security: support MACsec
Subsystems (2)
cover security: support MACsec
Added support for MACsec in rte_security for offloading MACsec Protocol operation to inline NIC device or a crypto device.
To support MACsec we cannot just make one security session and send with the packet to process it. MACsec specifications suggest, it can have 3 different entities - SECY Entity, SC(secure channel) and SA(security association). And same SA can be used by multiple SCs and similarly many SECY can have same SCs. Hence, in order to support this many to one relationships between all entities, 2 new APIs are created - rte_security_macsec_sc_create and rte_security_sa_create. Flow of execution of the APIs would be as
- rte_security_macsec_sa_create
- rte_security_macsec_sc_create
- rte_security_session_create(for secy)
And in case of inline protocol processing rte_flow can be created with rte_security action similar to IPsec flows except that the flow item will be MACsec instead of IPsec.
A new flow item is added for MACsec header and a set of events are added to specify the errors occurred during inline protocol processing.
New APIs are also created for getting SC and SA stats.
Akhil Goyal (3):
net: add MACsec header
security: support MACsec
ethdev: add MACsec flow item
doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 +- doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 107 +++++++- lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h | 55 ++++ lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h | 18 ++ lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 56 ++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 86 ++++++ lib/security/rte_security.h | 362 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 86 ++++++ lib/security/version.map | 6 + 10 files changed, 766 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/3 net: add MACsec header
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
--- doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 ++- lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.h
doc/api/doxy-api-index.md +2 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ The public API headers are grouped by topics: [Geneve](@ref rte_geneve.h), [eCPRI](@ref rte_ecpri.h), [L2TPv2](@ref rte_l2tpv2.h), - [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h) + [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h), + [MACsec](@ref rte_macsec.h) - **QoS**: [metering](@ref rte_meter.h),
lib/net/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ headers = files( 'rte_geneve.h', 'rte_l2tpv2.h', 'rte_ppp.h', + 'rte_macsec.h', ) sources = files(
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +56 -0
56 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH 1/3] net: add MACsec header
Hi Olivier,
Could you please review this patch?
Apologies. I missed to add you earlier.
Regards,
Akhil
Quoted 110 lines
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] net: add MACsec header
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 ++- lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.hdoc/api/doxy-api-index.md +2
-1@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ The public API headers are grouped by topics: [Geneve](@ref rte_geneve.h), [eCPRI](@ref rte_ecpri.h), [L2TPv2](@ref rte_l2tpv2.h), - [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h) + [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h), + [MACsec](@ref rte_macsec.h) - **QoS**: [metering](@ref rte_meter.h),lib/net/meson.build +1
-0@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ headers = files( 'rte_geneve.h', 'rte_l2tpv2.h', 'rte_ppp.h', + 'rte_macsec.h', ) sources = files(lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +25
-0@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _RTE_MACSEC_H_ +#define _RTE_MACSEC_H_ + +/** + * @file + * + * MACsec-related defines + */ + +#include <rte_byteorder.h> + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* SecTAG length = macsec ether header without the optional SCI */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TAG_LEN 6 +#define RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN 8 + +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_VERSION 0x80 /**< Version mask for MACsec.Should be 0. */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +3
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_ES 0x40/**< End station - SCI is not valid */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SC 0x20/**< SCI present */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SCB 0x10/**< Secure channel support EPON single copy broadcast */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_E 0x08/**< User data is encrypted */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_C 0x04/**< User data was changed (because of encryption) */
+#defineRTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK0x03/**< Association number mask intci_an*/
+#defineRTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN4 /**< 2 bits for the association
number */lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +8
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12/**< Salt length for MACsec SA */ + +/** +* MACsec Header +*/ +struct rte_macsec_hdr { +/* SecTAG */ +uint8_t tci_an;/**< Tag control information and Association number of SC */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +8
-0+#if RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_LITTLE_ENDIAN + uint8_t short_length : 6; /**< Short Length */ + uint8_t unused : 2; +#elif RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_BIG_ENDIAN + uint8_t unused : 2; + uint8_t short_length : 6; +#endif +rte_be32_t packet_number;/**< Packet number to support replay protection */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +8
-1+uint8_t secure_channel_id[8 ];/* optional */ +} __rte_packed; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* RTE_MACSEC_H_ */ --2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 1/3] net: add MACsec header
In reply to Akhil GoyalHi Akhil,
Few comments below.
Quoted 55 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 ++- lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.hdoc/api/doxy-api-index.md +2
-1@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ The public API headers are grouped by topics: [Geneve](@ref rte_geneve.h), [eCPRI](@ref rte_ecpri.h), [L2TPv2](@ref rte_l2tpv2.h), - [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h) + [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h), + [MACsec](@ref rte_macsec.h) - **QoS**: [metering](@ref rte_meter.h),lib/net/meson.build +1
-0@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ headers = files( 'rte_geneve.h', 'rte_l2tpv2.h', 'rte_ppp.h', + 'rte_macsec.h', ) sources = files(lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +12
-0@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _RTE_MACSEC_H_ +#define _RTE_MACSEC_H_ + +/** +* @file +* +* MACsec-related defines +*/
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 22
Quoted 10 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +10
-0+ +#include <rte_byteorder.h> + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* SecTAG length = macsec ether header without the optional SCI */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TAG_LEN 6
Use a doxygen-like comment.
Is this define required? In my understanding, it is the same as sizeof(struct rte_macsec_hdr).
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 23
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN 8
Missing doxygen doc.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 28
Quoted 5 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +5
-0+ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_VERSION 0x80/**< Version mask for MACsec. Should be 0. */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_ES 0x40/**< End station - SCI is not valid */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SC 0x20/**< SCI present */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SCB 0x10/**< Secure channel support EPON single copy broadcast */
support -> supports?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 30
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_E 0x08/**< User data is encrypted */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_C 0x04/**< User data was changed (because of encryption) */
In [1], I can read the following, which is not similar:
E and C bits used to determine if packet is encrypted
• E, C = 1, 1 – Encrypted
• E, C = 0, 0 – Authenticated-Only
Is there any reference paper for macsec header?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 31
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK 0x03/**< Association number mask in tci_an */
nit: all comments should end with a dot.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 32
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN 4/**< 2 bits for the association number */
I don't get how this defined is used. Can the comment be clarified?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 33
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12/**< Salt length for MACsec SA */
Same here.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 39
Quoted 6 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +6
-0+ +/** +* MACsec Header +*/ +struct rte_macsec_hdr { +/* SecTAG */
Is the SecTAG comment required? Or maybe it should be moved above the struct?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 40
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+uint8_t tci_an;/**< Tag control information and Association number of SC */
nit: duplicated spaces after uint8_t
Can we use a bitfield here for tci and an, like you did for short_length?
Like this:
uint8_t tci:6; uint8_t an:2;
Or:
uint8_t tci_version:1; uint8_t tci_es:1; uint8_t tci_sc:1; uint8_t tci_scb:1; uint8_t tci_e:1; uint8_t tci_c:1; uint8_t an:2;
I think the 2nd one is easier to use.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 43
Quoted 3 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +3
-0+#if RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_LITTLE_ENDIAN + uint8_t short_length : 6; /**< Short Length */ + uint8_t unused : 2;
nit: no spaces around ':'
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 49
Quoted 6 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +6
-0+#elif RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_BIG_ENDIAN + uint8_t unused : 2; + uint8_t short_length : 6; +#endif +rte_be32_t packet_number;/**< Packet number to support replay protection */ +uint8_t secure_channel_id[8 ];/* optional */
8 -> RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN ?
I think it would be more convenient to have another struct for the secure_channel_id.
For instance, this pseudo code:
struct struct rte_macsec_hdr *hdr = NULL;
struct struct rte_macsec_sci_hdr *hdr_sci = NULL;
if (seg_len(mbuf) < sizeof(*hdr))
return -1;
if (hdr.tci_sc) {
if (seg_len(mbuf) < sizeof(*hdr_sci))
return -1;
hdr_sci = hdr;
}With only one struct, it is difficult to properly do the length check.
Quoted 10 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +7
-0+} __rte_packed; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* RTE_MACSEC_H_ */ Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Thanks,
Olivier
RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 1/3] net: add MACsec header
Hi Olivier,
Thanks for your review. I will fix the issues in next version.
Quoted 207 lines
Hi Akhil,
Few comments below.
Quoted 55 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 ++- lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.hdoc/api/doxy-api-index.md +2
-1@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ The public API headers are grouped by topics: [Geneve](@ref rte_geneve.h), [eCPRI](@ref rte_ecpri.h), [L2TPv2](@ref rte_l2tpv2.h), - [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h) + [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h), + [MACsec](@ref rte_macsec.h) - **QoS**: [metering](@ref rte_meter.h),lib/net/meson.build +1
-0@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ headers = files( 'rte_geneve.h', 'rte_l2tpv2.h', 'rte_ppp.h', + 'rte_macsec.h', ) sources = files(lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +12
-0@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _RTE_MACSEC_H_ +#define _RTE_MACSEC_H_ + +/** +* @file +* +* MACsec-related defines +*/ lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 22
Quoted 10 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +10
-0+ +#include <rte_byteorder.h> + +#ifdef __cplusplus +extern "C" { +#endif + + +/* SecTAG length = macsec ether header without the optional SCI */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TAG_LEN 6Use a doxygen-like comment.
Is this define required? In my understanding, it is the same as
sizeof(struct rte_macsec_hdr).lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 23
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN 8Missing doxygen doc.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 25
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_VERSION 0x80/**< Version mask for MACsec. Should be 0. */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 26
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_ES 0x40/**< End station - SCI is not valid */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 28
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SC 0x20/**< SCI present */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_SCB 0x10/**< Secure channel support EPON single copy broadcast */
support -> supports?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 30
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_E 0x08/**< User data is encrypted */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_C 0x04/**< User data was changed (because of encryption) */
In [1], I can read the following, which is not similar:
E and C bits used to determine if packet is encrypted
• E, C = 1, 1 – Encrypted
• E, C = 0, 0 – Authenticated-OnlyIs there any reference paper for macsec header?
[1] https://www.marvell.com/content/dam/marvell/en/public-
collateral/automotive-solutions/marvell-macsec-security-in-ethernet-based- vehicle-white-paper.pdflib/net/rte_macsec.h line 31
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK 0x03/**< Association number mask in
tci_an*/nit: all comments should end with a dot.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 32
Quoted 2 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN 4/**< 2 bits for the association number */
I don't get how this defined is used. Can the comment be clarified?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 33
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_SALT_LEN 12/**< Salt length for MACsec SA */ Same here.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 39
Quoted 6 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +6
-0+ +/** +* MACsec Header +*/ +struct rte_macsec_hdr { +/* SecTAG */ Is the SecTAG comment required? Or maybe it should be moved above the struct?
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 40
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+uint8_t tci_an;/**< Tag control information and Association number of SC */
nit: duplicated spaces after
uint8_tCan we use a bitfield here for tci and an, like you did for
short_length?Like this:
uint8_t tci:6; uint8_t an:2;Or:
uint8_t tci_version:1; uint8_t tci_es:1; uint8_t tci_sc:1; uint8_t tci_scb:1; uint8_t tci_e:1; uint8_t tci_c:1; uint8_t an:2;I think the 2nd one is easier to use.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 43
Quoted 3 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +3
-0+#if RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_LITTLE_ENDIAN + uint8_t short_length : 6; /**< Short Length */ + uint8_t unused : 2;nit: no spaces around ':'
lib/net/rte_macsec.h
Quoted 5 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +5
-0+#elif RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_BIG_ENDIAN + uint8_t unused : 2; + uint8_t short_length : 6; +#endif +rte_be32_t packet_number;/**< Packet number to support replay protection */
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 49
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+uint8_t secure_channel_id[8 ];/* optional */ 8 ->
RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN?I think it would be more convenient to have another struct for the
secure_channel_id.For instance, this pseudo code:
struct struct rte_macsec_hdr *hdr = NULL; struct struct rte_macsec_sci_hdr *hdr_sci = NULL; if (seg_len(mbuf) < sizeof(*hdr)) return -1; if (hdr.tci_sc) { if (seg_len(mbuf) < sizeof(*hdr_sci)) return -1; hdr_sci = hdr; }With only one struct, it is difficult to properly do the length check.
Quoted 10 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +7
-1+} __rte_packed; + +#ifdef __cplusplus +} +#endif + +#endif /* RTE_MACSEC_H_ */ --2.25.1
Thanks,
Olivier
RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 1/3] net: add MACsec header
In reply to Olivier MatzHi Olivier,
Quoted 4 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_E 0x08 /**< User data is encrypted */ +#define RTE_MACSEC_TCI_C 0x04 /**< User data was changed (because ofencryption) */
E bit means the user data is encrypted if set. Above defines are mask to each of the fields in tci_an. I would add a comment that these are masks to each of the fields.
C bit means the user data is changed (because of encryption)
Quoted 8 lines
In [1], I can read the following, which is not similar:
E and C bits used to determine if packet is encrypted
• E, C = 1, 1 – Encrypted
• E, C = 0, 0 – Authenticated-OnlyIs there any reference paper for macsec header?
The reference is IEEE802.1AE standard.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8585421
Quoted 9 lines
[1] https://www.marvell.com/content/dam/marvell/en/public-
collateral/automotive-solutions/marvell-macsec-security-in-ethernet-based- vehicle-white-paper.pdfQuoted 1 line
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
+#define
RTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN4 /**< 2 bits for the associationnumber */
I don't get how this defined is used. Can the comment be clarified?
In case of MACsec we can have 4 different SAs for each of the secure channel Based on the AN field.RTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN is basically added to make an upper limit to the array of SAs. I will re-write the comment as
#define RTE_MACSEC_NUM_AN 4 /**< Max number of association numbers. */
Or shall I move it to rte_security?
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+#define
RTE_MACSEC_SALT_LEN12 /**< Salt length for MACsec SA */
For MACsec SA configuration, Salt is used which has a fixed size of 12 bytes. Do you want me to move it to rte_security?
Quoted 13 lines
Same here.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 39
Quoted 6 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +6
-0+ +/** +* MACsec Header +*/ +struct rte_macsec_hdr { +/* SecTAG */ Is the SecTAG comment required? Or maybe it should be moved above the struct?
Quoted 6 lines
Review
Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ uint8_t tci_an; /**< Tag control information and Association numberof SC */
nit: duplicated spaces after
uint8_tCan we use a bitfield here for tci and an, like you did for
short_length?
Would it be really necessary to split it to bitfields. Can we not use it like vtc_flow in rte_ipv6_hdr?
Quoted 30 lines
Like this:
uint8_t tci:6; uint8_t an:2;Or:
uint8_t tci_version:1; uint8_t tci_es:1; uint8_t tci_sc:1; uint8_t tci_scb:1; uint8_t tci_e:1; uint8_t tci_c:1; uint8_t an:2;I think the 2nd one is easier to use.
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 43
Quoted 3 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +3
-0+#if RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_LITTLE_ENDIAN + uint8_t short_length : 6; /**< Short Length */ + uint8_t unused : 2;nit: no spaces around ':'
lib/net/rte_macsec.h
Quoted 5 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +5
-0+#elif RTE_BYTE_ORDER ==RTE_BIG_ENDIAN + uint8_t unused : 2; + uint8_t short_length : 6; +#endif +rte_be32_t packet_number;/**< Packet number to support replay protection */
Quoted 6 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h line 49
Quoted 1 line
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +1
-0+uint8_t secure_channel_id[8 ];/* optional */ 8 ->
RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN?I think it would be more convenient to have another struct for the
secure_channel_id.
Ok Can we use it like this
struct rte_macsec_sci_hdr {
uint8_t sci[RTE_MACSEC_SCI_LEN]; /**< Optional secure channel id. */
} __rte_packed;
struct rte_macsec_hdr {
uint8_t tci_an; /**< Tag control information and Association number of SC. */
#if RTE_BYTE_ORDER == RTE_LITTLE_ENDIAN
uint8_t short_length:6; /**< Short Length. */
uint8_t unused:2;
#elif RTE_BYTE_ORDER == RTE_BIG_ENDIAN
uint8_t unused:2;
uint8_t short_length:6; /**< Short Length. */
#endif
rte_be32_t packet_number; /**< Packet number to support replay protection. */
union {
uint8_t payload[0];
struct rte_macsec_sci_hdr sci[0];
};
} __rte_packed;PATCH 2/3 security: support MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support for MACsec in rte_security for offloading MACsec Protocol operation to inline NIC device or a crypto device.
To support MACsec we cannot just make one security session and send with the packet to process it. MACsec specifications suggest, it has 3 different entities - SECY Entity, SC(secure channel) and SA(security association). And same SA can be used by multiple SCs and similarly many SECY can have same SCs. Hence, in order to support this many to one relationships between all entities, 2 new APIs are created - rte_security_macsec_sc_create and rte_security_macsec_sa_create. Flow of execution of the APIs would be as
- rte_security_macsec_sa_create
- rte_security_macsec_sc_create
- rte_security_session_create(for secy)
And in case of inline protocol processing rte_flow can be created with rte_security action. A new flow item will be added for MACsec header. New APIs are also created for getting SC and SA stats.
--- doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 107 +++++++- lib/security/rte_security.c | 86 ++++++ lib/security/rte_security.h | 362 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 86 ++++++ lib/security/version.map | 6 + 5 files changed, 634 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst +102 -5
@@ -345,6 +345,55 @@ The CRC is Ethernet CRC-32 as specified in Ethernet/[ISO/IEC 8802-3]. * Other DOCSIS protocol functionality such as Header Checksum (HCS) calculation may be added in the future. +MACSEC Protocol +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Media Access Control security (MACsec) provides point-to-point security on Ethernet +links and is defined by IEEE standard 802.1AE. MACsec secures an Ethernet link for +almost all traffic, including frames from the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), +Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), +Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and other protocols that are not typically secured +on an Ethernet link because of limitations with other security solutions. + +.. code-block:: c + + Receive Transmit + ------- -------- + + Ethernet frame Ethernet frame + from network towards network + | ^ + ~ | + | ~ + V | + +-----------------------+ +------------------+ +-------------------------+ + | Secure frame verify | | Cipher Suite(SA) | | Secure Frame Generation | + +-----------------------+<-----+------------------+----->+-------------------------+ + | SecTAG + ICV remove | | SECY | SC | | SecTAG + ICV Added | + +---+-------------------+ +------------------+ +-------------------------+ + | ^ + | | + V | + Packet to Core/App Packet from core/App + + + +To configure MACsec on an inline NIC device or a lookaside crypto device, a security +association(SA) and a secure channel(SC) are created before creating rte_security +session. + +SA is created using API ``rte_security_macsec_sa_create`` which allows setting +SA keys, salt, SSCI, packet number(PN) into the PMD and the API returns a handle +which can be used to map it with a secure channel using the API +``rte_security_macsec_sc_create``. Same SAs can be used for multiple SCs. +The Rx SC will need a set of 4 SAs for each of the association numbers(AN). +For Tx SC a single SA is set which will be used by hardware to process the packet. + +The API ``rte_security_macsec_sc_create`` returns a handle for SC and this handle +is set in ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` to create a MACsec session using +``rte_security_session_create``. + + Device Features and Capabilities ---------------------------------
@@ -517,6 +566,35 @@ protocol. RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST() }; +Below is the example PMD capability for MACsec + +.. code-block:: c + + static const struct rte_security_capability pmd_security_capabilities[] = { + { /* DOCSIS Uplink */ + .action = RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_INLINE_PROTOCOL, + .protocol = RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC, + .macsec = { + .mtu = 1500, + .alg = RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128, + .max_nb_sc = 64, + .max_nb_sa = 128, + .max_nb_sess = 64, + .replay_win_sz = 4096, + .relative_sectag_insert = 1, + .fixed_sectag_insert = 1, + .icv_include_da_sa = 1, + .ctrl_port_enable = 1, + .preserve_sectag = 1, + .preserve_icv = 1, + .validate_frames = 1, + .re_key = 1, + .anti_replay = 1, + }, + .crypto_capabilities = NULL, + }, + }; + Capabilities Discovery ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -661,6 +739,8 @@ which will be updated in the future. IPsec related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_ipsec_xform`` +MACsec related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` + PDCP related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_pdcp_xform`` DOCSIS related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_docsis_xform``
@@ -682,7 +762,7 @@ The ingress/egress flow attribute should match that specified in the security session if the security session supports the definition of the direction. Multiple flows can be configured to use the same security session. For -example if the security session specifies an egress IPsec SA, then multiple +example if the security session specifies an egress IPsec/MACsec SA, then multiple flows can be specified to that SA. In the case of an ingress IPsec SA then it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session.
@@ -692,8 +772,8 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | +--------|--------+ | Add/Remove | - | IPsec SA | <------ Build security flow action of - | | | ipsec transform + | IPsec/MACsec SA | <------ Build security flow action of + | | | IPsec/MACsec transform |--------|--------| | +--------V--------+
@@ -712,9 +792,9 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | | +--------|--------+ -* Add/Delete SA flow: +* Add/Delete IPsec SA flow: To add a new inline SA construct a rte_flow_item for Ethernet + IP + ESP - using the SA selectors and the ``rte_crypto_ipsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. + using the SA selectors and the ``rte_security_ipsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. Note that any rte_flow_items may be empty, which means it is not checked. .. code-block:: console
@@ -729,6 +809,23 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | Eth | -> ... -> | ESP | -> | END | +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ +* Add/Delete MACsec SA flow: + To add a new inline SA construct a rte_flow_item for Ethernet + SecTAG + using the SA selectors and the ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. + Note that any rte_flow_items may be empty, which means it is not checked. + +.. code-block:: console + + In its most basic form, MACsec flow specification is as follows: + +-------+ +----------+ +-----+ + | Eth | -> | SecTag | -> | END | + +-------+ +----------+ +-----+ + + However, the API can represent, MACsec offload with any encapsulation: + +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ + | Eth | -> ... -> | SecTag | -> | END | + +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ + Telemetry support -----------------
lib/security/rte_security.c +86 -0
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lib/security/rte_security.h +354 -8
420 lines not on this page · raw message
lib/security/rte_security_driver.h +86 -0
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lib/security/version.map +6 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ EXPERIMENTAL { __rte_security_get_userdata; __rte_security_set_pkt_metadata; rte_security_dynfield_offset; + rte_security_macsec_sa_create; + rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy; + rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get; + rte_security_macsec_sc_create; + rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy; + rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get; rte_security_session_stats_get; rte_security_session_update; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Hi txgbe/ixgbe maintainers,
I see that MACsec is supported by ixgbe and txgbe PMDs. Could you please review this patch?
Regards,
Akhil
Quoted 22 lines
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] security: support MACsec
Added support for MACsec in
rte_securityfor offloading MACsec Protocol operation to inline NIC device or a crypto device.To support MACsec we cannot just make one security session and send with the packet to process it. MACsec specifications suggest, it has 3 different entities - SECY Entity, SC(secure channel) and SA(security association). And same SA can be used by multiple SCs and similarly many SECY can have same SCs. Hence, in order to support this many to one relationships between all entities, 2 new APIs are created -
rte_security_macsec_sc_createandrte_security_macsec_sa_create. Flow of execution of the APIs would be as
-rte_security_macsec_sa_create
-rte_security_macsec_sc_create
-rte_security_session_create(for secy)
And in case of inline protocol processingrte_flowcan be created withrte_securityaction. A new flow item will be added for MACsec header. New APIs are also created for getting SC and SA stats.Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>---
PATCH 3/3 ethdev: add MACsec flow item
In reply to Akhil GoyalA new flow item is defined for MACsec flows which can be offloaded to an inline device. If the flow matches with MACsec header, device will process as per the security session created using rte_security APIs.
If an error comes while MACsec processing in HW, PMD will notify with the events defined in this patch.
--- lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h | 18 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +55 -0
@@ -3864,6 +3864,61 @@ rte_eth_tx_buffer_count_callback(struct rte_mbuf **pkts, uint16_t unsent,int rte_eth_tx_done_cleanup (uint16_t port_id,uint16_t queue_id,uint32_t free_cnt); +/** +* Subtypes for MACsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC) raised by +* Ethernet device. +*/ +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_UNKNOWN , +/* subevents of RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR sectag validation events +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.V = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.E = 0 && SecTag.TCI.C = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 +* Validation check: SecTag.SL >= 'd48 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.ES = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SCB = 1 +*/ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 , +}; + +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_UNKNOWN , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +/* Notifies Invalid SA event */ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SA_NOT_VALID , +}; + +/** +* Descriptor for @ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC event. Used by eth dev to send extra +* information of the MACsec offload event. +*/ +struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc { +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type type; +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype subtype; +/** +* Event specific metadata. +* +* For the following events, *userdata* registered +* with the *rte_security_session* would be returned +* as metadata, +* +* @see struct rte_security_session_conf +*/ +uint64_t metadata; +}; +/** * Subtypes for IPsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_IPSEC) raised by * eth device.
lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h +18 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <rte_l2tpv2.h> #include <rte_ppp.h> #include <rte_gre.h> +#include <rte_macsec.h> #ifdef __cplusplusextern "C" {
@@ -668,6 +669,13 @@ enum rte_flow_item_type {* See struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt. */ RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_GRE_OPTION , + +/** +* Matches MACsec Ethernet Header. +* +* See struct rte_flow_item_macsec. +*/ + RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC, };/**
@@ -1214,6 +1222,16 @@ struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt {struct rte_gre_hdr_opt_sequence sequence; }; +/** +* RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC. +* +* Matches MACsec header. +*/ +struct rte_flow_item_macsec { +struct rte_macsec_hdr macsec_hdr; +}; + +/** * RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_FUZZY *
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH 3/3] ethdev: add MACsec flow item
Quoted 135 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, 14 August 2022 21:46A new flow item is defined for MACsec flows which can be offloaded to an inline device. If the flow matches with MACsec header, device will process as per the security session created using
rte_securityAPIs.
If an error comes while MACsec processing in HW, PMD will notify with the events defined in this patch.Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h | 18 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +2
-0@@ -3864,6 +3864,61 @@ rte_eth_tx_buffer_count_callback(struct rte_mbuf **pkts, uint16_t unsent, intrte_eth_tx_done_cleanup (uint16_t port_id,uint16_t queue_id,uint32_t free_cnt); +/** +* Subtypes for MACsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC) raised by
+ * Ethernet device.
+ */lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +3
-0+enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_UNKNOWN , +/* subevents of RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR sectag validation events
lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +31
-0+* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.V = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.E = 0 && SecTag.TCI.C = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 +* Validation check: SecTag.SL >= 'd48 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.ES = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SCB = 1 +*/ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , + RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1, +}; + +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_UNKNOWN , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +/* Notifies Invalid SA event */ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SA_NOT_VALID , +}; + +/** +* Descriptor for @ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC event. Used by eth dev to send extra
+ * information of the MACsec offload event.
+ */lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +15
-0+struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc { +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type type; +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype subtype; +/** +* Event specific metadata. +* +* For the following events, *userdata* registered +* with the *rte_security_session* would be returned +* as metadata, +* +* @see struct rte_security_session_conf +*/ +uint64_t metadata; +}; +/** * Subtypes for IPsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_IPSEC) raised by * eth device. lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h +18
-1@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <rte_l2tpv2.h> #include <rte_ppp.h> #include <rte_gre.h> +#include <rte_macsec.h> #ifdef __cplusplusextern "C" {@@ -668,6 +669,13 @@ enum rte_flow_item_type {* See struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt. */ RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_GRE_OPTION , + +/** +* Matches MACsec Ethernet Header. +* +* See struct rte_flow_item_macsec. +*/ + RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC, };/** @@ -1214,6 +1222,16 @@ struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt {struct rte_gre_hdr_opt_sequence sequence; }; +/** +* RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC. +* +* Matches MACsec header. +*/ +struct rte_flow_item_macsec { +struct rte_macsec_hdr macsec_hdr; +}; + +/** * RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_FUZZY * --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
Best,
Ori
v2 cover security: support MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support for MACsec in rte_security for offloading MACsec Protocol operation to inline NIC device or a crypto device.
To support MACsec we cannot just make one security session and send with the packet to process it. MACsec specifications suggest, it can have 3 different entities - SECY Entity, SC(secure channel) and SA(security association). And same SA can be used by multiple SCs and similarly many SECY can have same SCs. Hence, in order to support this many to one relationships between all entities, 2 new APIs are created - rte_security_macsec_sc_create and rte_security_sa_create. Flow of execution of the APIs would be as
- rte_security_macsec_sa_create
- rte_security_macsec_sc_create
- rte_security_session_create(for secy)
And in case of inline protocol processing rte_flow can be created with rte_security action similar to IPsec flows except that the flow item will be MACsec instead of IPsec.
A new flow item is added for MACsec header and a set of events are added to specify the errors occurred during inline protocol processing.
New APIs are also created for getting SC and SA stats.
Patches for PMD implementation and test app are submitted separately which can be separately applied after RC1.
Changes in v2:
- Incorporated comments from Olivier except the one to split tci_an into bitfields.
- added release notes and removed deprecation notice.
- added some missing fields in rte_security patch.
Akhil Goyal (3):
net: add MACsec header
ethdev: add MACsec flow item
security: support MACsec
doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 +- doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 107 ++++++- doc/guides/rel_notes/deprecation.rst | 5 - doc/guides/rel_notes/release_22_11.rst | 10 + lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h | 55 ++++ lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h | 18 ++ lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 61 ++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 86 ++++++ lib/security/rte_security.h | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 86 ++++++ lib/security/version.map | 6 + 12 files changed, 789 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 1/3 net: add MACsec header
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
--- doc/api/doxy-api-index.md | 3 +- lib/net/meson.build | 1 + lib/net/rte_macsec.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 lib/net/rte_macsec.h
doc/api/doxy-api-index.md +2 -1
@@ -126,7 +126,8 @@ The public API headers are grouped by topics: [Geneve](@ref rte_geneve.h), [eCPRI](@ref rte_ecpri.h), [L2TPv2](@ref rte_l2tpv2.h), - [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h) + [PPP](@ref rte_ppp.h), + [MACsec](@ref rte_macsec.h) - **QoS**: [metering](@ref rte_meter.h),
lib/net/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ headers = files( 'rte_geneve.h', 'rte_l2tpv2.h', 'rte_ppp.h', + 'rte_macsec.h', ) sources = files(
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +61 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] net: add MACsec header
Quoted 4 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added MACsec protocol header to be used for supporting MACsec protocol offload in hardware or directly in the application.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>
Thanks
Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] net: add MACsec header
In reply to Akhil Goyal28/09/2022 14:22, Akhil Goyal:
Quoted 4 lines
lib/net/rte_macsec.h new file +2
-0+#ifndef _RTE_MACSEC_H_ +#define _RTE_MACSEC_H_
[...]
Quoted 1 line
+#endif /*
RTE_MACSEC_H_*/
Discrepancy spotted here. Anyway no need of underscores at all. I'll rename to RTE_MACSEC_H while merging.
RE: [PATCH v2 1/3] net: add MACsec header
In reply to Akhil GoyalQuoted 6 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>
Sent: Wednesday, 28 September 2022 15:23
To: [email protected]
Thanks,
Ori
PATCH v2 2/3 ethdev: add MACsec flow item
In reply to Akhil GoyalA new flow item is defined for MACsec flows which can be offloaded to an inline device. If the flow matches with MACsec header, device will process as per the security session created using rte_security APIs.
If an error comes while MACsec processing in HW, PMD will notify with the events defined in this patch.
--- lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h | 18 ++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
lib/ethdev/rte_ethdev.h +55 -0
@@ -3579,6 +3579,61 @@ rte_eth_tx_buffer_count_callback(struct rte_mbuf **pkts, uint16_t unsent,int rte_eth_tx_done_cleanup (uint16_t port_id,uint16_t queue_id,uint32_t free_cnt); +/** +* Subtypes for MACsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC) raised by +* Ethernet device. +*/ +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_UNKNOWN , +/* subevents of RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR sectag validation events +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.V = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.E = 0 && SecTag.TCI.C = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 +* Validation check: SecTag.SL >= 'd48 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.ES = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 +* RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 +* Validation check: SecTag.TCI.SC = 1 && SecTag.TCI.SCB = 1 +*/ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_SUBEVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 , +}; + +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type { +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_UNKNOWN , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP , +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP , +/* Notifies Invalid SA event */ +RTE_ETH_MACSEC_EVENT_SA_NOT_VALID , +}; + +/** +* Descriptor for @ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC event. Used by eth dev to send extra +* information of the MACsec offload event. +*/ +struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc { +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_type type; +enum rte_eth_macsec_event_subtype subtype; +/** +* Event specific metadata. +* +* For the following events, *userdata* registered +* with the *rte_security_session* would be returned +* as metadata, +* +* @see struct rte_security_session_conf +*/ +uint64_t metadata; +}; +/** * Subtypes for IPsec offload event(@ref RTE_ETH_EVENT_IPSEC) raised by * eth device.
lib/ethdev/rte_flow.h +18 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@#include <rte_l2tpv2.h> #include <rte_ppp.h> #include <rte_gre.h> +#include <rte_macsec.h> #ifdef __cplusplusextern "C" {
@@ -626,6 +627,13 @@ enum rte_flow_item_type {* See struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt. */ RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_GRE_OPTION , + +/** +* Matches MACsec Ethernet Header. +* +* See struct rte_flow_item_macsec. +*/ + RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC, };/**
@@ -1099,6 +1107,16 @@ struct rte_flow_item_gre_opt {struct rte_gre_hdr_opt_sequence sequence; }; +/** +* RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_MACSEC. +* +* Matches MACsec header. +*/ +struct rte_flow_item_macsec { +struct rte_macsec_hdr macsec_hdr; +}; + +/** * RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_FUZZY *
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 3/3 security: support MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support for MACsec in rte_security for offloading MACsec Protocol operation to inline NIC device or a crypto device.
To support MACsec we cannot just make one security session and send with the packet to process it. MACsec specifications suggest, it has 3 different entities - SECY Entity, SC(secure channel) and SA(security association). And same SA can be used by multiple SCs and similarly many SECY can have same SCs. Hence, in order to support this many to one relationships between all entities, 2 new APIs are created - rte_security_macsec_sc_create and rte_security_macsec_sa_create. Flow of execution of the APIs would be as
- rte_security_macsec_sa_create
- rte_security_macsec_sc_create
- rte_security_session_create(for secy)
And in case of inline protocol processing rte_flow can be created with rte_security action. A new flow item will be added for MACsec header. New APIs are also created for getting SC and SA stats.
--- doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 107 ++++++- doc/guides/rel_notes/deprecation.rst | 5 - doc/guides/rel_notes/release_22_11.rst | 10 + lib/security/rte_security.c | 86 ++++++ lib/security/rte_security.h | 370 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 86 ++++++ lib/security/version.map | 6 + 7 files changed, 652 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst +102 -5
@@ -347,6 +347,55 @@ The CRC is Ethernet CRC-32 as specified in Ethernet/[ISO/IEC 8802-3]. * Other DOCSIS protocol functionality such as Header Checksum (HCS) calculation may be added in the future. +MACSEC Protocol +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Media Access Control security (MACsec) provides point-to-point security on Ethernet +links and is defined by IEEE standard 802.1AE. MACsec secures an Ethernet link for +almost all traffic, including frames from the Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), +Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), +Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and other protocols that are not typically secured +on an Ethernet link because of limitations with other security solutions. + +.. code-block:: c + + Receive Transmit + ------- -------- + + Ethernet frame Ethernet frame + from network towards network + | ^ + ~ | + | ~ + V | + +-----------------------+ +------------------+ +-------------------------+ + | Secure frame verify | | Cipher Suite(SA) | | Secure Frame Generation | + +-----------------------+<-----+------------------+----->+-------------------------+ + | SecTAG + ICV remove | | SECY | SC | | SecTAG + ICV Added | + +---+-------------------+ +------------------+ +-------------------------+ + | ^ + | | + V | + Packet to Core/App Packet from core/App + + + +To configure MACsec on an inline NIC device or a lookaside crypto device, a security +association(SA) and a secure channel(SC) are created before creating rte_security +session. + +SA is created using API ``rte_security_macsec_sa_create`` which allows setting +SA keys, salt, SSCI, packet number(PN) into the PMD and the API returns a handle +which can be used to map it with a secure channel using the API +``rte_security_macsec_sc_create``. Same SAs can be used for multiple SCs. +The Rx SC will need a set of 4 SAs for each of the association numbers(AN). +For Tx SC a single SA is set which will be used by hardware to process the packet. + +The API ``rte_security_macsec_sc_create`` returns a handle for SC and this handle +is set in ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` to create a MACsec session using +``rte_security_session_create``. + + Device Features and Capabilities ---------------------------------
@@ -519,6 +568,35 @@ protocol. RTE_CRYPTODEV_END_OF_CAPABILITIES_LIST() }; +Below is the example PMD capability for MACsec + +.. code-block:: c + + static const struct rte_security_capability pmd_security_capabilities[] = { + { + .action = RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_INLINE_PROTOCOL, + .protocol = RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC, + .macsec = { + .mtu = 1500, + .alg = RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128, + .max_nb_sc = 64, + .max_nb_sa = 128, + .max_nb_sess = 64, + .replay_win_sz = 4096, + .relative_sectag_insert = 1, + .fixed_sectag_insert = 1, + .icv_include_da_sa = 1, + .ctrl_port_enable = 1, + .preserve_sectag = 1, + .preserve_icv = 1, + .validate_frames = 1, + .re_key = 1, + .anti_replay = 1, + }, + .crypto_capabilities = NULL, + }, + }; + Capabilities Discovery ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
@@ -658,6 +736,8 @@ which will be updated in the future. IPsec related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_ipsec_xform`` +MACsec related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` + PDCP related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_pdcp_xform`` DOCSIS related configuration parameters are defined in ``rte_security_docsis_xform``
@@ -679,7 +759,7 @@ The ingress/egress flow attribute should match that specified in the security session if the security session supports the definition of the direction. Multiple flows can be configured to use the same security session. For -example if the security session specifies an egress IPsec SA, then multiple +example if the security session specifies an egress IPsec/MACsec SA, then multiple flows can be specified to that SA. In the case of an ingress IPsec SA then it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session.
@@ -689,8 +769,8 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | +--------|--------+ | Add/Remove | - | IPsec SA | <------ Build security flow action of - | | | ipsec transform + | IPsec/MACsec SA | <------ Build security flow action of + | | | IPsec/MACsec transform |--------|--------| | +--------V--------+
@@ -709,9 +789,9 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | | +--------|--------+ -* Add/Delete SA flow: +* Add/Delete IPsec SA flow: To add a new inline SA construct a rte_flow_item for Ethernet + IP + ESP - using the SA selectors and the ``rte_crypto_ipsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. + using the SA selectors and the ``rte_security_ipsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. Note that any rte_flow_items may be empty, which means it is not checked. .. code-block:: console
@@ -726,6 +806,23 @@ it is only valid to have a single flow to map to that security session. | Eth | -> ... -> | ESP | -> | END | +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ +* Add/Delete MACsec SA flow: + To add a new inline SA construct a rte_flow_item for Ethernet + SecTAG + using the SA selectors and the ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` as the ``rte_flow_action``. + Note that any rte_flow_items may be empty, which means it is not checked. + +.. code-block:: console + + In its most basic form, MACsec flow specification is as follows: + +-------+ +----------+ +-----+ + | Eth | -> | SecTag | -> | END | + +-------+ +----------+ +-----+ + + However, the API can represent, MACsec offload with any encapsulation: + +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ + | Eth | -> ... -> | SecTag | -> | END | + +-------+ +--------+ +-----+ + Telemetry support -----------------
doc/guides/rel_notes/deprecation.rst +0 -5
@@ -151,11 +151,6 @@ Deprecation Notices pointer for the private data to the application which can be attached to the packet while enqueuing. -* security: MACsec support is planned to be added in DPDK 22.11, - which would result in updates to structures ``rte_security_macsec_xform``, - ``rte_security_macsec_stats`` and security capability structure - ``rte_security_capability`` to accommodate MACsec capabilities. - * eventdev: The function ``rte_event_crypto_adapter_queue_pair_add`` will accept configuration of type ``rte_event_crypto_adapter_queue_conf`` instead of ``rte_event``, similar to ``rte_event_eth_rx_adapter_queue_add`` signature.
doc/guides/rel_notes/release_22_11.rst +10 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ New Features * Added AES-CCM support in lookaside protocol (IPsec) for CN9K & CN10K. * Added AES & DES DOCSIS algorithm support in lookaside crypto for CN9K. +* **Added support for MACsec in rte_security.** + + * Added MACsec transform for rte_security session and added new APIs to configure + security associations(SA) and secure channels(SC). + * **Added eventdev adapter instance get API.** * Added ``rte_event_eth_rx_adapter_instance_get`` to get Rx adapter
@@ -209,6 +214,11 @@ API Changes * ethdev: Promoted ``rte_flow_pick_transfer_proxy()`` from experimental to stable. +* security: MACsec support is added which resulted in updates to + structures ``rte_security_macsec_xform``, ``rte_security_macsec_stats`` + and security capability structure ``rte_security_capability`` to + accommodate MACsec capabilities. + * telemetry: The allowed characters in names for dictionary values are now limited to alphanumeric characters and a small subset of additional printable characters.
lib/security/rte_security.c +86 -0
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lib/security/rte_security.h +362 -8
422 lines not on this page · raw message
lib/security/rte_security_driver.h +86 -0
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lib/security/version.map +6 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ EXPERIMENTAL { __rte_security_set_pkt_metadata; rte_security_dynfield_offset; + rte_security_macsec_sa_create; + rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy; + rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get; + rte_security_macsec_sc_create; + rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy; + rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get; rte_security_session_stats_get; rte_security_session_update; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
cover Support and test inline MACsec for cnxk
These patches implement the rte_security MACsec APIs for net/cnxk and also add test cases to test functionality.
MACsec APIs are introduced in http://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/list/?series=24878
depends-on: http://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/list/?series=24878
The patches are sent to showcase sample implementation and are not complete. Final patches will be sent in next few weeks.
Akhil Goyal (5):
common/cnxk: add ROC APIs for MACsec
common/cnxk: derive hash key for MACsec
net/cnxk: support MACsec
test/security: add inline MACsec cases
test/security: add more MACsec cases
app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 1126 +++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 2639 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c | 17 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h | 2 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c | 86 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 361 ++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 347 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 431 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 52 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 425 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c | 230 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 34 + drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c | 407 +++ drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h | 59 + drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 11 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c | 14 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 31 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c | 2 +- drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + 23 files changed, 6280 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/5 common/cnxk: add ROC APIs for MACsec
Added mbox related to configuration of MACsec.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c | 86 +++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 361 ++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 347 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 431 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 52 ++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 425 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c | 230 ++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 33 ++ 11 files changed, 1971 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +3 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ sources = files( 'roc_irq.c', 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', + 'roc_mcs.c', + 'roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c', + 'roc_mcs_stats.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c', 'roc_nix_bpf.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h +3 -0
@@ -106,4 +106,7 @@/* NIX Inline dev */ #include "roc_nix_inl.h" +/* MACsec */ +#include "roc_mcs.h" +#endif /* _ROC_API_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c +86 -0
98 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +358 -3
380 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +347 -0
347 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h new file +431 -0
431 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h new file +52 -0
52 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c new file +425 -0
425 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c new file +230 -0
230 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h +3 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@/* DPI */ #include "roc_dpi_priv.h" +/* MCS */ +#include "roc_mcs_priv.h" +/* REE */ #include "roc_ree_priv.h"
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +33 -0
@@ -99,6 +99,39 @@ INTERNAL { roc_model; roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; + roc_mcs_active_lmac_set; + roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc; + roc_mcs_dev_init; + roc_mcs_dev_fini; + roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_event_cb_register; + roc_mcs_event_cb_unregister; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_enable; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; + roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get; + roc_mcs_free_rsrc; + roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_intr_configure; + roc_mcs_lmac_mode_set; + roc_mcs_pn_table_write; + roc_mcs_pn_table_read; + roc_mcs_port_stats_get; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; + roc_mcs_sa_stats_get; + roc_mcs_sc_stats_get; + roc_mcs_secy_policy_read; + roc_mcs_secy_policy_write; + roc_mcs_secy_stats_get; + roc_mcs_stats_clear; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/5 common/cnxk: derive hash key for MACsec
In reply to Akhil Goyal--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h | 2 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 1 + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c +17 -0
@@ -206,3 +206,20 @@ roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive(const uint8_t *auth_key, uint8_t *derived_key)cipher (k3, derived_key, aes_ks); } + +void +roc_aes_hash_key_derive (const uint8_t *key,uint16_t len,uint8_t hash_key[]) +{ +uint32_t aes_ks[KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN ] = {0 }; +uint8_t data[16 ] = {0x0 }; +int i; + +if (len ==16 ) { +aes_key_expand (key, aes_ks); +cipher (data, hash_key, aes_ks); +for (i =0 ; i <16 ; i++) +plt_info (" 0x%x" , hash_key[i]); + }else { +plt_err ("\n AES-256 key conversion not supported" ); + } +}
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h +2 -0
@@ -10,5 +10,7 @@*/ void __roc_api roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive(const uint8_t *auth_key,uint8_t *derived_key); +void __roc_api roc_aes_hash_key_derive(const uint8_t *key, uint16_t len, +uint8_t *hash_key);#endif /* _ROC_AES_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ INTERNAL { roc_ae_ec_grp_put; roc_ae_fpm_get; roc_ae_fpm_put; + roc_aes_hash_key_derive; roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive; roc_bphy_cgx_cpri_mode_change; roc_bphy_cgx_cpri_mode_misc;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/5 net/cnxk: support MACsec
In reply to Akhil Goyal--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c | 407 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h | 59 ++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 11 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c | 14 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 31 +++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c | 2 +- drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + 7 files changed, 523 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c new file +407 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#include <cnxk_ethdev.h> +#include <cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h> +#include <roc_mcs.h> + +static int +mcs_resource_alloc (struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +uint8_t rsrc_id[],uint8_t rsrc_cnt,enum cnxk_mcs_rsrc_type type) +{ +struct roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc_req req = {0 }; +struct roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp rsp = {0 }; +int i; + + req.rsrc_type = type; + req.rsrc_cnt = rsrc_cnt; + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.dir = dir; + +if (roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc (mcs_dev->mdev, &req, &rsp)) { +printf ("error: Cannot allocate mcs resource.\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + +for (i =0 ; i < rsrc_cnt; i++) { +switch (rsp.rsrc_type) { +case CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_FLOWID : + rsrc_id[i] = rsp.flow_ids[i]; +break ; +case CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SECY : + rsrc_id[i] = rsp.secy_ids[i]; +break ; +case CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SC : + rsrc_id[i] = rsp.sc_ids[i]; +break ; +case CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SA : + rsrc_id[i] = rsp.sa_ids[i]; +break ; +default : +printf ("error: Invalid mcs resource allocated.\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + } +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_create (void *device,struct rte_security_macsec_sa *conf) +{ +struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device; +struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +struct roc_mcs_pn_table_write_req pn_req = {0 }; +struct roc_mcs_sa_plcy_write_req req = {0 }; +uint8_t hash_key[16 ] = {0 }; +uint8_t sa_id =0 ; +int ret =0 ; + + ret =mcs_resource_alloc (mcs_dev, conf->dir, &sa_id,1 ,CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SA ); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to allocate SA id.\n" ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + req.sa_index[0 ] = sa_id; + req.sa_cnt =1 ; + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.dir = conf->dir; + +if (conf->key.length !=16 || conf->key.length !=32 ) +return -EINVAL ; + +memcpy (&req.plcy[0 ][0 ], conf->key.data, conf->key.length); +roc_aes_hash_key_derive (conf->key.data, conf->key.length, hash_key); +memcpy (&req.plcy[0 ][4 ], hash_key,CNXK_MACSEC_HASH_KEY ); +memcpy (&req.plcy[0 ][6 ], conf->salt,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_SALT_LEN ); + req.plcy[0 ][7 ] |= (uint64_t )conf->ssci <<32 ; + req.plcy[0 ][8 ] = conf->an &0x3 ; + + ret =roc_mcs_sa_policy_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &req); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to write SA policy.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + pn_req.next_pn = conf->next_pn; + pn_req.pn_id = sa_id; + pn_req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + pn_req.dir = conf->dir; + + ret =roc_mcs_pn_table_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &pn_req); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to write PN table.\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +return sa_id; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sa_id) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sa_id); + +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_create (void *device,struct rte_security_macsec_sc *conf) +{ +struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device; +struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +uint8_t sc_id =0 ; +int i, ret =0 ; + + ret =mcs_resource_alloc (mcs_dev, conf->dir, &sc_id,1 ,CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SC ); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to allocate SC id.\n" ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + +if (conf->dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ) { +struct roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map req = {0 }; + + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.sa_index0 = conf->sc_tx.sa_id &0x7F ; + req.sa_index1 = conf->sc_tx.sa_id_rekey &0x7F ; + req.rekey_ena = conf->sc_tx.re_key_en; + req.sa_index0_vld = conf->sc_tx.active; + req.sa_index1_vld = conf->sc_tx.re_key_en && conf->sc_tx.active; + req.tx_sa_active = conf->sc_tx.active; + req.sectag_sci = conf->sc_tx.sci; + req.sc_id = sc_id; + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + + ret =roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &req); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to map TX SC-SA" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }else { +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { +struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map req = {0 }; + + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.sa_index = conf->sc_rx.sa_id[i] &0x7F ; + req.sa_in_use = conf->sc_rx.sa_in_use[i]; + req.sc_id = sc_id; + req.an = i &0x3 ; + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + ret =roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &req); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to map RX SC-SA" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + } + } +return sc_id; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sc_id) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sc_id); + +return 0 ; +} + +struct cnxk_macsec_sess * +cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev, +const struct rte_security_session *sess) +{ +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *macsec_sess =NULL ; + + TAILQ_FOREACH(macsec_sess, &dev->mcs_list, entry) { +if (macsec_sess->sess == sess) +return macsec_sess; + } + +return NULL ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_session_create (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev, +struct rte_security_session_conf *conf, +struct rte_security_session *sess, +struct rte_mempool *mempool) +{ +struct rte_security_macsec_xform *xform = &conf->macsec; +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *macsec_sess_priv; +struct roc_mcs_secy_plcy_write_req req; +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +uint8_t secy_id =0 ; +uint8_t sectag_tci =0 ; +int ret =0 ; + + ret =mcs_resource_alloc (mcs_dev, xform->dir, &secy_id,1 ,CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SECY ); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to allocate SECY id.\n" ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + req.secy_id = secy_id; + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.dir = xform->dir; + req.plcy =0L ; + +if (xform->dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ) { + sectag_tci = ((uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.sectag_version <<5 ) | + ((uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.end_station <<4 ) | + ((uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.send_sci <<3 ) | + ((uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.scb <<2 ) | + ((uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.encrypt <<1 ) | + (uint8_t )xform->tx_secy.encrypt; + req.plcy = ((uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.mtu <<48 ) | + (((uint64_t )sectag_tci &0x3F ) <<40 ) | + (((uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.sectag_off &0x7F ) <<32 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.sectag_insert_mode <<30 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.icv_include_da_sa <<28 ) | + (((uint64_t )xform->cipher_off &0x7F ) <<20 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->alg <<12 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.protect_frames <<4 ) | + (uint64_t )xform->tx_secy.ctrl_port_enable; + }else { + req.plcy = ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.replay_win_sz <<32 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.replay_protect <<30 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.icv_include_da_sa <<28 ) | + (((uint64_t )xform->cipher_off &0x7F ) <<20 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->alg <<12 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.preserve_sectag <<9 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.preserve_icv <<8 ) | + ((uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.validate_frames <<4 ) | + (uint64_t )xform->rx_secy.ctrl_port_enable; + } + + ret =roc_mcs_secy_policy_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &req); +if (ret) { +printf ("\n Failed to configure SECY" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + +/*get session priv*/ +if (rte_mempool_get (mempool, (void **)&macsec_sess_priv)) { +plt_err ("Could not allocate security session private data" ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + + macsec_sess_priv->sci = xform->sci; + macsec_sess_priv->sc_id = xform->sc_id; + macsec_sess_priv->secy_id = secy_id; + macsec_sess_priv->dir = xform->dir; + +TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL (&dev->mcs_list, macsec_sess_priv, entry); +set_sec_session_private_data (sess, (void *)macsec_sess_priv); + +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_session_destroy (void *device,struct rte_security_session *sess) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sess); + +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_mcs_flow_configure (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, + const struct rte_flow_attr *attr __rte_unused, +const struct rte_flow_item pattern[], +const struct rte_flow_action actions[], + struct rte_flow_error *error __rte_unused, +void **mcs_flow) +{ +struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write_req req = {0 }; +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +struct cnxk_mcs_flow_opts opts = {0 }; +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *sess =cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, + (const struct rte_security_session *)actions->conf); +const struct rte_flow_item_eth *eth_item =NULL ; +struct rte_ether_addr src; +struct rte_ether_addr dst; +int ret; +int i =0 ; + + ret =mcs_resource_alloc (mcs_dev, sess->dir, &(sess->flow_id),1 ,CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_FLOWID ); +if (ret) { +printf ("Failed to allocate FLow id.\n" ); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + req.sci = sess->sci; + req.flow_id = sess->flow_id; + req.secy_id = sess->secy_id; + req.sc_id = sess->sc_id; + req.ena =1 ; + req.ctr_pkt =0 ;/* TBD */ + req.mcs_id = mcs_dev->idx; + req.dir = sess->dir; + +while (pattern[i].type !=RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_END ) { +if (pattern[i].type ==RTE_FLOW_ITEM_TYPE_ETH ) + eth_item = pattern[i].spec; +else +printf ("%s:%d unhandled flow item : %d" , __func__, __LINE__, + pattern[i].type); + i++; + } +if (eth_item) { + dst = eth_item->hdr.dst_addr; + src = eth_item->hdr.src_addr; + +/* Find ways to fill opts */ + + req.data[0 ] = (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[0 ] <<40 | (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[1 ] <<32 | + (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[2 ] <<24 | (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[3 ] <<16 | + (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[4 ] <<8 | (uint64_t )dst.addr_bytes[5 ] | + (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[5 ] <<48 | (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[4 ] <<56 ; + req.data[1 ] = (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[3 ] | (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[2 ] <<8 | + (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[1 ] <<16 | (uint64_t )src.addr_bytes[0 ] <<24 | + (uint64_t )eth_item->hdr.ether_type <<32 | + ((uint64_t )opts.outer_tag_id &0xFFFF ) <<48 ; + req.data[2 ] = ((uint64_t )opts.outer_tag_id &0xF0000 ) | + ((uint64_t )opts.outer_priority &0xF ) <<4 | + ((uint64_t )opts.second_outer_tag_id &0xFFFFF ) <<8 | + ((uint64_t )opts.second_outer_priority &0xF ) <<28 | + ((uint64_t )opts.bonus_data <<32 ) | + ((uint64_t )opts.tag_match_bitmap <<48 ) | + ((uint64_t )opts.packet_type &0xF ) <<56 | + ((uint64_t )opts.outer_vlan_type &0x7 ) <<60 | + ((uint64_t )opts.inner_vlan_type &0x1 ) <<63 ; + req.data[3 ] = ((uint64_t )opts.inner_vlan_type &0x6 ) | + ((uint64_t )opts.num_tags &0x7F ) <<2 | ((uint64_t )opts.express &1 ) <<9 | + ((uint64_t )opts.port &0x3 ) <<10 | + ((uint64_t )opts.flowid_user &0xF ) <<12 ; + + req.mask[0 ] =0x0 ; + req.mask[1 ] =0xFFFFFFFF00000000 ; + req.mask[2 ] =0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF ; + req.mask[3 ] =0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF3FF ; + + ret =roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write (mcs_dev->mdev, &req); +if (ret) +return ret; + + *mcs_flow = &req; + }else { +printf ("\nFlow not confirured" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sa_id); +RTE_SET_USED (stats); + +return 0 ; +} + +int +cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sc_id); +RTE_SET_USED (stats); + +return 0 ; +} + +void +cnxk_mcs_dev_fini (struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev) +{ +/* Cleanup MACsec dev */ +roc_mcs_dev_fini (mcs_dev->mdev); + +plt_free (mcs_dev); +} + +struct cnxk_mcs_dev * +cnxk_mcs_dev_init (uint8_t mcs_idx) +{ +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev; + + mcs_dev =plt_zmalloc (sizeof (struct cnxk_mcs_dev ),PLT_CACHE_LINE_SIZE ); +if (!mcs_dev) +return NULL ; + + mcs_dev->mdev =roc_mcs_dev_init (mcs_dev->idx); +if (!mcs_dev->mdev) { +plt_free (mcs_dev); +return NULL ; + } + mcs_dev->idx = mcs_idx; + +return mcs_dev; +}
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h new file +59 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +10 -1
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <rte_pmd_cnxk.h> #include <cn10k_ethdev.h> +#include <cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h> #include <cnxk_security.h> #include <roc_priv.h>
@@ -601,7 +602,9 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_session_create(void *device,if (conf->action_type !=RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_INLINE_PROTOCOL )return -ENOTSUP ; -if (conf->protocol !=RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_IPSEC ) +if (conf->protocol ==RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC ) +return cn10k_eth_macsec_session_create (dev, conf, sess, mempool); +else if (conf->protocol !=RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_IPSEC )return -ENOTSUP ;if (rte_security_dynfield_register () <0 )
@@ -1058,9 +1061,15 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_ops_override(void) init_once =1 ;/* Update platform specific ops */ + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_create = cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_create; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_create = cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_create; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_destroy = cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_destroy; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_destroy = cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_destroy; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_create = cn10k_eth_sec_session_create; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_destroy = cn10k_eth_sec_session_destroy; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.capabilities_get = cn10k_eth_sec_capabilities_get; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_update = cn10k_eth_sec_session_update; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_stats_get = cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get = cn10k_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get = cn10k_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get; }
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c +14 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@* Copyright(C) 2020 Marvell. */ #include <cnxk_flow.h> +#include "cn10k_ethdev_mcs.h" #include "cn10k_flow.h" #include "cn10k_ethdev.h" #include "cn10k_rx.h"
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ cn10k_flow_create(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, const struct rte_flow_attr *attr,const struct rte_flow_action *act_q =NULL ;struct roc_npc *npc = &dev->npc;struct roc_npc_flow *flow; +void *mcs_flow =NULL ;int vtag_actions =0 ;uint32_t req_act =0 ;int i, rc;
@@ -186,6 +188,18 @@ cn10k_flow_create(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, const struct rte_flow_attr *attr, } } +if (actions[0 ].type ==RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_SECURITY && +cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, actions[0 ].conf) !=NULL ) { + rc =cn10k_mcs_flow_configure (eth_dev, attr, pattern, actions, error, &mcs_flow); +if (rc) { +rte_flow_error_set (error, rc, +RTE_FLOW_ERROR_TYPE_ACTION ,NULL , +"Failed to configure mcs flow" ); +return NULL ; + } +return (struct rte_flow *)mcs_flow; + } + flow =cnxk_flow_create (eth_dev, attr, pattern, actions, error);if (!flow) {if (mtr)
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h +31 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,21 @@ struct cnxk_eth_dev_sec_outb {rte_spinlock_t lock; }; +/* MACsec session private data */ +struct cnxk_macsec_sess { +/* List entry */ +TAILQ_ENTRY (cnxk_macsec_sess) entry; + +/* Back pointer to session */ +struct rte_security_session *sess; +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; +uint64_t sci; +uint8_t secy_id; +uint8_t sc_id; +uint8_t flow_id; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD (cnxk_macsec_sess_list, cnxk_macsec_sess); +struct cnxk_eth_dev {/* ROC NIX */ struct roc_nix nix;
@@ -437,6 +452,10 @@ struct cnxk_eth_dev {/* Reassembly dynfield/flag offsets */ int reass_dynfield_off;int reass_dynflag_bit; + +/* MCS device */ +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev; +struct cnxk_macsec_sess_list mcs_list; };struct cnxk_eth_rxq_sp {
@@ -649,6 +668,18 @@ cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess(struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,int cnxk_nix_inl_meta_pool_cb (uint64_t *aura_handle,uint32_t buf_sz,uint32_t nb_bufs,bool destroy); +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *cnxk_mcs_dev_init (uint8_t mcs_idx); +void cnxk_mcs_dev_fini (struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev); + +struct cnxk_macsec_sess * +cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev, +const struct rte_security_session *sess); +int cn10k_mcs_flow_configure (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, +const struct rte_flow_attr *attr, +const struct rte_flow_item pattern[], +const struct rte_flow_action actions[], +struct rte_flow_error *error,void **mcs_flow); +/* Other private functions */ int nix_recalc_mtu (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev);int nix_mtr_validate (struct rte_eth_dev *dev,uint32_t id);
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c +1 -1
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess(struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,static unsigned int cnxk_eth_sec_session_get_size(void *device __rte_unused) { -return sizeof (struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess ); +return RTE_MAX (sizeof (struct cnxk_macsec_sess ),sizeof (struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess )); }struct rte_security_ops cnxk_eth_sec_ops = {
drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ sources += files( # CN10K sources += files( 'cn10k_ethdev.c', + 'cn10k_ethdev_mcs.c', 'cn10k_ethdev_sec.c', 'cn10k_flow.c', 'cn10k_rx_select.c',
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/5 test/security: add inline MACsec cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec inline cases for encryption cases.
--- app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 821 ++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 2318 +++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 3140 insertions(+) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
app/test/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ test_sources = files( 'test_rwlock.c', 'test_sched.c', 'test_security.c', + 'test_security_inline_macsec.c', 'test_security_inline_proto.c', 'test_seqlock.c', 'test_service_cores.c',
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c new file +821 -0
821 lines not on this page · raw message
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h new file +2318 -0
2,172 lines not on this page · raw message
The rest of this diff is not shown. View the raw message.
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Part of the diff is not shown here. View the raw message.
cover Add MACsec unit test cases
Inline MACsec offload was supported in DPDK 22.11
using rte_security APIs.
This patchset adds few minor changes in the rte_security APIs to specify the direction of SA/SC and update the SC configuration to set packet number threshold.
The patchset also add functional test cases in dpdk-test app to verify MACsec functionality.
This patchset is pending from last release [1] due to lack of hardware to test. Now the test cases are verified on Marvell cnxk PMD and the pmd support is added as a separate patchset.
Akhil Goyal (10):
security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
security: add MACsec packet number threshold
test/security: add inline MACsec cases
test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
test/security: add MACsec negative cases
test/security: verify MACsec stats
test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
test/security: remove no MACsec support case
Ankur Dwivedi (3):
test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security.c | 37 - app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 2332 ++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 3895 +++++++++++++++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 +- lib/security/rte_security.h | 24 +- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 +- 7 files changed, 6266 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/13 security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
--- lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
lib/security/rte_security.c +10 -6
@@ -164,13 +164,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, }int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id) +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -181,13 +182,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sc_id }int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id) +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -199,22 +201,24 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sa_idint rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, dir, stats); }int rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, dir, stats); }int
lib/security/rte_security.h +10 -4
@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sc_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -768,7 +769,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id); +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * @warning
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sa_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -805,7 +808,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id); +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** Device-specific metadata field type */ typedef uint64_t rte_security_dynfield_t ;
@@ -1077,6 +1081,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @param stats statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1085,7 +1090,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sa_id, +uint16_t sa_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);/**
@@ -1096,6 +1101,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @param stats SC statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1104,7 +1110,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sc_id, +uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
lib/security/rte_security_driver.h +10 -2
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id MACsec SC ID +* @param dir Direction of SC */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Configure a MACsec security Association (SA) on a device.
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id MACsec SA ID +* @param dir Direction of SA */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Get the size of a security session
@@ -162,6 +166,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SC * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* - -EINVAL if sc_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SA * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -183,6 +190,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* - -EINVAL if sa_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/13 security: add MACsec packet number threshold
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded Packet number threshold parameter in MACsec SC configuration to identify the maximum allowed threshold for packet number field in the packet.
A field is_xpn is also added to identify if the SAs are configured for extended packet number or not so that packet number threshold can be configured accordingly.
--- lib/security/rte_security.h | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/security/rte_security.h +8 -2
@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */
@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */ uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8_t reserved : 6; } sc_rx;struct {uint16_t sa_id;/**< SA ID to be used for encryption */
@@ -416,8 +420,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint64_t sci;/**< SCI value to be used if send_sci is set */ uint8_t active : 1; /**< Channel is active */ uint8_t re_key_en : 1; /**< Enable Rekeying */ +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 6; + uint8_t reserved : 5; } sc_tx; }; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 02/13] security: add MACsec packet number threshold
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 24 May 2023 01:19:07 +0530 Akhil Goyal <[email protected]> wrote:
lib/security/rte_security.h +2
-0@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */
lib/security/rte_security.h struct rte_security_macsec_sc { · line 415
Quoted 8 lines
lib/security/rte_security.h +3
-1@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */ uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8
Is this an ABI change? If so needs to wait for 23.11 release
RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 02/13] security: add MACsec packet number threshold
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 16 lines · On Wed, 24 May 2023 01:19:07 +0530 Akhil Goyal <[email protected]> wrote:
lib/security/rte_security.h +2
-0@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */
Quoted 8 lines
lib/security/rte_security.h struct rte_security_macsec_sc {
Quoted 6 lines
lib/security/rte_security.h +3
-1uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8Is this an ABI change? If so needs to wait for 23.11 release
rte_security_macsec_sc/sa_create are experimental APIs. So, it won't be an issue I believe.
RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 02/13] security: add MACsec packet number threshold
Quoted 30 lines
Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH 02/13] security: add MACsec packet number threshold
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 16 lines · On Wed, 24 May 2023 01:19:07 +0530 Akhil Goyal <[email protected]> wrote:
lib/security/rte_security.h +2
-0@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */ Quoted 8 lines
lib/security/rte_security.h struct rte_security_macsec_sc {
Quoted 6 lines
lib/security/rte_security.h +3
-1uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8Is this an ABI change? If so needs to wait for 23.11 release
Quoted 2 lines
rte_security_macsec_sc/sa_create are experimental APIs. So, it won't be an issue I believe.
Looking at the ABI issues reported for this patchset.
Even if these APIs are experimental, we cannot really change them. As all are part of rte_security_ctx which is exposed.
But, user is not required to know its contents and it should not be exposed. In next release I would make it internal like rte_security_session. For now, I would defer this MACsec support to next release.
PATCH 3/13 test/security: add inline MACsec cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalUpdated test app to verify Inline MACsec offload using rte_security APIs.
A couple of test cases are added to verify encap only and decap only of some known test vectors from MACsec specification.
--- app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 1108 +++++++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 1086 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 2195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
app/test/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ test_sources = files( 'test_rwlock.c', 'test_sched.c', 'test_security.c', + 'test_security_inline_macsec.c', 'test_security_inline_proto.c', 'test_seqlock.c', 'test_service_cores.c',
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c new file +1108 -0
1,108 lines not on this page · raw message
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h new file +1086 -0
1,086 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/13 test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test vectors and test cases to verify auth_only/verify_only and encap-decap/auth-verify to verify the complete TX-RX path using the loopback mode of ethdev.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 153 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 995 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1148 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +153 -0
@@ -937,6 +937,143 @@ test_inline_macsec_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_VERIFY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1090,6 +1227,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec decap(De-cipher+verify) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec encap + decap known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth + verify known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +995 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/13 test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test case and test vectors to verify multiple flows of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 49 ++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -0
@@ -1074,6 +1074,51 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *tv[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_vector iter[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, err; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + +for (i =0 ; i <MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; i++) { +memcpy (&iter[i].sa_key.data, sa_key,MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], plain_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], secure_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ ); + iter[i].sa_key.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ; + iter[i].plain_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].secure_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].alg =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128 ; + iter[i].ssci =0x0 ; + iter[i].xpn =0x0 ; + tv[i] = (const struct mcs_test_vector *)&iter[i]; + } + err =test_macsec (tv,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow failed" ); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow Passed" ); + err =0 ; + } +return err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1219,6 +1264,10 @@ inline_macsec_testsuite_teardown(void)static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { .suite_name ="Inline MACsec Ethernet Device Unit Test Suite" , .unit_test_cases = { +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap + decap Multi flow" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_multi_flow), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec encap(Cipher+Auth) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +109 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 6/13 test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify MACsec processing with VLAN
tags inserted. Vectors are added to verify 1/2/3
VLAN tags in clear or encrypted data.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 67 ++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +67 -0
@@ -1119,6 +1119,69 @@ test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused)return err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_vlan_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_vlan_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, (2 * size) + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1292,6 +1355,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth + verify known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_with_vlan),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +217 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/13 test/security: add MACsec negative cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec negative test cases to verify
pkt drop, untagged rx, bad tag rx, sa not in use,
out packets untagged, pkts too long.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 346 +++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 475 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 821 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +346 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,103 @@ mcs_stats_dump(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op, } } +static int +mcs_stats_check (struct rte_security_ctx *ctx,enum mcs_op op, +const struct mcs_test_opts *opts, +const struct mcs_test_vector *td, +void *rx_sess,void *tx_sess, +uint8_t rx_sc_id,uint8_t tx_sc_id, +uint16_t rx_sa_id[],uint16_t tx_sa_id[]) +{ +struct rte_security_stats sess_stats = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_secy_stats *secy_stat; +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats sc_stat = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats sa_stat = {0 }; +int i; + +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, rx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if ((opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_notag_cnt !=1 ) || + (opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_untaged_cnt !=1 )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_bad_tag_cnt && secy_stat->pkt_badtag_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_sa_not_in_use && secy_stat->pkt_nosaerror_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_decap_stats && secy_stat->octet_decrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_verify_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_validated_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, rx_sc_id, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sc_stat); + +if ((opts->check_decap_stats || opts->check_verify_only_stats) && + sc_stat.pkt_ok_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_invalid_stats && sc_stat.pkt_notvalid_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, rx_sa_id[i], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sa_stat); + + } + } + +if (op ==MCS_ENCAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_AUTH_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +memset (&sess_stats,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_stats )); +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, tx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_untagged && secy_stat->pkt_untagged_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong && secy_stat->pkt_toolong_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && secy_stat->octet_encrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_protected_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + + +memset (&sc_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, tx_sc_id,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + &sc_stat); + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && sc_stat.pkt_encrypt_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && sc_stat.pkt_protected_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , &sa_stat); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -833,12 +930,23 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; } out: +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong ==1 || + opts->check_sa_not_in_use ==1 || + opts->check_bad_tag_cnt ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; +for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) {if (opts->dump_all_stats) {mcs_stats_dump (ctx, op, rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); + }else { +if (ret ==TEST_SUCCESS ) + ret =mcs_stats_check (ctx, op, opts, td[i], + rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], + rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], + rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); } }
@@ -1182,6 +1290,220 @@ test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_untagged_rx =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors) / +sizeof ((list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_bad_tag_cnt =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =0 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sa_not_in_use =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = false; + opts.protect_frames = false; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_out_pkts_untagged =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =50 ; + opts.check_out_pkts_toolong =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1359,6 +1681,30 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_with_vlan), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec packet drop" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec untagged Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec bad tag Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec SA not in use" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts untagged" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts too long" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +475 -0
481 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 8/13 test/security: verify MACsec stats
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify various stats of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 222 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +222 -0
@@ -1438,6 +1438,140 @@ test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_decap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_decap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_verify_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLE ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_pkts_unchecked_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) {
@@ -1504,6 +1638,70 @@ test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_encap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_auth_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1697,6 +1895,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec SA not in use", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec decap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_decap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts invalid stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts unchecked stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec out pkts untagged", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
@@ -1705,6 +1919,14 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec out pkts too long", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 9/13 test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 124 +++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 306 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 429 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +124 -0
@@ -757,6 +757,71 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,return 0 ; } +static int +test_macsec_event_callback (uint16_t port_id,enum rte_eth_event_type type, +void *param,void *ret_param) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector *vector = (struct mcs_err_vector *)param; +struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc *event_desc =NULL ; + +RTE_SET_USED (port_id); + +if (type !=RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC ) +return -1 ; + + event_desc = ret_param; +if (event_desc ==NULL ) { +printf ("Event descriptor not set\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + vector->notify_event = true; + +switch (event_desc->type) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; +switch (event_desc->subtype) { +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 ; +break ; +default : +printf ("\nUnknown Macsec event subtype: %d" , event_desc->subtype); + } +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID ; +break ; +default : +printf ("Invalid MACsec event reported\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -914,6 +979,8 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcswhile (--nb_rx >=0 )rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[nb_rx]); ret =TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->check_sectag_interrupts ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; goto out; }
@@ -1702,6 +1769,59 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 }; +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, size; +int err, all_err =0 ; +enum rte_eth_event_macsec_subtype subtype[] = { +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 , + }; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sectag_interrupts =1 ; + + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_intr_test_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_intr_test_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_intr_test_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if ((err_vector.event ==RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ) && + (err_vector.event_subtype == subtype[i])) { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d passed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d failed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1927,6 +2047,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth only stats", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec interrupts all" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +305 -1
317 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 10/13 test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalThis patch enables the Tx HW rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 137 +++++++++- .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 243 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 378 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +135 -2
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,uint8_t i; sc_conf->dir = dir; + sc_conf->pn_threshold = ((uint64_t )td->xpn <<32 ) | +rte_be_to_cpu_32 (*(const uint32_t *)(&td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off +2 ]));if (dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ) { sc_conf->sc_tx.sa_id = sa_id[0 ];if (sa_id[1 ] !=MCS_INVALID_SA ) {
@@ -232,12 +234,16 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,/* use some default SCI */ sc_conf->sc_tx.sci =0xf1341e023a2b1c5d ; } +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_tx.is_xpn =1 ; }else {for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_id[i] = sa_id[i]; sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_in_use[i] = opts->sa_in_use; } sc_conf->sc_rx.active =1 ; +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_rx.is_xpn =1 ; } }
@@ -834,6 +840,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsstruct rte_security_session_conf sess_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sa sa_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sc sc_conf = {0 }; +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 };struct rte_security_ctx *ctx;int nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;
@@ -868,6 +875,34 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->rekey_en) { + + err_vector.td = td[i]; + err_vector.rekey_td = opts->rekey_td; + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY ) + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.len); +else { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.len); + + tx_pkts_burst[j]->ol_flags |=RTE_MBUF_F_TX_MACSEC ; + } +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + j++; + } +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) {
@@ -922,6 +957,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[i][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; tx_sa_id[i][1 ] =MCS_INVALID_SA ; +if (opts->rekey_en) { +memset (&sa_conf,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa )); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , + tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec rekey SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); + goto out; + } + tx_sa_id[i][1 ] = (uint16_t )id; + }fill_macsec_sc_conf (td[i], &sc_conf, opts,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , tx_sa_id[i], tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sc_create (ctx, &sc_conf);
@@ -984,9 +1033,44 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs goto out; } +if (opts->rekey_en) { +switch (err_vector.event) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +/* The first sa is active now, so the 0th sa can be +* reconfigured. Using the same key as zeroeth sa, but +* other key can also be configured. +*/ +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[0 ], &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + td[0 ]->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); +return TEST_FAILED ; + } + tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; +break ; +default : +printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); + } + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { - ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], op, - opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); +if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) { +/* The second received packet is matched with +* rekey td +*/ + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], + opts->rekey_td, op, + opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }else { + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], + op, opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }if (ret !=TEST_SUCCESS ) {for ( ; i < nb_rx; i++)rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]);
@@ -1019,6 +1103,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsdestroy_default_flow (port_id); +if (opts->rekey_en) +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +/* Destroy session so that other cases can create the session again */ for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) { if (op == MCS_ENCAP || op == MCS_ENCAP_DECAP ||
@@ -1029,6 +1117,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX);rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][0 ],RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +if (opts->rekey_en) { +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][1 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); + } }if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {
@@ -1822,6 +1914,43 @@ test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2051,6 +2180,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec interrupts all", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Tx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +243 -0
253 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 11/13 test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the Rx rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -1
@@ -906,8 +906,14 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsif (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) { +if (opts->rekey_en && an == + (opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK )) +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); +else /* For simplicity, using same SA conf for all AN */ -fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf, +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf);if (id <0 ) {
@@ -1054,6 +1060,9 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id;break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +break ;default :printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); }
@@ -1951,6 +1960,41 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2184,6 +2228,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Tx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 12/13 test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables anti replay test case for MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 82 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 467 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 549 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +82 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct mcs_test_opts {uint8_t replay_protect;uint8_t rekey_en;const struct mcs_test_vector *rekey_td; +const struct mcs_test_vector *ar_td[3 ];bool dump_all_stats;uint8_t check_untagged_rx;uint8_t check_bad_tag_cnt;
@@ -716,6 +717,15 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 )return TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +if (opts->replay_win_sz ==0 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=2 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; +else if (opts->replay_win_sz ==32 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + } +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) {memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(ctx, rx_sa_id[i],
@@ -845,6 +855,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsint nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;uint8_t tci_off; +int k;memset (rx_pkts_burst,0 ,sizeof (rx_pkts_burst[0 ]) * opts->nb_td);
@@ -875,6 +886,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (k =0 ; k <3 ; k++, j++) { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.data, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.len); +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + } + } +if (opts->rekey_en) { err_vector.td = td[i];
@@ -1068,6 +1093,15 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } } +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { +rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]); + rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; + } + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; + goto out; + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) {if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) {/* The second received packet is matched with
@@ -1995,6 +2029,50 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_anti_replay(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +uint16_t replay_win_sz[2 ] = {32 ,0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; +int j; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.replay_protect =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (j =0 ; j <2 ; j++) { + opts.replay_win_sz = replay_win_sz[j]; + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[i]; + opts.ar_td[0 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[1 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[2 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d failed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d passed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2232,6 +2310,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Rx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec anti-replay" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_anti_replay),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +467 -0
471 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 13/13 test/security: remove no MACsec support case
In reply to Akhil GoyalRemoved the test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec case as MACsec is now supported and capability can have valid MACsec support.
--- app/test/test_security.c | 37 ------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 37 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security.c +0 -37
@@ -1828,41 +1828,6 @@ test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol(void)return TEST_SUCCESS ; } -/** -* Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when macsec protocol -* is searched and capabilities table contain proper entry. -* However macsec records search is not supported in rte_security. -*/ -static int -test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec (void ) -{ -struct security_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; -struct rte_security_capability_idx idx = { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }; -struct rte_security_capability capabilities[] = { - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }, - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_NONE , - }, - }; - - mock_capabilities_get_exp.device =NULL ; - mock_capabilities_get_exp.ret = capabilities; - -const struct rte_security_capability *ret; - ret =rte_security_capability_get (&ut_params->ctx, &idx); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_FUNCTION_CALL_RET (rte_security_capability_get, - ret,NULL ,"%p" ); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_CALLS (mock_capabilities_get_exp,1 ); - -return TEST_SUCCESS ; -} -/** * Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when capabilities table * does not contain entry with matching ipsec proto field
@@ -2319,8 +2284,6 @@ static struct unit_test_suite security_testsuite = { test_capability_get_no_matching_action),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol), -TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, - test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_ipsec_mismatch_proto), TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
v2 cover Add MACsec unit test cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalInline MACsec offload was supported in DPDK 22.11
using rte_security APIs.
This patchset adds few minor changes in the rte_security APIs to specify the direction of SA/SC and update the SC configuration to set packet number threshold.
The patchset also add functional test cases in dpdk-test app to verify MACsec functionality.
This patchset is pending from last release [1] due to lack of hardware to test. Now the test cases are verified on Marvell cnxk PMD and the pmd support is added as a separate patchset.
[1] https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/cover/[email protected]/
Changes in v2:
- Added abignore for experimental APIs
- Fixed build
Akhil Goyal (10):
security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
security: add MACsec packet number threshold
test/security: add inline MACsec cases
test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
test/security: add MACsec negative cases
test/security: verify MACsec stats
test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
test/security: remove no MACsec support case
Ankur Dwivedi (3):
test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security.c | 37 - app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 2332 ++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 3895 +++++++++++++++++ devtools/libabigail.abignore | 7 + lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 +- lib/security/rte_security.h | 24 +- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 +- 8 files changed, 6273 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 1/13 security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
--- devtools/libabigail.abignore | 7 +++++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
devtools/libabigail.abignore +7 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ [suppress_type] type_kind = enum changed_enumerators = RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_ECPM, RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_TYPE_LIST_END +; Ignore changes to rte_security_ops MACsec APIs which are experimental +[suppress_type] + name = rte_security_ops + has_data_member_inserted_between = + { + offset_of(security_macsec_sc_create_t), offset_of(security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t) + } ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ; Temporary exceptions till next major ABI version ;
lib/security/rte_security.c +10 -6
@@ -164,13 +164,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, }int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id) +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -181,13 +182,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sc_id }int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id) +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -199,22 +201,24 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sa_idint rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, dir, stats); }int rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, dir, stats); }int
lib/security/rte_security.h +10 -4
@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sc_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -768,7 +769,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id); +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * @warning
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sa_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -805,7 +808,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id); +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** Device-specific metadata field type */ typedef uint64_t rte_security_dynfield_t ;
@@ -1077,6 +1081,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @param stats statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1085,7 +1090,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sa_id, +uint16_t sa_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);/**
@@ -1096,6 +1101,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @param stats SC statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1104,7 +1110,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sc_id, +uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
lib/security/rte_security_driver.h +10 -2
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id MACsec SC ID +* @param dir Direction of SC */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Configure a MACsec security Association (SA) on a device.
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id MACsec SA ID +* @param dir Direction of SA */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Get the size of a security session
@@ -162,6 +166,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SC * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* - -EINVAL if sc_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SA * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -183,6 +190,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* - -EINVAL if sa_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v2 01/13] security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
Quoted 29 lines
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/13] security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- devtools/libabigail.abignore | 7 +++++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)devtools/libabigail.abignore +0
-0@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ [suppress_type] type_kind = enum changed_enumerators = RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_ECPM,
RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_TYPE_LIST_ENDdevtools/libabigail.abignore +6
-0+; Ignore changes to rte_security_ops MACsec APIs which are experimental +[suppress_type] + name = rte_security_ops + has_data_member_inserted_between = + { + offset_of(security_macsec_sc_create_t),
Quoted 2 lines
offset_of(security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t)
+ }
Thomas/David,
Please review the exception added for MACsec rte_security APIs.
Regards,
Akhil
Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalQuoted 5 lines · Akhil Goyal
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- devtools/libabigail.abignore | 7 +++++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Looking at the report with no supression rule:
$ abidiff --suppr .../next-cryptodev/devtools/libabigail.abignore --no-added-syms --headers-dir1 .../abi/v23.03/build-gcc-shared/usr/local/include --headers-dir2 .../next-cryptodev/build-gcc-shared/install/usr/local/include .../abi/v23.03/build-gcc-shared/usr/local/lib64/librte_security.so.23.1 .../next-cryptodev/build-gcc-shared/install/usr/local/lib64/librte_security.so.23.2 Functions changes summary: 0 Removed, 1 Changed (13 filtered out), 0 Added functions Variables changes summary: 0 Removed, 0 Changed, 0 Added variable
1 function with some indirect sub-type change:
[C] 'function const rte_security_capability*rte_security_capabilities_get(rte_security_ctx*)' at rte_security.c:241:1 has some indirect sub-type changes:
parameter 1 of type 'rte_security_ctx*' has sub-type changes:
in pointed to type 'struct rte_security_ctx' at rte_security.h:69:1:
type size hasn't changed
1 data member change:
type of 'const rte_security_ops* ops' changed:
in pointed to type 'const rte_security_ops':
in unqualified underlying type 'struct rte_security_ops'
at rte_security_driver.h:230:1:
type size hasn't changed
4 data member changes (4 filtered):
type of 'security_macsec_sc_create_tmacsec_sc_create' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*,
rte_security_macsec_sc*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
rte_security_macsec_sc*)':
parameter 2 of type 'rte_security_macsec_sc*'
has sub-type changes:
in pointed to type 'structrte_security_macsec_sc' at rte_security.h:399:1:
type size changed from 256 to 320 (in bits) 1 data member insertion:
'union {struct {uint16_t sa_id[4];uint8_t sa_in_use[4]; uint8_t active; uint8_t is_xpn; uint8_t reserved;} sc_rx; struct {uint16_t sa_id; uint16_t sa_id_rekey; uint64_t sci; uint8_t active; uint8_t re_key_en; uint8_t is_xpn; uint8_t reserved;} sc_tx;}', at offset 128 (in bits)
1 data member change:
anonymous data member union {struct
{uint16_t sa_id[4]; uint8_t sa_in_use[4]; uint8_t active; uint8_t reserved;} sc_rx; struct {uint16_t sa_id; uint16_t sa_id_rekey; uint64_t sci; uint8_t active; uint8_t re_key_en; uint8_t reserved;} sc_tx;} at offset 64 (in bits) became data member 'uint64_t pn_threshold'
and size changed from 192 to 64 (in
bits) (by -128 bits)
type of 'security_macsec_sc_destroy_tmacsec_sc_destroy' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedef uint16_t)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedef uint16_t)':
parameter 3 of type 'enumrte_security_macsec_direction' was added
type of 'security_macsec_sc_stats_get_tmacsec_sc_stats_get' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedef uint16_t,
rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedef uint16_t, rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*)':
parameter 3 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' changed:
entity changed from
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' to 'enum rte_security_macsec_direction' at rte_security.h:361:1
type size changed from 64 to 32 (in bits) type alignment changed from 0 to 32
parameter 4 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' was added
type of 'security_macsec_sa_stats_get_tmacsec_sa_stats_get' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedef uint16_t,
rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedef uint16_t, rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*)':
parameter 3 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' changed:
entity changed from
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' to 'enum rte_security_macsec_direction' at rte_security.h:361:1
type size changed from 64 to 32 (in bits) type alignment changed from 0 to 32
parameter 4 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' was added
The report complains about the macsec ops type changes.
Quoted 5 lines
devtools/libabigail.abignore +0
-0
devtools/libabigail.abignore line 46
Quoted 10 lines
devtools/libabigail.abignore +7
-0@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ [suppress_type] type_kind = enum changed_enumerators = RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_ECPM, RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_TYPE_LIST_END +; Ignore changes to rte_security_ops MACsec APIs which are experimental +[suppress_type] + name = rte_security_ops + has_data_member_inserted_between = + { + offset_of(security_macsec_sc_create_t), offset_of(security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t) + }
So I don't get the intent with this rule.
There is no field named neither security_macsec_sc_create_t nor security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t in the rte_security_ops struct.
Now.. why is this rule making the check pass... it is a mystery to me. I already hit a case when libabigail ignored statements that are invalid or make no sense, so my guess is that this rule is actually applied as a simple:
[suppress_type]
name = rte_security_ops
And well, this rule is ok from my pov: this rte_security_ops struct does not change in size.
An application is not supposed to know about its content (that is defined in a driver header) and all accesses to those ops are supposed to be through symbols from the security library.
So I would go with this "larger" and simpler rule.
Just a small addition to this, as discussed offlist, this is going to be reworked in v23.11 and this rule on rte_security_ops will be unneccesary, so please move it in the relevant block (at the end) of the libabigail.abignore file.
Signature · 1 line
David Marchand
RE: [EXT] Re: [PATCH v2 01/13] security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
Quoted 137 lines · Akhil Goyal
Quoted 5 lines
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>--- devtools/libabigail.abignore | 7 +++++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)Looking at the report with no supression rule:
$ abidiff --suppr .../next-cryptodev/devtools/libabigail.abignore --no-added-syms --headers-dir1 .../abi/v23.03/build-gcc-shared/usr/local/include --headers-dir2 .../next-cryptodev/build-gcc-shared/install/usr/local/include .../abi/v23.03/build-gcc-shared/usr/local/lib64/librte_security.so.23.1 .../next-cryptodev/build-gcc- shared/install/usr/local/lib64/librte_security.so.23.2 Functions changes summary: 0 Removed, 1 Changed (13 filtered out), 0 Added functions Variables changes summary: 0 Removed, 0 Changed, 0 Added variable1 function with some indirect sub-type change:
[C] 'function const rte_security_capability*
rte_security_capabilities_get(rte_security_ctx*)' at rte_security.c:241:1 has some indirect sub-type changes:
parameter 1 of type 'rte_security_ctx*' has sub-type changes:
in pointed to type 'structrte_security_ctx' at rte_security.h:69:1:
type size hasn't changed
1 data member change:
type of 'const rte_security_ops* ops' changed:
in pointed to type 'constrte_security_ops':
in unqualified underlying type 'structrte_security_ops'
at rte_security_driver.h:230:1:
type size hasn't changed
4 data member changes (4 filtered):
type of 'security_macsec_sc_create_tmacsec_sc_create' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*,
rte_security_macsec_sc*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
rte_security_macsec_sc*)':
parameter 2 of type 'rte_security_macsec_sc*'
has sub-type changes:
in pointed to type 'structrte_security_macsec_sc' at rte_security.h:399:1:
type size changed from 256 to 320 (in bits) 1 data member insertion:
'union {struct {uint16_tsa_id[4];uint8_tsa_in_use[4];uint8_tactive;uint8_tis_xpn;uint8_treserved;}sc_rx; struct {uint16_tsa_id;uint16_tsa_id_rekey;uint64_tsci;uint8_tactive;uint8_tre_key_en;uint8_tis_xpn;uint8_treserved;}sc_tx;}', at offset 128 (in bits)
1 data member change:
anonymous data member union {struct
{uint16_tsa_id[4];uint8_tsa_in_use[4];uint8_tactive;uint8_treserved;}sc_rx; struct {uint16_tsa_id;uint16_tsa_id_rekey;uint64_tsci;uint8_tactive;uint8_tre_key_en;uint8_treserved;}sc_tx;} at offset 64 (in bits) became data member 'uint64_tpn_threshold'
and size changed from 192 to 64 (in
bits) (by -128 bits)
type of 'security_macsec_sc_destroy_tmacsec_sc_destroy' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedef uint16_t)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedefuint16_t)':
parameter 3 of type 'enumrte_security_macsec_direction' was added
type of 'security_macsec_sc_stats_get_tmacsec_sc_stats_get' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedefuint16_t,
rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedefuint16_t, rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*)':
parameter 3 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' changed:
entity changed from
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' to 'enumrte_security_macsec_direction' at rte_security.h:361:1
type size changed from 64 to 32 (in bits) type alignment changed from 0 to 32
parameter 4 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sc_stats*' was added
type of 'security_macsec_sa_stats_get_tmacsec_sa_stats_get' changed:
underlying type 'int (void*, typedefuint16_t,
rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*)*' changed:
in pointed to type 'function type int (void*,
typedefuint16_t, rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*)':
parameter 3 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' changed:
entity changed from
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' to 'enumrte_security_macsec_direction' at rte_security.h:361:1
type size changed from 64 to 32 (in bits) type alignment changed from 0 to 32
parameter 4 of type
'rte_security_macsec_sa_stats*' was addedThe report complains about the macsec ops type changes.
devtools/libabigail.abignore line 39
Quoted 8 lines
devtools/libabigail.abignore +0
-0@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ [suppress_type] type_kind = enum changed_enumerators = RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_ECPM,
RTE_CRYPTO_ASYM_XFORM_TYPE_LIST_ENDdevtools/libabigail.abignore
Quoted 6 lines
devtools/libabigail.abignore +6
-0+; Ignore changes to rte_security_ops MACsec APIs which are experimental +[suppress_type] + name = rte_security_ops + has_data_member_inserted_between = + { + offset_of(security_macsec_sc_create_t),
offset_of(security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t)devtools/libabigail.abignore line 46
Quoted 1 line
devtools/libabigail.abignore +1
-0+ }So I don't get the intent with this rule.
There is no field named neithersecurity_macsec_sc_create_tnorsecurity_macsec_sa_stats_get_tin therte_security_opsstruct.Now.. why is this rule making the check pass... it is a mystery to me. I already hit a case when libabigail ignored statements that are invalid or make no sense, so my guess is that this rule is actually applied as a simple:
[suppress_type]
name =rte_security_ops
Quoted 6 lines
And well, this rule is ok from my pov: this
rte_security_opsstruct does not change in size.
An application is not supposed to know about its content (that is defined in a driver header) and all accesses to those ops are supposed to be through symbols from the security library.
So I would go with this "larger" and simpler rule.
The intent was to make it specific to MACsec APIs only.
I am ok with both as these are internal thing and would change it in next release. Updated the v3 as per your suggestion.
Quoted 6 lines
Just a small addition to this, as discussed offlist, this is going to be reworked in v23.11 and this rule on
rte_security_opswill be unneccesary, so please move it in the relevant block (at the end) of the libabigail.abignore file.
Ack
PATCH v2 2/13 security: add MACsec packet number threshold
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded Packet number threshold parameter in MACsec SC configuration to identify the maximum allowed threshold for packet number field in the packet.
A field is_xpn is also added to identify if the SAs are configured for extended packet number or not so that packet number threshold can be configured accordingly.
--- lib/security/rte_security.h | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/security/rte_security.h +8 -2
@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */
@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */ uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8_t reserved : 6; } sc_rx;struct {uint16_t sa_id;/**< SA ID to be used for encryption */
@@ -416,8 +420,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint64_t sci;/**< SCI value to be used if send_sci is set */ uint8_t active : 1; /**< Channel is active */ uint8_t re_key_en : 1; /**< Enable Rekeying */ +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 6; + uint8_t reserved : 5; } sc_tx; }; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 3/13 test/security: add inline MACsec cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalUpdated test app to verify Inline MACsec offload using rte_security APIs.
A couple of test cases are added to verify encap only and decap only of some known test vectors from MACsec specification.
--- app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 1108 +++++++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 1086 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 2195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
app/test/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ test_sources = files( 'test_rwlock.c', 'test_sched.c', 'test_security.c', + 'test_security_inline_macsec.c', 'test_security_inline_proto.c', 'test_seqlock.c', 'test_service_cores.c',
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c new file +1108 -0
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app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h new file +1086 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 4/13 test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test vectors and test cases to verify auth_only/verify_only and encap-decap/auth-verify to verify the complete TX-RX path using the loopback mode of ethdev.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 153 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 995 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1148 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +153 -0
@@ -937,6 +937,143 @@ test_inline_macsec_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_VERIFY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1090,6 +1227,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec decap(De-cipher+verify) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec encap + decap known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth + verify known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +995 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 5/13 test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test case and test vectors to verify multiple flows of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 49 ++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -0
@@ -1074,6 +1074,51 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *tv[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_vector iter[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, err; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + +for (i =0 ; i <MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; i++) { +memcpy (&iter[i].sa_key.data, sa_key,MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], plain_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], secure_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ ); + iter[i].sa_key.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ; + iter[i].plain_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].secure_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].alg =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128 ; + iter[i].ssci =0x0 ; + iter[i].xpn =0x0 ; + tv[i] = (const struct mcs_test_vector *)&iter[i]; + } + err =test_macsec (tv,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow failed" ); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow Passed" ); + err =0 ; + } +return err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1219,6 +1264,10 @@ inline_macsec_testsuite_teardown(void)static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { .suite_name ="Inline MACsec Ethernet Device Unit Test Suite" , .unit_test_cases = { +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap + decap Multi flow" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_multi_flow), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec encap(Cipher+Auth) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +109 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 6/13 test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify MACsec processing with VLAN
tags inserted. Vectors are added to verify 1/2/3
VLAN tags in clear or encrypted data.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 67 ++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +67 -0
@@ -1119,6 +1119,69 @@ test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused)return err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_vlan_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_vlan_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, (2 * size) + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1292,6 +1355,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth + verify known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_with_vlan),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +217 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 7/13 test/security: add MACsec negative cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec negative test cases to verify
pkt drop, untagged rx, bad tag rx, sa not in use,
out packets untagged, pkts too long.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 346 +++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 475 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 821 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +346 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,103 @@ mcs_stats_dump(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op, } } +static int +mcs_stats_check (struct rte_security_ctx *ctx,enum mcs_op op, +const struct mcs_test_opts *opts, +const struct mcs_test_vector *td, +void *rx_sess,void *tx_sess, +uint8_t rx_sc_id,uint8_t tx_sc_id, +uint16_t rx_sa_id[],uint16_t tx_sa_id[]) +{ +struct rte_security_stats sess_stats = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_secy_stats *secy_stat; +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats sc_stat = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats sa_stat = {0 }; +int i; + +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, rx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if ((opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_notag_cnt !=1 ) || + (opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_untaged_cnt !=1 )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_bad_tag_cnt && secy_stat->pkt_badtag_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_sa_not_in_use && secy_stat->pkt_nosaerror_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_decap_stats && secy_stat->octet_decrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_verify_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_validated_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, rx_sc_id, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sc_stat); + +if ((opts->check_decap_stats || opts->check_verify_only_stats) && + sc_stat.pkt_ok_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_invalid_stats && sc_stat.pkt_notvalid_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, rx_sa_id[i], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sa_stat); + + } + } + +if (op ==MCS_ENCAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_AUTH_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +memset (&sess_stats,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_stats )); +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, tx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_untagged && secy_stat->pkt_untagged_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong && secy_stat->pkt_toolong_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && secy_stat->octet_encrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_protected_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + + +memset (&sc_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, tx_sc_id,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + &sc_stat); + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && sc_stat.pkt_encrypt_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && sc_stat.pkt_protected_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , &sa_stat); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -833,12 +930,23 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; } out: +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong ==1 || + opts->check_sa_not_in_use ==1 || + opts->check_bad_tag_cnt ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; +for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) {if (opts->dump_all_stats) {mcs_stats_dump (ctx, op, rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); + }else { +if (ret ==TEST_SUCCESS ) + ret =mcs_stats_check (ctx, op, opts, td[i], + rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], + rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], + rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); } }
@@ -1182,6 +1290,220 @@ test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_untagged_rx =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors) / +sizeof ((list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_bad_tag_cnt =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =0 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sa_not_in_use =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = false; + opts.protect_frames = false; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_out_pkts_untagged =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =50 ; + opts.check_out_pkts_toolong =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1359,6 +1681,30 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_with_vlan), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec packet drop" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec untagged Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec bad tag Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec SA not in use" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts untagged" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts too long" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +475 -0
481 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 8/13 test/security: verify MACsec stats
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify various stats of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 222 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +222 -0
@@ -1438,6 +1438,140 @@ test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_decap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_decap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_verify_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLE ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_pkts_unchecked_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) {
@@ -1504,6 +1638,70 @@ test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_encap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_auth_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1697,6 +1895,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec SA not in use", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec decap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_decap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts invalid stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts unchecked stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec out pkts untagged", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
@@ -1705,6 +1919,14 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec out pkts too long", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 9/13 test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 124 +++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 306 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 429 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +124 -0
@@ -757,6 +757,71 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,return 0 ; } +static int +test_macsec_event_callback (uint16_t port_id,enum rte_eth_event_type type, +void *param,void *ret_param) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector *vector = (struct mcs_err_vector *)param; +struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc *event_desc =NULL ; + +RTE_SET_USED (port_id); + +if (type !=RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC ) +return -1 ; + + event_desc = ret_param; +if (event_desc ==NULL ) { +printf ("Event descriptor not set\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + vector->notify_event = true; + +switch (event_desc->type) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; +switch (event_desc->subtype) { +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 ; +break ; +default : +printf ("\nUnknown Macsec event subtype: %d" , event_desc->subtype); + } +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID ; +break ; +default : +printf ("Invalid MACsec event reported\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -914,6 +979,8 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcswhile (--nb_rx >=0 )rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[nb_rx]); ret =TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->check_sectag_interrupts ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; goto out; }
@@ -1702,6 +1769,59 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 }; +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, size; +int err, all_err =0 ; +enum rte_eth_event_macsec_subtype subtype[] = { +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 , + }; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sectag_interrupts =1 ; + + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_intr_test_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_intr_test_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_intr_test_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if ((err_vector.event ==RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ) && + (err_vector.event_subtype == subtype[i])) { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d passed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d failed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1927,6 +2047,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth only stats", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec interrupts all" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +305 -1
317 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 10/13 test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalThis patch enables the Tx HW rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 137 +++++++++- .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 243 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 378 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +135 -2
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,uint8_t i; sc_conf->dir = dir; + sc_conf->pn_threshold = ((uint64_t )td->xpn <<32 ) | +rte_be_to_cpu_32 (*(const uint32_t *)(&td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off +2 ]));if (dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ) { sc_conf->sc_tx.sa_id = sa_id[0 ];if (sa_id[1 ] !=MCS_INVALID_SA ) {
@@ -232,12 +234,16 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,/* use some default SCI */ sc_conf->sc_tx.sci =0xf1341e023a2b1c5d ; } +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_tx.is_xpn =1 ; }else {for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_id[i] = sa_id[i]; sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_in_use[i] = opts->sa_in_use; } sc_conf->sc_rx.active =1 ; +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_rx.is_xpn =1 ; } }
@@ -834,6 +840,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsstruct rte_security_session_conf sess_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sa sa_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sc sc_conf = {0 }; +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 };struct rte_security_ctx *ctx;int nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;
@@ -868,6 +875,34 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->rekey_en) { + + err_vector.td = td[i]; + err_vector.rekey_td = opts->rekey_td; + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY ) + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.len); +else { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.len); + + tx_pkts_burst[j]->ol_flags |=RTE_MBUF_F_TX_MACSEC ; + } +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + j++; + } +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) {
@@ -922,6 +957,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[i][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; tx_sa_id[i][1 ] =MCS_INVALID_SA ; +if (opts->rekey_en) { +memset (&sa_conf,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa )); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , + tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec rekey SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); + goto out; + } + tx_sa_id[i][1 ] = (uint16_t )id; + }fill_macsec_sc_conf (td[i], &sc_conf, opts,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , tx_sa_id[i], tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sc_create (ctx, &sc_conf);
@@ -984,9 +1033,44 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs goto out; } +if (opts->rekey_en) { +switch (err_vector.event) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +/* The first sa is active now, so the 0th sa can be +* reconfigured. Using the same key as zeroeth sa, but +* other key can also be configured. +*/ +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[0 ], &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + td[0 ]->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); +return TEST_FAILED ; + } + tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; +break ; +default : +printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); + } + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { - ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], op, - opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); +if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) { +/* The second received packet is matched with +* rekey td +*/ + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], + opts->rekey_td, op, + opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }else { + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], + op, opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }if (ret !=TEST_SUCCESS ) {for ( ; i < nb_rx; i++)rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]);
@@ -1019,6 +1103,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsdestroy_default_flow (port_id); +if (opts->rekey_en) +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +/* Destroy session so that other cases can create the session again */ for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) { if (op == MCS_ENCAP || op == MCS_ENCAP_DECAP ||
@@ -1029,6 +1117,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX);rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][0 ],RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +if (opts->rekey_en) { +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][1 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); + } }if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {
@@ -1822,6 +1914,43 @@ test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2051,6 +2180,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec interrupts all", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Tx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +243 -0
253 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 11/13 test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the Rx rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -1
@@ -906,8 +906,14 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsif (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) { +if (opts->rekey_en && an == + (opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK )) +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); +else /* For simplicity, using same SA conf for all AN */ -fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf, +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf);if (id <0 ) {
@@ -1054,6 +1060,9 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id;break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +break ;default :printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); }
@@ -1951,6 +1960,41 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2184,6 +2228,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Tx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 12/13 test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables anti replay test case for MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 82 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 467 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 549 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +82 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct mcs_test_opts {uint8_t replay_protect;uint8_t rekey_en;const struct mcs_test_vector *rekey_td; +const struct mcs_test_vector *ar_td[3 ];bool dump_all_stats;uint8_t check_untagged_rx;uint8_t check_bad_tag_cnt;
@@ -716,6 +717,15 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 )return TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +if (opts->replay_win_sz ==0 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=2 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; +else if (opts->replay_win_sz ==32 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + } +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) {memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(ctx, rx_sa_id[i],
@@ -845,6 +855,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsint nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;uint8_t tci_off; +int k;memset (rx_pkts_burst,0 ,sizeof (rx_pkts_burst[0 ]) * opts->nb_td);
@@ -875,6 +886,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (k =0 ; k <3 ; k++, j++) { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.data, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.len); +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + } + } +if (opts->rekey_en) { err_vector.td = td[i];
@@ -1068,6 +1093,15 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } } +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { +rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]); + rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; + } + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; + goto out; + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) {if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) {/* The second received packet is matched with
@@ -1995,6 +2029,50 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_anti_replay(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +uint16_t replay_win_sz[2 ] = {32 ,0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; +int j; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.replay_protect =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (j =0 ; j <2 ; j++) { + opts.replay_win_sz = replay_win_sz[j]; + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[i]; + opts.ar_td[0 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[1 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[2 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d failed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d passed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2232,6 +2310,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Rx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec anti-replay" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_anti_replay),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +467 -0
471 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 13/13 test/security: remove no MACsec support case
In reply to Akhil GoyalRemoved the test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec case as MACsec is now supported and capability can have valid MACsec support.
--- app/test/test_security.c | 37 ------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 37 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security.c +0 -37
@@ -1828,41 +1828,6 @@ test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol(void)return TEST_SUCCESS ; } -/** -* Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when macsec protocol -* is searched and capabilities table contain proper entry. -* However macsec records search is not supported in rte_security. -*/ -static int -test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec (void ) -{ -struct security_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; -struct rte_security_capability_idx idx = { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }; -struct rte_security_capability capabilities[] = { - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }, - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_NONE , - }, - }; - - mock_capabilities_get_exp.device =NULL ; - mock_capabilities_get_exp.ret = capabilities; - -const struct rte_security_capability *ret; - ret =rte_security_capability_get (&ut_params->ctx, &idx); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_FUNCTION_CALL_RET (rte_security_capability_get, - ret,NULL ,"%p" ); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_CALLS (mock_capabilities_get_exp,1 ); - -return TEST_SUCCESS ; -} -/** * Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when capabilities table * does not contain entry with matching ipsec proto field
@@ -2319,8 +2284,6 @@ static struct unit_test_suite security_testsuite = { test_capability_get_no_matching_action),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol), -TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, - test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_ipsec_mismatch_proto), TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
v3 cover Add MACsec unit test cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalInline MACsec offload was supported in DPDK 22.11
using rte_security APIs.
This patchset adds few minor changes in the rte_security APIs to specify the direction of SA/SC and update the SC configuration to set packet number threshold.
The patchset also add functional test cases in dpdk-test app to verify MACsec functionality.
This patchset is pending from last release [1] due to lack of hardware to test. Now the test cases are verified on Marvell cnxk PMD and the pmd support is added as a separate patchset.
[1] https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/cover/[email protected]/
Changes in v3:
- updated libabigail.abignore exception as suggested by David.
Changes in v2:
- Added abignore for experimental APIs
- Fixed build
Akhil Goyal (10):
security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
security: add MACsec packet number threshold
test/security: add inline MACsec cases
test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
test/security: add MACsec negative cases
test/security: verify MACsec stats
test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
test/security: remove no MACsec support case
Ankur Dwivedi (3):
test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security.c | 37 - app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 2332 ++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 3895 +++++++++++++++++ devtools/libabigail.abignore | 4 + lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 +- lib/security/rte_security.h | 24 +- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 +- 8 files changed, 6270 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 1/13 security: add direction in SA/SC configuration
MACsec SC/SA ids are created based on direction of the flow. Hence, added the missing field for configuration and cleanup of the SCs and SAs.
--- devtools/libabigail.abignore | 4 ++++ lib/security/rte_security.c | 16 ++++++++++------ lib/security/rte_security.h | 14 ++++++++++---- lib/security/rte_security_driver.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
devtools/libabigail.abignore +4 -0
@@ -41,3 +41,7 @@ ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ; Temporary exceptions till next major ABI version ; ;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; + +; Ignore changes to rte_security_ops which are internal to PMD. +[suppress_type] + name = rte_security_ops
lib/security/rte_security.c +10 -6
@@ -164,13 +164,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, }int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id) +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sc_destroy (instance->device, sc_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -181,13 +182,14 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sc_id }int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id) +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir) {int ret;RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_destroy, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP ); - ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id); + ret = instance->ops->macsec_sa_destroy (instance->device, sa_id, dir);if (ret !=0 )return ret;
@@ -199,22 +201,24 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy(struct rte_security_ctx *instance, uint16_t sa_idint rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sc_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sc_stats_get (instance->device, sc_id, dir, stats); }int rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats) {RTE_PTR_CHAIN3_OR_ERR_RET (instance, ops, macsec_sa_stats_get, -EINVAL , -ENOTSUP );RTE_PTR_OR_ERR_RET (stats, -EINVAL ); -return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, stats); +return instance->ops->macsec_sa_stats_get (instance->device, sa_id, dir, stats); }int
lib/security/rte_security.h +10 -4
@@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sc_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -768,7 +769,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sc_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id); +rte_security_macsec_sc_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * @warning
@@ -798,6 +800,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID to be destroyed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @return * - 0 if successful. * - -EINVAL if sa_id is invalid or instance is NULL.
@@ -805,7 +808,8 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_create(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,*/ __rte_experimental int -rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id); +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (struct rte_security_ctx *instance,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** Device-specific metadata field type */ typedef uint64_t rte_security_dynfield_t ;
@@ -1077,6 +1081,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sa_id SA ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SA * @param stats statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1085,7 +1090,7 @@ rte_security_session_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sa_id, +uint16_t sa_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);/**
@@ -1096,6 +1101,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,* * @param instance security instance * @param sc_id SC ID for which stats are needed +* @param dir direction of the SC * @param stats SC statistics * @return * - On success, return 0.
@@ -1104,7 +1110,7 @@ rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(struct rte_security_ctx *instance,__rte_experimental intrte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (struct rte_security_ctx *instance, -uint16_t sc_id, +uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
lib/security/rte_security_driver.h +10 -2
@@ -106,8 +106,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id MACsec SC ID +* @param dir Direction of SC */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Configure a MACsec security Association (SA) on a device.
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_create_t)(void *device, struct rte_security_mac* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id MACsec SA ID +* @param dir Direction of SA */ -typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id); +typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_destroy_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);/** * Get the size of a security session
@@ -162,6 +166,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sc_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SC * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -169,6 +174,7 @@ typedef int (*security_session_stats_get_t)(void *device,* - -EINVAL if sc_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats);/**
@@ -176,6 +182,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* * @param device Crypto/eth device pointer * @param sa_id secure channel ID created by rte_security_macsec_sc_create() +* @param dir direction of SA * @param stats SC stats of the driver * * @return
@@ -183,6 +190,7 @@ typedef int (*security_macsec_sc_stats_get_t)(void *device, uint16_t sc_id,* - -EINVAL if sa_id or device is invalid. */ typedef int (*security_macsec_sa_stats_get_t )(void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir,struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 2/13 security: add MACsec packet number threshold
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded Packet number threshold parameter in MACsec SC configuration to identify the maximum allowed threshold for packet number field in the packet.
A field is_xpn is also added to identify if the SAs are configured for extended packet number or not so that packet number threshold can be configured accordingly.
--- lib/security/rte_security.h | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/security/rte_security.h +8 -2
@@ -399,6 +399,8 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sa { struct rte_security_macsec_sc { /** Direction of SC */ enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir; + /** Packet number threshold */ + uint64_t pn_threshold; union { struct { /** SAs for each association number */
@@ -407,8 +409,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint8_t sa_in_use[RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ];/** Channel is active */ uint8_t active : 1; +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 7; + uint8_t reserved : 6; } sc_rx;struct {uint16_t sa_id;/**< SA ID to be used for encryption */
@@ -416,8 +420,10 @@ struct rte_security_macsec_sc {uint64_t sci;/**< SCI value to be used if send_sci is set */ uint8_t active : 1; /**< Channel is active */ uint8_t re_key_en : 1; /**< Enable Rekeying */ +/** Extended packet number is enabled for SAs */ + uint8_t is_xpn : 1;/** Reserved bitfields for future */ - uint8_t reserved : 6; + uint8_t reserved : 5; } sc_tx; }; };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 3/13 test/security: add inline MACsec cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalUpdated test app to verify Inline MACsec offload using rte_security APIs.
A couple of test cases are added to verify encap only and decap only of some known test vectors from MACsec specification.
--- app/test/meson.build | 1 + app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 1108 +++++++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 1086 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 2195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c create mode 100644 app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h
app/test/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ test_sources = files( 'test_rwlock.c', 'test_sched.c', 'test_security.c', + 'test_security_inline_macsec.c', 'test_security_inline_proto.c', 'test_seqlock.c', 'test_service_cores.c',
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c new file +1108 -0
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app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h new file +1086 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 4/13 test/security: add MACsec integrity cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test vectors and test cases to verify auth_only/verify_only and encap-decap/auth-verify to verify the complete TX-RX path using the loopback mode of ethdev.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 153 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 995 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 1148 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +153 -0
@@ -937,6 +937,143 @@ test_inline_macsec_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_VERIFY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1090,6 +1227,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec decap(De-cipher+verify) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec encap + decap known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth + verify known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +995 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 5/13 test/security: verify multi flow MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded test case and test vectors to verify multiple flows of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 49 ++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -0
@@ -1074,6 +1074,51 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *tv[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_vector iter[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, err; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + +for (i =0 ; i <MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; i++) { +memcpy (&iter[i].sa_key.data, sa_key,MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], plain_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], secure_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ ); + iter[i].sa_key.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ; + iter[i].plain_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].secure_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].alg =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128 ; + iter[i].ssci =0x0 ; + iter[i].xpn =0x0 ; + tv[i] = (const struct mcs_test_vector *)&iter[i]; + } + err =test_macsec (tv,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow failed" ); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow Passed" ); + err =0 ; + } +return err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1219,6 +1264,10 @@ inline_macsec_testsuite_teardown(void)static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { .suite_name ="Inline MACsec Ethernet Device Unit Test Suite" , .unit_test_cases = { +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap + decap Multi flow" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_multi_flow), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec encap(Cipher+Auth) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +109 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 6/13 test/security: add MACsec VLAN cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify MACsec processing with VLAN
tags inserted. Vectors are added to verify 1/2/3
VLAN tags in clear or encrypted data.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 67 ++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 217 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 284 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +67 -0
@@ -1119,6 +1119,69 @@ test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused)return err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_vlan_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_vlan_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, (2 * size) + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1292,6 +1355,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth + verify known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_with_vlan),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +217 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 7/13 test/security: add MACsec negative cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec negative test cases to verify
pkt drop, untagged rx, bad tag rx, sa not in use,
out packets untagged, pkts too long.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 346 +++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 475 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 821 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +346 -0
@@ -660,6 +660,103 @@ mcs_stats_dump(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op, } } +static int +mcs_stats_check (struct rte_security_ctx *ctx,enum mcs_op op, +const struct mcs_test_opts *opts, +const struct mcs_test_vector *td, +void *rx_sess,void *tx_sess, +uint8_t rx_sc_id,uint8_t tx_sc_id, +uint16_t rx_sa_id[],uint16_t tx_sa_id[]) +{ +struct rte_security_stats sess_stats = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_secy_stats *secy_stat; +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats sc_stat = {0 }; +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats sa_stat = {0 }; +int i; + +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, rx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if ((opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_notag_cnt !=1 ) || + (opts->check_untagged_rx && secy_stat->pkt_untaged_cnt !=1 )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_bad_tag_cnt && secy_stat->pkt_badtag_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_sa_not_in_use && secy_stat->pkt_nosaerror_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_decap_stats && secy_stat->octet_decrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_verify_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_validated_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, rx_sc_id, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sc_stat); + +if ((opts->check_decap_stats || opts->check_verify_only_stats) && + sc_stat.pkt_ok_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_invalid_stats && sc_stat.pkt_notvalid_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, rx_sa_id[i], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , &sa_stat); + + } + } + +if (op ==MCS_ENCAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || + op ==MCS_AUTH_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) { +memset (&sess_stats,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_stats )); +rte_security_session_stats_get (ctx, tx_sess, &sess_stats); + secy_stat = &sess_stats.macsec; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_untagged && secy_stat->pkt_untagged_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong && secy_stat->pkt_toolong_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && secy_stat->octet_encrypted_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && secy_stat->octet_protected_cnt != + (uint16_t )(td->plain_pkt.len -2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN )) +return TEST_FAILED ; + + +memset (&sc_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sc_stats_get (ctx, tx_sc_id,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + &sc_stat); + +if (opts->check_encap_stats && sc_stat.pkt_encrypt_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +if (opts->check_auth_only_stats && sc_stat.pkt_protected_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + +memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); +rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , &sa_stat); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -833,12 +930,23 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; } out: +if (opts->check_out_pkts_toolong ==1 || + opts->check_sa_not_in_use ==1 || + opts->check_bad_tag_cnt ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; +for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) {if (opts->dump_all_stats) {mcs_stats_dump (ctx, op, rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); + }else { +if (ret ==TEST_SUCCESS ) + ret =mcs_stats_check (ctx, op, opts, td[i], + rx_sess[i], tx_sess[i], + rx_sc_id[i], tx_sc_id[i], + rx_sa_id[i], tx_sa_id[i]); } }
@@ -1182,6 +1290,220 @@ test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nPacket drop case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_untagged_rx =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors) / +sizeof ((list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_untagged_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_bad_tag_cnt =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_bad_tag_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =0 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sa_not_in_use =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = false; + opts.protect_frames = false; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_out_pkts_untagged =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_NO_DISCARD ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =50 ; + opts.check_out_pkts_toolong =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1359,6 +1681,30 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_with_vlan), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec packet drop" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkt_drop), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec untagged Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_untagged_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec bad tag Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_bad_tag_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec SA not in use" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts untagged" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec out pkts too long" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +475 -0
481 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 8/13 test/security: verify MACsec stats
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded cases to verify various stats of MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 222 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +222 -0
@@ -1438,6 +1438,140 @@ test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_decap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_decap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nDecap stats case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_verify_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nVerify only stats case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_err_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =0 ; +else + err =-1 ; + + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_DISABLE ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_pkts_unchecked_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_untagged(const void *data __rte_unused) {
@@ -1504,6 +1638,70 @@ test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_encap_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_auth_only_stats =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) + err =-1 ; +else + err =0 ; + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1697,6 +1895,22 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec SA not in use", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_sa_not_in_use), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec decap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_decap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts invalid stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_invalid_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec pkts unchecked stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_pkts_unchecked_stats), TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST( "MACsec out pkts untagged", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec,
@@ -1705,6 +1919,14 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec out pkts too long", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_out_pkts_toolong), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only stats" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 9/13 test/security: verify MACsec interrupts
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 124 +++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 306 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 429 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +124 -0
@@ -757,6 +757,71 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,return 0 ; } +static int +test_macsec_event_callback (uint16_t port_id,enum rte_eth_event_type type, +void *param,void *ret_param) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector *vector = (struct mcs_err_vector *)param; +struct rte_eth_event_macsec_desc *event_desc =NULL ; + +RTE_SET_USED (port_id); + +if (type !=RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC ) +return -1 ; + + event_desc = ret_param; +if (event_desc ==NULL ) { +printf ("Event descriptor not set\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + vector->notify_event = true; + +switch (event_desc->type) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; +switch (event_desc->subtype) { +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 : + vector->event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 ; +break ; +default : +printf ("\nUnknown Macsec event subtype: %d" , event_desc->subtype); + } +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; +break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID : + vector->event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SA_NOT_VALID ; +break ; +default : +printf ("Invalid MACsec event reported\n" ); +return -1 ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int test_macsec (const struct mcs_test_vector *td[],enum mcs_op op,const struct mcs_test_opts *opts) {
@@ -914,6 +979,8 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcswhile (--nb_rx >=0 )rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[nb_rx]); ret =TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->check_sectag_interrupts ==1 ) + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; goto out; }
@@ -1702,6 +1769,59 @@ test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 }; +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, size; +int err, all_err =0 ; +enum rte_eth_event_macsec_subtype subtype[] = { +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 , +RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 , + }; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.check_sectag_interrupts =1 ; + + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_intr_test_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_intr_test_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_intr_test_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if ((err_vector.event ==RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ) && + (err_vector.event_subtype == subtype[i])) { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d passed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + }else { +printf ("\nSectag val err interrupt test case %d failed" , + cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -1927,6 +2047,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec auth only stats", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_auth_only_stats), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec interrupts all" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +305 -1
317 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 10/13 test/security: verify MACsec Tx HW rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalThis patch enables the Tx HW rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 137 +++++++++- .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 243 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 378 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +135 -2
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,uint8_t i; sc_conf->dir = dir; + sc_conf->pn_threshold = ((uint64_t )td->xpn <<32 ) | +rte_be_to_cpu_32 (*(const uint32_t *)(&td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off +2 ]));if (dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ) { sc_conf->sc_tx.sa_id = sa_id[0 ];if (sa_id[1 ] !=MCS_INVALID_SA ) {
@@ -232,12 +234,16 @@ fill_macsec_sc_conf(const struct mcs_test_vector *td,/* use some default SCI */ sc_conf->sc_tx.sci =0xf1341e023a2b1c5d ; } +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_tx.is_xpn =1 ; }else {for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) { sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_id[i] = sa_id[i]; sc_conf->sc_rx.sa_in_use[i] = opts->sa_in_use; } sc_conf->sc_rx.active =1 ; +if (td->xpn >0 ) + sc_conf->sc_rx.is_xpn =1 ; } }
@@ -834,6 +840,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsstruct rte_security_session_conf sess_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sa sa_conf = {0 };struct rte_security_macsec_sc sc_conf = {0 }; +struct mcs_err_vector err_vector = {0 };struct rte_security_ctx *ctx;int nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;
@@ -868,6 +875,34 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->rekey_en) { + + err_vector.td = td[i]; + err_vector.rekey_td = opts->rekey_td; + err_vector.event =RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; + err_vector.event_subtype =RTE_ETH_SUBEVENT_MACSEC_UNKNOWN ; +rte_eth_dev_callback_register (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY ) + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.len); +else { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.data, + opts->rekey_td->plain_pkt.len); + + tx_pkts_burst[j]->ol_flags |=RTE_MBUF_F_TX_MACSEC ; + } +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + j++; + } +if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) {
@@ -922,6 +957,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[i][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; tx_sa_id[i][1 ] =MCS_INVALID_SA ; +if (opts->rekey_en) { +memset (&sa_conf,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa )); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , + tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec rekey SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); + goto out; + } + tx_sa_id[i][1 ] = (uint16_t )id; + }fill_macsec_sc_conf (td[i], &sc_conf, opts,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , tx_sa_id[i], tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sc_create (ctx, &sc_conf);
@@ -984,9 +1033,44 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs goto out; } +if (opts->rekey_en) { +switch (err_vector.event) { +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +/* The first sa is active now, so the 0th sa can be +* reconfigured. Using the same key as zeroeth sa, but +* other key can also be configured. +*/ +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[0 ], &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX , + td[0 ]->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK , tci_off); + id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf); +if (id <0 ) { +printf ("MACsec SA create failed : %d.\n" , id); +return TEST_FAILED ; + } + tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id; +break ; +default : +printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); + } + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { - ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], op, - opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); +if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) { +/* The second received packet is matched with +* rekey td +*/ + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], + opts->rekey_td, op, + opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }else { + ret =test_macsec_post_process (rx_pkts_burst[i], td[i], + op, opts->check_out_pkts_untagged); + }if (ret !=TEST_SUCCESS ) {for ( ; i < nb_rx; i++)rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]);
@@ -1019,6 +1103,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsdestroy_default_flow (port_id); +if (opts->rekey_en) +rte_eth_dev_callback_unregister (port_id,RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC , + test_macsec_event_callback, &err_vector); +/* Destroy session so that other cases can create the session again */ for (i =0 ; i < opts->nb_td; i++) { if (op == MCS_ENCAP || op == MCS_ENCAP_DECAP ||
@@ -1029,6 +1117,10 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX);rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][0 ],RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); +if (opts->rekey_en) { +rte_security_macsec_sa_destroy (ctx, tx_sa_id[i][1 ], +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_TX ); + } }if (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {
@@ -1822,6 +1914,43 @@ test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.encrypt = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Tx hw rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2051,6 +2180,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec interrupts all", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_interrupts_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Tx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +243 -0
253 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 11/13 test/security: verify MACsec Rx rekey
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables the Rx rekey test case for MACSEC.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +49 -1
@@ -906,8 +906,14 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsif (op ==MCS_DECAP || op ==MCS_ENCAP_DECAP || op ==MCS_VERIFY_ONLY || op ==MCS_AUTH_VERIFY ) {for (an =0 ; an <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; an++) { +if (opts->rekey_en && an == + (opts->rekey_td->secure_pkt.data[tci_off] & +RTE_MACSEC_AN_MASK )) +fill_macsec_sa_conf (opts->rekey_td, &sa_conf, +RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); +else /* For simplicity, using same SA conf for all AN */ -fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf, +fill_macsec_sa_conf (td[i], &sa_conf,RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX , an, tci_off); id =rte_security_macsec_sa_create (ctx, &sa_conf);if (id <0 ) {
@@ -1054,6 +1060,9 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } tx_sa_id[0 ][0 ] = (uint16_t )id;break ; +case RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP : +printf ("Received RTE_ETH_EVENT_MACSEC_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP event\n" ); +break ;default :printf ("Received unsupported event\n" ); }
@@ -1951,6 +1960,41 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + opts.rekey_en =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_rekey_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_rekey_vectors)[0 ])); +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[i]; + opts.rekey_td = &list_mcs_rekey_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d failed\n" , i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Rx rekey test case %d passed\n" , i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2184,6 +2228,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Tx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_tx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec re-key Rx" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 12/13 test/security: verify MACsec anti replay
In reply to Akhil GoyalFrom: Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>
This patch enables anti replay test case for MACsec.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 82 +++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 467 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 549 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +82 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct mcs_test_opts {uint8_t replay_protect;uint8_t rekey_en;const struct mcs_test_vector *rekey_td; +const struct mcs_test_vector *ar_td[3 ];bool dump_all_stats;uint8_t check_untagged_rx;uint8_t check_bad_tag_cnt;
@@ -716,6 +717,15 @@ mcs_stats_check(struct rte_security_ctx *ctx, enum mcs_op op,if (opts->check_pkts_unchecked_stats && sc_stat.pkt_unchecked_cnt !=1 )return TEST_FAILED ; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +if (opts->replay_win_sz ==0 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=2 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; +else if (opts->replay_win_sz ==32 && + sc_stat.pkt_late_cnt !=1 ) +return TEST_FAILED ; + } +for (i =0 ; i <RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_NUM_AN ; i++) {memset (&sa_stat,0 ,sizeof (struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats )); rte_security_macsec_sa_stats_get(ctx, rx_sa_id[i],
@@ -845,6 +855,7 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcsint nb_rx =0 , nb_sent;int i, j =0 , ret, id, an =0 ;uint8_t tci_off; +int k;memset (rx_pkts_burst,0 ,sizeof (rx_pkts_burst[0 ]) * opts->nb_td);
@@ -875,6 +886,20 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } j++; +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (k =0 ; k <3 ; k++, j++) { + tx_pkts_burst[j] =init_packet (mbufpool, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.data, + opts->ar_td[k]->secure_pkt.len); +if (tx_pkts_burst[j] ==NULL ) { +while (j--) +rte_pktmbuf_free (tx_pkts_burst[j]); + ret =TEST_FAILED ; + goto out; + } + } + } +if (opts->rekey_en) { err_vector.td = td[i];
@@ -1068,6 +1093,15 @@ test_macsec(const struct mcs_test_vector *td[], enum mcs_op op, const struct mcs } } +if (opts->replay_protect) { +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) { +rte_pktmbuf_free (rx_pkts_burst[i]); + rx_pkts_burst[i] =NULL ; + } + ret =TEST_SUCCESS ; + goto out; + } +for (i =0 ; i < nb_rx; i++) {if (opts->rekey_en && i ==1 ) {/* The second received packet is matched with
@@ -1995,6 +2029,50 @@ test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_anti_replay(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +uint16_t replay_win_sz[2 ] = {32 ,0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; +int j; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.replay_protect =1 ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (j =0 ; j <2 ; j++) { + opts.replay_win_sz = replay_win_sz[j]; + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[i]; + opts.ar_td[0 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[1 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + opts.ar_td[2 ] = &list_mcs_anti_replay_vectors[++i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d failed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("Replay window: %u, Anti replay test case %d passed\n" , + opts.replay_win_sz, i); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -2232,6 +2310,10 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec re-key Rx", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_rekey_rx), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec anti-replay" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_anti_replay),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +467 -0
471 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v3 13/13 test/security: remove no MACsec support case
In reply to Akhil GoyalRemoved the test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec case as MACsec is now supported and capability can have valid MACsec support.
--- app/test/test_security.c | 37 ------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 37 deletions(-)
app/test/test_security.c +0 -37
@@ -1828,41 +1828,6 @@ test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol(void)return TEST_SUCCESS ; } -/** -* Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when macsec protocol -* is searched and capabilities table contain proper entry. -* However macsec records search is not supported in rte_security. -*/ -static int -test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec (void ) -{ -struct security_unittest_params *ut_params = &unittest_params; -struct rte_security_capability_idx idx = { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }; -struct rte_security_capability capabilities[] = { - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_LOOKASIDE_PROTOCOL , - .protocol =RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC , - }, - { - .action =RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_NONE , - }, - }; - - mock_capabilities_get_exp.device =NULL ; - mock_capabilities_get_exp.ret = capabilities; - -const struct rte_security_capability *ret; - ret =rte_security_capability_get (&ut_params->ctx, &idx); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_FUNCTION_CALL_RET (rte_security_capability_get, - ret,NULL ,"%p" ); -TEST_ASSERT_MOCK_CALLS (mock_capabilities_get_exp,1 ); - -return TEST_SUCCESS ; -} -/** * Test execution of rte_security_capability_get when capabilities table * does not contain entry with matching ipsec proto field
@@ -2319,8 +2284,6 @@ static struct unit_test_suite security_testsuite = { test_capability_get_no_matching_action),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_no_matching_protocol), -TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, - test_capability_get_no_support_for_macsec),TEST_CASE_ST (ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown, test_capability_get_ipsec_mismatch_proto), TEST_CASE_ST(ut_setup_with_session, ut_teardown,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v3 00/13] Add MACsec unit test cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalQuoted 11 lines
Subject: [PATCH v3 00/13] Add MACsec unit test cases
Inline MACsec offload was supported in DPDK 22.11
usingrte_securityAPIs.
This patchset adds few minor changes in therte_securityAPIs to specify the direction of SA/SC and update the SC configuration to set packet number threshold.The patchset also add functional test cases in dpdk-test app to verify MACsec functionality.
Quoted 7 lines
This patchset is pending from last release [1] due to lack of hardware to test. Now the test cases are verified on Marvell cnxk PMD and the pmd support is added as a separate patchset.
[1] https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/cover/20220928124516.93050-1-
[email protected]/
Patchset applied to dpdk-next-crypto
PATCH 5/5 test/security: add more MACsec cases
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded more cases related to decap and auth + cipher.
--- app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c | 305 +++++++++++++++++ .../test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h | 321 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 626 insertions(+)
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec.c +305 -0
@@ -655,6 +655,283 @@ test_inline_macsec_encap_all(const void *data __rte_unused)return all_err; } +static int +test_inline_macsec_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Decryption case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Decryption case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_VERIFY_ONLY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_cipher_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_cipher_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_cipher_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encap-decap case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + + +static int +test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_integrity_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_integrity_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_integrity_vectors[i]; + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_AUTH_VERIFY , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nAuth Generate + Verify case %d Passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, size + all_err, -all_err); + +return all_err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_multi_flow(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *tv[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_vector iter[MCS_MAX_FLOWS ]; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int i, err; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + +for (i =0 ; i <MCS_MAX_FLOWS ; i++) { +memcpy (&iter[i].sa_key.data, sa_key,MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].plain_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], plain_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data, eth_addrs[i],2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); +memcpy (&iter[i].secure_pkt.data[2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ], secure_user_data, +MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ ); + iter[i].sa_key.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ; + iter[i].hash_key.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_KEY_SZ ; + iter[i].plain_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_PLAIN_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].secure_pkt.len =MCS_MULTI_FLOW_TD_SECURE_DATA_SZ + + (2 *RTE_ETHER_ADDR_LEN ); + iter[i].alg =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_ALG_GCM_128 ; + iter[i].ssci =0x0 ; + iter[i].xpn =0x0 ; + tv[i] = (const struct mcs_test_vector *)&iter[i]; + } + err =test_macsec (tv,MCS_ENCAP_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow failed" ); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\nCipher Auth Encryption multi flow Passed" ); + err =0 ; + } +return err; +} + +static int +test_inline_macsec_with_vlan(const void *data __rte_unused) +{ +const struct mcs_test_vector *cur_td; +struct mcs_test_opts opts = {0 }; +int err, all_err =0 ; +int i, size; + + opts.val_frames =RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_VALIDATE_STRICT ; + opts.protect_frames = true; + opts.sa_in_use =1 ; + opts.nb_td =1 ; + opts.mtu =RTE_ETHER_MTU ; + + size = (sizeof (list_mcs_vlan_vectors) /sizeof ((list_mcs_vlan_vectors)[0 ])); + +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_ENCAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Encap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } +for (i =0 ; i < size; i++) { + cur_td = &list_mcs_vlan_vectors[i]; +if (i ==0 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =1 ; + }else if (i ==1 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =1 ; + }else if (i ==2 ) { + opts.sectag_insert_mode =0 ;/* offset from special E-type */ + opts.nb_vlan =2 ; + } + err =test_macsec (&cur_td,MCS_DECAP , &opts); +if (err) { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d failed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =-1 ; + }else { +printf ("\n VLAN Decap case %d passed" , cur_td->test_idx); + err =0 ; + } + all_err += err; + } + +printf ("\n%s: Success: %d, Failure: %d\n" , __func__, (2 * size) + all_err, -all_err); +return all_err; +} +static int ut_setup_inline_macsec (void ) {
@@ -804,6 +1081,34 @@ static struct unit_test_suite inline_macsec_testsuite = { "MACsec encap(Cipher+Auth) known vector", ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, test_inline_macsec_encap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec decap(De-cipher+verify) known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec verify only known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_verify_only_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec encap + decap known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_encap_decap_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec auth + verify known vector" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_auth_verify_all), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap + decap Multi flow" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_multi_flow), +TEST_CASE_NAMED_ST ( +"MACsec Encap and decap with VLAN" , + ut_setup_inline_macsec, ut_teardown_inline_macsec, + test_inline_macsec_with_vlan),TEST_CASES_END ()/**< NULL terminate unit test array */ },
app/test/test_security_inline_macsec_vectors.h +321 -0
328 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
cover net/cnxk: add MACsec support
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec support in Marvell cnxk PMD. The patchset is pending from last release [1] Sending as a new series as the functionality is now complete and tested on hardware.
Depends-on: https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/list/?series=28140
[1] https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/cover/[email protected]/
Akhil Goyal (15):
common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization common/cnxk: add MACsec SA configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec SC configuration APIs common/cnxk: add MACsec secy and flow configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec PN and LMAC mode configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec stats
common/cnxk: add MACsec interrupt APIs common/cnxk: add MACsec port configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec control port configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec FIPS mbox common/cnxk: derive hash key for MACsec net/cnxk: add MACsec initialization
net/cnxk: create/destroy MACsec SC/SA net/cnxk: add MACsec session and flow configuration net/cnxk: add MACsec stats
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c | 86 ++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h | 4 +- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c | 86 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h | 6 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c | 21 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h | 2 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 524 ++++++++++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 895 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 619 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 73 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 528 +++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c | 193 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c | 5 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 44 ++ drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 25 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c | 22 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c | 15 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 30 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 726 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 111 ++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c | 2 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_flow.c | 5 + drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + 27 files changed, 3995 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/15 common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization
Added ROC init and fini APIs for supporting MACsec.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h | 6 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c | 21 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h | 2 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 65 +++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 39 +++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 65 ++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c | 5 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 6 + 13 files changed, 461 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_irq.c', 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', + 'roc_mcs.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h +3 -0
@@ -114,4 +114,7 @@/* ML */ #include "roc_ml.h" +/* MACsec */ +#include "roc_mcs.h" +#endif /* _ROC_API_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h +6 -0
@@ -40,4 +40,10 @@ roc_feature_nix_has_reass(void) return roc_model_is_cn10ka(); } +static inline bool +roc_feature_nix_has_macsec (void ) +{ +return roc_model_is_cn10kb (); +} +#endif
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c +21 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ idev_set_defaults(struct idev_cfg *idev) idev->num_lmtlines =0 ; idev->bphy =NULL ; idev->cpt =NULL ; + idev->mcs =NULL ; idev->nix_inl_dev =NULL ;plt_spinlock_init (&idev->nix_inl_dev_lock);plt_spinlock_init (&idev->npa_dev_lock);
@@ -186,6 +187,26 @@ roc_idev_cpt_get(void)return NULL ; } +struct roc_mcs * +roc_idev_mcs_get (void ) +{ +struct idev_cfg *idev =idev_get_cfg (); + +if (idev !=NULL ) +return idev->mcs; + +return NULL ; +} + +void +roc_idev_mcs_set (struct roc_mcs *mcs) +{ +struct idev_cfg *idev =idev_get_cfg (); + +if (idev !=NULL ) +__atomic_store_n (&idev->mcs, mcs, __ATOMIC_RELEASE); +} +uint64_t *roc_nix_inl_outb_ring_base_get (struct roc_nix *roc_nix) {
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h +2 -0
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@ void __roc_api roc_idev_cpt_set(struct roc_cpt *cpt); struct roc_nix *__roc_api roc_idev_npa_nix_get(void); uint64_t __roc_api roc_idev_nix_inl_meta_aura_get(void); +struct roc_mcs *__roc_api roc_idev_mcs_get(void); +void __roc_api roc_idev_mcs_set(struct roc_mcs *mcs);#endif /* _ROC_IDEV_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct idev_cfg {struct roc_bphy *bphy;struct roc_cpt *cpt;struct roc_sso *sso; +struct roc_mcs *mcs;struct nix_inl_dev *nix_inl_dev;struct idev_nix_inl_cfg inl_cfg;plt_spinlock_t nix_inl_dev_lock;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +64 -1
77 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +245 -0
245 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _ROC_MCS_H_ +#define _ROC_MCS_H_ + +#define MCS_AES_GCM_256_KEYLEN 32 + +struct roc_mcs_hw_info { +uint8_t num_mcs_blks;/* Number of MCS blocks */ +uint8_t tcam_entries;/* RX/TX Tcam entries per mcs block */ +uint8_t secy_entries;/* RX/TX SECY entries per mcs block */ +uint8_t sc_entries;/* RX/TX SC CAM entries per mcs block */ +uint16_t sa_entries;/* PN table entries = SA entries */ +uint64_t rsvd[16 ]; +}; + + +struct roc_mcs { +TAILQ_ENTRY (roc_mcs) next; +struct plt_pci_device *pci_dev; +struct mbox *mbox; +void *userdata; +uint8_t idx; +uint8_t refcount; + +#define ROC_MCS_MEM_SZ (1 * 1024) + uint8_t reserved[ROC_MCS_MEM_SZ] __plt_cache_aligned; +} __plt_cache_aligned; + +/* Initialization */ +__roc_api struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs_dev_init(uint8_t mcs_idx); +__roc_api void roc_mcs_dev_fini(struct roc_mcs *mcs); +/* Get roc mcs dev structure */ +__roc_api struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs_dev_get(uint8_t mcs_idx); +/* HW info get */ +__roc_api int roc_mcs_hw_info_get(struct roc_mcs_hw_info *hw_info); +#endif /* _ROC_MCS_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h new file +65 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h +3 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@/* DPI */ #include "roc_dpi_priv.h" +/* MCS */ +#include "roc_mcs_priv.h" +/* REE */ #include "roc_ree_priv.h"
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c +5 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case NPA_ERR_PARAM :case NPC_ERR_PARAM :case SSO_ERR_PARAM : +case MCS_ERR_PARAM :case UTIL_ERR_PARAM : err_msg ="Invalid parameter" ;break ;
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode) err_msg ="Operation not supported" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : +case MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : err_msg ="Hardware does not support" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_QUEUE_INVALID_RANGE :
@@ -223,6 +225,9 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case SSO_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_BOUNDED : err_msg ="SSO pf/vf not found" ;break ; +case MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND : + err_msg ="MCS device not found" ; +break ;case UTIL_ERR_FS : err_msg ="file operation failed" ;break ;
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +6 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ INTERNAL { roc_idev_cpt_get; roc_idev_cpt_set; roc_idev_lmt_base_addr_get; + roc_idev_mcs_get; + roc_idev_mcs_set; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_get; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_set; roc_idev_npa_nix_get;
@@ -131,6 +133,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_dev_init; + roc_mcs_dev_fini; + roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 01/15] common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c line 10
Quoted 11 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added ROC init and fini APIs for supporting MACsec.
Signed-off-by Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vamsi Attunuru <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>---
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +4
-0+ +TAILQ_HEAD (roc_mcs_head, roc_mcs); +/* Local mcs tailq list */ +static struct roc_mcs_head roc_mcs_head =TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER (roc_mcs_head);
Can we remove this global variable by moving? This is to avoid breaking multiprocess,
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c line 179
Quoted 7 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +7
-0+struct roc_mcs * +roc_mcs_dev_init (uint8_t mcs_idx) +{ +struct roc_mcs *mcs; +struct npa_lf *npa; + +if (roc_model_is_cn10kb ()) {
Use roc_feature_nix_has_macsec()
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c line 192
Quoted 13 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +13
-0+ mcs =roc_idev_mcs_get (); +if (mcs) { +plt_info ("Skipping device, mcs device already probed" ); + mcs->refcount++; +return mcs; + } + } + + mcs =plt_zmalloc (sizeof (struct roc_mcs ),PLT_CACHE_LINE_SIZE ); +if (!mcs) +return NULL ; + +if (roc_model_is_cnf10kb () ||roc_model_is_cn10kb ()) {
Use roc_feature_nix_has_macsec()
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h line 18
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h new file +8
-0+MCS_ERR_PARAM =-900 , +MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP =-901 , + MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND = -902, +}; + +#define MCS_SUPPORT_CHECK \ + do { \ + if (!(roc_model_is_cnf10kb() || roc_model_is_cn10kb_a0())) \
Use roc_feature_nix_has_macsec()
PATCH 2/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec SA configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to allocate/free MACsec resources
and APIs to write SA policy.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 12 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 43 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 4 + 5 files changed, 271 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', 'roc_mcs.c', + 'roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +12 -0
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ struct mbox_msghdr {M (MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES ,0xa000 , mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_SA_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa005, mcs_sa_plcy_write, mcs_sa_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_GET_HW_INFO ,0xa00b , mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \/* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */
@@ -705,6 +706,17 @@ struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io plcy[2][9]; /* Support 2 SA policy */ + uint8_t __io sa_index[2]; + uint8_t __io sa_cnt; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io num_mcs_blks; /* Number of MCS blocks */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +43 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c new file +211 -0
211 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +4 -0
@@ -133,10 +133,14 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc; roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 02/15] common/cnxk: add MACsec SA configuration
Quoted 13 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added ROC APIs to allocate/free MACsec resources and APIs to write SA policy.
Signed-off-by Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vamsi Attunuru <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>---
index
7593c7c890..9266edd9a1100644
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map INTERNAL { · line 136
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +1
-0@@ -133,10 +133,14 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc;
Please change to roc_mcs_rsrc_alloc
i.e keeping action as last
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map INTERNAL { · line 140
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +1
-0roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_free_rsrc;
Same as above.
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +2
-1roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect; --2.25.1
PATCH 3/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec SC configuration APIs
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to configure MACsec secure channel(SC) and its mapping with SAs for both Rx and Tx.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 37 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 41 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 7 ++ 4 files changed, 256 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +37 -0
@@ -280,7 +280,10 @@ struct mbox_msghdr {M (MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES ,0xa000 , mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_RX_SC_CAM_WRITE, 0xa004, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SA_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa005, mcs_sa_plcy_write, mcs_sa_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_TX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa006, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_RX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa007, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_GET_HW_INFO ,0xa00b , mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \/* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */
@@ -706,6 +709,16 @@ struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +/* RX SC_CAM mapping */ +struct mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io sci; /* SCI */ + uint64_t __io secy_id; /* secy index mapped to SC */ + uint8_t __io sc_id; /* SC CAM entry index */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint64_t __io plcy[2][9]; /* Support 2 SA policy */
@@ -716,6 +729,30 @@ struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_tx_sc_sa_map { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io sa_index0; + uint8_t __io sa_index1; + uint8_t __io rekey_ena; + uint8_t __io sa_index0_vld; + uint8_t __io sa_index1_vld; + uint8_t __io tx_sa_active; + uint64_t __io sectag_sci; + uint8_t __io sc_id; /* used as index for SA_MEM_MAP */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_rx_sc_sa_map { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io sa_index; + uint8_t __io sa_in_use; + uint8_t __io sc_id; +/* an range is 0-3, sc_id + an used as index SA_MEM_MAP */ + uint8_t __io an; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +};struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +41 -0
57 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c +171 -0
174 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +7 -0
@@ -139,8 +139,15 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_dev_get; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 4/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec secy and flow configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to configure MACsec secy policy and flow entries.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 38 +++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 37 +++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 5 ++ 4 files changed, 195 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +38 -0
@@ -280,10 +280,14 @@ struct mbox_msghdr {M (MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES ,0xa000 , mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_FLOWID_ENTRY_WRITE ,0xa002 , mcs_flowid_entry_write, mcs_flowid_entry_write_req, \ + msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_SECY_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa003, mcs_secy_plcy_write, mcs_secy_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_RX_SC_CAM_WRITE, 0xa004, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SA_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa005, mcs_sa_plcy_write, mcs_sa_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_TX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa006, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_RX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa007, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FLOWID_ENA_ENTRY, 0xa008, mcs_flowid_ena_entry, mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_GET_HW_INFO ,0xa00b , mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \/* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */
@@ -709,6 +713,31 @@ struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_flowid_entry_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io data[4]; + uint64_t __io mask[4]; + uint64_t __io sci; /* CNF10K-B for tx_secy_mem_map */ + uint8_t __io flow_id; + uint8_t __io secy_id; /* secyid for which flowid is mapped */ +/* sc_id is Valid if dir = MCS_TX, SC_CAM id mapped to flowid */ + uint8_t __io sc_id; + uint8_t __io ena; /* Enable tcam entry */ + uint8_t __io ctr_pkt; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_secy_plcy_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io plcy; + uint8_t __io secy_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +/* RX SC_CAM mapping */ struct mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr;
@@ -754,6 +783,15 @@ struct mcs_rx_sc_sa_map { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io flow_id; + uint8_t __io ena; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io num_mcs_blks; /* Number of MCS blocks */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +37 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,24 @@ struct roc_mcs_free_rsrc_req {uint8_t all;/* Free all the cam resources */ }; +struct roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write_req { +uint64_t data[4 ]; +uint64_t mask[4 ]; +uint64_t sci;/* 105N for tx_secy_mem_map */ +uint8_t flow_id; +uint8_t secy_id;/* secyid for which flowid is mapped */ +uint8_t sc_id;/* Valid if dir = MCS_TX, SC_CAM id mapped to flowid */ +uint8_t ena;/* Enable tcam entry */ +uint8_t ctr_pkt; +uint8_t dir; +}; + +struct roc_mcs_secy_plcy_write_req { +uint64_t plcy; +uint8_t secy_id; +uint8_t dir; +}; +/* RX SC_CAM mapping */ struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req {uint64_t sci;/* SCI */
@@ -64,6 +82,12 @@ struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map {uint8_t an;/* value range 0-3, sc_id + an used as index SA_MEM_MAP */ }; +struct roc_mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry { +uint8_t flow_id; +uint8_t ena; +uint8_t dir; +}; +struct roc_mcs_hw_info {uint8_t num_mcs_blks;/* Number of MCS blocks */ uint8_t tcam_entries;/* RX/TX Tcam entries per mcs block */
@@ -110,6 +134,11 @@ __roc_api int roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs, struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req *rx_sc_cam); __roc_api int roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable(struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req *rx_sc_cam); +/* SECY policy read and write */ +__roc_api int roc_mcs_secy_policy_write(struct roc_mcs *mcs, +struct roc_mcs_secy_plcy_write_req *secy_plcy); +__roc_api int roc_mcs_secy_policy_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs, +struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req *rx_sc_cam);/* RX SC-SA MAP read and write */ __roc_api int roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write(struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map *rx_sc_sa_map);
@@ -120,4 +149,12 @@ __roc_api int roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write(struct roc_mcs *mcs, struct roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map *tx_sc_sa_map); __roc_api int roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map *tx_sc_sa_map); +/* Flow entry read, write and enable */ +__roc_api int roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write(struct roc_mcs *mcs, +struct roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write_req *flowid_req); +__roc_api int roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs, +struct roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write_req *flowid_rsp); +__roc_api int roc_mcs_flowid_entry_enable(struct roc_mcs *mcs, +struct roc_mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry *entry); +#endif /* _ROC_MCS_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c +115 -0
124 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +5 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_enable; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; + roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable;
@@ -146,6 +149,8 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; + roc_mcs_secy_policy_read; + roc_mcs_secy_policy_write; roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read; roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec PN and LMAC mode configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs for setting packet number and LMAC
related configurations.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 31 ++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 5 ++ 5 files changed, 211 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +56 -0
@@ -288,7 +288,11 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(MCS_TX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa006, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_RX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa007, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_FLOWID_ENA_ENTRY, 0xa008, mcs_flowid_ena_entry, mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_PN_TABLE_WRITE, 0xa009, mcs_pn_table_write, mcs_pn_table_write_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_SET_ACTIVE_LMAC, 0xa00a, mcs_set_active_lmac, mcs_set_active_lmac, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_GET_HW_INFO, 0xa00b, mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \ + M(MCS_SET_LMAC_MODE, 0xa013, mcs_set_lmac_mode, mcs_set_lmac_mode, msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_SET_PN_THRESHOLD ,0xa014 , mcs_set_pn_threshold, mcs_set_pn_threshold, msg_rsp) \ /* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */#define MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES \
@@ -792,6 +796,34 @@ struct mcs_flowid_ena_dis_entry { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_pn_table_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io next_pn; + uint8_t __io pn_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_cam_entry_read_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rsrc_type; /* TCAM/SECY/SC/SA/PN */ + uint8_t __io rsrc_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_cam_entry_read_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io reg_val[10]; + uint8_t __io rsrc_type; + uint8_t __io rsrc_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io num_mcs_blks; /* Number of MCS blocks */
@@ -802,6 +834,30 @@ struct mcs_hw_info { uint64_t __io rsvd[16]; }; +struct mcs_set_active_lmac { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint32_t __io lmac_bmap; /* bitmap of active lmac per mcs block */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; +uint16_t channel_base;/* MCS channel base */ + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_set_lmac_mode { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io mode; /* '1' for internal bypass mode (passthrough), '0' for MCS processing */ + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_set_pn_threshold { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io threshold; + uint8_t __io xpn; /* '1' for setting xpn threshold */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +};/* NPA mbox message formats */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c +71 -0
77 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +48 -0
72 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c +31 -0
@@ -210,6 +210,37 @@ roc_mcs_sa_policy_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs __plt_unused,return -ENOTSUP ; } +int +roc_mcs_pn_table_write (struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_pn_table_write_req *pn_table) +{ +struct mcs_pn_table_write_req *pn; +struct msg_rsp *rsp; + +MCS_SUPPORT_CHECK ; + +if (pn_table ==NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + + pn =mbox_alloc_msg_mcs_pn_table_write (mcs->mbox); +if (pn ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; + + pn->next_pn = pn_table->next_pn; + pn->pn_id = pn_table->pn_id; + pn->mcs_id = mcs->idx; + pn->dir = pn_table->dir; + +return mbox_process_msg (mcs->mbox, (void *)&rsp); +} + +int +roc_mcs_pn_table_read(struct roc_mcs *mcs __plt_unused, + struct roc_mcs_pn_table_write_req *sa __plt_unused) +{ +MCS_SUPPORT_CHECK ; + +return -ENOTSUP ; +}int roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write (struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req *rx_sc_cam)
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +5 -0
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_active_lmac_set; roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc; roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini;
@@ -142,6 +143,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_lmac_mode_set; + roc_mcs_pn_table_write; + roc_mcs_pn_table_read; + roc_mcs_pn_threshold_set; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 05/15] common/cnxk: add MACsec PN and LMAC mode configuration
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h struct mcs_hw_info { · line 841
Quoted 12 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added ROC APIs for setting packet number and LMAC
related configurations.Signed-off-by Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vamsi Attunuru <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +5
-0+struct mcs_set_active_lmac { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint32_t __io lmac_bmap; /* bitmap of active lmac per mcs block */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; +uint16_t channel_base;/* MCS channel base */
Gotcha . Found a missing __io
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +3
-0+ uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +
PATCH 6/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec stats
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs for MACsec stats for SC/SECY/FLOW/PORT
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 93 ++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 85 ++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c | 193 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 5 + 5 files changed, 377 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_mbox.c', 'roc_mcs.c', 'roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c', + 'roc_mcs_stats.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +93 -0
105 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +85 -0
95 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c new file +193 -0
193 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +5 -0
@@ -141,12 +141,14 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_flowid_entry_enable; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; + roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_mcs_lmac_mode_set; roc_mcs_pn_table_write; roc_mcs_pn_table_read; roc_mcs_pn_threshold_set; + roc_mcs_port_stats_get; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write;
@@ -154,8 +156,11 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; + roc_mcs_sc_stats_get; roc_mcs_secy_policy_read; roc_mcs_secy_policy_write; + roc_mcs_secy_stats_get; + roc_mcs_stats_clear; roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read; roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec interrupt APIs
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to support various MACsec interrupts.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 37 +++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 8 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 3 + 6 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c +86 -0
@@ -500,6 +500,91 @@ pf_vf_mbox_send_up_msg(struct dev *dev, void *rec_msg) } } +static int +mbox_up_handler_mcs_intr_notify (struct dev *dev,struct mcs_intr_info *info,struct msg_rsp *rsp) +{ +struct roc_mcs_event_desc desc = {0 }; +struct roc_mcs *mcs; + +plt_base_dbg ("pf:%d/vf:%d msg id 0x%x (%s) from: pf:%d/vf:%d" ,dev_get_pf (dev->pf_func), +dev_get_vf (dev->pf_func), info->hdr.id,mbox_id2name (info->hdr.id), +dev_get_pf (info->hdr.pcifunc),dev_get_vf (info->hdr.pcifunc)); + + mcs =roc_mcs_dev_get (info->mcs_id); +if (!mcs) + goto exit; + +if (info->intr_mask) { +switch (info->intr_mask) { +case MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1 ; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1 ; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48 ; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1 ; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SECTAG_VAL_ERR ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1 ; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_PACKET_XPN_EQ0_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; + desc.metadata.sa_idx = info->sa_id; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_RX_PN_THRESH_REACHED_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; + desc.metadata.sa_idx = info->sa_id; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_TX_PACKET_XPN_EQ0_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_HARD_EXP ; + desc.metadata.sa_idx = info->sa_id; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_TX_PN_THRESH_REACHED_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_TX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP ; + desc.metadata.sa_idx = info->sa_id; +break ; +case MCS_CPM_TX_SA_NOT_VALID_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_SA_NOT_VALID ; +break ; +case MCS_BBE_RX_DFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT : +case MCS_BBE_TX_DFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_DATA_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.metadata.lmac_id = info->lmac_id; +break ; +case MCS_BBE_RX_PLFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT : +case MCS_BBE_TX_PLFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_POLICY_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.metadata.lmac_id = info->lmac_id; +break ; +case MCS_PAB_RX_CHAN_OVERFLOW_INT : +case MCS_PAB_TX_CHAN_OVERFLOW_INT : + desc.type =ROC_MCS_EVENT_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.subtype =ROC_MCS_EVENT_PKT_ASSM_FIFO_OVERFLOW ; + desc.metadata.lmac_id = info->lmac_id; +break ; +default : + goto exit; + } + +mcs_event_cb_process (mcs, &desc); + } + +exit: + rsp->hdr.rc =0 ; +return 0 ; +} +static int mbox_up_handler_cgx_link_event (struct dev *dev,struct cgx_link_info_msg *msg,struct msg_rsp *rsp)
@@ -588,6 +673,7 @@ mbox_process_msgs_up(struct dev *dev, struct mbox_msghdr *req)return err; \ }MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES + MBOX_UP_MCS_MESSAGES#undef M }
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +36 -1
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(MCS_GET_SC_STATS, 0xa00e, mcs_get_sc_stats, mcs_stats_req, mcs_sc_stats) \ M(MCS_GET_PORT_STATS, 0xa010, mcs_get_port_stats, mcs_stats_req, mcs_port_stats) \ M(MCS_CLEAR_STATS, 0xa011, mcs_clear_stats, mcs_clear_stats, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_INTR_CFG, 0xa012, mcs_intr_cfg, mcs_intr_cfg, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SET_LMAC_MODE, 0xa013, mcs_set_lmac_mode, mcs_set_lmac_mode, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_SET_PN_THRESHOLD ,0xa014 , mcs_set_pn_threshold, mcs_set_pn_threshold, msg_rsp) \
@@ -304,9 +305,11 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(CGX_LINK_EVENT, 0xC00, cgx_link_event, cgx_link_info_msg, msg_rsp) \ M(CGX_PTP_RX_INFO, 0xC01, cgx_ptp_rx_info, cgx_ptp_rx_info_msg, msg_rsp) +#define MBOX_UP_MCS_MESSAGES M(MCS_INTR_NOTIFY, 0xE00, mcs_intr_notify, mcs_intr_info, msg_rsp) +enum { #define M(_name, _id, _1, _2, _3) MBOX_MSG_##_name = _id, - MBOX_MESSAGES MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES + MBOX_MESSAGES MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES MBOX_UP_MCS_MESSAGES#undef M };
@@ -847,6 +850,38 @@ struct mcs_set_active_lmac { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +#define MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_V_EQ1_INT BIT_ULL(0) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_E_EQ0_C_EQ1_INT BIT_ULL(1) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_SL_GTE48_INT BIT_ULL(2) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_ES_EQ1_SC_EQ1_INT BIT_ULL(3) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_SECTAG_SC_EQ1_SCB_EQ1_INT BIT_ULL(4) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_PACKET_XPN_EQ0_INT BIT_ULL(5) +#define MCS_CPM_RX_PN_THRESH_REACHED_INT BIT_ULL(6) +#define MCS_CPM_TX_PACKET_XPN_EQ0_INT BIT_ULL(7) +#define MCS_CPM_TX_PN_THRESH_REACHED_INT BIT_ULL(8) +#define MCS_CPM_TX_SA_NOT_VALID_INT BIT_ULL(9) +#define MCS_BBE_RX_DFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(10) +#define MCS_BBE_RX_PLFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(11) +#define MCS_BBE_TX_DFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(12) +#define MCS_BBE_TX_PLFIFO_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(13) +#define MCS_PAB_RX_CHAN_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(14) +#define MCS_PAB_TX_CHAN_OVERFLOW_INT BIT_ULL(15) + +struct mcs_intr_cfg { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io intr_mask; /* Interrupt enable mask */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; +}; + +struct mcs_intr_info { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io intr_mask; + int __io sa_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_set_lmac_mode {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io mode; /* '1' for internal bypass mode (passthrough), '0' for MCS processing */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c +117 -0
141 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +144 -0
160 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h +8 -0
@@ -62,4 +62,12 @@ roc_mcs_to_mcs_priv(struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs) return (struct mcs_priv *)&roc_mcs->reserved[0]; } +static inline void * +roc_mcs_to_mcs_cb_list (struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs) +{ +return (void *)((uintptr_t )roc_mcs->reserved +sizeof (struct mcs_priv )); +} + +int mcs_event_cb_process (struct roc_mcs *mcs,struct roc_mcs_event_desc *desc); +#endif /* _ROC_MCS_PRIV_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +3 -0
@@ -138,12 +138,15 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_event_cb_register; + roc_mcs_event_cb_unregister; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_enable; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_intr_configure; roc_mcs_lmac_mode_set; roc_mcs_pn_table_write; roc_mcs_pn_table_read;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 8/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec port configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs for MACsec port configurations
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 40 ++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 345 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 48 +++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 4 + 4 files changed, 437 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +40 -0
@@ -299,6 +299,9 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(MCS_INTR_CFG, 0xa012, mcs_intr_cfg, mcs_intr_cfg, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SET_LMAC_MODE, 0xa013, mcs_set_lmac_mode, mcs_set_lmac_mode, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SET_PN_THRESHOLD, 0xa014, mcs_set_pn_threshold, mcs_set_pn_threshold, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_PORT_RESET, 0xa018, mcs_port_reset, mcs_port_reset_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_PORT_CFG_SET, 0xa019, mcs_port_cfg_set, mcs_port_cfg_set_req, msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_PORT_CFG_GET ,0xa020 , mcs_port_cfg_get, mcs_port_cfg_get_req, mcs_port_cfg_get_rsp) \ /* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */#define MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES \
@@ -899,6 +902,43 @@ struct mcs_set_pn_threshold { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_port_cfg_set_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io cstm_tag_rel_mode_sel; + uint8_t __io custom_hdr_enb; + uint8_t __io fifo_skid; + uint8_t __io lmac_mode; + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_port_cfg_get_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_port_cfg_get_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io cstm_tag_rel_mode_sel; + uint8_t __io custom_hdr_enb; + uint8_t __io fifo_skid; + uint8_t __io lmac_mode; + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_port_reset_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io reset; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io lmac_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_stats_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io id;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c +345 -0
363 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +48 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +4 -0
@@ -151,6 +151,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_pn_table_write; roc_mcs_pn_table_read; roc_mcs_pn_threshold_set; + roc_mcs_port_cfg_get; + roc_mcs_port_cfg_set; + roc_mcs_port_recovery; + roc_mcs_port_reset; roc_mcs_port_stats_get; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 9/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec control port configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to configure MACsec control port.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 4 ++ 4 files changed, 258 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +72 -0
@@ -299,9 +299,17 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(MCS_INTR_CFG, 0xa012, mcs_intr_cfg, mcs_intr_cfg, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SET_LMAC_MODE, 0xa013, mcs_set_lmac_mode, mcs_set_lmac_mode, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SET_PN_THRESHOLD, 0xa014, mcs_set_pn_threshold, mcs_set_pn_threshold, msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_ALLOC_CTRL_PKT_RULE ,0xa015 , mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule, mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule_req, \ + mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule_rsp) \ +M (MCS_FREE_CTRL_PKT_RULE ,0xa016 , mcs_free_ctrl_pkt_rule, mcs_free_ctrl_pkt_rule_req, \ + msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_WRITE ,0xa017 , mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_write, mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_write_req, \ + msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_PORT_RESET, 0xa018, mcs_port_reset, mcs_port_reset_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_PORT_CFG_SET, 0xa019, mcs_port_cfg_set, mcs_port_cfg_set_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_PORT_CFG_GET, 0xa020, mcs_port_cfg_get, mcs_port_cfg_get_req, mcs_port_cfg_get_rsp) \ +M (MCS_CUSTOM_TAG_CFG_GET ,0xa021 , mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get, mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_req, \ + mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_rsp) \ /* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */#define MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES \
@@ -902,6 +910,53 @@ struct mcs_set_pn_threshold { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +enum mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_type { +MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_TYPE_ETH , +MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_TYPE_DA , +MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_TYPE_RANGE , +MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_TYPE_COMBO , +MCS_CTRL_PKT_RULE_TYPE_MAC , +}; + +struct mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rule_type; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; /* MCS block ID */ + uint8_t __io dir; /* Macsec ingress or egress side */ + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rule_idx; + uint8_t __io rule_type; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_free_ctrl_pkt_rule_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rule_idx; + uint8_t __io rule_type; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint8_t __io all; /* Free all the rule resources */ + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io data0; + uint64_t __io data1; + uint64_t __io data2; + uint8_t __io rule_idx; + uint8_t __io rule_type; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_port_cfg_set_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io cstm_tag_rel_mode_sel;
@@ -931,6 +986,23 @@ struct mcs_port_cfg_get_rsp { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint16_t __io cstm_etype[8]; + uint8_t __io cstm_indx[8]; + uint8_t __io cstm_etype_en; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_port_reset_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io reset;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c +117 -0
129 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +65 -0
89 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +4 -0
@@ -134,7 +134,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; roc_mcs_active_lmac_set; + roc_mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule; roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc; + roc_mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_write; + roc_mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get; roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get;
@@ -144,6 +147,7 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get; + roc_mcs_free_ctrl_pkt_rule; roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_mcs_intr_configure;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 09/15] common/cnxk: add MACsec control port configuration
Quoted 15 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added ROC APIs to configure MACsec control port.
Signed-off-by Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vamsi Attunuru <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>---
__roc_apiint roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get(structroc_mcs*mcs, structroc_mcs_stats_req*mcs_req,struct roc_mcs_flowid_stats *stats);drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +0
-0
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map INTERNAL { · line 137
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +1
-0@@ -134,7 +134,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; roc_mcs_active_lmac_set; + roc_mcs_alloc_ctrl_pkt_rule;
roc_mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_alloc
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map INTERNAL { · line 150
Quoted 11 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +3
-0roc_mcs_alloc_rsrc; + roc_mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_write; + roc_mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get; roc_mcs_dev_init; roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get;@@ -144,6 +147,7 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_flowid_entry_read; roc_mcs_flowid_entry_write; roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get; + roc_mcs_free_ctrl_pkt_rule;
roc_mcs_ctrl_pkt_rule_free
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +0
-1roc_mcs_free_rsrc; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_mcs_intr_configure; --2.25.1
PATCH 10/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec FIPS mbox
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec FIPS configuration mbox
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +74 -0
@@ -310,6 +310,15 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { M(MCS_PORT_CFG_GET, 0xa020, mcs_port_cfg_get, mcs_port_cfg_get_req, mcs_port_cfg_get_rsp) \M (MCS_CUSTOM_TAG_CFG_GET ,0xa021 , mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get, mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_req, \ mcs_custom_tag_cfg_get_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_RESET, 0xa040, mcs_fips_reset, mcs_fips_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_MODE_SET, 0xa041, mcs_fips_mode_set, mcs_fips_mode_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_CTL_SET, 0xa042, mcs_fips_ctl_set, mcs_fips_ctl_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_IV_SET, 0xa043, mcs_fips_iv_set, mcs_fips_iv_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_CTR_SET, 0xa044, mcs_fips_ctr_set, mcs_fips_ctr_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_KEY_SET, 0xa045, mcs_fips_key_set, mcs_fips_key_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_BLOCK_SET, 0xa046, mcs_fips_block_set, mcs_fips_block_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FIPS_START, 0xa047, mcs_fips_start, mcs_fips_req, msg_rsp) \ +M (MCS_FIPS_RESULT_GET ,0xa048 , mcs_fips_result_get, mcs_fips_req, mcs_fips_result_rsp) /* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */#define MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES \
@@ -1099,6 +1108,71 @@ struct mcs_clear_stats { uint8_t __io all; /* All resources stats mapped to PF are cleared */ }; +struct mcs_fips_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_mode_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io mode; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_ctl_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io ctl; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_iv_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint32_t __io iv_bits95_64; + uint64_t __io iv_bits63_0; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_ctr_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint32_t __io fips_ctr; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_key_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io sak_bits255_192; + uint64_t __io sak_bits191_128; + uint64_t __io sak_bits127_64; + uint64_t __io sak_bits63_0; + uint64_t __io hashkey_bits127_64; + uint64_t __io hashkey_bits63_0; + uint8_t __io sak_len; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_block_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io blk_bits127_64; + uint64_t __io blk_bits63_0; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; +}; + +struct mcs_fips_result_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io blk_bits127_64; + uint64_t __io blk_bits63_0; + uint64_t __io icv_bits127_64; + uint64_t __io icv_bits63_0; + uint8_t __io result_pass; +}; +/* NPA mbox message formats */ /* NPA mailbox error codes
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +69 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 11/15 common/cnxk: derive hash key for MACsec
In reply to Akhil GoyalMACsec hardware configuration need hash key to be generated from the cipher key of AES-GCM-128/256.
Added an ROC API to derive the hash key and extend the case for AES-256 as well.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h | 4 +- drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 1 + 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c +57 -29
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@#include "roc_api.h" -#define KEY_WORD_LEN (ROC_CPT_AES_XCBC_KEY_LENGTH / sizeof(uint32_t)) -#define KEY_ROUNDS 10/* (Nr+1)*Nb */ -#define KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN ((KEY_ROUNDS + 1) * 4)/* (Nr+1)*Nb words */ +#define KEY128_ROUNDS 10/* (Nr+1)*Nb */ +#define KEY256_ROUNDS 14/* (Nr+1)*Nb */ +#define KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (nr) ((nr + 1) * 4)/* (Nr+1)*Nb words */ +#define AES_HASH_KEY_LEN 16/* * AES 128 implementation based on NIST FIPS 197 suitable for LittleEndian
@@ -93,22 +94,30 @@ GF8mul(uint8_t byte, uint32_t mp) }static void -aes_key_expand (const uint8_t *key,uint32_t *ks) +aes_key_expand (const uint8_t *key,uint32_t len,uint32_t *ks) { -unsigned int i =4 ; +uint32_t len_words = len /sizeof (uint32_t ); +unsigned int schedule_len; +unsigned int i = len_words;uint32_t temp; + schedule_len = (len ==ROC_CPT_AES128_KEY_LEN ) ?KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (KEY128_ROUNDS ) : +KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (KEY256_ROUNDS );/* Skip key in ks */ -memcpy (ks, key,KEY_WORD_LEN *sizeof (uint32_t )); +memcpy (ks, key, len); -while (i <KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN ) { +while (i < schedule_len) { temp = ks[i -1 ]; -if ((i &0x3 ) ==0 ) { +if ((i & (len_words -1 )) ==0 ) { temp =rot_word (temp); temp =sub_word (temp); - temp ^= (uint32_t )GF8mul (1 ,1 << ((i >>2 ) -1 )); + temp ^= (uint32_t )GF8mul (1 ,1 << ((i / len_words) -1 )); } - ks[i] = ks[i -4 ] ^ temp; +if (len ==ROC_CPT_AES256_KEY_LEN ) { +if ((i % len_words) ==4 ) + temp =sub_word (temp); + } + ks[i] = ks[i - len_words] ^ temp; i++; } }
@@ -145,64 +154,83 @@ mix_columns(uint8_t *sRc) }static void -cipher (uint8_t *in,uint8_t *out,uint32_t *ks) +cipher (uint8_t *in,uint8_t *out,uint32_t *ks,uint32_t key_rounds,uint8_t in_len) { -uint32_t state[KEY_WORD_LEN ]; +uint8_t data_word_len = in_len /sizeof (uint32_t ); +uint32_t state[data_word_len];unsigned int i, round;memcpy (state, in,sizeof (state));/* AddRoundKey(state, w[0, Nb-1]) // See Sec. 5.1.4 */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++) state[i] ^= ks[i]; -for (round =1 ; round <KEY_ROUNDS ; round++) { +for (round =1 ; round < key_rounds; round++) {/* SubBytes(state) // See Sec. 5.1.1 */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++) state[i] =sub_word (state[i]);/* ShiftRows(state) // See Sec. 5.1.2 */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++)shift_word ((uint8_t *)state, i, i);/* MixColumns(state) // See Sec. 5.1.3 */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++)mix_columns ((uint8_t *)&state[i]);/* AddRoundKey(state, w[round*Nb, (round+1)*Nb-1]) */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) - state[i] ^= ks[round *4 + i]; +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++) + state[i] ^= ks[round * data_word_len + i]; }/* SubBytes(state) */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++) state[i] =sub_word (state[i]);/* ShiftRows(state) */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++)shift_word ((uint8_t *)state, i, i);/* AddRoundKey(state, w[Nr*Nb, (Nr+1)*Nb-1]) */ -for (i =0 ; i <KEY_WORD_LEN ; i++) - state[i] ^= ks[KEY_ROUNDS *4 + i]; -memcpy (out, state,KEY_WORD_LEN *sizeof (uint32_t )); +for (i =0 ; i < data_word_len; i++) + state[i] ^= ks[key_rounds * data_word_len + i]; +memcpy (out, state, data_word_len *sizeof (uint32_t )); }void roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive (const uint8_t *auth_key,uint8_t *derived_key) { -uint32_t aes_ks[KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN ] = {0 }; +uint32_t aes_ks[KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (KEY128_ROUNDS )] = {0 };uint8_t k1[16 ] = {[0 ...15 ] =0x01 };uint8_t k2[16 ] = {[0 ...15 ] =0x02 };uint8_t k3[16 ] = {[0 ...15 ] =0x03 }; -aes_key_expand (auth_key, aes_ks); +aes_key_expand (auth_key,ROC_CPT_AES_XCBC_KEY_LENGTH , aes_ks); -cipher (k1, derived_key, aes_ks); +cipher (k1, derived_key, aes_ks,KEY128_ROUNDS ,sizeof (k1)); derived_key +=sizeof (k1); -cipher (k2, derived_key, aes_ks); +cipher (k2, derived_key, aes_ks,KEY128_ROUNDS ,sizeof (k2)); derived_key +=sizeof (k2); -cipher (k3, derived_key, aes_ks); +cipher (k3, derived_key, aes_ks,KEY128_ROUNDS ,sizeof (k3)); +} + +void +roc_aes_hash_key_derive (const uint8_t *key,uint16_t len,uint8_t hash_key[]) +{ +uint8_t data[AES_HASH_KEY_LEN ] = {0x0 }; + +if (len ==ROC_CPT_AES128_KEY_LEN ) { +uint32_t aes_ks[KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (KEY128_ROUNDS )] = {0 }; + +aes_key_expand (key,ROC_CPT_AES128_KEY_LEN , aes_ks); +cipher (data, hash_key, aes_ks,KEY128_ROUNDS ,sizeof (data)); + }else { +uint32_t aes_ks[KEY_SCHEDULE_LEN (KEY256_ROUNDS )] = {0 }; + +aes_key_expand (key,ROC_CPT_AES256_KEY_LEN , aes_ks); +cipher (data, hash_key, aes_ks,KEY256_ROUNDS ,sizeof (data)); + } }
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h +2 -2
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@/* * Derive k1, k2, k3 from 128 bit AES key */ -void __roc_api roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive(const uint8_t *auth_key, -uint8_t *derived_key); +void __roc_api roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive(const uint8_t *auth_key, uint8_t *derived_key); +void __roc_api roc_aes_hash_key_derive(const uint8_t *key, uint16_t len, uint8_t *hash_key);#endif /* _ROC_AES_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +1 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ INTERNAL { roc_ae_ec_grp_put; roc_ae_fpm_get; roc_ae_fpm_put; + roc_aes_hash_key_derive; roc_aes_xcbc_key_derive; roc_bphy_cgx_cpri_mode_change; roc_bphy_cgx_cpri_mode_misc;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 12/15 net/cnxk: add MACsec initialization
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded initialization routines for MACsec for
cn10kb platform.
--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 6 ++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c | 13 +++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 14 +++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 61 +++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + 6 files changed, 246 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +6 -0
@@ -1059,9 +1059,15 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_ops_override(void) init_once =1 ;/* Update platform specific ops */ + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_create =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_create =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_destroy =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_destroy =NULL ; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_create = cn10k_eth_sec_session_create; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_destroy = cn10k_eth_sec_session_destroy; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.capabilities_get = cn10k_eth_sec_capabilities_get; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_update = cn10k_eth_sec_session_update; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_stats_get = cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get =NULL ; }
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c +13 -0
@@ -1945,6 +1945,16 @@ cnxk_eth_dev_init(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev)if (rc) goto free_mac_addrs; +if (roc_feature_nix_has_macsec ()) { + rc =cnxk_mcs_dev_init (dev,0 ); +if (rc) { +plt_err ("Failed to init MCS" ); + goto free_mac_addrs; + } + dev->rx_offload_capa |=RTE_ETH_RX_OFFLOAD_MACSEC_STRIP ; + dev->tx_offload_capa |=RTE_ETH_TX_OFFLOAD_MACSEC_INSERT ; + } + plt_nix_dbg("Port=%d pf=%d vf=%d ver=%s hwcap=0x%" PRIx64 " rxoffload_capa=0x%" PRIx64 " txoffload_capa=0x%" PRIx64, eth_dev->data->port_id, roc_nix_get_pf(nix),
@@ -2042,6 +2052,9 @@ cnxk_eth_dev_uninit(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, bool reset) } eth_dev->data->nb_rx_queues =0 ; +if (roc_feature_nix_has_macsec ()) +cnxk_mcs_dev_fini (dev); +/* Free security resources */ nix_security_release (dev);
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h +14 -0
@@ -392,6 +392,9 @@ struct cnxk_eth_dev {/* Reassembly dynfield/flag offsets */ int reass_dynfield_off;int reass_dynflag_bit; + +/* MCS device */ +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev; };struct cnxk_eth_rxq_sp {
@@ -617,6 +620,17 @@ int cnxk_nix_cman_config_set(struct rte_eth_dev *dev, const struct rte_eth_cman_int cnxk_nix_cman_config_get (struct rte_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_eth_cman_config *config); +int cnxk_mcs_dev_init (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,uint8_t mcs_idx); +void cnxk_mcs_dev_fini (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev); + +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev, +const struct rte_security_session *sess); +int cnxk_mcs_flow_configure (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev,const struct rte_flow_attr *attr, +const struct rte_flow_item pattern[], +const struct rte_flow_action actions[],struct rte_flow_error *error, +void **mcs_flow); +int cnxk_mcs_flow_destroy (struct cnxk_eth_dev *eth_dev,void *mcs_flow); +/* Other private functions */ int nix_recalc_mtu (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev);int nix_mtr_validate (struct rte_eth_dev *dev,uint32_t id);
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c new file +151 -0
151 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h new file +61 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ sources = files( 'cnxk_ethdev.c', 'cnxk_ethdev_cman.c', 'cnxk_ethdev_devargs.c', + 'cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c', 'cnxk_ethdev_mtr.c', 'cnxk_ethdev_ops.c', 'cnxk_ethdev_sec.c',
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 13/15 net/cnxk: create/destroy MACsec SC/SA
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support to create/destroy MACsec SA and SC.
--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 9 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 250 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 16 ++ 3 files changed, 271 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +5 -4
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <rte_pmd_cnxk.h> #include <cn10k_ethdev.h> +#include <cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h> #include <cnxk_security.h> #include <roc_priv.h>
@@ -1059,10 +1060,10 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_ops_override(void) init_once =1 ;/* Update platform specific ops */ - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_create =NULL ; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_create =NULL ; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_destroy =NULL ; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_destroy =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_create = cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_create; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_create = cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_create; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_destroy = cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_destroy; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_destroy = cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_destroy; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_create = cn10k_eth_sec_session_create; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_destroy = cn10k_eth_sec_session_destroy; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.capabilities_get = cn10k_eth_sec_capabilities_get;
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c +250 -0
256 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h +16 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ struct cnxk_mcs_dev {uint8_t idx; }; +enum cnxk_mcs_rsrc_type { +CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_FLOWID , +CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SECY , +CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SC , +CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SA , +CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_PORT , +}; +struct cnxk_mcs_event_data {/* Valid for below events * - ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP
@@ -59,3 +67,11 @@ struct cnxk_mcs_event_desc {enum roc_mcs_event_subtype subtype;struct cnxk_mcs_event_data metadata; }; + +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_create (void *device,struct rte_security_macsec_sa *conf); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_create (void *device,struct rte_security_macsec_sc *conf); + +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sc_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 14/15 net/cnxk: add MACsec session and flow configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support for MACsec session/flow create/destroy.
--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 11 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c | 22 ++- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c | 2 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 16 ++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 261 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 25 +++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c | 2 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_flow.c | 5 + 8 files changed, 340 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +9 -2
@@ -612,7 +612,9 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_session_create(void *device,if (conf->action_type !=RTE_SECURITY_ACTION_TYPE_INLINE_PROTOCOL )return -ENOTSUP ; -if (conf->protocol !=RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_IPSEC ) +if (conf->protocol ==RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_MACSEC ) +return cnxk_eth_macsec_session_create (dev, conf, sess); +else if (conf->protocol !=RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_IPSEC )return -ENOTSUP ;if (rte_security_dynfield_register () <0 )
@@ -856,13 +858,18 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_session_destroy(void *device, struct rte_security_session *sess) {struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device;struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *macsec_sess;struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess *eth_sec;rte_spinlock_t *lock;void *sa_dptr; eth_sec =cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); -if (!eth_sec) +if (!eth_sec) { + macsec_sess =cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); +if (macsec_sess) +return cnxk_eth_macsec_session_destroy (dev, sess);return -ENOENT ; + } lock = eth_sec->inb ? &dev->inb.lock : &dev->outb.lock;rte_spinlock_lock (lock);
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c +21 -1
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * Copyright(C) 2020 Marvell. */ -#include <cnxk_flow.h> #include "cn10k_flow.h" #include "cn10k_ethdev.h" #include "cn10k_rx.h" +#include "cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h" +#include <cnxk_flow.h> static int cn10k_mtr_connect (struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev,uint32_t mtr_id)
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ cn10k_flow_create(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, const struct rte_flow_attr *attr,const struct rte_flow_action *act_q =NULL ;struct roc_npc *npc = &dev->npc;struct roc_npc_flow *flow; +void *mcs_flow =NULL ;int vtag_actions =0 ;uint32_t req_act =0 ;int mark_actions;
@@ -187,6 +189,17 @@ cn10k_flow_create(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, const struct rte_flow_attr *attr, } } +if (actions[0 ].type ==RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_SECURITY && +cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, actions[0 ].conf) !=NULL ) { + rc =cnxk_mcs_flow_configure (eth_dev, attr, pattern, actions, error, &mcs_flow); +if (rc) { +rte_flow_error_set (error, rc,RTE_FLOW_ERROR_TYPE_ACTION ,NULL , +"Failed to configure mcs flow" ); +return NULL ; + } +return (struct rte_flow *)mcs_flow; + } + flow =cnxk_flow_create (eth_dev, attr, pattern, actions, error);if (!flow) {if (mtr)
@@ -253,6 +266,13 @@ cn10k_flow_destroy(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev, struct rte_flow *rte_flow, } } + rc =cnxk_mcs_flow_destroy (dev, (void *)flow); +if (rc <0 ) { +rte_flow_error_set (error, rc,RTE_FLOW_ERROR_TYPE_UNSPECIFIED ,NULL , +"Failed to free mcs flow" ); +return rc; + } + vtag_actions =roc_npc_vtag_actions_get (npc);if (vtag_actions) {if (flow->nix_intf ==ROC_NPC_INTF_RX ) {
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c +2 -0
@@ -1953,6 +1953,8 @@ cnxk_eth_dev_init(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev) } dev->rx_offload_capa |=RTE_ETH_RX_OFFLOAD_MACSEC_STRIP ; dev->tx_offload_capa |=RTE_ETH_TX_OFFLOAD_MACSEC_INSERT ; + +TAILQ_INIT (&dev->mcs_list); } plt_nix_dbg("Port=%d pf=%d vf=%d ver=%s hwcap=0x%" PRIx64
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h +16 -0
@@ -289,6 +289,21 @@ struct cnxk_eth_dev_sec_outb {rte_spinlock_t lock; }; +/* MACsec session private data */ +struct cnxk_macsec_sess { +/* List entry */ +TAILQ_ENTRY (cnxk_macsec_sess) entry; + +/* Back pointer to session */ +struct rte_security_session *sess; +enum mcs_direction dir; +uint64_t sci; +uint8_t secy_id; +uint8_t sc_id; +uint8_t flow_id; +}; +TAILQ_HEAD (cnxk_macsec_sess_list, cnxk_macsec_sess); +struct cnxk_eth_dev {/* ROC NIX */ struct roc_nix nix;
@@ -395,6 +410,7 @@ struct cnxk_eth_dev {/* MCS device */ struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev; +struct cnxk_macsec_sess_list mcs_list; };struct cnxk_eth_rxq_sp {
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c +261 -0
267 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h +25 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,27 @@ enum cnxk_mcs_rsrc_type { CNXK_MCS_RSRC_TYPE_PORT, }; +struct cnxk_mcs_flow_opts { +uint32_t outer_tag_id; +/**< {VLAN_ID[11:0]}, or 20-bit MPLS label*/ +uint8_t outer_priority; +/**< {PCP/Pbits, DE/CFI} or {1'b0, EXP} for MPLS.*/ +uint32_t second_outer_tag_id; +/**< {VLAN_ID[11:0]}, or 20-bit MPLS label*/ +uint8_t second_outer_priority; +/**< {PCP/Pbits, DE/CFI} or {1'b0, EXP} for MPLS. */ +uint16_t bonus_data; +/**< 2 bytes of additional bonus data extracted from one of the custom tags*/ +uint8_t tag_match_bitmap; +uint8_t packet_type; +uint8_t outer_vlan_type; +uint8_t inner_vlan_type; +uint8_t num_tags; +bool express; +uint8_t lmac_id; +uint8_t flowid_user; +}; +struct cnxk_mcs_event_data {/* Valid for below events * - ROC_MCS_EVENT_RX_SA_PN_SOFT_EXP
@@ -75,3 +96,7 @@ int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_destroy(void *device, uint16_t sa_id, enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir);int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir); + +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_create (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session_conf *conf, +struct rte_security_session *sess); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_destroy (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session *sess);
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c +1 -1
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess(struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,static unsigned int cnxk_eth_sec_session_get_size(void *device __rte_unused) { -return sizeof (struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess ); +return RTE_MAX (sizeof (struct cnxk_macsec_sess ),sizeof (struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess )); }struct rte_security_ops cnxk_eth_sec_ops = {
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_flow.c +5 -0
@@ -298,6 +298,11 @@ cnxk_flow_validate(struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev,uint32_t flowkey_cfg =0 ;int rc; +/* Skip flow validation for MACsec. */ +if (actions[0 ].type ==RTE_FLOW_ACTION_TYPE_SECURITY && +cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, actions[0 ].conf) !=NULL ) +return 0 ; +memset (&flow,0 ,sizeof (flow)); flow.is_validate = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 15/15 net/cnxk: add MACsec stats
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded support for MACsec SC/flow/session stats.
--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 11 +++-- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 9 ++++ 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +8 -3
@@ -1027,12 +1027,17 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get(void *device, struct rte_security_session *sess, {struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device;struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *macsec_sess;struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess *eth_sec;int rc; eth_sec =cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); -if (eth_sec ==NULL ) +if (eth_sec ==NULL ) { + macsec_sess =cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); +if (macsec_sess) +return cnxk_eth_macsec_session_stats_get (dev, macsec_sess, stats);return -EINVAL ; + } rc =roc_nix_inl_sa_sync (&dev->nix, eth_sec->sa, eth_sec->inb,ROC_NIX_INL_SA_OP_FLUSH );
@@ -1076,6 +1081,6 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_ops_override(void) cnxk_eth_sec_ops.capabilities_get = cn10k_eth_sec_capabilities_get; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_update = cn10k_eth_sec_session_update; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_stats_get = cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get =NULL ; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get = cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get = cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get; }
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c +64 -0
70 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h +9 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_destroy(void *device, uint16_t sa_id,int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_stats_get (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct cnxk_macsec_sess *sess, +struct rte_security_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_create (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session_conf *conf,struct rte_security_session *sess);int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_destroy (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session *sess);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 15/15] net/cnxk: add MACsec stats
Quoted 4 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added support for MACsec SC/flow/session stats.
Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>
# Please fix the the build issue
http://mails.dpdk.org/archives/test-report/2023-June/410104.html
# Please rebase to dpdk-next-mrvl as doc is updated in
https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/patch/[email protected]/
Quoted 136 lines
--- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 11 +++-- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 9 ++++ 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c +8
-3@@ -1027,12 +1027,17 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get(void *device, struct rte_security_session *sess, {struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device;struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_macsec_sess *macsec_sess;struct cnxk_eth_sec_sess *eth_sec;int rc; eth_sec =cnxk_eth_sec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); -if (eth_sec ==NULL ) +if (eth_sec ==NULL ) { + macsec_sess =cnxk_eth_macsec_sess_get_by_sess (dev, sess); +if (macsec_sess) +return cnxk_eth_macsec_session_stats_get (dev, macsec_sess, stats);return -EINVAL ; + } rc =roc_nix_inl_sa_sync (&dev->nix, eth_sec->sa, eth_sec->inb,ROC_NIX_INL_SA_OP_FLUSH );@@ -1076,6 +1081,6 @@ cn10k_eth_sec_ops_override(void) cnxk_eth_sec_ops.capabilities_get = cn10k_eth_sec_capabilities_get; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_update = cn10k_eth_sec_session_update; cnxk_eth_sec_ops.session_stats_get = cn10k_eth_sec_session_stats_get; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get =NULL ; - cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get =NULL ; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sc_stats_get = cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get; + cnxk_eth_sec_ops.macsec_sa_stats_get = cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get; }drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c +64
-0@@ -517,6 +517,70 @@ cnxk_mcs_flow_destroy(struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev, void *flow)return (ret ==0 ) ?1 : ret; } +int +cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats) +{ +RTE_SET_USED (device); +RTE_SET_USED (sa_id); +RTE_SET_USED (dir); +RTE_SET_USED (stats); + +return 0 ; +} + +int +cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats) +{ +struct rte_eth_dev *eth_dev = (struct rte_eth_dev *)device; +struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev =cnxk_eth_pmd_priv (eth_dev); +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +struct roc_mcs_stats_req req = {0 }; + +if (!roc_feature_nix_has_macsec ()) +return -ENOTSUP ; + + req.id = sc_id; + req.dir = (dir ==RTE_SECURITY_MACSEC_DIR_RX ) ?MCS_RX :MCS_TX ; + +return roc_mcs_sc_stats_get (mcs_dev->mdev, &req, (struct roc_mcs_sc_stats *)stats); +} + +int +cnxk_eth_macsec_session_stats_get (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct cnxk_macsec_sess *sess, +struct rte_security_stats *stats) +{ +struct cnxk_mcs_dev *mcs_dev = dev->mcs_dev; +struct roc_mcs_flowid_stats flow_stats = {0 }; +struct roc_mcs_port_stats port_stats = {0 }; +struct roc_mcs_stats_req req = {0 }; + +if (!roc_feature_nix_has_macsec ()) +return -ENOTSUP ; + + req.id = sess->flow_id; + req.dir = sess->dir; +roc_mcs_flowid_stats_get (mcs_dev->mdev, &req, &flow_stats); +plt_nix_dbg ("\n******* FLOW_ID IDX[%u] STATS dir: %u********\n" , sess->flow_id, sess->dir); +plt_nix_dbg ("TX: tcam_hit_cnt: 0x%lx\n" , flow_stats.tcam_hit_cnt); + + req.id = mcs_dev->port_id; + req.dir = sess->dir; +roc_mcs_port_stats_get (mcs_dev->mdev, &req, &port_stats); +plt_nix_dbg ("\n********** PORT[0] STATS ****************\n" ); +plt_nix_dbg ("RX tcam_miss_cnt: 0x%lx\n" , port_stats.tcam_miss_cnt); +plt_nix_dbg ("RX parser_err_cnt: 0x%lx\n" , port_stats.parser_err_cnt); +plt_nix_dbg ("RX preempt_err_cnt: 0x%lx\n" , port_stats.preempt_err_cnt); +plt_nix_dbg ("RX sectag_insert_err_cnt: 0x%lx\n" , port_stats.sectag_insert_err_cnt); + + req.id = sess->secy_id; + req.dir = sess->dir; + +return roc_mcs_secy_stats_get (mcs_dev->mdev, &req, + (struct roc_mcs_secy_stats *)(&stats->macsec)); +} +static int cnxk_mcs_event_cb (void *userdata,struct roc_mcs_event_desc *desc,void *cb_arg) {drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h +9
-1@@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_destroy(void *device, uint16_t sa_id,int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_destroy (void *device,uint16_t sc_id,enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sa_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sa_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_sc_stats_get (void *device,uint16_t sa_id, +enum rte_security_macsec_direction dir, +struct rte_security_macsec_sc_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_stats_get (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct cnxk_macsec_sess *sess, +struct rte_security_stats *stats); +int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_create (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session_conf *conf,struct rte_security_session *sess);int cnxk_eth_macsec_session_destroy (struct cnxk_eth_dev *dev,struct rte_security_session *sess); --2.25.1
v2 cover net/cnxk: add MACsec support
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded MACsec support in Marvell cnxk PMD. The patchset is pending from last release [1] Sending as a new series as the functionality is now complete and tested on hardware.
Depends-on: http://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/list/?series=28391
[1] https://patches.dpdk.org/project/dpdk/cover/[email protected]/
Changes in v2:
- Addressed review comments from Jerin.
Akhil Goyal (15):
common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization common/cnxk: add MACsec SA configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec SC configuration APIs common/cnxk: add MACsec secy and flow configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec PN and LMAC mode configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec stats
common/cnxk: add MACsec interrupt APIs common/cnxk: add MACsec port configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec control port configuration common/cnxk: add MACsec FIPS mbox common/cnxk: derive hash key for MACsec net/cnxk: add MACsec initialization
net/cnxk: create/destroy MACsec SC/SA net/cnxk: add MACsec session and flow configuration net/cnxk: add MACsec stats
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.c | 86 ++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_aes.h | 4 +- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_dev.c | 86 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h | 12 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c | 46 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 524 +++++++++++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 871 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 621 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 73 +++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 528 ++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c | 193 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c | 5 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 45 ++ drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_ethdev_sec.c | 25 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cn10k_flow.c | 23 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.c | 15 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev.h | 30 + drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c | 726 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h | 111 ++++ drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_sec.c | 2 +- drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_flow.c | 5 + drivers/net/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + 27 files changed, 4007 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_stats.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/cnxk/cnxk_ethdev_mcs.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 1/15 common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization
Added ROC init and fini APIs for supporting MACsec.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h | 12 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c | 46 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 65 +++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 41 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 65 ++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c | 5 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 7 + 13 files changed, 471 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_irq.c', 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', + 'roc_mcs.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h +3 -0
@@ -114,4 +114,7 @@/* ML */ #include "roc_ml.h" +/* MACsec */ +#include "roc_mcs.h" +#endif /* _ROC_API_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h +12 -0
@@ -59,4 +59,16 @@ roc_feature_nix_has_age_drop_stats(void) {return (roc_model_is_cn10kb () ||roc_model_is_cn10ka_b0 ()); } + +static inline bool +roc_feature_nix_has_macsec (void ) +{ +return roc_model_is_cn10kb (); +} + +static inline bool +roc_feature_bphy_has_macsec (void ) +{ +return roc_model_is_cnf10kb (); +}#endif
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c +46 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h +3 -0
@@ -19,4 +19,7 @@ struct roc_nix *__roc_api roc_idev_npa_nix_get(void); uint64_t __roc_api roc_idev_nix_inl_meta_aura_get(void); struct roc_nix_list *__roc_api roc_idev_nix_list_get(void); +struct roc_mcs *__roc_api roc_idev_mcs_get(uint8_t mcs_idx); +void __roc_api roc_idev_mcs_set(struct roc_mcs *mcs); +void __roc_api roc_idev_mcs_free(struct roc_mcs *mcs);#endif /* _ROC_IDEV_H_ */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct idev_cfg {struct roc_bphy *bphy;struct roc_cpt *cpt;struct roc_sso *sso; +struct roc_mcs_head mcs_list;struct nix_inl_dev *nix_inl_dev;struct idev_nix_inl_cfg inl_cfg;struct roc_nix_list roc_nix_list;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +64 -1
77 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +220 -0
220 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h new file +41 -0
41 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h new file +65 -0
65 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h +3 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@/* DPI */ #include "roc_dpi_priv.h" +/* MCS */ +#include "roc_mcs_priv.h" +/* REE */ #include "roc_ree_priv.h"
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c +5 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case NPA_ERR_PARAM :case NPC_ERR_PARAM :case SSO_ERR_PARAM : +case MCS_ERR_PARAM :case UTIL_ERR_PARAM : err_msg ="Invalid parameter" ;break ;
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode) err_msg ="Operation not supported" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : +case MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : err_msg ="Hardware does not support" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_QUEUE_INVALID_RANGE :
@@ -223,6 +225,9 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case SSO_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_BOUNDED : err_msg ="SSO pf/vf not found" ;break ; +case MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND : + err_msg ="MCS device not found" ; +break ;case UTIL_ERR_FS : err_msg ="file operation failed" ;break ;
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +7 -0
@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ INTERNAL { roc_idev_cpt_get; roc_idev_cpt_set; roc_idev_lmt_base_addr_get; + roc_idev_mcs_free; + roc_idev_mcs_get; + roc_idev_mcs_set; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_get; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_set; roc_idev_npa_nix_get;
@@ -132,6 +135,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_dev_init; + roc_mcs_dev_fini; + roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v2 01/15] common/cnxk: add ROC MACsec initialization
Quoted 6 lines · Akhil Goyal
Added ROC init and fini APIs for supporting MACsec.
Signed-off-by Ankur Dwivedi <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vamsi Attunuru <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Akhil Goyal <[email protected]>
Please update the release note in the last patch.
Quoted 651 lines
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h | 12 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c | 46 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 65 +++++++- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 41 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h | 65 ++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h | 3 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c | 5 + drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 7 + 13 files changed, 471 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.hdrivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1
-0@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_irq.c', 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', + 'roc_mcs.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',drivers/common/cnxk/roc_api.h +3
-0@@ -114,4 +114,7 @@/* ML */ #include "roc_ml.h" +/* MACsec */ +#include "roc_mcs.h" +#endif /* _ROC_API_H_ */ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_features.h +12
-0@@ -59,4 +59,16 @@ roc_feature_nix_has_age_drop_stats(void) {return (roc_model_is_cn10kb () ||roc_model_is_cn10ka_b0 ()); } + +static inline bool +roc_feature_nix_has_macsec (void ) +{ +return roc_model_is_cn10kb (); +} + +static inline bool +roc_feature_bphy_has_macsec (void ) +{ +return roc_model_is_cnf10kb (); +}#endif drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.c +46
-0@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ idev_set_defaults(struct idev_cfg *idev) idev->num_lmtlines =0 ; idev->bphy =NULL ; idev->cpt =NULL ; +TAILQ_INIT (&idev->mcs_list); idev->nix_inl_dev =NULL ;TAILQ_INIT (&idev->roc_nix_list);plt_spinlock_init (&idev->nix_inl_dev_lock);@@ -187,6 +188,51 @@ roc_idev_cpt_get(void)return NULL ; } +struct roc_mcs * +roc_idev_mcs_get (uint8_t mcs_idx) +{ +struct idev_cfg *idev =idev_get_cfg (); +struct roc_mcs *mcs =NULL ; + +if (idev !=NULL ) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(mcs, &idev->mcs_list, next) { +if (mcs->idx == mcs_idx) +return mcs; + } + } + +return NULL ; +} + +void +roc_idev_mcs_set (struct roc_mcs *mcs) +{ +struct idev_cfg *idev =idev_get_cfg (); +struct roc_mcs *mcs_iter =NULL ; + +if (idev !=NULL ) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(mcs_iter, &idev->mcs_list, next) { +if (mcs_iter->idx == mcs->idx) +return ; + } +TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL (&idev->mcs_list, mcs, next); + } +} + +void +roc_idev_mcs_free (struct roc_mcs *mcs) +{ +struct idev_cfg *idev =idev_get_cfg (); +struct roc_mcs *mcs_iter =NULL ; + +if (idev !=NULL ) { + TAILQ_FOREACH(mcs_iter, &idev->mcs_list, next) { +if (mcs_iter->idx == mcs->idx) +TAILQ_REMOVE (&idev->mcs_list, mcs, next); + } + } +} +uint64_t *roc_nix_inl_outb_ring_base_get (struct roc_nix *roc_nix) {drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev.h +3
-0@@ -19,4 +19,7 @@ struct roc_nix *__roc_api roc_idev_npa_nix_get(void); uint64_t __roc_api roc_idev_nix_inl_meta_aura_get(void); struct roc_nix_list *__roc_api roc_idev_nix_list_get(void); +struct roc_mcs *__roc_api roc_idev_mcs_get(uint8_t mcs_idx); +void __roc_api roc_idev_mcs_set(struct roc_mcs *mcs); +void __roc_api roc_idev_mcs_free(struct roc_mcs *mcs);#endif /* _ROC_IDEV_H_ */ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_idev_priv.h +1
-0@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct idev_cfg {struct roc_bphy *bphy;struct roc_cpt *cpt;struct roc_sso *sso; +struct roc_mcs_head mcs_list;struct nix_inl_dev *nix_inl_dev;struct idev_nix_inl_cfg inl_cfg;struct roc_nix_list roc_nix_list;drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +64
-1@@ -295,7 +295,12 @@ struct mbox_msghdr { nix_bpids) \ M(NIX_FREE_BPIDS, 0x8029, nix_free_bpids, nix_bpids, msg_rsp) \ M(NIX_RX_CHAN_CFG, 0x802a, nix_rx_chan_cfg, nix_rx_chan_cfg, \ - nix_rx_chan_cfg) + nix_rx_chan_cfg) \ + /* MCS mbox IDs (range 0xa000 - 0xbFFF) */ \ + M(MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES, 0xa000, mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ + mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ + M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_GET_HW_INFO, 0xa00b, mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \ /* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */ #define MBOX_UP_CGX_MESSAGES \@@ -673,6 +678,64 @@ struct cgx_set_link_mode_rsp { int __io status; }; +/* MCS mbox structures */ +enum mcs_direction { +MCS_RX , +MCS_TX , +}; + +enum mcs_rsrc_type { +MCS_RSRC_TYPE_FLOWID , +MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SECY , +MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SC , +MCS_RSRC_TYPE_SA , +}; + +struct mcs_alloc_rsrc_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rsrc_type; + uint8_t __io rsrc_cnt; /* Resources count */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; /* MCS block ID */ + uint8_t __io dir; /* Macsec ingress or egress side */ + uint8_t __io all; /* Allocate all resource type one each */ + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io flow_ids[128]; /* Index of reserved entries */ + uint8_t __io secy_ids[128]; + uint8_t __io sc_ids[128]; + uint8_t __io sa_ids[256]; + uint8_t __io rsrc_type; + uint8_t __io rsrc_cnt; /* No of entries reserved */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint8_t __io all; + uint8_t __io rsvd[256]; +}; + +struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io rsrc_id; /* Index of the entry to be freed */ + uint8_t __io rsrc_type; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint8_t __io all; /* Free all the cam resources */ + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_hw_info { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io num_mcs_blks; /* Number of MCS blocks */ + uint8_t __io tcam_entries; /* RX/TX Tcam entries per mcs block */ + uint8_t __io secy_entries; /* RX/TX SECY entries per mcs block */ + uint8_t __io sc_entries; /* RX/TX SC CAM entries per mcs block */ + uint16_t __io sa_entries; /* PN table entries = SA entries */ + uint64_t __io rsvd[16]; +}; + +/* NPA mbox message formats */ /* NPA mailbox error codes drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.c new file +220
-0@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#include "roc_api.h" +#include "roc_priv.h" + +int +roc_mcs_hw_info_get (struct roc_mcs_hw_info *hw_info) +{ +struct mcs_hw_info *hw; +struct npa_lf *npa; +int rc; + +MCS_SUPPORT_CHECK ; + +if (hw_info ==NULL ) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Use mbox handler of first probed pci_func for +* initial mcs mbox communication. +*/ + npa =idev_npa_obj_get (); +if (!npa) +return MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND ; + +mbox_alloc_msg_mcs_get_hw_info (npa->mbox); + rc =mbox_process_msg (npa->mbox, (void *)&hw); +if (rc) +return rc; + + hw_info->num_mcs_blks = hw->num_mcs_blks; + hw_info->tcam_entries = hw->tcam_entries; + hw_info->secy_entries = hw->secy_entries; + hw_info->sc_entries = hw->sc_entries; + hw_info->sa_entries = hw->sa_entries; + +return rc; +} + +static int +mcs_alloc_bmap (uint16_t entries,void **mem,struct plt_bitmap **bmap) +{ +size_t bmap_sz; +int rc =0 ; + + bmap_sz =plt_bitmap_get_memory_footprint (entries); + *mem =plt_zmalloc (bmap_sz,PLT_CACHE_LINE_SIZE ); +if (*mem ==NULL ) + rc = -ENOMEM ; + + *bmap =plt_bitmap_init (entries, *mem, bmap_sz); +if (!*bmap) { +plt_free (*mem); + *mem =NULL ; + rc = -ENOMEM ; + } + +return rc; +} + +static void +rsrc_bmap_free (struct mcs_rsrc *rsrc) +{ +plt_bitmap_free (rsrc->tcam_bmap); +plt_free (rsrc->tcam_bmap_mem); +plt_bitmap_free (rsrc->secy_bmap); +plt_free (rsrc->secy_bmap_mem); +plt_bitmap_free (rsrc->sc_bmap); +plt_free (rsrc->sc_bmap_mem); +plt_bitmap_free (rsrc->sa_bmap); +plt_free (rsrc->sa_bmap_mem); +} + +static int +rsrc_bmap_alloc (struct mcs_priv *priv,struct mcs_rsrc *rsrc) +{ +int rc; + + rc =mcs_alloc_bmap (priv->tcam_entries <<1 , &rsrc->tcam_bmap_mem, &rsrc->tcam_bmap); +if (rc) + goto exit; + + rc =mcs_alloc_bmap (priv->secy_entries <<1 , &rsrc->secy_bmap_mem, &rsrc->secy_bmap); +if (rc) + goto exit; + + rc =mcs_alloc_bmap (priv->sc_entries <<1 , &rsrc->sc_bmap_mem, &rsrc->sc_bmap); +if (rc) + goto exit; + + rc =mcs_alloc_bmap (priv->sa_entries <<1 , &rsrc->sa_bmap_mem, &rsrc->sa_bmap); +if (rc) + goto exit; + +return rc; +exit: +rsrc_bmap_free (rsrc); + +return rc; +} + +static int +mcs_alloc_rsrc_bmap (struct roc_mcs *mcs) +{ +struct mcs_priv *priv =roc_mcs_to_mcs_priv (mcs); +struct mcs_hw_info *hw; +int i, rc; + +mbox_alloc_msg_mcs_get_hw_info (mcs->mbox); + rc =mbox_process_msg (mcs->mbox, (void *)&hw); +if (rc) +return rc; + + priv->num_mcs_blks = hw->num_mcs_blks; + priv->tcam_entries = hw->tcam_entries; + priv->secy_entries = hw->secy_entries; + priv->sc_entries = hw->sc_entries; + priv->sa_entries = hw->sa_entries; + + rc =rsrc_bmap_alloc (priv, &priv->dev_rsrc); +if (rc) +return rc; + + priv->port_rsrc =plt_zmalloc (sizeof (struct mcs_rsrc ) *4 ,0 ); +if (priv->port_rsrc ==NULL ) { +rsrc_bmap_free (&priv->dev_rsrc); +return -ENOMEM ; + } + +for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PORTS_PER_MCS ; i++) { + rc =rsrc_bmap_alloc (priv, &priv->port_rsrc[i]); +if (rc) + goto exit; + + priv->port_rsrc[i].sc_conf = +plt_zmalloc (priv->sc_entries *sizeof (struct mcs_sc_conf ),0 ); +if (priv->port_rsrc[i].sc_conf ==NULL ) { +rsrc_bmap_free (&priv->port_rsrc[i]); + goto exit; + } + } + +return rc; + +exit: +while (i--) { +rsrc_bmap_free (&priv->port_rsrc[i]); +plt_free (priv->port_rsrc[i].sc_conf); + } +plt_free (priv->port_rsrc); + +return -ENOMEM ; +} + +struct roc_mcs * +roc_mcs_dev_init (uint8_t mcs_idx) +{ +struct roc_mcs *mcs; +struct npa_lf *npa; + +if (!(roc_feature_bphy_has_macsec () ||roc_feature_nix_has_macsec ())) +return NULL ; + + mcs =roc_idev_mcs_get (mcs_idx); +if (mcs) { +plt_info ("Skipping device, mcs device already probed" ); + mcs->refcount++; +return mcs; + } + + mcs =plt_zmalloc (sizeof (struct roc_mcs ),PLT_CACHE_LINE_SIZE ); +if (!mcs) +return NULL ; + + npa =idev_npa_obj_get (); +if (!npa) + goto exit; + + mcs->mbox = npa->mbox; + mcs->idx = mcs_idx; + +/* Add any per mcsv initialization */ +if (mcs_alloc_rsrc_bmap (mcs)) + goto exit; + +roc_idev_mcs_set (mcs); + mcs->refcount++; + +return mcs; +exit: +plt_free (mcs); +return NULL ; +} + +void +roc_mcs_dev_fini (struct roc_mcs *mcs) +{ +struct mcs_priv *priv; +int i; + + mcs->refcount--; +if (mcs->refcount >0 ) +return ; + + priv =roc_mcs_to_mcs_priv (mcs); + +rsrc_bmap_free (&priv->dev_rsrc); + +for (i =0 ; i <MAX_PORTS_PER_MCS ; i++) { +rsrc_bmap_free (&priv->port_rsrc[i]); +plt_free (priv->port_rsrc[i].sc_conf); + } + +plt_free (priv->port_rsrc); + +roc_idev_mcs_free (mcs); + +plt_free (mcs); +}drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h new file +41
-0@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _ROC_MCS_H_ +#define _ROC_MCS_H_ + +#define MCS_AES_GCM_256_KEYLEN 32 + +struct roc_mcs_hw_info { +uint8_t num_mcs_blks;/* Number of MCS blocks */ +uint8_t tcam_entries;/* RX/TX Tcam entries per mcs block */ +uint8_t secy_entries;/* RX/TX SECY entries per mcs block */ +uint8_t sc_entries;/* RX/TX SC CAM entries per mcs block */ +uint16_t sa_entries;/* PN table entries = SA entries */ +uint64_t rsvd[16 ]; +}; + + +struct roc_mcs { +TAILQ_ENTRY (roc_mcs) next; +struct plt_pci_device *pci_dev; +struct mbox *mbox; +void *userdata; +uint8_t idx; +uint8_t refcount; + +#define ROC_MCS_MEM_SZ (1 * 1024) + uint8_t reserved[ROC_MCS_MEM_SZ] __plt_cache_aligned; +} __plt_cache_aligned; + +TAILQ_HEAD (roc_mcs_head, roc_mcs); + +/* Initialization */ +__roc_api struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs_dev_init(uint8_t mcs_idx); +__roc_api void roc_mcs_dev_fini(struct roc_mcs *mcs); +/* Get roc mcs dev structure */ +__roc_api struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs_dev_get(uint8_t mcs_idx); +/* HW info get */ +__roc_api int roc_mcs_hw_info_get(struct roc_mcs_hw_info *hw_info); +#endif /* _ROC_MCS_H_ */ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_priv.h new file +65
-0@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +* Copyright(C) 2022 Marvell. +*/ + +#ifndef _ROC_MCS_PRIV_H_ +#define _ROC_MCS_PRIV_H_ + +#define MAX_PORTS_PER_MCS 4 + +enum mcs_error_status { +MCS_ERR_PARAM =-900 , +MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP =-901 , +MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND =-902 , +}; + +#define MCS_SUPPORT_CHECK \ + do { \ + if (!(roc_feature_bphy_has_macsec() || roc_feature_nix_has_macsec())) \ + return MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP; \ + } while (0) + +struct mcs_sc_conf { +struct { +uint64_t sci; +uint16_t sa_idx0; +uint16_t sa_idx1; +uint8_t rekey_enb; + } tx; +struct { +uint16_t sa_idx; +uint8_t an; + } rx; +}; + +struct mcs_rsrc { +struct plt_bitmap *tcam_bmap; +void *tcam_bmap_mem; +struct plt_bitmap *secy_bmap; +void *secy_bmap_mem; +struct plt_bitmap *sc_bmap; +void *sc_bmap_mem; +struct plt_bitmap *sa_bmap; +void *sa_bmap_mem; +struct mcs_sc_conf *sc_conf; +}; + +struct mcs_priv { +struct mcs_rsrc *port_rsrc; +struct mcs_rsrc dev_rsrc; +uint64_t default_sci; +uint32_t lmac_bmap; +uint8_t num_mcs_blks; +uint8_t tcam_entries; +uint8_t secy_entries; +uint8_t sc_entries; +uint16_t sa_entries; +}; + +static inline struct mcs_priv * +roc_mcs_to_mcs_priv (struct roc_mcs *roc_mcs) +{ +return (struct mcs_priv *)&roc_mcs->reserved[0 ]; +} + +#endif /* _ROC_MCS_PRIV_H_ */ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_priv.h +3
-0@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@/* DPI */ #include "roc_dpi_priv.h" +/* MCS */ +#include "roc_mcs_priv.h" +/* REE */ #include "roc_ree_priv.h" drivers/common/cnxk/roc_utils.c +5
-0@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case NPA_ERR_PARAM :case NPC_ERR_PARAM :case SSO_ERR_PARAM : +case MCS_ERR_PARAM :case UTIL_ERR_PARAM : err_msg ="Invalid parameter" ;break ;@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode) err_msg ="Operation not supported" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : +case MCS_ERR_HW_NOTSUP : err_msg ="Hardware does not support" ;break ;case NIX_ERR_QUEUE_INVALID_RANGE :@@ -223,6 +225,9 @@ roc_error_msg_get(int errorcode)case SSO_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_BOUNDED : err_msg ="SSO pf/vf not found" ;break ; +case MCS_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND : + err_msg ="MCS device not found" ; +break ;case UTIL_ERR_FS : err_msg ="file operation failed" ;break ;drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +7
-1@@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ INTERNAL { roc_idev_cpt_get; roc_idev_cpt_set; roc_idev_lmt_base_addr_get; + roc_idev_mcs_free; + roc_idev_mcs_get; + roc_idev_mcs_set; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_get; roc_idev_npa_maxpools_set; roc_idev_npa_nix_get;@@ -132,6 +135,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_se_auth_key_set; roc_se_ciph_key_set; roc_se_ctx_init; + roc_mcs_dev_init; + roc_mcs_dev_fini; + roc_mcs_dev_get; + roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect; --2.25.1
PATCH v2 2/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec SA configuration
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to allocate/free MACsec resources
and APIs to write SA policy.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build | 1 + drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 12 ++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 43 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 211 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 4 + 5 files changed, 271 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c
drivers/common/cnxk/meson.build +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ sources = files( 'roc_ie_ot.c', 'roc_mbox.c', 'roc_mcs.c', + 'roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c', 'roc_ml.c', 'roc_model.c', 'roc_nix.c',
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +12 -0
@@ -300,6 +300,7 @@ struct mbox_msghdr {M (MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES ,0xa000 , mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_SA_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa005, mcs_sa_plcy_write, mcs_sa_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_GET_HW_INFO ,0xa00b , mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \/* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */
@@ -725,6 +726,17 @@ struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io plcy[2][9]; /* Support 2 SA policy */ + uint8_t __io sa_index[2]; + uint8_t __io sa_cnt; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint8_t __io dir; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint8_t __io num_mcs_blks; /* Number of MCS blocks */
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +43 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c new file +211 -0
211 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +4 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,10 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_dev_fini; roc_mcs_dev_get; roc_mcs_hw_info_get; + roc_mcs_rsrc_alloc; + roc_mcs_rsrc_free; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; + roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH v2 3/15 common/cnxk: add MACsec SC configuration APIs
In reply to Akhil GoyalAdded ROC APIs to configure MACsec secure channel(SC) and its mapping with SAs for both Rx and Tx.
--- drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h | 37 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h | 41 ++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c | 171 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/common/cnxk/version.map | 7 ++ 4 files changed, 256 insertions(+)
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mbox.h +37 -0
@@ -300,7 +300,10 @@ struct mbox_msghdr {M (MCS_ALLOC_RESOURCES ,0xa000 , mcs_alloc_resources, mcs_alloc_rsrc_req, \ mcs_alloc_rsrc_rsp) \ M(MCS_FREE_RESOURCES, 0xa001, mcs_free_resources, mcs_free_rsrc_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_RX_SC_CAM_WRITE, 0xa004, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write, mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req, msg_rsp) \ M(MCS_SA_PLCY_WRITE, 0xa005, mcs_sa_plcy_write, mcs_sa_plcy_write_req, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_TX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa006, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_tx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \ + M(MCS_RX_SC_SA_MAP_WRITE, 0xa007, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write, mcs_rx_sc_sa_map, msg_rsp) \M (MCS_GET_HW_INFO ,0xa00b , mcs_get_hw_info, msg_req, mcs_hw_info) \/* Messages initiated by AF (range 0xC00 - 0xDFF) */
@@ -726,6 +729,16 @@ struct mcs_free_rsrc_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +/* RX SC_CAM mapping */ +struct mcs_rx_sc_cam_write_req { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint64_t __io sci; /* SCI */ + uint64_t __io secy_id; /* secy index mapped to SC */ + uint8_t __io sc_id; /* SC CAM entry index */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; +struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req {struct mbox_msghdr hdr; uint64_t __io plcy[2][9]; /* Support 2 SA policy */
@@ -736,6 +749,30 @@ struct mcs_sa_plcy_write_req { uint64_t __io rsvd; }; +struct mcs_tx_sc_sa_map { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io sa_index0; + uint8_t __io sa_index1; + uint8_t __io rekey_ena; + uint8_t __io sa_index0_vld; + uint8_t __io sa_index1_vld; + uint8_t __io tx_sa_active; + uint64_t __io sectag_sci; + uint8_t __io sc_id; /* used as index for SA_MEM_MAP */ + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +}; + +struct mcs_rx_sc_sa_map { +struct mbox_msghdr hdr; + uint8_t __io sa_index; + uint8_t __io sa_in_use; + uint8_t __io sc_id; +/* an range is 0-3, sc_id + an used as index SA_MEM_MAP */ + uint8_t __io an; + uint8_t __io mcs_id; + uint64_t __io rsvd; +};struct mcs_hw_info {struct mbox_msghdr hdr;
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs.h +41 -0
57 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/roc_mcs_sec_cfg.c +171 -0
174 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/common/cnxk/version.map +7 -0
@@ -141,8 +141,15 @@ INTERNAL { roc_mcs_hw_info_get; roc_mcs_rsrc_alloc; roc_mcs_rsrc_free; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_enable; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_cam_write; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_rx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_mcs_sa_policy_read; roc_mcs_sa_policy_write; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_read; + roc_mcs_tx_sc_sa_map_write; roc_nix_bpf_alloc; roc_nix_bpf_config; roc_nix_bpf_connect;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1