUNO (defconfig)
- LTP test on SOFTIRON (debugrun config)
- Kselftests arm64 KVM (BASEAEM with defconfig)
Quoted 3 lines
* If any targetted stress tests have been used? e.g. stress-ng's memory system tests?
I did run stress-ng memory system tests.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm assuming that's hitting LTP on a few machines/configs, which'd be reasonable. It'd just be nice to confirm exactly what has been tested.
Quoted 8 lines
I've added this to my lcoal syzkaller instance's test branch, and I'll shout if that hits anything over the weekend.
Quoted 3 lines
Changes in V1:
Did you mean to list some cahnges here?
Actually there was no change between V1 and V2, other than just rebasing.
Quoted 82 lines
Quoted 60 lines
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6
-2@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte) }extern void __sync_icache_dcache (pte_t pteval); +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new);/* * PTE bits configuration in the presence of hardware Dirty Bit Management @@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval);* PTE_DIRTY || (PTE_WRITE && !PTE_RDONLY) */ -static inline void __check_racy_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep, +static inline void __check_safe_pte_update (struct mm_struct *mm,pte_t *ptep,pte_t pte) {pte_t old_pte;@@ -318,6 +319,9 @@ static inline void __check_racy_pte_update(struct mm_struct *mm, pte_t *ptep,VM_WARN_ONCE (pte_write (old_pte) && !pte_dirty (pte),"%s: racy dirty state clearing: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); +VM_WARN_ONCE (!pgattr_change_is_safe (pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)), +"%s: unsafe attribute change: 0x%016llx -> 0x%016llx" , + __func__,pte_val (old_pte),pte_val (pte)); } static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,@@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static inline void __set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,mte_sync_tags (old_pte, pte); } -__check_racy_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte); +__check_safe_pte_update (mm, ptep, pte);set_pte (ptep, pte); }arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +1
-1@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ static phys_addr_t __init early_pgtable_alloc(int shift)return phys; } -static bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) +bool pgattr_change_is_safe (u64 old,u64 new) {/* * The following mapping attributes may be updated in live arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) · line 146
Quoted 2 lines
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +0
-0@@ -145,6 +145,12 @@ static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new)if (old ==0 || new ==0 )return true;These checks above should really use
pte_valid(); we were just being lazy when this was originally written since for the init_*() cases the memory should be zero initially.So could you make that:
if (!pte_valid(__pte(old)) || !pte_valid(__pte(new))) return true;arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c static bool pgattr_change_is_safe(u64 old, u64 new) · line 152
Quoted 5 lines
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +5
-0+/* If old and new ptes are valid, pfn should not change */ +if (pte_valid (__pte (old)) &&pte_valid (__pte (new))) { +if (pte_pfn (__pte (old)) !=pte_pfn (__pte (new))) +return false; + }With the above change, it's clear that both must be valid to get this far, and this check can be reduced to:
Quoted 7 lines
/* A live entry's pfn should not change */ if (pte_pfn(__pte(old)) != pte_pfn(__pte(new))) return false;With those changes:
Acked-by Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Sent out the V3 as suggested.