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Clean up BPF permissions checks

PATCH Applied Andrii Nakryiko 3 participants 7 messages Jun 13, 2023 – Jun 19, 2023

Subsystems (10)
Networking Kselftest BPF BPF selftests +6 more subsystems
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Andrii Nakryiko

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover Clean up BPF permissions checks

This patch set contains a few refactorings to BPF map and BPF program creation permissions checks, which were originally part of BPF token patch set ([0]), but are logically completely independent and useful in their own right.

[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=755113&state=*

Andrii Nakryiko (4):
bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()
bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function
bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types
bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations

 kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c                     |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c                |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c                   |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/cpumap.c                           |   4 -
 kernel/bpf/devmap.c                           |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c                          |   6 -
 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c                         |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c                 |   4 -
 kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c                  |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c                         |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                          | 155 +++++++++++-------
 net/core/sock_map.c                           |   4 -
 net/xdp/xskmap.c                              |   4 -
 .../bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c      |   6 +-
 14 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/4 bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()

Make each bpf() syscall command a bit more self-contained, making it easier to further enhance it. We move sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled handling down to map_create() and bpf_prog_load(), two special commands in this regard.

Also swap the order of checks, calling bpf_capable() only if sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled is true, avoiding unnecessary audit messages.

Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +19 -15
index 92a57efc77de..1cc590101e19 100644
@@ -1157,6 +1157,15 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	     !node_online(numa_node)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
+	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+	 * object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
+	 * capability checks are still carried out.
+	 */
+	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* find map type and init map: hashtable vs rbtree vs bloom vs ... */
 	map = find_and_alloc_map(attr);
 	if (IS_ERR(map))

@@ -2532,6 +2541,16 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
 	is_gpl = license_is_gpl_compatible(license);
 
+	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF program
+	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
+	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
+	 * object creation success. Even with unprivileged BPF disabled,
+	 * capability checks are still carried out for these
+	 * and other operations.
+	 */
+	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (attr->insn_cnt == 0 ||
 	    attr->insn_cnt > (bpf_capable() ? BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS : BPF_MAXINSNS))
 		return -E2BIG;

@@ -5027,23 +5046,8 @@ static int bpf_prog_bind_map(union bpf_attr *attr)
 static int __sys_bpf(int cmd, bpfptr_t uattr, unsigned int size)
 {
 	union bpf_attr attr;
-	bool capable;
 	int err;
 
-	capable = bpf_capable() || !sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled;
-
-	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block key object
-	 * creation commands for unprivileged users; other actions depend
-	 * of fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on
-	 * object creation success.  Capabilities are later verified for
-	 * operations such as load and map create, so even with unprivileged
-	 * BPF disabled, capability checks are still carried out for these
-	 * and other operations.
-	 */
-	if (!capable &&
-	    (cmd == BPF_MAP_CREATE || cmd == BPF_PROG_LOAD))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	err = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(uattr, sizeof(attr), size);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/4 bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function

In reply to Andrii Nakryiko

Currently find_and_alloc_map() performs two separate functions: some argument sanity checking and partial map creation workflow hanling. Neither of those functions are self-sufficient and are augmented by further checks and initialization logic in the caller (map_create() function). So unify all the sanity checks, permission checks, and creation and initialization logic in one linear piece of code in map_create() instead. This also make it easier to further enhance permission checks and keep them located in one place.

Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +24 -33
index 1cc590101e19..be885d547cde 100644
@@ -109,37 +109,6 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops bpf_map_offload_ops = {
 	.map_mem_usage = bpf_map_offload_map_mem_usage,
 };
 
-static struct bpf_map *find_and_alloc_map(union bpf_attr *attr)
-{
-	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
-	u32 type = attr->map_type;
-	struct bpf_map *map;
-	int err;
-
-	if (type >= ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_map_types))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	type = array_index_nospec(type, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_map_types));
-	ops = bpf_map_types[type];
-	if (!ops)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-
-	if (ops->map_alloc_check) {
-		err = ops->map_alloc_check(attr);
-		if (err)
-			return ERR_PTR(err);
-	}
-	if (attr->map_ifindex)
-		ops = &bpf_map_offload_ops;
-	if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
-	if (IS_ERR(map))
-		return map;
-	map->ops = ops;
-	map->map_type = type;
-	return map;
-}
-
 static void bpf_map_write_active_inc(struct bpf_map *map)
 {
 	atomic64_inc(&map->writecnt);

@@ -1127,7 +1096,9 @@ static int map_check_btf(struct bpf_map *map, const struct btf *btf,
 /* called via syscall */
 static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
+	const struct bpf_map_ops *ops;
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
+	u32 map_type = attr->map_type;
 	struct bpf_map *map;
 	int f_flags;
 	int err;

@@ -1157,6 +1128,25 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	     !node_online(numa_node)))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/* find map type and init map: hashtable vs rbtree vs bloom vs ... */
+	map_type = attr->map_type;
+	if (map_type >= ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_map_types))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	map_type = array_index_nospec(map_type, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_map_types));
+	ops = bpf_map_types[map_type];
+	if (!ops)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (ops->map_alloc_check) {
+		err = ops->map_alloc_check(attr);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+	if (attr->map_ifindex)
+		ops = &bpf_map_offload_ops;
+	if (!ops->map_mem_usage)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF map
 	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
 	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on

@@ -1166,10 +1156,11 @@ static int map_create(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !bpf_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	/* find map type and init map: hashtable vs rbtree vs bloom vs ... */
-	map = find_and_alloc_map(attr);
+	map = ops->map_alloc(attr);
 	if (IS_ERR(map))
 		return PTR_ERR(map);
+	map->ops = ops;
+	map->map_type = map_type;
 
 	err = bpf_obj_name_cpy(map->name, attr->map_name,
 			       sizeof(attr->map_name));
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/4 bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types

In reply to Andrii Nakryiko

This allows to do more centralized decisions later on, and generally makes it very explicit which maps are privileged and which are not (e.g., LRU_HASH and LRU_PERCPU_HASH, which are privileged HASH variants, as opposed to unprivileged HASH and HASH_PERCPU; now this is explicit and easy to verify).

Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c                     |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c                |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c                   |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/cpumap.c                           |  4 --
 kernel/bpf/devmap.c                           |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c                          |  6 ---
 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c                         |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c                 |  4 --
 kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c                  |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c                         |  3 --
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                          | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/sock_map.c                           |  4 --
 net/xdp/xskmap.c                              |  4 --
 .../bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c      |  6 ++-
 14 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c +0 -3
index 540331b610a9..addf3dd57b59 100644
@@ -86,9 +86,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *bloom_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
 	struct bpf_bloom_filter *bloom;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	if (attr->key_size != 0 || attr->value_size == 0 ||
 	    attr->max_entries == 0 ||
 	    attr->map_flags & ~BLOOM_CREATE_FLAG_MASK ||
kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c +0 -3
index 47d9948d768f..b5149cfce7d4 100644
@@ -723,9 +723,6 @@ int bpf_local_storage_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	    !attr->btf_key_type_id || !attr->btf_value_type_id)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (attr->value_size > BPF_LOCAL_STORAGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE)
 		return -E2BIG;
kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c +0 -3
index d3f0a4825fa6..116a0ce378ec 100644
@@ -655,9 +655,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	const struct btf_type *t, *vt;
 	struct bpf_map *map;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	st_ops = bpf_struct_ops_find_value(attr->btf_vmlinux_value_type_id);
 	if (!st_ops)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c +0 -4
index 8ec18faa74ac..8a33e8747a0e 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <trace/events/xdp.h>
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
 

@@ -89,9 +88,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *cpu_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	u32 value_size = attr->value_size;
 	struct bpf_cpu_map *cmap;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
 	    (value_size != offsetofend(struct bpf_cpumap_val, qsize) &&
kernel/bpf/devmap.c +0 -3
index 802692fa3905..49cc0b5671c6 100644
@@ -160,9 +160,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *dev_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	struct bpf_dtab *dtab;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	dtab = bpf_map_area_alloc(sizeof(*dtab), NUMA_NO_NODE);
 	if (!dtab)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +0 -6
index 9901efee4339..56d3da7d0bc6 100644
@@ -422,12 +422,6 @@ static int htab_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct htab_elem, fnode.next) !=
 		     offsetof(struct htab_elem, hash_node.pprev));
 
-	if (lru && !bpf_capable())
-		/* LRU implementation is much complicated than other
-		 * maps.  Hence, limit to CAP_BPF.
-		 */
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	if (zero_seed && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		/* Guard against local DoS, and discourage production use. */
 		return -EPERM;
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +0 -3
index e0d3ddf2037a..17c7e7782a1f 100644
@@ -544,9 +544,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *trie_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
 	struct lpm_trie *trie;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
 	    !(attr->map_flags & BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) ||
kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c +0 -4
index 601609164ef3..8d2ddcb7566b 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
 #include "percpu_freelist.h"
 

@@ -46,9 +45,6 @@ static bool queue_stack_map_is_full(struct bpf_queue_stack *qs)
 /* Called from syscall */
 static int queue_stack_map_alloc_check(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	/* check sanity of attributes */
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 0 ||
 	    attr->value_size == 0 ||
kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c +0 -3
index cbf2d8d784b8..4b4f9670f1a9 100644
@@ -151,9 +151,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *reuseport_array_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	int numa_node = bpf_map_attr_numa_node(attr);
 	struct reuseport_array *array;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	/* allocate all map elements and zero-initialize them */
 	array = bpf_map_area_alloc(struct_size(array, ptrs, attr->max_entries), numa_node);
 	if (!array)
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +0 -3
index b25fce425b2c..458bb80b14d5 100644
@@ -74,9 +74,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	u64 cost, n_buckets;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!bpf_capable())
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	if (attr->map_flags & ~STACK_CREATE_FLAG_MASK)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +47 -0

53 lines not on this page · raw message

net/core/sock_map.c +0 -4
index 00afb66cd095..19538d628714 100644
@@ -32,8 +32,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 {
 	struct bpf_stab *stab;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
 	    attr->key_size    != 4 ||
 	    (attr->value_size != sizeof(u32) &&

@@ -1085,8 +1083,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *sock_hash_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	struct bpf_shtab *htab;
 	int i, err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 ||
 	    attr->key_size    == 0 ||
 	    (attr->value_size != sizeof(u32) &&
net/xdp/xskmap.c +0 -4
index 2c1427074a3b..e1c526f97ce3 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
 
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <linux/filter.h>
-#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <net/xdp_sock.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>

@@ -68,9 +67,6 @@ static struct bpf_map *xsk_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr)
 	int numa_node;
 	u64 size;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
 	if (attr->max_entries == 0 || attr->key_size != 4 ||
 	    attr->value_size != 4 ||
 	    attr->map_flags & ~(BPF_F_NUMA_NODE | BPF_F_RDONLY | BPF_F_WRONLY))
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c +5 -1
index 8383a99f610f..0adf8d9475cb 100644
@@ -171,7 +171,11 @@ static void test_unpriv_bpf_disabled_negative(struct test_unpriv_bpf_disabled *s
 				prog_insns, prog_insn_cnt, &load_opts),
 		  -EPERM, "prog_load_fails");
 
-	for (i = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH; i <= BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER; i++)
+	/* some map types require particular correct parameters which could be
+	 * sanity-checked before enforcing -EPERM, so only validate that
+	 * the simple ARRAY and HASH maps are failing with -EPERM
+	 */
+	for (i = BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH; i <= BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY; i++)
 		ASSERT_EQ(bpf_map_create(i, NULL, sizeof(int), sizeof(int), 1, NULL),
 			  -EPERM, "map_create_fails");
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/4 bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations

In reply to Andrii Nakryiko

Move out flags validation and license checks out of the permission checks. They were intermingled, which makes subsequent changes harder. Clean this up: perform straightforward flag validation upfront, and fetch and check license later, right where we use it. Also consolidate capabilities check in one block, right after basic attribute sanity checks.

Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 21 +++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +9 -12
index 8324c64e1e54..1eaa16d3c6db 100644
@@ -2550,7 +2550,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	struct btf *attach_btf = NULL;
 	int err;
 	char license[128];
-	bool is_gpl;
 
 	if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_LOAD))
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -2569,16 +2568,6 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 	    !bpf_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	/* copy eBPF program license from user space */
-	if (strncpy_from_bpfptr(license,
-				make_bpfptr(attr->license, uattr.is_kernel),
-				sizeof(license) - 1) < 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
-	license[sizeof(license) - 1] = 0;
-
-	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
-	is_gpl = license_is_gpl_compatible(license);
-
 	/* Intent here is for unprivileged_bpf_disabled to block BPF program
 	 * creation for unprivileged users; other actions depend
 	 * on fd availability and access to bpffs, so are dependent on

@@ -2671,12 +2660,20 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size)
 			     make_bpfptr(attr->insns, uattr.is_kernel),
 			     bpf_prog_insn_size(prog)) != 0)
 		goto free_prog_sec;
+	/* copy eBPF program license from user space */
+	if (strncpy_from_bpfptr(license,
+				make_bpfptr(attr->license, uattr.is_kernel),
+				sizeof(license) - 1) < 0)
+		goto free_prog_sec;
+	license[sizeof(license) - 1] = 0;
+
+	/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
+	prog->gpl_compatible = license_is_gpl_compatible(license) ? 1 : 0;
 
 	prog->orig_prog = NULL;
 	prog->jited = 0;
 
 	atomic64_set(&prog->aux->refcnt, 1);
-	prog->gpl_compatible = is_gpl ? 1 : 0;
 
 	if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(prog->aux)) {
 		err = bpf_prog_dev_bound_init(prog, attr);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Acked-by on the v1 series
#5 lore raw
In reply to Andrii Nakryiko
Quoted 12 lines · Andrii Nakryiko

This patch set contains a few refactorings to BPF map and BPF program creation permissions checks, which were originally part of BPF token patch set ([0]), but are logically completely independent and useful in their own right.

[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=755113&state=*

Andrii Nakryiko (4):
bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()
bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function
bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types
bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations

Quoted 19 lines
 kernel/bpf/bloom_filter.c                     |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/bpf_local_storage.c                |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/bpf_struct_ops.c                   |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/cpumap.c                           |   4 -
 kernel/bpf/devmap.c                           |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/hashtab.c                          |   6 -
 kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c                         |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/queue_stack_maps.c                 |   4 -
 kernel/bpf/reuseport_array.c                  |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/stackmap.c                         |   3 -
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c                          | 155 +++++++++++-------
 net/core/sock_map.c                           |   4 -
 net/xdp/xskmap.c                              |   4 -
 .../bpf/prog_tests/unpriv_bpf_disabled.c      |   6 +-
 14 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1

Since I took a look at this as part of the original series, and these are really non-controversial changes, feel free to use:

Acked-by Stanislav Fomichev <[email protected]>
CI Applied
#6 lore raw
In reply to Andrii Nakryiko
This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master) by Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>:

Quoted 6 lines · On Tue, 13 Jun 2023 15:35:29 -0700 you wrote:

This patch set contains a few refactorings to BPF map and BPF program creation permissions checks, which were originally part of BPF token patch set ([0]), but are logically completely independent and useful in their own right.

[0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=755113&state=*

Quoted 7 lines

Andrii Nakryiko (4):
bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()
bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function
bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types
bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [bpf-next,1/4] bpf: move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load()

    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/1d28635abcf1
  - [bpf-next,2/4] bpf: inline map creation logic in map_create() function
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/22db41226b67
  - [bpf-next,3/4] bpf: centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/6c3eba1c5e28
  - [bpf-next,4/4] bpf: keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations
    https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/7f6719f7a866

You are awesome, thank you!

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