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fix race in gmap_make_secure

PATCH Superseded Claudio Imbrenda 2 participants 7 messages Apr 26, 2023 – Apr 27, 2023

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v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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Claudio Imbrenda

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v2 cover fix race in gmap_make_secure

This fixes a potential race and, most importantly, removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

This removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET. Once this patch is merged I'll send a separate patch to perform FOLL_GET automatically with follow_page, as suggested by Jason Gunthorpe.

Claudio Imbrenda (1):
KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/uv.c +11 -21
index 9f18a4af9c13..cb2ee06df286 100644
@@ -192,21 +192,10 @@ static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page)
 	return res;
 }
 
-static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
-			   struct page *exp_page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
+static int make_page_secure(struct page *page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
 {
-	pte_t entry = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
-	struct page *page;
 	int expected, cc = 0;
 
-	if (!pte_present(entry))
-		return -ENXIO;
-	if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID)
-		return -ENXIO;
-
-	page = pte_page(entry);
-	if (page != exp_page)
-		return -ENXIO;
 	if (PageWriteback(page))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	expected = expected_page_refs(page);
@@ -304,17 +293,18 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENXIO;
-	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE);
-	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
-		goto out;
-
-	lock_page(page);
 	ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock);
-	if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
-		uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
-	rc = make_secure_pte(ptep, uaddr, page, uvcb);
+	if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) {
+		page = pte_page(*ptep);
+		rc = -EAGAIN;
+		if (trylock_page(page)) {
+			if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
+				uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+			rc = make_page_secure(page, uvcb);
+			unlock_page(page);
+		}
+	}
 	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
-	unlock_page(page);
 out:
 	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.0
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

Quoted 9 lines · Claudio Imbrenda

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :)

What race does this fix?
When can this happen?
What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?

author maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

Quoted 11 lines · On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Claudio Imbrenda

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)  
Quoted 6 lines

It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :)

What race does this fix?
When can this happen?
What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?

We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/[email protected]> it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.

Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte.

The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.

maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

Quoted 27 lines · Claudio Imbrenda
Quoted 11 lines · On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Claudio Imbrenda

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)  
Quoted 6 lines

It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :)

What race does this fix?
When can this happen?
What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?

We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/[email protected]> it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.

Quoted 5 lines

Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte.

The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.

I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody will remember any of the details in one year.

author maintainer
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

Quoted 31 lines · On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 14:01:27 +0200 Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 30 lines · Claudio Imbrenda
Quoted 11 lines · On Thu, 27 Apr 2023 12:53:04 +0200 Heiko Carstens <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Claudio Imbrenda

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)    
Quoted 6 lines

It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :)

What race does this fix?
When can this happen?
What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?

We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/[email protected]> it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.

Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.

I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody will remember any of the details in one year.

I will put it in the patch description.

do you think the text above is enough?

maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure

Quoted 30 lines · Claudio Imbrenda
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 11 lines · Claudio Imbrenda
Quoted 9 lines

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Fixes 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)    
Quoted 6 lines

It would be helpful if this would be a bit more descriptive. "Fix race" is not very helpful :)

What race does this fix?
When can this happen?
What are the consequences if the race window is being hit?

We are locking something we don't have a reference to, and as explained by Jason and David in this thread <Y9J4P/[email protected]> it can lead to all kind of bad things, including the page getting unmapped (MADV_DONTNEED), freed, reallocated as a larger folio and the unlock_page() would target the wrong bit.

Also there is another race with the FOLL_WRITE, which could race between the follow_page and the get_locked_pte.

The main point of the patch is to remove the last follow_page without FOLL_GET or FOLL_PIN, removing the races can be considered a nice bonus.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

I've seen that discussion. What I'm actually asking for is that all of this information should be added to the commit description. Nobody will remember any of the details in one year.

I will put it in the patch description.

do you think the text above is enough?

Fine with me. With a proper Link: tag this is much better than before. Thanks!