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CXL Poison List Retrieval & Tracing

PATCH In review [email protected] 4 participants 24 messages Apr 18, 2023 – Apr 27, 2023 CXL

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#0 lore raw

v13 cover CXL Poison List Retrieval & Tracing

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Changes in v13:
- New Lead-in patches
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands (Dan) cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all

- New Patch: cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
Patch connects the lead-in patches with the rest of this set. Poison init was previously done in the GET_POISON_LIST patch. With LIST deprecated, needed a method, along with a reason, to discover device support.

- cxl_poison_state_init(): use kvmalloc for potentially large payload (Dan)
- cxl_poison_state_init() unset poison enabled bit on failure
- trigger sysfs: make the core interface a proper api (Dan)
- trigger sysfs: use down_read_interruptible (Dan)
- Reorganize the by_endpoint work to make typesafe (Dan)
- poison_by_decoder() only fill ctx when iteration is done
- Remove mentions of mixed mode as a 'watch for'. Just say no. (Dan)
- s/overflow_t/overflow_ts in cxlmem.h struct and trace.h struct (Dan)
- Really remove errant line from cxl_memdev_visible() (Jonathan, DaveJ, Dan)

Link to v12:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/

Add support for retrieving device poison lists and store the returned error records as kernel trace events.

The handling of the poison list is guided by the CXL 3.0 Specification Section 8.2.9.8.4.1. [1]

Example trigger:

$ echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/mem0/trigger_poison_list

Example Trace Events:

Poison found in a PMEM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region11 region_uuid=d96e67ec-76b0-406f-8c35-5b52630dcad1 hpa=0xf100000000 dpa=0x70000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in RAM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region2 region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xf010000000 dpa=0x0 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in an unmapped DPA resource:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem3 host=cxl_mem.3 serial=3 trace_type=List region= region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xffffffffffffffff dpa=0x40000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

[1]: https://www.computeexpresslink.org/download-the-specification

Alison Schofield (8):
cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command cxl/trace: Add TRACE support for CXL media-error records cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute cxl/region: Provide region info to the cxl_poison trace event cxl/trace: Add an HPA to cxl_poison trace events tools/testing/cxl: Mock support for Get Poison List

Dan Williams (1):
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  14 +++
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h                 |   9 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               |  54 +++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/region.c               | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.c                |  94 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.h                | 101 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  83 ++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/mem.c                       |  43 +++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c                       |   4 +
 include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h            |  35 +++++-
 tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c            |  42 +++++++
 12 files changed, 740 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

base-commit: e686c32590f40bffc45f105c04c836ffad3e531a

Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v13 1/9 cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands

From: Dan Williams <[email protected]>

The CXL subsystem is adding formal mechanisms for managing device poison. Minimize the maintenance burden going forward, and maximize the investment in common tooling by deprecating direct user access to poison commands outside of CXL_MEM_RAW_COMMANDS debug scenarios.

A new cxl_deprecated_commands[] list is created for querying which command ids defined in previous kernels are now deprecated.

CXL Media and Poison Management commands, opcodes 0x43XX, defined in CXL 3.0 Spec, Table 8-93 are deprecated with one exception: Get Scan Media Capabilities. Keep Get Scan Media Capabilities as it simply provides information and has no impact on the device state.

Effectively all of the commands defined in:

commit 87815ee9d006 ("cxl/pci: Add media provisioning required commands")

...were defined prematurely and should have waited until the kernel implementation was decided. To my knowledge there are no shipping devices with poison support and no known tools that would regress with this change.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c      |  5 -----
 include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +0 -5
index f2addb457172..938cff2c948e 100644
@@ -61,12 +61,7 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
 	CXL_CMD(SET_ALERT_CONFIG, 0xc, 0, 0),
 	CXL_CMD(GET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, 0, 0x1, 0),
 	CXL_CMD(SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, 0x1, 0, 0),
-	CXL_CMD(GET_POISON, 0x10, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0),
-	CXL_CMD(INJECT_POISON, 0x8, 0, 0),
-	CXL_CMD(CLEAR_POISON, 0x48, 0, 0),
 	CXL_CMD(GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS, 0x10, 0x4, 0),
-	CXL_CMD(SCAN_MEDIA, 0x11, 0, 0),
-	CXL_CMD(GET_SCAN_MEDIA, 0, CXL_VARIABLE_PAYLOAD, 0),
 };
 
 /*
include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h +30 -5
index 86bbacf2a315..14bc6e742148 100644
@@ -40,19 +40,22 @@
 	___C(SET_ALERT_CONFIG, "Set Alert Configuration"),                \
 	___C(GET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, "Get Shutdown State"),                   \
 	___C(SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE, "Set Shutdown State"),                   \
-	___C(GET_POISON, "Get Poison List"),                              \
-	___C(INJECT_POISON, "Inject Poison"),                             \
-	___C(CLEAR_POISON, "Clear Poison"),                               \
+	___DEPRECATED(GET_POISON, "Get Poison List"),                     \
+	___DEPRECATED(INJECT_POISON, "Inject Poison"),                    \
+	___DEPRECATED(CLEAR_POISON, "Clear Poison"),                      \
 	___C(GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS, "Get Scan Media Capabilities"),         \
-	___C(SCAN_MEDIA, "Scan Media"),                                   \
-	___C(GET_SCAN_MEDIA, "Get Scan Media Results"),                   \
+	___DEPRECATED(SCAN_MEDIA, "Scan Media"),                          \
+	___DEPRECATED(GET_SCAN_MEDIA, "Get Scan Media Results"),          \
 	___C(MAX, "invalid / last command")
 
 #define ___C(a, b) CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_##a
+#define ___DEPRECATED(a, b) CXL_MEM_DEPRECATED_ID_##a
 enum { CXL_CMDS };
 
 #undef ___C
+#undef ___DEPRECATED
 #define ___C(a, b) { b }
+#define ___DEPRECATED(a, b) { "Deprecated " b }
 static const struct {
 	const char *name;
 } cxl_command_names[] __attribute__((__unused__)) = { CXL_CMDS };
@@ -68,6 +71,28 @@ static const struct {
  */
 
 #undef ___C
+#undef ___DEPRECATED
+#define ___C(a, b) (0)
+#define ___DEPRECATED(a, b) (1)
+
+static const __u8 cxl_deprecated_commands[]
+	__attribute__((__unused__)) = { CXL_CMDS };
+
+/*
+ * Here's how this actually breaks out:
+ * cxl_deprecated_commands[] = {
+ *	[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_INVALID] = 0,
+ *	[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_IDENTIFY] = 0,
+ *	...
+ *	[CXL_MEM_DEPRECATED_ID_GET_POISON] = 1,
+ *	[CXL_MEM_DEPRECATED_ID_INJECT_POISON] = 1,
+ *	[CXL_MEM_DEPRECATED_ID_CLEAR_POISON] = 1,
+ *	...
+ * };
+ */
+
+#undef ___C
+#undef ___DEPRECATED
 
 /**
  * struct cxl_command_info - Command information returned from a query.
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v13 2/9 cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

The Get, Inject, and Clear poison commands are not available for direct user access because they require kernel driver controls to perform safely.

Further restrict access to these commands by requiring the selection of the debugfs attribute 'cxl_raw_allow_all' to enable in raw mode.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +6 -0
index 938cff2c948e..fd1026970d3a 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
  *
  * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that
  * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management.
+ *
+ * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_,INJECT_,CLEAR_]POISON: These commands require kernel
+ * driver orchestration for safety.
  */
 static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = {
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW,
@@ -90,6 +93,9 @@ static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = {
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE,
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA,
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON,
 };
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
Reviewed-by on v13 2/9
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 2/9] cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all

Quoted 10 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023 10:39:02 -0700 [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

The Get, Inject, and Clear poison commands are not available for direct user access because they require kernel driver controls to perform safely.

Further restrict access to these commands by requiring the selection of the debugfs attribute 'cxl_raw_allow_all' to enable in raw mode.

Makes sense. I see Dan already has these queued in cxl pending so don't mind if tags get added or not. I'm only looking again as I was testing the latest version of the qemu emulation of poison handling.

Quoted 28 lines
---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +6 -0
index 938cff2c948e..fd1026970d3a 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static struct cxl_mem_command cxl_mem_commands[CXL_MEM_COMMAND_ID_MAX] = {
  *
  * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_]SCAN_MEDIA: The kernel provides a native error list that
  * is kept up to date with patrol notifications and error management.
+ *
+ * CXL_MBOX_OP_[GET_,INJECT_,CLEAR_]POISON: These commands require kernel
+ * driver orchestration for safety.
  */
 static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = {
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_ACTIVATE_FW,
@@ -90,6 +93,9 @@ static u16 cxl_disabled_raw_commands[] = {
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_SHUTDOWN_STATE,
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA,
 	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON,
+	CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON,
 };
 
 /*
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v13 3/9 cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Driver reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same DPA range. (CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1). The driver maintains state information to achieve this goal.

To initialize the state, first recognize the poison commands in the CEL (Command Effects Log). If the device supports Get Poison List, allocate a single buffer for the poison list and protect it with a lock.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h    | 34 +++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c       |  4 ++
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +79 -2
index fd1026970d3a..17737386283a 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <cxlpci.h>
 #include <cxlmem.h>
 #include <cxl.h>
 
@@ -120,6 +121,43 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
+{
+#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
+
+	if ((opcode >> 8) == CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_poison_state *poison,
+				       u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static struct cxl_mem_command *cxl_mem_find_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 	struct cxl_mem_command *c;
@@ -635,13 +673,18 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd) {
+		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
 			dev_dbg(cxlds->dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+		if (cmd)
+			set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+
+		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&cxlds->poison, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
 	}
 }
@@ -1108,6 +1151,40 @@ int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_set_timestamp, CXL);
 
+static void free_poison_buf(void *buf)
+{
+	kvfree(buf);
+}
+
+/* Get Poison List output buffer is protected by cxlds->poison.lock */
+static int cxl_poison_alloc_buf(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
+{
+	cxlds->poison.list_out = kvmalloc(cxlds->payload_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cxlds->poison.list_out)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return devm_add_action_or_reset(cxlds->dev, free_poison_buf,
+					cxlds->poison.list_out);
+}
+
+int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!test_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, cxlds->poison.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = cxl_poison_alloc_buf(cxlds);
+	if (rc) {
+		clear_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, cxlds->poison.enabled_cmds);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	mutex_init(&cxlds->poison.lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_poison_state_init, CXL);
+
 struct cxl_dev_state *cxl_dev_state_create(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds;
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +34 -0
index ccbafc05a636..16e0241d72a9 100644
@@ -215,6 +215,37 @@ struct cxl_event_state {
 	struct mutex log_lock;
 };
 
+/* Device enabled poison commands */
+enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
+ *
+ * @max_errors: Maximum media error records held in device cache
+ * @enabled_cmds: All poison commands enabled in the CEL
+ * @list_out: The poison list payload returned by device
+ * @lock: Protect reads of the poison list
+ *
+ * Reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader
+ * does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped
+ * (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same
+ * DPA range. CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1
+ */
+struct cxl_poison_state {
+	u32 max_errors;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX);
+	struct cxl_mbox_poison_out *list_out;
+	struct mutex lock;  /* Protect reads of poison list */
+};
+
 /**
  * struct cxl_dev_state - The driver device state
  *
@@ -251,6 +282,7 @@ struct cxl_event_state {
  * @serial: PCIe Device Serial Number
  * @doe_mbs: PCI DOE mailbox array
  * @event: event log driver state
+ * @poison: poison driver state info
  * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands
  *
  * See section 8.2.9.5.2 Capacity Configuration and Label Storage for
@@ -290,6 +322,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {
 	struct xarray doe_mbs;
 
 	struct cxl_event_state event;
+	struct cxl_poison_state poison;
 
 	int (*mbox_send)(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd);
 };
@@ -608,6 +641,7 @@ void set_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, unsigned long *cmds
 void clear_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, unsigned long *cmds);
 void cxl_mem_get_event_records(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u32 status);
 int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
+int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CXL_SUSPEND
 void cxl_mem_active_inc(void);
drivers/cxl/pci.c +4 -0
index 60b23624d167..827ea0895778 100644
@@ -769,6 +769,10 @@ static int cxl_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = cxl_poison_state_init(cxlds);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = cxl_dev_state_identify(cxlds);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
#5 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v13 3/9] cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state

Quoted 85 lines · alison.schofield@ wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Driver reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same DPA range. (CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1). The driver maintains state information to achieve this goal.

To initialize the state, first recognize the poison commands in the CEL (Command Effects Log). If the device supports Get Poison List, allocate a single buffer for the poison list and protect it with a lock.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h    | 34 +++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c       |  4 ++
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +39 -1
index fd1026970d3a..17737386283a 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <cxlpci.h>
 #include <cxlmem.h>
 #include <cxl.h>
 
@@ -120,6 +121,43 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
+{
+#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
+
+	if ((opcode >> 8) == CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_poison_state *poison,
+				       u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static struct cxl_mem_command *cxl_mem_find_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 	struct cxl_mem_command *c;
@@ -635,13 +673,18 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd) {
+		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
 			dev_dbg(cxlds->dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;

drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, size_t size, u8 *cel) · line 688

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +6 -1
 		}
 
-		set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+		if (cmd)
+			set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+
+		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&cxlds->poison, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);

Ah, nice I like how you suppressed the unsupported by driver message which could have lead to confusion. I think we should duplicate this approach for the DCD command set.

Looks good.

Reviewed-by on v13 3/9
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 3/9] cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state

In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 8 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023 10:39:03 -0700 [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Driver reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same DPA range. (CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1). The driver maintains state information to achieve this goal.

Quoted 6 lines

To initialize the state, first recognize the poison commands in the CEL (Command Effects Log). If the device supports Get Poison List, allocate a single buffer for the poison list and protect it with a lock.

Nice. One passing comment inline.

Quoted 19 lines
---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h    | 34 +++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c       |  4 ++
 3 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +1 -0
index fd1026970d3a..17737386283a 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <cxlpci.h>
 #include <cxlmem.h>
 #include <cxl.h>
 

drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) · line 128

Quoted 8 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +5 -0
@@ -120,6 +121,43 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool cxl_is_poison_command(u16 opcode)
+{
+#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43
+
+	if ((opcode >> 8) == CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS)

Perhaps at somepoint we should add macros to split the opcodes up? Doesn't need to be in this series, but if we get a lot of opcode >> 8 it might be nice (there are two that I'm seeing so far).

Quoted 178 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +73 -2
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static void cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(struct cxl_poison_state *poison,
+				       u16 opcode)
+{
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_INJECT_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_CLEAR_POISON:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA_CAPS:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SCAN_MEDIA:
+		set_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS, poison->enabled_cmds);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 static struct cxl_mem_command *cxl_mem_find_command(u16 opcode)
 {
 	struct cxl_mem_command *c;
@@ -635,13 +673,18 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
 		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
 		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
 
-		if (!cmd) {
+		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode)) {
 			dev_dbg(cxlds->dev,
 				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+		if (cmd)
+			set_bit(cmd->info.id, cxlds->enabled_cmds);
+
+		if (cxl_is_poison_command(opcode))
+			cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled(&cxlds->poison, opcode);
+
 		dev_dbg(cxlds->dev, "Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n", opcode);
 	}
 }
@@ -1108,6 +1151,40 @@ int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_set_timestamp, CXL);
 
+static void free_poison_buf(void *buf)
+{
+	kvfree(buf);
+}
+
+/* Get Poison List output buffer is protected by cxlds->poison.lock */
+static int cxl_poison_alloc_buf(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
+{
+	cxlds->poison.list_out = kvmalloc(cxlds->payload_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cxlds->poison.list_out)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return devm_add_action_or_reset(cxlds->dev, free_poison_buf,
+					cxlds->poison.list_out);
+}
+
+int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!test_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, cxlds->poison.enabled_cmds))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = cxl_poison_alloc_buf(cxlds);
+	if (rc) {
+		clear_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, cxlds->poison.enabled_cmds);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	mutex_init(&cxlds->poison.lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_poison_state_init, CXL);
+
 struct cxl_dev_state *cxl_dev_state_create(struct device *dev)
 {
 	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds;
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +34 -0
index ccbafc05a636..16e0241d72a9 100644
@@ -215,6 +215,37 @@ struct cxl_event_state {
 	struct mutex log_lock;
 };
 
+/* Device enabled poison commands */
+enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits {
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_INJECT,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_CLEAR,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_CAPS,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_MEDIA,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_SCAN_RESULTS,
+	CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info
+ *
+ * @max_errors: Maximum media error records held in device cache
+ * @enabled_cmds: All poison commands enabled in the CEL
+ * @list_out: The poison list payload returned by device
+ * @lock: Protect reads of the poison list
+ *
+ * Reads of the poison list are synchronized to ensure that a reader
+ * does not get an incomplete list because their request overlapped
+ * (was interrupted or preceded by) another read request of the same
+ * DPA range. CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.9.8.4.1
+ */
+struct cxl_poison_state {
+	u32 max_errors;
+	DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX);
+	struct cxl_mbox_poison_out *list_out;
+	struct mutex lock;  /* Protect reads of poison list */
+};
+
 /**
  * struct cxl_dev_state - The driver device state
  *
@@ -251,6 +282,7 @@ struct cxl_event_state {
  * @serial: PCIe Device Serial Number
  * @doe_mbs: PCI DOE mailbox array
  * @event: event log driver state
+ * @poison: poison driver state info
  * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands
  *
  * See section 8.2.9.5.2 Capacity Configuration and Label Storage for
@@ -290,6 +322,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {
 	struct xarray doe_mbs;
 
 	struct cxl_event_state event;
+	struct cxl_poison_state poison;
 
 	int (*mbox_send)(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd);
 };
@@ -608,6 +641,7 @@ void set_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, unsigned long *cmds
 void clear_exclusive_cxl_commands(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, unsigned long *cmds);
 void cxl_mem_get_event_records(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, u32 status);
 int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
+int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CXL_SUSPEND
 void cxl_mem_active_inc(void);
drivers/cxl/pci.c +4 -0
index 60b23624d167..827ea0895778 100644
@@ -769,6 +769,10 @@ static int cxl_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = cxl_poison_state_init(cxlds);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = cxl_dev_state_identify(cxlds);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v13 4/9 cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

CXL devices maintain a list of locations that are poisoned or result in poison if the addresses are accessed by the host.

Per the spec, (CXL 3.0 8.2.9.8.4.1), the device returns this Poison list as a set of Media Error Records that include the source of the error, the starting device physical address, and length. The length is the number of adjacent DPAs in the record and is in units of 64 bytes.

Retrieve the poison list.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h    | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +55 -0
index 17737386283a..05ff50ee8489 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <cxlpci.h>
 #include <cxlmem.h>
 #include <cxl.h>
@@ -1038,6 +1039,7 @@ int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
 	/* See CXL 2.0 Table 175 Identify Memory Device Output Payload */
 	struct cxl_mbox_identify id;
 	struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd;
+	u32 val;
 	int rc;
 
 	mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) {
@@ -1061,6 +1063,11 @@ int cxl_dev_state_identify(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
 	cxlds->lsa_size = le32_to_cpu(id.lsa_size);
 	memcpy(cxlds->firmware_version, id.fw_revision, sizeof(id.fw_revision));
 
+	if (test_bit(CXL_POISON_ENABLED_LIST, cxlds->poison.enabled_cmds)) {
+		val = get_unaligned_le24(id.poison_list_max_mer);
+		cxlds->poison.max_errors = min_t(u32, val, CXL_POISON_LIST_MAX);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_dev_state_identify, CXL);
@@ -1151,6 +1158,54 @@ int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_set_timestamp, CXL);
 
+int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,
+		       struct cxl_region *cxlr)
+{
+	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
+	struct cxl_mbox_poison_out *po;
+	struct cxl_mbox_poison_in pi;
+	struct cxl_mbox_cmd mbox_cmd;
+	int nr_records = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = mutex_lock_interruptible(&cxlds->poison.lock);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	po = cxlds->poison.list_out;
+	pi.offset = cpu_to_le64(offset);
+	pi.length = cpu_to_le64(len / CXL_POISON_LEN_MULT);
+
+	mbox_cmd = (struct cxl_mbox_cmd) {
+		.opcode = CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON,
+		.size_in = sizeof(pi),
+		.payload_in = &pi,
+		.size_out = cxlds->payload_size,
+		.payload_out = po,
+		.min_out = struct_size(po, record, 0),
+	};
+
+	do {
+		rc = cxl_internal_send_cmd(cxlds, &mbox_cmd);
+		if (rc)
+			break;
+
+		/* TODO TRACE the media error records */
+
+		/* Protect against an uncleared _FLAG_MORE */
+		nr_records = nr_records + le16_to_cpu(po->count);
+		if (nr_records >= cxlds->poison.max_errors) {
+			dev_dbg(&cxlmd->dev, "Max Error Records reached: %d\n",
+				nr_records);
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (po->flags & CXL_POISON_FLAG_MORE);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&cxlds->poison.lock);
+	return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(cxl_mem_get_poison, CXL);
+
 static void free_poison_buf(void *buf)
 {
 	kvfree(buf);
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +46 -0

58 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v13 5/9 cxl/trace: Add TRACE support for CXL media-error records

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

CXL devices may support the retrieval of a device poison list. Add a new trace event that the CXL subsystem may use to log the media-error records returned in the poison list.

Log each media-error record as a cxl_poison trace event of type 'List'.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h  |  4 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c  |  5 ++-
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.h | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/cxl/core/core.h +4 -0
index cde475e13216..e888e293943e 100644
@@ -64,4 +64,8 @@ int cxl_memdev_init(void);
 void cxl_memdev_exit(void);
 void cxl_mbox_init(void);
 
+enum cxl_poison_trace_type {
+	CXL_POISON_TRACE_LIST,
+};
+
 #endif /* __CXL_CORE_H__ */
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +4 -1
index 05ff50ee8489..2daeeedb16e1 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,10 @@ int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,
 		if (rc)
 			break;
 
-		/* TODO TRACE the media error records */
+		for (int i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(po->count); i++)
+			trace_cxl_poison(cxlmd, cxlr, &po->record[i],
+					 po->flags, po->overflow_ts,
+					 CXL_POISON_TRACE_LIST);
 
 		/* Protect against an uncleared _FLAG_MORE */
 		nr_records = nr_records + le16_to_cpu(po->count);
drivers/cxl/core/trace.h +94 -0

110 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH v13 6/9 cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

When a boolean 'true' is written to this attribute the memdev driver retrieves the poison list from the device. The list consists of addresses that are poisoned, or would result in poison if accessed, and the source of the poison. This attribute is only visible for devices supporting the capability. The retrieved errors are logged as kernel events when cxl_poison event tracing is enabled.

---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 14 ++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  3 +-
 drivers/cxl/mem.c                       | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +14 -0
index 3acf2f17a73f..48ac0d911801 100644
@@ -415,3 +415,17 @@ Description:
 		1), and checks that the hardware accepts the commit request.
 		Reading this value indicates whether the region is committed or
 		not.
+
+
+What:		/sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/trigger_poison_list
+Date:		April, 2023
+KernelVersion:	v6.4
+Contact:	[email protected]
+Description:
+		(WO) When a boolean 'true' is written to this attribute the
+		memdev driver retrieves the poison list from the device. The
+		list consists of addresses that are poisoned, or would result
+		in poison if accessed, and the source of the poison. This
+		attribute is only visible for devices supporting the
+		capability. The retrieved errors are logged as kernel
+		events when cxl_poison event tracing is enabled.
drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +43 -0

49 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +2 -1
index 07775ab5af4e..68b9db545aae 100644
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ struct cxl_mbox_cmd {
 	C(FWROLLBACK, -ENXIO, "rolled back to the previous active FW"),         \
 	C(FWRESET, -ENXIO, "FW failed to activate, needs cold reset"),		\
 	C(HANDLE, -ENXIO, "one or more Event Record Handles were invalid"),     \
-	C(PADDR, -ENXIO, "physical address specified is invalid"),		\
+	C(PADDR, -EFAULT, "physical address specified is invalid"),		\
 	C(POISONLMT, -ENXIO, "poison injection limit has been reached"),        \
 	C(MEDIAFAILURE, -ENXIO, "permanent issue with the media"),		\
 	C(ABORT, -ENXIO, "background cmd was aborted by device"),               \
@@ -688,6 +688,7 @@ int cxl_set_timestamp(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
 int cxl_poison_state_init(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds);
 int cxl_mem_get_poison(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, u64 offset, u64 len,
 		       struct cxl_region *cxlr);
+int cxl_trigger_poison_list(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CXL_SUSPEND
 void cxl_mem_active_inc(void);
drivers/cxl/mem.c +43 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
maintainer
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 8 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023, [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

When a boolean 'true' is written to this attribute the memdev driver retrieves the poison list from the device. The list consists of addresses that are poisoned, or would result in poison if accessed, and the source of the poison. This attribute is only visible for devices supporting the capability. The retrieved errors are logged as kernel events when cxl_poison event tracing is enabled.

btw thinking of scan media, is there some interface you already have in mind?

Afaict we could have a new 'trigger_poison_list_nocache' attribute, or write "scan_overflow" or whatever to this very file.

Thanks,
Davidlohr

author maintainer
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 11 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Quoted 8 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023, [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

When a boolean 'true' is written to this attribute the memdev driver retrieves the poison list from the device. The list consists of addresses that are poisoned, or would result in poison if accessed, and the source of the poison. This attribute is only visible for devices supporting the capability. The retrieved errors are logged as kernel events when cxl_poison event tracing is enabled.

Quoted 5 lines

btw thinking of scan media, is there some interface you already have in mind?

Afaict we could have a new 'trigger_poison_list_nocache' attribute, or write "scan_overflow" or whatever to this very file.

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset. Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

Quoted 3 lines

Thanks,
Davidlohr

maintainer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 3 lines · Alison Schofield

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm not crazy about calling the interface scan media straight how just because it's very unintuitive - albeit users that care will probably don't care.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset.

Agreed.

Quoted 3 lines

Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

trigger_poison_list_overflow?

If triggered and the list hasn't overflowed yet, just be a nop?

Thanks,
Davidlohr

#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 16 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Quoted 3 lines · Alison Schofield

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm not crazy about calling the interface scan media straight how just because it's very unintuitive - albeit users that care will probably don't care.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset.

Agreed.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

trigger_poison_list_overflow?

If triggered and the list hasn't overflowed yet, just be a nop?

What about a "poison_overflow" policy? Defaults to "report", but you can write "scan" to have trigger_poison_list invocations fallback to scan_media on overflow.

author maintainer
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 21 lines · Dan Williams
Quoted 20 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Quoted 3 lines · Alison Schofield

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm not crazy about calling the interface scan media straight how just because it's very unintuitive - albeit users that care will probably don't care.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset.

Agreed.

Quoted 3 lines

Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

trigger_poison_list_overflow?

If triggered and the list hasn't overflowed yet, just be a nop?

What about a "poison_overflow" policy? Defaults to "report", but you can write "scan" to have trigger_poison_list invocations fallback to scan_media on overflow.

With a policy like that, the driver may automatically do scan media in response to overflow reports.

For users that want to schedule those scans (policy set to 'report'), they can do so my doing trigger_scan_media at their leisure.

Would you expect the driver to retain overflow state, and warn those users that they are issuing scan_media without prior overflow events?

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 24 lines · Alison Schofield
Quoted 23 lines · Dan Williams
Quoted 22 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Quoted 3 lines · Alison Schofield

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm not crazy about calling the interface scan media straight how just because it's very unintuitive - albeit users that care will probably don't care.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset.

Agreed.

Quoted 3 lines

Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

trigger_poison_list_overflow?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

If triggered and the list hasn't overflowed yet, just be a nop?

What about a "poison_overflow" policy? Defaults to "report", but you can write "scan" to have trigger_poison_list invocations fallback to scan_media on overflow.

With a policy like that, the driver may automatically do scan media in response to overflow reports.

Sure that's what the policy enables.

Quoted 2 lines

For users that want to schedule those scans (policy set to 'report'), they can do so my doing trigger_scan_media at their leisure.

It's not clear that scan media matters so much in practice that the kernel needs to have separate controls for it.

One of the observations of the overflow threshold is that the failing part is likely to be RMA'd before the poison list fills up. Scan Media was more relevant in the PMEM days [1] before List Poison was introduced in CXL that promised to always record poison on creation.

If Scan Media is an operation that is rarely used, does the kernel need to carry a trigger_scan_media attribute? I.e. the kernel only needs one way to kick off a poison collection event and the depth of that collection is an optional policy setting. Whether that policy needs to be configurable is also an argument that needs evidence.

Quoted 2 lines

Would you expect the driver to retain overflow state, and warn those users that they are issuing scan_media without prior overflow events?

I don't follow the use of plural "users". Only the single platform owner cares about the health of the hardware.

[1]: https://pmem.io/documents/IntelOptanePMem_DSM_Interface-V3.0.pdf

author maintainer
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v13 6/9] cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute

Quoted 53 lines · Dan Williams
Quoted 24 lines · Alison Schofield
Quoted 23 lines · Dan Williams
Quoted 22 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Quoted 3 lines · Alison Schofield

At the moment, I have 'trigger_scan_media' that results in a spew of scan media results to a trace file. I guess we'll chat more about presenting a _nocache, when I post for review.

I'm not crazy about calling the interface scan media straight how just because it's very unintuitive - albeit users that care will probably don't care.

Quoted 3 lines

I'm concerned that a _nocache_ will lead user to believe they are getting 'fresher' results, and to over-use it with that mindset.

Agreed.

Quoted 3 lines

Get Poison List gives accurate results and Scan Media is only necessary when the poison list has overflowed. OK...here I go opening the can of worms myself ;)

trigger_poison_list_overflow?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

If triggered and the list hasn't overflowed yet, just be a nop?

What about a "poison_overflow" policy? Defaults to "report", but you can write "scan" to have trigger_poison_list invocations fallback to scan_media on overflow.

With a policy like that, the driver may automatically do scan media in response to overflow reports.

Sure that's what the policy enables.

Quoted 2 lines

For users that want to schedule those scans (policy set to 'report'), they can do so my doing trigger_scan_media at their leisure.

It's not clear that scan media matters so much in practice that the kernel needs to have separate controls for it.

One of the observations of the overflow threshold is that the failing part is likely to be RMA'd before the poison list fills up. Scan Media was more relevant in the PMEM days [1] before List Poison was introduced in CXL that promised to always record poison on creation.

If Scan Media is an operation that is rarely used, does the kernel need to carry a trigger_scan_media attribute? I.e. the kernel only needs one way to kick off a poison collection event and the depth of that collection is an optional policy setting. Whether that policy needs to be configurable is also an argument that needs evidence.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Would you expect the driver to retain overflow state, and warn those users that they are issuing scan_media without prior overflow events?

I don't follow the use of plural "users". Only the single platform owner cares about the health of the hardware.

This conversation isn't new or a surprise. The no user access was discussed previously, off-list. Let's pick it back up when I post the scan support patchset - so we can get more eyes on it, and keep the discussion in one place.

Alison

Quoted 2 lines

[1]: https://pmem.io/documents/IntelOptanePMem_DSM_Interface-V3.0.pdf

author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH v13 7/9 cxl/region: Provide region info to the cxl_poison trace event

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

User space may need to know which region, if any, maps the poison address(es) logged in a cxl_poison trace event. Since the mapping of DPAs (device physical addresses) to a region can change, the kernel must provide this information at the time the poison list is read. The event informs user space that at event <timestamp> this <region> mapped to this <DPA>, which is poisoned.

The cxl_poison trace event is already wired up to log the region name and uuid if it receives param 'struct cxl_region'.

In order to provide that cxl_region, add another method for gathering poison - by committed endpoint decoder mappings. This method is only available with CONFIG_CXL_REGION and is only used if a region actually maps the memdev where poison is being read. After the region driver reads the poison list for all the mapped resources, poison is read for any remaining unmapped resources.

The default method remains: read the poison by memdev resource.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h   |   5 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c |  13 +++-
 drivers/cxl/core/region.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/cxl/core/core.h +5 -0
index e888e293943e..deb5f87d6d0a 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,12 @@ void cxl_decoder_kill_region(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled);
 #define CXL_DAX_REGION_TYPE(x) (&cxl_dax_region_type)
 int cxl_region_init(void);
 void cxl_region_exit(void);
+int cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port);
 #else
+static inline int cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline void cxl_decoder_kill_region(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled)
 {
 }
drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +12 -1
index 71f5ec6ba6c1..8db7f220f182 100644
@@ -136,13 +136,24 @@ static int cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
 
 int cxl_trigger_poison_list(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
 {
+	struct cxl_port *port;
 	int rc;
 
+	port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
+	if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rc = down_read_interruptible(&cxl_dpa_rwsem);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(cxlmd);
+	if (port->commit_end == -1) {
+		/* No regions mapped to this memdev */
+		rc = cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(cxlmd);
+	} else {
+		/* Regions mapped, collect poison by endpoint */
+		rc =  cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(port);
+	}
 	up_read(&cxl_dpa_rwsem);
 
 	return rc;
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +124 -0

130 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
#18 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v13 7/9] cxl/region: Provide region info to the cxl_poison trace event

Quoted 125 lines · alison.schofield@ wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

User space may need to know which region, if any, maps the poison address(es) logged in a cxl_poison trace event. Since the mapping of DPAs (device physical addresses) to a region can change, the kernel must provide this information at the time the poison list is read. The event informs user space that at event <timestamp> this <region> mapped to this <DPA>, which is poisoned.

The cxl_poison trace event is already wired up to log the region name and uuid if it receives param 'struct cxl_region'.

In order to provide that cxl_region, add another method for gathering poison - by committed endpoint decoder mappings. This method is only available with CONFIG_CXL_REGION and is only used if a region actually maps the memdev where poison is being read. After the region driver reads the poison list for all the mapped resources, poison is read for any remaining unmapped resources.

The default method remains: read the poison by memdev resource.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h   |   5 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c |  13 +++-
 drivers/cxl/core/region.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/cxl/core/core.h +5 -0
index e888e293943e..deb5f87d6d0a 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,12 @@ void cxl_decoder_kill_region(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled);
 #define CXL_DAX_REGION_TYPE(x) (&cxl_dax_region_type)
 int cxl_region_init(void);
 void cxl_region_exit(void);
+int cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port);
 #else
+static inline int cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline void cxl_decoder_kill_region(struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled)
 {
 }
drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +12 -1
index 71f5ec6ba6c1..8db7f220f182 100644
@@ -136,13 +136,24 @@ static int cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
 
 int cxl_trigger_poison_list(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd)
 {
+	struct cxl_port *port;
 	int rc;
 
+	port = dev_get_drvdata(&cxlmd->dev);
+	if (!port || !is_cxl_endpoint(port))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	rc = down_read_interruptible(&cxl_dpa_rwsem);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(cxlmd);
+	if (port->commit_end == -1) {
+		/* No regions mapped to this memdev */
+		rc = cxl_get_poison_by_memdev(cxlmd);
+	} else {
+		/* Regions mapped, collect poison by endpoint */
+		rc =  cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(port);
+	}
 	up_read(&cxl_dpa_rwsem);
 
 	return rc;
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +38 -0
index f29028148806..5f1c8ce9d956 100644
@@ -2213,6 +2213,130 @@ struct cxl_pmem_region *to_cxl_pmem_region(struct device *dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL(to_cxl_pmem_region, CXL);
 
+struct cxl_poison_context {
+	struct cxl_port *port;
+	enum cxl_decoder_mode mode;
+	u64 offset;
+};
+
+static int cxl_get_poison_unmapped(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd,
+				   struct cxl_poison_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds = cxlmd->cxlds;
+	u64 offset, length;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Collect poison for the remaining unmapped resources
+	 * after poison is collected by committed endpoints.
+	 *
+	 * Knowing that PMEM must always follow RAM, get poison
+	 * for unmapped resources based on the last decoder's mode:
+	 *	ram: scan remains of ram range, then any pmem range
+	 *	pmem: scan remains of pmem range
+	 */
+
+	if (ctx->mode == CXL_DECODER_RAM) {
+		offset = ctx->offset;
+		length = resource_size(&cxlds->ram_res) - offset;
+		rc = cxl_mem_get_poison(cxlmd, offset, length, NULL);
+		if (rc == -EFAULT)
+			rc = 0;
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (ctx->mode == CXL_DECODER_PMEM) {
+		offset = ctx->offset;
+		length = resource_size(&cxlds->dpa_res) - offset;
+		if (!length)
+			return 0;
+	} else if (resource_size(&cxlds->pmem_res)) {

drivers/cxl/core/region.c struct cxl_pmem_region *to_cxl_pmem_region(struct device *dev) · line 2263

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +10 -0
+		offset = cxlds->pmem_res.start;
+		length = resource_size(&cxlds->pmem_res);
+	} else {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return cxl_mem_get_poison(cxlmd, offset, length, NULL);
+}
+
+static int  poison_by_decoder(struct device *dev, void *arg)

Looks like an extra space snuck in there, I can fix that up on applying.

Quoted 40 lines
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +40 -0
+{
+	struct cxl_poison_context *ctx = arg;
+	struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled;
+	struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd;
+	u64 offset, length;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!is_endpoint_decoder(dev))
+		return rc;
+
+	cxled = to_cxl_endpoint_decoder(dev);
+	if (!cxled->dpa_res || !resource_size(cxled->dpa_res))
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Regions are only created with single mode decoders: pmem or ram.
+	 * Linux does not support mixed mode decoders. This means that
+	 * reading poison per endpoint decoder adheres to the requirement
+	 * that poison reads of pmem and ram must be separated.
+	 * CXL 3.0 Spec 8.2.9.8.4.1
+	 */
+	if (cxled->mode == CXL_DECODER_MIXED) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "poison list read unsupported in mixed mode\n");
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	cxlmd = cxled_to_memdev(cxled);
+	if (cxled->skip) {
+		offset = cxled->dpa_res->start - cxled->skip;
+		length = cxled->skip;
+		rc = cxl_mem_get_poison(cxlmd, offset, length, NULL);
+		if (rc == -EFAULT && cxled->mode == CXL_DECODER_RAM)
+			rc = 0;
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	offset = cxled->dpa_res->start;
+	length = cxled->dpa_res->end - offset + 1;
+	rc = cxl_mem_get_poison(cxlmd, offset, length, cxled->cxld.region);

drivers/cxl/core/region.c struct cxl_pmem_region *to_cxl_pmem_region(struct device *dev) · line 2313

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +10 -0
+	if (rc == -EFAULT && cxled->mode == CXL_DECODER_RAM)
+		rc = 0;
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	/* Iterate until commit_end is reached */
+	if (cxled->cxld.id == ctx->port->commit_end) {
+		ctx->offset = cxled->dpa_res->end + 1;
+		ctx->mode = cxled->mode;
+		rc = 1;

I think a "return 1" is appropriate here with a "return 0" below, I can also fix that up on applying.

Quoted 32 lines
drivers/cxl/core/region.c +26 -0
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int cxl_get_poison_by_endpoint(struct cxl_port *port)
+{
+	struct cxl_poison_context ctx;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	rc = down_read_interruptible(&cxl_region_rwsem);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	ctx = (struct cxl_poison_context) {
+		.port = port
+	};
+
+	rc = device_for_each_child(&port->dev, &ctx, poison_by_decoder);
+	if (rc == 1)
+		rc = cxl_get_poison_unmapped(to_cxl_memdev(port->uport), &ctx);
+
+	up_read(&cxl_region_rwsem);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static struct lock_class_key cxl_pmem_region_key;
 
 static struct cxl_pmem_region *cxl_pmem_region_alloc(struct cxl_region *cxlr)
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH v13 8/9 cxl/trace: Add an HPA to cxl_poison trace events

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

When a cxl_poison trace event is reported for a region, the poisoned Device Physical Address (DPA) can be translated to a Host Physical Address (HPA) for consumption by user space.

Translate and add the resulting HPA to the cxl_poison trace event. Follow the device decode logic as defined in the CXL Spec 3.0 Section 8.2.4.19.13.

If no region currently maps the poison, assign ULLONG_MAX to the cxl_poison event hpa field.

---
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.h | 11 ++++-
 2 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/cxl/core/trace.c +94 -0
index 29ae7ce81dc5..d0403dc3c8ab 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,99 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 /* Copyright(c) 2022 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */
 
+#include <cxl.h>
+#include "core.h"
+
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include "trace.h"
+
+static bool cxl_is_hpa_in_range(u64 hpa, struct cxl_region *cxlr, int pos)
+{
+	struct cxl_region_params *p = &cxlr->params;
+	int gran = p->interleave_granularity;
+	int ways = p->interleave_ways;
+	u64 offset;
+
+	/* Is the hpa within this region at all */
+	if (hpa < p->res->start || hpa > p->res->end) {
+		dev_dbg(&cxlr->dev,
+			"Addr trans fail: hpa 0x%llx not in region\n", hpa);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Is the hpa in an expected chunk for its pos(-ition) */
+	offset = hpa - p->res->start;
+	offset = do_div(offset, gran * ways);
+	if ((offset >= pos * gran) && (offset < (pos + 1) * gran))
+		return true;
+
+	dev_dbg(&cxlr->dev,
+		"Addr trans fail: hpa 0x%llx not in expected chunk\n", hpa);
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static u64 cxl_dpa_to_hpa(u64 dpa,  struct cxl_region *cxlr,
+			  struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled)
+{
+	u64 dpa_offset, hpa_offset, bits_upper, mask_upper, hpa;
+	struct cxl_region_params *p = &cxlr->params;
+	int pos = cxled->pos;
+	u16 eig = 0;
+	u8 eiw = 0;
+
+	ways_to_eiw(p->interleave_ways, &eiw);
+	granularity_to_eig(p->interleave_granularity, &eig);
+
+	/*
+	 * The device position in the region interleave set was removed
+	 * from the offset at HPA->DPA translation. To reconstruct the
+	 * HPA, place the 'pos' in the offset.
+	 *
+	 * The placement of 'pos' in the HPA is determined by interleave
+	 * ways and granularity and is defined in the CXL Spec 3.0 Section
+	 * 8.2.4.19.13 Implementation Note: Device Decode Logic
+	 */
+
+	/* Remove the dpa base */
+	dpa_offset = dpa - cxl_dpa_resource_start(cxled);
+
+	mask_upper = GENMASK_ULL(51, eig + 8);
+
+	if (eiw < 8) {
+		hpa_offset = (dpa_offset & mask_upper) << eiw;
+		hpa_offset |= pos << (eig + 8);
+	} else {
+		bits_upper = (dpa_offset & mask_upper) >> (eig + 8);
+		bits_upper = bits_upper * 3;
+		hpa_offset = ((bits_upper << (eiw - 8)) + pos) << (eig + 8);
+	}
+
+	/* The lower bits remain unchanged */
+	hpa_offset |= dpa_offset & GENMASK_ULL(eig + 7, 0);
+
+	/* Apply the hpa_offset to the region base address */
+	hpa = hpa_offset + p->res->start;
+
+	if (!cxl_is_hpa_in_range(hpa, cxlr, cxled->pos))
+		return ULLONG_MAX;
+
+	return hpa;
+}
+
+u64 cxl_trace_hpa(struct cxl_region *cxlr, struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd,
+		  u64 dpa)
+{
+	struct cxl_region_params *p = &cxlr->params;
+	struct cxl_endpoint_decoder *cxled = NULL;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i <  p->nr_targets; i++) {
+		cxled = p->targets[i];
+		if (cxlmd == cxled_to_memdev(cxled))
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!cxled || cxlmd != cxled_to_memdev(cxled))
+		return ULLONG_MAX;
+
+	return cxl_dpa_to_hpa(dpa, cxlr, cxled);
+}
drivers/cxl/core/trace.h +9 -2
index 17c24baaf740..220cc7e721b8 100644
@@ -636,6 +636,8 @@ TRACE_EVENT(cxl_memory_module,
 #define cxl_poison_overflow(flags, time)				\
 	(flags & CXL_POISON_FLAG_OVERFLOW ? le64_to_cpu(time) : 0)
 
+u64 cxl_trace_hpa(struct cxl_region *cxlr, struct cxl_memdev *memdev, u64 dpa);
+
 TRACE_EVENT(cxl_poison,
 
 	TP_PROTO(struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd, struct cxl_region *region,
@@ -651,6 +653,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(cxl_poison,
 		__field(u8, trace_type)
 		__string(region, region)
 		__field(u64, overflow_ts)
+		__field(u64, hpa)
 		__field(u64, dpa)
 		__field(u32, dpa_length)
 		__array(char, uuid, 16)
@@ -671,21 +674,25 @@ TRACE_EVENT(cxl_poison,
 		if (region) {
 			__assign_str(region, dev_name(&region->dev));
 			memcpy(__entry->uuid, &region->params.uuid, 16);
+			__entry->hpa = cxl_trace_hpa(region, cxlmd,
+						     __entry->dpa);
 		} else {
 			__assign_str(region, "");
 			memset(__entry->uuid, 0, 16);
+			__entry->hpa = ULLONG_MAX;
 		}
 	    ),
 
 	TP_printk("memdev=%s host=%s serial=%lld trace_type=%s region=%s "  \
-		"region_uuid=%pU dpa=0x%llx dpa_length=0x%x source=%s "     \
-		"flags=%s overflow_time=%llu",
+		"region_uuid=%pU hpa=0x%llx dpa=0x%llx dpa_length=0x%x "    \
+		"source=%s flags=%s overflow_time=%llu",
 		__get_str(memdev),
 		__get_str(host),
 		__entry->serial,
 		show_poison_trace_type(__entry->trace_type),
 		__get_str(region),
 		__entry->uuid,
+		__entry->hpa,
 		__entry->dpa,
 		__entry->dpa_length,
 		show_poison_source(__entry->source),
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH v13 9/9 tools/testing/cxl: Mock support for Get Poison List

In reply to [email protected]

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Make mock memdevs support the Get Poison List mailbox command. Return a fake poison error record when the get poison list command is issued.

This supports testing the kernel tracing and cxl list capabilities for media errors.

---
 tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c +42 -0
index 9263b04d35f7..cf7975db05ed 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/sizes.h>
 #include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <cxlmem.h>
 
 #include "trace.h"
@@ -40,6 +41,10 @@ static struct cxl_cel_entry mock_cel[] = {
 		.opcode = cpu_to_le16(CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_HEALTH_INFO),
 		.effect = cpu_to_le16(0),
 	},
+	{
+		.opcode = cpu_to_le16(CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON),
+		.effect = cpu_to_le16(0),
+	},
 };
 
 /* See CXL 2.0 Table 181 Get Health Info Output Payload */
@@ -471,6 +476,8 @@ static int mock_id(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
 			cpu_to_le64(DEV_SIZE / CXL_CAPACITY_MULTIPLIER),
 	};
 
+	put_unaligned_le24(CXL_POISON_LIST_MAX, id.poison_list_max_mer);
+
 	if (cmd->size_out < sizeof(id))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -888,6 +895,34 @@ static int mock_health_info(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int mock_get_poison(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds,
+			   struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
+{
+	struct cxl_mbox_poison_in *pi = cmd->payload_in;
+
+	/* Mock one poison record at pi.offset for 64 bytes */
+	struct {
+		struct cxl_mbox_poison_out po;
+		struct cxl_poison_record record;
+	} __packed mock_plist = {
+		.po = {
+			.count = cpu_to_le16(1),
+		},
+		.record = {
+			.length = cpu_to_le32(1),
+			.address = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(pi->offset) +
+					       CXL_POISON_SOURCE_INJECTED),
+		},
+	};
+
+	if (cmd->size_out < sizeof(mock_plist))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	memcpy(cmd->payload_out, &mock_plist, sizeof(mock_plist));
+	cmd->size_out = sizeof(mock_plist);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct device *dev = cxlds->dev;
@@ -942,6 +977,9 @@ static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *
 	case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
 		rc = mock_passphrase_secure_erase(cxlds, cmd);
 		break;
+	case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_POISON:
+		rc = mock_get_poison(cxlds, cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1010,6 +1048,10 @@ static int cxl_mock_mem_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
+	rc = cxl_poison_state_init(cxlds);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
 	rc = cxl_dev_state_identify(cxlds);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.37.3
Tested-by on the v13 series
#21 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023 10:39:00 -0700 [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

FWIW I've just been hammering the QEMU emulation for this to test a new version of that, but as a side effect I hit ther corner cases with this as well and it all looks good to me.

Quoted 74 lines

Changes in v13:
- New Lead-in patches
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands (Dan) cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all

- New Patch: cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
Patch connects the lead-in patches with the rest of this set. Poison init was previously done in the GET_POISON_LIST patch. With LIST deprecated, needed a method, along with a reason, to discover device support.

- cxl_poison_state_init(): use kvmalloc for potentially large payload (Dan)
- cxl_poison_state_init() unset poison enabled bit on failure
- trigger sysfs: make the core interface a proper api (Dan)
- trigger sysfs: use down_read_interruptible (Dan)
- Reorganize the by_endpoint work to make typesafe (Dan)
- poison_by_decoder() only fill ctx when iteration is done
- Remove mentions of mixed mode as a 'watch for'. Just say no. (Dan)
- s/overflow_t/overflow_ts in cxlmem.h struct and trace.h struct (Dan)
- Really remove errant line from cxl_memdev_visible() (Jonathan, DaveJ, Dan)

Link to v12:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/

Add support for retrieving device poison lists and store the returned error records as kernel trace events.

The handling of the poison list is guided by the CXL 3.0 Specification Section 8.2.9.8.4.1. [1]

Example trigger:

$ echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/mem0/trigger_poison_list

Example Trace Events:

Poison found in a PMEM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region11 region_uuid=d96e67ec-76b0-406f-8c35-5b52630dcad1 hpa=0xf100000000 dpa=0x70000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in RAM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region2 region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xf010000000 dpa=0x0 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in an unmapped DPA resource:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem3 host=cxl_mem.3 serial=3 trace_type=List region= region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xffffffffffffffff dpa=0x40000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

[1]: https://www.computeexpresslink.org/download-the-specification

Alison Schofield (8):
cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command cxl/trace: Add TRACE support for CXL media-error records cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute cxl/region: Provide region info to the cxl_poison trace event cxl/trace: Add an HPA to cxl_poison trace events tools/testing/cxl: Mock support for Get Poison List

Dan Williams (1):
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  14 +++
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h                 |   9 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               |  54 +++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/region.c               | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.c                |  94 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.h                | 101 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  83 ++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/mem.c                       |  43 +++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c                       |   4 +
 include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h            |  35 +++++-
 tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c            |  42 +++++++
 12 files changed, 740 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

base-commit: e686c32590f40bffc45f105c04c836ffad3e531a

#22 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · On Sun, 23 Apr 2023 16:30:11 +0100 Jonathan Cameron…
Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023 10:39:00 -0700 [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

FWIW I've just been hammering the QEMU emulation for this to test a new version of that, but as a side effect I hit ther corner cases with this as well and it all looks good to me.

I should refine that slightly - doesn't cover patch 9 as I didn't try the mocking.

Jonathan

Quoted 77 lines
Quoted 76 lines

Changes in v13:
- New Lead-in patches
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands (Dan) cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all

- New Patch: cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
Patch connects the lead-in patches with the rest of this set. Poison init was previously done in the GET_POISON_LIST patch. With LIST deprecated, needed a method, along with a reason, to discover device support.

- cxl_poison_state_init(): use kvmalloc for potentially large payload (Dan)
- cxl_poison_state_init() unset poison enabled bit on failure
- trigger sysfs: make the core interface a proper api (Dan)
- trigger sysfs: use down_read_interruptible (Dan)
- Reorganize the by_endpoint work to make typesafe (Dan)
- poison_by_decoder() only fill ctx when iteration is done
- Remove mentions of mixed mode as a 'watch for'. Just say no. (Dan)
- s/overflow_t/overflow_ts in cxlmem.h struct and trace.h struct (Dan)
- Really remove errant line from cxl_memdev_visible() (Jonathan, DaveJ, Dan)

Link to v12:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/

Add support for retrieving device poison lists and store the returned error records as kernel trace events.

The handling of the poison list is guided by the CXL 3.0 Specification Section 8.2.9.8.4.1. [1]

Example trigger:

$ echo 1 > /sys/bus/cxl/devices/mem0/trigger_poison_list

Example Trace Events:

Poison found in a PMEM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region11 region_uuid=d96e67ec-76b0-406f-8c35-5b52630dcad1 hpa=0xf100000000 dpa=0x70000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in RAM Region:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem0 host=cxl_mem.0 serial=0 trace_type=List region=region2 region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xf010000000 dpa=0x0 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

Poison found in an unmapped DPA resource:
cxl_poison: memdev=mem3 host=cxl_mem.3 serial=3 trace_type=List region= region_uuid=00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 hpa=0xffffffffffffffff dpa=0x40000000 dpa_length=0x40 source=Injected flags= overflow_time=0

[1]: https://www.computeexpresslink.org/download-the-specification

Alison Schofield (8):
cxl/mbox: Restrict poison cmds to debugfs cxl_raw_allow_all cxl/mbox: Initialize the poison state
cxl/mbox: Add GET_POISON_LIST mailbox command cxl/trace: Add TRACE support for CXL media-error records cxl/memdev: Add trigger_poison_list sysfs attribute cxl/region: Provide region info to the cxl_poison trace event cxl/trace: Add an HPA to cxl_poison trace events tools/testing/cxl: Mock support for Get Poison List

Dan Williams (1):
cxl/mbox: Deprecate poison commands

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl |  14 +++
 drivers/cxl/core/core.h                 |   9 ++
 drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c                 | 150 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c               |  54 +++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/region.c               | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.c                |  94 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/core/trace.h                | 101 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h                    |  83 ++++++++++++-
 drivers/cxl/mem.c                       |  43 +++++++
 drivers/cxl/pci.c                       |   4 +
 include/uapi/linux/cxl_mem.h            |  35 +++++-
 tools/testing/cxl/test/mem.c            |  42 +++++++
 12 files changed, 740 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

base-commit: e686c32590f40bffc45f105c04c836ffad3e531a

#23 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Jonathan Cameron
Quoted 6 lines · On Sun, 23 Apr 2023 16:30:11 +0100 Jonathan Cameron…
Quoted 2 lines · On Tue, 18 Apr 2023 10:39:00 -0700 [email protected] wrote:

From: Alison Schofield <[email protected]>

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

FWIW I've just been hammering the QEMU emulation for this to test a new version of that, but as a side effect I hit ther corner cases with this as well and it all looks good to me.

I should refine that slightly - doesn't cover patch 9 as I didn't try the mocking.

Thanks Jonathan, I've picked up your test and review tags.