net: Fix error/warning by -fstrict-flex-arrays=3
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover net: Fix error/warning by -fstrict-flex-arrays=3
df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3") started applying strict rules for standard string functions (strlen(), memcpy(), etc.) if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.
This series fixes two false positives caught by syzkaller.
Changes:
v2:
* Patch 2: Fix offset calc.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
Kuniyuki Iwashima (2):
af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().
net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 ++++++- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH v2 1/2 af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
syzkaller found a bug in unix_bind_bsd() [0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.
108 is the size of sun_addr of struct sockaddr_un and is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When calling bind(), we use struct sockaddr_storage as the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.
However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes fortify_panic() if CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. __fortify_strlen() has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in struct sockaddr_storage.
Let's make __fortify_strlen() recognise the actual buffer size.
[0]:
detected buffer overflow in __fortify_strlen
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1031!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030
sp : ffff800089817af0
x29: ffff800089817af0 x28: ffff800089817b40 x27: 1ffff00011302f68
x26: 000000000000006e x25: 0000000000000012 x24: ffff800087e60140
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089817c20 x21: ffff800089817c8e
x20: 000000000000006c x19: ffff00000c323900 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00011302eb8 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x8 : 64a26b65474d2a00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff800089817438 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff800080f19e8c x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 000000000000002c
Call trace: fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline] unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline] unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)
--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/unix/af_unix.c +13 -3
@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len) ((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] =0 ; } +static int unix_strlen_bsd (struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr) +{ +/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, the +* max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if +* CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() know that +* the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108 +* is within __data[]. See also: unix_mkname_bsd(). +*/ +return strlen (((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; +} +static void __unix_remove_socket (struct sock *sk) {sk_del_node_init (sk);
@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,int err;unix_mkname_bsd (sunaddr, addr_len); - addr_len =strlen (sunaddr->sun_path) + - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; - + addr_len =unix_strlen_bsd (sunaddr); addr =unix_create_addr (sunaddr, addr_len);if (!addr)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH v2 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
Quoted 8 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
syzkaller found a bug in
unix_bind_bsd()[0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.108 is the size of
sun_addrof structsockaddr_unand is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When callingbind(), we use structsockaddr_storageas the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.
Quoted 4 lines
However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes
fortify_panic()ifCONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.__fortify_strlen()has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in structsockaddr_storage.
Oh, the max size is 108, but it's allowed to be unterminated? This seems to contradict the comment for unix_validate_addr() (which then doesn't validate this ...) Reading "max 7 unix" seems to clear this up and confirm that it doesn't need to be terminated. Bleh.
Regardless, see below for a simpler solution, since this doesn't need to be arbitrarily long, just potentially unterminated.
Quoted 73 lines
Let's make
__fortify_strlen()recognise the actual buffer size.[0]:
detected buffer overflow in__fortify_strlen
kernel BUG atlib/string_helpers.c:1031!Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030sp :
ffff800089817af0
x29:ffff800089817af0x28:ffff800089817b40x27:1ffff00011302f68
x26:000000000000006ex25: 0000000000000012 x24:ffff800087e60140
x23:dfff800000000000x22:ffff800089817c20x21:ffff800089817c8e
x20:000000000000006cx19:ffff00000c323900x18:ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14:1ffff00011302eb8x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 :64a26b65474d2a00x8 :64a26b65474d2a00x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 :ffff800089817438x4 :ffff800086ac99e0x3 :ffff800080f19e8cx2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 :000000000000002cCall trace: fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline] unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline] unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")Reported-by syzkaller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)net/unix/af_unix.c +12
-0@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len) ((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] =0 ; } +static int unix_strlen_bsd (struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr) +{ +/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, the +* max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if +* CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() know that +* the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108 +* is within __data[]. See also: unix_mkname_bsd(). +*/ +return strlen (((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; +} +static void __unix_remove_socket (struct sock *sk) {sk_del_node_init (sk);
net/unix/af_unix.c static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, · line 1212
Quoted 4 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +0
-1@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,int err;unix_mkname_bsd (sunaddr, addr_len); - addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +
Instead of a whole new function, I think this can just be:
strnlen(sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) +
Quoted 9 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +1
-2- offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; - + addr_len =unix_strlen_bsd (sunaddr); addr =unix_create_addr (sunaddr, addr_len);if (!addr)return -ENOMEM ;Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Re: [PATCH v2 net 1/2] af_unix: Fix fortify_panic() in unix_bind_bsd().
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 07:39:48 -0700
Quoted 9 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 8 lines
syzkaller found a bug in
unix_bind_bsd()[0]. We can reproduce it by bind()ing a socket on a path with length 108.108 is the size of
sun_addrof structsockaddr_unand is the maximum valid length for the pathname socket. When callingbind(), we use structsockaddr_storageas the actual buffer size, so terminating sun_addr[108] with null is legitimate.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
However, strlen(sunaddr) for such a case causes
fortify_panic()ifCONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y.__fortify_strlen()has no idea about the actual buffer size and takes 108 as overflow, although 108 still fits in structsockaddr_storage.Oh, the max size is 108, but it's allowed to be unterminated? This seems to contradict the comment for
unix_validate_addr()(which then doesn't validate this ...)
Because we call it for the abstract socket too which starts with \0 and does not handle it specially.
Quoted 5 lines
Reading "max 7 unix" seems to clear this up and confirm that it doesn't need to be terminated. Bleh.
Regardless, see below for a simpler solution, since this doesn't need to be arbitrarily long, just potentially unterminated.
unix_mkname_bsd() terminates it. Technically, we need not call strlen() if we don't optimise the allocated string length. connect() does not need strlen() and just calls unix_mkname_bsd() in unix_find_bsd().
Quoted 95 lines
Quoted 74 lines
Let's make
__fortify_strlen()recognise the actual buffer size.[0]:
detected buffer overflow in__fortify_strlen
kernel BUG atlib/string_helpers.c:1031!Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor296 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 lr : fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030sp :
ffff800089817af0
x29:ffff800089817af0x28:ffff800089817b40x27:1ffff00011302f68
x26:000000000000006ex25: 0000000000000012 x24:ffff800087e60140
x23:dfff800000000000x22:ffff800089817c20x21:ffff800089817c8e
x20:000000000000006cx19:ffff00000c323900x18:ffff800086ab1630
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000001
x14:1ffff00011302eb8x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 :64a26b65474d2a00x8 :64a26b65474d2a00x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 :ffff800089817438x4 :ffff800086ac99e0x3 :ffff800080f19e8cx2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 :000000000000002cCall trace: fortify_panic+0x1c/0x20 lib/string_helpers.c:1030 _Z16__fortify_strlenPKcU25pass_dynamic_object_size1 include/linux/fortify-string.h:217 [inline] unix_bind_bsd net/unix/af_unix.c:1212 [inline] unix_bind+0xba8/0xc58 net/unix/af_unix.c:1326 __sys_bind+0x1ac/0x248 net/socket.c:1792 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1803 [inline] __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __arm64_sys_bind+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1801 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591 Code: aa0003e1 d0000e80 91030000 97ffc91a (d4210000)Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")Reported-by syzkaller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)net/unix/af_unix.c +12
-0@@ -302,6 +302,18 @@ static void unix_mkname_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len) ((char *)sunaddr)[addr_len] =0 ; } +static int unix_strlen_bsd (struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr) +{ +/* Don't pass sunaddr->sun_path to strlen(). Otherwise, the +* max valid length UNIX_PATH_MAX (108) will cause panic if +* CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. Let __fortify_strlen() know that +* the actual buffer is struct sockaddr_storage and that 108 +* is within __data[]. See also: unix_mkname_bsd(). +*/ +return strlen (((struct sockaddr_storage *)sunaddr)->__data) + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; +} +static void __unix_remove_socket (struct sock *sk) {sk_del_node_init (sk);net/unix/af_unix.c static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, · line 1212
Quoted 4 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +0
-1@@ -1209,9 +1221,7 @@ static int unix_bind_bsd(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr,int err;unix_mkname_bsd (sunaddr, addr_len); - addr_len = strlen(sunaddr->sun_path) +Instead of a whole new function, I think this can just be:
strnlen(sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) +Quoted 9 lines
net/unix/af_unix.c +1
-2- offsetof(struct sockaddr_un , sun_path) +1 ; - + addr_len =unix_strlen_bsd (sunaddr); addr =unix_create_addr (sunaddr, addr_len);if (!addr)return -ENOMEM ;Signature · 1 line
2.30.2Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
PATCH v2 2/2 af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().
In reply to Kuniyuki Iwashimasyzkaller found a warning in packet_getname() [0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].
Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes as MAX_ADDR_LEN.
The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct sockaddr_storage defined in __sys_getsockname() and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].
To avoid the warning, we need to let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size.
Another option would be to use strncpy() and limit the copied length to sizeof(sll_addr), but it will return the partial address and break an application that passes sockaddr_storage to getsockname().
[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "sll->sll_addr" at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 (size 8)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 255 at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor750 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 lr : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604
sp : ffff800089887bc0
x29: ffff800089887bc0 x28: ffff000010f80f80 x27: 0000000000000003
x26: dfff800000000000 x25: ffff700011310f80 x24: ffff800087d55000
x23: dfff800000000000 x22: ffff800089887c2c x21: 0000000000000010
x20: ffff00000de08310 x19: ffff800089887c20 x18: ffff800086ab1630
x17: 20646c6569662065 x16: 6c676e697320666f x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1fffe0000d56d7ca x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x8 : 3e60944c3da92b00 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 : ffff8000898874f8 x4 : ffff800086ac99e0 x3 : ffff8000803f8808 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace: packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 __sys_getsockname+0x168/0x24c net/socket.c:2042 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2057 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2054 [inline] __arm64_sys_getsockname+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:2054 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
--- net/packet/af_packet.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/packet/af_packet.c +6 -1
@@ -3601,7 +3601,12 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,if (dev) { sll->sll_hatype = dev->type; sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len; -memcpy (sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); + +/* Let __fortify_memcpy_chk() know the actual buffer size. */ +memcpy (((struct sockaddr_storage *)sll)->__data + + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_addr) - + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll , sll_protocol), + dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); }else { sll->sll_hatype =0 ;/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */ sll->sll_halen =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
RE: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().
Quoted 52 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
syzkaller found a warning in
packet_getname()[0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct
in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes asMAX_ADDR_LEN.The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct
sockaddr_storagedefined in__sys_getsockname()and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].To avoid the warning, we need to let
__fortify_memcpy_chk()know the actual buffer size.Another option would be to use
strncpy()and limit the copied length tosizeof(sll_addr), but it will return the partial address and break an application that passessockaddr_storagetogetsockname().[0]:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "sll->sll_addr" atnet/packet/af_packet.c:3604(size 8)WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 255 at net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 255 Comm: syz-executor750 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00330-g60cc1f7d0605 #4 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 lr : packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604sp :
ffff800089887bc0
x29:ffff800089887bc0x28:ffff000010f80f80x27: 0000000000000003
x26:dfff800000000000x25:ffff700011310f80x24:ffff800087d55000
x23:dfff800000000000x22:ffff800089887c2cx21: 0000000000000010
x20:ffff00000de08310x19:ffff800089887c20x18:ffff800086ab1630
x17:20646c6569662065x16:6c676e697320666fx15: 0000000000000001
x14:1fffe0000d56d7cax13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 :3e60944c3da92b00x8 :3e60944c3da92b00x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001 x5 :ffff8000898874f8x4 :ffff800086ac99e0x3 :ffff8000803f8808x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000000Call trace: packet_getname+0x25c/0x3a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3604 __sys_getsockname+0x168/0x24c net/socket.c:2042 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2057 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2054 [inline] __arm64_sys_getsockname+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:2054 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2c0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 el0_svc_common+0x134/0x240 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:139 do_el0_svc+0x64/0x198 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:188 el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:647 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:665 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:591
Quoted 3 lines
Fixes df8fc4e934c1 ("kbuild: Enable -fstrict-flex-arrays=3")Reported-by syzkaller <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().
In reply to Kuniyuki IwashimaQuoted 10 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
syzkaller found a warning in
packet_getname()[0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct
in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes asMAX_ADDR_LEN.The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct
sockaddr_storagedefined in__sys_getsockname()and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].
Ah, so the issue here is that the UAPI for sll_addr is lying about its size. I think a better fix here is to fix the structure (without breaking UAPI sizes or names):
include/uapi/linux/if_packet.h +5 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct sockaddr_ll {unsigned short sll_hatype;unsigned char sll_pkttype;unsigned char sll_halen; -unsigned char sll_addr[8 ]; +union { +unsigned char sll_addr[8 ]; +/* Actual length is in sll_halen. */ + __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(unsigned char, sll_addr_flex); + }; };/* Packet types */
net/packet/af_packet.c +1 -1
@@ -3601,7 +3601,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,if (dev) { sll->sll_hatype = dev->type; sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len; -memcpy (sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); +memcpy (sll->sll_addr_flex, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); }else { sll->sll_hatype =0 ;/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */ sll->sll_halen =0 ;
We can't rename sll_data nor change it's size, as userspace uses it pretty extensively:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=sizeof.*sll_addr&literal=0
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Re: [PATCH v2 net 2/2] af_packet: Fix warning of fortified memcpy() in packet_getname().
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 08:04:53 -0700
Quoted 7 lines · Kuniyuki Iwashima
Quoted 6 lines
syzkaller found a warning in
packet_getname()[0], where we try to copy 16 bytes to sockaddr_ll.sll_addr[8].Some devices (ip6gre, vti6, ip6tnl) have 16 bytes address expressed by struct
in6_addr. Also, Infiniband has 32 bytes asMAX_ADDR_LEN.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The write seems to overflow, but actually not since we use struct
sockaddr_storagedefined in__sys_getsockname()and its size is 128 (_K_SS_MAXSIZE) bytes. Thus, we have sufficient room after sll_addr[] as __data[].Ah, so the issue here is that the UAPI for
sll_addris lying about its size. I think a better fix here is to fix the structure (without breaking UAPI sizes or names):
Doesn't it forcify sll_addr here ?
Quoted 38 lines
include/uapi/linux/if_packet.h +5
-1@@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ struct sockaddr_ll {unsigned short sll_hatype;unsigned char sll_pkttype;unsigned char sll_halen; -unsigned char sll_addr[8 ]; +union { +unsigned char sll_addr[8 ]; +/* Actual length is in sll_halen. */ + __DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(unsigned char, sll_addr_flex); + }; };/* Packet types */ net/packet/af_packet.c +1
-1@@ -3601,7 +3601,7 @@ static int packet_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,if (dev) { sll->sll_hatype = dev->type; sll->sll_halen = dev->addr_len; -memcpy (sll->sll_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); +memcpy (sll->sll_addr_flex, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len); }else { sll->sll_hatype =0 ;/* Bad: we have no ARPHRD_UNSPEC */ sll->sll_halen =0 ;We can't rename
sll_datanor change it's size, as userspace uses it pretty extensively:
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=sizeof.*sll_addr&literal=0Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook