pull request (net): ipsec 2023-08-15
Subsystems (4)
Steffen Klassert
maintainercover pull request (net): ipsec 2023-08-15
1) Fix a slab-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_address_filter. From Lin Ma.
2) Fix the pfkey sadb_x_filter validation.
From Lin Ma.
3) Use the correct nla_policy structure for XFRMA_SEC_CTX. From Lin Ma.
4) Fix warnings triggerable by bad packets in the encap functions. From Herbert Xu.
5) Fix some slab-use-after-free in decode_session6. From Zhengchao Shao.
6) Fix a possible NULL piointer dereference in xfrm_update_ae_params. Lin Ma.
7) Add a forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH. From Lin Ma.
8) Don't leak offloaded policies.
From Leon Romanovsky.
9) Delete also the offloading part of an acquire state. From Leon Romanovsky.
Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
Thanks!
The following changes since commit 3a8a670eeeaa40d87bd38a587438952741980c18:
Merge tag 'net-next-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next (2023-06-28 16:43:10 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git tags/ipsec-2023-08-15
for you to fetch changes up to f3ec2b5d879ef5bbcb24678914641343cb6399a2:
xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy (2023-08-01 12:04:43 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
ipsec-2023-08-15
----------------------------------------------------------------
Herbert Xu (1):
xfrm: Silence warnings triggerable by bad packets
Leon Romanovsky (2):
xfrm: delete offloaded policy
xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy
Lin Ma (5):
net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read
net: af_key: fix sadb_x_filter validation
net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structure
xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
Zhengchao Shao (3):
xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
ip6_vti: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
ip_vti: fix potential slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 4 ++-- net/key/af_key.c | 4 ++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 22 +++++++++------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c | 4 ++-- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 ++------ net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 9 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 1/11 net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB read
From: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
We found below OOB crash:
[ 44.211730] ================================================================== [ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97 [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4 [ 44.212045] Call Trace: [ 44.212045] <TASK> [ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50 [ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0 [ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0 [ 44.212045] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260 [ 44.212045] ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120 [ 44.212045] ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 [ 44.212045] ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10 [ 44.212045] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740 [ 44.212045] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da [ 44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da [ 44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c [ 44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] </TASK> [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Allocated by task 97: [ 44.212045] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 [ 44.212045] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140 [ 44.212045] kmemdup+0x21/0x50 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300 [ 44.212045] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 44.212045] allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324) [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ... [ 44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ^ [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ==================================================================
By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states, the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak.
if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) {
filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]),
sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (filter == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
// NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!!
}This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like the code in pfkey_dump() function.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +9 -0
@@ -1267,6 +1267,15 @@ static int xfrm_dump_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL);if (filter ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; + +/* see addr_match(), (prefix length >> 5) << 2 +* will be used to compare xfrm_address_t +*/ +if (filter->splen > (sizeof (xfrm_address_t) <<3 ) || + filter->dplen > (sizeof (xfrm_address_t) <<3 )) { +kfree (filter); +return -EINVAL ; + } }if (attrs[XFRMA_PROTO ])
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 2/11 net: af_key: fix sadb_x_filter validation
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
When running xfrm_state_walk_init(), the xfrm_address_filter being used is okay to have a splen/dplen that equals to sizeof(xfrm_address_t)<<3. This commit replaces >= to > to make sure the boundary checking is correct.
--- net/key/af_key.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/key/af_key.c +2 -2
@@ -1848,9 +1848,9 @@ static int pfkey_dump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msif (ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER -1 ]) {struct sadb_x_filter *xfilter = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_FILTER -1 ]; -if ((xfilter->sadb_x_filter_splen >= +if ((xfilter->sadb_x_filter_splen > (sizeof (xfrm_address_t) <<3 )) || - (xfilter->sadb_x_filter_dplen >= + (xfilter->sadb_x_filter_dplen > (sizeof (xfrm_address_t) <<3 ))) {mutex_unlock (&pfk->dump_lock);return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 3/11 net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structure
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like
* verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx*
* xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
* copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx *
...
It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes).
This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid ambiguity.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +1 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_ALG_COMP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) }, [XFRMA_ENCAP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) }, [XFRMA_TMPL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) }, - [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) }, + [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) }, [XFRMA_LTIME_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -1
@@ -3024,7 +3024,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_ALG_COMP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) }, [XFRMA_ENCAP] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_encap_tmpl) }, [XFRMA_TMPL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) }, - [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_sec_ctx) }, + [XFRMA_SEC_CTX] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) }, [XFRMA_LTIME_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_lifetime_cur) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL] = { .len = sizeof(struct xfrm_replay_state) }, [XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 4/11 xfrm: Silence warnings triggerable by bad packets
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
After the elimination of inner modes, a couple of warnings that were previously unreachable can now be triggered by malformed inbound packets.
Fix this by:
1. Moving the setting of skb->protocol into the decap functions.
2. Returning -EINVAL when unexpected protocol is seen.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 22 +++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +9 -13
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)int optlen =0 ;int err = -EINVAL ; + skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IP ); +if (unlikely (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol ==IPPROTO_BEETPH )) {struct ip_beet_phdr *ph;int phlen;
@@ -232,6 +234,8 @@ static int xfrm4_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) {int err = -EINVAL ; + skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IP ); +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (struct iphdr ))) goto out;
@@ -267,6 +271,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) {int err = -EINVAL ; + skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ); +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ))) goto out;
@@ -296,6 +302,8 @@ static int xfrm6_remove_beet_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)int size =sizeof (struct ipv6hdr );int err; + skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ); + err =skb_cow_head (skb, size + skb->mac_len);if (err) goto out;
@@ -346,6 +354,7 @@ xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove(struct xfrm_state *x,return xfrm6_remove_tunnel_encap (x, skb);break ; } +return -EINVAL ; }WARN_ON_ONCE (1 );
@@ -366,19 +375,6 @@ static int xfrm_prepare_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)return -EAFNOSUPPORT ; } -switch (XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol) { -case IPPROTO_IPIP : -case IPPROTO_BEETPH : - skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IP ); -break ; -case IPPROTO_IPV6 : - skb->protocol =htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ); -break ; -default : -WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); -break ; - } -return xfrm_inner_mode_encap_remove (x, skb); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 5/11 xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]>
When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then, slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets.
The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 kasan_report+0x11d/0x130 decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 __xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0 xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30 __qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10 neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550 ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550 ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890 ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0 addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580 expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30 Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 <fa> 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0 cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0 do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 start_secondary+0x200/0x290 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b </TASK> Allocated by task 939: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410 kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270 __alloc_skb+0x129/0x330 inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230 __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00 addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390 process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0 worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0 kthread+0x344/0x440 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640 The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80)
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before sending packets.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c +2 -2
@@ -537,8 +537,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)switch (skb->protocol) {case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );memset (IP6CB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );if (!dst) { fl.u.ip6.flowi6_oif = dev->ifindex; fl.u.ip6.flowi6_flags |=FLOWI_FLAG_ANYSRC ;
@@ -552,8 +552,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t xfrmi_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) }break ;case htons (ETH_P_IP ): -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );memset (IPCB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );if (!dst) {struct rtable *rt;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 6/11 ip6_vti: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]>
When ipv6_vti device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then, slab-use-after-free may occur when ipv6_vti device sends IPv6 packets.
The stack information is as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88802e08edc2 by task swapper/0/0 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707-00001-g84e2cad7f979 #410 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 kasan_report+0x11d/0x130 decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 __xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0 vti6_tnl_xmit+0x3e6/0x1ee0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30 __qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10 neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550 ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550 ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890 ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0 addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580 expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0 </IRQ> Allocated by task 9176: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410 kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270 __alloc_skb+0x129/0x330 netlink_sendmsg+0x9b1/0xe30 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 9176: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 ____kasan_slab_free+0x160/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x11b/0x220 kmem_cache_free+0xf0/0x490 skb_free_head+0x17f/0x1b0 skb_release_data+0x59c/0x850 consume_skb+0xd2/0x170 netlink_unicast+0x54f/0x7f0 netlink_sendmsg+0x926/0xe30 sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x739/0x920 ___sys_sendmsg+0x110/0x1b0 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802e08ed00
which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640 The buggy address is located 194 bytes inside of freed 640-byte region [ffff88802e08ed00, ffff88802e08ef80)
As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before sending packets.
--- net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c +2 -2
@@ -568,12 +568,12 @@ vti6_tnl_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) vti6_addr_conflict(t, ipv6_hdr(skb))) goto tx_err; -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );memset (IP6CB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );break ;case htons (ETH_P_IP ): -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );memset (IPCB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );break ;default : goto tx_err;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 7/11 ip_vti: fix potential slab-use-after-free in decode_session6
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Zhengchao Shao <[email protected]>
When ip_vti device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then, slab-use-after-free may occur when ip_vti device sends IPv6 packets. As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before sending packets.
--- net/ipv4/ip_vti.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_vti.c +2 -2
@@ -287,12 +287,12 @@ static netdev_tx_t vti_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)switch (skb->protocol) {case htons (ETH_P_IP ): -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );memset (IPCB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET );break ;case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): -xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );memset (IP6CB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb))); +xfrm_decode_session (skb, &fl,AF_INET6 );break ;default : goto tx_err;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 8/11 xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700
This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -1
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs,struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH ];struct nlattr *mt = attrs[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH ]; -if (re) { +if (re && x->replay_esn && x->preplay_esn) {struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn; replay_esn =nla_data (re); memcpy(x->replay_esn, replay_esn,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 9/11 xfrm: add forgotten nla_policy for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
The previous commit 4e484b3e969b ("xfrm: rate limit SA mapping change message to user space") added one additional attribute named XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH and described its type at compat_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c).
However, the author forgot to also describe the nla_policy at xfrma_policy (net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c). Hence, this suppose NLA_U32 (4 bytes) value can be faked as empty (0 bytes) by a malicious user, which leads to 4 bytes overflow read and heap information leak when parsing nlattrs.
To exploit this, one malicious user can spray the SLUB objects and then leverage this 4 bytes OOB read to leak the heap data into x->mapping_maxage (see xfrm_update_ae_params(...)), and leak it to userspace via copy_to_user_state_extra(...).
The above bug is assigned CVE-2023-3773. To fix it, this commit just completes the nla_policy description for XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH, which enforces the length check and avoids such OOB read.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -0
@@ -3044,6 +3044,7 @@ const struct nla_policy xfrma_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = { [XFRMA_SET_MARK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, [XFRMA_IF_ID] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH ] = { .type =NLA_U32 }, };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xfrma_policy );
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 10/11 xfrm: delete offloaded policy
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
The policy memory was released but not HW driver data. Add call to xfrm_dev_policy_delete(), so drivers will have a chance to release their resources.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -0
@@ -2345,6 +2345,7 @@ static int xfrm_get_policy(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid); } }else { +xfrm_dev_policy_delete (xp);xfrm_audit_policy_delete (xp, err ?0 :1 , true);if (err !=0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Steffen Klassert
maintainerPATCH 11/11 xfrm: don't skip free of empty state in acquire policy
In reply to Steffen KlassertFrom: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
In destruction flow, the assignment of NULL to xso->dev caused to skip of xfrm_dev_state_free() call, which was called in xfrm_state_put(to_put) routine.
Instead of open-coded variant of xfrm_dev_state_delete() and xfrm_dev_state_free(), let's use them directly.
--- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 ++------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +1 -0
@@ -1984,6 +1984,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_dev_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)if (dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free) dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_free (x); xso->dev =NULL ; + xso->type =XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED ;netdev_put (dev, &xso->dev_tracker); } }
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +2 -6
@@ -1324,12 +1324,8 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,struct xfrm_dev_offload *xso = &x->xso;if (xso->type ==XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_PACKET ) { - xso->dev->xfrmdev_ops->xdo_dev_state_delete (x); - xso->dir =0 ; -netdev_put (xso->dev, &xso->dev_tracker); - xso->dev =NULL ; - xso->real_dev =NULL ; - xso->type =XFRM_DEV_OFFLOAD_UNSPECIFIED ; +xfrm_dev_state_delete (x); +xfrm_dev_state_free (x); }#endif x->km.state =XFRM_STATE_DEAD ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerQuoted 1 line · On Tue, 15 Aug 2023 11:52:59 +0200 Steffen Klassert wrote:
ipsec-2023-08-15
Looks merged, 5fc43ce03b in net, thanks!