selinux: revert SECINITSID_INIT support
Paul Moore
maintainerPATCH 1/1 selinux: revert SECINITSID_INIT support
This commit reverts 5b0eea835d4e ("selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on distros with old SELinux userspace tools/libraries, specifically Ubuntu 16.04.
Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and backwards compatible SELinux tree.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 ------------------- .../selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ---- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 ------------------ 6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 64 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +0 -28
@@ -2313,19 +2313,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) new_tsec->keycreate_sid =0 ; new_tsec->sockcreate_sid =0 ; -/* -* Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space -* as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from -* early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL -* (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL). -*/ -if (!selinux_initialized ()) { - new_tsec->sid =SECINITSID_INIT ; -/* also clear the exec_sid just in case */ - new_tsec->exec_sid =0 ; -return 0 ; - } -if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
@@ -4542,21 +4529,6 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)if (sksec->sid ==SECINITSID_KERNEL )return 0 ; -/* -* Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that -* inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped -* here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set. -* -* By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready -* for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel -* thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will -* still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap -* setting. -*/ -if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context () && - sksec->sid ==SECINITSID_INIT ) -return 0 ; -ad_net_init_from_sk (&ad, &net, sk); return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h +1 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {NULL ,"file" ,NULL , -"init" , +NULL ,"any_socket" ,"port" , "netif",
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +0 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ,POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC , -POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT , __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +0 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {"nnp_nosuid_transition" ,"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , "ioctl_skip_cloexec", - "userspace_initial_context", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
security/selinux/include/security.h +0 -6
@@ -189,12 +189,6 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); } -static inline bool selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context (void ) -{ -return READ_ONCE ( - selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT ]); -} -struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state {
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +0 -27
@@ -864,8 +864,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)int policydb_load_isids (struct policydb *p,struct sidtab *s) {struct ocontext *head, *c; -bool isid_init_supported =ebitmap_get_bit (&p->policycaps, -POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT );int rc; rc =sidtab_init (s);
@@ -889,13 +887,6 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)if (!name)continue ; -/* -* Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare -* support for it -*/ -if (sid ==SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init_supported) -continue ; - rc =sidtab_set_initial (s, sid, &c->context[0 ]);if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
@@ -903,24 +894,6 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)sidtab_destroy (s);return rc; } - -/* -* If the policy doesn't support the "userspace_initial_context" -* capability, set SECINITSID_INIT to the same context as -* SECINITSID_KERNEL. This ensures the same behavior as before -* the reintroduction of SECINITSID_INIT, where all tasks -* started before policy load would initially get the context -* corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL. -*/ -if (sid ==SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init_supported) { - rc =sidtab_set_initial (s,SECINITSID_INIT , &c->context[0 ]); -if (rc) { -pr_err ("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n" , - name); -sidtab_destroy (s); -return rc; - } - } }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Quoted 12 lines · Paul Moore
This commit reverts
5b0eea835d4e("selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on distros with old SELinux userspacetools/libraries, specifically Ubuntu 16.04.Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and backwards compatible SELinux tree.
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 ------------------- .../selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ---- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 ------------------ 6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 64 deletions(-)
I don't think I'm able to post a fix for this quickly enough, so:
Signature · 3 lines
Ondrej Mosnacek Senior Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel Red Hat, Inc.
Quoted 23 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 12 lines · Paul Moore
This commit reverts
5b0eea835d4e("selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on distros with old SELinux userspacetools/libraries, specifically Ubuntu 16.04.Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and backwards compatible SELinux tree.
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 ------------------- .../selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ---- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 ------------------ 6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 64 deletions(-)
Quoted 4 lines
I don't think I'm able to post a fix for this quickly enough, so:
Acked-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Should we revert the userspace patch as well (just the policy capability one)? Or is a fix expected soon enough to not worry about it?
Jim
Quoted 5 lines
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Senior Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel Red Hat, Inc.
Quoted 22 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 12 lines · Paul Moore
This commit reverts
5b0eea835d4e("selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes") as it was found to cause problems on distros with old SELinux userspacetools/libraries, specifically Ubuntu 16.04.Hopefully we will be able to re-add this functionality at a later date, but let's revert this for now to help ensure a stable and backwards compatible SELinux tree.
Quoted 8 lines
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 28 ------------------- .../selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 - security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ---- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 27 ------------------ 6 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 64 deletions(-)
Quoted 3 lines
I don't think I'm able to post a fix for this quickly enough, so:
Acked-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>
Merged into selinux/next.
FWIW, I really do like the idea behind this, and I'm looking forward to a proper fix so that we can bring it back. Unfortunately the revert is necessary so we have can have a week or two of good code in selinux/next before the merge window.
* https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/blob/main/README.md#kernel-tree-process
Signature · 1 line
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