x86/bugs: Some SRSO fixes
Subsystems (3)
Borislav Petkov
maintainercover x86/bugs: Some SRSO fixes
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Hi all,
those are the leftover smaller fixes which can go after the release date. I'll queue them next week.
Thx.
Borislav Petkov (AMD) (3):
Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 12 +-- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 ++++++++++------- drivers/base/cpu.c | 86 +++++---------------- 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerPATCH 1/3 Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files without their file extension in the name. Do that here too.
No functional changes.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +6 -6
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. l1tf mds tsx_async_abort - multihit.rst - special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst - core-scheduling.rst - l1d_flush.rst - processor_mmio_stale_data.rst - cross-thread-rsb.rst + multihit + special-register-buffer-data-sampling + core-scheduling + l1d_flush + processor_mmio_stale_data + cross-thread-rsb srso gather_data_sampling.rst
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Pawan Gupta
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/3] Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index
Quoted 25 lines · Borislav Petkov
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Most of the
index.rstfiles inDocumentation/refer to other rst files without their file extension in the name. Do that here too.No functional changes.
Reported-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +0
-4@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. l1tf mds tsx_async_abort - multihit.rst - special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst - core-scheduling.rst - l1d_flush.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst are configurable at compile, boot or run time. · line 23
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +6
-2- processor_mmio_stale_data.rst - cross-thread-rsb.rst + multihit + special-register-buffer-data-sampling + core-scheduling + l1d_flush + processor_mmio_stale_data + cross-thread-rsb srso gather_data_sampling.rst
While at it could you please also change this? Else, I will send another patch.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 1/3] Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index
Quoted 1 line · Pawan Gupta
While at it could you please also change this?
Yes, I can.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/bugs] Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index
In reply to Borislav PetkovThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 182ac87070e26d32a01445cec7ca7afa07411468 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/182ac87070e26d32a01445cec7ca7afa07411468 Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Sat, 29 Jul 2023 16:53:02 +02:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 10:48:12 +02:00
Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index
Most of the index.rst files in Documentation/ refer to other rst files without their file extension in the name. Do that here too.
No functional changes.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +7 -7
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. l1tf mds tsx_async_abort - multihit.rst - special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst - core-scheduling.rst - l1d_flush.rst - processor_mmio_stale_data.rst - cross-thread-rsb.rst + multihit + special-register-buffer-data-sampling + core-scheduling + l1d_flush + processor_mmio_stale_data + cross-thread-rsb srso - gather_data_sampling.rst + gather_data_sampling
Borislav Petkov
maintainerPATCH 2/3 driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
In reply to Borislav PetkovFrom: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which issues the "Not affected" string.
No functional changes.
--- drivers/base/cpu.c | 86 ++++++++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
drivers/base/cpu.c +18 -68
@@ -509,79 +509,29 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void) }#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr, -char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds (struct device *dev, +ssize_t cpu_show_not_affected (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) {return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); } -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} +#define CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (func) \ + ssize_t cpu_show_##func(struct device *, \ + struct device_attribute *, char *) \ + __attribute__((weak, alias("cpu_show_not_affected"))) + +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (meltdown); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v1); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v2); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_store_bypass); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (l1tf); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (mds); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (tsx_async_abort); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (itlb_multihit); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (srbds); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (mmio_stale_data); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (retbleed); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_rstack_overflow);ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf)
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Re: [PATCH 2/3] driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which issues the "Not affected" string.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
Pawan Gupta
reviewerRe: [PATCH 2/3] driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 86 lines · Borislav Petkov
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which issues the "Not affected" string.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>--- drivers/base/cpu.c | 86 ++++++++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)drivers/base/cpu.c +1
-59@@ -509,79 +509,29 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void) }#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr, -char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds (struct device *dev, +ssize_t cpu_show_not_affected (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) {return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); } -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf)
drivers/base/cpu.c static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void) · line 518
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/base/cpu.c +1
-9-{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} +#define CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (func) \
Nit, its not actually a vulnerability fallback, does CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK() sound better?
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/base/cpu.c +9
-0+ ssize_t cpu_show_##func(struct device *, \ + struct device_attribute *, char *) \ + __attribute__((weak, alias("cpu_show_not_affected"))) + +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (meltdown); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v1); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v2); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_store_bypass); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (l1tf);
drivers/base/cpu.c static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void) · line 537
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/base/cpu.c +7
-0+CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (mds); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (tsx_async_abort); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (itlb_multihit); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (srbds); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (mmio_stale_data); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (retbleed); +CPU_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_rstack_overflow);ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf)
Do you want me to send a separate patch for this?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH 2/3] driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
Quoted 1 line · Pawan Gupta
Do you want me to send a separate patch for this?
No need - I'll fix it up.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/bugs] driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
In reply to Borislav PetkovThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 0fddfe338210aa018137c03030c581f5ea4be282 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/0fddfe338210aa018137c03030c581f5ea4be282 Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Sat, 29 Jul 2023 17:20:33 +02:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 11:03:04 +02:00
driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubs
Make them all a weak function, aliasing to a single function which issues the "Not affected" string.
No functional changes.
--- drivers/base/cpu.c | 87 +++++++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
drivers/base/cpu.c +19 -68
@@ -509,79 +509,30 @@ static void __init cpu_dev_register_generic(void) }#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v1 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2 (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr, -char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds (struct device *dev, +ssize_t cpu_show_not_affected (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) {return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); } -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} - -ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow (struct device *dev, -struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -return sysfs_emit (buf,"Not affected\n" ); -} +#define CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (func) \ + ssize_t cpu_show_##func(struct device *, \ + struct device_attribute *, char *) \ + __attribute__((weak, alias("cpu_show_not_affected"))) + +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (meltdown); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v1); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (spectre_v2); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_store_bypass); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (l1tf); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (mds); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (tsx_async_abort); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (itlb_multihit); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (srbds); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (mmio_stale_data); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (retbleed); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (spec_rstack_overflow); +CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK (gather_data_sampling);ssize_t __weak cpu_show_gds (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf)
Borislav Petkov
maintainerPATCH 3/3 Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
In reply to Borislav PetkovFrom: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Add a note about the dependency of the User->User mitigation on the previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.
Make the layout moar pretty.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +44 -27
@@ -42,42 +42,59 @@ The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: The possible values in this file are: - - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + * 'Not affected': - - 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no - microcode extending IBPB functionality - to address the vulnerability has been - applied. + The processor is not vulnerable - - 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode - patch has been applied. It does not - address User->Kernel and Guest->Host - transitions protection but it does - address User->User and VM->VM attack - vectors. + * 'Vulnerable: no microcode': - (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB + functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied. - - 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements - the extended IBPB microcode patch - functionality by addressing User->Kernel - and Guest->Host transitions protection. + * 'Mitigation: microcode': - Selected by default or by - spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret + Extended IBPB functionality microcode patch has been applied. It does + not address User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection but it + does address User->User and VM->VM attack vectors. - - 'Mitigation: IBPB' Similar protection as "safe RET" above - but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege - domain crossings (User->Kernel, - Guest->Host). + Note that User->User mitigation is controlled by how the IBPB aspect in + the Spectre v2 mitigation is selected: - (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) + * conditional IBPB: + + where each process can select whether it needs an IBPB issued + around it PR_SPEC_DISABLE/_ENABLE etc, see :doc:`spectre` + + * strict: + + i.e., always on - by supplying spectre_v2_user=on on the kernel + command line + + (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + + * 'Mitigation: safe RET': + + Software-only mitigation. It complements the extended IBPB microcode + patch functionality by addressing User->Kernel and Guest->Host + transitions protection. + + Selected by default or by spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret + + * 'Mitigation: IBPB': + + Similar protection as "safe RET" above but employs an IBPB barrier on + privilege domain crossings (User->Kernel, Guest->Host). + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) + + * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT': + + Mitigation addressing the cloud provider scenario - the Guest->Host + transitions only. + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) - - 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider - scenario - the Guest->Host transitions - only. - (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to:
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Pawan Gupta
reviewerRe: [PATCH 3/3] Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
Quoted 26 lines · Borislav Petkov
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Add a note about the dependency of the
User->Usermitigation on the previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.Make the layout moar pretty.
Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 ++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +1
-4@@ -42,42 +42,59 @@ The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: The possible values in this file are: - - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + * 'Not affected': - - 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no - microcode extending IBPB functionality - to address the vulnerability has been
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: · line 49
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +2
-7- applied. + The processor is not vulnerable - - 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode - patch has been applied. It does not - address User->Kernel and Guest->Host - transitions protection but it does - address User->User and VM->VM attack - vectors. + * 'Vulnerable: no microcode':
All other mitigations capitalizes the first letter, to be consistent s/no microcode/No microcode/
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: · line 54
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +3
-5- (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB + functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied. - - 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements - the extended IBPB microcode patch - functionality by addressing User->Kernel - and Guest->Host transitions protection. + * 'Mitigation: microcode':
Ditto.
[tip: x86/bugs] Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
In reply to Borislav PetkovThe following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 09f9f37c324d90102e8574856ab168c34de1916d Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/09f9f37c324d90102e8574856ab168c34de1916d Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 02 Aug 2023 20:07:32 +02:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 10 Aug 2023 11:03:12 +02:00
Documentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
Add a note about the dependency of the User->User mitigation on the previous Spectre v2 IBPB selection.
Make the layout moar pretty.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst +44 -27
@@ -42,42 +42,59 @@ The sysfs file showing SRSO mitigation status is: The possible values in this file are: - - 'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable + * 'Not affected': - - 'Vulnerable: no microcode' The processor is vulnerable, no - microcode extending IBPB functionality - to address the vulnerability has been - applied. + The processor is not vulnerable - - 'Mitigation: microcode' Extended IBPB functionality microcode - patch has been applied. It does not - address User->Kernel and Guest->Host - transitions protection but it does - address User->User and VM->VM attack - vectors. + * 'Vulnerable: no microcode': - (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + The processor is vulnerable, no microcode extending IBPB + functionality to address the vulnerability has been applied. - - 'Mitigation: safe RET' Software-only mitigation. It complements - the extended IBPB microcode patch - functionality by addressing User->Kernel - and Guest->Host transitions protection. + * 'Mitigation: microcode': - Selected by default or by - spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret + Extended IBPB functionality microcode patch has been applied. It does + not address User->Kernel and Guest->Host transitions protection but it + does address User->User and VM->VM attack vectors. - - 'Mitigation: IBPB' Similar protection as "safe RET" above - but employs an IBPB barrier on privilege - domain crossings (User->Kernel, - Guest->Host). + Note that User->User mitigation is controlled by how the IBPB aspect in + the Spectre v2 mitigation is selected: - (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) + * conditional IBPB: + + where each process can select whether it needs an IBPB issued + around it PR_SPEC_DISABLE/_ENABLE etc, see :doc:`spectre` + + * strict: + + i.e., always on - by supplying spectre_v2_user=on on the kernel + command line + + (spec_rstack_overflow=microcode) + + * 'Mitigation: safe RET': + + Software-only mitigation. It complements the extended IBPB microcode + patch functionality by addressing User->Kernel and Guest->Host + transitions protection. + + Selected by default or by spec_rstack_overflow=safe-ret + + * 'Mitigation: IBPB': + + Similar protection as "safe RET" above but employs an IBPB barrier on + privilege domain crossings (User->Kernel, Guest->Host). + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb) + + * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT': + + Mitigation addressing the cloud provider scenario - the Guest->Host + transitions only. + + (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) - - 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT' Mitigation addressing the cloud provider - scenario - the Guest->Host transitions - only. - (spec_rstack_overflow=ibpb-vmexit) In order to exploit vulnerability, an attacker needs to:
Quoted 14 lines · Borislav Petkov
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Hi all,
those are the leftover smaller fixes which can go after the release date. I'll queue them next week.
Thx.
Borislav Petkov (AMD) (3):
Documentation/hw-vuln: Unify filename specification in index driver core: cpu: Unify redundant silly stubsDocumentation/srso: Document IBPB aspect and fix formatting
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 12 +-- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 71 ++++++++++------- drivers/base/cpu.c | 86 +++++---------------- 3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
2.41.0