Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Subsystems (2)
v3 cover Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.
The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring
---
v3:
* Fix the commit message
* Use READ_ONCE in io_uring_allowed to avoid races
* Add reviews
v2:
* Documentation style fixes
* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged processes
Matteo Rizzo (1):
io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
base-commit: 1601fb26b26758668533bdb211fdfbb5234367ee
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog
PATCH v3 1/1 io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +19 -0
@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded. +io_uring_disabled +================= + +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this +shrinks the kernel's attack surface. + += ================================================================== +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the + default setting. +1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes. + io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is + privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can + still be used. +2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup + always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be + used. += ================================================================== + + kexec_load_disabled ===================
io_uring/io_uring.c +31 -0
@@ -152,6 +152,22 @@ static void __io_submit_flush_completions(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx);struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; +static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = { + { + .procname ="io_uring_disabled" , + .data = &sysctl_io_uring_disabled, + .maxlen =sizeof (sysctl_io_uring_disabled), + .mode =0644 , + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 =SYSCTL_ZERO , + .extra2 =SYSCTL_TWO , + }, + {}, +}; +#endif +struct sock *io_uring_get_socket (struct file *file) {#if defined(CONFIG_UNIX )
@@ -4015,9 +4031,19 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)return io_uring_create (entries, &p, params); } +static inline bool io_uring_allowed (void ) +{ +int disabled =READ_ONCE (sysctl_io_uring_disabled); + +return disabled ==0 || (disabled ==1 &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )); +} +SYSCALL_DEFINE2 (io_uring_setup, u32, entries, struct io_uring_params __user *, params) { +if (!io_uring_allowed ()) +return -EPERM ; +return io_uring_setup (entries, params); }
@@ -4592,6 +4618,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void) req_cachep =KMEM_CACHE (io_kiocb,SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |SLAB_PANIC |SLAB_ACCOUNT |SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU ); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +register_sysctl_init ("kernel" , kernel_io_uring_disabled_table); +#endif +return 0 ; };__initcall (io_uring_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.255.g8b1d071c50-goog
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 10 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.Signed-off-by Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jeff Moyer <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
In reply to Matteo RizzoHi,
Quoted 6 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.
Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group could be required (similar to hugetlb_shm_group)? Requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN could have the unintended consequence of io_uring requiring tasks being run with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of granting the right to use io_uring?
ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow some services to use io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring to run services effectively as root.
Greetings,
Andres Freund
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Hi, Andres,
Quoted 10 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.
Quoted 5 lines
Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group could be required (similar tohugetlb_shm_group)? RequiringCAP_SYS_ADMINcould have the unintended consequence ofio_uringrequiring tasks being run with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of granting the right to useio_uring?
That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely disable io_uring.
Quoted 3 lines
ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow some services to use
io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring to run services effectively as root.
Do you have a proposal for how that would work? Why is this preferable to using a group?
Cheers,
Jeff
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Hi,
Sorry for the delayed response, EINBOXOVERFLOW.
Quoted 12 lines · Jeff Moyer
Quoted 10 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group could be required (similar tohugetlb_shm_group)? RequiringCAP_SYS_ADMINcould have the unintended consequence ofio_uringrequiring tasks being run with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of granting the right to useio_uring?That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely disable
io_uring.
Makes sense.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow some services to use
io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring to run services effectively as root.Do you have a proposal for how that would work?
I think group based permissions would allow for it, even if perhaps not in the most beautiful manner. Systemd can configure additional groups for a service with SupplementaryGroups, so adding a "io_uring" group or such should work.
Greetings,
Andres Freund
Jens Axboe
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 33 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Sorry for the delayed response, EINBOXOVERFLOW.
Quoted 12 lines · Jeff Moyer
Quoted 10 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group could be required (similar tohugetlb_shm_group)? RequiringCAP_SYS_ADMINcould have the unintended consequence ofio_uringrequiring tasks being run with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of granting the right to useio_uring?That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely disable
io_uring.Makes sense.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow some services to use
io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring to run services effectively as root.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Do you have a proposal for how that would work?
I think group based permissions would allow for it, even if perhaps not in the most beautiful manner. Systemd can configure additional groups for a service with SupplementaryGroups, so adding a "
io_uring" group or such should work.
I'm going to drop the original patch until we work out a scheme that everybody is happy with, and that is flexible enough.
Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
In reply to Andres FreundQuoted 33 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Sorry for the delayed response, EINBOXOVERFLOW.
Quoted 12 lines · Jeff Moyer
Quoted 10 lines · Andres Freund
Hi,
Quoted 6 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Hm, is there a chance that instead of requiring
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, a certain group could be required (similar tohugetlb_shm_group)? RequiringCAP_SYS_ADMINcould have the unintended consequence ofio_uringrequiring tasks being run with more privileges than needed... Or some other more granular way of granting the right to useio_uring?That's fine with me, so long as there is still an option to completely disable
io_uring.Makes sense.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
ISTM that it'd be nice if e.g. a systemd service specification could allow some services to use
io_uring, without allowing it for everyone, or requiring to run services effectively as root.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Do you have a proposal for how that would work?
I think group based permissions would allow for it, even if perhaps not in the most beautiful manner. Systemd can configure additional groups for a service with SupplementaryGroups, so adding a "
io_uring" group or such should work.
This is more complex/requires more configuration than just blocking root/non-root. Also, might not be practical for non-systemd systems, I suspect. Can we keep the other options in the sysctl io_uring_disabled as well:
0 -> all allowed (default)
1 -> group based permission
2 -> root only
3 -> all blocked
Signature · 1 line
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
Quoted 14 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables the creation of new
io_uringinstances system-wide.The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through
io_uringwhere disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For example a distro or cloud provider might want to disableio_uringby default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the machine enable and disableio_uringsystemwide at runtime without requiring a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] io_uring: add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
commit: d55f54dac19a0cee1818353ab5aa3edac9034db4
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe