xfsprogs: don't allow udisks to automount XFS filesystems with no prompt
PATCH v2 1/1 xfsprogs: don't allow udisks to automount XFS filesystems with no prompt
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then GNOME will do exactly that. Including mounting mangled XFS filesystems!
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This is not a substitute for lklfuse. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the sh*tstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
v2: Add external logs to the list too, and document the var we set
--- configure.ac | 1 + include/builddefs.in | 2 ++ m4/package_services.m4 | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scrub/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ scrub/xfs.rules | 13 +++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scrub/xfs.rules
configure.ac +1 -0
@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ AC_HAVE_SG_IO AC_HAVE_HDIO_GETGEO AC_CONFIG_SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR +AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR if test "$enable_blkid" = yes; then AC_HAVE_BLKID_TOPO
include/builddefs.in +2 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ HAVE_SYSTEMD = @have_systemd@ SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR = @systemd_system_unit_dir@ HAVE_CROND = @have_crond@ CROND_DIR = @crond_dir@ +HAVE_UDEV = @have_udev@ +UDEV_RULE_DIR = @udev_rule_dir@ HAVE_LIBURCU_ATOMIC64 = @have_liburcu_atomic64@ HAVE_MEMFD_CLOEXEC = @have_memfd_cloexec@ HAVE_MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL = @have_memfd_noexec_seal@
m4/package_services.m4 +42 -0
45 lines not on this page · raw message
scrub/Makefile +11 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ endif endif # scrub_prereqs +UDEV_RULES = xfs.rules +ifeq ($(HAVE_UDEV),yes) + INSTALL_SCRUB += install-udev +endif + HFILES = \ common.h \ counter.h \
@@ -180,6 +185,12 @@ install-scrub: default $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(XFS_SCRUB_ALL_PROG) $(PKG_SBIN_DIR) $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(PKG_STATE_DIR) +install-udev: $(UDEV_RULES) + $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(UDEV_RULE_DIR) + for i in $(UDEV_RULES); do \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 $$i $(UDEV_RULE_DIR)/64-$$i; \ + done + install-dev: -include .dep
scrub/xfs.rules new file +13 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +# +# According to http://storaged.org/doc/udisks2-api/latest/udisks.8.html, +# supplying UDISKS_AUTO=0 here changes the HintAuto property of the block +# device abstraction to mean "do not automatically start" (e.g. mount). +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs|xfs_external_log", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"
Quoted 21 lines · Darrick J. Wong
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then GNOME will do exactly that. Including mounting mangled XFS filesystems!
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
Quoted 7 lines
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This is not a substitute for lklfuse. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the sh*tstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
This seems great, thanks for doing it.
/me wonders how long until distros/users start to complain and report problems
their OS'es are not automounting xfs :) /me runs
Carlos
Quoted 136 lines
v2: Add external logs to the list too, and document the var we set
Signed-off-by Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dave Chinner <[email protected]>--- configure.ac | 1 + include/builddefs.in | 2 ++ m4/package_services.m4 | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scrub/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ scrub/xfs.rules | 13 +++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scrub/xfs.rulesconfigure.ac +1
-0@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ AC_HAVE_SG_IO AC_HAVE_HDIO_GETGEO AC_CONFIG_SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR +AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR if test "$enable_blkid" = yes; then AC_HAVE_BLKID_TOPOinclude/builddefs.in +2
-0@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ HAVE_SYSTEMD = @have_systemd@ SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR = @systemd_system_unit_dir@ HAVE_CROND = @have_crond@ CROND_DIR = @crond_dir@ +HAVE_UDEV = @have_udev@ +UDEV_RULE_DIR = @udev_rule_dir@ HAVE_LIBURCU_ATOMIC64 = @have_liburcu_atomic64@ HAVE_MEMFD_CLOEXEC = @have_memfd_cloexec@ HAVE_MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL = @have_memfd_noexec_seal@m4/package_services.m4 +42
-0@@ -75,3 +75,45 @@ AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR], AC_SUBST(have_crond) AC_SUBST(crond_dir) ]) + +# +# Figure out where to put udev rule files +# +AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR], +[ + AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG]) + AC_ARG_WITH([udev_rule_dir], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-udev-rule-dir@<:@=DIR@:>@], + [Install udev rules into DIR.])], + [], + [with_udev_rule_dir=yes]) + AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" != "xno"], + [ + AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" = "xyes"], + [ + PKG_CHECK_MODULES([udev], [udev], + [ + with_udev_rule_dir="$($PKG_CONFIG --variable=udev_dir udev)/rules.d" + ], [ + with_udev_rule_dir="" + ]) + m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_(MAJOR|MINOR|BUILD|REVISION)$]) + ]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for udev rule dir]) + udev_rule_dir="${with_udev_rule_dir}" + AS_IF([test -n "${udev_rule_dir}"], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(${udev_rule_dir}) + have_udev="yes" + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + have_udev="no" + ]) + ], + [ + have_udev="disabled" + ]) + AC_SUBST(have_udev) + AC_SUBST(udev_rule_dir) +])scrub/Makefile +11
-0@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ endif endif # scrub_prereqs +UDEV_RULES = xfs.rules +ifeq ($(HAVE_UDEV),yes) + INSTALL_SCRUB += install-udev +endif + HFILES = \ common.h \ counter.h \@@ -180,6 +185,12 @@ install-scrub: default $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(XFS_SCRUB_ALL_PROG) $(PKG_SBIN_DIR) $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(PKG_STATE_DIR) +install-udev: $(UDEV_RULES) + $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(UDEV_RULE_DIR) + for i in $(UDEV_RULES); do \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 $$i $(UDEV_RULE_DIR)/64-$$i; \ + done + install-dev: -include .depscrub/xfs.rules new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +# +# According to http://storaged.org/doc/udisks2-api/latest/udisks.8.html, +# supplying UDISKS_AUTO=0 here changes the HintAuto property of the block +# device abstraction to mean "do not automatically start" (e.g. mount). +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs|xfs_external_log", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"
Quoted 30 lines · Carlos Maiolino
Quoted 21 lines · Darrick J. Wong
From: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
The unending stream of syzbot bug reports and overwrought filing of CVEs for corner case handling (i.e. things that distract from actual user complaints) in XFS has generated all sorts of of overheated rhetoric about how every bug is a Serious Security Issue(tm) because anyone can craft a malicious filesystem on a USB stick, insert the stick into a victim machine, and mount will trigger a bug in the kernel driver that leads to some compromise or DoS or something.
I thought that nobody would be foolish enough to automount an XFS filesystem. What a fool I was! It turns out that udisks can be told that it's okay to automount things, and then GNOME will do exactly that. Including mounting mangled XFS filesystems!
<delete angry rant about poor decisionmaking and armchair fs developers blasting us on X while not actually doing any of the work>
Turn off /this/ idiocy by adding a udev rule to tell udisks not to automount XFS filesystems.
Quoted 7 lines
This will not stop a logged in user from unwittingly inserting a malicious storage device and pressing [mount] and getting breached. This is not a substitute for a thorough audit. This is not a substitute for lklfuse. This does not solve the general problem of in-kernel fs drivers being a huge attack surface. I just want a vacation from the sh*tstorm of bad ideas and threat models that I never agreed to support.
Quoted 6 lines
This seems great, thanks for doing it.
Reviewed-by Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>/me wonders how long until distros/users start to complain and report problems
their OS'es are not automounting xfs :) /me runs
Well you don't have to include the make install steps in the fedora/rhel xfsprogs.spec files. :)
Judging from the udisks git repo it sounds like they've mostly neutered the automount hint to a subset of "commonly" removable devices like usb and firewire.
--D
Quoted 139 lines
Carlos
Quoted 136 lines
v2: Add external logs to the list too, and document the var we set
Signed-off-by Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dave Chinner <[email protected]>--- configure.ac | 1 + include/builddefs.in | 2 ++ m4/package_services.m4 | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ scrub/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++ scrub/xfs.rules | 13 +++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+) create mode 100644 scrub/xfs.rulesconfigure.ac +1
-0@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ AC_HAVE_SG_IO AC_HAVE_HDIO_GETGEO AC_CONFIG_SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR +AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR if test "$enable_blkid" = yes; then AC_HAVE_BLKID_TOPOinclude/builddefs.in +2
-0@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ HAVE_SYSTEMD = @have_systemd@ SYSTEMD_SYSTEM_UNIT_DIR = @systemd_system_unit_dir@ HAVE_CROND = @have_crond@ CROND_DIR = @crond_dir@ +HAVE_UDEV = @have_udev@ +UDEV_RULE_DIR = @udev_rule_dir@ HAVE_LIBURCU_ATOMIC64 = @have_liburcu_atomic64@ HAVE_MEMFD_CLOEXEC = @have_memfd_cloexec@ HAVE_MEMFD_NOEXEC_SEAL = @have_memfd_noexec_seal@m4/package_services.m4 +42
-0@@ -75,3 +75,45 @@ AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_CROND_DIR], AC_SUBST(have_crond) AC_SUBST(crond_dir) ]) + +# +# Figure out where to put udev rule files +# +AC_DEFUN([AC_CONFIG_UDEV_RULE_DIR], +[ + AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG]) + AC_ARG_WITH([udev_rule_dir], + [AS_HELP_STRING([--with-udev-rule-dir@<:@=DIR@:>@], + [Install udev rules into DIR.])], + [], + [with_udev_rule_dir=yes]) + AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" != "xno"], + [ + AS_IF([test "x${with_udev_rule_dir}" = "xyes"], + [ + PKG_CHECK_MODULES([udev], [udev], + [ + with_udev_rule_dir="$($PKG_CONFIG --variable=udev_dir udev)/rules.d" + ], [ + with_udev_rule_dir="" + ]) + m4_pattern_allow([^PKG_(MAJOR|MINOR|BUILD|REVISION)$]) + ]) + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for udev rule dir]) + udev_rule_dir="${with_udev_rule_dir}" + AS_IF([test -n "${udev_rule_dir}"], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(${udev_rule_dir}) + have_udev="yes" + ], + [ + AC_MSG_RESULT(no) + have_udev="no" + ]) + ], + [ + have_udev="disabled" + ]) + AC_SUBST(have_udev) + AC_SUBST(udev_rule_dir) +])scrub/Makefile +11
-0@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ endif endif # scrub_prereqs +UDEV_RULES = xfs.rules +ifeq ($(HAVE_UDEV),yes) + INSTALL_SCRUB += install-udev +endif + HFILES = \ common.h \ counter.h \@@ -180,6 +185,12 @@ install-scrub: default $(INSTALL) -m 755 $(XFS_SCRUB_ALL_PROG) $(PKG_SBIN_DIR) $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(PKG_STATE_DIR) +install-udev: $(UDEV_RULES) + $(INSTALL) -m 755 -d $(UDEV_RULE_DIR) + for i in $(UDEV_RULES); do \ + $(INSTALL) -m 644 $$i $(UDEV_RULE_DIR)/64-$$i; \ + done + install-dev: -include .depscrub/xfs.rules new file +13
-0@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +# +# Copyright (C) 2023 Oracle. All rights reserved. +# Author: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> +# +# Don't let udisks automount XFS filesystems without even asking a user. +# This doesn't eliminate filesystems as an attack surface; it only prevents +# evil maid attacks when all sessions are locked. +# +# According to http://storaged.org/doc/udisks2-api/latest/udisks.8.html, +# supplying UDISKS_AUTO=0 here changes the HintAuto property of the block +# device abstraction to mean "do not automatically start" (e.g. mount). +SUBSYSTEM=="block", ENV{ID_FS_TYPE}=="xfs|xfs_external_log", ENV{UDISKS_AUTO}="0"