memfd: support MFD_NOEXEC alongside MFD_EXEC
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 memfd: support MFD_NOEXEC alongside MFD_EXEC
Add a new flag for memfd_create() called MFD_NOEXEC, which has the opposite effect as MFD_EXEC (i.e., it strips the executable bits from the inode file mode).
The default mode for memfd_create() has historically been to use 0777 as file modes. The new MFD_EXEC flag has now made this explicit, paving the way to reduce the default to 0666 and thus dropping the executable bits for security reasons. Additionally, the MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag has been added which allows this without changing the default right now.
Unfortunately, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL enforces MFD_ALLOW_SEALING and F_SEAL_EXEC, with no alternatives available. This leads to multiple issues:
* Applications that do not want to allow sealing either have to use MFD_EXEC (which we don't want, unless they actually need the executable bits), or they must add F_SEAL_SEAL immediately on return of memfd_create(2) with MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, since this implicitly enables sealing.
Note that we explicitly added MFD_ALLOW_SEALING when creating memfd_create(2), because enabling seals on existing users of shmem without them knowing about it can easily introduce DoS scenarios. It is unclear why MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was designed to enable seals, and this is especially dangerous with MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEAL set via sysctl, since it will silently enable sealing on every memfd created.
* Applications that do not want MFD_EXEC, but rely on F_GET_SEALS to *NOT* return F_SEAL_EXEC have no way of achieving this other than using MFD_EXEC and clearing the executable bits manually via fchmod(2). Using MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will set F_SEAL_EXEC and thus break existing code that hard-codes the seal-set.
This is already an issue when sending log-memfds to systemd-journald today, which verifies the seal-set of the received FD and fails if unknown seals are set. Hence, you have to use MFD_EXEC when creating memfds for this purpose, even though you really do not need the executable bits set.
* Applications that want to enable the executable bit later on, currently have no way to create the memfd without it. They have to clear the bits immediately after creating it via fchmod(2), or just leave them set.
By adding MFD_NOEXEC, user-space is now able to clear the executable bits on all memfds immediately, clearly stating their intention, without requiring fixups after creating the memfd. In particular, it is highly useful for existing use-cases that cannot allow new seals to appear on memfds.
--- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 4 ++-- include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + mm/memfd.c | 29 ++++++++++++++--------------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/linux/pid_namespace.h +2 -2
@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ struct fs_pin;#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL ) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE )/* * sysctl for vm.memfd_noexec -* 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL +* 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC * acts like MFD_EXEC was set. -* 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL +* 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC * acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. * 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be * rejected.
include/uapi/linux/memfd.h +1 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#define MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL 0x0008U/* executable */ #define MFD_EXEC 0x0010U +#define MFD_NOEXEC 0x0020U/* * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page
mm/memfd.c +14 -15
@@ -266,7 +266,9 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg)#define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)#define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_EXEC) +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS \ + (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ + MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC) SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, const char __user *, uname,
@@ -289,11 +291,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,return -EINVAL ; } -/* Invalid if both EXEC and NOEXEC_SEAL are set.*/ -if ((flags &MFD_EXEC ) && (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL )) +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) + flags |=MFD_ALLOW_SEALING |MFD_NOEXEC ; + +if ((flags &MFD_EXEC ) && (flags &MFD_NOEXEC ))return -EINVAL ; -if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC |MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ))) { +if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC |MFD_NOEXEC ))) {#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL int sysctl =MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC ;struct pid_namespace *ns;
@@ -366,20 +370,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, file->f_mode |=FMODE_LSEEK |FMODE_PREAD |FMODE_PWRITE ; file->f_flags |=O_LARGEFILE ; -if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) { -struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC ) +file_inode (file)->i_mode &= ~0111 ; - inode->i_mode &= ~0111 ; - file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); -if (file_seals) { + file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); +if (file_seals) { +if (flags &MFD_ALLOW_SEALING ) *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL ; +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) *file_seals |=F_SEAL_EXEC ; - } - }else if (flags &MFD_ALLOW_SEALING ) { -/* MFD_EXEC and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING are set */ - file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); -if (file_seals) - *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL ; }fd_install (fd, file);
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Hi David
Thanks email and patch for discussion.
Quoted 5 lines · David Rheinsberg
Add a new flag for
memfd_create()calledMFD_NOEXEC, which has the opposite effect asMFD_EXEC(i.e., it strips the executable bits from the inode file mode).
I previously thought about having the symmetric flags, such as MFD_NOEXEC/MFD_EXEC/MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL/MFD_EXEC_SEAL, but decided against it. The app shall decide beforehand what the memfd is created for, if it is no-executable, then it should be sealed, such that it can't be chmod to enable "X" bit.
Quoted 16 lines
The default mode for
memfd_create()has historically been to use 0777 as file modes. The newMFD_EXECflag has now made this explicit, paving the way to reduce the default to 0666 and thus dropping the executable bits for security reasons. Additionally, theMFD_NOEXEC_SEALflag has been added which allows this without changing the default right now.Unfortunately,
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALenforcesMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGandF_SEAL_EXEC, with no alternatives available. This leads to multiple issues:* Applications that do not want to allow sealing either have to use
MFD_EXEC(which we don't want, unless they actually need the executable bits), or they must addF_SEAL_SEALimmediately on return ofmemfd_create(2)withMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, since this implicitly enables sealing.
Quoted 3 lines
Note that we explicitly added
MFD_ALLOW_SEALINGwhen creatingmemfd_create(2), because enabling seals on existing users of shmem without them knowing about it can easily introduce DoS scenarios.
The application that doesn't want MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL can use MFD_EXEC, the kernel won't add MFD_ALLOW_SEALING implicitly. MFD_EXEC makes the kernel behave the same as before, this is also why sysctl vm.memfd_noexec=0 can work seamlessly.
Quoted 6 lines
It
is unclear whyMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwas designed to enable seals, and this is especially dangerous withMEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEALset via sysctl, since it will silently enable sealing on every memfd created.
Without sealing, chmod(2) can modify the mfd to be executable, that is the consideration that MFD_NOEXEC is not provided as an option. Indeed, current design is "biased" towards promoting MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL as the safest approach, and try to avoid the pitfall that dev accidently uses "MFD_NOEXEC" without realizing it can still be chmod().
Quoted 13 lines
* Applications that do not want
MFD_EXEC, but rely onF_GET_SEALSto *NOT* returnF_SEAL_EXEChave no way of achieving this other than usingMFD_EXECand clearing the executable bits manually via fchmod(2). UsingMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwill setF_SEAL_EXECand thus break existing code that hard-codes the seal-set.This is already an issue when sending log-memfds to systemd-journald today, which verifies the seal-set of the received FD and fails if unknown seals are set. Hence, you have to use
MFD_EXECwhen creating memfds for this purpose, even though you really do not need the executable bits set.
Quoted 5 lines
* Applications that want to enable the executable bit later on, currently have no way to create the memfd without it. They have to clear the bits immediately after creating it via fchmod(2), or just leave them set.
Is it OK to do what you want in two steps ? What is the concern there ? i.e. memfd_create(MFD_EXEC), then chmod to remove the "X" bit.
I imagine this is probably already what the application does for creating no-executable mfd before my patch, i.e.:memfd_create(), then chmod() to remove "X" to remove "X" bit.
Thanks!
-Jeff
-Jeff
Quoted 103 lines
By adding
MFD_NOEXEC, user-space is now able to clear the executable bits on all memfds immediately, clearly stating their intention, without requiring fixups after creating the memfd. In particular, it is highly useful for existing use-cases that cannot allow new seals to appear on memfds.Signed-off-by David Rheinsberg <[email protected]>--- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 4 ++-- include/uapi/linux/memfd.h | 1 + mm/memfd.c | 29 ++++++++++++++--------------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)include/linux/pid_namespace.h +2
-2@@ -19,9 +19,9 @@ struct fs_pin;#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL ) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE )/* * sysctl for vm.memfd_noexec -* 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL +* 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC * acts like MFD_EXEC was set. -* 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL +* 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC * acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. * 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be * rejected. include/uapi/linux/memfd.h +1
-0@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#define MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL 0x0008U/* executable */ #define MFD_EXEC 0x0010U +#define MFD_NOEXEC 0x0020U/* * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page mm/memfd.c +14
-16@@ -266,7 +266,9 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned int arg)#define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)#define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN) -#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_EXEC) +#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS \ + (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \ + MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL | MFD_EXEC | MFD_NOEXEC) SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, const char __user *, uname,@@ -289,11 +291,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,return -EINVAL ; } -/* Invalid if both EXEC and NOEXEC_SEAL are set.*/ -if ((flags &MFD_EXEC ) && (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL )) +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) + flags |=MFD_ALLOW_SEALING |MFD_NOEXEC ; + +if ((flags &MFD_EXEC ) && (flags &MFD_NOEXEC ))return -EINVAL ; -if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC |MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ))) { +if (!(flags & (MFD_EXEC |MFD_NOEXEC ))) {#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL int sysctl =MEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_EXEC ;struct pid_namespace *ns;@@ -366,20 +370,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create, file->f_mode |=FMODE_LSEEK |FMODE_PREAD |FMODE_PWRITE ; file->f_flags |=O_LARGEFILE ; -if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) { -struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC ) +file_inode (file)->i_mode &= ~0111 ; - inode->i_mode &= ~0111 ; - file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); -if (file_seals) { + file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); +if (file_seals) { +if (flags &MFD_ALLOW_SEALING ) *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL ; +if (flags &MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL ) *file_seals |=F_SEAL_EXEC ; - } - }else if (flags &MFD_ALLOW_SEALING ) { -/* MFD_EXEC and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING are set */ - file_seals =memfd_file_seals_ptr (file); -if (file_seals) - *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL ; }fd_install (fd, file); --2.41.0
Hi
Quoted 10 lines · Jeff Xu
Hi David
Thanks email and patch for discussion.
Quoted 5 lines · David Rheinsberg
Add a new flag for
memfd_create()calledMFD_NOEXEC, which has the opposite effect asMFD_EXEC(i.e., it strips the executable bits from the inode file mode).
Quoted 5 lines
I previously thought about having the symmetric flags, such as MFD_NOEXEC/MFD_EXEC/MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL/MFD_EXEC_SEAL, but decided against it. The app shall decide beforehand what the memfd is created for, if it is no-executable, then it should be sealed, such that it can't be chmod to enable "X" bit.
My point is, an application might decide to *not* seal a property, because it knows it has to change it later on. But it might still want to disable the executable bit initially, so to avoid having executable pages around that can be exploited.
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 16 lines
The default mode for
memfd_create()has historically been to use 0777 as file modes. The newMFD_EXECflag has now made this explicit, paving the way to reduce the default to 0666 and thus dropping the executable bits for security reasons. Additionally, theMFD_NOEXEC_SEALflag has been added which allows this without changing the default right now.Unfortunately,
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALenforcesMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGandF_SEAL_EXEC, with no alternatives available. This leads to multiple issues:* Applications that do not want to allow sealing either have to use
MFD_EXEC(which we don't want, unless they actually need the executable bits), or they must addF_SEAL_SEALimmediately on return ofmemfd_create(2)withMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, since this implicitly enables sealing.Quoted 3 lines
Note that we explicitly added
MFD_ALLOW_SEALINGwhen creatingmemfd_create(2), because enabling seals on existing users of shmem without them knowing about it can easily introduce DoS scenarios.The application that doesn't want
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALcan useMFD_EXEC, the kernel won't addMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGimplicitly.MFD_EXECmakes the kernel behave the same as before, this is also why sysctl vm.memfd_noexec=0 can work seamlessly.Quoted 6 lines
It
is unclear whyMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwas designed to enable seals, and this is especially dangerous withMEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEALset via sysctl, since it will silently enable sealing on every memfd created.
Quoted 6 lines
Without sealing, chmod(2) can modify the mfd to be executable, that is the consideration that
MFD_NOEXECis not provided as an option. Indeed, current design is "biased" towards promotingMFD_NOEXEC_SEALas the safest approach, and try to avoid the pitfall that dev accidently uses "MFD_NOEXEC" without realizing it can still bechmod().
I think I didn't get my point across. Imagine an application that does *NOT* use sealing, but uses memfds. This application shares memfds with untrusted clients, and does this in a safe way (SIGBUS protected). Everything works fine, unless someone decides to enable vm.memfd_noexec=2. Suddenly, the memfd will have sealing enabled *without* the application ever requesting this. Now any untrusted client that got the memfd can add seals to the memfd, even though the creator of the memfd did not enable sealing. This client can now seal WRITES on the memfd, even though it really should not be able to do that.
(This is not an hypothetical setup, we have such setups for data sharing already)
Thus, setting the security-option memfd_noexec *breaks* applications, because it enables sealing. If MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL would *not* imply MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, this would not be an issue. IOW, why does ´MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL clear F_SEAL_SEAL even if MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is not set?
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 13 lines
* Applications that do not want
MFD_EXEC, but rely onF_GET_SEALSto *NOT* returnF_SEAL_EXEChave no way of achieving this other than usingMFD_EXECand clearing the executable bits manually via fchmod(2). UsingMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwill setF_SEAL_EXECand thus break existing code that hard-codes the seal-set.This is already an issue when sending log-memfds to systemd-journald today, which verifies the seal-set of the received FD and fails if unknown seals are set. Hence, you have to use
MFD_EXECwhen creating memfds for this purpose, even though you really do not need the executable bits set.Quoted 5 lines
* Applications that want to enable the executable bit later on, currently have no way to create the memfd without it. They have to clear the bits immediately after creating it via fchmod(2), or just leave them set.
Quoted 6 lines
Is it OK to do what you want in two steps ? What is the concern there ? i.e.
memfd_create(MFD_EXEC), then chmod to remove the "X" bit.I imagine this is probably already what the application does for creating no-executable mfd before my patch, i.e.:
memfd_create(), thenchmod()to remove "X" to remove "X" bit.
Yes, correct, this is not a technical issue, but rather an API issue. I don't think most memfd-users are aware that their inode has the executable bit set, and they likely don't want it. But for backwards-compatibility reasons (as noted above), they cannot use MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL. Hence, we have to make them explicitly request an executable memfd via MFD_EXEC now, even though they clearly do not want this. And then we have to add code to drop the executable immediately afterwards.
It don't understand why we don't add out MFD_NOEXEC and thus make it a lot easier to patch existing applications? And we make it explicit that these applications don't care for the executable-bit, rather than forcing them to request the executable bit just to drop it immediately.
The downside of MFD_NOEXEC is that it might be picked over MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL by uneducated users, thus reduce security. But right now, the alternative is that existing code picks MFD_EXEC instead and never clears the executable bit, because it is a hassle to do so.
Or is there another reason *not* to include MFD_NOEXEC? I am not sure I understand fully why you fight it so vehemently?
Thanks
David
Hi David,
Quoted 14 lines · David Rheinsberg
Hi
Quoted 10 lines · Jeff Xu
Hi David
Thanks email and patch for discussion.
Quoted 5 lines · David Rheinsberg
Add a new flag for
memfd_create()calledMFD_NOEXEC, which has the opposite effect asMFD_EXEC(i.e., it strips the executable bits from the inode file mode).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I previously thought about having the symmetric flags, such as MFD_NOEXEC/MFD_EXEC/MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL/MFD_EXEC_SEAL, but decided against it. The app shall decide beforehand what the memfd is created for, if it is no-executable, then it should be sealed, such that it can't be chmod to enable "X" bit.
My point is, an application might decide to *not* seal a property, because it knows it has to change it later on. But it might still want to disable the executable bit initially, so to avoid having executable pages around that can be exploited.
I understand that.
My argument was this application can do this in two steps, as in my previous email:
1> memfd_create(MFD_EXEC)
2> chmod
Two system calls back to back isn't too terrible, and I know this might seem to be not optimized for your user case, I will explain it later, please read on.
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 16 lines
The default mode for
memfd_create()has historically been to use 0777 as file modes. The newMFD_EXECflag has now made this explicit, paving the way to reduce the default to 0666 and thus dropping the executable bits for security reasons. Additionally, theMFD_NOEXEC_SEALflag has been added which allows this without changing the default right now.Unfortunately,
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALenforcesMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGandF_SEAL_EXEC, with no alternatives available. This leads to multiple issues:* Applications that do not want to allow sealing either have to use
MFD_EXEC(which we don't want, unless they actually need the executable bits), or they must addF_SEAL_SEALimmediately on return ofmemfd_create(2)withMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, since this implicitly enables sealing.Quoted 3 lines
Note that we explicitly added
MFD_ALLOW_SEALINGwhen creatingmemfd_create(2), because enabling seals on existing users of shmem without them knowing about it can easily introduce DoS scenarios.The application that doesn't want
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALcan useMFD_EXEC, the kernel won't addMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGimplicitly.MFD_EXECmakes the kernel behave the same as before, this is also why sysctl vm.memfd_noexec=0 can work seamlessly.Quoted 6 lines
It
is unclear whyMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwas designed to enable seals, and this is especially dangerous withMEMFD_NOEXEC_SCOPE_NOEXEC_SEALset via sysctl, since it will silently enable sealing on every memfd created.Quoted 6 lines
Without sealing, chmod(2) can modify the mfd to be executable, that is the consideration that
MFD_NOEXECis not provided as an option. Indeed, current design is "biased" towards promotingMFD_NOEXEC_SEALas the safest approach, and try to avoid the pitfall that dev accidently uses "MFD_NOEXEC" without realizing it can still bechmod().
Quoted 3 lines
I think I didn't get my point across. Imagine an application that does *NOT* use sealing, but uses memfds. This application shares memfds with untrusted clients, and does this in a safe way (SIGBUS protected). Everything works fine, unless someone decides to enable
vm.memfd_noexec=2. Suddenly, the memfd will have sealing enabled *without* the application ever requesting this. Now any untrusted client that got the memfd can add seals to the memfd, even though the creator of the memfd did not enable sealing. This client can now seal WRITES on the memfd, even though it really should not be able to do that.(This is not an hypothetical setup, we have such setups for data sharing already)
Thanks, this helps me understand your point better.
I'm not convinced that sysctl needs to consider the threat model of "someone" changing and breaking an application. If we follow that threat model, there are a lot of other sysctls to worry about.
Also, in the system that you described, if memfd is handled to an untrusted process, not only "sealing" can cause damage, but also chmod, arbitrary rw, imo the right approach is to harden the process or mechanism of passing the memfd.
Quoted 3 lines
Thus, setting the security-option
memfd_noexec*breaks* applications, because it enables sealing. IfMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwould *not* implyMFD_ALLOW_SEALING, this would not be an issue. IOW, why does ´MFD_NOEXEC_SEALclearF_SEAL_SEALeven ifMFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is not set?
If MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is not desired, then it should not be used to overwrite memfd_create() in this system.
For the question of why the sysctl adding a seal without application setting it , the rationale here is, as summary of previous/this emails:
1> The sysctl helps a system (or container in pid name) to migrate out of old API, e.g, a container can update only the applications that need executable memfd, change the sysctl to MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL overwrite, thus secure the usage of executable memfd to only those need to. This is faster than updating all of the applications.
2> Since the sysctl does overwrite, it has potential to break an application's intent, i.e. an unmigrated application which expects executable memfd, and kernel uses MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL overwrite. It is important to use this with caution and abundant tests before turning it on.
3> The seal is added because the majority of users should just care about MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, this prevents changing the memfd to executable through chmod at runtime.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 13 lines
* Applications that do not want
MFD_EXEC, but rely onF_GET_SEALSto *NOT* returnF_SEAL_EXEChave no way of achieving this other than usingMFD_EXECand clearing the executable bits manually via fchmod(2). UsingMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwill setF_SEAL_EXECand thus break existing code that hard-codes the seal-set.This is already an issue when sending log-memfds to systemd-journald today, which verifies the seal-set of the received FD and fails if unknown seals are set. Hence, you have to use
MFD_EXECwhen creating memfds for this purpose, even though you really do not need the executable bits set.Quoted 5 lines
* Applications that want to enable the executable bit later on, currently have no way to create the memfd without it. They have to clear the bits immediately after creating it via fchmod(2), or just leave them set.
Quoted 6 lines
Is it OK to do what you want in two steps ? What is the concern there ? i.e.
memfd_create(MFD_EXEC), then chmod to remove the "X" bit.I imagine this is probably already what the application does for creating no-executable mfd before my patch, i.e.:
memfd_create(), thenchmod()to remove "X" to remove "X" bit.
Quoted 6 lines
Yes, correct, this is not a technical issue, but rather an API issue. I don't think most memfd-users are aware that their inode has the executable bit set, and they likely don't want it. But for backwards-compatibility reasons (as noted above), they cannot use
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL. Hence, we have to make them explicitly request an executable memfd viaMFD_EXECnow, even though they clearly do not want this. And then we have to add code to drop the executable immediately afterwards.It don't understand why we don't add out
MFD_NOEXECand thus make it a lot easier to patch existing applications? And we make it explicit that these applications don't care for the executable-bit, rather than forcing them to request the executable bit just to drop it immediately.The downside of
MFD_NOEXECis that it might be picked overMFD_NOEXEC_SEALby uneducated users, thus reducing security. But right now, the alternative is that existing code picksMFD_EXECinstead and never clears the executable bit, because it is a hassle to do so.
Yes. This is the downside I was thinking about.
I lean to believe the kernel API shouldn't be feature rich, it could be simple, optimized towards the majority of user cases, and ideally, is self-explained without devs to look through documentation. For example, if I had to choose one to implement between MFD_NOEXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, I would choose MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL because it should be what most users care about.
Quoted 2 lines
Or is there another reason *not* to include
MFD_NOEXEC? I am not sure I understand fully why you fight it so vehemently?
I wouldn't add it myself, I hope to convince you not to :-). If you still think it is beneficial to add MFD_NOEXEC (saving one chmod call and making it easy to use), I wouldn't feel bad about that. I would suggest going with documentation to help devs to choose between those two, i.e. recommend MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL in most cases.
Thanks
Best regards,
-Jeff
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks
David
Hi Jeff!
Quoted 9 lines · Jeff Xu
Quoted 2 lines
My point is, an application might decide to *not* seal a property, because it knows it has to change it later on. But it might still want to disable the executable bit initially, so to avoid having executable pages around that can be exploited.
I understand that.
My argument was this application can do this in two steps, as in my previous email:
1>memfd_create(MFD_EXEC)
2> chmod
Quoted 3 lines
Two system calls back to back isn't too terrible, and I know this might seem to be not optimized for your user case, I will explain it later, please read on.
Yes, I agree that MFD_NOEXEC would be rather simple to imitate. So this is mostly a discussion about the intention and side-effects of this workaround, which is also likely why we haven't found an agreement, yet.
[...]
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think I didn't get my point across. Imagine an application that does *NOT* use sealing, but uses memfds. This application shares memfds with untrusted clients, and does this in a safe way (SIGBUS protected). Everything works fine, unless someone decides to enable
vm.memfd_noexec=2. Suddenly, the memfd will have sealing enabled *without* the application ever requesting this. Now any untrusted client that got the memfd can add seals to the memfd, even though the creator of the memfd did not enable sealing. This client can now seal WRITES on the memfd, even though it really should not be able to do that.(This is not an hypothetical setup, we have such setups for data sharing already)
Thanks, this helps me understand your point better.
Quoted 8 lines
I'm not convinced that sysctl needs to consider the threat model of "someone" changing and breaking an application. If we follow that threat model, there are a lot of other sysctls to worry about.
Also, in the system that you described, if memfd is handled to an untrusted process, not only "sealing" can cause damage, but also chmod, arbitrary rw, imo the right approach is to harden the process or mechanism of passing the memfd.
No. The model I describe is carefully designed to hand out file-descriptors to inodes that the clients have *no* access to. They cannot run fchmod(2), unlink(2), etc. All they can do is operate on the open file. And all access to this shared file is properly guarded against possible damage the other concurrent clients can do. The entire model is already hardened against malicious actors.
With the new sysctl, a new attack-vector is introduced, which was not possible before.
I was *explicitly* told to add MFD_ALLOW_SEALING for that exact reason when introducing memfd_create(2). So I am a bit baffled why it is now ok to enable sealing behind the users back.
I agree that the new sysctl is a root-only option. But I fail to see *why* it implies MFD_ALLOW_SEALING? This behavior is not documented nor is it explained in the original commit-messages, nor mentioned *anywhere*.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Thus, setting the security-option
memfd_noexec*breaks* applications, because it enables sealing. IfMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwould *not* implyMFD_ALLOW_SEALING, this would not be an issue. IOW, why does ´MFD_NOEXEC_SEALclearF_SEAL_SEALeven ifMFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is not set?If
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALis not desired, then it should not be used to overwritememfd_create()in this system.For the question of why the sysctl adding a seal without application setting it , the rationale here is, as summary of previous/this emails:
I still think we are not talking about the same thing. I completely understand why you add the seal! I am just questioning why you *CLEAR* F_SEAL_SEAL? That is, why do you enable MFD_ALLOW_SEALING without the user requesting it? You could just set F_SEAL_EXEC without clearing F_SEAL_SEAL. And then require MFD_ALLOW_SEALING on top to clear F_SEAL_SEAL.
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The downside of
MFD_NOEXECis that it might be picked overMFD_NOEXEC_SEALby uneducated users, thus reducing security. But right now, the alternative is that existing code picksMFD_EXECinstead and never clears the executable bit, because it is a hassle to do so.Yes. This is the downside I was thinking about.
I lean to believe the kernel API shouldn't be feature rich, it could be simple, optimized towards the majority of user cases, and ideally, is self-explained without devs to look through documentation. For example, if I had to choose one to implement between
MFD_NOEXECandMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, I would chooseMFD_NOEXEC_SEALbecause it should be what most users care about.
Well, if we were to go back, we would make MFD_NOEXEC(_SEAL) the default and just add MFD_EXEC :)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Or is there another reason *not* to include
MFD_NOEXEC? I am not sure I understand fully why you fight it so vehemently?I wouldn't add it myself, I hope to convince you not to :-). If you still think it is beneficial to add
MFD_NOEXEC(saving one chmod call and making it easy to use), I wouldn't feel bad about that. I would suggest going with documentation to help devs to choose between those two, i.e. recommendMFD_NOEXEC_SEALin most cases.
Any application that cannot use F_SEAL_EXEC (e.g., because its peers verify for historic reasons that the seal is not set) now has to do an extra dance to get the "safer" behavior, rather than getting the "safer" behavior by default. That is, we make it easier to get the unsafe behavior than to get the safe behavior (in this particular scenario).
Without MFD_NOEXEC, it is easier to end up with a 0777 memfd than not. I want the application that desires S_IXUSR to jump through hoops, not the application that does *not* require it.
In other words, I would prefer MFD_ALLOW_EXEC, which requires fchmod(2) to set S_IXUSR`, rather than requiring a call to fchmod(2) to clear it for everyone that does not need it.
Thanks
David
Quoted 26 lines · David Rheinsberg
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think I didn't get my point across. Imagine an application that does *NOT* use sealing, but uses memfds. This application shares memfds with untrusted clients, and does this in a safe way (SIGBUS protected). Everything works fine, unless someone decides to enable
vm.memfd_noexec=2. Suddenly, the memfd will have sealing enabled *without* the application ever requesting this. Now any untrusted client that got the memfd can add seals to the memfd, even though the creator of the memfd did not enable sealing. This client can now seal WRITES on the memfd, even though it really should not be able to do that.(This is not an hypothetical setup, we have such setups for data sharing already)
Thanks, this helps me understand your point better.
Quoted 8 lines
I'm not convinced that sysctl needs to consider the threat model of "someone" changing and breaking an application. If we follow that threat model, there are a lot of other sysctls to worry about.
Also, in the system that you described, if memfd is handled to an untrusted process, not only "sealing" can cause damage, but also chmod, arbitrary rw, imo the right approach is to harden the process or mechanism of passing the memfd.
No. The model I describe is carefully designed to hand out file-descriptors to inodes that the clients have *no* access to. They cannot run fchmod(2), unlink(2), etc. All they can do is operate on the open file. And all access to this shared file is properly guarded against possible damage the other concurrent clients can do. The entire model is already hardened against malicious actors.
With the new sysctl, a new attack-vector is introduced, which was not possible before.
I was *explicitly* told to add
MFD_ALLOW_SEALINGfor that exact reason when introducingmemfd_create(2). So I am a bit baffled why it is now ok to enable sealing behind the users back.I agree that the new sysctl is a root-only option. But I fail to see *why* it implies
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING? This behavior is not documented nor is it explained in the original commit-messages, nor mentioned *anywhere*.Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Thus, setting the security-option
memfd_noexec*breaks* applications, because it enables sealing. IfMFD_NOEXEC_SEALwould *not* implyMFD_ALLOW_SEALING, this would not be an issue. IOW, why does ´MFD_NOEXEC_SEALclearF_SEAL_SEALeven ifMFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is not set?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
If
MFD_NOEXEC_SEALis not desired, then it should not be used to overwritememfd_create()in this system.For the question of why the sysctl adding a seal without application setting it , the rationale here is, as summary of previous/this emails:
I still think we are not talking about the same thing. I completely understand why you add the seal! I am just questioning why you *CLEAR*
F_SEAL_SEAL? That is, why do you enableMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGwithout the user requesting it? You could just setF_SEAL_EXECwithout clearingF_SEAL_SEAL. And then requireMFD_ALLOW_SEALINGon top to clearF_SEAL_SEAL.
Ah, I apologize. I didn't read it carefully enough and misunderstood you, thanks for clarification.
The reason that F_SEAL_SEAL is cleared, is that MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL implies MFD_ALLOW_SEALING, and it seems to be reasonable that application might want to use sealing e.g I image application write the content to memfd then adding F_SEAL_WRITE.
Your point is that MFD_ALLOW_SEALING should not be implied by MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL. An application should still explicitly set MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.
To me, MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, the _SEAL part implies to allow sealing, but of course, this might not be so clear to anyone other than me :-) , documentation is indeed necessary.
And with the context you described, now I think your approach is better:
1> application set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, with MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
F_SEAL_EXEC is set, F_SEAL_SEAL is clear.
2> Application set MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, without MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
F_SEAL_EXEC and F_SEAL_SEAL are set.
Quoted 18 lines
[...]
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The downside of
MFD_NOEXECis that it might be picked overMFD_NOEXEC_SEALby uneducated users, thus reducing security. But right now, the alternative is that existing code picksMFD_EXECinstead and never clears the executable bit, because it is a hassle to do so.Yes. This is the downside I was thinking about.
I lean to believe the kernel API shouldn't be feature rich, it could be simple, optimized towards the majority of user cases, and ideally, is self-explained without devs to look through documentation. For example, if I had to choose one to implement between
MFD_NOEXECandMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL, I would chooseMFD_NOEXEC_SEALbecause it should be what most users care about.Well, if we were to go back, we would make
MFD_NOEXEC(_SEAL)the default and just addMFD_EXEC:)Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Or is there another reason *not* to include
MFD_NOEXEC? I am not sure I understand fully why you fight it so vehemently?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I wouldn't add it myself, I hope to convince you not to :-). If you still think it is beneficial to add
MFD_NOEXEC(saving one chmod call and making it easy to use), I wouldn't feel bad about that. I would suggest going with documentation to help devs to choose between those two, i.e. recommendMFD_NOEXEC_SEALin most cases.Any application that cannot use
F_SEAL_EXEC(e.g., because its peers verify for historic reasons that the seal is not set) now has to do an extra dance to get the "safer" behavior, rather than getting the "safer" behavior by default. That is, we make it easier to get the unsafe behavior than to get the safe behavior (in this particular scenario). WithoutMFD_NOEXEC, it is easier to end up with a 0777 memfd than not. I want the application that desiresS_IXUSRto jump through hoops, not the application that does *not* require it.
I see your points now, i.e. the "disallow sealing entirely" is at least as important as "not able to chmod to add X".
I think the reasonable mid-ground is perhaps adding MFD_NOEXEC support, with some documentation to help dev to choose between MFD_NOEXEC and MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL
Would you like to update your patch to the last version on Andrew's branch, adding selftest, and perhaps help for documentation ?
Thanks!
-Jeff