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net: Fix error/warning by -fstrict-flex-arrays=3

PATCH Superseded Kuniyuki Iwashima 3 participants 8 messages Jul 20, 2023

Subsystems (4)

v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover net: Fix error/warning by -fstrict-flex-arrays=3

df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") started applying strict rules for standard string functions (strlen(), memcpy(), etc.) if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.

This series fixes two false positives caught by syzkaller.

Changes:
v2:
* Patch 2: Fix offset calc.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/

Kuniyuki Iwashima (2):
af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().

 net/packet/af_packet.c |  7 ++++++-
 net/unix/af_unix.c     | 16 +++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().

syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.

108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.

However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in struct sockaddr_storage.

Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size.

[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!

Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030

sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c

Call trace:
 fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline]
 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline]
 unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326
 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +13 -3
index 123b35ddfd71..e1b1819b96d1 100644
@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len)
 	((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] = 0;
 }
 
+static int unix_strlen_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr)
+{
+	/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen().  Otherwise, the
+	 * max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if
+	 * CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.  Let __fortify_strlen() know that
+	 * the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108
+	 * is within __data[].  See also: unix_mkname_bsd().
+	 */
+	return strlen(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) +
+		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
+}
+
 static void __unix_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	sk_del_node_init(sk);
@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,
 	int err;
 
 	unix_mkname_bsd(sunaddr, addr_len);
-	addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +
-		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
-
+	addr_len = unix_strlen_bsd(sunaddr);
 	addr = unix_create_addr(sunaddr, addr_len);
 	if (!addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().

Quoted 8 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima

syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.

108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.

Quoted 4 lines

However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in struct sockaddr_storage.

Oh, the max size is 108, but it's allowed to be unterminated? This seems to contradict the comment for unix_validate_addr() (which then doesn't validate this ...) Reading "max 7 unix" seems to clear this up and confirm that it doesn't need to be terminated. Bleh.

Regardless, see below for a simpler solution, since this doesn't need to be arbitrarily long, just potentially unterminated.

Quoted 73 lines

Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size.

[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!

Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030

sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c

Call trace:
 fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline]
 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline]
 unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326
 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +12 -0
index 123b35ddfd71..e1b1819b96d1 100644
@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len)
 	((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] = 0;
 }
 
+static int unix_strlen_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr)
+{
+	/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen().  Otherwise, the
+	 * max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if
+	 * CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.  Let __fortify_strlen() know that
+	 * the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108
+	 * is within __data[].  See also: unix_mkname_bsd().
+	 */
+	return strlen(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) +
+		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
+}
+
 static void __unix_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	sk_del_node_init(sk);

net/unix/af_unix.c static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, · line 1212

Quoted 4 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +0 -1
@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,
 	int err;
 
 	unix_mkname_bsd(sunaddr, addr_len);
-	addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +

Instead of a whole new function, I think this can just be:

		strnlen(sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) +
Quoted 9 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -2
-		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
-
+	addr_len = unix_strlen_bsd(sunaddr);
 	addr = unix_create_addr(sunaddr, addr_len);
 	if (!addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 07:39:48 -0700

Quoted 9 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 8 lines

syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.

108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in struct sockaddr_storage.

Oh, the max size is 108, but it's allowed to be unterminated? This seems to contradict the comment for unix_validate_addr() (which then doesn't validate this ...)

Because we call it for the abstract socket too which starts with \0 and does not handle it specially.

Quoted 5 lines

Reading "max 7 unix" seems to clear this up and confirm that it doesn't need to be terminated. Bleh.

Regardless, see below for a simpler solution, since this doesn't need to be arbitrarily long, just potentially unterminated.

unix_mkname_bsd() terminates it. Technically, we need not call strlen() if we don't optimise the allocated string length. connect() does not need strlen() and just calls unix_mkname_bsd() in unix_find_bsd().

Quoted 95 lines
Quoted 74 lines

Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size.

[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!

Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030

sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c

Call trace:
 fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline]
 unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline]
 unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326
 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
---
 net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +12 -0
index 123b35ddfd71..e1b1819b96d1 100644
@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len)
 	((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] = 0;
 }
 
+static int unix_strlen_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr)
+{
+	/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen().  Otherwise, the
+	 * max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if
+	 * CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.  Let __fortify_strlen() know that
+	 * the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108
+	 * is within __data[].  See also: unix_mkname_bsd().
+	 */
+	return strlen(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) +
+		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
+}
+
 static void __unix_remove_socket(struct sock *sk)
 {
 	sk_del_node_init(sk);

net/unix/af_unix.c static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, · line 1212

Quoted 4 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +0 -1
@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,
 	int err;
 
 	unix_mkname_bsd(sunaddr, addr_len);
-	addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +

Instead of a whole new function, I think this can just be:

		strnlen(sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) +
Quoted 9 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +1 -2
-		offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1;
-
+	addr_len = unix_strlen_bsd(sunaddr);
 	addr = unix_create_addr(sunaddr, addr_len);
 	if (!addr)
 		return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().

In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashima

syzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].

Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN.

The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].

To avoid the warning, we need to let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size.

Another option would be to use strncpy() and limit the copied length to sizeof(sll_addr), but it will return the partial address and break an application that passes sockaddr_storage to getsockname().

[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "sll->sll_addr" at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 (size 8)

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 255 at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor750 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
lr : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604

sp : ffff800089887bc0
x29: ffff800089887bc0 x28: ffff000010f80f80 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff700011310f80 x24: ffff800087d55000
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089887c2c x21: 0000000000000010
x20: ffff00000de08310 x19: ffff800089887c20 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 20646c6569662065 x16: 6c676e697320666f x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe0000d56d7ca x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x8 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff8000898874f8 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff8000803f8808 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000000

Call trace:
 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
 __sys_getsockname+0x168/0x24c net/socket.c:2042
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2057 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2054 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_getsockname+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:2054
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
---
 net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +6 -1
index 85ff90a03b0c..7f60b78f170f 100644
@@ -3601,7 +3601,12 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	if (dev) {
 		sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
 		sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len;
-		memcpy(sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
+
+		/* Let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size. */
+		memcpy(((struct sockaddr_storage *)sll)->__data +
+		       offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr) -
+		       offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_protocol),
+		       dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	} else {
 		sll->sll_hatype = 0;	/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */
 		sll->sll_halen = 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 2/2
#5 lore raw

RE: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().

Quoted 52 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima

syzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].

Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN.

The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].

To avoid the warning, we need to let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size.

Another option would be to use strncpy() and limit the copied length to sizeof(sll_addr), but it will return the partial address and break an application that passes sockaddr_storage to getsockname().

[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "sll->sll_addr" at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 (size 8)

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 255 at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor750 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
lr : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604

sp : ffff800089887bc0
x29: ffff800089887bc0 x28: ffff000010f80f80 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff700011310f80 x24: ffff800087d55000
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089887c2c x21: 0000000000000010
x20: ffff00000de08310 x19: ffff800089887c20 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 20646c6569662065 x16: 6c676e697320666f x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe0000d56d7ca x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x8 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff8000898874f8 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff8000803f8808 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000000

Call trace:
 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
 __sys_getsockname+0x168/0x24c net/socket.c:2042
 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2057 [inline]
 __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2054 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_getsockname+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:2054
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52
 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139
 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188
 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().

In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 10 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima

syzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].

Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN.

The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].

Ah, so the issue here is that the UAPI for sll_addr is lying about its size. I think a better fix here is to fix the structure (without breaking UAPI sizes or names):

include/uapi/linux/if_packet.h +5 -1
index 9efc42382fdb..4d0ad22f83b5 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct sockaddr_ll {
 	unsigned short	sll_hatype;
 	unsigned char	sll_pkttype;
 	unsigned char	sll_halen;
-	unsigned char	sll_addr[8];
+	union {
+		unsigned char	sll_addr[8];
+		/* Actual length is in sll_halen. */
+		__DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(unsigned char, sll_addr_flex);
+	};
 };
 
 /* Packet types */
net/packet/af_packet.c +1 -1
index 85ff90a03b0c..8e3ddec4c3d5 100644
@@ -3601,7 +3601,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	if (dev) {
 		sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
 		sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len;
-		memcpy(sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
+		memcpy(sll->sll_addr_flex, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	} else {
 		sll->sll_hatype = 0;	/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */
 		sll->sll_halen = 0;

We can't rename sll_data nor change it's size, as userspace uses it pretty extensively:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=sizeof.*sll_addr&literal=0

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 08:04:53 -0700

Quoted 7 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 6 lines

syzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].

Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].

Ah, so the issue here is that the UAPI for sll_addr is lying about its size. I think a better fix here is to fix the structure (without breaking UAPI sizes or names):

Doesn't it forcify sll_addr here ?

Quoted 38 lines
include/uapi/linux/if_packet.h +5 -1
index 9efc42382fdb..4d0ad22f83b5 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct sockaddr_ll {
 	unsigned short	sll_hatype;
 	unsigned char	sll_pkttype;
 	unsigned char	sll_halen;
-	unsigned char	sll_addr[8];
+	union {
+		unsigned char	sll_addr[8];
+		/* Actual length is in sll_halen. */
+		__DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(unsigned char, sll_addr_flex);
+	};
 };
 
 /* Packet types */
net/packet/af_packet.c +1 -1
index 85ff90a03b0c..8e3ddec4c3d5 100644
@@ -3601,7 +3601,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 	if (dev) {
 		sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
 		sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len;
-		memcpy(sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
+		memcpy(sll->sll_addr_flex, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
 	} else {
 		sll->sll_hatype = 0;	/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */
 		sll->sll_halen = 0;

We can't rename sll_data nor change it's size, as userspace uses it pretty extensively:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=sizeof.*sll_addr&literal=0

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook