BPF: make verifier 'misconfigured' errors more meaningful
PATCH 1/1 BPF: make verifier 'misconfigured' errors more meaningful
From: zhongjun <[email protected]>
There are too many so-called 'misconfigured' errors potentially feed back to user-space, that make it very hard to judge on a glance the reason a verification failure occurred.
This patch make those similar error outputs more sensitive and readible.
base-commit: 738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +15 -9
@@ -12684,7 +12684,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) dst_reg->btf_id = aux->btf_var.btf_id;break ;default : -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: dst_reg->type = %d\n" , + dst_reg->type);return -EFAULT ; }return 0 ;
@@ -12722,7 +12723,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) { dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP; } else { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: insn->src_reg = %d\n" , + (int )insn->src_reg);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -12769,7 +12771,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) }if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: gen_ld_abs is NULL\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -15814,13 +15816,14 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {if (!ops->gen_prologue) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: gen_prologue is NULL\n" );return -EINVAL ; } cnt = ops->gen_prologue (insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write, env->prog);if (cnt >=ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf)) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n" , + cnt,ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf));return -EINVAL ; }else if (cnt) { new_prog =bpf_patch_insn_data (env,0 , insn_buf, cnt);
@@ -15951,7 +15954,8 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) &target_size);if (cnt ==0 || cnt >=ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf) || (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: ins[%d] cnt=%d ctx_s=%u tg_s=%u\n" , + i, cnt, ctx_field_size, target_size);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -16400,7 +16404,8 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND)) { cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs (insn, insn_buf);if (cnt ==0 || cnt >=ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf)) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n" , + cnt,ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf));return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -16647,7 +16652,8 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)if (cnt == -EOPNOTSUPP ) goto patch_map_ops_generic;if (cnt <=0 || cnt >=ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf)) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n" , + cnt,ARRAY_SIZE (insn_buf));return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -16848,7 +16854,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)if (!map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track || !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack || !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) { -verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured\n" ); +verbose (env,"bpf verifier is misconfigured: map_poke_xxx is NULL\n" );return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 10 lines · On Wed, Apr 5, 2023 at 6:53 PM <[email protected]> wrote:
From: zhongjun <[email protected]>
There are too many so-called 'misconfigured' errors potentially feed back to user-space, that make it very hard to judge on a glance the reason a verification failure occurred.
This patch make those similar error outputs more sensitive and readible.Signed-off-by Jun Zhong <[email protected]>base-commit:
738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd
This is a Nack. We don't add debug code to the kernel. If you see these messages you're hacking the verifier incorrectly.
kernel test robot
build botkernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
Hi,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on 738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/zhongjun-uniontech-com/BPF-make-verifier-misconfigured-errors-more-meaningful/20230406-094605 base: 738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406014351.8984-1-zhongjun%40uniontech.com patch subject: [PATCH] BPF: make verifier 'misconfigured' errors more meaningful config: sh-allmodconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230406/[email protected]/config) compiler: sh4-linux-gcc (GCC) 12.1.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/e5263a5893bdd6f559e1dbc9e585339a933c7351
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review zhongjun-uniontech-com/BPF-make-verifier-misconfigured-errors-more-meaningful/20230406-094605 git checkout e5263a5893bdd6f559e1dbc9e585339a933c7351
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-12.1.0 make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=sh olddefconfig COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-12.1.0 make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=sh SHELL=/bin/bash kernel/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function 'convert_ctx_accesses':
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:15825:93: warning: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat=]
15825 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n",
| ~~^
| |
| long unsigned int
| %u
kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function 'do_misc_fixups':
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16407:101: warning: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat=]
16407 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n",
| ~~^
| |
| long unsigned int
| %u
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16655:109: warning: format '%lu' expects argument of type 'long unsigned int', but argument 4 has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat=]
16655 | verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n",
| ~~^
| |
| long unsigned int
| %uvim +15825 kernel/bpf/verifier.c
15800
15801 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
15802 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
15803 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff
15804 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
15805 */
15806 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
15807 {
15808 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
15809 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
15810 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
15811 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
15812 u32 target_size, size_default, off;
15813 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
15814 enum bpf_access_type type;
15815 bool is_narrower_load;
15816
15817 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
15818 if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
15819 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: gen_prologue is NULL\n");
15820 return -EINVAL;
15821 }
15822 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
15823 env->prog);
15824 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
15825 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n",
15826 cnt, ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf));
15827 return -EINVAL;
15828 } else if (cnt) {
15829 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
15830 if (!new_prog)
15831 return -ENOMEM;
15832
15833 env->prog = new_prog;
15834 delta += cnt - 1;
15835 }
15836 }
15837
15838 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
15839 return 0;
15840
15841 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
15842
15843 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
15844 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
15845 bool ctx_access;
15846
15847 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15848 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15849 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15850 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
15851 type = BPF_READ;
15852 ctx_access = true;
15853 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15854 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15855 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15856 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
15857 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15858 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15859 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15860 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15861 type = BPF_WRITE;
15862 ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX;
15863 } else {
15864 continue;
15865 }
15866
15867 if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
15868 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) {
15869 struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
15870 *insn,
15871 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
15872 };
15873
15874 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
15875 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
15876 if (!new_prog)
15877 return -ENOMEM;
15878
15879 delta += cnt - 1;
15880 env->prog = new_prog;
15881 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
15882 continue;
15883 }
15884
15885 if (!ctx_access)
15886 continue;
15887
15888 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
15889 case PTR_TO_CTX:
15890 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
15891 continue;
15892 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
15893 break;
15894 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
15895 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
15896 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15897 break;
15898 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
15899 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15900 break;
15901 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
15902 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15903 break;
15904 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
15905 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
15906 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
15907 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot
15908 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
15909 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed
15910 * for this case.
15911 */
15912 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
15913 if (type == BPF_READ) {
15914 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
15915 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
15916 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
15917 }
15918 continue;
15919 default:
15920 continue;
15921 }
15922
15923 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
15924 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
15925
15926 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
15927 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
15928 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
15929 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
15930 */
15931 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
15932 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
15933 off = insn->off;
15934 if (is_narrower_load) {
15935 u8 size_code;
15936
15937 if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
15938 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
15939 return -EINVAL;
15940 }
15941
15942 size_code = BPF_H;
15943 if (ctx_field_size == 4)
15944 size_code = BPF_W;
15945 else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
15946 size_code = BPF_DW;
15947
15948 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
15949 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
15950 }
15951
15952 target_size = 0;
15953 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
15954 &target_size);
15955 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
15956 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
15957 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: ins[%d] cnt=%d ctx_s=%u tg_s=%u\n",
15958 i, cnt, ctx_field_size, target_size);
15959 return -EINVAL;
15960 }
15961
15962 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
15963 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
15964 off, size, size_default) * 8;
15965 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
15966 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n");
15967 return -EINVAL;
15968 }
15969 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
15970 if (shift)
15971 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
15972 insn->dst_reg,
15973 shift);
15974 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
15975 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
15976 } else {
15977 if (shift)
15978 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
15979 insn->dst_reg,
15980 shift);
15981 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
15982 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
15983 }
15984 }
15985
15986 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
15987 if (!new_prog)
15988 return -ENOMEM;
15989
15990 delta += cnt - 1;
15991
15992 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
15993 env->prog = new_prog;
15994 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
15995 }
15996
15997 return 0;
15998 }
15999
Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests
kernel test robot
build botkernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
Hi,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on 738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/zhongjun-uniontech-com/BPF-make-verifier-misconfigured-errors-more-meaningful/20230406-094605 base: 738a96c4a8c36950803fdd27e7c30aca92dccefd patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406014351.8984-1-zhongjun%40uniontech.com patch subject: [PATCH] BPF: make verifier 'misconfigured' errors more meaningful config: arm-randconfig-r021-20230403 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20230406/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 17.0.0 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 67409911353323ca5edf2049ef0df54132fa1ca7)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross
chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# install arm cross compiling tool for clang build
# apt-get install binutils-arm-linux-gnueabi
# https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/e5263a5893bdd6f559e1dbc9e585339a933c7351
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review zhongjun-uniontech-com/BPF-make-verifier-misconfigured-errors-more-meaningful/20230406-094605 git checkout e5263a5893bdd6f559e1dbc9e585339a933c7351
# save the config file
mkdir build_dir && cp config build_dir/.config
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=arm olddefconfig COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=clang make.cross W=1 O=build_dir ARCH=arm SHELL=/bin/bash kernel/bpf/
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c:15826:11: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]
cnt, ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/kernel.h:55:25: note: expanded from macro 'ARRAY_SIZE'
#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]) + __must_be_array(arr))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16408:12: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]
cnt, ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/kernel.h:55:25: note: expanded from macro 'ARRAY_SIZE'
#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]) + __must_be_array(arr))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16656:13: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned long' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]
cnt, ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf));
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/kernel.h:55:25: note: expanded from macro 'ARRAY_SIZE'
#define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]) + __must_be_array(arr))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 warnings generated.
vim +15826 kernel/bpf/verifier.c
15800
15801 /* convert load instructions that access fields of a context type into a
15802 * sequence of instructions that access fields of the underlying structure:
15803 * struct __sk_buff -> struct sk_buff
15804 * struct bpf_sock_ops -> struct sock
15805 */
15806 static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
15807 {
15808 const struct bpf_verifier_ops *ops = env->ops;
15809 int i, cnt, size, ctx_field_size, delta = 0;
15810 const int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
15811 struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16], *insn;
15812 u32 target_size, size_default, off;
15813 struct bpf_prog *new_prog;
15814 enum bpf_access_type type;
15815 bool is_narrower_load;
15816
15817 if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
15818 if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
15819 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: gen_prologue is NULL\n");
15820 return -EINVAL;
15821 }
15822 cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
15823 env->prog);
15824 if (cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
15825 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: cnt=%d exceeds limit@%lu\n",
15826 cnt, ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf));
15827 return -EINVAL;
15828 } else if (cnt) {
15829 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
15830 if (!new_prog)
15831 return -ENOMEM;
15832
15833 env->prog = new_prog;
15834 delta += cnt - 1;
15835 }
15836 }
15837
15838 if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(env->prog->aux))
15839 return 0;
15840
15841 insn = env->prog->insnsi + delta;
15842
15843 for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
15844 bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
15845 bool ctx_access;
15846
15847 if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15848 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15849 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15850 insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
15851 type = BPF_READ;
15852 ctx_access = true;
15853 } else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15854 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15855 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15856 insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
15857 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
15858 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
15859 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
15860 insn->code == (BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) { 15861 type = BPF_WRITE;
15862 ctx_access = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX;
15863 } else {
15864 continue;
15865 }
15866
15867 if (type == BPF_WRITE &&
15868 env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].sanitize_stack_spill) {
15869 struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
15870 *insn,
15871 BPF_ST_NOSPEC(),
15872 };
15873
15874 cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(patch);
15875 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, patch, cnt);
15876 if (!new_prog)
15877 return -ENOMEM;
15878
15879 delta += cnt - 1;
15880 env->prog = new_prog;
15881 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
15882 continue;
15883 }
15884
15885 if (!ctx_access)
15886 continue;
15887
15888 switch ((int)env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ptr_type) {
15889 case PTR_TO_CTX:
15890 if (!ops->convert_ctx_access)
15891 continue;
15892 convert_ctx_access = ops->convert_ctx_access;
15893 break;
15894 case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
15895 case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
15896 convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15897 break;
15898 case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
15899 convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15900 break;
15901 case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
15902 convert_ctx_access = bpf_xdp_sock_convert_ctx_access;
15903 break;
15904 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
15905 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
15906 /* PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC always has a valid lifetime, unlike
15907 * PTR_TO_BTF_ID, and an active ref_obj_id, but the same cannot
15908 * be said once it is marked PTR_UNTRUSTED, hence we must handle
15909 * any faults for loads into such types. BPF_WRITE is disallowed
15910 * for this case.
15911 */
15912 case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
15913 if (type == BPF_READ) {
15914 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
15915 BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
15916 env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
15917 }
15918 continue;
15919 default:
15920 continue;
15921 }
15922
15923 ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
15924 size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
15925
15926 /* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
15927 * convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
15928 * convert_ctx_access changes. If conversion is successful,
15929 * we will apply proper mask to the result.
15930 */
15931 is_narrower_load = size < ctx_field_size;
15932 size_default = bpf_ctx_off_adjust_machine(ctx_field_size);
15933 off = insn->off;
15934 if (is_narrower_load) {
15935 u8 size_code;
15936
15937 if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
15938 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
15939 return -EINVAL;
15940 }
15941
15942 size_code = BPF_H;
15943 if (ctx_field_size == 4)
15944 size_code = BPF_W;
15945 else if (ctx_field_size == 8)
15946 size_code = BPF_DW;
15947
15948 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
15949 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
15950 }
15951
15952 target_size = 0;
15953 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
15954 &target_size);
15955 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
15956 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
15957 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured: ins[%d] cnt=%d ctx_s=%u tg_s=%u\n",
15958 i, cnt, ctx_field_size, target_size);
15959 return -EINVAL;
15960 }
15961
15962 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
15963 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
15964 off, size, size_default) * 8;
15965 if (shift && cnt + 1 >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)) {
15966 verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n");
15967 return -EINVAL;
15968 }
15969 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
15970 if (shift)
15971 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
15972 insn->dst_reg,
15973 shift);
15974 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
15975 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
15976 } else {
15977 if (shift)
15978 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
15979 insn->dst_reg,
15980 shift);
15981 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
15982 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
15983 }
15984 }
15985
15986 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
15987 if (!new_prog)
15988 return -ENOMEM;
15989
15990 delta += cnt - 1;
15991
15992 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
15993 env->prog = new_prog;
15994 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
15995 }
15996
15997 return 0;
15998 }
15999
Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests