Skip to contentSkip to conversation

target/i386: add support for VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE

RFC PATCH In review Ake Koomsin 2 participants 2 messages Aug 8, 2023 – Dec 14, 2023

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH v2 1/1 target/i386: add support for VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE

Current QEMU can expose waitpkg to guests when it is available. However, VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE is still not recognized and masked by QEMU. This can lead to an unexpected situation when a L1 hypervisor wants to expose waitpkg to a L2 guest. The L1 hypervisor can assume that VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE exists as waitpkg is available. The L1 hypervisor then can accidentally expose waitpkg to the L2 guest. This will cause invalid opcode exception in the L2 guest when it executes waitpkg related instructions.

This patch adds VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE support, and sets up dependency between the bit and CPUID_7_0_ECX_WAITPKG. QEMU should not expose waitpkg feature if VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE is not available to avoid unexpected invalid opcode exception in L2 guests.

---

v2:
- Fix typo in the patch header (targer -> target)

v1:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2023-08/msg01048.html

 target/i386/cpu.c | 6 +++++-
 target/i386/cpu.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +5 -1
index 97ad229d8b..00f913b638 100644
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
             "vmx-invpcid-exit", "vmx-vmfunc", "vmx-shadow-vmcs", "vmx-encls-exit",
             "vmx-rdseed-exit", "vmx-pml", NULL, NULL,
             "vmx-xsaves", NULL, NULL, NULL,
-            NULL, "vmx-tsc-scaling", NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, "vmx-tsc-scaling", "vmx-enable-user-wait-pause", NULL,
             NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
         },
         .msr = {
@@ -1545,6 +1545,10 @@ static FeatureDep feature_dependencies[] = {
         .from = { FEAT_8000_0001_ECX,       CPUID_EXT3_SVM },
         .to = { FEAT_SVM,                   ~0ull },
     },
+    {
+        .from = { FEAT_VMX_SECONDARY_CTLS,  VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE },
+        .to = { FEAT_7_0_ECX,               CPUID_7_0_ECX_WAITPKG },
+    },
 };
 
 typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 {
target/i386/cpu.h +1 -0
index e0771a1043..a6000e93bd 100644
@@ -1111,6 +1111,7 @@ uint64_t x86_cpu_get_supported_feature_word(FeatureWord w,
 #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML               0x00020000
 #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES                   0x00100000
 #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING              0x02000000
+#define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE   0x04000000
 
 #define VMX_PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK                 0x00000001
 #define VMX_PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING                   0x00000008
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 41 lines · Ake Koomsin

Current QEMU can expose waitpkg to guests when it is available. However, VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE is still not recognized and masked by QEMU. This can lead to an unexpected situation when a L1 hypervisor wants to expose waitpkg to a L2 guest. The L1 hypervisor can assume that VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE exists as waitpkg is available. The L1 hypervisor then can accidentally expose waitpkg to the L2 guest. This will cause invalid opcode exception in the L2 guest when it executes waitpkg related instructions.

This patch adds VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE support, and sets up dependency between the bit and CPUID_7_0_ECX_WAITPKG. QEMU should not expose waitpkg feature if VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE is not available to avoid unexpected invalid opcode exception in L2 guests.

---

v2:
- Fix typo in the patch header (targer -> target)

v1:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2023-08/msg01048.html

  target/i386/cpu.c | 6 +++++-
  target/i386/cpu.h | 1 +
  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -1
index 97ad229d8b..00f913b638 100644
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
              "vmx-invpcid-exit", "vmx-vmfunc", "vmx-shadow-vmcs", "vmx-encls-exit",
              "vmx-rdseed-exit", "vmx-pml", NULL, NULL,
              "vmx-xsaves", NULL, NULL, NULL,
-            NULL, "vmx-tsc-scaling", NULL, NULL,
+            NULL, "vmx-tsc-scaling", "vmx-enable-user-wait-pause", NULL,
              NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
          },
          .msr = {

target/i386/cpu.c static FeatureDep feature_dependencies[] = { · line 1551

Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +4 -0
@@ -1545,6 +1545,10 @@ static FeatureDep feature_dependencies[] = {
          .from = { FEAT_8000_0001_ECX,       CPUID_EXT3_SVM },
          .to = { FEAT_SVM,                   ~0ull },
      },
+    {
+        .from = { FEAT_VMX_SECONDARY_CTLS,  VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE },
+        .to = { FEAT_7_0_ECX,               CPUID_7_0_ECX_WAITPKG },
+    },

Is this what we really want?

It prevents us from exposing WAITPKG to the guest when we don't want to expose VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE.

An easy example is that, we want to launch a VM without virtualization capability. And this VM cannot have WAITPKG?

Quoted 15 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +0 -0
  };
 
  typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 {
target/i386/cpu.h +1 -0
index e0771a1043..a6000e93bd 100644
@@ -1111,6 +1111,7 @@ uint64_t x86_cpu_get_supported_feature_word(FeatureWord w,
  #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML               0x00020000
  #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES                   0x00100000
  #define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING              0x02000000
+#define VMX_SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USER_WAIT_PAUSE   0x04000000
 
  #define VMX_PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK                 0x00000001
  #define VMX_PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING                   0x00000008