Skip to contentSkip to conversation

netlabel: fix shift wrapping bug in netlbl_catmap_setlong()

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 5 messages Aug 29, 2023

Subsystems (5)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/5 netlabel: fix shift wrapping bug in netlbl_catmap_setlong()

From: Dmitry Mastykin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b403643d154d15176b060b82f7fc605210033edd ]

There is a shift wrapping bug in this code on 32-bit architectures. NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE is u64, bitmap is unsigned long. Every second 32-bit word of catmap becomes corrupted.

---
 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +2 -1
index 15fe2120b3109..14c3d640f94b9 100644
@@ -871,7 +871,8 @@ int netlbl_catmap_setlong(struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap,
 
 	offset -= iter->startbit;
 	idx = offset / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
-	iter->bitmap[idx] |= bitmap << (offset % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE);
+	iter->bitmap[idx] |= (NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE)bitmap
+			     << (offset % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/5 bnx2x: fix page fault following EEH recovery

From: David Christensen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ebe4eda4265642859507d1b3ca330d8c196cfe5 ]

In the last step of the EEH recovery process, the EEH driver calls into bnx2x_io_resume() to re-initialize the NIC hardware via the function bnx2x_nic_load(). If an error occurs during bnx2x_nic_load(), OS and hardware resources are released and an error code is returned to the caller. When called from bnx2x_io_resume(), the return code is ignored and the network interface is brought up unconditionally. Later attempts to send a packet via this interface result in a page fault due to a null pointer reference.

This patch checks the return code of bnx2x_nic_load(), prints an error message if necessary, and does not enable the interface.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_main.c +7 -2
index 7925c40c00625..cb5c3d3153331 100644
@@ -14484,11 +14484,16 @@ static void bnx2x_io_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	bp->fw_seq = SHMEM_RD(bp, func_mb[BP_FW_MB_IDX(bp)].drv_mb_header) &
 							DRV_MSG_SEQ_NUMBER_MASK;
 
-	if (netif_running(dev))
-		bnx2x_nic_load(bp, LOAD_NORMAL);
+	if (netif_running(dev)) {
+		if (bnx2x_nic_load(bp, LOAD_NORMAL)) {
+			netdev_err(bp->dev, "Error during driver initialization, try unloading/reloading the driver\n");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
 
 	netif_device_attach(dev);
 
+done:
 	rtnl_unlock();
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/5 sctp: handle invalid error codes without calling BUG()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0067dfcd9418fd3b0632bc59210d120d038a9c6 ]

The sctp_sf_eat_auth() function is supposed to return enum sctp_disposition values but if the call to sctp_ulpevent_make_authkey() fails, it returns -ENOMEM.

This results in calling BUG() inside the sctp_side_effects() function. Calling BUG() is an over reaction and not helpful. Call WARN_ON_ONCE() instead.

This code predates git.

---
 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c +4 -1
index 169819263c0bb..87822421b99db 100644
@@ -1235,7 +1235,10 @@ static int sctp_side_effects(enum sctp_event event_type,
 	default:
 		pr_err("impossible disposition %d in state %d, event_type %d, event_id %d\n",
 		       status, state, event_type, subtype.chunk);
-		BUG();
+		error = status;
+		if (error >= 0)
+			error = -EINVAL;
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		break;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/5 cifs: add a warning when the in-flight count goes negative

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4645cc2f1e2d6f268bb8dcfac40997c52432aed ]

We've seen the in-flight count go into negative with some internal stress testing in Microsoft.

Adding a WARN when this happens, in hope of understanding why this happens when it happens.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +1 -0
index dec306a3b0f41..3287795c648e5 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ smb2_add_credits(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, const unsigned int add,
 		*val = 65000; /* Don't get near 64K credits, avoid srv bugs */
 		printk_once(KERN_WARNING "server overflowed SMB3 credits\n");
 	}
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(server->in_flight == 0);
 	server->in_flight--;
 	if (server->in_flight == 0 && (optype & CIFS_OP_MASK) != CIFS_NEG_OP)
 		rc = change_conf(server);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/5 ALSA: seq: oss: Fix racy open/close of MIDI devices

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 297224fc0922e7385573a30c29ffdabb67f27b7d ]

Although snd_seq_oss_midi_open() and snd_seq_oss_midi_close() can be called concurrently from different code paths, we have no proper data protection against races. Introduce open_mutex to each seq_oss_midi object for avoiding the races.

---
 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c +22 -13
index cc8f06638edca..7226c03f15934 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct seq_oss_midi {
 	struct snd_midi_event *coder;	/* MIDI event coder */
 	struct seq_oss_devinfo *devinfo;	/* assigned OSSseq device */
 	snd_use_lock_t use_lock;
+	struct mutex open_mutex;
 };
 
 
@@ -184,6 +185,7 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_check_new_port(struct snd_seq_port_info *pinfo)
 	mdev->flags = pinfo->capability;
 	mdev->opened = 0;
 	snd_use_lock_init(&mdev->use_lock);
+	mutex_init(&mdev->open_mutex);
 
 	/* copy and truncate the name of synth device */
 	strlcpy(mdev->name, pinfo->name, sizeof(mdev->name));
@@ -332,14 +334,16 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_open(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, int fmode)
 	int perm;
 	struct seq_oss_midi *mdev;
 	struct snd_seq_port_subscribe subs;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((mdev = get_mididev(dp, dev)) == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	mutex_lock(&mdev->open_mutex);
 	/* already used? */
 	if (mdev->opened && mdev->devinfo != dp) {
-		snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-		return -EBUSY;
+		err = -EBUSY;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	perm = 0;
@@ -349,14 +353,14 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_open(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, int fmode)
 		perm |= PERM_READ;
 	perm &= mdev->flags;
 	if (perm == 0) {
-		snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-		return -ENXIO;
+		err = -ENXIO;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	/* already opened? */
 	if ((mdev->opened & perm) == perm) {
-		snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-		return 0;
+		err = 0;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	perm &= ~mdev->opened;
@@ -381,13 +385,17 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_open(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev, int fmode)
 	}
 
 	if (! mdev->opened) {
-		snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-		return -ENXIO;
+		err = -ENXIO;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
 	mdev->devinfo = dp;
+	err = 0;
+
+ unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mdev->open_mutex);
 	snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-	return 0;
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -401,10 +409,9 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_close(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev)
 
 	if ((mdev = get_mididev(dp, dev)) == NULL)
 		return -ENODEV;
-	if (! mdev->opened || mdev->devinfo != dp) {
-		snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
-		return 0;
-	}
+	mutex_lock(&mdev->open_mutex);
+	if (!mdev->opened || mdev->devinfo != dp)
+		goto unlock;
 
 	memset(&subs, 0, sizeof(subs));
 	if (mdev->opened & PERM_WRITE) {
@@ -423,6 +430,8 @@ snd_seq_oss_midi_close(struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp, int dev)
 	mdev->opened = 0;
 	mdev->devinfo = NULL;
 
+ unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&mdev->open_mutex);
 	snd_use_lock_free(&mdev->use_lock);
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1