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block: relax permission for Persistent Reservations ioctl

RFC In review Jingbo Xu 2 participants 3 messages Jun 9, 2023 – Jun 10, 2023 Block layer

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Jingbo Xu

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#0 lore raw

RFC 1/1 block: relax permission for Persistent Reservations ioctl

When the shared storage is accessed from containers [1], it's not recommended to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers for access to Persistent Reservations in risk of container escape.

Remove the extra CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission constraint for Persistent Reservations ioctl which shall do no harm [2].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/[email protected]/

---
I also noticed that the extra CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission constraint is not added until v4 [*] of original pull request for Persistent Reservation API.

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

---
 block/ioctl.c | 10 ----------
 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
block/ioctl.c +0 -10
index 9c5f637ff153..46c9ac43bbf8 100644
@@ -260,8 +260,6 @@ static int blkdev_pr_register(struct block_device *bdev,
 	const struct pr_ops *ops = bdev->bd_disk->fops->pr_ops;
 	struct pr_registration reg;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (!ops || !ops->pr_register)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&reg, arg, sizeof(reg)))
@@ -278,8 +276,6 @@ static int blkdev_pr_reserve(struct block_device *bdev,
 	const struct pr_ops *ops = bdev->bd_disk->fops->pr_ops;
 	struct pr_reservation rsv;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (!ops || !ops->pr_reserve)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&rsv, arg, sizeof(rsv)))
@@ -296,8 +292,6 @@ static int blkdev_pr_release(struct block_device *bdev,
 	const struct pr_ops *ops = bdev->bd_disk->fops->pr_ops;
 	struct pr_reservation rsv;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (!ops || !ops->pr_release)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&rsv, arg, sizeof(rsv)))
@@ -314,8 +308,6 @@ static int blkdev_pr_preempt(struct block_device *bdev,
 	const struct pr_ops *ops = bdev->bd_disk->fops->pr_ops;
 	struct pr_preempt p;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (!ops || !ops->pr_preempt)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&p, arg, sizeof(p)))
@@ -332,8 +324,6 @@ static int blkdev_pr_clear(struct block_device *bdev,
 	const struct pr_ops *ops = bdev->bd_disk->fops->pr_ops;
 	struct pr_clear c;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
 	if (!ops || !ops->pr_clear)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&c, arg, sizeof(c)))
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1.6.gb485710b
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Jingbo Xu

When the shared storage is accessed from containers [1], it's not recommended to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers for access to Persistent Reservations in risk of container escape.

Remove the extra CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission constraint for Persistent Reservations ioctl which shall do no harm [2].

I think we still to check that if CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not present, the file descriptors needs to be open for write, and we're not called on a partition (the latter should probbaly be always checked, as a reservation for a partitions doesn't make sense).

But in general I think relaxing this is a good idea, we just need to be very careful. Looking at the discussion of unprivileged nvme command passthrough might be a good start.

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Christoph Hellwig
Quoted 6 lines · Jingbo Xu

When the shared storage is accessed from containers [1], it's not recommended to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers for access to Persistent Reservations in risk of container escape.

Remove the extra CAP_SYS_ADMIN permission constraint for Persistent Reservations ioctl which shall do no harm [2].

Quoted 8 lines

I think we still to check that if CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not present, the file descriptors needs to be open for write, and we're not called on a partition (the latter should probbaly be always checked, as a reservation for a partitions doesn't make sense).

But in general I think relaxing this is a good idea, we just need to be very careful. Looking at the discussion of unprivileged nvme command passthrough might be a good start.

Hi,

Thanks for the reply.

It seems I need to dive deeper into details of Persistent Reservations protocol and the permission control you mentioned in nvme command passthrough.

Thanks for your suggestions. I will send a new version later.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
Jingbo