x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PKRU covert channel
PATCH 1/1 x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PKRU covert channel
When XCR0[9] is set, PKRU can be read and written from userspace with XSAVE and XRSTOR, even when CR4.PKE is clear.
Clear XCR0[9] when protection keys are disabled.
--- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { [XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256] = X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, [XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM] = X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, [XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR] = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, - [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_PKU, + [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_OSPKE, [XFEATURE_PASID] = X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, [XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, [XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.283.g2d96d420d3-goog
Quoted 7 lines · Jim Mattson
When XCR0[9] is set, PKRU can be read and written from userspace with XSAVE and XRSTOR, even when CR4.PKE is clear.
Clear XCR0[9] when protection keys are disabled.
Reported-by Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Is there any way to trigger this other than "nopku" on the command-line?
I'm not sure how scary this particular covert channel is, but it does make sense to do this even if it's only to avoid wasting XSAVE space on a feature that nobody can use (for things other than covert channels).
Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Jim Mattson
When XCR0[9] is set, PKRU can be read and written from userspace with XSAVE and XRSTOR, even when CR4.PKE is clear.
Clear XCR0[9] when protection keys are disabled.
Reported-by Tavis Ormandy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>Is there any way to trigger this other than "nopku" on the command-line?
Or by configuration option:
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS=n
Quoted 5 lines
I'm not sure how scary this particular covert channel is, but it does make sense to do this even if it's only to avoid wasting XSAVE space on a feature that nobody can use (for things other than covert channels).
Acked-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 18032b47adf1db7b7f5fb2d1344e65aafe6417df Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/18032b47adf1db7b7f5fb2d1344e65aafe6417df Author: Jim Mattson <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 30 Aug 2023 21:32:21 -07:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 23:29:49 +02:00
x86/fpu/xstate: Fix PKRU covert channel
When XCR0[9] is set, PKRU can be read and written from userspace with XSAVE and XRSTOR, even when CR4.PKE is clear.
Clear XCR0[9] when protection keys are disabled.
--- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +1 -1
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static unsigned short xsave_cpuid_features[] __initdata = { [XFEATURE_ZMM_Hi256] = X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, [XFEATURE_Hi16_ZMM] = X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, [XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR] = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, - [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_PKU, + [XFEATURE_PKRU] = X86_FEATURE_OSPKE, [XFEATURE_PASID] = X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, [XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, [XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA] = X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE,