efi/x86: Avoid legacy decompressor during EFI boot
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainercover efi/x86: Avoid legacy decompressor during EFI boot
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Ard Biesheuvel (6):
x86: decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code
x86: decompressor: Factor out kernel decompression and relocation
x86: efistub: Obtain ACPI RSDP address while running in the stub
x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
x86: efistub: Prefer EFI memory attributes protocol over DXE services
x86: efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot
arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 24 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 39 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 44 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 360 +++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 1/6 x86: decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code
We no longer have to be cautious when referring to global variables in the position independent decompressor code, now that we use PIE codegen and assert in the linker script that no GOT entries exist (which would require adjustment for the actual runtime load address of the decompressor binary).
This means we can simply refer to global variables directly, instead of passing them into C routines from asm code. Let's do so for the code that will be called directly from the EFI stub after a subsequent patch, and avoid the need to pass these quantities directly.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 8 -------- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 8 +------- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +0 -8
@@ -179,13 +179,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated) */ /* push arguments for extract_kernel: */ - pushl output_len@GOTOFF(%ebx) /* decompressed length, end of relocs */ pushl %ebp /* output address */ - pushl input_len@GOTOFF(%ebx) /* input_len */ - leal input_data@GOTOFF(%ebx), %eax - pushl %eax /* input_data */ - leal boot_heap@GOTOFF(%ebx), %eax - pushl %eax /* heap area */ pushl %esi /* real mode pointer */ call extract_kernel /* returns kernel entry point in %eax */ addl $24, %esp
@@ -213,8 +207,6 @@ SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, gdt_end) */ .bss .balign 4 -boot_heap: - .fill BOOT_HEAP_SIZE, 1, 0 boot_stack: .fill BOOT_STACK_SIZE, 1, 0 boot_stack_end:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +1 -7
@@ -564,11 +564,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated) */ pushq %rsi /* Save the real mode argument */ movq %rsi, %rdi /* real mode address */ - leaq boot_heap(%rip), %rsi /* malloc area for uncompression */ - leaq input_data(%rip), %rdx /* input_data */ - movl input_len(%rip), %ecx /* input_len */ - movq %rbp, %r8 /* output target address */ - movl output_len(%rip), %r9d /* decompressed length, end of relocs */ + movq %rbp, %rsi /* output target address */ call extract_kernel /* returns kernel entry point in %rax */ popq %rsi
@@ -726,8 +722,6 @@ SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(boot_idt, SYM_L_GLOBAL, boot_idt_end) */ .bss .balign 4 -SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_heap, .fill BOOT_HEAP_SIZE, 1, 0) - SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(boot_stack) .fill BOOT_STACK_SIZE, 1, 0 .balign 16
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +10 -7
@@ -330,6 +330,11 @@ static size_t parse_elf(void *output)return ehdr.e_entry -LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ; } +static u8 boot_heap[BOOT_HEAP_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ; + +extern unsigned char input_data[]; +extern unsigned int input_len, output_len; +/* * The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position * is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel
@@ -347,14 +352,12 @@ static size_t parse_elf(void *output)* |-------uncompressed kernel image---------| * */ -asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap, -unsigned char *input_data, -unsigned long input_len, -unsigned char *output, -unsigned long output_len) +asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, +unsigned char *output) {const unsigned long kernel_total_size = VO__end - VO__text;unsigned long virt_addr =LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ; +memptr heap = (memptr )boot_heap;unsigned long needed_size;size_t entry_offset;
@@ -412,7 +415,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,* entries. This ensures the full mapped area is usable RAM * and doesn't include any reserved areas. */ - needed_size =max (output_len, kernel_total_size); + needed_size =max ((unsigned long )output_len, kernel_total_size);#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 needed_size =ALIGN (needed_size,MIN_KERNEL_ALIGN );#endif
@@ -443,7 +446,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 if (heap >0x3fffffffffffUL )error ("Destination address too large" ); -if (virt_addr +max (output_len, kernel_total_size) >KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE ) +if (virt_addr + needed_size >KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE )error ("Destination virtual address is beyond the kernel mapping area" );#else if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(128 <<20 )-1 ) &0x7fffffff ))
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 2/6 x86: decompressor: Factor out kernel decompression and relocation
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelFactor out the decompressor sequence that invokes the decompressor, parses the ELF and applies the relocations so that we will be able to call it directly from the EFI stub.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +22 -5
@@ -330,11 +330,32 @@ static size_t parse_elf(void *output)return ehdr.e_entry -LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ; } +const unsigned long kernel_total_size = VO__end - VO__text; +static u8 boot_heap[BOOT_HEAP_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ;extern unsigned char input_data[];extern unsigned int input_len, output_len; +unsigned long decompress_kernel (unsigned char *outbuf,unsigned long virt_addr, +void (*error)(char *x)) +{ +unsigned long entry; + +if (!free_mem_ptr) { + free_mem_ptr = (unsigned long )boot_heap; + free_mem_end_ptr = (unsigned long )boot_heap +sizeof (boot_heap); + } + +__decompress (input_data, input_len,NULL ,NULL , outbuf, output_len, +NULL , error); + + entry =parse_elf (outbuf); +handle_relocations (outbuf, output_len, virt_addr); + +return entry; +} +/* * The compressed kernel image (ZO), has been moved so that its position * is against the end of the buffer used to hold the uncompressed kernel
@@ -355,7 +376,6 @@ extern unsigned int input_len, output_len; asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode,unsigned char *output) { -const unsigned long kernel_total_size = VO__end - VO__text;unsigned long virt_addr =LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR ;memptr heap = (memptr )boot_heap;unsigned long needed_size;
@@ -458,10 +478,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode,#endif debug_putstr ("\nDecompressing Linux... " ); -__decompress (input_data, input_len,NULL ,NULL , output, output_len, -NULL , error); - entry_offset =parse_elf (output); -handle_relocations (output, output_len, virt_addr); + entry_offset =decompress_kernel (output, virt_addr, error);debug_putstr ("done.\nBooting the kernel (entry_offset: 0x" );debug_puthex (entry_offset);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 3/6 x86: efistub: Obtain ACPI RSDP address while running in the stub
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelOne of the actions performed by the decompressor is populating the RSDP address field in the boot_params struct, and when doing EFI boot, EFI configuration tables are the preferred source for this information.
In preparation for removing the decompressor code from the EFI stub boot path, set this field from the EFI stub code.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +5 -0
@@ -787,6 +787,11 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, efi_dxe_table =NULL ; } +if (!boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr) + boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr = (unsigned long ) + (get_efi_config_table (ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID ) ?: +get_efi_config_table (ACPI_TABLE_GUID )); +/* * If the kernel isn't already loaded at a suitable address, * relocate it.
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 4/6 x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelIn preparation for updating the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the bare metal decompressor code altogether, implement the support code for switching between 4 and 5 levels of paging before jumping to the kernel proper.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c +4 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@#include "efistub.h" +extern bool efi_no5lvl; +bool efi_nochunk;bool efi_nokaslr = !IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE );bool efi_novamap;
@@ -73,6 +75,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_parse_options(char const *cmdline) efi_loglevel =CONSOLE_LOGLEVEL_QUIET ; }else if (!strcmp (param,"noinitrd" )) { efi_noinitrd = true; + }else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ) && !strcmp (param,"no5lvl" )) { + efi_no5lvl = true; }else if (!strcmp (param,"efi" ) && val) { efi_nochunk =parse_option_str (val,"nochunk" ); efi_novamap |=parse_option_str (val,"novamap" );
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +145 -0
163 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Re: [PATCH 4/6] x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
Quoted 4 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
In preparation for updating the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the bare metal decompressor code altogether, implement the support code for switching between 4 and 5 levels of paging before jumping to the kernel proper.
I must admit it is neat. I like it a lot.
Any chance we can share the code with the traditional decompressor? There's not much that EFI specific here. It should be possible to isolate it from the rest, no?
Quoted 16 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +8
-0@@ -792,6 +925,14 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, (get_efi_config_table (ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID ) ?:get_efi_config_table (ACPI_TABLE_GUID )); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + status =efi_setup_5level_paging (); +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +efi_err ("efi_setup_5level_paging() failed!\n" ); + goto fail; + } +#endif +/* * If the kernel isn't already loaded at a suitable address, * relocate it.
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, · line 1060
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +4
-0@@ -910,6 +1051,10 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, goto fail; } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +efi_5level_switch (); +#endif +return bzimage_addr; fail:efi_err ("efi_main() failed!\n" );
Maybe use IS_ENABLED() + dummy efi_setup_5level_paging()/efi_5level_switch() instead of #ifdefs?
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4/6] x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
Quoted 9 lines · Kirill A . Shutemov
Quoted 4 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
In preparation for updating the EFI stub boot flow to avoid the bare metal decompressor code altogether, implement the support code for switching between 4 and 5 levels of paging before jumping to the kernel proper.
I must admit it is neat. I like it a lot.
Thanks!
Quoted 4 lines
Any chance we can share the code with the traditional decompressor? There's not much that EFI specific here. It should be possible to isolate it from the rest, no?
I agree. The EFI boot code should still avoid the bare metal trampoline allocation/deallocation, but the actual payload could be the same - it's just an indirect call with the GDT and page table pointers as arguments.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 20 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +8
-0@@ -792,6 +925,14 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, (get_efi_config_table (ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID ) ?:get_efi_config_table (ACPI_TABLE_GUID )); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + status =efi_setup_5level_paging (); +if (status !=EFI_SUCCESS ) { +efi_err ("efi_setup_5level_paging() failed!\n" ); + goto fail; + } +#endif +/* * If the kernel isn't already loaded at a suitable address, * relocate it. @@ -910,6 +1051,10 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, goto fail; }
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle, · line 1060
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +4
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +efi_5level_switch (); +#endif +return bzimage_addr; fail:efi_err ("efi_main() failed!\n" );Maybe use
IS_ENABLED()+ dummy efi_setup_5level_paging()/efi_5level_switch() instead of #ifdefs?
These are functions returning void so I can just move the #ifdef into the function implementation. Wo do need #ifdefs at some level, as i386 does not provide a definition for __KERNEL32_CS
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 5/6 x86: efistub: Prefer EFI memory attributes protocol over DXE services
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelCurrently, we rely on DXE services in some cases to clear non-execute restrictions from page allocations that need to be executable. This is dodgy, because DXE services are not specified by UEFI but by PI, and they are not intended for consumption by OS loaders. However, no alternative existed at the time.
Now, there is a new UEFI protocol that should be used instead, so if it exists, prefer it over the DXE services calls.
--- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 28 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +20 -8
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const efi_system_table_t *efi_system_table;const efi_dxe_services_table_t *efi_dxe_table; u32 image_offset __section(".data");static efi_loaded_image_t *image =NULL ; +static efi_memory_attribute_protocol_t *memattr;static efi_status_t preserve_pci_rom_image (efi_pci_io_protocol_t *pci,struct pci_setup_rom **__rom)
@@ -221,12 +222,18 @@ adjust_memory_range_protection(unsigned long start, unsigned long size)unsigned long rounded_start, rounded_end;unsigned long unprotect_start, unprotect_size; -if (efi_dxe_table ==NULL ) -return ; - rounded_start =rounddown (start,EFI_PAGE_SIZE ); rounded_end =roundup (start + size,EFI_PAGE_SIZE ); +if (memattr !=NULL ) { +efi_call_proto (memattr, clear_memory_attributes, rounded_start, + rounded_end - rounded_start,EFI_MEMORY_XP ); +return ; + } + +if (efi_dxe_table ==NULL ) +return ; +/* * Don't modify memory region attributes, they are * already suitable, to lower the possibility to
@@ -913,13 +920,18 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long efi_main(efi_handle_t handle,if (efi_system_table->hdr.signature !=EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE_SIGNATURE )efi_exit (handle,EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ); - efi_dxe_table =get_efi_config_table (EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_GUID ); -if (efi_dxe_table && - efi_dxe_table->hdr.signature !=EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_SIGNATURE ) { -efi_warn ("Ignoring DXE services table: invalid signature\n" ); - efi_dxe_table =NULL ; +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI_DXE_MEM_ATTRIBUTES )) { + efi_dxe_table =get_efi_config_table (EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_GUID ); +if (efi_dxe_table && + efi_dxe_table->hdr.signature !=EFI_DXE_SERVICES_TABLE_SIGNATURE ) { +efi_warn ("Ignoring DXE services table: invalid signature\n" ); + efi_dxe_table =NULL ; + } } +/* grab the memory attributes protocol if it exists */ +efi_bs_call (locate_protocol, &guid,NULL , (void **)&memattr); +if (!boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr) boot_params->acpi_rsdp_addr = (unsigned long) (get_efi_config_table(ACPI_20_TABLE_GUID) ?:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerPATCH 6/6 x86: efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot
In reply to Ard BiesheuvelThe bare metal decompressor code was never really intended to run in a hosted environment such as the EFI boot services, and does a few things that are problematic in the context of EFI boot now that the logo requirements are getting tighter.
In particular, the decompressor moves itself around in memory, and assumes that arbitrary chunks of low memory can be temporarily emptied, populated with trampoline code and restored again afterwards, and this is difficult to support in a context where memory is not permitted to be mapped writable and executable at the same time or, at the very least, is mapped non-executable by default, and needs special treatment for this restriction to be lifted.
Since EFI already maps all of memory 1:1, we don't need to create new page tables or handle page faults when decompressing the kernel. That means there is also no need to set up special exception handlers for SEV. Generally, there is little need to do anything that the decompressor does beyond
- perform the 4/5 level paging switch, if needed,
- decompress the kernel
- relocate the kernel
So let's do all of this from the EFI stub code, and avoid the bare metal decompressor altogether.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 ------ arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 16 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 31 ---- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 188 ++++++++------------ 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S +0 -55
@@ -245,10 +245,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_entry) jmp startup_32 SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_entry) -#define ST32_boottime 60 // offsetof(efi_system_table_32_t, boottime) -#define BS32_handle_protocol 88 // offsetof(efi_boot_services_32_t, handle_protocol) -#define LI32_image_base 32 // offsetof(efi_loaded_image_32_t, image_base) - /* * efi_status_t efi32_pe_entry(efi_handle_t image_handle, * efi_system_table_32_t *sys_table)
@@ -256,8 +252,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_entry) SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_pe_entry) pushl %ebp movl %esp, %ebp - pushl %eax // dummy push to allocate loaded_image - pushl %ebx // save callee-save registers pushl %edi
@@ -266,48 +260,8 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_pe_entry) movl $0x80000003, %eax // EFI_UNSUPPORTED jnz 2f - call 1f -1: pop %ebx - - /* Get the loaded image protocol pointer from the image handle */ - leal -4(%ebp), %eax - pushl %eax // &loaded_image - leal (loaded_image_proto - 1b)(%ebx), %eax - pushl %eax // pass the GUID address - pushl 8(%ebp) // pass the image handle - - /* - * Note the alignment of the stack frame. - * sys_table - * handle <-- 16-byte aligned on entry by ABI - * return address - * frame pointer - * loaded_image <-- local variable - * saved %ebx <-- 16-byte aligned here - * saved %edi - * &loaded_image - * &loaded_image_proto - * handle <-- 16-byte aligned for call to handle_protocol - */ - - movl 12(%ebp), %eax // sys_table - movl ST32_boottime(%eax), %eax // sys_table->boottime - call *BS32_handle_protocol(%eax) // sys_table->boottime->handle_protocol - addl $12, %esp // restore argument space - testl %eax, %eax - jnz 2f - movl 8(%ebp), %ecx // image_handle movl 12(%ebp), %edx // sys_table - movl -4(%ebp), %esi // loaded_image - movl LI32_image_base(%esi), %esi // loaded_image->image_base - leal (startup_32 - 1b)(%ebx), %ebp // runtime address of startup_32 - /* - * We need to set the image_offset variable here since startup_32() will - * use it before we get to the 64-bit efi_pe_entry() in C code. - */ - subl %esi, %ebp // calculate image_offset - movl %ebp, (image_offset - 1b)(%ebx) // save image_offset xorl %esi, %esi jmp efi32_entry // pass %ecx, %edx, %esi // no other registers remain live
@@ -318,15 +272,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_pe_entry) RET SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_pe_entry) - .section ".rodata" - /* EFI loaded image protocol GUID */ - .balign 4 -SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(loaded_image_proto) - .long 0x5b1b31a1 - .word 0x9562, 0x11d2 - .byte 0x8e, 0x3f, 0x00, 0xa0, 0xc9, 0x69, 0x72, 0x3b -SYM_DATA_END(loaded_image_proto) - .data .balign 8 SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(efi32_boot_gdt)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S +0 -16
@@ -84,19 +84,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE leal startup_32@GOTOFF(%edx), %ebx - -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB -/* - * If we were loaded via the EFI LoadImage service, startup_32() will be at an - * offset to the start of the space allocated for the image. efi_pe_entry() will - * set up image_offset to tell us where the image actually starts, so that we - * can use the full available buffer. - * image_offset = startup_32 - image_base - * Otherwise image_offset will be zero and has no effect on the calculations. - */ - subl image_offset@GOTOFF(%edx), %ebx -#endif - movl BP_kernel_alignment(%esi), %eax decl %eax addl %eax, %ebx
@@ -153,10 +140,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(startup_32) #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB SYM_FUNC_START(efi32_stub_entry) add $0x4, %esp - movl 8(%esp), %esi /* save boot_params pointer */ call efi_main - /* efi_main returns the possibly relocated address of startup_32 */ - jmp *%eax SYM_FUNC_END(efi32_stub_entry) SYM_FUNC_ALIAS(efi_stub_entry, efi32_stub_entry) #endif
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +0 -31
@@ -146,19 +146,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32) #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE movl %ebp, %ebx - -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB -/* - * If we were loaded via the EFI LoadImage service, startup_32 will be at an - * offset to the start of the space allocated for the image. efi_pe_entry will - * set up image_offset to tell us where the image actually starts, so that we - * can use the full available buffer. - * image_offset = startup_32 - image_base - * Otherwise image_offset will be zero and has no effect on the calculations. - */ - subl rva(image_offset)(%ebp), %ebx -#endif - movl BP_kernel_alignment(%esi), %eax decl %eax addl %eax, %ebx
@@ -346,20 +333,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64) /* Start with the delta to where the kernel will run at. */ #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE leaq startup_32(%rip) /* - $startup_32 */, %rbp - -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB -/* - * If we were loaded via the EFI LoadImage service, startup_32 will be at an - * offset to the start of the space allocated for the image. efi_pe_entry will - * set up image_offset to tell us where the image actually starts, so that we - * can use the full available buffer. - * image_offset = startup_32 - image_base - * Otherwise image_offset will be zero and has no effect on the calculations. - */ - movl image_offset(%rip), %eax - subq %rax, %rbp -#endif - movl BP_kernel_alignment(%rsi), %eax decl %eax addq %rax, %rbp
@@ -529,11 +502,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(startup_64) #endif SYM_FUNC_START(efi64_stub_entry) and $~0xf, %rsp /* realign the stack */ - movq %rdx, %rbx /* save boot_params pointer */ call efi_main - movq %rbx,%rsi - leaq rva(startup_64)(%rax), %rax - jmp *%rax SYM_FUNC_END(efi64_stub_entry) SYM_FUNC_ALIAS(efi_stub_entry, efi64_stub_entry) #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +2 -0
@@ -216,6 +216,8 @@ efi_status_t efi_set_virtual_address_map(unsigned long memory_map_size,#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_MIXED +#define EFI_ALLOC_LIMIT (efi_is_64bit() ? ULONG_MAX : U32_MAX) +#define ARCH_HAS_EFISTUB_WRAPPERS static inline bool efi_is_64bit (void )
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +73 -115
254 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 24 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 39 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 44 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 360 +++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
Upon a quick scan, I can't argue with that diffstat and would prefer a lot more if we did this instead of Evgeny's pile which touches a lot of nasty and hard to debug code which gets executed on *everything*.
So if people agree with that approach, I'd gladly give it a more detailed look.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 8 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
arch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 24 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 39 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 44 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 360 +++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
Quoted 7 lines
Upon a quick scan, I can't argue with that diffstat and would prefer a lot more if we did this instead of Evgeny's pile which touches a lot of nasty and hard to debug code which gets executed on *everything*.
So if people agree with that approach, I'd gladly give it a more detailed look.
I think the general approach is better, but to be honest, I may have missed a thing or two, so it would be good if people more familiar with the history could chime in.
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
My series also implements W^X for both UEFI and non-UEFI boot paths, but I agree that we can just consider non-UEFI code legacy and it would be better to avoid touching it and encourage everyone to use UEFI code path on x86 instead. If PE format will also get fixed with either my patches or some others, I do like your approach more than mine, as it removes a lot of old cruft but does not break things (as far as I see). Seems like a perfect compromise between [1] and my approach.
I've briefly tested the patches and looked through them and they look good to me. Two things I've noticed:
* there's one TSC-related TODO;
* probably we want to clear .bss in efi32_stub_entry andefi64_stub_entry
for UEFI handover protocol, since it's unfortunately still present
and
.bss will contain garbage.
I'll probably do some more testing on the weekend and let you know if I find something.
Please tell me if/when you are going to merge these or similar, and I will clean up and rebase PE-related patches on top of these.
I'd also like to send W^X patches for EFISTUB (omitting the non-UEFI boot path) as a follow up after the PE file header will get fixed. They will be considerably smaller with this approach and will not touch legacy code.
Thanks,
Evgeniy Baskov
Quoted 38 lines
Cc Evgeniy Baskov <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>Cc Peter Jones <[email protected]>Cc Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>Cc Dave Young <[email protected]>Cc Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Ard Biesheuvel (6):
x86: decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code
x86: decompressor: Factor out kernel decompression and relocation
x86: efistub: Obtain ACPI RSDP address while running in the stub
x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
x86: efistub: Prefer EFI memory attributes protocol over DXE services
x86: efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI bootarch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 24 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 39 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 44 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 360 +++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 43 lines · Evgeniy Baskov
Quoted 32 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more
amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is
supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the
first place.So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called
from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress
the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code,
page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 11 lines
My series also implements W^X for both UEFI and non-UEFI boot paths, but I
agree that we can just consider non-UEFI code legacy and it would be better
to avoid touching it and encourage everyone to use UEFI code path on x86 instead. If PE format will also get fixed with either my patches or some others, I do like your approach more than mine, as it removes a lot of old
cruft but does not break things (as far as I see). Seems like a perfect compromise between [1] and my approach.
Thanks, I'm glad we agree.
Quoted 9 lines
I've briefly tested the patches and looked through them and they look good
to me. Two things I've noticed:
* there's one TSC-related TODO;
* probably we want to clear .bss inefi32_stub_entryandefi64_stub_entry
for UEFI handover protocol, since it's unfortunately still present
and
.bss will contain garbage.
I'll look into that.
Quoted 3 lines
I'll probably do some more testing on the weekend and let you know if I find something.
Yes, please.
Quoted 10 lines
Please tell me if/when you are going to merge these or similar, and I will
clean up and rebase PE-related patches on top of these.I'd also like to send W^X patches for EFISTUB (omitting the non-UEFI boot
path) as a follow up after the PE file header will get fixed. They will be
considerably smaller with this approach and will not touch legacy code.
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating z_stream
I'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 38 lines
Cc Evgeniy Baskov <[email protected]>Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>Cc Peter Jones <[email protected]>Cc Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>Cc Dave Young <[email protected]>Cc Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>Cc Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>Cc Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Ard Biesheuvel (6):
x86: decompressor: Move global symbol references to C code
x86: decompressor: Factor out kernel decompression and relocation
x86: efistub: Obtain ACPI RSDP address while running in the stub
x86: efistub: Perform 4/5 level paging switch from the stub
x86: efistub: Prefer EFI memory attributes protocol over DXE services
x86: efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI bootarch/x86/boot/compressed/efi_mixed.S | 55 --- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S | 24 -- arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 39 +-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 44 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 2 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 4 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 360 +++++++++++++------- 7 files changed, 279 insertions(+), 249 deletions(-)
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 8 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Thanks Tom.
The internal malloc() seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 8 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?
I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:
ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries
!!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!! ExceptionData - 0000000000000000
RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400
GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE - 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1) /root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/Variable RuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Thanks,
Tom
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 86 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 8 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:
ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries
!!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!! ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!
Quoted 4 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Thanks.
It seems I was a bit naive and underestimated the amount of SEV related processing that goes on in the decompressor after the EFI stub has handed over. I will have to take some time and go through this, and decide whether there is a way we can share this code with the EFI stub without introducing yet another permutation that requires testing and maintenance.
Any suggestions on how to test this stuff is appreciated - does QEMU emulate any of this? Does consumer-level AMD hardware implement the pieces I'd need to run a SEV host with SNP support etc?
Quoted 101 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 86 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 8 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:
ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries
!!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!! ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 4 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Thanks.
It seems I was a bit naive and underestimated the amount of SEV related processing that goes on in the decompressor after the EFI stub has handed over. I will have to take some time and go through this, and decide whether there is a way we can share this code with the EFI stub without introducing yet another permutation that requires testing and maintenance.
Quoted 3 lines
Any suggestions on how to test this stuff is appreciated - does QEMU emulate any of this? Does consumer-level AMD hardware implement the pieces I'd need to run a SEV host with SNP support etc?
Unfortunately Qemu doesn't emulate any of this and SEV support, specifically the SEV firmware, isn't available on consumer-level parts, so you would need an EPYC part to do SEV.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 85 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 47 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 8 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:
ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries
!!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000
RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206
RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B
RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000
RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68
R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018
R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98
R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198
DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030
GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030
CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000
CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000
DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000
DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400
GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!
Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add __section(".data") to free_mem_ptr and free_mem_end_ptr in arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c and to malloc_ptr and malloc_cnt in include/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.
However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of 0x38 after switching GDTs in arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S by calling startup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls in sme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably" to just after calling startup_64_setup_env() fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
Tom
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 108 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 89 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 9 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to
boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries !!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add
__section(".data")tofree_mem_ptrandfree_mem_end_ptrinarch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.cand tomalloc_ptrandmalloc_cntininclude/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of
0x38after switching GDTs inarch/x86/kernel/head_64.Sby callingstartup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls insme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to__KERNEL_CSso IRET works reliably" to just after callingstartup_64_setup_env()fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.
Quoted 4 lines
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Very interesting. I was under the assumption that everything that goes on in sev_enable() in the decompressor would be rather indispensable to boot in SEV mode (which I only spotted today) so I am quite surprised that things just appear to work. (There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)
If you mean the thing in startup_32 which does get_sev_encryption_bit() etc, that is going away.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteArd Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
(There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)
If you mean the thing in
startup_32which doesget_sev_encryption_bit()etc, that is going away.
OK, good to know.
Quoted 114 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 108 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 89 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 9 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to
boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries !!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add
__section(".data")tofree_mem_ptrandfree_mem_end_ptrinarch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.cand tomalloc_ptrandmalloc_cntininclude/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of
0x38after switching GDTs inarch/x86/kernel/head_64.Sby callingstartup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls insme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to__KERNEL_CSso IRET works reliably" to just after callingstartup_64_setup_env()fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.Quoted 4 lines
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Quoted 7 lines
Very interesting. I was under the assumption that everything that goes on in
sev_enable()in the decompressor would be rather indispensable to boot in SEV mode (which I only spotted today) so I am quite surprised that things just appear to work. (There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)
The sev_enable() function for SEV and SEV-ES is more for ensuring a proper environment (ensuring the proper CPUID bits are present for the guest, checking the GHCB protocol level, properly preparing pagetables, etc.). Since we're still in EFI and using the EFI #VC handler and pagetables, we don't require some of that stuff, but some of the it would need to be performed at some point (I wasn't trying to be a malicious hypervisor).
I haven't tested SEV-SNP yet because the hypervisor support is not upstream, yet, and I haven't applied your series to an SNP hypervisor tree, yet. There is a lot of support in sev_enable() for SNP that may likely cause a problem compared to SEV and SEV-ES.
SEV-SNP has a lot more checking and validation going on and it ensures it gets the confidential computing blob from EFI into the boot parameters. I'm not sure when I'll be able to test SNP, since I'm off next week and trying to wrap up a bunch of stuff before I leave.
Thanks,
Tom
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 124 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 114 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 108 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 89 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 9 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to
boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries !!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add
__section(".data")tofree_mem_ptrandfree_mem_end_ptrinarch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.cand tomalloc_ptrandmalloc_cntininclude/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of
0x38after switching GDTs inarch/x86/kernel/head_64.Sby callingstartup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls insme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to__KERNEL_CSso IRET works reliably" to just after callingstartup_64_setup_env()fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.Quoted 4 lines
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Quoted 7 lines
Very interesting. I was under the assumption that everything that goes on in
sev_enable()in the decompressor would be rather indispensable to boot in SEV mode (which I only spotted today) so I am quite surprised that things just appear to work. (There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)
Quoted 7 lines
The
sev_enable()function for SEV and SEV-ES is more for ensuring a proper environment (ensuring the proper CPUID bits are present for the guest, checking the GHCB protocol level, properly preparing pagetables, etc.). Since we're still in EFI and using the EFI #VC handler and pagetables, we don't require some of that stuff, but some of the it would need to be performed at some point (I wasn't trying to be a malicious hypervisor).
OK, good to know.
Quoted 10 lines
I haven't tested SEV-SNP yet because the hypervisor support is not upstream, yet, and I haven't applied your series to an SNP hypervisor tree, yet. There is a lot of support in
sev_enable()for SNP that may likely cause a problem compared to SEV and SEV-ES.SEV-SNP has a lot more checking and validation going on and it ensures it gets the confidential computing blob from EFI into the boot parameters. I'm not sure when I'll be able to test SNP, since I'm off next week and trying to wrap up a bunch of stuff before I leave.
Would it make sense, given the apparent direct dependency on EFI, to move that stuff into the EFI stub instead of doing it from the decompressor?
Thanks for giving this a spin - I can wait for more testing until you get back, and hopefully, we'll have converged a bit more by that time and there will be a new revision of the series available for testing.
BTW any clue whether your boot path is relying on the EFI handover protocol? I.e., QemuStartLegacyImage() in OVMF? Evgeny mentioned that BSS needs clearing in that case, and I was wondering if that is the case you are hitting.
(If you have a DEBUG OVMF boot log you could share, I can go through it myself)
Quoted 146 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 124 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 114 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 108 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 89 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 9 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to
boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries !!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add
__section(".data")tofree_mem_ptrandfree_mem_end_ptrinarch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.cand tomalloc_ptrandmalloc_cntininclude/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of
0x38after switching GDTs inarch/x86/kernel/head_64.Sby callingstartup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls insme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to__KERNEL_CSso IRET works reliably" to just after callingstartup_64_setup_env()fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.Quoted 4 lines
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Quoted 7 lines
Very interesting. I was under the assumption that everything that goes on in
sev_enable()in the decompressor would be rather indispensable to boot in SEV mode (which I only spotted today) so I am quite surprised that things just appear to work. (There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)Quoted 7 lines
The
sev_enable()function for SEV and SEV-ES is more for ensuring a proper environment (ensuring the proper CPUID bits are present for the guest, checking the GHCB protocol level, properly preparing pagetables, etc.). Since we're still in EFI and using the EFI #VC handler and pagetables, we don't require some of that stuff, but some of the it would need to be performed at some point (I wasn't trying to be a malicious hypervisor).OK, good to know.
Quoted 10 lines
I haven't tested SEV-SNP yet because the hypervisor support is not upstream, yet, and I haven't applied your series to an SNP hypervisor tree, yet. There is a lot of support in
sev_enable()for SNP that may likely cause a problem compared to SEV and SEV-ES.SEV-SNP has a lot more checking and validation going on and it ensures it gets the confidential computing blob from EFI into the boot parameters. I'm not sure when I'll be able to test SNP, since I'm off next week and trying to wrap up a bunch of stuff before I leave.
Quoted 3 lines
Would it make sense, given the apparent direct dependency on EFI, to move that stuff into the EFI stub instead of doing it from the decompressor?
We tried to make the support for SNP not be reliant on EFI. If EFI is present, then get the confidential computing blob from it. Otherwise, the cc blob can be supplied as part of the setup data in the Linux boot protocol (see find_cc_block() in arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c).
So I guess some of it could be moved, but I'm not sure how much.
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks for giving this a spin - I can wait for more testing until you get back, and hopefully, we'll have converged a bit more by that time and there will be a new revision of the series available for testing.
BTW any clue whether your boot path is relying on the EFI handover protocol? I.e.,
QemuStartLegacyImage()in OVMF? Evgeny mentioned that
I don't believe it is. It's using the Grub EFI bootloader to load and boot Linux.
Quoted 3 lines
BSS needs clearing in that case, and I was wondering if that is the case you are hitting.
(If you have a DEBUG OVMF boot log you could share, I can go through it myself)
Sure, I'll send you a copy in a separate email.
Thanks,
Tom
Ard Biesheuvel
maintainerQuoted 152 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 146 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 124 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 114 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 108 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 89 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 48 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 37 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 26 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
This series is conceptually a combination of Evgeny's series [0] and mine [1], both of which attempt to make the early decompressor code more amenable to executing in the EFI environment with stricter handling of memory permissions.
My series [1] implemented zboot for x86, by getting rid of the entire x86 decompressor, and replacing it with existing EFI code that does the same but in a generic way. The downside of this is that only EFI boot is supported, making it unviable for distros, which need to support BIOS boot and hybrid EFI boot modes that omit the EFI stub.
Evgeny's series [0] adapted the entire decompressor code flow to allow it to execute in the EFI context as well as the bare metal context, and this involves changes to the 1:1 mapping code and the page fault handlers etc, none of which are really needed when doing EFI boot in the first place.
So this series attempts to occupy the middle ground here: it makes minimal changes to the existing decompressor so some of it can be called from the EFI stub. Then, it reimplements the EFI boot flow to decompress the kernel and boot it directly, without relying on the trampoline code, page table code or page fault handling code. This allows us to get rid of quite a bit of unsavory EFI stub code, and replace it with two clear invocations of the EFI firmware APIs to clear NX restrictions from allocations that have been populated with executable code.
Quoted 8 lines
The only code that is being reused is the decompression library itself, along with the minimal ELF parsing that is required to copy the ELF segments in place, and the relocation processing that fixes up absolute symbol references to refer to the correct virtual addresses.
Note that some of Evgeny's changes to clean up the PE/COFF header generation will still be needed, but I've omitted those here for brevity.
Quoted 9 lines
I tried booting an SEV and an SEV-ES guest using this and both failed to boot:
EFI stub: WARNING: Decompression failed: Out of memory while allocating
z_streamI'll have to take a closer look as to why, but it might be a couple of days before I can get to it.
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks Tom.
The internal
malloc()seems to be failing, which is often caused by BSS clearing problems. Could you elaborate a little bit on the boot environment you are using here?I'm using Qemu v7.2.1 as my VMM, Linux 6.3 with your series applied for my host/hypervisor and guest kernel and the current OVMF tree built using OvmfPkgX64.dsc.
I was originally using the current merge window Linux, but moved to the release version just to . With the release version SEV and SEV-ES still fail to
boot, but SEV actually #GPs now. And some of the register contents look like encrypted data:ConvertPages: range 1000000 - 4FA1FFF covers multiple entries !!!! X64 Exception Type - 0D(#GP - General Protection) CPU Apic ID - 00000000 !!!!
ExceptionData - 0000000000000000RIP - 00000000597E71C1, CS - 0000000000000038, RFLAGS - 0000000000210206 RAX - 1FBA02A45943B920, RCX - 0000000000AF7009, RDX - A9DAE761B64A1F1B RBX - 1FBA02A45943B8C0, RSP - 000000007FD97320, RBP - 0000000002000000 RSI - 0000000001000000, RDI - 1FBA02A45943DE68 R8 - 0000000003EF3C94, R9 - 0000000000000000, R10 - 000000007D7C6018 R11 - 0000000000000000, R12 - 0000000001000000, R13 - 00000000597EDD98 R14 - 0000000001000000, R15 - 000000007E0A5198 DS - 0000000000000030, ES - 0000000000000030, FS - 0000000000000030 GS - 0000000000000030, SS - 0000000000000030 CR0 - 0000000080010033, CR2 - 0000000000000000, CR3 - 000000007FA01000 CR4 - 0000000000000668, CR8 - 0000000000000000 DR0 - 0000000000000000, DR1 - 0000000000000000, DR2 - 0000000000000000 DR3 - 0000000000000000, DR6 - 00000000FFFF0FF0, DR7 - 0000000000000400GDTR - 000000007F7DC000 0000000000000047, LDTR - 0000000000000000
IDTR - 000000007F34C018 0000000000000FFF, TR - 0000000000000000FXSAVE_STATE- 000000007FD96F80
!!!! Find image based on IP(0x597E71C1)/root/kernels/ovmf-build-X64/Build/OvmfX64/DEBUG_GCC5/X64/MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe/DEBUG/VariableRuntimeDxe.dll (ImageBase=0000000000D4792C, EntryPoint=0000000000D50CC3) !!!!Quoted 3 lines
So, yes, probably an area of memory that was zeroes when mapped unencrypted, but wasn't cleared after changing the mapping to encrypted.
Yes, looks like a bss clearing issue. If I add
__section(".data")tofree_mem_ptrandfree_mem_end_ptrinarch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.cand tomalloc_ptrandmalloc_cntininclude/linux/decompress/mm.h, then I can boot an SEV guest.However, an SEV-ES guest is triple faulting. This looks to be because we're still on the EFI CS of
0x38after switching GDTs inarch/x86/kernel/head_64.Sby callingstartup_64_setup_env(). Before switching to the kernel CS, we take a #VC (from CPUID calls insme_enable) and things blow up on the iretq. Moving the block headed by the comment "Now switch to__KERNEL_CSso IRET works reliably" to just after callingstartup_64_setup_env()fixes it and an SEV-ES guest can boot.Quoted 4 lines
This worked before because I believe we switched off the EFI CS as part of the kernel decompressor support and so this bug wasn't exposed. But this needs to be fixed regardless of this series.
Quoted 7 lines
Very interesting. I was under the assumption that everything that goes on in
sev_enable()in the decompressor would be rather indispensable to boot in SEV mode (which I only spotted today) so I am quite surprised that things just appear to work. (There is some 32-bit SEV code in the decompressor as well that obviously never gets called when booting in long mode, but I hadn't quite grasped how much other SEV code there actually is)Quoted 7 lines
The
sev_enable()function for SEV and SEV-ES is more for ensuring a proper environment (ensuring the proper CPUID bits are present for the guest, checking the GHCB protocol level, properly preparing pagetables, etc.). Since we're still in EFI and using the EFI #VC handler and pagetables, we don't require some of that stuff, but some of the it would need to be performed at some point (I wasn't trying to be a malicious hypervisor).OK, good to know.
Quoted 10 lines
I haven't tested SEV-SNP yet because the hypervisor support is not upstream, yet, and I haven't applied your series to an SNP hypervisor tree, yet. There is a lot of support in
sev_enable()for SNP that may likely cause a problem compared to SEV and SEV-ES.SEV-SNP has a lot more checking and validation going on and it ensures it gets the confidential computing blob from EFI into the boot parameters. I'm not sure when I'll be able to test SNP, since I'm off next week and trying to wrap up a bunch of stuff before I leave.
Quoted 3 lines
Would it make sense, given the apparent direct dependency on EFI, to move that stuff into the EFI stub instead of doing it from the decompressor?
Quoted 7 lines
We tried to make the support for SNP not be reliant on EFI. If EFI is present, then get the confidential computing blob from it. Otherwise, the cc blob can be supplied as part of the setup data in the Linux boot protocol (see
find_cc_block()inarch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c).So I guess some of it could be moved, but I'm not sure how much.
Fair enough.
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Quoted 7 lines
Thanks for giving this a spin - I can wait for more testing until you get back, and hopefully, we'll have converged a bit more by that time and there will be a new revision of the series available for testing.
BTW any clue whether your boot path is relying on the EFI handover protocol? I.e.,
QemuStartLegacyImage()in OVMF? Evgeny mentioned thatI don't believe it is. It's using the Grub EFI bootloader to load and boot Linux.
Looking at the log you just sent (thanks), it appears you are using distro shim+grub, which implement their own rough approximation of PE file loading, and typically use the EFI handover protocol. This is good news, because we already know how broken shim and GRUB are, and I was concerned that there might be another issue to track down here.
I'll implement Evgeny's suggestion to clear BSS explicitly in the EFI handover protocol entrypoints for the next revision of the series.
Thanks,