cxl/memdev: Make sanitize interfaces conditionally available
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainercover cxl/memdev: Make sanitize interfaces conditionally available
Hi,
This is a requested[0] follow up (patch 3). Patches 1,2 are additional doc updates.
Thanks!
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/
Davidlohr Bueso (3):
cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 15 +++++++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 16 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainerPATCH 1/3 cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions
Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same goes for both sanitize and secure erase.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +11 -2
@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description: whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity, or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires - the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges. + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact: [email protected] Description: (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for - all user data areas of the device. + all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Re: [PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions
Quoted 4 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same goes for both sanitize and secure erase.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Quoted 35 lines
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +11
-2@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description: whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity, or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires - the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges. + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase@@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact: [email protected] Description: (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for - all user data areas of the device. + all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
Re: [PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions
In reply to Davidlohr BuesoQuoted 13 lines · On Tue, 25 Jul 2023 22:19:38 -0700 Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> wrote:
Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same goes for both sanitize and secure erase.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +0
-0
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl Description: · line 89
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +5
-1@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description: whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity, or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires - the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges. + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states.
That worries me a bit. Sounds like we are leaving a possible attack vector after a user will assume that all data is definitely gone and their secrets secure.
I'm not sure what the attack would be, but I'd be happier if we didn't forgo the cache evictions. This is not exactly a fast path at any time. However I though region tear down (and resulting HDM decoder disables) were followed by a flush anyway so there should be nothing there...
Quoted 17 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +6
-1What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase@@ -92,7 +96,12 @@ Contact: [email protected] Description: (WO) Write a boolean 'true' string value to this attribute to secure erase user data by changing the media encryption keys for - all user data areas of the device. + all user data areas of the device. This functionality requires + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/3] cxl/memdev: Improve sanitize ABI descriptions
Quoted 29 lines · Jonathan Cameron
Quoted 13 lines · On Tue, 25 Jul 2023 22:19:38 -0700 Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> wrote:
Be more detailed about the CPU cache management situation. The same goes for both sanitize and secure erase.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +0
-0Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl Description: · line 89
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +5
-1@@ -82,7 +82,11 @@ Description: whether it resides in persistent capacity, volatile capacity, or the LSA, is made permanently unavailable by whatever means is appropriate for the media type. This functionality requires - the device to be not be actively decoding any HPA ranges. + the device to be disabled, that is, not actively decoding any + HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache + management, relying instead for it to be done when a region + transitions between software programmed and hardware committed + states.That worries me a bit. Sounds like we are leaving a possible attack vector after a user will assume that all data is definitely gone and their secrets secure.
Quoted 4 lines
I'm not sure what the attack would be, but I'd be happier if we didn't forgo the cache evictions. This is not exactly a fast path at any time. However I though region tear down (and resulting HDM decoder disables) were followed by a flush anyway so there should be nothing there...
I had similar concerns, but ultimately could not come up with a potential attack scenario by not doing the flushing explicitly, which is before+after the operation, per the spec.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cxl/[email protected]/
The main motivation for avoiding these calls is not really that this is a fast path, but it's that the global CPU flushing affects system-wide. That said, it's hard to argue on defaulting on the safe side and just doing the flushes - exactly because of reasons we don't know until too late. Dan?
Thanks,
Davidlohr
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainerPATCH 2/3 cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc
In reply to Davidlohr Bueso... as is the case with all members of struct cxl_memdev_state.
--- drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +1 -0
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {* @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset * @event: event log driver state * @poison: poison driver state info +* @security: security driver state info * @fw: firmware upload / activation state * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands *
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Re: [PATCH 2/3] cxl/memdev: Document security state in kern-doc
Quoted 3 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
... as is the case with all members of struct
cxl_memdev_state.Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Quoted 16 lines
--- drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +1
-0@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ struct cxl_dev_state {* @next_persistent_bytes: persistent capacity change pending device reset * @event: event log driver state * @poison: poison driver state info +* @security: security driver state info * @fw: firmware upload / activation state * @mbox_send: @dev specific transport for transmitting mailbox commands *
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainerPATCH 3/3 cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
In reply to Davidlohr BuesoIf the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands, hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can never be attempted.
In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 6 ++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 15 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +4 -2
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase
@@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +44 -1
63 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +19 -0
@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { .attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes, }; +static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible (struct kobject *kobj, +struct attribute *a,int n) +{ +struct device *dev =kobj_to_dev (kobj); +struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd =to_cxl_memdev (dev); +struct cxl_memdev_state *mds =to_cxl_memdev_state (cxlmd->cxlds); + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +return a->mode; +} +static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = { .name ="security" , .attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes, + .is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible, };static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {
drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +15 -0
@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits { CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX }; +/* Device enabled security commands */ +enum security_cmd_enabled_bits { +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX +}; +/** * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info *
@@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {* struct cxl_security_state - Device security state * * @state: state of last security operation +* @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout * @poll_dwork: polling work item
@@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {*/ struct cxl_security_state {unsigned long state; + DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);bool poll;int poll_tmo_secs;struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Re: [PATCH 3/3] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
Quoted 8 lines · Davidlohr Bueso
If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands, hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can never be attempted.
In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
LGTM
Quoted 174 lines
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 6 ++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 15 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +4
-2@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase@@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +44
-1@@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)return false; } +static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled (struct cxl_security_state *security, +u16 opcode) +{ +switch (opcode) { +case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK , security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +} +static bool cxl_is_poison_command (u16 opcode) {#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43@@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)u16 opcode =le16_to_cpu (cel_entry[i].opcode);struct cxl_mem_command *cmd =cxl_mem_find_command (opcode); -if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command (opcode)) { +if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command (opcode) || + !cxl_is_security_command (opcode))) {dev_dbg (dev,"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n" , opcode);continue ;@@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)if (cxl_is_poison_command (opcode))cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled (&mds->poison, opcode); +if (cxl_is_security_command (opcode)) +cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled (&mds->security, opcode); +dev_dbg (dev,"Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n" , opcode); } }drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +19
-0@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { .attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes, }; +static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible (struct kobject *kobj, +struct attribute *a,int n) +{ +struct device *dev =kobj_to_dev (kobj); +struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd =to_cxl_memdev (dev); +struct cxl_memdev_state *mds =to_cxl_memdev_state (cxlmd->cxlds); + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +return a->mode; +} +static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = { .name ="security" , .attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes, + .is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible, };static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +15
-0@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits { CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX }; +/* Device enabled security commands */ +enum security_cmd_enabled_bits { +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX +}; +/** * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info * @@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {* struct cxl_security_state - Device security state * * @state: state of last security operation +* @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout * @poll_dwork: polling work item @@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {*/ struct cxl_security_state {unsigned long state; + DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);bool poll;int poll_tmo_secs;struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
Re: [PATCH 3/3] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
In reply to Davidlohr BuesoQuoted 8 lines · On Tue, 25 Jul 2023 22:19:40 -0700 Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> wrote:
If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands, hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can never be attempted.
In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Ah just realized I was too late on this one as it's upstream. Ah well I'll comment anyway (I'd already reviewed most of it :)
Quoted 12 lines
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 6 ++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 15 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +0
-0
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl Description: · line 90
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +2
-1@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation.
Or older kernel....
I don't think we need to talk about when they aren't present as it just complicates the ABI docs. The similar case for the DOE is there to explain the weird corner of it's there, but broken.
An example were it's not documented (I think) is the poison commands so I think we should keep that absence as meaning the obvious (you can't use the interface).
Quoted 18 lines
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +2
-1What /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/security/erase@@ -101,7 +102,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation. What: /sys/bus/cxl/devices/memX/firmware/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +0
-0
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode) · line 130
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +7
-0@@ -121,6 +121,45 @@ static bool cxl_is_security_command(u16 opcode)return false; } +static void cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled (struct cxl_security_state *security, +u16 opcode) +{ +switch (opcode) { +case CXL_MBOX_OP_SANITIZE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , security->enabled_cmds); +break ;
I'm a fan of returning when nothing else to do.
(this is when I realized this was definitely upstream as I called this function
in the switch cci code!)
Quoted 128 lines
drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c +37
-1+case CXL_MBOX_OP_SECURE_ERASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_GET_SECURITY_STATE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_SET_PASSPHRASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK , security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_FREEZE_SECURITY : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE : +set_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE , + security->enabled_cmds); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +} +static bool cxl_is_poison_command (u16 opcode) {#define CXL_MBOX_OP_POISON_CMDS 0x43@@ -677,7 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)u16 opcode =le16_to_cpu (cel_entry[i].opcode);struct cxl_mem_command *cmd =cxl_mem_find_command (opcode); -if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command (opcode)) { +if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command (opcode) || + !cxl_is_security_command (opcode))) {dev_dbg (dev,"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n" , opcode);continue ;@@ -689,6 +729,9 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)if (cxl_is_poison_command (opcode))cxl_set_poison_cmd_enabled (&mds->poison, opcode); +if (cxl_is_security_command (opcode)) +cxl_set_security_cmd_enabled (&mds->security, opcode); +dev_dbg (dev,"Opcode 0x%04x enabled\n" , opcode); } }drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c +19
-0@@ -477,9 +477,28 @@ static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_pmem_attribute_group = { .attrs = cxl_memdev_pmem_attributes, }; +static umode_t cxl_memdev_security_visible (struct kobject *kobj, +struct attribute *a,int n) +{ +struct device *dev =kobj_to_dev (kobj); +struct cxl_memdev *cxlmd =to_cxl_memdev (dev); +struct cxl_memdev_state *mds =to_cxl_memdev_state (cxlmd->cxlds); + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_sanitize.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +if (a == &dev_attr_security_erase.attr && + !test_bit (CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , mds->security.enabled_cmds)) +return 0 ; + +return a->mode; +} +static struct attribute_group cxl_memdev_security_attribute_group = { .name ="security" , .attrs = cxl_memdev_security_attributes, + .is_visible = cxl_memdev_security_visible, };static const struct attribute_group *cxl_memdev_attribute_groups[] = {drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h +15
-0@@ -244,6 +244,19 @@ enum poison_cmd_enabled_bits { CXL_POISON_ENABLED_MAX }; +/* Device enabled security commands */ +enum security_cmd_enabled_bits { +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SANITIZE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_GET_SECURITY_STATE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_SET_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_DISABLE_PASSPHRASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_UNLOCK , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_FREEZE_SECURITY , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE , +CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX +}; +/** * struct cxl_poison_state - Driver poison state info * @@ -346,6 +359,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {* struct cxl_security_state - Device security state * * @state: state of last security operation +* @enabled_cmds: All security commands enabled in the CEL * @poll: polling for sanitization is enabled, device has no mbox irq support * @poll_tmo_secs: polling timeout * @poll_dwork: polling work item @@ -353,6 +367,7 @@ struct cxl_fw_state {*/ struct cxl_security_state {unsigned long state; + DECLARE_BITMAP(enabled_cmds, CXL_SEC_ENABLED_MAX);bool poll;int poll_tmo_secs;struct delayed_work poll_dwork;
Davidlohr Bueso
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/3] cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported
Quoted 7 lines · Jonathan Cameron
Quoted 4 lines · On Tue, 25 Jul 2023 22:19:40 -0700 Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]> wrote:
If the device does not support Sanitize or Secure Erase commands, hide the respective sysfs interfaces such that the operation can never be attempted.
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In order to be generic, keep track of the enabled security commands found in the CEL - the driver does not support Security Passthrough.
Signed-off-by Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>Ah just realized I was too late on this one as it's upstream. Ah well I'll comment anyway (I'd already reviewed most of it :)
Yes, this has already been picked up by Linus. Regardless, thanks for having a look at the series.
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--- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl | 6 ++-- drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/cxl/core/memdev.c | 19 +++++++++++ drivers/cxl/cxlmem.h | 15 +++++++++ 4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +0
-0Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl Description: · line 90
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Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-cxl +2
-1@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ Description: HPA ranges. This permits avoiding explicit global CPU cache management, relying instead for it to be done when a region transitions between software programmed and hardware committed - states. + states. If this file is not present, then there is no hardware + support for the operation.Or older kernel....
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I don't think we need to talk about when they aren't present as it just complicates the ABI docs. The similar case for the DOE is there to explain the weird corner of it's there, but broken.
An example were it's not documented (I think) is the poison commands so I think we should keep that absence as meaning the obvious (you can't use the interface).
*nod* - I'll have that present for the future.
Thanks,
Davidlohr