ksmbd: ZDI Vulnerability patches for 5.15.y
cover ksmbd: ZDI Vulnerability patches for 5.15.y
These are ZDI Vulnerability patches that was not applied in linux 5.15 stable kernel.
Namjae Jeon (4):
ksmbd: use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message()
ksmbd: validate command payload size
ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in smb2_write
ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/4 ksmbd: use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message()
From: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
commit b83b27909e74d27796de19c802fbc3b65ab4ba9a upstream.
Use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message().
--- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +2 -7
@@ -347,16 +347,11 @@ static int smb2_validate_credit_charge(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,int ksmbd_smb2_check_message (struct ksmbd_work *work) { -struct smb2_pdu *pdu = work->request_buf; +struct smb2_pdu *pdu =ksmbd_req_buf_next (work);struct smb2_hdr *hdr = &pdu->hdr;int command;__u32 clc_len;/* calculated length */ -__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (pdu); - -if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { - pdu =ksmbd_req_buf_next (work); - hdr = &pdu->hdr; - } +__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (work->request_buf);if (le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand) >0 ) len =le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/4 ksmbd: use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message()
In reply to Namjae JeonFrom: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
commit b83b27909e74d27796de19c802fbc3b65ab4ba9a upstream.
Use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message().
--- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +2 -7
@@ -347,16 +347,11 @@ static int smb2_validate_credit_charge(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,int ksmbd_smb2_check_message (struct ksmbd_work *work) { -struct smb2_pdu *pdu = work->request_buf; +struct smb2_pdu *pdu =ksmbd_req_buf_next (work);struct smb2_hdr *hdr = &pdu->hdr;int command;__u32 clc_len;/* calculated length */ -__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (pdu); - -if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { - pdu =ksmbd_req_buf_next (work); - hdr = &pdu->hdr; - } +__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (work->request_buf);if (le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand) >0 ) len =le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [5.15.y PATCH 1/4] ksmbd: use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message()
2023-07-20 22:23 GMT+09:00, Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>:
Quoted 5 lines
From: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
commit
b83b27909e74d27796de19c802fbc3b65ab4ba9aupstream.Use
ksmbd_req_buf_next()inksmbd_smb2_check_message().
Note that same patch sent twice...
Quoted 40 lines
Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Hyunchul Lee <[email protected]>Acked-by Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Steve French <[email protected]>--- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 9 ++------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +2
-7@@ -347,16 +347,11 @@ static int smb2_validate_credit_charge(structksmbd_conn *conn, int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work) { - struct smb2_pdu *pdu = work->request_buf; + struct smb2_pdu *pdu = ksmbd_req_buf_next(work);struct smb2_hdr *hdr = &pdu->hdr;int command;__u32 clc_len;/* calculated length */ -__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (pdu); - -if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { - pdu =ksmbd_req_buf_next (work); - hdr = &pdu->hdr; - } +__u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (work->request_buf);if (le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand) >0 )len =
le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand);
--
2.25.1
PATCH 2/4 ksmbd: validate command payload size
In reply to Namjae Jeoncommit 2b9b8f3b68edb3d67d79962f02e26dbb5ae3808d upstream.
->StructureSize2 indicates command payload size. ksmbd should validate this size with rfc1002 length before accessing it.
This patch remove unneeded check and add the validation for this.
[ 8.912583] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0x12a/0xc50 [ 8.913051] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800ac7d92c by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 8.914967] Call Trace: [ 8.915126] <TASK> [ 8.915267] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 8.915506] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 8.916558] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 8.917080] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 [ 8.917334] ksmbd_smb2_check_message+0x12a/0xc50 [ 8.917935] ksmbd_verify_smb_message+0xae/0xd0 [ 8.918223] handle_ksmbd_work+0x192/0x820 [ 8.918478] process_one_work+0x419/0x760 [ 8.918727] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0 [ 8.919222] kthread+0x187/0x1d0 [ 8.919723] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 8.919954] </TASK>
--- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +12 -11
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work)int command;__u32 clc_len;/* calculated length */ __u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (work->request_buf); +__u32 req_struct_size;if (le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand) >0 ) len =le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand);
@@ -374,17 +375,9 @@ int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work) }if (smb2_req_struct_sizes[command] != pdu->StructureSize2) { -if (command !=SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE && - (hdr->Status ==0 || pdu->StructureSize2 !=SMB2_ERROR_STRUCTURE_SIZE2_LE )) { -/* error packets have 9 byte structure size */ -ksmbd_debug (SMB , -"Illegal request size %u for command %d\n" , -le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2), command); -return 1 ; - }else if (command ==SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE && - hdr->Status ==0 && -le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2) !=OP_BREAK_STRUCT_SIZE_20 && -le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2) !=OP_BREAK_STRUCT_SIZE_21 ) { +if (command ==SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE && +le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2) !=OP_BREAK_STRUCT_SIZE_20 && +le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2) !=OP_BREAK_STRUCT_SIZE_21 ) {/* special case for SMB2.1 lease break message */ ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Illegal request size %d for oplock break\n",
@@ -393,6 +386,14 @@ int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work) } } + req_struct_size =le16_to_cpu (pdu->StructureSize2) + + __SMB2_HEADER_STRUCTURE_SIZE; +if (command ==SMB2_LOCK_HE ) + req_struct_size -=sizeof (struct smb2_lock_element ); + +if (req_struct_size > len +1 ) +return 1 ; +if (smb2_calc_size (hdr, &clc_len))return 1 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/4 ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in smb2_write
In reply to Namjae Jeoncommit 5fe7f7b78290638806211046a99f031ff26164e1 upstream.
ksmbd_smb2_check_message doesn't validate hdr->NextCommand. If ->NextCommand is bigger than Offset + Length of smb2 write, It will allow oversized smb2 write length. It will cause OOB read in smb2_write.
--- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +9 -3
@@ -352,10 +352,16 @@ int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work)int command;__u32 clc_len;/* calculated length */ __u32 len =get_rfc1002_len (work->request_buf); -__u32 req_struct_size; +__u32 req_struct_size, next_cmd =le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand); -if (le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand) >0 ) - len =le32_to_cpu (hdr->NextCommand); +if ((u64 )work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off + next_cmd > len) { +pr_err ("next command(%u) offset exceeds smb msg size\n" , + next_cmd); +return 1 ; + } + +if (next_cmd >0 ) + len = next_cmd;else if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) len -= work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
cover ksmbd: ZDI Vulnerability patches for 5.15.y
In reply to Namjae JeonThese are ZDI Vulnerability patches that was not applied in linux 5.15 stable kernel.
Namjae Jeon (4):
ksmbd: use ksmbd_req_buf_next() in ksmbd_smb2_check_message()
ksmbd: validate command payload size
ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in smb2_write
ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
2023-07-20 22:23 GMT+09:00, Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>:
Quoted 2 lines
These are ZDI Vulnerability patches that was not applied in linux 5.15 stable kernel.
Note that same patch sent twice...
Quoted 16 lines
Namjae Jeon (4):
ksmbd: useksmbd_req_buf_next()inksmbd_smb2_check_message()
ksmbd: validate command payload size
ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read insmb2_write
ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound requestfs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)--
2.25.1
PATCH 4/4 ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
In reply to Namjae Jeoncommit 5005bcb4219156f1bf7587b185080ec1da08518e upstream.
This patch validate session id and tree id in compound request. If first operation in the compound is SMB2 ECHO request, ksmbd bypass session and tree validation. So work->sess and work->tcon could be NULL. If secound request in the compound access work->sess or tcon, It cause NULL pointer dereferecing error.
--- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ksmbd/server.c +20 -13
@@ -184,24 +184,31 @@ static void __handle_ksmbd_work(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto send; } -if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { - rc = conn->ops->check_user_session (work); -if (rc <0 ) { - command = conn->ops->get_cmd_val (work); - conn->ops->set_rsp_status (work, -STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED ); - goto send; - }else if (rc >0 ) { - rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon (work); + do { + if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { + rc = conn->ops->check_user_session(work); if (rc < 0) { - conn->ops->set_rsp_status (work, -STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED ); + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED); goto send; + } else if (rc > 0) { + rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon(work); + if (rc < 0) { + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED); + goto send; + } } } - } - do { rc = __process_request(work, conn, &command); if (rc == SERVER_HANDLER_ABORT) break;
fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +39 -5
78 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Namjae Jeon
These are ZDI Vulnerability patches that was not applied in linux 5.15 stable kernel.
Namjae Jeon (4):
ksmbd: useksmbd_req_buf_next()inksmbd_smb2_check_message()
ksmbd: validate command payload size
ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read insmb2_write
ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
Quoted 8 lines
fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
All now queued up now, thanks!
greg k-h
2023-07-21 2:54 GMT+09:00, Greg KH <[email protected]>:
Quoted 15 lines · Namjae Jeon
Quoted 14 lines
These are ZDI Vulnerability patches that was not applied in linux 5.15 stable kernel.
Namjae Jeon (4):
ksmbd: useksmbd_req_buf_next()inksmbd_smb2_check_message()
ksmbd: validate command payload size
ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read insmb2_write
ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound requestfs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
--
2.25.1All now queued up now, thanks!
Thank you!
Quoted 3 lines
greg k-h